The label not wanting to be owned here is Physical Eliminativism. — I like sushi

Ok, you need to present why you think that. I looked it up briefly and my points don't fit what you claim. Please point out why. I'm also a bit put aback by this. The only reason I could think you would attempt to link me to a philosophy that I hold no claim to is because you are unable to address the points I've directly presented.

Philosophim does not believe there is a Hard Problem. — I like sushi

Incorrect. We cannot know what its like to have the subjective experience of another individual, and while this is the case, the hard problem will be unsolvable.

↪Philosophim I suggest you use this term (Eliminativism) to describe your position in the future and perhaps look it up and address the arguments against it. — I like sushi

I suggest you not pull a fast one and try to label a poster as holding a position they clearly do not hold without explaining why. Further, I've been speaking with you specifically to your issues, I do not think you needed to tag other people in this thread. I've been very polite with you and thought we were having a nice conversation. Want to pull back a bit and keep talking with me on the issues I've noted and make sure you understand fully before hoisting a label that doesn't fit me?

Look at my points again and address them as is. Trying to tie me to something without a good reason and ignoring my points is a straw man tactic. Don't be like Wayfarer who acts childish when he realizes he's beat.

Why do brain states have subjective experience at all? — Patterner

We might be going around a little, and that's fine. Its not been an unpleasant go-around, but we might be coming to an irreconcilable rift in the conversation.

My point is that question is not special. Its the same question you can ask of anything. Its not a question that can be answered by mechanics. "Why is water wet?" is not answered by the molecular structure of water. It answers the 'what', not 'why'. Why isn't H2O sandy for example? Why is it 'water' and not 'dirt'. Because that's how matter is when H2O happens in reality. Why? We don't know.

Why is it that atoms are two neutrons and protons with orbiting electrons? Why does an electron even exist? Why does gravity exist? Why does subjective experience exist? All are the same type of unanswerable question.

Hoffman and Greene said about the physical properties off the universe:
"is utterly different in nature than conscious experience". — Patterner

They simply don't understand the question they're asking then. Its the same question. Why is water wet when H2O happens? Because it does. Why is a brain conscious? Because it is. We can know the mechanics of H2O. We can know the mechanics of the brain that produce a person stating they have a subjective experience. But we can't know why.

Lets look at it another way. Lets say that there is a physical and a completely different substance called 'mental'. Why? We could even break it down and show the exact interactions that produce mental subjective experience. It still wouldn't answer why. Why does not change the fact of what is. And what is in consciousness is clear and undeniable. Matter and energy, when combined a certain way, at minimal with neuronal states, produce subjective experience. The only way we know this is because we ourselves have some version of subjective experience, and we assume by logical belief that everyone else does as well.

But I mean, its clear. You have subjective experience right? You're made of matter and energy. Everything about your consciousness is like the thing in the box I mentioned in a previous post. Its stuck in the box of your brain, and everything we do to it physically results in generally predictable physical outcomes. There is no actual indicator that your consciousness acts in any manner that is different from a physical process then the fact that you don't know 'why' neurons have subjective experience. The only rational conclusion is that consciousness is simply an expression of matter and energy, just like the wetness of water. It is in no way special or different. Just another form of the wonder of physical reality itself.

"there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate." — Patterner

Here they're just wrong. Its us. We are physical things, we have subjective experience. Neuroscience has proven our physical brain are the source, physical manipulation of the brain changes subjective experience, therefore the most rational conclusion is simply that water is wet, and brains can have subjective experience.

"seem completely disconnected from anything remotely like subjective experience." — Patterner

And H2O seems completely disconnected from hydrogen alone or oxygen alone. Yet magically, actually magically, its wet. No need to posit something non-physical to explain this absolutely mind-blowing marvel. Its just one more aspect of physical reality.

If I rubbed two sticks together and a geyser of water shot out of it, you would ask how that happened. You would not be satisfied if I answered that it came from the wood — Patterner

I have never been satisifed with the answer as to why 'water is wet'. It makes no sense. Why does a thing called Oxygen even exist? Why are there electrons, protons, and neutrons? Why is there anything, and why is it 'x' instead of 'y'? There are no answers. Consciousness for me is just the same question wrapped up in different words Patterner. But I don't question that water is H2O because of the science, and I don't question that consciousness is a physical process of brains because of the science. Don't know if that explains my viewpoint, and I'll understand if you disagree. But the way I see the world, consciousness is absolutely nothing special. It all is.

For Supervenience -- focusing on the physical stuff of Brain States causing another State -- the problem is the distinction made for different States, with The Mental/Brain State (Idea to Slap) supervenes the Physical State (Motion of Hand to Slap). This means that one state changes the other but not vice versa. — I like sushi

I may not have communicated this clearly then. No, both states would affect each other. Let me be clear.

Lets say that to get vision A, we have two neurons set themselves into position 1. But then, we have neurons 3 and 4 looking at Vision A. The brain is making judgements about vision A. Now it may be that its simply looking at the state of position 1, but the vision impacts the brain as well. Only in the case of substance dualism is it possible that the vision of the brain does not impact the brain itself. All physical interactions affect one another.

So either the Brain State plays no causal role in this OR this is physical reductionism — I like sushi

I'm not a fan of 'reductionism' here, but that may be bias. The 'mental state' IS the physical process. Its not 'reduced' to a physical process. The subjective experience of 'state 1' is a physical thing with neurons actively analyzing the process and coming up with new thoughts.

Do you think there is a good reason to distinguish between me moving my hand and me thinking about moving my hand? If your answer is yes, then we have Property Dualism and it needs explaining. — I like sushi

Yes, but it doesn't require property dualism.

"State 1" is me envisioning a cat. Two other neurons analyze the message from state 1 and 'analyse it' State 2 for them is 'Continuing to think about the cat' and state 3 is "Stop thinking about the cat". So we can say that neurons 3 and 4 are analyzing the state message that's coming from neurons 1 and 2. We can come up with, the process of "the vision" and "analyzing the vision". Both are physical. The categorization is 'vision' vs 'thought about vision'. This doesn't deny that both are physical processes, but we can categorize them using different language to better understand what's going on besides "Physical thought processes another physical thought".

If we are looking at this form a phsyical reductionist perspective it looks a more like Epiphenomenalism is a reasonable explaination of such Mental States. — I like sushi

Epiphenominalism fails because it is impossible for one physical process to not impact another. Impossible.

Ok, so that leaves us with 'a different kind of causality'.
— Philosophim

Well, this is where the line of thinking takes us. — I like sushi

I hope clarifying my point means we don't have to go down this route. In fact, causality is so fully defined, I don't think there can be 'a different kind of causality', and any ideas that lead to this road should use that as an indicator that the line of thinking that lead there is a dead end.

As far as I can see, you are talking about how gravity works. Well Einstein gave an explanation, that in the fabric of spacetime there is an effect like a gradient between masses drawing them together. — Punshhh

Yes, its possibly physical. But this gradient is entirely theoretical, and to me, still has the 'pullling' problem that I spoke about. Appreciate your viewpoint on it.

I understand your thought process here, but I fall in behind Bob Ross and Timothy on that discussion. — Punshhh

More than fair. Bob Ross in particular really understood the issue well, and I can see his viewpoint.

Although personally I would say how we and the universe came into existence is a deep mystery and it’s pointless trying to work it out until someone (who knows) comes along to tell us how it works. — Punshhh

True. The attempt wasn't to show how, but establish what is most our most rational claim could be when we don't know. While I might be incorrect on the idea of an uncaused existence, at least you can see an example of something, the uncaused inception itself, as a clear example of something non-physical. Thanks for reading and I hope it was fun to think about.

Now this is cleared up, the point I am making may possibly get around taking some kind of Eliminative argument to avoid this contradiction (Possibly). So put aside any disagreement with substance dualism and put some thought into what this could mean for the problem at large in terms of different types of causality or the absense of causality. How does this strengthen or weaken more physicalist positions?How does this reframe the problem? — I like sushi

I wasn't quite clear on what you wanted, so I'll state what I thought you said.

We've seen the results from property dualism, now you want to imagine IF substance dualism exists. I already mentioned that there is absolutely nothing we could glean about causality because we don't know what the properties of something non-physical would be. Would it appear to interrupt physical causality? is it the same? We don't know.

So, lets break down further what you said. Lets first start with an absense of causality. If there is no causality between two substances, they don't have any identifiable interaction. Causality is simply that a prior state necessarily leads to another state. Causality can even be handled inductively with probability. Once we know limits and can measure several limited outcomes, we can at least find a limit and start giving the odds for a particular outcome. No causality at all would eliminate all of that. If the mental affected the physical and vice versa, it would be so random we wouldn't be able to verify whether one actually impacted the other, or it was just a random circumstance that the mental appeared to impact or be impacted, but actually wasn't. If my paper on the logical necessity of a first cause, you can see the logic of true randomness. So no causality leaves us with no objective outcomes and we would never now how the two substances interacted, if ever, at all.

Ok, so that leaves us with 'a different kind of causality'. I have no idea what that would mean. We have regular causality and probability to handle uncertain causality. What else is there? It seems we only have the options of strict causality, probable causality, and no causality. Was I in the general ballpark of what you wanted to think about?

We cannot do any of that with consciousness. Nobody has any idea how it can come about from the properties of particles. There's nothing. What does it have to do with mass, charge, the nuclear forces, gravity, or any other physical thing that can be named? There aren't even guesses. Nobody can make any connection. — Patterner

You have to be very careful here. We have tons of information about the brain and objective consciousness. We can clearly see brain states influencing behaviors and responses from individuals that demonstrate altered brain states alter the person's subjective experience. Let me give you an analogy.

We have a box, When we shake it, something rumbles inside. Can shake the box and see bumps on the outside wall, but we can't get into the box. In every way, the thing inside of the box indicates its a physical thing. Can we suddenly claim it isn't? Its not inductively reasonable to.

What do I mean by this? The close inductive reason is to things we know, the more likelihood its going to be correct. Before we landed on the moon we didn't know exactly what would happen. We had theories. And all of those theories were based on things we knew from what we could glean. There was an imagined state that when we landed, aliens would emerge from under the rocks. But that's pretty far from what we know, so was likely an unreasonable induction to make.

Back to the box. If everything about the thing inside of the box indicates its physical, what's more reasonble to induce? That the thing inside of the box is physical, or that it is some hitherto unknown substance that defies all of our notions of physics? Its the former.

The only, the ONLY thing preventing us from being able to fully understand consciousness is the fact that we don't know what its like to have the subjective experience of another thing besides ourselves. Its the thing in the box that we cannot open. But if we're logical and test everything around that we can know about and discover it continuously implies that what's inside the box is physical...its more reasonable to believe its physical.

There is no logical reason why there may not be two substances (Substance Dualism). — I like sushi

Actually, there is. We have to be careful to not confuse 'plausible' with logical reason that it exists. First, there needs to be an indication of something occurring that is in conflict with the idea of one substance. There is nothing conflicting with the proposal that the brain is the source of consciousness and that subjective experience is a physical experience of the brain.

Second, there needs to be some evidence of this supposed second substance, and a working idea of how it is different and works. People didn't understand that rain was a simple cycle of physical law. Since they didn't understand it, they proposed an indefinable non-falsifiable proposal, "God did it". We are no different from the unenlightened before us in our strategies and approaches to things we don't fully understand. The only argument for consciousness being separate from the brain as another substance is purely, "We don't understand exactly why." That's not a viable argument.

Logically, there really is no good reason to think there are two substances in the brain. Objective consciousness reflects physical brain state changes, and people usually report that they had no subjective experiences beyond dreams when this unconscious behavior is recorded. It is at best a fun, IF, and I'll happily play along there. Anything more is outside the realm of IF, and has no validity in modern day.

In terms of Property Dualism you seem okay with this as you say it makes sense to demarcate between a slap in the face and the desire to slap someone in the face as two different states. — I like sushi

To make sure there is no misunderstanding if by property dualism you mean, "Classifications and grouping an underlying identity into subidentities," yes. If you mean, "Actual classification of two entirely different comprised substances that can objectively be identified as separate," no. Both the desire and the action to slap someone in the face are physical. But it makes sense to demarcate the type of physical action into words to convey quick communication. We are constantly trying to shorten what we need to say to convey an idea, and one does not have to go through the atomic method each time they want to explain that a pencil uses graphite.

It would then follow that you are saying mental states supervene over phsyical states, meaning if the physical state changes so to must the mental state, but not vice versa. — I like sushi

No, they're both physical states. So they can affect each other. There is no logical reason they wouldn't. Now IF they are two substances, who knows? Maybe its only the mental substance affecting the physical, and its a meat puppet being strung along from something we don't fully understand. Maybe the physical has a one way influence on the mental instead. We don't know. We wouldn't be able to tell because we don't even know how these two substances would interact. We need more.

It then follows that these mental states (you refer to as physical) have no causal effect. So now we have a physical state (neural state of mentality) that is non-causal. — I like sushi

No, I don't think that's the way it works. Physical interactions always affect what is being interacted with. What you are describing could only happen if the 'mental' was a substance that violated basic physical law. Fortunately there are many cases of 'mental' imagery and subjective experiences affecting the physical body, once again lending credence to thoughts being physical, and not some other substance with completely different rules.

What I think is perdurable is the mind as the 'tool' — Danileo

What did you mean by perdurable?

Coming back I exposed how we can have actually non-physical thoughts and asked you why they are formed in a physical determinant brain — Danileo

No I haven't seen an indicator that thoughts are necessarily non-physical. Why is water wet? Go ahead, touch some. Why does it flow like that? Why do some thing burn? Why is fire even real? Why is there anything at all? The question of, "Why does this exist?" is a question that we ask of everything and science cannot truly answer. That's a separate philosophical question. But it is not unique to consciousness, it applies to every single thing that you likely take for granted.

Let me ask you another question. If I said, "I can't understand why water is wet, therefore it must not be physical," is that a viable argument against the wetness of water being physical?" Of course not. What actual fact has lead you to believe that the mind is not physical? Not a, "I don't get it, its not like other matter." That's not an argument. I mean a real clash with the laws of physical reality, a clear contradiction between what matter and energy of the brain do and the outcomes of it? Why is it so difficult for you to simply think that subjective experience is the same as the 'wetness' of water?

It's not a matter of not being able to experience what someone/thing else experiences. The puzzle is why anything has any subjective experience at all. — Patterner

The only reason why we don't understand that is because we can't know what its like to subjectively experience as that thing. If we had that, we could attempt to figure it out. The scientific knowledge you are positing would need to be an objective analysis of a personal subjective experience. We can't create that objective knowledge without being able to have that personal subjective experience as reference.

To be clear, a person could answer this for themselves. We can stimulate a particular area of the brain and a person states, "I see green." But this is not objective. We have to trust the person is accurately conveying what they are 'seeing'. We could go to another person, stimulate the same neuron set, and they also say, "I see green." Except that we don't actually know if the green the first experiences is the green the second experiences. What are the experienced dimensions? Are there accompanying feelings or othere sensations? The variables are massive. This is why we do color blind tests with objective and measurable tests. We don't actually know what the person sees when they're color blind. But we do know color blind people can't discern differences between colored objects like the rest of us by their behavior.

Does any of this imply in any way that consciousness is not your brain? Not in the slightest. Just go read a bit of modern day neuroscience. To conclude that the brain is not the source of consciousness is a purely imaginative proposal that has no evidence of its actual existence. Just because we can't know what its like to experience their subjective version of 'green' doesn't mean that changes in consciousness and subjective experience are reported when manipulating the brain opposed to other areas of the body, or even outside of the body.

Why does the physical activity of moving ions, signals moving through neurons, neurotransmitters jumping the gap between neurons, and any and all other physical activity, have a subjective experience? — Patterner

Why does hydrogen and two oxygen in combination at a certain temperature become a water? This question applies to the entirety of existence. Why is a rock hard? Why from carbon can we construct graphite and all living things? Why do electrons bond, or even exist at all? Why is there anything?

That question does not deny what is, it merely asks "Why is". And 'why is', is a fantastic philosophical question, and may not have an answer.

Great topic, especially the ten commandments in writing philosophy.

I could use your logic and say that because there are non physical occurrences in the mind and mind is attached to physical world then all the world is non-physical. — Danileo

No because you have to have a clear definition of non-physical, and then clear evidence that exists as something not actually physical. We're putting the cart before the horse. Saying the mind is 'non-physical' is not a claim of truth or reality. It is a belief or supposition. Considering you did not answer my question about whether you would still have an interest in seeing the brain as non-physical if it was still permanently destroyed on brain death, am I safe to assume this is a bit of faith or belief system to give yourself hope that you'll survive in some way after death?

You do seem to be conveying a Dualist approach in term of Properties, meaning you have stated that there is a good reason to distinguish between Physical and Mental Acts. So maybe looking at this metaphysical delineation would help in expressing how Causation could differ? — I like sushi

So what causation is, "A prior state which necessarily lead to the current state" itself would not change. But we just don't know how something non-physical would interact with and change the physical. All of physics is built on physical causation at this time.

There's really nothing else to say. You would need to know what non-physical things were, and how they interact with the physical. Causation requires an understanding of consistent and repeatable logical states. Is there something else you were trying to get at? I feel like there is and I'm missing it.

Two tokens of the same word, say “cat” typed twice, aren’t the same instance, but they are instances of the same word. — Wayfarer

No disagreement. But the word does not only represent one instance. It allows a multitude of similarities that pass the bar to fit that label. Different physical expressions of a general identity only have to pass certain thresholds before they are matched. A name does not do this. There is only one Wayfarer, you.

But if you didn't physically exist, there would be no Wayfarer out there to discover. If we can't find one unicorn, we surely can't say 'unicorns' (plural) exist. And even if more than one unicorn exists, it physically exists by similar category, not as some non-physical entity out there.

So it's nonsense to say that different versions of the same song are not the same song. They're numerically different instances of the same idea - which is the point! — Wayfarer

To be more specific in reference to physical vs non-physical. Physically, they are different songs and not the same/identical. We say they are similar enough based on a category that we create that we group them together as 'a song'. But this is a process of the brain, not that there is something out there that does not involve matter and/or energy that is 'the song'. If you like reference to other Philosophers, look up Plato's forms and its critiques.

Your 'papers' contain no references to any other philosophers or philosophies - yet you seem to believe that they should be regarded as authoritative sources for any reader. — Wayfarer

No. They are constructed to be able to be understood by any person without a philosophy background as they are posted on a general philosophy forum that is open to all backgrounds. At one time I did reference other philosophers, and the ideas blew up to hundreds of pages. Eventually I realized anyone with a philosophy background should be familiar with the general themes, and no one was going to read a 200 page novel to get to the point I was trying to make. The point of philosophy is to logically craft language that can be used both rationally and practically in the world. I have attempted to do just that. You should try reading the knowledge paper at least. Maybe you'll find a new perspective, or maybe you'll be able to point out a flaw in the argument and I'll have something new to look at. Either way, we both win.

That is, if we assume that physicalism is actually wrong and there is something else going on, then the Causal relation between Mental and Mental Acts compared to Physical to Physical may very well be quite different. — I like sushi

Thanks for clarifying. I wouldn't even say could be different, it absolutely would be different. Physical and non-physical things, even if we didn't know exactly what they were, would have to be different in the way they exist. It wouldn't be just the hard problem, all of physics would need a readjustment.

I am not trying to "make consciousness something non-physical." Consciousness is non-physical. I'm interested in this particular hypothesis. — Patterner

Poor word choice on my end then. "Identify" instead of 'make'.

But if someone says “I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced”, they are not making a conceptual mistake. — David Chalmers

Completely agree. But lets make sure we're on the same page here. The reason we can't know what its like to experience it, is we have no way of knowing what a 'thing' experiences without being 'that thing'. That doesn't mean we can't learn about its objective function or behavior. It simply means that when talking objectively about something, we can't include the act of being the thing itself.

To clarify even further. If we DID have the ability to experience a thing in itself, there would be no problem at that point. We would have the ability to create controls and variables to test and map out the brain with the experience of being. Its important not to confuse the fact that we can't know what its like to be something, with the idea that this means being a physical thing is not somehow physical.

Why is it that when
electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. — David Chalmers

A great question! But one that does not place doubt on the physical nature of the brain. For that, we would need some type of evidence of consciousness being non-physical. For example, not tied to a physical location. But it seems that when I walk around the room, my consciousness follows me in my head. You have to define what non-physical would entail, and you'll quickly realize consciousness in no way fits this.

Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman

I don't have your video link and I'm not sure how to interpret this out of context.

And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. — Greene

The answer is simple. We are not the particles. We don't know how to have the experience of those particles without being those particles.

Because nothing in our modern mathematics days, "Ok, well, do a triple interval and carry the 2, and then *click* here's the taste of feta cheese. — David Eagleman

Just a repeat of the same issue I've noted.

It's not just that we don't have scientific theories. We don't have remotely plausible ideas about how to do it. — Donald Hoffman

Agreed. But does not at all imply consciousness does not come from the brain.

I think proto-consciousness is a property of matter, just like mass and electric charge are. When the body dies, mass and electric charge are still in the particles. So is proto-consciousness. But there is no longer a thinking brain experiencing itself. — Patterner

I agree with this. I think that there is at some type of level, the 'experience' of being something. Not like a complex human brain of course. But that 'thing' exists'. It is. There must be some type of feedback of 'being'.

Again, all of these are well known by me, but none of them come even close to indicating that consciousness is not physical. Even though we've reached a limit in knowing what its like to 'be' something else, 'being' is physical. And thus the subjective experience of 'being' is by consequent, also physical.

I don't need to respond to a false distinction. Two instances of the same song are of the same song. If you put out a version of a Beetles song that you created in GarageBand, you would be sued for infringing copyright. — Wayfarer

Right because the copyright determines the level of similarity to the copyrighted version to say whether you have the legal right to profit off of making a copy. A copyright category does not make them identical songs, and I clearly laid out that the technical term for same in this instance is identical. I have seen no indication that this is a false distinction besides you just insisting that it is. If this is as far as you wish to go on this, I'm not going to agree that you've adequately answered the point I brought up.

This is the question of nature of identity that has occupied philosophers for centuries. But you won't find it in neuroscience, as neuroscience doesn't need to consider these kinds of questions. — Wayfarer

I wrote an entire paper on knowledge and identity here if you're interested. Epistemology has been my primary focus in philosophy. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

I mention 'distinctive knowledge' but identity is a form of this.

To say that meaning is reducible to brain activity is to confuse the physical substrate that enables cognition with the semantic content of thought. That's a category mistake. Neural activity may correlate with thought, but it isn't identical to meaning. Meaning belongs to the realm of intentionality—aboutness—which isn’t captured by physical properties like mass or charge or ion transmission. — Wayfarer

No, the category error is yours. Once again, you need to demonstrate, not simply claim, that meaning can exist somewhere out there in the universe apart from a physical brain. All you are doing here is asserting its not physical, but I'm seeing no example or reason demonstrating that it is necessarily non-physical. I can easily note that thought is physical, meaning is a thought, therefore meaning is physical. As I have evidence of meaning only coming from a physical brain, and not somewhere else not physically, by default you cannot necessarily demonstrate that thought is non-physical.

Consider: “The cat is on the mat” can be expressed in English, French, Morse code, or binary. The physical forms are completely different, but the meaning is the same. So clearly, the meaning isn't reducible to any particular physical configuration. It’s multiply realizable—something that’s deeply problematic for strict identity theory. — Wayfarer

No, this is both a category and vocabulary error. They are not 'the same' in the technical sense. They are different physical expressions of representation, and the intent is to get a person to imagine a similar concept. I noted what 'same' and 'equivalent' meant, and you are simply dismissing those terms without explaining why they should be changed to something else. What you described does not fit the terms I noted. If you would like to talk about social contextual identity, we can. Its a pretty simple issue once you get the basics down. I do not ascribe to strict identity theory, and they still aren't 'the same', but similar within an established identity context.

You seem to assume that unless a word can be pared down to a physical or operational definition, it lacks explanatory value — Wayfarer

No. It needs to be clear and falsifiable for a philosophical discussion. Meaning "X state is physical. Y state would not be physical." Same with non-physical. "Y state would be non-physical. X state would be physical." One of the main purposes of philosophy is to take words that we take for granted or have unclear meaning, and rationally shape them into clear and meaningful words that can be used rationally with the least amount of induction or uncertainty as possible.

So yes, we should clarify our terms—but not by reducing them to what can be physically pointed at. — Wayfarer

No, I never said it had to be physically pointed at. It needs a clear term and demonstration that the term exists in reality. Otherwise you're using made up emotional words that lack rational context. Its like the term 'good'. If I asked you why murder is wrong and you answered its difficult to define why its wrong, then I would ask how you could know its wrong. Its poor philosophy. Poor philosophy is what people go to either in ignorance, or an attempt to hide the fact that when more accuracy is demanded of their term, it starts to fall apart.

Regardless, if you cannot agree that two songs played at different locations are not identical, then we may have arrived at the end of our discussion. That does not strike me as logical, and if we cannot agree on such a simple point, we're unlikely to continue productive discussion. I appreciate your time regardless, I'm sure we'll chat again.

Not so. A melody can be reproduced in any number of media, but remain the same melody. Not 'similar', not 'like', but 'the same'. — Wayfarer

Lets be very clear here. 'Same' means 'identical'. Identical meaning. Equivalent means that something is the same besides its existent location. If I had two letter 'a's that were identitical to the pixel, then they would be equivalent. You're going to have to explain to me how the physical variations of the song being played at different locations resolve to 100% equality and not simularity. Without explaining that, your point is simply false.

Likewise, a story, a recipe, a formula - it can be reproduced in any number of languages or media or formats, but still retain the same information or meaning. — Wayfarer

This is also untrue. A perfect translation is almost impossible. Here's a small primer. https://dalgazette.com/opinions/lost-in-translation/

"No one will interpret a book in the same way, and this shows in books like The Vegetarian. Kang’s Korean-speaking readers did not read the book as Smith did.

The fact that there are infinite ways to interpret a book makes us wonder if a translation in the literal sense is even possible. We’re left with this question of: must something inevitably change in translation?

Yes, something will always be lost or added. "

What a sentence means, and what it refers to, lack the properties that something typically needs in order to make a difference in the world. The information conveyed by this sentence has no mass, no momentum, no electric charge, no solidity, and no clear extension in the space within you, around you, or anywhere. — Deacon, Terrence W. (2011). Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (Function). Kindle Edition.

Nice quote, but it doesn't counter the point I've made. He's claiming it has no mass etc., I am by pointing to the brain, which is matter and energy, being the source. Can you demonstrate a counter that allows meaning to exist apart from a brain?

The more general a term is, the harder to define. — Wayfarer

This is a clear indicator that you have a poor word that is often used for general situations and not specifics. General words are typically cultural, emotive, and based on a collective subjective experience and not objective analysis. It being difficult to define does not excuse one from not defining it in a conversation that digs into specifics and attempts a more objective analysis.

But very broad terms, like physical (or non-physical), will, intention, purpose - these are very hard terms to define. But acknowledging that, doesn't mean they're not real. — Wayfarer

It doesn't mean that the intent of these words is to point to something real. But many words we use to point to real things are no more than a sign post. "This" is 'that'. What is that? Well 'that' is over there. Again, very useful for general sign pointing and broad ideas. A big part of philosophy is dissecting these generic words down and pariing them down to the core specifics that unify the multiple objects the generic word will lump together. It goes from an emotional indicator, to one of more careful analysis. By consequence, the definition of the word should become more narrow and clear. If one can do so, then they have a valuable word to use in rational communication. If one cannot pare the word down from a generic to a specific, this is evidence that the word needs more work and shouldn't be considered in serious discussion yet.

As I said, numbers, laws, conventions, principles - these are not physical but they're real nonetheless. — Wayfarer

But if you can't define what non-physical is, then all it is, is a general negation word. "Not-physical." If this is all it is, then it is on the person to then clearly demonstrate why something they claim is not physical by demonstrating that it is impossible that it can be physical, and demonstrating its existence apart from the physical.

As I said, numbers, laws, conventions, principles - these are not physical but they're real nonetheless. — Wayfarer

You can't just claim that Wayfarer, you have to prove that. I've asked you several times to demonstrate why these things, by necessity, cannot be physical. I've tried to create several scenarios for you go with. "If there was no human brain to think of these concepts of identity, would these concepts of identity exist somewhere else in reality?" I have never heard you say yes, and then point out where.

The idea of something being physical is falsifiable. I mentioned a few of my own possible non-physical ideas a few posts up. They can work as possibilities because they attempt to show that they are true negations of what is physical. What is physical is matter and energy. Something non-physical would need to defy what matter and energy do. The problem is, is that I have clear examples of numbers, laws, convention, and principles as expressions of matter and energy through brains. I have neuroscience on my side which indicates that thoughts come from a brain, which is made out of matter and energy. Unless you can provide examples of science which indicate, necessarily, that there is something to the brain that involves something that cannot be physical, then you can't claim its non-physical.

To be clear, you could say, "Maybe they're wrong." Perfectly acceptable. You can come up with wild and cool ideas. Perfectly acceptable. But just because you have an imagination or a desire that something is not physical, its perfectly unacceptable to claim that its non-physical without careful proof.

Some say they're constructs of the brain, but I say they're perceived by reason. — Wayfarer

And reason is a physical process that attempts to correctly apply representation to reality.

But among non-physical things are theories of the physical. These include mathematical constructs and hypotheses which are in themselves not physical. — Wayfarer

No, they are comprised of matter and energy. Again, to my mind the only way you could prove this Wayfarer is to demonstrate that these things would exists without any physical brains. Can I go to somewhere in the universe and say, "Here exists the non-physical mathmatical constructs and hypotheses of reality apart from matter and energy?" Whereas I can point to the brains of individuals, the physical books, etc and show where they exist.

But what if what we think if the 'physical world' is also an action of the brain? And that this is what makes it non-physical. — Wayfarer

I don't follow this. Can you go into a little more depth? If thinking is physical, and we think that the brain is physical, how is that non-physical?

I checked your video link, thank you. They would agree with me on this statement for sure: "Your subjective reality is objectively true." That meaning, the experience of that subjective reality, is real. Your interpretation of that subjective reality to the reality beyond your subjective may of course not be real. I can believe I'll live forever, and objectively, I believe that. It doesn't mean that my belief means that its actually true that I will live forever. I'm not seeing the video negating the points I've made, but feel free to point out if you think they do.

↪Philosophim maybe even the brain could have something non-physical?
Otherwise how do you explain dreaming about flying? — Danileo

Just a bit of science about it. https://biologyinsights.com/the-neuroscience-of-dreams-what-happens-in-the-brain/

My advice as always with philosophy of mind is do neuroscience first, philosophy second.

Why does a physical determinant brain produce non-physical products. — Danileo

This is begging the question. A dream is a physical experience of the brain.

The only explanation could be that the mind is independent of the world. — Danileo

If the mind were independent of the world then we would not be tied to viewing or experiencing the world from our body and perspective. I cannot move my experience of the world outside of my head. I cannot suddenly have a viewpoint of the world through my feet, or from the other side of the room. This should be obvious.

If the mind were independent of the world, then no drugs, illness, or damage to the brain would cause any change to your mind. Yet it does. This is basic medical knowledge and the entire foundation of psyche drugs.

No, the only rational conclusion from decades of scientific research and medical knowledge is that your 'mind' is a process of the brain. Its a physical reality, not something outside of it. A question for you. What is your motivation for it being non-physical? What would that give you that you do not have now? For example, lets say the mind was 'non-physical' but it still died forever once your brain died. Would you be ok with that?

I mean that energy transforms constantly and does not disappear. Energy disappearing would be the non physical. — Danileo

I see. Basically a violation of the conservation of mass and energy would be something non-physical. I can also get behind that.

Then if I dream I am flying? How can I dream of something that is not physical if the dreams are a physical product — Danileo

Dreams are a physical process. Does a dead brain dream? No. I think the real problem is that many people have a hard time understanding that yes, you are a physical being, your thoughts, feelings, dreams, etc. are all physical things. I strongly suspect this is because there is a living desire to never die, and this desire is a primary process of the brain. Actually accepting that you can die and cease to be sets off alarm bells up there, so your brain tries to find a way around it. Even in the face of obvious death people will do irrational things to prolong their existence if there's even the slightest hope it can.

Neuroscience allows no other conclusion at this point in study. Take a screwdriver and swirl it around in your brain, you will not be the same 'soul'. Get brain damage in certain areas and you could lose or permanently damage one of your five senses forever. Even your feelings and thought processes can be altered by messing around up there. You are your brain. Either people are ignorant of the scientific advances made, or this is simply screaming in the face of inevitable death where it worms around the known and obvious to clutch at the subjective and unknown.

I think consciousness is simply subjective experience, and thinking/mental is something humans are conscious of. So we can talk about mental being a physical process without touching on consciousness. — Patterner

I don't think we're all that separate from one another. I just view subjective experience as the experience of being physical being over time. In other words, its simply an aspect of the physical, not something separate.

I am curious in terms of motivation, what is the push to make consciousness something non-physical? Lets say for example that consciousness was something non-physical, but it could never be separated from the body and would cease to be forever when your brain dies. Would you accept that? Or would there be an insistence that consciousness had some other aspect that made it last beyond bodily death?

I looked for your book today and read your free introduction on Amazon. Two problems for me:

1. No digital copy.
2. Far too expensive for a first time unknown and uncredentialed author.

You're going to have to decide what you want out of this. Is your purpose to make money? I'm sure you're familiar with the book market and understand its not the place to do so for most people.

Do you want to have it read and people seriously discuss your work? Make an electronic pdf, host it somewhere, and link to it here in the forum for people read and dissect. There are people like myself who would willingly read it and give it a chance. But we're not going to pay for something from an unknown in the field who for all we know just has an opinion vs groundbreaking work.

Obviously your idea cannot be summarized on the forum, otherwise you wouldn't write a 260 page book. The only way you're going to get a serious discussion that understands your ideas is buy getting people to read it. If you do decide to make an electronic version, message me here and I promise you I'll read it and give a fair critique.

Therefore non-physical principles should be different principles from those who are physical, for example I could came up with a law that is claiming that the energy is limited or being generated randomly etc. — Danileo

Thank you, this clarifies the stance you're taking. Energy being limited seems to be a physical property, though maybe you mean something else here. Something unlimited would seem a better example of something non-physical. I also agree that true randomness, not inductively concluded randomness, would also be a non-physical property.

One argument for the presence of non-physical principle is why people can end up believing in those principles and transcending them to earth. — Danileo

But we know from neuroscience that this is all an action of the brain. The brain is not truly random nor unlimited. Consciousness is not truly random or unlimited. Thus I'm not seeing how we can attribute this to a non-physical property.

I mentioned in an earlier post there are a few things that might be non-physical, they've just never come up.
Care to elaborate? — Punshhh

Certainly. How I define non-physical is, 'That which is not comprised of something physical.' For me there is a strange notion in science that has not been answered yet. It very well could be that this is an opportunity for something non-physical, but then again it can also be a placeholder until we figure out more.

For me it is 'attraction'. And I don't mean the love kind. Weak force, strong force, gravity...there is something so counter to the idea of what is physical in this. Let me explain.

When two things collide, there is an equal and opposite force against one or both of the objects. So you can apply force to move an object forward and force to slow an object down. But attraction seems to pull an object to another. Yes, these forces do seem like properties of physical objects, so maybe they are a physical force as well. But...there's something so off on this. The best I've ever heard for the reason of attractive forces is that there are smaller particles inbetween causing this interchange. But that seems counter to the idea of equal and opposite force.

In the physical realm force is applied. But attraction seems to be an application of negative force. Maybe its a simple misunderstanding and there is something out there unknown which is actually pushing matter towards other matter and we've misattributed it to pull. I don't know. Its a mystery of science to me that still has the possibility of discovering something completely knew as we continue to learn about reality.

Another is an uncaused reality, and this one I'm much more certain on. This is mostly attributed to a god, but I mean the reality that the universe ultimately, must be uncaused. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15722/the-logic-of-a-universal-origin-and-meaning/p1 Here for more details if you wish. Something uncaused by definition, has no prior reason for its existence. While something physical could form uncaused, nothing physical caused it to exist. Therefore it meets the definition of non-physical.

I just got obfuscation. If you start to pin him down he will miraculously agree with you. — Punshhh

A little ironic considering I've been asking for a clear definition of non-physical and an example of its existence that does not entail the physical. I'm not arguing to just argue, I'm discussing with you and will happily agree if what is being said is clear and logical.

↪Philosophim I think I am getting lost in the meaning of what is physical, for example if I start flying it would be physical? — Danileo

What is physical shouldn't be confusing. What you're confused about is what is 'non-physical'. What is your clear definition of 'non-physical'? Then we can ask your flying question.

If your philosophy cannot allow for the existence of a song, and copywright to it, then all I can say is that it has a serious deficiency. — Wayfarer

Where did I say that? You create a definition of a song that follows a general pattern of tone and melody. A copyright, is literally the right to copy a work. A copy, like a twin, is a unique but similar emulation of something else. A 'song' is a category of different similar physical expressions of melody. How similar these physical expressions have to be is what society decides by law. So in one country it could be that a song which is 90% similar in melody is considered the same, while in another country its only 90% similar in tempo.

Melodies, as discussed. Numbers, laws, conventions, chess. There are thousands of these general kinds of things that are grasped by the mind (but not by 'neural activity'). — Wayfarer

Ok, the examples are good. But where's the clear definition of 'non-physical'? Is it just concepts? Definitions the human brain constructs?

Your critique of my work reflects a surprisingly limited and elitist perspective on philosophy — Sam26

No, just your work.

You say philosophy is solely “the love of wisdom” built on logic, dismissing belief-based arguments as mere fiction or faith. That’s not just a misreading of my project, it’s a fundamental misunderstanding of philosophy itself — Sam26

No, I'm pretty sure that's actual philosophy. Philosophy is not just an opinion. Its a discussion of logical foundations. You do not have logical foundations.

First, your assertion that arguing from belief isn’t philosophy, likening my NDE work to debating Gandalf’s height, is absurdly reductive. — Sam26

No, arguing merely from belief is not philosophy. That's religion. And no, I am not likening all of your work to Gandalf's height, I'm noting that many of your core premises to NDEs being viable outside of people experiencing them is illogical. You believing in something strongly does not make it true. You have to really be logical and rational to do philosophy. You are dismissing all the science and tests on NDEs that demonstrate the first person experiences of testimony do not align with the objective reality of what occurred. You are trying to wrap your belief system in philosophy because science will not legitimize it. Philosophy will not either.

Philosophy isn’t an ivory-tower club for logic-chopping purists; it’s the systematic exploration of life’s big questions, engaged by everyone from Socrates to the average person pursuing meaning in a coffee shop. — Sam26

Correct. But all of them use logic and reason.

As I argue in my book, epistemology, a core branch, is precisely about how we form and justify beliefs, whether about black holes, morality, or NDEs. — Sam26

No, epistemology is the study of knowledge. Beliefs are studied, but only for the purpose of figuring out what knowledge is.

NDE testimonies involve real people reporting verifiable experiences, like accurate surgical details during flatlined EEGs, documented in peer-reviewed studies (e.g., 2024 ScienceDirect on consciousness continuity) — Sam26

Now that's something we can work with. I couldn't find the article on searching, mind linking it?

You sneer that my work is “faith” or “religion,” not philosophy, because I explore consciousness survival. — Sam26

Nope. I'm noting you're dismissing serious flaws that have already been pointed out and committing logical fallacies. Your topic is not the issue. If you provided reasonable evidence and arguments for the existence of consciousness outside of brain death, that would be cool! An argument from emotion or desire for it to be true is not a rational argument.

Philosophy has always tackled the speculative: Leibniz on possible worlds, Kant on noumena, even Chalmers on the hard problem of consciousness. — Sam26

Yes, and they all used logic. And when Liebniz' monads had flaws due to further scientific discovery, no one considered them viable anymore. If you are going to talk about a subject that is in the scientific realm, you better be able to scientifically back it if you are going to come up with some philosophy about it.

Dismissing this as non-philosophical because it’s not yet “proven” ignores how philosophy engages open questions. — Sam26

No I'm dismissing it because you're ignoring the science that shows NDEs can be simulated outside of near death experiences, and to the date that I had checked in 2023-24, no scientific experiment has ever resulted in reported NDEs accurately reporting on things in the room that they could not personally sense and see with their body.

My book and this thread confront counterpoints head-on. — Sam26

No you don't. You ran on my last serious post to you.

Finally, your patronizing advice to “apply my passion” elsewhere, charity, neuroscience, teaching kids, reveals your contempt for philosophical inquiry into the profound. — Sam26

Its personal life advice. Take it as patronizing or not if you want. Listen to it if you want or not. But I see no evidence of you having the capability to meet the challenges of this thread, let alone the challenges of experts in this field.

A 2024 Taylor & Francis review shows NDEs’ cross-cultural consistency, suggesting a universal phenomenon worth exploring. — Sam26

This adds nothing. Everyone already know NDEs are real and have a wide classificaiton of simiularities on average, but also a significant minority of differences. We explored that back then in one of your citations if you remember.

If you think philosophy should only chase “real issues,” you’re not loving wisdom; you’re stifling it. — Sam26

No, I'm saying you need to address the issues in science. You're trying to hide your inability to do so in philosophy with the idea that opinions or belief systems are valid. They are not. They are religion and faith. I see no evidence of good science or philosophy here. Just a person obsessed.

Incorrect. The melody IS the same. RIght now, my 10-month-old grand-child is playing with an electronic toy which is playing the song My World is Blue. — Wayfarer

No, by fact it is not the same Wayfarer. Same being identical. Are a pair of twins the same? Similar, but not identical. Again, lumping things into a category is not the same as saying that all the things in that category are identical in reality. I can define sheep, but there is no one sheep that is identical to any other sheep.

The problem is, that is not at all what philosophy of mind believes by the immaterial or non-physical. — Wayfarer

I am not discussing with the philosophy of mind. I'm discussing with you and others. And I'm merely asking for a clear definition of something non-physical that is not a category error of something physical, that can clearly be shown to exist.

The fact you can only conceive of alternatives to the physical in terms of magical unicorns indicates a misunderstanding of the subject. — Wayfarer

No, that indicates either of us having a misunderstanding in answering your question. I was answering your point about me assuming everything is physical and I don't understand how anything can be described in other terms. My point was, I can. I have an imagination and believe that we can discover something that is not physical. But, it needs to be reasonable, not a misunderstanding of physical things.

A melody can be represented in musical notation or binary code. It can be engraved in metal or copied on to paper. Then it can be played back on different instruments or through digital reproduction. In every case the physical medium is different but the melody is the same. So how then can the melody be described as physical? — Wayfarer

No, the melody is not the same. It is similar, which is a very distinct difference. If I play the song in two different places at the same time, they are not the same. The physical composition of the instrument, the physical composition and actions of the player, and the very air and accoustics the song travels two are different. We summarize them as 'the same song' for convenience and summary in communication. But when we break it down and need to look at it in detail, our summary is not representative of some 'form' that exists outside of physical reality.

When I say a person 'kicked the bucket' in the right context it means, "They died", not that they literally kicked a bucket.

I clearly told you I don't associate with the physicalist position.
— Philosophim

Every post of yours that I’ve read assumes physicalism. — Wayfarer

No, you assume in every post of mine that I'm claiming physicalism.

Maybe because you assume that everything is physical — Wayfarer

I don't. I've said that almost every time this has come up in conversations with you. :)

and don’t understand how anything can described in other terms — Wayfarer

I am very open to the existence of something non-physical. I am open to a God existing. A magical unicorn. I am not being sarcastic or intending to insult. I LOVE thinking of wonderful things. I want there to be wonderful things Wayfarer. If I say I don't understand what a person means by 'non-physical' it is because they won't clearly define what the term means, nor point to something that objectively exists and fits this term.

I mentioned in an earlier post there are a few things that might be non-physical, they've just never come up. And by this I mean something that cannot be explained at all with physical reality, yet appear to exist. Maybe one day the subject will come up. For now, I want to see an actual definition of what non-physical is, and evidence of its existence that isn't merely a category error of something that is physical.

A computer does not have a mind's eye, cannot imagine, and cannot experience anything. — RogueAI

Can you prove that? Can you prove a bug has a mind's eye, can imagine, and can experience anything? Isn't a fruitfly just an organic mechanical object? You do not know what you've claimed, you believe what you've claimed. I already noted that some AIs demonstrate low level objective consciousness. We can't even know what its like for another human being to subjectively experience, much less if a robot has one or not.

When I imagine a sunset, I'm experiencing the colors. I'm seeing red. You're saying the redness isn't really there, it's just brain activity, — RogueAI

No, you are not experiencing the colors of the sunset when you imagine it. Your brain is giving you a memory or using the image framework it uses to process light and redo it for you as an image. You are not streaming light through your eyes, therefore you are literally not seeing red. This is a rare open shut case of objective truth.

but that is easily contradicted by imagining something, hallucinating, or dreaming. — RogueAI

All of this is also brain activity and not seeing colors, as to see colors you have to stream light through your eyes.

All right, let's talk about that. What is it about the brain that makes experience happen? What's it doing that my heart or gut biome isn't doing? Information processing? — RogueAI

Neuroscience is a fairly broad field, and you've asked a fairly broad question. At a very basic level, your brain matter and heart matter are two completely different cell structures. I don't think its a stretch to understand that different cell structures of the body do different things.

Start with the basics, a fruit fly. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/scientists-unveil-the-first-ever-complete-map-of-an-adult-fruit-flys-brain-captured-in-stunning-detail-180985191/https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-03190-y

Here all 120,000 neurons have been mapped. "Previously, researchers had mapped parts of the much smaller brains of a larval marine worm (78 neurons), a larval sea squirt (177 neurons) and an adult roundworm (302 neurons). In a breakthrough last year, scientists published the first complete connectome of a larval fruit fly, featuring 3,000 neurons.

An adult fruit fly’s brain is much more complex, however—and most importantly, the small insects share 60 percent of human DNA, as well 75 percent of the genes that cause genetic diseases, per a statement. As such, understanding the fly’s brain in such detail could hold implications for connections in human brains—and the neural pathways that lead to certain behaviors. Fruit flies, like humans, can get drunk, sing and be kept awake with coffee, suggesting similarities in our brains."

Read up on basic neuron activity. How they communicate, function, grow, etc.

Mental causes are really physical causes so I see no real difference in them than any other cause.
— Philosophim
Is there any need for the word "mental"? — Patterner

Absolutely. We can't go around calling everything 'physical' all the time in normal conversation. It is a great way to compartmentalize a certain set of physical existence and processes that are different from other physical sets and processes. We need some type of categorization, and we're not going to change the use of the word anytime soon. The issue is that mental processes are still physical processes. As long as you realize that, talking about mental processes is fine. Its when you start to think they exist apart from physical processes as some independent entities that you run into trouble.

Are you claiming that if we got rid of all of these physical things that the information of music would be floating out in space somewhere?
— Philosophim

Certainly not floating in space, but existing in a similar sense that numbers exist. There is no 1, 2, 3, floating in space, these numbers must be instantiated physically to "exist", in your sense. — hypericin

Ok, we're in agreement here.

Yet we routinely think of them independently from any particular instantiation, math wouldn't exist if we didn't do this. — hypericin

Just because we say they exist independently from instantiation, doesn't mean they do. People say and do a lot to organize categories into easily managed and summarized information. That doesn't mean this simplification or summarization changes the underlying reality.

Math is simply the logic of identities, specifically to quantities. Math could of course apply to 'non-physical' quantities, but I would first need a clear definition of what non-physical is as mentioned before.

The physical notes I write on a page. The physical intstrument I play it with. The physical ears that hear it.
— Philosophim

Here, we only identify the notes as information. The instrument is a tool to convert the information contained on the sheet into audible music, and the ears interpret this. — hypericin

You defining it as a category does not make it non-physical. To prove it is non-physical, you must give a clear example of what non-physical is, proof that it exists, then demonstrate that information can exist as this non-physical definition. All I see are physical notes in the page, physical instruments playing, and physical brains processing. DNA is information correct? Is that non-physical, or physical?

A song on a vinyl LP that is the same as the song you hear on Spotify. If you grant that it is the same song, this song cannot be physical, as their physical instantiation could not be more different. — hypericin

No, that is a category summation to process information. It is NOT the same song. One is the song you hear on a record interacting with a record player, the other is a song you hear though the electronics being stimulated correctly by electricity and modern day acoustics. If I play the song on my iphone, and you play the song on your android at the same time, don't they both exist physically as separate songs? Being similar does not mean being identical. Being able to categorize like things together as, 'That song" does not dismiss the underlying specific reality that they are all different physical expressions of a similar song. If all physical ways of expressing that song vanished, 'that song' as the summarative category of all like expressions, would also vanish. It does not exist independently of physical reality.

I created this thread to talk about the different perspectives regarding Physical and Mental Acts and how I believe there is a problem when using Causation at a micro and macro level as well as between nomological and metaphysical positions. — I like sushi

Ha ha! Then I have no idea how we got here.

What are your thoughts regarding Mental Actions as Causal Actions? — I like sushi

Mental causes are really physical causes so I see no real difference in them than any other cause. Causation is contextual based on identification and limits. As a basic example, asking "What caused X 1 second ago can be broken down into an infinite number of contexts. .99 seconds ago. .98. Are you at the quantum, atomic, or large planetary scale? What variables do we include and exclude? And so on.

Causation is simply taking in a set of factors that preceded an outcome, but necessarily lead to that outcome.

I explore cause a big in depth here if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15722/the-logic-of-a-universal-origin-and-meaning/p1

When it comes to then trying to establish a Physical to Mental or Mental to Physical causal route a much bigger problem emerges as we have no grounding for what constitutes a Mental Act — I like sushi

Which is why its much simpler when you realize its just a physical act.

Even within the world of physics causation is a quite difficult item to deal with at the extreme ends of the micro and macro scales. — I like sushi

Of course, this is because you introduce more variables. At the macro level, there is so much to consider. At the micro level the precision level can get to the absurd where you break a second into pico seconds and generate nothing meaningful after its all said and done. My apologies for hijacking your thread, it was not my intention and I hope this leads back to the points you wanted to address.

Information is not physical. If it was, it could not retain its identity as it propagates through completely different physical mediums. Information requires a medium, but it is a mistake to conflate information with its medium. — hypericin

Of course its physical. Let take music for example. The physical notes I write on a page. The physical intstrument I play it with. The physical ears that hear it. Are you claiming that if we got rid of all of these physical things that the information of music would be floating out in space somewhere? The notes on the page are not the same as the sound from the intrament, and this is not the same as the ears that hear it and the brain that interprets it. All of these are separate physical experiences that we label as 'information' due to the fact we create a process within multiple physical mediums to get a consistent outcome. Please, try to give me an example of a 'non-physical' bit of information that exists.

If the mind's eye is physical, then its contents should be physical too. But when I imagine a blue flower, my brain doesn’t turn blue. There's no blue in my skull. So where is the blue? — RogueAI

Sure, this is a common mistake. When you 'see' blue, its light entering your eyes, bouncing around and being interpreted by your brain as an experience. But the 'blue light' isn't being emitted by your brain. Lets use a computer analogy.

Right now you're looking at your screen. The computer is processing everything you see. When you type a key, it shows up on the screen. The computer is doing all of the processing, then sends it to the screen to display. The screen of course doesn't know anything about the processing. It just displays the light sequence. But everything that's on the screen, the computer is processing. I can unhook the screen, and all that will still process. I can open my computer up and watch the hard drive spin. Where's the light from the screen? If its processing the screen light, then why can't I see it? Should we conclude that because I cannot see the screen being processed in the computer, that it is not managing the process of the screen? No.

You're making a mistake in thinking that the experience of one type of processing is equivalent to another type of processing. Lets take it from another viewpoint now. All the computer knows is 1's and 0's that it feeds into a processor. It scans memory for more one's and zeros, it interupted by other 1's and 0's, and so on. This is 'its' experience. While part of it is processing the 1's and 0's its sending to the screen, 'it' doesn't know what its going to look like on that screen. Its just processing. Its internal processing is different than the external result when you put it all together.

Now, lets look at the brain. We already know that different areas of the brain process different senses. We have a section of the brain that processes the light from our eyes and processes it into something that we subjectively see. The subjective part of you is the screen. You don't know what's being processes in the sight part of your mind. Its just '1's and '0's. But eventually it gets to the section of your brain that gives you 'the screen'. "The screen' doesn't understand the processor, and the processor doesn't understand the screen. Does this make more sense?

I repeat to people often, "You cannot do philosophy of mind without neuroscience." If you do not understand modern day neuroscience, you are stumbling blindly in the dark.

I was not labelling you I was labelling the position you are expressing. Physicalism comes in many forms. It is not a religious doctrine. — I like sushi

Don't. Just address my arguments. Trying to attach an entire to theory to my arguments is a straw man tactic. I have a very simple point here. "Clearly define the term 'non-physical' and demonstrate that it exists." Everybody likes to criticize the 'physical' world with this strange term called 'non-physical', and yet no one seems to be able to define what non-physical is or demonstrate that its real. If you want to call an expectation of clearly defined words and a re-examining of assumptions a game, its called philosophy. :)

You were expressing that everything we know of, and can know of, is physical which is obviously (for most) associated with a physicalist position. — I like sushi

There is your key word, 'most'. I clearly told you I don't associate with the physicalist position. You even admit that not everyone does. It should be the end of this point. If it helps, I do not believe that everything we can know of is physical. But I sure can't know what is non-physical if no one can present a clear definition that isn't a skin over 'physical' that can be shown to exist. I'm not saying a God can't exist, I'm just asking for a clear definition and evidence of its existence.

Philosophim non-physical for me, is defined by a property that is not found in the tangible universe, for example symmetry. — Danileo

I appreciate this, as its not easy to define something you've been casually using for a while. What is the 'tangible' universe? Because 'tangible' as normally defined means real or not imaginary. So what I heard you say is that 'non-physical' are things that are not real or imaginary. But maybe you were thinking of a different idea and we can try to find another term that better fits what you're feeling.

What is symmetric in our minds? The time, with time comes notions like our own death and with it beliefs of what happens after we die.

Note that with this I am not saying that our mind is capable to produce perfect symmetric thinking ( as for that I am not sure ) but at least is close to it. — Danileo

Ok, I think you believe the mind is real and not imaginary, so I'm going to say you do think that something non-physical is tangible. What you seem to be describing as 'the mind' is really the subjective experience of the brain. Rationally, neuroscientists have over decades continually demonstrated that affecting the brain affects people's subjective experience, and consistently. Think about the entirety of psyche drugs and pharmacology. Think about brain surgery. They keep the patient conscious while they stimulate areas of the brain to get consistent results. Go to a brain chart and you can see that different parts of the brain handle different senses and physical responses.

For the subjective experience of the brain to not be a physical reality of physical processes, we would need some type of evidence of subjective experience apart from the physical. For example, lets say I stepped into a particular empty space and suddenly had a vision of a meadow. And anyone of X height who stepped in had that vision. And it didn't matter what we passed through that space, it gave the same results every time. THAT would be an example of something non-physical that is real.

No, I'm dismissing it because you can't show that it exists. You need to explain what it is to have a non-physical thing exist, then demonstrate that such a thing actually exists in reality.
I note you didn’t answer my question, what sort of proof do you require? You do understand, I presume how hard it is to prove something. — Punshhh

Oh, I'm not playing a trick here. I'm just asking you to define the word clearly that is not a 'skin' over what is defined as physical, then point to something in reality which objectively matches that definition. If its something close I'll even try to help adjust it if needed. I'm here to discuss, not troll.

I have put forward a rational argument for consciousness to be present in life forms. A presence which doesn’t appear to be necessary if the world is just physical. If the argument has merit — Punshhh

I tried to address your argument and simply noted that you are ascribing consciousness to something non-physical when we already have massive evidence that it is physical. Read my response to Danileo to see where I'm coming from.

Correction, you are claiming that consciousness is emergent from computation alone, aren’t you?
Saying it is emergent from physical processes is hand waving, because that also includes what a I am saying and which you were denying previously. — Punshhh

Perhaps we misunderstood each other then. Computation is a physical process. If the brain is active at a particular level, it has a subjective and objective experience we call consciousness. If it does not, it loses objective experience, and even further, seemingly loses subjective experience. Think a deep coma or dreamless sleep that feels like no time has passed on awakening. All of these are objectively understood in neuroscience and can be monitored by doctors and sometimes altered by drugs or treatments on the brain.

Line of argument is used in discussions of qualia, about differences between people’s qualia due to genetic variation. It doesn’t include the fact that 99% of the experience of one person is identical to that of another, with a nuance of difference. — Punshhh

The only way you can claim this is by observing people's actions. Objectively, you have zero ability to claim this is true from a subjective viewpoint. Please think on this for a minute. Do you know that other people think 99% like you because we can know the subjective experience they are having, or is it really an assumption based on people's physical actions and responses? Take being gay for example (or straight if you're gay) You can see a person's actions, but can you actually know what its like to be in their brain when they look at another person? No. No one can.

We cannot know that. For all we know, there is a subjective experience of being a single cell.
You’ve just accepted my rational argument. That’s pretty much what I was claiming and you were rejecting. — Punshhh

I agree with the point that we cannot know if something else besides has a subjective experience. I add that by consequence, we cannot know what its like to have another subjective experience than our own, nor claim with any rational certainty what does and does not have subjective experience. All we can do is observe behavior and assign objective consciousness.

But if you agree with me, this does not prove that consciousness is something non-physical. Because when we talk about some 'thing' having a subjective experience, we are talking about a physical thing in process. It is not a separate thing that floats apart from something physical, it is part of physical reality. It is what its like to BE that physical thing.

We don't have the answer to what its like for something else to subjectively experience, therefore it is outside of what can be known.
This is incorrect, it can be known, we are it. We don’t fully know the processes involved, be it is known, we just need to be able to see the wood for the trees. — Punshhh

Yes, "Me". You know what YOU have when you subjectively experience. Is there a way in science to hook me up to a screen and see what I see and feel what I feel? When I say, "Ow, I'm in pain," can you objectively know what its like for me to experience that pain, or do you only know from my words and actions? This is the classic hard problem.

I’m not saying it isn’t a physical process, it’s just a different physical process, an ethereal one in a supevalent relationship with it’s physical partner. — Punshhh

Then we have no disagreement. As long as you're not claiming its something 'non-physical' as in 'an entity that is not physical', then we're both thinking in the same terms.

↪Philosophim . Non-physicality is a way of describing not a object. — Danileo

So a process or verb? But a process and verb is an object or set of objects in action.

I could do a reverse argument and say that what is physical is a construction of our mind and therefore is grounded on our mind. So the foundation of what exists occured in our mind and therefore all theories have the same validation in matters of how they are constructed (not talking on probability or proofs) — Danileo

Feel free to just make the argument, no worry. :) As it stands you run into the same problems. You still have to define what a mind is independent of the physical, so you would still need a clear definition of what is non-physical, then proof that it exists. Using 'mind' as a placeholder concept without understanding its underlying underpinning is fine, but that's far different from claiming, "I know a mind is non-physical, here's clear proof."

I'll let you build out your full argument out first however. No need to rush it.

↪Philosophim You understand that this is one philosophical position. It is called physicalism. — I like sushi

No, I don't. The problem with ascribing me to one 'genre' is that I have no idea if I ascribe to everything in that genre. What I'm posting is not complicated and can be addressed by normal terminology and logic.

If you claim you are not talking about physicalism just spit out what you are talking about to avoid confusion if possible. — I like sushi

I already said I'm not. What area are you confused by? I'll try to clarify.

↪Philosophim and a physical process can only produce physical theories? — Danileo

A physical process is still physical. It doesn't become some type of entity that is separate from what is physical. You can classify physical processes as, "Mental processes" when the physical process of an active brain occurs. But a 'mental process' is a type of physical process.

To demonstrate a non-physical existence, you need to show something that exists independently of the physical. You need to carefully define it, and demonstrate that it exists. If you cannot, then you've essentially created an undefinable word that cannot be experienced. If you cannot do so, then 'non-physical' describes nothing and is nothing.

What was your point?
You are dismissing the ethereal being because it can’t to demonstrated physically to exist. — Punshhh

No, I'm dismissing it because you can't show that it exists. You need to explain what it is to have a non-physical thing exist, then demonstrate that such a thing actually exists in reality.

No, consciousness is simply a more advanced form of computation.
To the extent, perhaps, that a chemical reaction is a form of computation. But that does not encompass what consciousness is.
You seem to be about to declare that consciousness is emergent from computation alone. That if there is sufficient computation going on in a system, or body, then it will be conscious. — Punshhh

Yes, it is emergent from physical processes alone. No, the physical processes for consciousness must occur to have consciousness. This is why we can put someone under anesthesia and knock them unconscious. We stop the physical process of the brain responsible for consciousness.

I don’t know why anyone would think that AI might be conscious. Perhaps they conflate intelligence with consciousness. — Punshhh

I noted that objectively by some AIs actions, they have very low level consciousness. This is different from a subjective consciousness. A subjective consciousness is the experience of being what is. We can't know what its like to be a complex program, just like I can't know what its like to be you.

Just like I won't know what its like for you to be subjectively conscious as you are either.
It’s not that difficult, we are near identical. — Punshhh

Its incredibly difficult, and part of the hard problem of consciousness. Do you see green the way I do? We have color blind people who don't. What do they see the different colors as? Yes, we're observing the same wavelength of light, but what is that individual subjective experience of interpreting that light? There are people who cannot visualize. I can close my mind and 'see' images and replay experiences. There are some people who close their eyes and all they 'see' is the back of their eyelids. Can I know what that's like to subjectively live and think like that? No. We could perhaps gather objective data by having people of one type solve or think about problems and see how each camp handles them, but we can't know what its like to BE them.

Yes, that all makes sense, but it doesn’t capture consciousness, it’s all within the scope of computation and intelligence. — Punshhh

Can you define what you mean by consciousness? I think that's key to the discussion and if we don't have the same understanding of the definition, we'll talk over ourselves. There should be a definition that handles the objective, and one that handles the subjective.

But it is still a mechanical machine, you know levers and rope. — Punshhh

True, but that's what we are as well. Your brain is the combination of many individual cells. You are not 'one thing'. You are the combination of all of those processes that results in you having thoughts. One way to think about it is on a macro scale. Imagine a person, now imagine the entirety of a city. A person has an individual function, but when they're in a set of rules and processes like going to a job, going home, etc., the entire massive process can be identified and grouped as something unique from the processes of people. It doesn't mean that it exists apart from people or that its 'non-physical'. Its just the result of physical processes combining together.

Have you come across the idea of a philosophical zombie? There could be another universe like ours, but without any consciousness. — Punshhh

To be clear, without any subjective conscious. Its a fun thought experiment, but its essentially the 'evil demon' argument from Descartes or 'brain in a vat'. What if you're just a brain in a vat and this is all imagined? What if an evil demon is actually making you perceive reality differently? What if there are people who don't have subjective experiences? These are all fun things to think about, but the one thing they have in common is they are unprovable. We have absolutely no way of knowing one way or the other, so the reasonble thing is to say they are outside of what can be known, and the only logical solution is to rely on what can be known.

Once they were self replicating,( I am oversimplifying to make my point) they were able to evolve more sophisticated forms. All very well, they were like our philosophical zombie. — Punshhh

We cannot know that. For all we know, there is a subjective experience of being a single cell. Of being even something we don't consider life like an atom. After all, we are composed of atoms, so there is something in matter that causes a subjective experience. We just don't know fully what that is yet. Maybe when a group of cells gets together, there is some new subjective consciousness. Do you think all the cells of your brain know the experience of the group consciousness? Does a person working in the office know the experience of the city as a whole? We don't have the answer to what its like for something else to subjectively experience, therefore it is outside of what can be known.

Again, sounds like you're ascribing what is non-physical to a physical process.
No, they coexist in a supervenient relationship. — Punshhh

A physical process is a supervenient relationship to the physical entities involved in the process. You'll need to explain specifically why its not a physical process.