I've read through the thread. There are some darned good points being made. — Treatid

I appreciate the read and compliment!

Let me address the topic that you pointed out directly and accurately.

There are infinite (unlimited) possible categorisations — Treatid

True. We can create infinite distinctive knowledge. But can we accurately apply them? And if we do, are they useful to us for that particular situation? Taken within the solo context of the paper, this is a description, not a criticism. As long as we can applicably know whatever categorization we create, its objective knowledge.

However, if we include the context of one other person, we suddenly have new challenges. This original post did not address how social context works, as it was a long enough paper as it is. I will post the rest for you in the follow up in the "Reserved for further posts here", as I wasn't sure if readers were going to get that far into it.

Summary:

Social communication requires context, both distinctively, and applicably. The first thing which must be established before communication can occur is to find an agreement of essential properties within a definition. The essential properties of a 'tree' for a casual person may be very different than for a botanist for example. Once the properties are agreed upon by both parties, then applicable knowledge can begin.

So: A tall bush may be applicably known as a 'tall tree' by a group of average people, but that same tall tree is applicably known as "Bushicus tallimax" by botanists.

How do we agree what definitions to use? Through a combination of several factors.

1. Efficiency (Energy and time spent per result)
2. Effectiveness (How useful is it to us. Why do I care that that tree is a bush if I'm not a botanist?)
3. Danger in failure or loss of success (That bear is not friendly. I failed to identify this particular tree can cure cancer)

And of course, once you have established contextual definitions, the group could try for applicable knowledge or use the inductive hierarchy in application. I'm sure you can come up with more on your own as you seem to understand the underlying issues of the topic well. If you read the second part and feel like that did not adequately answer your points, please point them out again and I will address them.

Here we have the contradicting statements "All lemons are yellow" and "Not all lemons are yellow" proving that "unicorns exist". — Treatid

I think you have a severe misunderstanding. First, an assumption that two competing premises are true does not prove they are both true. In this case its clear that all lemons are not yellow is true, while "All lemons are yellow," is false.

Let me indicate what the Principle of Explosions is really indicating.

Lets say that I have the following proof.

A = A
A -> B
B -> C

If all are true, then this is proven. However, lets say that we discover that A -> !B. We now have a contradiction that invalidates this particular proof. But that does not invalidate logic.

To invalidate logic, we would need to discover that both A -> B and A -> !B and both are true. Again, not in the metaphorical sense but in the literal. At that, a fundamental of logic, that something cannot be proven to be both true and false at the same time would be invalid and result in the Principle of Explosion you're talking about.

1. We know that "Not all lemons are yellow", as it has been assumed to be true.
2. We know that "All lemons are yellow", as it has been assumed to be true. — Wikipedia

To your example, you should not be able to see why this doesn't cause an Explosion. The assumption of truth is not the proof of truth. Often times in logic, assumptions are made and later proven false. This is actually a logical method of proof called Reductio Ad Absurdum. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductio_ad_absurdum

To prove a contradiction exists, you must demonstrate that something both literally does, and does not exist at the same time. So far, no one has been able to demonstrate this within Axiomatic mathematics, so the logic stands.

You ask me to point to the specific inconsistency that destroys Axiomatic Mathematics...

You test my ability to take all posts in good faith. — Treatid

My intention was only to get clarification. A question asking you to clarify your stance is what good faith argumentation does. This helped me to see what you were thinking about, and allowed me to address the argument to your premises, and not my own. I wanted to avoid a "Straw man fallacy", or an instance in which a person invents or points to a premise the OP is not talking about, and makes the argument about that.

If his belief system was correct (and I don't know), he had nothing to be afraid of because he was just about to start the journey of eternity with a purportedly loving God. I personally feel that if his belief system was wrong — Andrew Tyson

You are correct. Modern day science has shown us without a doubt that death is final. Some despair, but you shouldn't. It should motivate you. Understand this is it. No second chances. Live your life as you want now, because you never will get another chance. Maybe we would have more people motivated to go into the sciences to extend life span if we all accepted the reality of death. Maybe more people would chase their dreams.

To me, it is a tragedy for most people to be deluded into thinking there's something after this is over.

The Principle of Explosion is why inconsistency is a problem. — Treatid

Sure, but you never pointed out the inconsistency that destroys Axiomatic math.

If a contradiction were to appear inside the universe then, logically, the universe must disappear in a puff of logic.

According to Axiomatic Mathematics, there are many inconsistent systems. These systems exist within the universe. Why hasn't the universe poofed out of existence. — Treatid

True. Do you have a specific example of when something both existed and did not exist at the same time in the universe? And I don't mean metaphysically, but in reality.

Second, you'll need to point out a contradiction in math, and prove that it necessarily represents the universe accurately. A claim of 'inconsistent systems' is not enough.

The separation between Axiomatic (or Logical) systems doesn't exist. — Treatid

Correct. Logical systems are built upon smaller proven parts.

Axiomatic mathematics must have distinctions between systems in order to exist. But the boundaries can't be seen. There is nothing to measure. They are the poster child of belief without evidence. — Treatid

I don't understand what you're stating here. Could you give an example?

If everything is connected then Logic, Axiomatic Mathematics and the whole universe are inconsistent. By the rules of Axiomatic Mathematics inconsistent systems have no information content.

Axiomatic Mathematics needs a distinction between systems to exist. — Treatid

How is everything inconsistent? I also don't understand your claim that axiomatic mathematics needs a distinction between its 'systems'. (What's a system?)

Logic is a theory of arguments. It (tries to) describe how a form of communication works. — Treatid

No, logic is a combination of proofs that have not been reasonably countered. Like I mentioned earlier, you cannot have an object 'A' both exist and not exist at the same time. A != A is proven to be wrong.

Your existence encompasses the whole of your existence. All your experiences are part and parcel of your existence. You are as certain of your direct experiences as you are of anything else. — Treatid

No disagreement here.

Logic never persuaded you that you feel pain and pleasure. You feel pain and pleasure because... you do. — Treatid

No, but logic can give something more reasonable to stand on then a feeling of certainty.

We can (indeed, must) use our personal experiences as the solid foundation upon which to build... everything. — Treatid

We only need personal experiences if we only trust ourselves. If we trust proven systems, then no.

Solipsism says we cannot know anything with certainty except the self.

This isn't wrong - but the self includes everything you ever experience. When you stub your toe on a table; that experience is certain. Definite. — Treatid

Yes, the experience of existing is certain as you experience it. But whether that experience correctly interprets how you exist in relation to others is not. Descartes evil demon covers this. Or the brain in a vat argument. Just because you believe strongly that you've stubbed your toe is not a reason alone to conclude you stubbed your toe. That's just an emotional conviction.

A physical sentence isn't wrong. It isn't right either. These words don't have any meaning. They are just shapes in the universe. — Treatid

No, they have meaning by the concepts they represent. And those concepts can be right or wrong depending on if they are in accordance with reality, or contradict reality.

You, personally, decide how you will respond to what you read. — Treatid

Sure. But this doesn't prove that my belief of certainty matches reality. You're equating emotions and beliefs with logic. They are not the same.

Right and wrong (truth and false) are entirely subjective opinions determined by each individual. — Treatid

It depends on the context. If I want to make up names for things I can. If I want to say that a rock hurtling through the air is about to hit me in the head, I am wrong.

I highly encourage you to read the work I linked you in the last post. You're the kind of person who can think along those lines, and I think it would be very valuable to help you sort out the thoughts your currently going through.

From what you said (in the above quote), you are implying that I would be equally morally responsible for the five deaths as the one; and thusly it wouldn't make sense to, then, let the five die at the expense of the one. — Bob Ross

No, I wasn't trying to imply that you had responsibility. I was asking what you felt would be right.

In the trolley dilemma, I am not morally responsible — Bob Ross

I think I see our difference here. I don't hold morality is a responsibility. I hold it as a choice. So for you, its not about choice, but responsibility. Thus you can be absolved of responsibility in certain situations no matter the outcome. The 'fate' part was more about outcome, so we don't need to focus on it.

I view morality as a matter of preferable outcomes based upon our choices. Responsibility doesn't enter into the equation for me. Mostly because I don't know what would be dictating responsibilities, and it seems to add a layer of complexity on a topic that is already complex enough. So to that point, what is dictating moral responsibilities? How do we rationally determine what we are, and are not responsible for?

Walk away. I cannot sacrifice innocent human beings to save other innocent human beings: the consequences are not what dictates what is right or wrong but, rather, the act—and the act is immoral. — Bob Ross

You didn't strike me as one to believe in fate. So because one innocent person would die if you saved five people, you would let the five people die because other forces that are already in motion would lead to their death. If that is your answer, how do you arrive at that decision?

I no longer see suicide as a rare fact... Their rates are higher than ever. — javi2541997

Its now about what you think, its about what is.

https://ourworldindata.org/suicide

"For some countries in Southern Africa and Eastern Europe, the estimated rates of suicide are high, with over 15 annual deaths per 100,000 people.

Meanwhile, for other countries in Europe, South America, and Asia, the estimated rates of suicide are lower, with under 10 annual deaths per 100,000 people."

So lets split the difference on this and go 13/100,000 people. That's a suicide rate each year of .013%
Peruse the sight for more data breakdowns if you want. But it is a fact that suicide is rare.

This is the point I was trying to get to. For you, if the case of human agency is a non-factor, you'll pull to save the greatest number. But you favor human agency over the the greatest number. I also don't disagree with this.

For me, it is that I cannot intentionally kill an innocent person (where it is implied it is against their will) period. — Bob Ross

Interesting. So if we have the trolley problem, both sides have innocent people, and both sides plead for you to save them by throwing the switch or walk away, what would you do?

Why is it rare? I think you are misunderstanding "should" with wish. — javi2541997

By statistics. If you really think you should die, you attempt to commit suicide. Most people do not attempt to commit suicide who are healthy. Therefore it is rare by fact. This is incontrovertible.

Eternal life is not scary at all. I view it like a child who is afraid of becoming an adult. They simply don't understand what its like. But its rare that anyone in any stage of their healthy life thinks they should die. So it would be 1000 to 100,000,000 years from now.

I'm about to come in hot. I can do this because you are making clear statements of position that I can engage with.

Thank you for that. — Treatid

No problem! This is the place where you can. Please enjoy thinking and challenging to your hearts content.

It is impossible to prove anything beyond all doubt (except, perhaps, your own existence is self-evident to you). — Treatid

I doubt that. And if doubt had any weight on its own, your statement would crumble. Doubt alone means nothing. I can doubt anything I want. What matters is "Reasonable doubt". If I say, "I doubt that unicorn's aren't real," someone can ask me, "What's your evidence for such a doubt?" If I say, "Because I want there to be unicorns," my doubt is just a feeling and can be dismissed.

Doubt is never the standard by which objectivity is determined. After all, people doubt that the world is a sphere. Doubts which can be tested, are falsifiable, and have good reasoning behind them can be considered as viable challenges to established claims. Anything else can easily be discarded.

There are no (logical or mathematical) proofs. — Treatid

Can you prove this? You're running into a classic conundrum of, "There is no reality/certainty etc." Your own statements fall into your own accusation. In which case, why should your statements hold any weight?

Look at it this way.

Option 1: There is not objectivity, so anything goes.
Option 2: There is objectivity, so not everything goes.

If you pick option 1 and I pick option 2, I don't have to accept your premises, while you have to accept that its fine for me to hold option 2. If you insist that I'm wrong, then you've countered your own argument. You're claiming, "Option 1 is objectively true, while option 2 is objectively false." Or better/relative comparative value that is more than an opinion. Option 1 is rationally worthless.

So while I could demonstrate a logical or mathematical proof, I'm instead putting the onus on you. You do the work of proving why option 1 doesn't collapse into pointlessness. And by doing so, option 1 crumbles. If you don't prove it, then I get to ignore it. If you do prove it, then you counter your own argument.

It is the nature of the universe that you cannot have definite proofs (as defined by formal logic and axiomatic mathematics). — Treatid

Again, feel free to prove this. Once again, doing so will defeat the statement.

Solispsism destroys Axiomatic Mathematics. — Treatid

Once again, the onus is on you to prove this statement.

Do you have a specific reason why we should disregard solipsism and the observations that lead to it? — Treatid

I have plenty, but first you must demonstrate why there is any reason we should accept solipsism and the observations that lead to it. Why should I, a person who isn't you, accept that you are able to prove that the only thing I can know exists is me?

I like the style/rigour of what you are doing. But I think what you are trying to do is impossible. — Treatid

I appreciate it, but we're on the philosophy boards. We can claim things are possible or impossible, but its all about proving it. Can you prove its impossible? What you're doing otherwise is taking the weak position of trying to have everyone else prove something which you haven't clearly spelled out yourself. You're committing the very flaw you're accusing others of.

Yes, it would make communication clearer and faster if we had rigorous definitions that everyone understood and agreed with. That isn't reality. — Treatid

So if you read the paper, you'll find that I both form foundations and standards upon which we can have definitive knowledge. Yet I also note there are plenty of times (in fact, the majority) in which much of our claims, language, etc, are based on induction. This is necessary for efficient communication, as creating a solidly known definition takes time and effort that is generally not required in day to day conversation. That does not mean it is impossible to create objective knowledge or terms.

So yes, most of our communication is filled with inductive premises, but that's a far cry from stating it is impossible to create or think on something objective. Again, you need to prove this yourself, not take the weak stance of making everyone else do the work to counter a claim you haven't fully tested yourself.

For example, I think you cannot justify the distinction you make between thought and experience.

Thought and experience are aspects of a single whole. You can't have thought without experience and vice versa. — Treatid

Then you misunderstood the definitions. Thoughts are an experience. I never say otherwise. "All tigers are cats, but not all cats are tigers." for example.

If we get into the weeds - we don't know what 'thinking', 'existing', 'experience' or 'self' mean in a definite manner. — Treatid

Yes, you do. You do within your own experience. Words are tools we use to categorize discrete experiences and concepts. They can be loosely defined, or very tightly defined. That's your call. If you wish to define something to the point it can be objective, you can, it just takes a lot of effort. To communicate with others, there must be a certain level of rigid definition to the term that both of you share, or else communication would be impossible. If I say 'dog' but my personal definition of dog is 'monkey', then we're at a loss with each other.

But if I'm a botanist who studies tree species, I'm going to have very rigorous definitions and standards that I share among my co-workers. These are objective terms used to identify plant species. Without this, science would be worthless.

While you get that definitions and communication are contextual, the contextual does not mean we can't have objective definitions. The contextual decides how objective our definitions are required or expected to be in that particular context. Just because you choose to remain in a context that you decide not to use objective definitions, does not mean its impossible for there to be a context in which there are tight objective definitions and conclusions.

If you can describe a static object you will have shown that I'm wrong and that I don't know what I'm talking about. — Treatid

Certainly, a 1X1X1 inch cube of solid iron with a density that weighs 10 grams.

A. You haven't actually described anything. "Objects are not relationships" is not a description of an Object. — Treatid

Its iron, its in the shape of a cube with 1X1X1 dimensions, and it weighs 10 grams. This can be tested and confirmed objectively.

B. What you have actually described is relationships. My default position is that if you manage to describe something it must have actually been a (set of) relationships in the first place. — Treatid

The universe changes, so it must be composed of stuff that can change. The universe is connected so it must be composed of things that connect. The universe is diverse so it must be composed of differences.

Objects do not have these properties. The universe is not composed of objects.

We label the things Relationships. — Treatid

I'm going to fire back here and note that your definition of "Relationship" needs to be tighter. If you're going to dismiss normal use of commonly accepted words and introduce your own meaning, you need to be very clear for it to be accepted. Objects do not have relationships like people do. Objects are described and known by experience and properties. If this simple language does not work, you need to detail why.

Philosophers, mathematicans and physicists have been looking for definitive, absolute truths to build upon. Objective truths. An Objective Universe. — Treatid

This is something you are already familiar with as philosophers. You already know that objective definitions are a hard problem.

Don't fight this result. Lean into it. Accept it. Then work forward from there. — Treatid

Not at all. Being intellectually lazy and giving up to pat ourselves on the back is what the general populace does. Don't ever fall for that intellectual trap. Your mind, like your muscles, wants to be lazy, sit on a couch and get fat. Don't let that happen. If you're interested in epistemology, I have at least one objective definition here. There's a good summary in the following post if that helps.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

↪Philosophim But then for anyone who seriously asks that question, the inherent goodness of existence must precisely be in question, must it not? — Pantagruel

Yes, what I do here is question the inherent goodness of existence, and determine that if there is an objective morality, it must conclude that existence, as a fundamental, should be. After the proof is finished, there is no longer any question. Even if my other proposals which build upon this fundamental are flawed, this fundamental answer to the base question stands.

The only sense, the only sense in which any of this makes any sense, is in the sense of the Shakespearian question. So if you are actually contemplating whether to be or not to be, as a choice, then you can come to the conclusion that existence is a good. — Pantagruel

Correct, and that is all this section is proving. The follow up post is where I try to logically build something off of this fundamental. Maybe I'm right, maybe I'm wrong. Feel free to post your critiques in that section and I'll address them to the best of my abilities.

Hang on. If good is what should be, then morality is an evaluation of what should be. Sure. If anything, that exactly contradicts your conclusion that existence is good, since it is about a good which does not yet exist (but can be instantiated by actions). — Pantagruel

Right, so morality is an analysis of what ought to be. So, if presented with two scenarios, I can use the premises of a morality to decide what outcome would be most optimal, or good. In this instance, its the state of there being existence, vs there being none at all. Where is the contradiction here?

"If existence should not be, then it is not good" Alright. But who says existence should not be? What is the point of assuming that? All you are doing is begging the question of the contrary, and trying to make it look like you are somehow deriving it from a logical operation (self-contradiction). — Pantagruel

Let me post these points from the OP again:

a. Assume that there is an objective morality.

If there is not an objective morality, then of course this is moot.

b. This leaves two answers to the question, "Should there be existence?". They are, "Yes", or "No".

Now we have a binary. If one is true, the other is false. — Philosophim

In sum, we work down to a fundamental question of morality, and realize there can be only two answers. Logically, if I demonstrate that one answer leads to a contradiction, then this means the other solution must be true if it does not lead to a contradiction. This is a basic Reductio Ad Absurdum argument. There is no begging of any question here.

What I really, really dislike is the way that you are now, in subsequent posts, presenting all of these poorly substantiated and widely criticized assumptions in an axiomatic fashion — Pantagruel

Why? The subsequent posts rely on the conclusions of the previous posts. This helps separate the arguments into chunks for better discussion, and helps focus the conversation on areas that people have difficulty with. I'm also clearly indicating that each post builds upon the last. If you don't agree with previous points, then you won't be able to understand how I build to the new points.

some of your fundamental assumptions are highly idiosyncratic and far from intuitively clear, as the objectors have been trying to point out. — Pantagruel

Feel free to point them out. I have no objection to that. But specify them, don't generally accuse if you want to make a point. I'll answer as they come, and if you point out something I agree with, I'll let you know. Just post them in the section that best suits your questions.

Then you start presenting more idiosyncratic ideas in later posts like "quantifying existence", which really isn't a thing. — Pantagruel

Feel free to post in that one about quantification of existence. I can refer to the OP points there, answer your questions, and go into detail. However, I don't want to get into a lengthy discussion on that section, if you don't find the premises that build to it sound. Then we've just wasted both of our times when really we needed to agree to the underlying points first (Or at least assume it while discussing the next steps).

Of course, if in the later steps I contradict conclusions in the earlier steps, that's perfectly fine to call out.

It's like you are trying to retroactively confer authority on your own un-substantiated axioms by weaving them into a system that people must agree with before they can criticize it. — Pantagruel

Nope. You'll find I'm straight forward with any issues or questions you have. Its just a simple A-> B -> C set of arguments, so if you're going to argue against point C because you believe point A is wrong, we really need to discuss point A before C. I am not claiming that you must agree to all the points in this, the first post. Only that if you want to discuss the later posts, its assumed that you understand and accept the premises of the previous posts.

First, even if there is an objective morality, it is inherently nonsensical that that morality should make existential claims. Morality is by definition about right and wrong. — Pantagruel

Lets look at the definitions in the OP once again.

Good - what should be
Existence - what is
Morality - a method of evaluating what is good

If good is "what should be" then morality is an analysis of evaluating "what should be". Therefore it is not nonsensical using these definitions. If you would like to propose other definitions, and why they would be better, then we can discuss that.

You are committing a flagrant category mistake by attempting to extrapolate from a moral ought to a metaphysical is. What would it even mean to assert "there should be no existence"? — Pantagruel

I'll repost point one again:

1. All moral questions boil down to one fundamental question that must be answered first, "Should there be existence?"

Starting with human centric morality, a question might be asked, "Should I lie to another person for personal gain?" But to truly answer this objectively, I must first have the answer to the question. "Should I exist at all?" Yet this goes further. until we arrive at a fundamental question of morality that must be answered before anything else can. "Should there be existence at all?" — Philosophim

My point is if good is "what ought to be" and we are analyzing "what ought to be", all moral questions will arrive at a fundamental that must be answered. "Should anything exist?" If existence should not be, then it is not good. If existence should be, then it is good. And to be clear, we are talking about any existence vs no existence at all. This is not 'existents' or discrete identifies of existence like atoms, humans, etc. This is the fundamental question of, "If there would be no existence, or some existence at all, what would an objective morality have to answer?"

All your claims about an objective morality being existentially self-founding prove is that anything which exists must exist in a state of non-self-contradiction. — Pantagruel

No, I don't prove ruductio ad absurdum. I'm using it to prove a point that any objective morality that claims, "Existence should not be" contradicts itself. Let me post the last few points again:

e. If it is the case that there is something objective which concludes there should be no existence, that objectivity must exist.

f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist.

g. If it shouldn't exist, then the answer "No" objectively shouldn't exist thus contradicting itself. — Philosophim

This is not the same as a banana proving that it is good. This is noting that at the fundamental question, there is a binary response. One leads to a contradiction, the other one does not, therefore the other one is true.

As others have pointed out, all you are doing is repeatedly assuming what you are claiming to "prove," which is that existence is good. — Pantagruel

And once again, those others are clearly wrong. I assume both binaries, and the binary that "Existence should not be" contradicts itself, while the "Existence should be," does not. Its a fairly straight forward Reductio ad absurdum argument.

In fact, there is extensive evidence to the fact that moral badness exists. — Pantagruel

True. You may want to read the next steps then. This part is only about answering the fundamental of "Existence vs non-existence". In my later papers that are linked in the OP, I note how to identify within existence discrete entities called 'existents'. So at that point I'm able to say, "This is separate from that" in existence. As we dig deeper, we find that some existents and their combinations result in over all more or less existence. For example, it is more existence for a father and son to live then the father to die and the son to live.

For now, understand that we are starting a base fundamental here, and the problem of the fundamental should be analyzed as it is.

I see, so while innocence is a factor, the an important ingredient here is self-agency.

I would say both are important. Not everything one does to themselves is morally permissible (in virtue of ‘self-agency’). — Bob Ross

No disagreement, I agree.

So I assume in the case of the one person on the track yelling, "Do it!" dramatically like out of a movie, you would be ok with throwing the track to hit them instead of the five who yelled, "No, please don't!".

Not necessarily. I would have to be certain that they really mean it: otherwise, I would error on the side of assuming they don’t consent. — Bob Ross

I'm not trying to play any hidden tricks here. We'll assume they mean it and are just very dramatic about it. :)

What if both sides plead with you to kill them and save the other side?

Assuming both parties really mean it and are in their right minds to mean it genuinely (e.g., they aren’t mentally ill, impaired, etc.), then I would pull the lever. — Bob Ross

This is the point I was trying to get to. For you, if the case of human agency is a non-factor, you'll pull to save the greatest number. But you favor human agency over the the greatest number. I also don't disagree with this.

The five plead with you to kill them instead of save the one, while the one is pleading with you not kill them, but kill the other five?

This was just to see if numbers ever came into play. No worry. — Bob Ross

I'm not quite sure you understand what solipsism is. Solipsism is the idea that the self is the only thing which can be known to exist. Lets take your idea and say, "Everything is sensory data." Well that includes the self. Meaning we wouldn't know if the self-exists "apart from sensory data" as well. There would be no reason then to say, "I only know I exist."

You make a good point. Thank you for your response! — Frog

Its always pleasant to interact with people such as yourself! Thank you.

If morality is truly objective, and our emotions are guides to help us follow this morality, then why does this "objective" morality differ from culture to culture? Why do the Chinese value upholding their honour more than we in the west do? Why do the Slavics find it correct to hold in their emotions rather than to "burden" others with them? Why is politeness and discipline considered a core trait in Japan, and not so much in, say, the Baltics? — Frog

They key is to look at what's in common, even among their differences. For example, there is no culture that values murder or stealing. In cases where there is variation, I've found if you look at the environment or political system, you can see that its all about preservation of a certain power dynamic.

For example, in a place with scarce resources, a culture may honor the land more. In a monarchy system, loyalty to higher status individuals is emphasized, while in democratic cultures, higher status loyalty to lower status individuals is more highly praised.

I'm working on my ow proposal for objective morality where I note that if an objective morality exists, there must be a minimal fundamental to build on. Its here if you're curious. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/15203/in-any-objective-morality-existence-is-inherently-good/p1

I think its refreshing to see a debate over words in another language. Its a reminder that the battle of words as representatives of truth is a hill we shouldn't die on. We make up words after all. Its whether their concept apply correctly to reality that matters.

This seems like a slippery slope here, assigning individuals "value." To believe that someone is objectively more valuable than another is — Frog

Its a nice ideal to not do this, but practically we do this all the time. Parents will throw themselves in danger to save their children. Men will sacrifice their lives by going to war to save their families. If we have an old person vs a young person who need a kidney transplant, and we only have one, most people would want the younger person saved.

A. It is only dangerous if we have no objective standard of morality. If we say, "Whatever you feel is moral is moral", then yes, any morality is dangerous because subjectivity is a terrible way to judge the value of others.

B. Again, this only happens if morality is subjective.

C. Our government does this all the time. WE do this all the time. Did you know there is enough money in America to feed the entire world? Did you know we could pay the medical bills of all Americans and no one would ever have to die of starvation or lack of medical care again? Most people could probably live comfortably on far less and give to the less fortunate so they have a better quality of life and don't die, but most don't.

While it is my belief that yes, we are all simply variables in a grand calculus, and that we don't truly matter, to reduce another man to a number is to waste the power you have to make him truly valued. — Frog

You don't actually believe that. If you actually believed that, you wouldn't care. But you do. What you can't do is create an objective reason why beyond your own emotions, so you come up with the only thing that can make rational sense without saying, "There must be an objective morality I'm not aware of." The thing which actually does make sense is, "There must be an objective morality I'm not aware of." But we would have to admit we don't know it. Some people have a hard time with this.

We are all insignificant to the universe, and we can only ever be significant to one another, and by refusing to acknowledge them as people, you waste this power. — Frog

Yeah again, you don't actually believe this. Here's the thing. Emotionally? I hardly care about anyone. I could kill, steal, and lie to people and it wouldn't impact me negatively. Also, I don't feel any particular joy or triumph from committing evil to another person either. Meaning, I have every right to believe that there is no objective morality and that nothing matters, but I don't. Why? Because emotions are guides, but they are not ultimately why we should make rational decisions.

My observations demonstrate to me a strong objective pattern of morality that belies subjectivity underlying human cultures. Not that I'm saying I've figured it out. But the idea that there is no morality or that it is purely subjective just doesn't seem to coincide with the smaller and larger patterns of interactive reality among living things. In the same breath you say it doesn't matter, but then berate me that we shouldn't waste our power in your beliefs. I would much rather you say "nothing matters" but act like it does however. And I'm sure you would for me too.

I say lets work on figuring out the patterns of morality instead of saying things we don't believe in, possibly confusing other people like me who have little emotional guidance to guide them. AI is coming, and we better have a morality to teach it. We can't afford to pat ourselves on the back with moral nihilism. Its not clever, and it helps no one.

However, it would be immoral for someone else to try to force me to voluntarily sacrifice myself to save other people because it is no longer voluntary if I do it. — Bob Ross

I see, so while innocence is a factor, the an important ingredient here is self-agency. So I assume in the case of the one person on the track yelling, "Do it!" dramatically like out of a movie, you would be ok with throwing the track to hit them instead of the five who yelled, "No, please don't!".

That leads to two more scenarios then. What if:

a. The five plead with you to kill them instead of save the one, while the one is pleading with you not kill them, but kill the other five?

b. What if both sides plead with you to kill them and save the other side?

He should never intentionally kill innocent people: even to avoid a bad outcome. — Bob Ross

I have a potentially interesting question for you Bob. Lets say it wasn't some other person, but yourself. You are presented with the following choice:

If you voluntarily choose to die, the world is saved.
If you decide not to die, the world dies and you die as well.

The thing is, you are an innocent person are you not?

How do you rationally reconcile the conflicts that arise from this scenario and your decision?

Espero que no te importe que haya usado el traductor de Google para que lo lean nuestros angloparlantes.

I google translated for our curious English speakers. Its a little rough, but it seems to cover JL Austin, and a very specific Spainish word's meaning. An interesting take as I'm not sure there's a direct translation to English, but here's the draft for others to read.

___________________________________________________________________________________

Testing testing...

Excellent! Finally a discussion that can be done all in Spanish from minute one. Generally, many philosophical aspects have already been discussed here... So, as a grain of sand, my contribution (I don't hope it will be the only one) will focus on the Selectivity test held last Monday. I will try to explain it using J.L.'s theories. austin

Context

The first test consists of language and literature. In addition to analyzing this and that morphologically, the teachers asked the students a very curious question:

A synonym for missing.

The first thing I thought was absent or absent... But according to the Civil Code, it is not the same, so I retracted my thoughts. First of all, what is missing?
The R.A.E says in this regard: Said of a person: That his whereabouts are unknown, without it being known if he lives. And as synonyms he quotes: dead, deceased, bloodless, extinct, stiff, tilinte, deceased...

I don't think many people use those words in their daily lives. And this reminded me of J.L. Austin and his theories within the philosophy of language.

Following Austin, "missing" is a normal word. In this sense, it is more than established and firmly adopted into ordinary language by the majority of Spanish society. In fact, when there is no more news about a person, it is said that he has disappeared or, at most, that he is absent. What I intend to explain is that, ordinarily speaking, disappeared will be the word that first appears in the language of average Spanish, and not exangüe or tilinte...

Furthermore, disappeared always has the same meaning. It is not ambiguous. On the other hand, dead and deceased is that of a person who is known to no longer live. So here there is a contradiction by the RAE. In the definition of missing, it objects to whether the subject lives or not. But to declare the death of a person, the date from which the death is understood to have occurred must be proven. They are two different states. In disappearance there is hope that the person continues to live, but in the deceased there is no hope.

It is also a dimensional word. It covers any situation to which an answer cannot be found because a person is not there. That is, it is the most understandable word in the group of synonyms offered by the R.A.E. I do not intend to exclude the others, but rather to explain that the first notion of finding a word that answers "that", that a person does not know anything about them, is gone.

Because it cannot be answered with the same word, I continue to choose absent, which curiously does not appear in the group of synonyms expressed above. :smile:

What would you have responded?

then its a different question
— Philosophim

Well, what's your answer to the different question? — Apustimelogist

I don't mind answering, just wanted to point out that we can make an infinite number of variables problems like the trolley problem, but the OP is trying to get an answer to the trolley problem.

If I have to kill 999 vs 1000 personally, I would still choose the 999. If you're noting that if I don't kill 999 people, 1000 people will die, I would kill the 999. We are of course speaking in absolutes where there are no other options.

Morality has to do with intent.

So is the variable here inaction of watching people die, or affirmative action pulling the lever to kill one of them? Is this inaction versus action?

Or is the question whether it is better to kill one person or five people in this scenario? — Fire Ologist

I believe those are both of the variables involved.

You have to figure out if you do, or do not value one life over five. The second part is responsibility. Are you responsible? There is variability within the argument, and its up to you to decide what those variable values should be.

All of the variables and so many more facts are important to understand before we can judge morality from this — Fire Ologist

The key to a thought problem is to solve it within its limitations, then afterward extend it into interesting discussion. None of the factors are relevant to giving an answer to the problem as presented. If its not mentioned "People on the trolley could be hurt" for example, its not relevant. After you give your answer, then you can ask the more interesting questions. But the question as it is is designed this way for a very specific reason and purpose. In THIS limited situation, what is more moral?

What if you had to execute the 999 people yourself? — Apustimelogist

If you change the thought experiment, then its a different question. Is what I'm stating wrong within the confines of the basic trolley problem? Equally valued human beings stuck on a track with an unstoppable train. The only decision you have is whether to press the lever to divert the train to another track with less people trapped on it. People will die no matter what you do.

I choose to divert the train to the track with less people on it because its simple math. If everyone is of unknown value, then we must assume equal value. In that case, we make the choice that sacrifices less lives. It is a problem of context, not a decision that universally applies in all other contexts. Feel free to disagree within the confines of the problem's intent. Any disagreement outside of its intent is again, not what I'm discussing.

I do not always do what I think I ought to do. — unenlightened

Which is fine. I can acknowledge that smoking is immoral, but do it anyway. We can say that lying is wrong, yet lie when it conveniences us. The question of morality is not what we do, but what we ought to do and why.

But one of the things I believe one ought not do is calculate the moral value of lives in the way the problem and the situation invites, because every life has infinite value. — unenlightened

Interesting. That still does not absolve the issue however. There are five equally infinitely valuable lives vs one equally valuable life. And yes, there can be multiple infinities.

But neither do i think it is right to make the opposite calculation of course, that one life is worth more than five. — unenlightened

True, and that can be reasoned that one is not more than 5. But can we not reasonably extend that to 5 is more than one?

and neither do I believe there is any more virtue in inaction than in action. — unenlightened

Why is that? That seems very important to your conclusions. This is not merely acting, this is acting with a choice on who lives and dies. What reason is behind this?

So I have nothing. — unenlightened

No, you have something here. You have some reasons, and an impetus that you haven't quite tackled yet. That's philosophical thought. Trying to make sense of what we do beyond an animal instinct.

In other words, I am not a consequentialist. — unenlightened

No one would say you are in this limited instance. I would not fear thinking on matters because you think it will give you a 'philosophical identity'. They are simple digests of complex ideas for beginners and the masses. Real philosophers just think, and what conclusions can be gleaned from situation to situation should be based on the context and logic of the discussion at that moment.

I don't agree. Most philosophical thought experiments are silly. To have any value, a thought experiment should take into account the issues we see in the real world. It can still be simple, but it has to be real. — T Clark

That's fair. If you're looking for a more complete moral theory, the trolley problem is useless. Proper philosophy is built upon several small arguments that should logically co-exist together. The trolley problem is just a small example as an introduction into philosophical thoughts. Its no surprising that a person like yourself who I feel has a much broader and deeper understanding of philosophy sees little value in it.

Sorry, I feel like I've waylaid your discussion. I know this wasn't the direction you wanted to take it. — T Clark

No worry! Its not my OP. I didn't think it was off topic though.

How often would that type of scenario actually happen in the real world. Answer - almost never. Given that, why has this become such a centerpiece of moral philosophy? — T Clark

Because morality is extremely complicated, and you can start with a very simple example that's easy for others to comprehend. In a proper philosophical discussion in which the limits are clearly laid out, it gives us a small window to evaluate what we think would be the proper decision and why. Its a starter problem one can build off of. It is not the answer to morality in general.

OK, but let's make Trolley Car even more ridiculous by having 999 people tied on the track and 1000 in the car. If a person decides not to pull the switch, do you think they did something wrong? Would you condemn them? — RogueAI

Yes, because this is again, not an emotional problem. Morality is not about our emotions. If you can save 1000 over 999, in this very restricted situation, you do so. If all human beings are the same value in the scenario, this is what you do. If you wish to change the scenario, then of course the answer can differ. With the scenario as is, I see no other reasonable answer.

The one over the five people every time.
— Philosophim

Yes, but what about one over two. I pull the switch if it's five to one, but I'm not sure what I would do if there are only two people on the car. Or what about saving ten people at the cost of nine? Is that obvious? — RogueAI

To me, yes. Because the problem as presented is a math problem, and nothing more. We don't know the value of the people on the tracks. So at that point we save the greatest number of lives.

I'm not declaring a principle. I'm declaring, "In X scenario, this is the correct answer"
— Philosophim

The one over the five people every time.
— Philosophim

This is what I mean by a principle. but it turns out that you don't think it's every time, but only this specific time. — unenlightened

Yes, in the context of his example. You mistakenly assumed I meant for all examples, which is normal mistake. If you reread my entire passage however, you'll note that I added, "The complications come in when you consider the value of the individuals on the tracks." So you can tell that it was your misunderstanding of what I was intending, not me changing anything after the fact.

And the only lesson I can learn, in that case, is to ask Philosophim whenever there's a moral dilemma, because he will know the correct answer, but will not know why it is correct. That is more of a cult than a philosophy. — unenlightened

I thought you understood it was by basic arithmetic as you critiqued me on earlier. If there is no value comparison between the people, then saving five people over one is a no brainer to me. If you disagree, feel free to explain why. You have not been addressing the problem, but a straw man up until now by changing the example, or inserting intentions that I did not make.

I don't know what i would do, quite possibly freeze like most of the people in the video. But if I didn't freeze, I would pull the lever. But I would feel guilty about it, because I do not believe it is moral to do so. I believe it is the comfortable thing to do. — unenlightened

This is a counter answer to the problem which we can discuss! So lets assume you would know what to do, as we've thought about this before. You state you would pull the lever, but not believe it is moral to do so. Why? Morality is often thought of as, "What ought to be/happen." If you think the moral actions is that the lever should be pressed, then you think its moral to do so. Your guilt or emotions over the issue don't change whether something is moral or not.

We need a non-human intelligence. It is my hope that AI will one day be that intelligence.
— Philosophim

Many people, most notably red-blooded, liberty-loving Americans, including most of those who would benefit from a sensible system of distribution, would condemn you for that hope. — Vera Mont

Just like they would have condemned the declaration that Earth orbited around the sun. Or many other superstitions and examples of ignorance over the centuries. Despite this, knowledge ultimately triumphs. Of course there will be resistance, but that doesn't mean it can't be overcome.

Here's... as close as possible... to a real world test. Just to check how people would actually react rather than believe they would. — Christoffer

Unfortunately this isn't a good example. The situation adds an extra variable of expertise involved. The participants didn't fully understand the situation, and thought hitting the lever might make things worse. Makes sense. If I'm in a strange room with equipment that I'm unfamiliar with, and I know there are people who normally operate this equipment and are possibly nearby, I'm not going to switch the switch.

A better example would have been to have the people be familiar with what the switch does first and have several switch tests with the train at a particular speed so that way they knew switching the tracks would not cause the train to derail, give them agency over it, and understand the power they have. This is like the example. Only then should they put the situation in front of them and see what they do.

when is it morally acceptable to choose non-interference?
— Tzeentch

When there's insufficient knowledge of the outcome, or of the moving parts of a situation. — Christoffer

I think you cover that here, I'm just adding to your note.

If there is a principle that it is right to act to kill 1 to save 5, the principle should apply to both scenarios. — unenlightened

I think our differences are that I'm not declaring a principle. I'm declaring, "In X scenario, this is the correct answer". You seem to think I'm extending some universal principal from this that extends to other scenarios. I'm not.

Now, if I were to declare, "From X example, this is a principle we can apply to all examples," you would be right. I'm not doing that however. You'll even notice I note that it changes if you consider the value of the people, or extend the scenario out from its basic intent.

The question I'm more interested in, is if giving the exact scenario, five nameless and unvalued humans (we don't know what they have done or will do) are on a set of tracks vs one nameless and unvalued human, is it moral to pull the lever to ensure only the one person dies, or leave it for the five to die?

So to be clear, there's a lever for you to pull or not to pull. Five nameless vs 1 nameless, the track is currently set to kill five nameless humans. What do you find moral in this specific and unaltered situation and why?