But if noesis is possible his entire analysis is wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why?

Noesis seems to be the real content of consciousness. For example, the consciousness of the thought that here is one hand.

Wittgenstein's conclusion is that "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition within a language game.

It is the case, however, that Wittgenstein was of the general opinion that thinking and language were the same.

Notebooks 1914-16 - Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition.

Language would be of no use if the meaning of the words couldn't be thought about. Even though "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition, the meaning of the words can still be thought about.

The hinge proposition "here is one hand" doesn't negate the consciousness of thought that here is one hand.

The point would be that people have often held conceptions of truth that would invalidate Wittgenstein's conclusions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Conceptions of truth don't invalidate Wittgenstein's conclusion.

Wittgenstein proposed that "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition. A hinge proposition is a foundation of the language game within which it is a part. This makes sense, in that "god exists" is a hinge proposition of the Christian language game and "god doesn't exist" is a hinge proposition in the Atheist language game.

As I see it, for Wittgenstein, within a language are hinge propositions and ordinary propositions, and these are different things. IE, not every proposition within a language is a hinge proposition.

There are many definitions of truth. For example, see SEP article on Truth. However, I find the most informative definition to be when a proposition in language corresponds with a fact in the world then that proposition is true.

The hinge proposition "here is one hand" does not engage with the world, and is therefore neither true nor false, whereas the ordinary proposition "the cat sat on the mat playing with the mouse" does engage with the world, and can therefore be either true or false.

Wittgenstein's main conclusion is that "here is one hand" is a hinge proposition. A hinge proposition is a foundation of the language within which it is a part. It is not a demonstration of the existence of the world.

I agree that the hinge proposition "here is one hand" is neither a tautology, axiom or truism. It is the foundation of the language of which it a part, and allows the rest of the language to take place.

In a different language game, "this is a mountain" could be a hinge proposition allowing the rest of the language to take place. Discussion could then be had about mountaineers, snow falling on the mountain tops, the difficulties of skiers, which ski lodge to visit and the best flights for the skier to use from their home country. It would include the truth or falsity of propositions such as "Italy is the best country to visit for the serious skier". But it wouldn't include the truth or falsity of the proposition "this is a mountain".

Being neither true nor false, the hinge proposition cannot be invalidated by conceptions of truth or falsity.

It isn’t independent of any world. On the contrary, it is the product of practical discursive engagement with others and with material circumstances in the actual world in which we live. — Joshs

The hinge proposition

You are conflating two different types of propositions within the language game. There is the hinge proposition and there is the ordinary proposition.

You are right that the ordinary proposition is the product of practical discursive engagement with others, but the hinge proposition is a different thing altogether.

This is why Wittgenstein critiques Moore's "here is one hand". The whole point of Wittgenstein's hinge proposition is that is not the product of practical discursive engagement with others.

"Here is one hand" is the hinge proposition that is a foundation of the language within which it is a part.

"Here is one hand that is slightly larger than the other and is wearing a yellow glove" is the ordinary proposition that does engage with the world.

From the perspective of the Patristics, or say, Thomism, Wittgenstein is simply deluded about the nature of truth, knowledge, and justification — Count Timothy von Icarus

@Sam26 suggested to me that "I don't want this thread to become an argument about the existence of God, and whether belief in God is a hinge."

However, it does seem that Pope Pius X did establish what Wittgenstein would call a hinge proposition about Thomism.

In the 1914 motu proprio Doctoris Angelici, Pope Pius X cautioned that the teachings of the Church cannot be understood without the basic philosophical underpinnings of Thomas's major theses:

The capital theses in the philosophy of St. Thomas are not to be placed in the category of opinions capable of being debated one way or another, but are to be considered as the foundations upon which the whole science of natural and divine things is based; if such principles are once removed or in any way impaired, it must necessarily follow that students of the sacred sciences will ultimately fail to perceive so much as the meaning of the words in which the dogmas of divine revelation are proposed by the magistracy of the Church. (Wikipedia - Thomism)

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For, leaving aside the proper interpretation of Wittgenstein, to say that "God exists" and "God does not exist" can both be simultaneously "tautologically true" obviously requires a view of truth that is likely to differ fundamentally (i.e. in terms of bedrock understanding) from most historical views, under which claims that something is simultaneously both true and not-true, without qualification, is absurd and "senseless." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, the Law of Non-Contradiction states that a proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time.

However, Wittgenstein's hinge propositions are neither true nor false.

There are many definition of "truth", but for me the most informative definition of truth is the correspondence between a proposition in language and a fact in the world.

Wittgenstein's hinge proposition is a foundation of the language of which it is a part, regardless of any correspondence between the hinge proposition and a fact in the world.

Therefore, the fact that the same hinge proposition may have different meanings in different language games does not break the LNC.

On the other side of the argument, “I have hands holds across contexts and language games. Atheists function without belief in God, but how would they function without the belief we have hands? — Sam26

Fair enough, putting God to one side.

One could argue that although the proposition "here is one hand" can be used across different language games, it could have different meanings. For example in the language games of the Direct and Indirect Realist.

For the Direct Realist (1), the proposition "here is one hand" is true, as they believe that the hand exists in the world. For the Indirect Realist (2), the proposition "here is one hand" may or may not be true, as they believe that the hand may or may not exist in the world.

The Indirect Realist is able to function successfully even though they believe that the hand they perceive may or may not exist in the world. For example, the Indirect Realist stops at a traffic light when they perceive the colour red, even though they believe that the colour red may or may not exist in the world.

For Wittgenstein, the hinge proposition "here is one hand" is independent of any world. As a hinge proposition, it is the foundation of the language within which it is a part, regardless of its truth, where truth is a correspondence between language and the world.

Notes
(1) Direct realism is the view that i) the external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism) and ii) we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct). For the Direct Realist, we directly perceive hands that exist in the world.

(2) Indirect realism is the view that i) the external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism) but ii) we perceive the external world indirectly, via sense data (hence, indirect). For the Indirect Realist, we also directly perceive hands, but the hands that we perceive may or may not exist in the world.

https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/theories-of-perception/

However, as mentioned above re noesis, the existence of God and of God as "truth itself" would seem to undermine Wittgenstein's conclusions in a rather radical manner. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For those who believe that god exists, then god exists. This is a tautology. It follows that they believe the proposition "god exists" to be true and the proposition "god doesn't exist" to be false. For those who believe that god exists, the proposition "god exists" is a hinge proposition and is a tautological truth.

For those who believe that god doesn't exist, then god doesn't exist. This is a tautology. It follows that they believe the proposition "god doesn't exist" to be true and the proposition "god exists" to be false. For those who believe that god doesn't exist, the proposition "god doesn't exist" is a hinge proposition and is a tautological truth.

For Wittgenstein, a hinge proposition is foundational to the system within which it is foundational. This is a tautology. For Wittgenstein, the proposition "hinge propositions are foundational to the system within which it is foundational" is a hinge proposition and is a tautological truth.

As the hinge propositions of the Christian and Atheist are tautological truths, they do not undermine Wittgenstein's conclusion, which is also a tautological truth.

Propositions can be true or false, but hinges are true as a condition of being a hinge, i.e., it's their foundational role. Moreover, it’s our acting that cements them in place, not any fact that establishes their truth. — Sam26

The Christian in acting their life cements the hinge "God as the ultimate source of all power", which is their truth. The Atheist in acting their life cements the hinge "there is no God", which is their truth. The Agnostic in acting their life cements the hinge "it is impossible to know whether there is a God", which is their truth.

The hinge is absolutely true within the system that it plays a foundational role. However, the truth of a hinge is relative to which system it is playing a foundational role.

The role of the hinge seems to be in ossifying differences between peoples. The hinge doesn't appear to include a mechanism for recognizing its own fallibility. Is this a correct understanding?

Would you reject out of hand the possibility that "God-realization" is a term, however fuzzy and encrusted with doctrines, that tries to answer this question? — J

The "I" here ceases to be entwined with thought, emotion, or perception - but instead is said to become, or else transcend into, pure awareness devoid of any duality. — javra

Pure consciousness. I'll have to mediate on that.

For pure consciousness is said to remain, even in the absence of the "I" and its objects — J

What would this consciousness be conscious of, if not the "I" or object of thought?

Yes, true, but the concept filled with sense data (in the IDR sense) is not synonymous with the concept. — AmadeusD

I agree. I may have the concept of a house in my mind. If I perceive something that I understand as one instantiation of my concept of a house, then I perceive this something as a house.

This, to be honest, because for it seems as though you are reifying the mind and its components (e.g. individual thoughts and percepts) into having similar characteristics to physical things in the external world, which can indeed hold separated givens. — javra

In the mind, there can be the concept of a house and the thought of a particular house. These are different things. I agree that there can be a concrete example of an abstract concept.

Yet to see a house (a percept) is indeed utterly separate from contemplating the concept/thought of "house". — javra

The Indirect Realist would argue that we never directly see the house, but only perceive a representation of a particular house.

Both the concept of a house and the representation of a particular house exist in the mind, and in this sense are not utterly separate, as both exist in the mind.

The "I" for example is not separate from its perceptions in so far as these perceptions are only so because they are perceived by the "I" - being in fact contingent on the "I"s awareness. — javra

As Nietzsche wrote:

What gives me the right to speak of an 'I' as cause, and finally of an 'I' as cause of thought?'

What gives me the right to say that the "I" causes thoughts, as if the "I" is separate to the thoughts it has?

I agree that the "I" is not separate to either its perceptions or thoughts. But what are the implications of this? The implication is that perceptions and thoughts are an intrinsic part of the "I".

In the same way, iron is an intrinsic part of the Eiffel Tower. Remove the iron, and what is left? Nothing.

Remove the perceptions and thoughts, and what is left? Nothing. There is no "I" remaining.

Doesn't this entail that with each change in thought thunk there will then necessarily be an ontological change in the "I" addressed? If so, how can the same "I" be privy to different thoughts? — javra

Yes, for each change in thought there will be an ontological change in the "I". Are you the same person you were ten years ago?

There is the question of identity through time. The "I" is not just the thought being had at the present moment in time, but is the complete set of thoughts stored as memories that stretch back into the distant past.

The problem is, if the "I" is separate to its thoughts, then how can the "I" know about its thoughts? The "I " can only know about the thoughts it has if these thoughts are an intrinsic part of the "I", such that "I" is its thoughts.

If the "I" is separate to its thoughts, the question is, how can the "I" be privy to any thoughts at all?

If I have a conscious thought/belief that I am seeing something, could that thought/belief be doubted? — Kranky

Nietzsche is right to point out that people naturally separate the "I" from the "thought".

What gives me the right to speak of an 'I' as cause, and finally of an 'I' as cause of thought?'

However, this cannot be the case, otherwise it would lead into the homunculus problem of infinite regression.

It is more likely that "I" is the thought rather than it is the "I" that is having the thought.

It still remains the case that a thought cannot doubt itself.

If I have a conscious thought/belief that I am seeing something, could that thought/belief be doubted? — Kranky

No. What could the existence of the thought/belief by doubted by? Only by a thought/belief. Then it would be the case that a thought/belief was doubting its own existence, which is a logical impossibility, as a thought/belief must exist in order for it to doubt its own existence.

"I think therefore I am" is the first principle of Descartes philosophy.

Philosophy writing, then. I think it must start with a philosophical idea or concept to be explored, discussed or analysed. And/or a particular philosopher's view and arguments. Compared to your own. — Amity

Perhaps this also:

What is philosophy?
Philosophy has two aspects. First, the study of fundamental questions such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language. Second, thinking deeply and critically about the topic using evidence, and clear, logical reasoning about this evidence. (based on GPT 4o)

What is a philosophy essay?
A philosophy essay starts with a thesis. The thesis is about a specific philosophical question, concept or argument. The essay then defends or explores this thesis using evidence and clear, logical reasoning about the evidence. The essay should question assumptions implicit within the thesis, engage with different viewpoints and explore implications if the thesis is true. (based on GPT 4o)

Curious what proportion of the Philosophy Forum fulfils these criteria, including my own posts.

But do these definitions exclude Friedrich Nietzsche, the German philosopher, who used a blend of philosophy, poetry and personal reflection?

Also, do these definitions exclude Jacques Derrida, the French philosopher, who argued that language is inherently unstable and challenged the idea of absolute logical certainty?

The problem with excluding logic is that my feelings about a topic are equal to your feelings about the same topic, and it then comes down to who can shout the loudest.

It is not necessary, or even desired, to write the perfect, academic essay! Unless that is what your aim is. — Amity

I want to know how to write the perfect, academic philosophy essay, even if it is beyond my ability.

I have the essay's title and am aiming at 2,000 words. For the rest of this month probably tabulating what should be included in a good philosophy essay and will start researching next month.

As with SpaceX's Iterative Design Process, perhaps being shot down occasionally is part of the learning process.

Because this is an open, free and easy environment — Amity

It's good to have an open environment. However, I do avoid political threads on the Forum because they generally break the spirit of what a philosophy essay should be, in that claims are often made with minimal effort in justifying them with either evidence or reasoned argument.

You keep coming up with ideas for an essay. How are you getting on with yours? — Amity

At the moment an actual essay is taking second place to trying to understand what a "Philosophy Essay" actually is.

I am going through various guides to "How to write a philosophy essay" and trying to tabulate what these guides have in common.

Every so often I make a post including my understanding of what a "Philosophy Essay" is in the expectation of being shot down.

I'm thinking particularly of the aphorisms of Nietzsche and Cioran here. I like that approach, but it doesn't quite fit with the idea of a philosophical essay. — Baden

A philosophy essay logically defends a claim. Nietzsche used the aphoristic style to free himself from a metaphysical search for the fundamental nature of reality. Must all philosophy essays be about the metaphysical search for the fundamental nature of reality? Discuss.

I think it is a silly claim and not one I will be making! — Amity

However, perhaps that is exactly the claim to make. If you can persuade others about a claim you think is silly, then it should be a cake walk to persuade others about a claim you think sensible.

When writing a philosophy essay, it is perhaps not essential to believe in your claim, only to logically argue for your claim.

If someone else can then make their own logical argument why your claim is silly, you can then take their argument on board and adjust your own position. An example of SpaceX's Rapid Design Iteration.

Dr Matt Williams of Jesus College Oxford made the point that he felt he always achieved high marks because he sometimes started with an outlandish claim which he argued well.

Until today, I had no idea that 'flash philosophy' was a thing. — Amity

Thanks for the link. I had never come across the concept before.

I like the idea of an essay in two halves. or even 4 quarters and a bit. Is it true that 'All you need is love'? — Amity

Question = All you need is love?

Possible claim = I argue that all you need is love.

I agree. Perhaps at its core a philosophy essay is about making a claim and logically defending it, regardless of whether in a formal or informal style.

I personally don't agree that all you need is love, so I would be interested in being persuaded otherwise.

"Why are we tempted to say that mathematics are universal?" — Moliere

Another useful source here

Question = "Why are we tempted to say that mathematics are universal?"

Why not do a Boris Johnson and write 500 words defending one's claim that "I argue that mathematics is not universal" and then another 500 words defending one's claim that "I argue that mathematics is universal".

From Reuters, London

Boris Johnson, who campaigned prominently for Britain to leave the European Union ahead of a June referendum, argued in favour of remaining in the bloc in an unpublished newspaper column two days before backing Brexit, according to a newspaper report.

As Sun Tzu wrote:

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

Actually, it may be hard to defend the view that ' All you need is Love' in 2000 words — Jack Cummins

Perhaps that's what would make it a good thesis for a philosophy essay.

The Thread allows 5,000 words, but the Seán Radcliffe essay that won him the 2023 Irish Young Philosopher Awards Grand Prize and Philosopher of Our Time Award was only about 1,500 words.

A philosophy essay is a dialogue between the author and the reader, and there may not be a correct or definitive answer, as long as the essay is well-argued within a logical structure.

The philosophy essay wants your personal opinion, a little bit of evidence for your opinion, a reason or two why this evidence is relevant, one or two obvious counter-arguments and a reason or two why you rebut the counter-arguments.

Perhaps "academic" just means a well-argued claim within a logical structure.

I have noticed in the last year, that the forum has become more academic...............................The only danger is that it may become elitist. — Jack Cummins

This gives a possible thesis: "The Academic elitist world-view is bad for society"

The topic of 'All You Need is Love' may be a good one — Jack Cummins

Let thesis = "All you need is love"

Let your claim = I argue that all you need is love

In a couple of thousand words, persuade me.

Also, with an essay it seems that there is a need to come up with an independent view. — Jack Cummins

As I see it:

A philosophy essay is a specific thing and is not the same thing as a literary essay. This is a "Philosophy writing challenge". In a philosophy essay, one starts with a thesis about which one makes a claim and then defends it.

In fact, it is not even necessary to believe the claim that you are making, as long as you make a strong argument for it.

For example, the thesis could be "The public are better off under an Oligarchy than a Democracy" You could either defend this claim, oppose this claim or claim that sometimes Oligarchies are better than Democracies. Whichever claim you are making, you need to support your claim with a strong argument.

Perhaps a philosophy essay is more about your reasoned defence of your claim than the actual topic itself.

As regards independent view, I am assuming that an essay of say 2,000 words at undergraduate level will be more suitable than a PhD Dissertation of say 100,000 words. This affects what is meant by "independent view".

In an undergraduate philosophy essay, the writer is not expected to independently develop a new philosophical idea, but is expected to show independence of thinking in reasoning about existing philosophical ideas.

There is a difference between having a view that is independent of current philosophical ideas and having an independent view about current philosophical ideas.

For example:
1) You could begin with a declarative statement expressing your opinion "The public are better off under an Oligarchy than a Democracy"
2) Then i) give the main evidence that supports your claim and ii) your reasons why this evidence supports your claim.
3) Then give one or two main counter-arguments
4) Then give reasons why you rebut these counter-arguments
5) Finish by summarising your reasons why the evidence supports your claim and your reasons for rebutting the counter-arguments.

As an exercise in writing a philosophy essay, you could defend a claim that you don't even believe in, as long as you made a persuasive case.

I don't understand how we could replace 1 by 3. — frank

If there is one object in the world, dividing it into three parts does not involve infinities. In our numbering system, dividing 1 by 3 does involve infinities.

This suggests that infinity is an artificial problem of our numbering system. Perhaps a different numbering system would avoid the problem of infinity altogether.

Could you describe what mind-independent world could be? — Corvus

Impossible for the mind to describe a mind-independent world.

What do we do with numbers like pi that go on forever? — frank

One third of 1 is 0.33333...........continuing to infinity.

If we altered our numbering system, such that we replaced 1 by 3, then one third of 3 is 1. This avoids any problem of infinity.

This suggests that the problem of infinity is an artificial problem of our numbering system.

Similarly with pi.

They are subjective mental states, nothing to do with knowledge. — Corvus

Our only knowledge about any mind-independent world, any objective reality, starts with our subjective mental states. This means that knowledge about an objective reality cannot be separated from our subjective mental states.

When there is discrepancies in the claims of knowledge on the same situation or object between different folks, you always have chance to carry out testimonies on the knowledge via repeated observations, experiments, or testing on the claims, and update your false beliefs, or correct the other folks false claim on his knowledge. — Corvus

True, if two people make different claims about the same situation, for example, one says the postbox is red, and the other says the postbox is green, their claims can be judged.

But as regards perception, what a person perceives in their mind cannot be judged by anyone other than that person, as mind reading is impossible.

In exactly the same way, any pain a person experiences cannot be judged by anyone other than that person, as mind reading is impossible.
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What we see is the only world there is. There is no other world. — Corvus

You could only know what another person sees in their mind if you were a mind reader, which is an impossibility.

Only a mind reader could know that what another person sees in their mind is the same as what they see.

Seeing a colour and feeling a pain are both subjective experiences that are unknowable to any one other than a mind reader.
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Mind-independent world is meaningless if you cannot see or know what it is. — Corvus

If you knew something about a mind-independent world then it couldn't be a mind-independent world.

That would be like knowing something that is unknown.

We do have knowledge about the truth of reality, because we have perception and reasoning and inferring on the perception. Not just perception. — Corvus

Ideal Realism is about a relation between the mind and the world: "The universe is just ideas in the head, but real. Matters are only real when accessible and interactable. When not, all matters are just ideas."

If person A was stung by a wasp, only person A would know their particular pain. Person B may know their own particular pain when stung by a wasp, but as mind reading is not possible, it is impossible for person B to know person A's particular pain.

The top light of a traffic light is labelled "red", the middle light is labelled "orange" and the bottom light is labelled "green".

When person A sees the top light of a traffic light, only person A knows the particular colour that they see. Similarly, person B knows the particular colour that they see. As mind reading is not possible, it is impossible for person B to know the particular colour that person A sees.

Therefore person B can never know whether they are seeing the same or different colour to person A

Therefore, it is possible that persons A and B are in fact seeing different colours.

If persons A and B are seeing different colours, then either one of them or both of them are wrong about the reality of the colour of the top light.

If person B is wrong about the true nature of the traffic light, then this means that even though they see a particular colour of the top traffic light, that particular colour may not in reality be the actual colour of the top traffic light. This means that even though person B sees the colour red, the top traffic light may not in reality be red.

If person B is right about the true nature of the top traffic light, it is possible that person A is wrong.

If person A is wrong about the true nature of the top light, then this means that even though they see a particular colour of the top traffic light, that particular colour may not in reality be the actual colour of the top traffic light. Therefore, even though person A sees the colour red, the top traffic light may not in fact be red.

But persons A and B are interchangeable,

Therefore, it is possible that a person may see a colour that in fact doesn't exist in reality in the world

Direct Realism is the theory that all people directly see the colour that exists in reality in the world, but as mind reading is not possible, this is unknowable.

Therefore Direct Realism is not a valid philosophy. The reality of a mind-independent world is inaccessible to the mind.

For empirical cases like seeing colour red, you must go out and investigate further and verify for the truth, if needed. — Corvus

Suppose in reality the truth is that an object in the world is green, but for whatever reason you always perceive green objects as red.

You could look at the green object from all directions and all times of the day and will always see this green object as red.

How is it possible for the human mind to analyse the fact that they always see a red object to discover the truth of reality that the object in the world is actually green?
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Your seeing colour red is not knowledge. — Corvus

Your seeing the colour red is knowledge about what is in the mind, but is not knowledge about what is in the world.

Knowledge is justified true belief.

As regards the mind, the colour you see is the colour you see, regardless of its name. The colour you see is necessarily a justified true belief, and is therefore knowledge.

As regards the world, you may believe the colour of the object is red. You may be able to justify that the colour of the object is red. But if the object is in reality actually green, then you have no knowledge about the truth of reality.

Perception cannot give us knowledge. It can only present with what is perceived in the form of raw data i.e. shapes, colours, sounds, words and motions. That is where it ends. It is our reasoning and inference which give us knowledge on the reality. Hence both DR and IRists are wrong. — Corvus

We perceive the colour red and reason that it was caused by a red object in the world.

Knowledge is justified true belief.

Just because we have reasoned that our perception of the colour red was caused by a red object in the world, suppose we are mistaken, and in fact our perception of the colour red was not caused by a red object in the world.

Suppose it was caused by a green object. We wouldn't then have knowledge about reality in the world.

Why should our perceptions necessarily give us knowledge about the world?

Perception cannot give us knowledge. It can only present with what is perceived in the form of raw data i.e. shapes, colours, sounds, words and motions. That is where it ends. It is our reasoning and inference which give us knowledge on the reality. Hence both DR and IRists are wrong. — Corvus

It depends what is meant by "knowledge".

Knowledge could mean justified true belief. If I believe that the Eiffel Tower is 330m tall and can justify my belief, perhaps I read it in Encyclopedia Britannica, and the Eiffel Tower is actually 330m tall, then I have knowledge about the Eiffel Tower

I agree that we perceive things and can then use our reason on these perceptions in order to give us knowledge about the world, such that the Eiffel Tower is 330m tall.

But in order to reason about my perceptions, I must first know that I am perceiving the colour red, for example. I don't think that I am seeing the colour red. I don't believe that I am seeing the colour red. I don't need to reason that I am seeing the colour red. I know that I am seeing the colour red.

Is knowing something knowledge? Is knowing that I see the colour red knowledge that I see the colour red?

In propositional terms, when I say "I know the Eiffel Tower is 330m tall", the fact "the Eiffel Tower is 330m tall" is knowledge. Similarly, when I say "I know I see the colour red", the fact "I see the colour red" is knowledge.

I would say that I have knowledge that I see colours, shapes, sounds, etc

It seems that knowledge can be about what is in the mind as well as what is outside the mind.

Does it mean that Indirect Realist can only have beliefs? No knowledge at all?
And likewise, Direct Relists can only have knowledge? No beliefs at all? — Corvus

The meaning of the words "direct knowledge" and "indirect knowledge" depends on context.
In ordinary language, I have direct knowledge of The Empire States Building as I have visited it, but I only have indirect knowledge of The Space Needle as I have never been there.

In philosophy, I have direct knowledge of my perceptions of the colour grey and rectangular shape, but I only have indirect knowledge through reasoning of the something in the world that may have caused my perceptions.

The meaning of the words "knowledge" and "belief" depends on context.
In ordinary language, I know that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, and I believe that the Eiffel Tower was built in 1889.

In philosophy, I know my perception of the colour red, and I believe that there is something in the world that caused this perception.

The Indirect Realist
Not entirely. The Indirect Realist has knowledge about what exists in their mind, such as when they perceive the colour red. But they argue that we can only have beliefs about what exists in the world that may be causing these perceptions in the mind.

The Direct Realist
The Direct Realist argues that they have knowledge about what exists in their mind, such as when they perceive the colour red, and they argue that they also have knowledge about the something in the world that caused these perceptions in the mind.

However, as I see it, Direct Realist is an invalid philosophy. IE, they are wrong.

That seems to imply that they are back to the dualism. — Corvus

Yes, but there is nothing fundamentally wrong with dualism.

If there was no dualism there would be no language. A word on the one hand exists as a shape and on the other hand exists as a representation of something else.

1) What is the significance of direct and indirect knowledge?...........................................3) What are the differences in direct and indirect knowledge compared to knowledge? — Corvus

I have direct knowledge of New York because I have been there, but only have indirect knowledge of Seattle as I have never been there.

I have direct knowledge of my perception of red, but only have indirect knowledge of the something in the world that might have caused it

Indirect knowledge signifies a belief.

I believe that the Space Needle in Seattle was originally sketched on a napkin, but I don't know it for a fact as I wasn't there at the time.
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2) Indirect or direct on relation to what? — Corvus

In relation to something in the world. The relation between what exists in the mind and what exists in the world.

That sounds confusing. Is it not the other way around? Are you sure you haven't put them wrong way around in the definition? What significance the word "indirect" have in the name? Why indirect? — Corvus

I don't believe so.

Suppose someone perceives the colour red. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that something in the world caused their perception.

The Direct Realist would argue that they are directly seeing the something in the world that caused their perception. They argue that the something in the world is actually red.

The Indirect realist argues that they are directly perceiving the colour red in their mind and only know about the something in the world that caused their perception indirectly through reason. They argue that the something in the world might be red, might be green, might be a wavelength of 700nm or might be something else altogether.

The Direct Realist argues that they have direct knowledge about the something in the world that caused their perception, whereas the Indirect Realist argues that their reasoning can only give them indirect knowledge about the something in the world that caused their perception.

So what is the difference between indirect realism and direct realism? From what you are saying, they sound exactly the same claims. — Corvus

As I wrote on page 2

Suppose someone perceives the colour red. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that something in the world caused their perception.

The Direct Realist says the person is directly perceiving the cause of their perceiving the colour red. The Indirect realist says that the person is only directly perceiving the colour red.