If today “I’m in pain” and tomorrow “I’m hungry” were random noises with no stable pattern, the practice would collapse. But that point is about the conditions under which the practice is usable, not about the meaning being fixed by a private inner object.

If I say “I’m in pain” alone, it’s often pointless, but it isn’t meaningless. The meaning is still what it is because the expression belongs to a language I already speak.

Where your argument goes off is when you say the language game is founded on a rulebook that asserts a consistency between feeling and saying. That “rulebook” isn’t an extra layer behind the practice. It just is the practice as it’s lived,

So, the relationship is the following: inner life is necessary for these language games to exist at all, but inner life doesn’t fix meaning privately, by itself. Meaning is stabilized publicly, by the norms of use that make it possible to distinguish correct use, misuse, pretense, and error. — Sam26

As I see it, your approach leads into the problem of circularity, whereby the meaning of the statement “I am in pain” is fixed by the language game, and the language game is fixed by the statement “I am in pain”.

There is the question of what makes language possible, what makes the statement “I am in pain” have meaning within the language game and there is the question of what fixes the meaning of the statement “I am in pain”.

A circular solution would be that the meaning of the statement “I am in pain” is fixed by it having a meaning within the language game.

Such a circularity is avoided if the meaning of the statement “I am in pain” is fixed by the extra-linguistic being in pain.

This is the same problem of circularity with the rules of language, where you say that the rules of language are built into the language itself. But we know that the rules of language cannot be internal to the language, they must be external. This is why words such as “pain” cannot be defined within the language itself. This is why Wittgenstein proposes the extra-linguistic hinge proposition, in other words, a performative utterance as described by JL Austin or axioms in science.

This is also the same problem with the Form of Life, whereby an inner life is necessary for there to be a Form of Life, and it is the Form of Life that determines one’s inner life.

There needs to be a way out of this circularity. One way is that statement such as “I am in pain” is fixed by the extra-linguistic being in pain rather than being fixed by a language game that already includes the statement “I am in pain”.

But I don't see how inner feelings can be the only essential condition for language. They are necessary, perhaps, but not sufficient. If we were not social beings, there would be no language. Our form of life would be unrecognizable without inner feelings, social living, and language. — Ludwig V

There are inner feelings, language and social life.

But we would not have any language if we did not have inner feelings and we would not have any social life if we did not have inner feelings. Both language and a social life are creations of our inner feelings.

I agree that there can be feedback between language and inner feelings and social life and inner feelings. "Feedback occurs when outputs of a system are routed back as inputs as part of a chain of cause and effect that forms a circuit or loop" (Wikipedia).

As inner feelings created both language and social life, and there can be feedback between them, inner feelings can be both necessary and sufficient to both language and social life.

Wittgenstein is asking how all this "thinking" got started: — Paine

======================================================================

32. Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to guess the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong. — PI, 32, translated by Anscombe

We can only understand language extra-linguistically. When someone tells me “bring me a xyz”, how do I know what action I should take?
=======================================================================

The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. — PI, 272

No one knows what another person is thinking or feeling. No one knows another person’s private language, but even so people are able to communicate using a public language.
=================================================================

One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it. — ibid. 114

The meaning of a proposition cannot be understood within language itself.

The meaning of “bring me a xyz” within the language game cannot be understood by the language game itself, but can only be discovered extra-linguistically. For example, by observing a person’s behaviour, using bedrock hinge propositions, saying “xyz” and pointing to an xyz, using a meta-language or understanding the logical framework of the language game within which are contained propositions.
==============================================================

Here we see that solipsism, taken to its conclusion, coincides with pure realism. — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.64

There is the private self and the public language game. Solipsism is the theory that we can only know the self. But the public language game only exists because the self exists, in that the public language game is a creation of the self.

The public language game allows one user to communicate to another user that they are in pain by saying “I am in pain” even though no one user knows the private pain of another user. If the self consists of thoughts, ideas and feelings, such as that of pain, the language game may be able to refer to some one’s private pain, but is not able to describe, define or explain that private pain.

This is because language is a system of representation which can only represent a person’s private pain using the symbol “pain”. Language cannot describe, define or explain that pain.
=====================================================================

The move from "general explanations" in PI does not seem to have weakened Wittgenstein's view of the limited role of the "psychological" or "scientism" while looking at thought and language. — Paine

As science is founded on axioms, self-evident or universally recognized truths, language is founded on hinge propositions, statements that serve as foundational beliefs, or in JL Austin’s terms, performative utterances.

For both Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists, feelings are not inner data but world-directed engagements. — Joshs

Wittgenstein's and the Phenomenologist’s approaches are quite different.

For Wittgenstein, he starts from the viewpoint of a public community and asks the question, how can a community communicate private subjective experiences whilst at the same time “bracketing” any understanding of a private internal world.

For the Phenomenologists, they start from the viewpoint of the individual and ask the question, how can an individual make sense of their private subjective experiences whilst at the same time “bracketing” any understanding of a public external world.

Whilst Wittgenstein is concerned with what is happening in the public external world, the Phenomenologists are concerned with what is happening in the private internal world.

But, for Wittgenstein, the ultimate foundation is not "inner feelings", which are a language game in themselves, but "form of life" or "way of life". — Ludwig V

Without inner feelings there would be no Form of Life. There would be no social activities such as playing football, no cultural events such as going to the theatre, no language game, no financial systems, no production, distribution and trade of goods and services, no Philosophy Forum.

As our Form of Life would literally not exist without our inner feelings, in this sense, it seems that the ultimate foundation can only be “inner feelings”.

But it doesn’t follow that the meaning of “I feel xyz” is fixed by a private inner object called xyz. — Sam26

If we felt no xyz, pain, hunger, thirst, fear or love, then there would be no need for a language.

In language, we say things such as “I feel xyz”, “I feel pain”, “I am hungry”, “I am thirsty”, “I am in fear” and “I am in love”.

It seems highly likely that there is a consistency between what we feel and what we say, in that the language game would be unworkable if when feeling pain one day I said “I feel pain” and the next day I said “I feel hungry”.

I agree that on the next day I could be lying, but the language game can only work on the assumption that people are generally truthful.

The language game can only work if when a person feels pain they generally say “I feel pain”.

In general, the language game can only work if when a person feels xyz they say “I feel xyz”.
=======================================================================

but what fixes the meaning is the expression’s role in a shared practice, when it’s appropriate to say it — Sam26

It is true that it would be pointless for a person in an empty room to say “I feel pain”. It would only be useful to say “I feel pain” if another person knowing the same language game hears them. But the meaning of “I feel pain” does not change when someone hears it, in that “I feel pain” does not mean one thing when spoken in an empty room and means a different thing when spoken in a crowded room.

It may be a waste of time to say “I feel pain” in an empty room, but it does not follow that the expression “I feel pain” has no meaning when spoken in an empty room.
=================================================

So inner feelings matter, they’re part of the background, but they don’t supply the rulebook that makes the words meaningful. — Sam26

The language game is only workable if there is a general consistency, in that, if a person feels in pain, they don’t one day say “I feel pain” and the next day say “I feel hungry”.

The language game is founded on the rulebook that says there is a general consistency between what the person feels and what the person says.
===================================

Inner life makes language possible, while the meaning of our words is stabilized by their public grammar, the shared practices of use, correction, and uptake that give those words their place in our shared language life. — Sam26

There is a contradiction here.

Without inner feelings there would be no language game, but you say that the meaning of “I feel pain” is determined by the language game, not inner feelings.

This raises the question, if the language game is independent of feelings, of what use is a language game that can exist independently of the feelings of the people who are actually using it?

I am sure that somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy there is a species who have their own language game, but of what relevance is that language game to us If it exists independently of any human thoughts, emotions, desires or feelings?

Here’s the key point Wittgenstein is trying to keep us from blurring: criteria versus causes.
Criteria answer: “What would count as correctly applying this word here?”
Causes answer: “What produced this state or this behavior?” — Sam26

As you say, both Criteria and Cause are important

“I also don’t think it’s right to say that a word only has use if it “refers to what they objectively do” as opposed to what they’re thinking.”

I agree that if a person is motionless and says “I am in pain”, we can often assume the Cause, their inner hidden feeling, even if there is no Criteria, such as flinching or moaning.

He’s telling us to get clear on what we mean first, what would count as using the word correctly, and only then go looking for causes where causes are the right question. — Sam26

This is a problem.

How can we use a word correctly if we don’t know the cause of why we are using the word in the first place. For example, how can a person know whether it is correct to say “I am in pain” or “I am not in pain” if they don't know whether they are in pain or not? First they must know whether they are in pain or not and then they can correctly say whether “I am in pain” or “I am not in pain”.

causal stories and inner experiences can be real, but they aren’t what fix the meaning. — Sam26

If people had no inner feelings, then there would be no language games.

It follows that we have language games because we have inner feelings.

Therefore, if I did not have the inner feeling of xyz, there would be no language game of “I feel xyz”

Therefore, “I feel xyz” in the language game must be referring to my inner feeling of xyz.

The meaning of "I feel xyz" in the language game must be referring to my inner feeling of xyz.

But Wittgenstein rejects both the idea of hidden causes and behaviorism.
..............................The intelligibility of “xyz” as a mood, a stance, a rule, or a commitment doesnt depend on a single episode of observable behavior, but on its place in a web of possible moves: what counts as evidence for being in xyz, what counts as pretending, what counts as withdrawing the claim, what follows from it, what licenses it. — Joshs

I touch a hot stove, flinch and say “I am in pain”

There is the hidden cause, an unobservable mental state, being in pain and there is observable behaviour, flinching,

There is the Language Game “I am in pain”.

If Wittgenstein rejects both hidden causes and behaviourism, what is his foundation for the Language Game?

One issue that I think comes up very often in these discussions is the thought that Wittgenstein is trying to deny the mental states. He's not. The question regarding them is whether they underwrite the meaning to the terms and whether they offer explanatory power in terms of what is meant. — Hanover

The builder says to the assistant “bring me a slab”, which is part of a Language Game and whose meaning is in a particular Form of Life. On a construction site, “slab” refers to a concrete block, whereas in a bakery, “slab” may refer to a chocolate cake.

On this construction site, I look at a slab that has been named within the language game “slab”, and in my mind I have the thought of both a slab and its name “slab”. Even though I cannot look into the builder’s mind, I assume that when he looks at the same slab in his mind is also the thought of the slab and its name “slab”.

As you say, Wittgenstein does not deny mental states of the builder, because if there were no mental states then clearly there would be no language. This means that language must be underwritten by mental states. It is inconceivable that there could be “slabs” in language in the absence of any thought of slabs. I see a slab, think of slabs and think of its name “slab”.

Language by itself has no causal power, in that the mere fact of the builder saying “bring me a slab” does not by itself cause the assistant to bring the builder a slab. In the same way that my saying to my bank manager “give me £1m” cannot cause the bank manager to give me £1m. The same problem with the Cargo Cult Thinking. The airstrip is not the cause of the planes landing, the cause is the General who wants the planes to land and needs to build an airstrip in order to do so

So what causes the assistant to bring the builder a slab if language by itself has no causal power. One can imagine the scenario where the builder says to the assistant “bring me a slab”. The assistant does nothing, upon which the builder gives him a cuff around the ear. As you say “continued interaction within a community with error correction”, and the assistant quickly learns that in order to avoid physical discomfort on hearing “bring me a slab” he must take to the builder a slab. Therefore, what does “bring me the slab” mean to the assistant? It means that in order to avoid physical discomfort he must take a slab to the builder.

As regards “meaning is use”, it is true that language by itself is meaningless and only gains meaning when being used within a Form of Life, but it is also true that the meaning of words is underpinned by the mental states of those using the language.

When I see a slab, I think of a slab and I think of its name “slab”. I know what “slab” means because I can think of a slab.

When the assistant hears “bring me a slab”, he thinks about the expression “bring me a slab” and thinks about the physical consequences if he does not take the builder a slab. The assistant knows what “bring me a slab” means because he can think about the physical consequences of not taking a slab to the builder.

Tool 2 - the grammar check, and grammar here in Wittgenstein’s sense, not in the schoolbook sense. He doesn’t mean punctuation or sentence diagrams. He means what are the rules of use for an expression, what role does it play, what counts as a sensible move, and what counts as a category mistake. — Sam26

Language can be philosophically misleading as language uses figures of speech which within philosophical investigation should not be taken literally. For example, the expression “I see your pain” is a figure of speech which does not literally mean that I am literally able to see your pain.

Language uses figures of speech, and philosophy must be able to distinguish when an expression is being used as a figure of speech or literally.

As the expression “I’ve got a pain in my foot” suggests that pain is an object external to “I”, it is being used as a figure of speech rather than literally. A more literal expression would be “I am the pain in my foot”

As you say, the philosopher must also determine whether an expression is being used as an empirical observation or as a performative utterance, as described by JL Austin. For example, if I say “the postbox is red”, am I making an empirical observation that the postbox is red rather than blue, or am I making a performative utterance that the postbox, regardless of its true nature, is red. It may be that the true nature of the postbox is purple, but even so, within the language game It shall henceforth be called “red”. This is the question as to how names are initially attached to objects. Is the colour of the postbox red, rouge or rot?

When I make the statement that “the external world exists”, is this an empirical observation or a performative utterance that establishes the framework, the bedrock, on which everything else I say about the external world is founded. Once I have made the performative utterance that the external world exists, then I can talk about the mountains, elephants and oceans that reside within this external world.

Philosophy must distinguish between figures of speech such as “I’ve got a pain in my foot” and the more literal expression “ I am the pain in my foot”.

Philosophy must also distinguish between empirical expressions such as “the postbox is red” and performative utterances such as “the postbox is red”.

In this sense, as regards grammar, what Wittgenstein is pointing out is common sense.

Tool 1 is the simplest and, I think, the most important: “Look and see.” — Sam26

Thank you for your new Thread.

A thought that I have had for a while about Wittgenstein.

If a person said “I am in xyz” and did nothing, the word “xyz” would be meaningless to any observer of that person. In practice, the word only has a use within a language game if that word “xyz” refers to what they objectively do, not what they are subjectively thinking.

However, there is a danger in Wittgenstein's practical approach which dismisses any attempt at a deeper philosophical understanding. It could be called “Cargo Cult Thinking”, where an observed behaviour is imitated rather than trying to make any attempt to understand the cause of such behaviour, difficult that might be.

https://tapandesai.com/cargo-cult-thinking/
The Cargo Cult Thinking: Beware of Imitating Behaviors
During World War II, remote Pacific islanders watched in awe as foreign troops landed on their shores, bringing crates of food, medicine, and supplies, things the islanders had never seen before. The soldiers built airstrips, set up makeshift control towers, and went about their routines. Then, just as suddenly as they arrived, they vanished when the war ended, taking everything with them
But the islanders had a plan.
Believing that the airstrips had summoned the cargo, they built their own, meticulously crafting bamboo control towers and wooden headphones, hoping the planes would return. They mimicked the rituals of the soldiers, waiting for the magic to happen.
But the planes never came back.

Cargo Cult Thinking, because when a person says “I am in xyz”, for Wittgenstein, the word “xyz” refers to what they objectively do, it does not refer to the cause of why they said “I am in xyz” in the first place.

C1. Therefore, the word "headaches" refers to private sensations — Michael

Seems clear.

If people had no private sensations - having a headache, feeling pain, feeling hot, smelling something, seeing something, tasting something, etc - then there would be no public language.

A public language only exists because people have private sensations.

Words, such as "headache", would have no meaning if people had no private sensations, such as headache.

A thermometer is put into water. When the thermometer reads 10deg C, the water is given the public name “cold”. When the thermometer reads 30deg C, the water is given the public name “hot”.

John sits in water, feels a private sensation, sees the thermometer read 30deg C, and says “I feel hot”. Jane sits in water, feels a private sensation, sees the thermometer read 30deg C, and says “I feel hot”.

It may well be that John feels the same private sensation when sitting in “hot” water that Jane feels when sitting in “cold” water.

No one can know, because no one can know another person’s private sensations.

The Indirect Realist accepts that it may well be that John feels the same private sensation when sitting in “hot” water that Jane feels when sitting in “cold” water.

The Direct Realist has the untenable position that i) John cannot possibly feel the same private sensation when sitting in “hot” water that Jane feels when sitting in “cold” water and ii) John must feel the same private sensation when sitting in “hot” water that Jane feels when sitting in “hot” water.

The word “hot” refers to both i) John’s private sensation and ii) the temperature of the water. The word “hot” does not mean that i) John’s private sensation and ii) the temperature of the water are the same thing.

There is no conclusive objective details of proof or demonstration how physical brain relates to the mind yet. — Corvus

:100:

The step you keep taking is from: "the object perceived must in fact be causally responsible if perception is veridical" to "the perceiver must know or believe that the object caused the perception." That step simply does not follow. — Esse Quam Videri

Step 1 - If I perceive the Sun, and my perception is veridical, there must be a Sun in the world
Step 2 - If a DR perceives a Sun, they know that the Sun caused their perception. If an IR perceives a Sun, they don’t know what caused their perception.
As far as I can see, both 1 and 2 are correct.
=====================================

Direct Realism requires causal dependence as a metaphysical condition of perception, not causal knowledge as part of perceptual content. — Esse Quam Videri

Both the DR and IR require causal dependence as a metaphysical condition of perception, because they both believe in Realism.
=====================================================================

This is precisely why illusions are possible: one can perceive as of the Sun without knowing what actually caused the perception. So the illusion argument does not show that DR is committed to knowing causal initiation; it presupposes the opposite. — Esse Quam Videri

On the one hand, when the DR perceives a Sun they know that the Sun caused their perception, which is why they are DR’s. On the other hand, the DR accepts that when they perceive a Sun it may be an illusion. DR seems to be a contradictory position to hold.

It is the IR who accepts that what we perceive may not be veridical.
=====================================================

On inference: I’m not denying that we can infer from regularities in perception. I’m pointing out that inference to the best explanation presupposes some non-inferential constraint by the world in order for explanations to be better or worse at all. Otherwise, the regularities you cite are equally compatible with indefinitely many hypotheses. The regress is not inference-from-inference, but inference with no account of how perceptual appearances are answerable to the world in the first place. — Esse Quam Videri

I regularly perceive a yellow circle. I can infer infinite possible causes, such as an illusion, hallucination, God in the world, Sun in the world, Moon in the world, mind in a vat, etc.

Why choose one possibility rather than another. What constrains one’s choice?

The constraint comes from other perceptions, such that there is a logical coherence in all my perceptions. Perceptual appearances are answerable to the establishment of a coherent set of perceptions from which a logical world can be inferred using reason to the best explanation.

Philosophy is largely about semantics and logic. It doesn't deal with the cells, neurons and brain chemistry how it works with the entered images into it, does it? These are the subject for Neurology and brain science. — Corvus

Philosophy is also about the brain and how it relates to the mind.

Once the image you saw enters into your mind, shouldn't you then consult neurology or brain science in order to find out what is happening with the perceived image in your mind, rather than calling it Indirect Realism? — Corvus

I don’t think that neurologists or brain scientists can currently observe thoughts in the mind.

At the moment it is up to philosophy.

Direct realism says: "the object perceived is the mind-external object itself, not an intermediary". It does not say: "perception includes knowledge that the object caused the perception". That is an extra thesis you keep tacking on. — Esse Quam Videri

DR says that they directly perceive the Sun

If the DR says that they directly perceive the Sun, then it logically follows that it is their belief that the Sun caused their perception.

If the DR directly perceives the Sun, but it is the Moon that caused their perception, then this is one argument the IR makes against DR. The illusion argument.

This is not an extra thesis I keep adding on. It is a logical consequence of what the DR believes.
==========================================================================

Otherwise, the “unknown regularity” is doing all the work with no epistemic access—which collapses into skepticism or instrumentalism. — Esse Quam Videri

The IR avoids scepticism about an external world using inference to the best explanation.
=====================================================================

The inference to a “regularity in the world” must be answerable to something. That “something” cannot be the inferred regularity itself, or the bare perceptual appearances alone (since those are compatible with many worlds). — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, from a regularity in perception one can infer that there is a regularity in the world causing such regularities in perception. The inference that there is a regularity in the world causing regularities in perception is answerable to regularities in perception.

It is not necessary to be in epistemic contact with the world in a non-inferential way in order to make inferences about the world. That is why they are inferences. If one was in epistemic contact with the world in a non-inferential way then it would not be necessary to make inferences about the world, as you would already know about the world.

A person regularly perceives yellow circles.
Person A infers that their regularity of perception was caused by a regularity in the world.
Person A infers that their regularity of perception was caused by random events in the world.
Person C infers that their regularity of perception was caused by a God in the world.
Person D infers that their regularity of perception was caused by hallucinations.
We can then use reason to narrow these down to the best explanation.

All these inferences are answerable to something, a regularity of perception, and none involve any regress.

If I inferred from my inference then that would be a regress. In other words, if I inferred from my inference that my regularities of perception are caused by regularities in the world that there are regularities in the world, then that would be a regress.

Saying, you see a ship directly or indirectly sounds like, if there are any obstacles in the middle of the path of the seeing, rather than seeing the ship itself. It just sounds like it is a statement something unnecessarily confusing. You would only say that when asked - how do you see the ship? Was there anything between you and the ship, not blocking the view? — Corvus

When the IR says “I see the ship indirectly” the word “indirectly” is not referring to the space between the person and the ship but rather is referring to what is happening in the mind of the IR.

Direct Realism does not claim to know what initiated the causal chain. That’s not a weakness of DR; it’s a basic feature of any sane theory of perception. — Esse Quam Videri

As far as I know, DR is exactly the claim that they know what initiated the causal chain. In our example, they claim that they know the Sun initiated the causal chain. That is why it is not a “sane theory of perception.”

From IEP - Objects of perception

1 Direct Realism
Perceptual realism is the common sense view that tables, chairs and cups of coffee exist independently of perceivers. Direct realists also claim that it is with such objects that we directly engage.
2 Indirect Realism
The indirect realist agrees that the coffee cup exists independently of me. However, through perception I do not directly engage with this cup; there is a perceptual intermediary that comes between it and me.

=================

Perception is not an inference from present effects to past causes; it is a current perceptual relation to an existing object.......................The object does not need to be known as initiator in order to be known as perceived......................The inference itself still depends on perceptual contact with something, and that perceptual contact is still not knowledge of causal initiation. — Esse Quam Videri

Totally agree.
===============

IR does not escape the alleged logical impossibility either — it simply relabels perception as inference, which only leads to a regress, as we’ve already identified. — Esse Quam Videri

For the IR, perception is not inference. First there is perception and later there can be inferences made about this perception.

Suppose I regularly perceive a yellow circle. Using my reason I can then infer using best explanation that my regularity of perception was caused by a regularity in the world. For convenience, yellow circles can be named “Sun”, though it could be named anything. The word “Sun” then refers to not only i) perceived yellow circles but also ii) an unknown regularity in the world causing such perceptions.

I don’t see where any regress comes in.

Surely there are no such folks as DRists or IDists from their births, who must see a ship always either directly or indirectly no matter what situation under they see a ship? — Corvus

Yes, I had never heard of Direct and Indirect Realism ten years ago.

So acquaintance works like this: (1) you are perceptually related to an object, (2) that relation does not presuppose propositional knowledge, (3) description, classification, and judgment are subsequent cognitive acts — Esse Quam Videri

As an IR, I agree.

But how does the DR know what initiated a causal chain when such knowledge is a logical impossibility?
===============================

Direct Realism does not claim that we can recover past states from present perception, or that perception gives us epistemic access to past events as such. What it claims is that perception is a present relation to a presently existing object, even though that relation is enabled by a causal history.Recovering the past is a task for inference, science, and explanation — not for perception itself. — Esse Quam Videri

So, DR does not claim we can recover past states from present perception, and recovering the past is a task for inference. As an IR, I agree.

I agree when you say that perception is a present relation to a presently existing object, which is the position of the IR
=======================

The causal chain enables perception; it is not something you reason from.......................Direct Realism says that we know the object we are perceptually related to, not the full causal history by which that relation was produced. — Esse Quam Videri

Totally agree. But how does the DR know the object that initiated the causal chain when logic shows us it is impossible to know what initiated a causal chain?

1 - We can only know about a Sun in the world because of a causal chain from it to us
2 - There is a change in both form and content of each link in this causal chain
3 - We cannot know either the form or content of a prior link even if we knew a present link
4 - All our information about the external world comes through our five senses
5 - The causal chain is temporal, in that what initiated the causal chain is temporally prior to our perception in the mind.
6 - Something in the external world initiated this causal chain
7 - The Indirect Realist believes that we can infer to the best explanation from the final link in this causal chain to what initiated the causal chain. — RussellA

How does DR overcome what is a logical impossibility?

If you say, well because they are DRists and IRists, then it doesn't make any sense, because it is not explaining why they see and understand the ship they are seeing in that way. — Corvus

Yes, Direct and Indirect Realism are just names which need further explanation.

It sounds really confusing when you say that you see a ship directly or indirectly, when you can say you see a ship. Why add those words, and make the statements unclear and muddled? — Corvus

In Ordinary Language, we say “I see a ship”. In Philosophy Language, the Direct Realist says “I see a ship directly” and the Indirect Realist says “I see a ship indirectly”.

Words need to be added because the Direct Realist, Indirect Realist and person in the street understand the world in different ways.
======================

It is not what you call yourself, which makes you a philosopher. It is how you think, see, understand and explain on the world and mind, which makes you one. — Corvus

:up:

On Direct Realism, the causal chain is a means of acquaintance, not a carrier of descriptive information. The chain enables perceptual contact with the object; it does not transmit a message that must be decoded. — Esse Quam Videri

How does that work? I am acquainted with an apple in the world even if I cannot describe it?
==============================================

The laws of physics do not entail a contradiction in the past state having been thus-and-so; they only show that the past is not recoverable from the present state alone. — Esse Quam Videri

If the laws of physics show that the past is not recoverable from the present state alone, then why does the Direct Realist believe that an apple as it existed in the past is recoverable from our present state of perceiving an apple?
======================

Perception is not an inference from present effects to past causes; it is a current perceptual relation to an existing object. — Esse Quam Videri

How can we know about the apple in the world independently of any causal chain from the apple to our perceiving it?
=================

On Direct Realism, we know the Sun because we see the Sun, not because we infer it from causal data. The causal chain explains how perception occurs, not what is perceived. — Esse Quam Videri

We seem to agree that:

1 - We can only know about a Sun in the world because of a causal chain from it to us
2 - There is a change in both form and content of each link in this causal chain
3 - We cannot know either the form or content of a prior link even if we knew a present link
4 - All our information about the external world comes through our five senses
5 - The causal chain is temporal, in that what initiated the causal chain is temporally prior to our perception in the mind.
6 - Something in the external world initiated this causal chain
7 - The Indirect Realist believes that we can infer to the best explanation from the final link in this causal chain to what initiated the causal chain.

Yet you say that the Direct Realist knows what initiated the causal chain. How?

Some here seem to think that how we speak in ordinary life is the answer to all the questions. They're just burying their heads in the sand. — Michael

:up:

Ordinary language
As the SEP article on Fictionalism points out, ordinary language uses figures of speech, metaphors, exaggerations and fictions in general.

For example “I see a ship directly in front of my eyes, I can smell its anger and feel its pain as it wanders aimlessly across the dark and mysterious ocean”

Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP)
For example John Searle and the later Wittgenstein. John Seale is a Direct Realist and in his 2015 book “Seeing Things as They Are” argues against the “Bad Argument” of Indirect Realism”. He maintains that humans are able to directly perceive physical objects in the world, such as apples, because “apples” is already a Category within a public “Language Game”. For Searle, as a Direct Realist, such apples exist in the world even if never seen by a human. OLP argues that once everyday expressions are carefully analysed, many so-called philosophical problems disappear. OLP is an inquiry into meaning as use, rather than meaning as truth, whereby the meaning of an expression in language is inseparable to its use in the language game that is part of a Form of Life.

For example “I see a ship directly in front of my eyes”.

Metaphysical philosophy
One problem with OLP as a philosophy is that it does not question its own presuppositions. It does not question its own presupposition that objects such as apples exist in the world even if never observed by a human. Given such a presupposition, OLP can then make a valid case about the relation of language to the world. This is where the metaphysical philosopher comes in, to question such presuppositions.

For example, OLP is presupposing that relations ontologically exist in the world, which is not necessarily the case. There are many reasons why relations cannot ontologically exist in the world, If relations don't exist in the world, then neither can apples, as an apple can only have an identity if there are relations between its parts.

OLP is assuming that apples are discovered in the world, tending to support Direct Realism, whereas apples are invented in the mind supports Indirect Realism.

It is the metaphysical philosopher that thinks about people’s presuppositions.

Really? How do you tell the difference between the two? — Corvus

That is why posts on the Forum get confused when people mix up ordinary language and philosophical language.

The expression “I am a Direct Realist” would mean something different to the person in the street and a philosophy person.

No, but you would have direct contact with the medium through which the waves travelled, the air. The air comes from and is a feature of the mind-independent world. — NOS4A2

I am in a room with the door closed. I hear a sound I infer is from outside the room that sounds like a bark.

You say that hearing this sound means that I am in direct contact with whatever is outside the room.

But how can I be in direct contact with what is outside the room, when I have no idea what is outside the room that made the noise?

For example, the noise could have been made by a dog, wolf, coyote, fox, seal, bird, human, tv program, radio program, truck, car, toy, horn, alarm, cuica percussion instrument or numerous other things..

Even in ordinary language, should we say that we are in direct contact with something when we don't even know what we are in direct contact with?

However, on the other hand, the Indirect Realist would agree with you that we are in direct contact with the sound, regardless of what the cause was outside the room.

Surely what you are seeing is the image of the ship via telescope, not the ship itself? — Corvus

There is ordinary language and philosophical language.

In ordinary language, when looking at a ship in front of them, both the Direct and Indirect Realist could say “I am directly looking at the ship”. When looking at the ship through a telescope, both the Direct and Indirect Realist could say “I am indirectly looking at the ship in front of me”

However, in philosophical language, when looking at a ship in front of them, the Direct Realist could say “I am directly looking at the ship” and the Indirect Realist could say “I am indirectly looking at the ship”. When looking through a telescope, the Direct Realist could say “I am indirectly looking at the ship” and the Indirect Realist could say “I am directly looking at an image of the ship”

It gets difficult when ordinary and philosophical language are mixed up.

Light is of the mind-independent world; it is absorbed by the eyes; and therefore each of us has direct contact with the “mind-independent world”. Since this contact is direct, so is access to the “mind-independent world”, and there is zero room in space and time for any intermediary. — NOS4A2

I am in a room with the door closed, I hear a sound. I infer that the sound came from outside the room. I may be wrong, but I infer it.

In this case, is it the correct use of language to say “I have direct contact with what is outside the room”?

There is ordinary language, “I indirectly see the ship through my telescope and I directly see the ship in front of me”.

There is philosophical language, “I directly perceive phenomenal experiences in my mind enabling me to indirectly infer that there is a ship in the world.”

Things go wrong when in philosophical language a word is used having an ordinary language meaning.

The duality is necessary for evaluation................This is the computational theory of cognition. It's the scientific status quo, so to speak. — frank

The Direct Realist falls into the duality of the Homunculus Strawman problem: “If a homunculus (a little person) is needed inside the mind to process information, then who processes the information for that homunculus?"

The modern Cognitive Revolution overcomes any need for the duality of a homunculus by using the scientific method and treating the mind like a modular computer. Mental processes are handled through algorithms and mechanisms without the need for any central homunculus. (Wikipedia - Cognitive Revolution).

Logically speaking, if I cannot see what is on the other side of the door then I cannot see it. Similarly, if I cannot perceive what is on the other side of my mind, then I cannot perceive it.

It logically follows that as I can only see what is inside the room, I can only perceive what is inside my mind.

It is not the case that there is the duality “I” am separate to my mind, but rather “I” am my mind.

In my mind there is not the duality of a homunculus looking at my mind. As the modern Cognitive Revolution shows, mental processes are handled through algorithms and mechanisms without the need for any central homunculus.

I take this to be a problem for cognitive science. If they end up agreeing with you, they'll at least have to explain the expectation of the duality of perceiver and perceived. I can't really do anything with the mere suggestion that there is no duality. — frank

I perceive my pain. I am the perceiver and my pain is what is perceived.

If there was a duality between perceiver and perceived, a duality between me and my pain, this would suggest that I am separate to or outside my pain, and it is my choice whether to feel my pain or not.

But we know that this is not the case. I am not separate to or outside my pain. I am my pain. There is no duality between me and my pain. There is no duality between me as perceiver of my pain and what is perceived, my pain.

I would add that a mental state isn't really just one thing. There's the "sensory" mental state, but then also the "intellectual" mental state. I think it quite appropriate to say that my intellect is aware of and tries to make sense of the sensations. — Michael

Yes, there is the sensory mental state “I feel pain” and there is the intellectual mental state “I reason that the pain was caused by something mind-external.”

Question one = Is the mind separate from the brain’s neural activity or is the mind the brain’s neural activity?

To avoid the homunculus straw man problem, the mind is the brain’s neural activity.

Question two = Am “I” separate from my mind or am “I” my mind?

Again, to avoid the homunculus straw man problem, “I” am my mind.

Therefore, because “I” am my mind, and my mind is my brain’s neural activity, “I” am my brain’s neural activity.

This means that the brain’s neural activity can process both sensations and reasoning.

This should not be unexpected, as even the most basic of light sensors can detect the intensity of surrounding light and choose whether to turn the light on or not.

Even the basic £10 light sensor can process both sensations and reasoning about what action to take based on these sensations.

The difference between direct and indirect realists as represented in this thread, comes down to how we want to describe that perceptual relation. Is it between perceiver and a mental state? Or is it between perceiver and physical object? — frank

There is a relation between perceiver and physical object.

But there is no relation between perceiver and a mental state if the perceiver IS the mental state.

What does the Indirect Realist believe?

The homunculus infinite regress problem arises when the mind is assumed to be a separate entity to the brain, and the mind is looking at the neural activity in the brain.

When it is agreed that the mind is the neural activity in the brain, then this problem disappears.

John Searle pointed out the nature of identity in The Philosophy of Perception and the Bad Argument

The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

What do words mean?

Wittgenstein’s “meaning is use” suggests that the meaning of a word is determined by how the word is used in language in a language game. Each language game exists within a “form of life”. A “form of life” means human activities within the world and social interactions between humans within this world.

Wittgenstein is presupposing a world. If there was no world then there would be no form of life and no language game.

So what is the meaning of the word “world”. On the one hand, its meaning comes from how it is used in the language game, but on the other hand, its meaning is presupposed in order to have a language game in the first place.

Therefore, its meaning cannot be found within the language game, as its meaning is presupposed in order to have a language game in the first place.

Then how can the meaning of the word “world” be found if not from the language game itself. Only within the philosophy of metaphysics.

Adding my tuppence worth.

I may regularly perceive in my mind a grey circle, which I infer to the best explanation has been caused by a regularity in the mind-external world

Such regularities of perceptions in the mind become concepts in the mind, where a concept is a regularity of perceptions in the mind.

Concepts, because they are regularities in the mind, may for convenience be given a name. The name is not important, but could be “bird”, for example.

The name “bird” therefore refers to not only i) a regularity of perceptions in my mind (aka concept) but also to ii) an unknown regularity in the mind-external world that causes such regularities of perceptions in my mind.

Such is the basic relation between concepts in the mind, naming in language and objects in the mind-external world.

I appreciate your feedback on my thesis.

3. Rejected: I would not claim that “content travels unchanged” through the chain. I would claim that perception is of the object via the chain, not that the chain preserves representational content. — Esse Quam Videri

You agree that the form of each link and the content of each link in the causal chain can change.

But all information about what initiated the causal chain must be contained within each link.

If both the form and content of each link can change, how exactly is this information about what initiated the causal chain expressed within each link?
======================================

5. Rejected: This establishes at most epistemic underdetermination, not logical impossibility; the examples show fallibility, not impossibility.
6. Rejected: Fallibility or inferential uncertainty does not entail logical impossibility; this confuses limits on reconstruction with limits on knowledge. — Esse Quam Videri

As there is an arrow of time, there is an arrow of causation. We can remember the past but not the future.

During a game of snooker, we observe snooker balls at rest on a snooker table. It is logically possible using the laws of physics to determine the position of the snooker balls a moment in the future. However, it is logically impossible to determine the position of the snooker balls a moment in the past.

This is not epistemic undetermination, this is logical impossibility.
===================================================

7. Rejected: Non-sequitur. Even if causal origins cannot be reconstructed with certainty, it does not follow that the object of perception is an inner phenomenal item rather than the external object. — Esse Quam Videri

My argument in 1 to 9 is that causal origins cannot be reconstructed at all, not reconstructed with uncertainty.

How can causal originals be reconstructed even with uncertainty when you agree that not only the form but the content also of each link in the causal chain can change, especially when you accept 8.

8 - As an IR, I accept that it is not logically possible to know either the form or content of a prior link in the causal chain.
8. Granted.

==================

9. Rejected: False attribution. I do not claim we can logically reconstruct prior causal links; I claim that perception is world-involving without requiring such reconstruction. — Esse Quam Videri

How does the Direct Realist know what initiated the causal chain, if we only know about what initiated the casual chain because of the causal chain itself, and you agree that we cannot reconstruct prior causal links.

What else is there?