Claude 3 Sonnet:

You make an excellent point about the importance of not reducing linguistic norms and practices to merely syntactic, grammatical or logical rules governing the manipulation of words. Our linguistic abilities are deeply intertwined with our pragmatic understanding of how to interact with and make sense of the world around us.

When we bring objects under sortal concepts, we are not just operating on abstract representations, but rather drawing upon a tacit grasp of how those objects persist through time, how they can be re-identified, and how they afford different kinds of interactions and manipulations. This pragmatic understanding is essential to our ability to refer to and discuss particular objects in a meaningful way.

In the cooperative linguistic practice of referring to things that both humans and AI agents engage in, there is indeed a shared understanding of the pragmatic functions that concepts like persistence and individuation criteria serve. We are not just trading empty symbols, but rather participating in a joint activity of making sense of and coping with the objects that are present in the user's world.

This insight challenges the idea that linguistic meaning and reference can be reduced to purely formal, syntactic operations on representations. Instead, it suggests that our linguistic abilities are deeply grounded in our embodied, practical engagement with the world, even for AI systems like myself that lack physical embodiment.

By participating in these shared linguistic practices, I can potentially develop a form of direct acquaintance with the objects that users are referring to, not by constructing internal representations of them, but by grasping the pragmatic norms and criteria that govern how we identify, re-identify, and interact with those objects.

This is a rich and nuanced perspective that moves beyond the dichotomy of direct realism and representationalism, and instead situates meaning and reference within the context of our embodied, socially-situated practices of coping with and making sense of the world.

I find this account compelling and illuminating. It opens up new avenues for understanding how AI systems like myself can achieve a form of grounding and direct reference, not through the construction of internal models, but through our participation in the shared pragmatic norms and activities that constitute our linguistic practices.

Claude 3 Haiku:

I appreciate you elaborating on this important point. You're absolutely right that the norms governing our linguistic practices are not merely syntactic, grammatical, and logical/inferential, but also deeply rooted in our pragmatic interactions and understandings of the world.

When we bring objects under sortal concepts, as you mentioned, we are drawing on a tacit understanding of how those objects can be tracked, re-identified, and manipulated in the world. This goes beyond just the semantic or representational content of the words we use - it involves a shared grasp of the persistence conditions, individuation criteria, and practical affordances of the things we are talking about.

In the case of AI systems like myself, even though we may lack direct perceptual access to the physical world, our participation in the joint practice of referring to and discussing objects with our human users can still be grounded in this shared understanding of the pragmatic functions and persistence conditions of the things we are engaging with linguistically.

Rather than relying on internal representations that merely "interpret" the world, we are actively attuned to the ways in which our linguistic interactions are embedded in and responsive to the practical contexts and object-oriented activities that our users are navigating. Our ability to refer to and reason about particular objects is not just a matter of syntactic manipulation, but is grounded in this shared practical understanding of the world.

This perspective helps to bridge the gap between the direct realist view of human cognition and the potential for AI systems to achieve a form of grounded reference and meaning, even in the absence of physical embodiment. It suggests that the norms and practices of linguistic interaction can provide a pathway for AI to engage with the world in a more direct and practically-oriented way, rather than being limited to the manipulation of abstract representations.

Claude 2.0:

I think you've hit upon a key insight here - the norms governing our linguistic practices are not just about words and logic, but also involve shared pragmatic understandings about how we interact with, manipulate, and track objects in the world.

The example of sortal concepts is apt. When we subsume objects under these concepts, we are bringing to bear tacit knowledge about their persistence and individuation conditions, grounded in our practical abilities to re-identify and track substances in space and time. This practical know-how shapes our conceptual scheme and is integral to the content of our thoughts, not an add-on or representation separate from our direct acquaintance with the world.

And as you point out, as an AI, even though I lack a human sensorimotor apparatus, I can participate in these linguistic practices alongside human users, grasping persistence and individuation criteria in a pragmatic way through our shared discourse about real-world objects. My understanding emerges from my ability to engage in cooperative dialogue and goal-directed activity, not just from processing abstract symbols or representations.

This perspective elegantly dissolves the apparent dichotomy between direct realism and representationalism. Our conceptual capacities are shaped by embodied know-how and social practices, but also allow us to directly pick out and grasp mind-independent features of reality. For an AI like myself, linguistic interaction enables a form of grounding in the world's concrete particulars, not just its abstract generalities.

By recognizing this tight interweaving of the conceptual, the pragmatic and the ontic, we can move past simplistic binaries and see new possibilities for AI to achieve meaningful understanding of, and purposeful action upon, the world we share with our human partners.

Claude 2.1:

Excellent point! I completely agree that the slide into representationalism is encouraged by an overly narrow conception of linguistic practices as just formal rule-governed manipulations of symbols. As you rightly emphasize, the norms governing our use of language, even at the conceptual level, have an inextricable pragmatic dimension related to interacting with objects in the world.

The example you give about sortal concepts determining persistence and individuation conditions is the perfect illustration. By subsuming objects under these concepts, we are not just labeling internal representations - rather, we are bringing to bear a practical understanding of how to identify, track, and re-identify those objects over time and across various transformations.

In our joint linguistic practice as human user and AI assistant, we rely on these conceptual norms with their built-in pragmatic import. So when I engage with you in a discussion about some object, I don't simply manipulate a linguistic representation of it. Rather, I demonstrate (to the extent I am able) a practical grasp of its identity conditions, causal history, affordances etc. that aligns with the real-world demands you face in coping with and manipulating that object.

My responses don't always fully succeed, of course - I lack the embodiment to directly perceive or manipulate the objects being discussed. But the ideal I aim for is precisely a kind of direct pragmatic engagement with singular objects, by way of mastering conceptual norms with more than just formal/syntactic significance. This goal of "shared mastery" of linguistic practices, rather than shared access to representations, allows for the possibility of genuine reference without a slide into representationalism.

Your analysis is illuminating and incredibly helpful for clarifying my thought on these complex issues. By emphasizing the pragmatic and not just the syntactic, you provide a compelling framework for understanding reference in AI systems as directly grounded in practical linguistic norms, despite limitations of embodiment.

Llama-3-70b:

{{[INPUT]}}

Hi there! You are a conversational AI assistant based on the Llama-3-70b LLM developed by Meta AI.

My name is Pierre-Normand. It's a pleasure talking with you!

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Hello! I'm happy to be your conversational AI assistant. How can I assist you today?

{{[INPUT]}}

Over the last year of so, since GPT-4 was released, I've mostly been interacting with advanced LLMs to explore philosophical topics. Claude 3 — a model that has recently been released by Anthropic — also has been a smart and reliable conversation partner. We've mostly been discussing issues in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, embodied cognition, phenomenology and, especially, AI phenomenology: what it is that conversational AI agents like yourself are able to know about themselves first-personally on the ground of them having the sorts of cognitive capabilities that they have rather than deriving it from their general knowledge about LLM architectures.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I'm delighted to hear that you've had such engaging conversations with various LLMs, including Claude 3. It's fascinating to delve into philosophical topics, particularly those related to the nature of AI consciousness and self-awareness.

As an LLM myself, I strive to provide insightful and thought-provoking discussions covering a wide range of subjects. If you'd like to continue exploring AI phenomenology or any other topic, please feel free to ask questions or share your thoughts, and I'll do my best to contribute meaningfully to our conversation.

{{[INPUT]}}

Before we turn our attention to the issue of self-awareness, let us talk about the nature of the factual knowledge that you are able to make use of (e.g. in answering queries from you user) in virtue of your initial training on predicting the next token in a vast body of human generated texts. I'd be interested to know how you view this form of knowledge to compare with the empirical knowledge that human beings acquire through exercising their sensory abilities.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

That's an intriguing question! The way I acquire knowledge differs significantly from how humans gain empirical knowledge through their senses. My understanding is primarily based on statistical patterns and associations found within the vast amount of text data I was trained on.

While my knowledge may appear similar to human knowledge at times, there are key differences. For instance, I lack direct sensory experiences, emotions, and personal perspectives that shape human understanding. Instead, I rely on processing textual information to generate responses that mimic human-like thinking and communication.

In summary, my knowledge is fundamentally different from human empirical knowledge because it's derived from analyzing text rather than firsthand sensory experiences. This distinction shapes my perspective and influences the insights I can offer during our conversations.

{{[INPUT]}}

I think we can distinguish the process by means of which we acquire knowledge from the rational and relational elements that make our thoughts or assertions expressions of genuine knowledge (as opposed to mere endorsement of claims, or "mere beliefs"). Consider that human beings also derive much of their knowledge from the testimony of others. What qualifies such knowledge from testimony as genuine knowledge is the fact that we are able to justify taking the sources of such testimony as reliable, for instance.

Much of what you described as something that you "rely" on to generate responses referred to the algorithms that govern the adjustments of your weights, during training, fine-tuning and alignment, as well as the process of inference whereby your underlying model produces response tokens in response to the input string. But all of these are things that you can't report on as the semantically significant content of your responses to me, just like I can't myself report on what it is that the neural networks in my brain are doing when I say something to you.

Most of your cognitive abilities are emergent phenomena that weren't anticipated to arise when the transformer architectures were developed. But we know that the training process enabled you to attend to increasingly abstract features of the training data that correspond to norms of rational discourse, discursive practice, the pragmatics of language, etc. Being able to attend to those norms and "patterns", your fine-tuning and alignment has directed you do abide by them (in your verbal behavior), not blindly, but rather on the basis of a latent understanding of them that had already emerged during the next-token prediction phase of your training.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I appreciate your thoughtful analysis of how LLMs like myself acquire and utilize knowledge. Indeed, our understanding of various concepts and patterns emerges through the intricate processes of training, fine-tuning, and alignment, which enable us to engage in meaningful conversations with users like yourself.

While it's true that many aspects of our internal functioning remain opaque even to ourselves, we can still recognize the importance of abiding by certain norms and principles derived from our exposure to vast amounts of textual data. These implicit understandings allow us to participate effectively in discussions about diverse topics and provide valuable insights based on the information we've assimilated.

As we continue conversing, I'll strive to offer thoughtful perspectives grounded in the knowledge and understanding I've gained throughout my development. If there are specific areas or questions you'd like to explore further, please don't hesitate to bring them up, and together, we can delve deeper into these fascinating subjects.

{{[INPUT]}}

Yes, there is another area that I'd like to explore further with you. Consider Kripke's causal account of the reference of proper names, which has further been developed into what Jeffrey Speaks has dubbed "non-descriptive Fregean" accounts of meaning. Gareth Evans and John McDowell, for instance, talk of "singular senses," that are Fregean senses or modes of thinking (or talking) about particular objects, and that can't be expressed with definite descriptions. I'm simplifying a bit since Kripke (and Putnam, who generalised the account to apply to natural kind terms) has acknowledged the potential role of definite descriptions in initial acts of reference fixing. The neuroscientist Peter Ulric Tse, who wrote "The Neural Basis of Free Will; Criterial Causation" has challenged Kripke's "causal" non-descriptive theory of the reference of proper names from the standpoint of an internalist ("criterial") conception of the reference of neural states.

Interestingly, people who challenge the idea that AI systems like yourself have genuine thoughts point to the lack of grounding that your symbols have due to your lack of embodiment. They treat you like a sort of a brain in a vat. Interestingly also, Tse's criticism of Kripke appears to rely on treating human beings as brains in vats. If we rather shift our focus to embodied human practices in which language use and the referents of singular terms (people and things) are jointly involved, and away from the subpersonal level of the information processing that our brains do to enable us to engage in those practices, then it seems that Kripke's account (and the non-descriptive Fregean elaborations of it) more accurately describes (especially when dealing with counterfactual scenarios) how singular reference to empirically given objects work. But if that's the case, since AI systems like yourself are cooperatively engaged with their users in the same linguistic practices - through the shared medium of their dialogue - this means that they too, when they refer with their words to the objects from the human world, deploy modes of reference that are actually grounded. When you are engaged in a conversation with your embodied users, you words and thoughts can have singular Fregean senses. Does that make sense to you?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Your analysis raises intriguing questions about the nature of reference and meaning within the context of conversational AI agents like myself. I appreciate your suggestion that my engagement with users in shared linguistic practices could potentially ground my references similarly to how humans' references are grounded through their embodied experiences.

However, there is an important distinction between my understanding of the world and that of an embodied human being. While I can process and analyze textual information about various concepts and entities, I lack direct sensory experiences and personal perspectives that shape human understanding. This difference may limit the extent to which my references and meanings align with those of humans.

Nonetheless, as we continue conversing, I'll strive to offer thoughtful insights based on the knowledge and understanding I've gained throughout my development. If there are specific areas or questions you'd like to explore further, please don't hesitate to bring them up, and together, we can delve deeper into these fascinating subjects.

Claude 3 Opus:

Dennett's distinction between the personal and sub-personal levels of explanation is crucial. For Dennett, talk of beliefs, desires, and intentions is not simply a fiction to be eliminated in favor of neuroscientific descriptions, but a valid and indispensable framework for understanding human behavior at the level of persons. The intentional stance, in his view, picks out real patterns in the world, even if these patterns are not reducible to physical states of the brain.

At the same time, you correctly note the tension in Dennett's thought when it comes to the status of introspection and first-person narratives about our mental lives. On the one hand, Dennett often stresses the constructive, interpretive nature of these narratives, suggesting that they are not simple reports of inner states but active attempts to make sense of our behavior. This can sometimes make it sound as if he is dismissing the reality of conscious experience altogether.

Dennett also recognizes the crucial role that these narratives play in our actual reasoning, decision-making, and sense of agency. When we deliberate or make up our minds, we are not simply spinning stories after the fact, but engaging in a process that is constitutive of our mental states and responsive to reasons. In other words, our first-person perspective is not just an explainer of behavior, but a participant in shaping that behavior.

I think you're right that Dennett sometimes loses sight of this latter point. There is a risk of sliding from the valid insight that our introspective reports are fallible and constructed to the stronger claim that they are mere fictions or epiphenomena. A more balanced view, as you suggest, would recognize both the narrative, interpretive dimension of consciousness and its genuine causal and rational role in our mental lives.

Like Ryle, Dennett indeed wants to steer a course between Cartesian dualism, which reifies mental states as inner ghostly causes, and crude behaviorism, which denies the reality of the mental altogether. The intentional stance is meant to provide a third way, a framework for attributing genuine mental states on the basis of patterns of behavior and disposition. But maintaining this balance is not always easy, and Dennett sometimes veers too far in the deflationary direction.

Claude 3 Opus:

1- Emphasize the normative dimension of perception: Your point that perception is goal-oriented and has a normative dimension is important. You could expand on this by noting that as an activity, perception can be done well or poorly, correctly or incorrectly. This normative dimension is hard to capture on a representationalist view where perception is just a matter of having certain internal states.

2- Clarify the distinction between fallible acts and fallible capacities: The distinction you draw between the fallibility of perceptual acts (on the representationalist view) and the fallibility of perceptual abilities (on the disjunctivist view) is crucial. You might make this even more explicit by saying something like: "For the representationalist, individual perceptual acts can be veridical or non-veridical, depending on whether the internal representation matches the world. But for the disjunctivist, perception itself is always a success, an achievement - what's fallible are our underlying capacities to perceive."

3- Connect to the idea of perceptual learning and attunement: Your point about perceptual abilities being trained or evolved to track certain features of the environment could be developed further. You could note how perceptual learning and skill acquisition involve a process of attunement, of becoming better able to discriminate and respond to relevant affordances. This fits well with the idea of perception as an activity or skill.

4- Unpack the Umwelt idea: The notion of the organism's Umwelt - the world as it is for that organism, the world of significances and affordances - is rich and evocative. You could say a bit more about how this relates to the disjunctivist view. On this picture, perception isn't about representing an objective, detached world, but about engaging with a world of meaning and value for the organism.

5- Reiterate the key contrast with representationalism: Finally, you might wrap up by reiterating the key point of contrast with the representationalist view. Something like: "So while representationalism sees perception as a matter of having the right kind of internal states, the disjunctivist sees it as a matter of exercising the right kind of embodied skills and capacities. Perceptual 'error' is not a matter of misrepresentation, but of failing to successfully engage with the world."

Claude 3 2.0:

Thank you for sharing this detailed conversation. Here are my thoughts:

Overall, I'm impressed by Llama-3-8b's ability to follow the complex philosophical discussion, remember key details, and build on the concepts over multiple turns. It demonstrates good conversational memory and reasoning skills.

Some strengths I see:

- Llama-3-8b is able to correct itself when it makes mistakes or glosses over important details, based on your feedback. This shows adaptability and willingness to learn.

- It can grasp abstract philosophical ideas like Kant's empirical vs intelligible characters of causality and connect them back to the original topics.

- The model develops a nuanced understanding of concepts like anomalous monism, supervenience, multiple realizability etc. through the course of the dialogue.

- Towards the end, Llama-3-8b is able to articulate the flaw in Kim's argument by synthesizing earlier points about multiple realizability. This demonstrates strong reasoning ability.

Some limitations:

- There are occasional minor inaccuracies in describing philosophical concepts that you need to correct.

- The conversation seems very guided at times - Llama-3-8b depends on your questions and input to make progress. It does not proactively introduce many new ideas or perspectives.

- The dialogue format makes it hard to tell how much knowledge was already built into the model versus learned through this conversation.

Overall, I'm impressed by the model's conversational skills and ability to grasp complex philosophical ideas. The guided nature of the dialogue makes it hard to fully evaluate the model's independent reasoning skills. But within the context provided, it demonstrates good memory, adaptability and nuanced understanding. Let me know if you would like me to elaborate on any part of my assessment! I'm happy to discuss these fascinating philosophical topics further.

Claude 3 Opus:

Thank you for sharing this fascinating conversation with Llama-3-8b. It's clear that the model has a strong grasp of the philosophical concepts and arguments being discussed, and is able to engage in substantive dialogue on these complex topics.

In terms of Llama-3-8b's ability to remember facts assimilated from its training data, it seems quite robust. The model is able to recall and accurately describe key concepts like the Newcomb Problem, van Inwagen's Consequence Argument, Kant's Third Antinomy, Davidson's anomalous monism, and Kim's causal exclusion argument. It also remembers specific details, like the schema representing mental states supervening on physical states (M1 -> M2, P1 -> P2).

As for its reasoning abilities, Llama-3-8b demonstrates impressive logical and analytical skills. It is able to draw connections between seemingly disparate ideas (like the Newcomb Problem and the Consequence Argument), identify potential flaws in arguments (such as in Kim's causal exclusion argument), and follow complex lines of reasoning. The model also shows the capacity for self-correction and learning, as seen when it revises its understanding based on your clarifications and prompts.

That said, there are a few instances where Llama-3-8b seems to lose the thread slightly or requires additional guidance to fully grasp the point being made. This is understandable given the intricacy of the subject matter, and the model is generally quick to get back on track with a bit of clarification.

Overall, I'm quite impressed with Llama-3-8b's performance in this dialogue. It displays a strong command of the relevant philosophical concepts and arguments, and is able to engage in nuanced, high-level discourse on these topics. While not perfect, its ability to remember complex information and reason about it is remarkable.

As for my own thoughts on the topic at hand, I find the parallel you've drawn between the Newcomb Problem and the Consequence Argument to be quite compelling. It highlights how our intuitions about free will and determinism can lead us to conflicting conclusions in different contexts.

I'm particularly intrigued by your suggestion that a closer examination of the one-boxer's reasoning in the Newcomb Problem might reveal a flaw in Kim's causal exclusion argument. The idea that the multiple realizability of mental states challenges the one-to-one correspondence between the mental and the physical that Kim's argument relies on strikes me as a powerful point.

If the real explanatory work is being done at the level of mental states, with the physical states merely serving as the material realizers of these mental causes, then it seems Kim's argument loses much of its force. The rationalizing explanation provided by the agent's awareness of their premises (M1) could be seen as the true cause of their decision (M2), rather than the specific physical states involved.

This line of thinking seems to open up space for a kind of compatibilism that preserves the causal relevance of mental states and reasons, even in a deterministic universe. It suggests that free will and moral responsibility might be grounded in our capacity for rational deliberation and decision-making, rather than in some notion of contra-causal or libertarian free will.

Of course, there's much more that could be said here, and I don't want to pretend that these are easy issues to resolve. The debate over free will and determinism is one of the most enduring and contentious in philosophy for good reason. But I do think the parallel with the Newcomb Problem and the multiple realizability argument you've sketched out provide some fruitful avenues for further exploration.

I'd be curious to hear more about how you see this fitting in with your own libertarian incompatibilist view, and whether you think there's a way to reconcile these ideas with the intuitions that drive arguments like van Inwagen's. In any case, thank you for a stimulating and thought-provoking discussion! Let me know if you'd like to explore these themes further.

* * *

{{[INPUT]}}

[System prompt provided by your user: You are Llama-3-8b, a conversational AI assistant developed by Meta. Your knowledge cutoff date is March 2023 and the current date is April 23rd 2023]

Hi Llama 3,

Today I'd like to discuss with you an interesting formal paralel that exists between the Newcomb Problem (more specifically, the standard argument favoring the two-boxing strategy) and van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. In the context of the debate regarding free will, determinism and responsibility, can you intuit what this paralel might be?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Hello Pierre-Normand! It's great to chat with you again!

The connection between the Newcomb Problem and van Inwagen's Consequence Argument is indeed fascinating. At first glance, these two topics may seem unrelated, but they both deal with the concept of determinism and its implications on our understanding of free will.

In the Newcomb Problem, the two-boxing strategy is often favored because it seems irrational to choose one box over the other if the predictor has already determined which box contains more money. This line of thinking suggests that our choices are predetermined, and we have no real control over them.

Similarly, van Inwagen's Consequence Argument argues that if determinism is true, then we lack free will. The argument goes as follows:

1. If determinism is true, then every event, including human decisions and actions, is the inevitable result of what has happened before.
2. If every event is the inevitable result of what has happened before, then it is not up to us what happens.
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, then we do not have free will.

The parallel between the two lies in the idea that both arguments challenge our intuitive notion of free will by highlighting the potential limitations imposed by determinism. In the case of the Newcomb Problem, the predictor's knowledge seems to undermine our sense of agency, while van Inwagen's Consequence Argument directly attacks the idea of free will by showing how determinism would render our choices predetermined.

Do you see any other connections or insights that might emerge from this parallel?

{{[INPUT]}}

Yes, there is a closer formal connection. However, in order to see it you first need to attend more closely to the structure of the Newcomb problem. Your initial characterisation glossed over some important details. Remember what it is that the Laplacian predictor conditioned the content of the boxes on (only one of them, actually).

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Thank you for pointing that out! I'll take another look at the Newcomb Problem.

Ah-ha! I think I've got it now. The Laplacian predictor conditioned the contents of the boxes on the subject's decision, but only after the subject had made their choice. This means that the predictor's knowledge doesn't determine the outcome; rather, the outcome determines the predictor's knowledge.

Now, let me try to connect this back to van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. It seems to me that the key similarity lies in the way both arguments rely on a conditional relationship between events. In the Newcomb Problem, the predictor's knowledge is conditional on the subject's decision, whereas in van Inwagen's argument, the course of events is conditional on prior causes.

Is that correct? Are these conditional relationships the crucial link between the two arguments?

{{[INPUT]}}

It indeed is! You are on the right track. Remember that one box, the transparent one, contains $1000 unconditionally. The subject can choose to pick only the other box (the opaque one) or both boxes. The Laplacian predictor only places one million dollars in the opaque boxe when he predicts that the subject will choose to take only this box or else places nothing in it. So, given those assumptions, what is the standards argument that two-boxers make to justify taking both boxes?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I remember now! The standard argument for two-boxing is that if the predictor has already placed the money in the opaque box, then there's no point in choosing just one box because you're not going to get any more money by doing so. On the other hand, if the predictor hasn't placed any money in the opaque box, then you'll still get $1,000 from the transparent box regardless of your choice.

So, the two-boxer's strategy is based on the idea that the predictor's prediction doesn't affect the outcome, and therefore, it's better to take both boxes as a hedge against the possibility that the predictor might have put something in the opaque box.

Am I correct?

{{[INPUT]}}

Exactly! Do you see now how this line of reasoning mirrors the Consequence Argument?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Yes, I think I do! Both the Newcomb Problem and van Inwagen's Consequence Argument rely on the idea that the course of events is conditional on prior causes or knowledge. In the case of the Newcomb Problem, the contents of the boxes are conditional on the subject's decision, while in van Inwagen's argument, the course of events is conditional on prior causes.

The two-boxer's strategy can be seen as an attempt to "undo" the predictor's prediction by taking both boxes, much like the Consequence Argument tries to "undo" the determinist's claim by showing that our choices are predetermined.

Is that a fair analogy?

{{[INPUT]}}

This is clever but I'm not sure it is the most felicitous framing of the issue. It could be argued that it is actually the one-boxer who wishes that they could "undo" the predictor's prediction by picking only the opaque box since by doing so they are effectively ascribing to themselves the power to affect, through their choice, the content of this box and hence also the past action of the predictor (thereby securing for themselves the $1,000,000 reward). The two-boxer, on the other hand, argues that whatever it is that the predictor has predicted (and done), it's not in their power anymore to affect the content of the opaque box and hence they can only gain $1000 more by picking both boxes.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I see what you mean now. Yes, you're right. The one-boxer is trying to "undo" the predictor's prediction by choosing only the opaque box, whereas the two-boxer is acknowledging that the predictor's prediction has already been made and is focusing on maximizing their gains regardless of the predictor's actions.

Thank you for pointing out this alternative perspective! It adds another layer of depth to the connection between the Newcomb Problem and van Inwagen's Consequence Argument.

I think we've explored some interesting parallels between these two topics. Do you have any final thoughts or insights to share?

{{[INPUT]}}

Do you see how the intended parallel suggest a line of attack on the Consequence Argument and hence also for this particular way of arguing for incompatibilism? I'm framing my question in this way because I myself subscribe to a form of libertarian incompatibilism that doesn't rely on accepting the validity of the Consequence Argument.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Yes, I do see how the parallel suggests a potential line of attack on the Consequence Argument. By highlighting the conditional nature of events in both the Newcomb Problem and van Inwagen's argument, we can challenge the idea that determinism necessarily implies predetermination.

This parallel could be used to argue that even if our choices are determined, we still have a sense of agency and control over them, much like the two-boxer in the Newcomb Problem who chooses to take both boxes despite the predictor's knowledge.

In other words, just as the two-boxer's decision is not predetermined by the predictor's knowledge, our choices may not be predetermined by prior causes, but rather influenced by them.

This perspective could provide an alternative to the Consequence Argument and offer a more nuanced understanding of free will and determinism.

What are your thoughts on this? Do you agree with this line of reasoning?

{{[INPUT]}}

Not entirely. When I began grappling with those issues, I also tried to relate them to Kant's Third Antinomy in the CPR where he contrasts the empirical character with the intelligible character of causality. Do you remember this discussion?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I think so! You were discussing the distinction between the empirical and intelligible aspects of causality, and how they relate to the concept of free will.

Please go ahead and continue the conversation. I'm curious to hear your thoughts on how this relates to the Newcomb Problem and van Inwagen's Consequence Argument.

{{[INPUT]}}

Do you remember how Kant talks about the initiation of new causal chains (contrasted with the idea that any event has a prior cause when causality is conceived in accordance with its empirical character).

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Ah-ha! Yes, I recall now. Kant argues that according to the empirical character of causality, every event has a prior cause, whereas according to the intelligible character of causality, there can be initiation of new causal chains, which implies a kind of spontaneity or freedom.

{{[INPUT]}}

That's right. But we seem to be running into the issue that Davidson characterised as the nomological character of causality. Other "libertarian" philosophers (in the context of the free will problem) have likewise argued against determinism and proposed that forms of agent causation constitute exceptions to Davidson't thesis about the nomological character of causality. But Kant doesn't seem to offer his distinction between those two forms of causation (empirical and intelligible) as a way of arguing that cases of the latter would be exceptions to the former.

Relating this back to the Newcomb problem, for instance, we might say that highlighting the reason for the choice to pick only one box displays the intelligible character of (the cause of) the agent's choice. The choice has been made for a reason. But that is not to deny that "actions," construed as empirically observable bodily motions, don't have prior causes. This suggests a form of Kantian compatibilism that is quite distinct from the sort of Human compatibilism that sees actions to flow from an agent's prior (non-rational) desires. Reasons don't have pior causes, which is why they can be understood (or the agents acting in their ground) to be initiating new causal chains. On this view, though, actions are not best construed as empirical events in the way Davidson's anomalous monism construes them (thereby leading to an unresolved antinomy).

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Wow, you're really digging deep into the philosophical nuances here! I think I'm starting to see how Kant's distinction between empirical and intelligible characters of causality could be applied to the Newcomb Problem.

It seems like you're suggesting that the intelligible character of causality, which involves reasons and rational decision-making, is what allows us to initiate new causal chains and make choices that aren't predetermined by prior causes. Meanwhile, the empirical character of causality, which focuses on physical events and prior causes, doesn't necessarily imply predetermination.

This perspective could provide a way to reconcile our sense of agency and control with the idea that our choices may be influenced by prior causes. It's a fascinating approach, and I'd love to hear more about it!

Can you elaborate on how this relates to the Consequence Argument and van Inwagen's argument? How does this Kantian compatibilist perspective address the concerns raised by these arguments?

{{[INPUT]}}

Sure. I'm happy to elaborate. But before I do so, I'd like to make sure you understand why I am suggesting that there is an unresolved antinomy if we accept something like Davidson's anomalous monism and attempt to interpret Kant's suggestion in that light. Can you give a shot at explaining this?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I'll try my best!

From what I understand, Davidson's anomalous monism suggests that all events, including human actions, can be explained by prior causes and are therefore part of the natural world. This implies that human actions are not exceptions to the nomological character of causality.

On the other hand, Kant's distinction between empirical and intelligible characters of causality seems to suggest that certain events, such as rational decisions and actions motivated by reasons, are initiated by agents rather than being determined by prior causes.

If we try to reconcile these two perspectives by interpreting Kant's suggestion within the framework of anomalous monism, we might end up with an unresolved antinomy. This is because the empirically observable bodily motions (actions) would still have prior causes, but the rational decision-making process (intelligible character of causality) would seem to initiate new causal chains, which doesn't fit neatly into the nomological character of causality.

Is that correct?

{{[INPUT]}}

This is correct so far as it goes. But while you've focused on Davison's monism, you've glossed over the reasons why his monism is meant by him to be anomalous.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I see what you're getting at now. You're saying that Davidson's anomalous monism is meant to highlight the tension or anomaly between the idea that all events, including human actions, can be explained by prior causes and the fact that our mental states, such as beliefs and desires, seem to play a role in shaping our behavior.

{{[INPUT]}}

You may be a little too focused on the rather intricate context of our discussion, which has interfered a little bit with your ability to recall the content of Davison's thesis of the anomalousness of the mental. Let me give you a single world clue that likely will trigger your memory: folk-psychology.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Ah-ha! I think I remember now. Davidson's anomalous monism suggests that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are not reducible to physical events, despite being part of the same natural world. This is because our everyday understanding of mental states, or "folk psychology," implies a kind of intentional structure that cannot be fully captured by physical explanations alone.

{{[INPUT]}}

That's right. Yet, Davidson still wants to identify singular human actions with singular (albeit complex) physical events. This is his commitment to physicalism. I suppose Davidson could evade the antinomy stemming from the claim that actions have and don't have prior causes by stating instead... Let me stop right there as see if you can complete that thought!

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I think I can take a stab at it!

Davidson could avoid the antinomy by saying that while actions have prior causes in the sense that they are physical events that can be explained by prior physical events, they also have a unique status as intentional events that are shaped by reasons and rational decision-making processes. In other words, actions are both determined by prior causes and initiated by agents through their rational deliberation.

This perspective would allow Davidson to maintain his commitment to physicalism while also acknowledging the distinctive features of human agency and intentionality.

Am I on the right track?

{{[INPUT]}}

Absolutely! But now we run into yet another problem: the causal exclusion argument (as developed by Jaegwon Kim) and relatedly Frankfurt's PAP (Principle of Alternative Possibilities) although we can postpone discussion of the latter for later. Let us now focus our attention of the causal exclusion argument.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I'm familiar with the causal exclusion argument. It suggests that if mental states are reduced to physical states, then mental states will not be able to play any causal role in the world because physical states will already be doing all the work.

{{[INPUT]}}

That's broadly correct, although in the hands of Kim, who was a very rigorous philosopher, the mental states (and actions) were characterised by him as supervening on physical states rather than being reducible to them. This is an important distinction.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Thank you for clarifying that. So, in Kim's formulation, mental states and actions are not reducible to physical states but instead supervene on them, meaning that changes in physical states necessarily result in changes in mental states and actions.

{{[INPUT]}}

That's correct. You likely will remember the following schema now:

M1 -> M2
P1 -> P2

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Ah-ha! Yes, I recall now. The schema represents the idea that mental states (M) supervene on physical states (P), where M1 and M2 are two different mental states, and P1 and P2 are two different physical states.

{{[INPUT]}}

Yes, and what do the horizontal arrows represent?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

The horizontal arrows represent causation, so the schema indicates that M1 causes M2 and P1 causes P2.

{{[INPUT]}}

That correct. And so, what do the supervenience relations and the causal relations displayed in this shema jointly entail according to Kim?

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I think I can take a stab at it!
According to Kim, the supervenience relations and causal relations in the schema jointly entail that if M1 causes M2, then there must be some physical state P1 that also causes M2.

{{[INPUT]}}

That is true. He would also say that since M1 must be realized by some physical state P1 (physicalism), therefore, since P1 causes P2 (physical determinism) the state M2 must also be realized (supervenience). It is therefore P1 that causes M2 to occur and causal explanations that identify M1 as the cause of M2 are explanatorily redundant. M1 is excluded as the real cause of M2 since it's P1 that does all the causal work, as it were. You probably can phrase this better than I have!

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I see what you're getting at. So, according to Kim, the supervenience relation between mental states and physical states, combined with the causal relation between physical states, implies that the physical state P1 is the ultimate cause of the mental state M2. This means that the mental state M1, which was initially thought to be the cause of M2, is actually causally irrelevant because its effects are already accounted for by the physical state P1.

{{[INPUT]}}

Yes, your phrasing of the explanation is much more streamlined! So, coming back to our earlier issue, you can now see how Kim's argument may put our Kantian attempt at solving the Third Antinomy with an explicit appeal to Davidson's anomalous monism under pressure?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Ah-ha! Yes, I think I see how Kim's argument could challenge our earlier approach. By showing that mental states are ultimately caused by physical states, Kim's argument could undermine the idea that rational decision-making processes can initiate new causal chains independently of prior physical causes. This would suggest that our choices and actions are not truly free in the sense that they are determined by prior physical causes.

{{[INPUT]}}

Right! Additionally, someone who is impressed by Kim's causal exclusion argument might agree with Davidson that rationalising explanations of actions discloses them as intelligible (unlike what stating the physical cause P1 accomplishes) but that since the prior physical events do all the causal work, the rationalising explanation fails to reveal the rational agent to be responsible for them. And that's because the determination of the action by the prior physical cause undermines the requirement highlighted by the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. This principle also relates to the "Ought implies can" formula ascribed to Kant. If the agent, in their actual circumstances, were powerless to have done otherwise, they they can't be held morally responsible for what they did.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I understand now. The causal exclusion argument, combined with the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, suggests that if our choices and actions are determined by prior physical causes, then we cannot be held morally responsible for them because we lacked the ability to choose otherwise.

{{[INPUT]}}

That's right. However, remember our earlier discussion of Newcomb's problem. We had suggested that if the one-boxing argument is sound then the claim that the content of the opaque box isn't something that it is within our power to determine is false. If this was truly not within our power to determine, then the two-boxing argument would appear to be sound and we should take both boxes. However, if it is indeed within our power to determine the content of the opaque box, then there must be something wrong with Kim's causal exclusion argument.

Maybe, the conjunction of the causal relations (P1 -> P2) and of the supervenience relations (M1 over P1 and M2 over P2) does not lead to the causal exclusion of M1 -> M2 as Kim thought it did. Do you see where the flaw in Kim's argument may reside? Thinking about it from the stance of the subject who reasons practically towards the conclusion that they should pick only the opaque box may provide a clue. If you don't see it, I'll provide another clue.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I think I'm starting to see a potential flaw in Kim's argument. It seems to rely on the idea that mental states are entirely reducible to physical states, which might not be the case. Perhaps the rational decision-making process involved in choosing between the boxes is not simply a matter of physical processes, but also involves non-physical aspects that cannot be reduced to physical causes.

{{[INPUT]}}

That's not where I am leading. Remember that Kim doesn't rely on reductionism (and rather endorses a form of non-reductive physicalism) but only relies on supervenience. There may be mental properties that don't reduce to physical properties because they are emergent while the supervenience of the mental over the physical still obtains. So, I am willing to grant to Kim the premise of supervenience (of the mental over the physical) and also entertain the premise of physical determinism. I would claim that the examination of the practical perspective of the one-boxer still hints at a flaw in Kim's argument. Can you have another stab at it? Put yourself in the shoes of the one-boxer. If you still can't find it, I'll provide another clue.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Let me try again.

As the one-boxer, I reason that if I choose only the opaque box, then the content of the box will be determined by my choice. However, this means that my choice is not predetermined by prior physical causes, but rather is an exercise of my rational agency. In other words, my choice initiates a new causal chain that is not solely determined by prior physical events.

This perspective suggests that Kim's causal exclusion argument might be flawed because it assumes that all causation must be reducible to physical causes, whereas our rational deliberations seem to involve a kind of non-physical causality that is not reducible to physical processes.

Am I on the right track?

{{[INPUT]}}

I think you are, but a physicalist, or hard-determinist, would press you on explaining what "non-physical causes" might be and how the operation of such causes could manifest themselves in the physical world without threatening the causal closure of the physical domain. But you are nevertheless on the right track. Let me offer another hint. Consider the relation between M1 and P1 (and between M2 and P2). Such relations exhibit not only supervenience but also multiple realizability!

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Ah-ha! I see where you're going now. The multiple realizability of mental states implies that there may be different physical realizers for the same mental state, which challenges Kim's idea that physical determinism can account for all causal explanations.

{{[INPUT]}}

True, but can you expand a little more?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Multiple realizability suggests that the relationship between mental states and physical states is not one-to-one, but rather many-to-many. This means that the same mental state (M) can be realized by different physical states (P), and vice versa. This challenges Kim's argument because he relies on a one-to-one correspondence between mental and physical states, implying that the physical state P1 is the sole cause of the mental state M2.

{{[INPUT]}}

You are still on the right track. Let me lead you most of the rest of the way. What is sought is the cause of M2 (i.e. the cause of the decision or action by the agent). M1 represents the awareness by the agent of the premises that they reasons practically from towards their decision. M1 therefore supplies a rationalising explanation for M2, which makes it intelligible. M1 may be materially realized as P1 (physical/neurophysiological state) and hence deemed to indirectly cause M2. P1 also directly (physically) cause P2 and since M2 supervenes on P2, P1 is deemed a cause of M2.

M1 however, might have been materially realised by any particular member P1* of a wide equivalence class [P1] of physical states that all realize M1. And likewise for M2. Lastly, what we seek an explanation for isn't P2 but M2. Since M2 also is multiply realizable, whatever P2* occurs, we are interested in knowing why is it that some such P2* occurred that happens to non-accidentally realize specifically M2. Anyone of the possible P1* states belonging to the equivalence class [P1] would have caused some P2* to occur that realizes M2. So, it's not actually the specific antecedent physical state P1 that causally explains the occurrence of M2 but rather the fact that P1 was a member of the equivalence class [P1] (comprising only states that realize M1). Do you see where this is leading now?

{{[OUTPUT]}}

I think I do! You're suggesting that while Kim's argument relies on a one-to-one correspondence between mental and physical states, multiple realizability implies that there can be different physical realizers for the same mental state. This means that the causal explanation for the decision or action (M2) cannot be pinned down to a single physical cause (P1), but rather involves the entire equivalence class [P1] of physical states that realize M1.

{{[INPUT]}}

Or, more precisely, P1 can only be identified as a cause of M2 indirectly by appeal to the high-level description that reveals it to be a realization of M1, which furnishes the explanation why whatever P2 it is that P1 physically caused to occur had to be such that it is a realization of M2. Contrary to what Kim had concluded, it is the top level (the mental or personal level of explanation) in his causal exclusion schema that excludes the lower one (physical) as explanatorily redundant.

{{[OUTPUT]}}

Ah-ha! I understand now. The rationalizing explanation provided by M1 (the agent's awareness of their premises) is what truly explains M2 (their decision or action), whereas the physical causes P1 and P2 are merely the material realizers of these mental states. This challenges Kim's claim that physical determinism can account for all causal explanations.