"Every determination of choice proceeds from the representation of a possible action to the deed through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, taking an interest in the action or its effect.” — TimeLine

I am not not sure if I understand this. Does it exclude instinct? Are cats and dogs capable of choices? If it's based on pleasure and displeasure why is it important if it's represented or immediate? The source of the action seems to be the same.

Isn't our choice to act or not to act on our desire based on a stronger desire?

Thank you!

Oh, ok, I see. I think that after all this approach is not that different from Aristotle's as mcdoodle and somxtatis described it. At least in practice. Do you agree?

You're not part of my family for definite, but the dog is — unenlightened

Hm, yes, but not based on resemblance, which I thought was the criterion? By "objective" I mean based on the nature (looks) of things that we categorize, not on our whims. For example, if we judge who's in based on resemblance, and two people look the same, logically we'd have to either include both or exclude both. So, if there's no shared feature but different games share different features, where and how do we draw the line?

Well I have my mother's nose, and my father's eyes, but my sister has my father's nose and my mother's eyes; so we have nothing in common, but are the same family. — unenlightened

Oh, OK! Is there an objective way to say who is not part of the family?

Yes. It was a joke. — unenlightened

It sounds true though >:O

But how do we know that the possibility is there if it never gets actual?

What are family resemblances? Isn't it contradictory to say that the essence of things is that they have no essence? :s

I think that Aristotle was a substance dualist, as he distinguish primary substance from secondary substance, so he has two distinct ways of using "essence", one refers to a universal, the other to a particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you mean that there is something due to which a particular human is the particular human that it is and then there's something due to which humans are humans? What would be the latter? Is there such a thing?

Hi! Sorry, I didn't mean that Aristotle considers rationality the essence of man. The example was mine, I was just trying to understand. So, from what you say, the essence that makes things to be recognized as belonging to a specific group is not shared by all the members of this group?

Awareness of the environment is a basic feature of consciousness. — TheMadFool

What is then the difference between awareness and consciousness under this view?

:D

I meant to explain that there is a sense of "self-consciousness" that doesn't refer to the mere outcome of turning one's own gaze inside, as it were, and contemplate what it is one is feeling, experiencing, etc., but rather is a form of critical reflection on what it is that is required to make sense of one's ability to know the world on the basis of experience, or to know what it is one ought to do (and that one is actually doing or intending to do -- i.e. practical self-knowledge) on the basis of practical deliberation, and that reveals explicitly features of our rational abilities that are necessarily operative in every mature human being, including those who don't critically reflect on them. Immanuel Kant is one fellow who pioneered this sort of reflection and Sebastian Rödl is traveling a parallel path. — Pierre-Normand

I'm still not sure I understand this :P
What I meant wasn't that self-consciousness is to think about what I'm feeling or experiencing but just to notice that I'm here, I'm someone, to be aware of myself. And then I think that it is difficult to be conscious of something else and not to be conscious of myself or to be conscious of myself and not be conscious of other things. I think that one implies the other. You mean that these philosophers say that self-consciousness is not about that?

Thank you :D (L)

What do you mean? >:O

If plants are conscious but their reactions are just automatic, then a robot which is programmed to react to certain things is conscious. But that is clearly false, robots are not aware, they are programmed. I thought that what we mean by "aware" is "not-automatic" :P

How can I understand that the sun is there and move towards the sun but not understand that I'm moving toward the sun?

Also, why don't you think that the way plants grow is just programmed and automatic?

Consciousness is awareness of the outside world and that is immanent in all living things. — TheMadFool

Do you mean that plants are conscious the same way humans are?

Thank you, even though I don't understand at all what you mean in your second paragraph :-#

Everytime I come here I think I'm leaving more perplexed than before :P Most people use too advanced language for someone like me who hasn't read philosophy and when I try to search for the things they say, usually to understand the explanations, I have to search for other explanations because again it's given in a language I don't understand. Are these books you mentioned easy to understand? Or do you know any other books or sites where I can read about philosophical ideas in easier language?

If in daily someone asked me, I would say that to be conscious is to recognize that I'm having an experience. But this implies that I'm also aware of myself, so then how is self-consciousness different from consciousness? And how science or philosophy use these words differently?

Yes, we knew that water wasn't a tree but we couldn't know that the tree wasn't somehow made of water. We can distinguish between water and trees when someone talks to us about trees, but if we don't know what water really is, can we distinguish between water and the ultimate substance of the universe when someone talks to us about the ultimate stuff of reality? Now that we know what it is made of, we know it is not the basic stuff of the universe, before that we couldn't tell (this is maybe what Pierre-Normand is talking about?).

Sorry if I don't express myself clearly, I'm still learning english and I find these thoughts really confusing :P

Do you mean that what it is depends simply on the context of our discussions? Can't we just use the word wrongly?

'm sure it would have been correct to say that even before any scientific enquiry we knew what water and trees were. An understanding of particle physics doesn't seem necessary. — Michael

Does this work for all kinds of things? Either we are talking about doors or about the concept of numbers what you said applies? Aren't there things that we need to know how they work in order to say that we know what they're really are?

For example, if we don't know how water is constituted, we might think that it is the substance out of which everything is constituted and then say that this is what it really is, not just something for us to drink.

So in this sense it could be correct to say that we know what consciousness is – even if we don't know anything more. — Michael

What would you say it is in this sense?

Existence suggests something acting or being acted upon.
If existence has an essence it is differentiation. — Cavacava

Is this different than what darthbarracuda said? Namely that to exist is to be causally relevant? What do you mean by the second sentence? Does it mean that since acting or being acted upon requires change and change implies differentiation then existence is about creating difference?

Do you agree with darthbarracuda that to exist is also to be causally relevant? If you do, and since you believe that fictions exist (in some way), which way you think they're causally relevant?

I'm talking about Sean Carroll's "The Big Picture".

I'm also reading a book which says that causes do not exist! Patterns exist. If causes do not exist, then to exist is not to be causally relevant. If we accept patterns exist instead of causes, would it make sense to say that to exist is to be part of a pattern?

Are they all "unified' in the sense that they all exist in the same fundamental ontological way? — darthbarracuda

I don't know!!! What Banno said, "to exist is to be spoken of", seems similar to what Rich said, "If there is some memory of it, it exists". So, the Wizard of Oz exists. You said that to exist is to be causally relevant. Would you say that a literary character can be causally relevant?

Thank you!

Can we say then that the insubstantial is unreal? Or is it just immaterial?

But the question remains: are all these different ways only ontically different? Are they unified ontologically? — darthbarracuda

I'm afraid I don't understand the question :s

What counts as memory though? For example, if there is a footprint somewhere but noone ever sees it, doesn't it exist? Is memory the same as thought?


:D

To ask such a question seems to presuppose that there is only one "way" or "mode" of existence. — darthbarracuda

I didn't want to imply something like that. So, are there different ways of existing? Do these ways have something in common?

If there is some memory of it, it exists — Rich

If there is no memory of something, it doesn't?



Thanks! I guess I'll have to read all these people to understand your answer :P

I forgot to say that I haven't read any philosophy, so I'm not familiar with its vocabulary, so if it's possible, please use as less strange language as possible :D

For example, I don't know what any of these mean: holographic model of the universe, existence is either a false predicate, Aristotelian hylomorphism, Piercean semiotic theory, hell, even OSR

So, are there causes at higher levels? It is not just a way we talk about things because it's useful to us?

Why should he have used a dictionary definition?

Although, an example given by the Oxford dictionary seems close to the scientist's use.

a deep sense of spirituality that connects them to the natural environment

So, is it probably you who tries to eliminate some uses of the word to fit your preferred use?

But there is non on all levels, so it is wrong to assign blame or credit, because noone of us is the cause of anything. Why can we ignore that there are no causes on some level while we can't ignore it on other levels?

I think Carroll's is foolish talk, for the most profound knowledge lies in poetry, music and art, and scientific knowledge is itself marvellous but not all-encompassing. — mcdoodle

I think he recognizes that, he's quite clear about this point. My question is different. That if "usefulness" determines the way we talk about the world, then it is possible to talk about the fundamental (scientific) level in different ways. An example of this would be the issue of "causes" and "patterns". "Causes" can be useful to certain people on the fundamental level as well, not just on some "emergent" level.

Does he ever fully explain what he means by this? This reads super vaguely. — Heister Eggcart

I think he means that there's no other realm, no supernatural realm, that the world exists by itself...

The broader ontology typically associated with atheism is naturalism—there is only one world, the natural world, exhibiting patterns we call the “laws of nature,” and which is discoverable by the methods of science and empirical investigation. There is no separate realm of the supernatural, spiritual, or divine; nor is there any cosmic teleology or transcendent purpose inherent in the nature of the universe or in human life. “Life” and “consciousness” do not denote essences distinct from matter; they are ways of talking about phenomena that emerge from the interplay of extraordinarily complex systems. Purpose and meaning in life arise through fundamentally human acts of creation, rather than being derived from anything outside ourselves. Naturalism is a philosophy of unity and patterns, describing all of reality as a seamless web

Yet, the same man who just wrote the above is also vehemently against the many religious traditions that, unfortunately for him, tell a similar story in a multitude of different ways! — Heister Eggcart

I think this might be because he thinks that it goes against his second point...

-There are many ways of talking about the world.
-All good ways of talking must be consistent with one another and with the world.
-Our purposes in the moment determine the best way of talking.

Though, does Carroll provide a measure for what constitutes greater and lesser degrees of usefulness? — Heister Eggcart

I'm not sure, I still haven't reached very far but this is what he says...

I’m going to argue for a different view: our fundamental ontology, the best way we have of talking about the world at the deepest level, is extremely sparse. But many concepts that are part of non-fundamental ways we have of talking about the world—useful ideas describing higher-level, macroscopic reality—deserve to be called “real.” The key word there is “useful.” There are certainly non-useful ways of talking about the world. In scientific contexts, we refer to such non-useful ways as “wrong” or “false.” A way of talking isn’t just a list of concepts; it will generally include a set of rules for using them, and relationships among them. Every scientific theory is a way of talking about the world... Today, we would say that Kepler’s theory is fairly useful in certain circumstances, but it’s not as useful as Newton’s, which in turn isn’t as broadly useful as Einstein’s general theory of relativity

What we’re seeing is a manifestation of the layered nature of our descriptions of reality. At the deepest level we currently know about, the basic notions are things like “spacetime,” “quantum fields,” “equations of motion,” and “interactions.” No causes, whether material, formal, efficient, or final. But there are levels on top of that, where the vocabulary changes. Indeed, it’s possible to recover pieces of Aristotle’s physics quantitatively, as limits of Newtonian mechanics in an appropriate regime, where dissipation and friction are central. (Coffee cups do come to a stop, after all.) In the same way, it’s possible to understand why it’s so useful to refer to causes and effects in our everyday experience, even if they’re not present in the underlying equations. There are many different useful stories we have to tell about reality to get along in the world.

So, I'm wondering who decides that it is only useful to consider causes "real" at a higher level and not at the fundamental level too? As I said, I think that it is useful to Mr. Carroll because he thinks it fits his atheist/naturalist view better, but if someone does not have that view, then it might not be useful to get rid of causes at the fundamental level. If usefulness determines the reality of things, then doesn't it follow that different people who find different things useful (in order "to get along in the world") will talk about the world differently? After all, talking about causes at the fundamental level, does not make predictions less accurate. Am I wrong???

I don't understand :P

I choose to test the hypothesis that god exists by searching for the effects of god. I find plenty as mentioned above. Now am I not right in concluding that god exists for I find many many effects? — TheMadFool

No, you are not right :) You just assume that it is God's effects. You haven't showed that they are indeed God's! What I mean is something like this...

If I have the flu, then I have a sore throat.
I have a sore throat.
Therefore, I have the flu.

But having the flu is not the only cause of a sore throat since many illnesses cause sore throat, such as the common cold or strep throat.

I think what is most useful here is to take the assumption that everything happens at once. That is, time move forwards as easily as backwards — Accursius

Actually, Mr. Carroll says that time moves forward and it's practically unlikely to have backward processes, because of the second law of thermodynamics.

Also, my question is about the distinction between patterns and causes. In this respect, these are the same, one event follows another. The difference is that in the first instance, we just have a specific pattern of events while on the other instance we have causes as well. And I was wondering that if there are multiple ways to talk about things and if we choose the way we talk about things based on our goals or on their usefulness, why should I prefer to talk about patterns (instead of causes) if the vocabulary of causes suits me better?

They didn't find any but had they found some they would have concluded ''ether exists''. — TheMadFool

Or maybe they could have several hypotheses that explained the effects. That's my point. Ideas, will, the self, or matter explain the effects as well. Many people would say that they explain them better. So, it's not that obvious, at least to me!!!

Because there are different things that I can call the sources of these effects. In the stone example the effect could be my will to break the window (therefore my will exists) or my body (therefore my body exists) and in the second the cause of the effect could be again my will or my body. Or I could even say that the idea of God is the cause and since ideas can have effects, ideas exist (but not God himself).