The main problem with your interpretation is that none of the texts that you have provided support it, and this is because Kant is explicit that the "Kingdom of Ends" is only an ideal, or in your quote, "merely possible." If it were more than an ideal and it were—as you seem to conceive it—an actualizable utopia, then all of the problems I have pointed out would come to bear. In that case the utopian end-state would be liable to justify the sort of violence you have in mind, all in order to achieve it. — Leontiskos
A cursory reading of these essays is sufficient to reveal that Kant's interest in political history was an intentional application of his overall Transcendental Perspective[17] to the final (i.e., ultimate) problem of the end or destiny of the human race. The essays rarely give an account or interpretation of any specific historical events. Instead, as their very titles suggest, they pose questions about the necessary form of human history, such as: What was the "Conjectural Beginning of Human History"? (1786), "What is Enlightenment?" (1784), "...Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" (1798), and What is "The End of All Things"? (1794). Kant's goal, in other words, was to discover an "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective" (1784) which could bring "Perpetual Peace" (1795) to humanity through a full realization of the highest good. — Palmquist, Stephen (October 1994) 'The Kingdom of God Is at Hand!' (Did Kant Really Say That?). History of Philosophy Quarterly. 11 (4): 421–437. ISSN 0740-0675. JSTOR 27744641
According to your source such interpretations are certainly atypical, deviating from the received view. Still, none of the sources you cite are promoting your view that it is necessary to resort to violence to bring about a Kingdom of Ends. That strikes me as a grievous departure from Kant. — Leontiskos
Again, given the exact same distal intent of, say, minimizing harm and maximizing harmony, the use of violence as means of obtaining this very same distal intent can be simultaneously right in proximal application (wherein far greater harm/disharmony is thereby avoided) and yet remain wrong in distal terms (for an absolute harmony cannot be of itself produced via violence); — javra
To minimize harm and maximize harmony is obviously not the same as treating everyone as an end in themselves. — Leontiskos
In his writings on religion, Kant interprets the Kingdom of God as a religious symbol for the moral reality of the Kingdom of Ends. As such, it is the ultimate goal of both religious and political organization of human society.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Ends#Overview
A number of Kant’s readers have come to question this received view, however. Perhaps the first philosopher to suggest a teleological reading of Kant was John Stuart Mill. In the first chapter of his Utilitarianism, Mill implies that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative could only sensibly be interpreted as a test of the consequences of universal adoption of a maxim. [...]
There are also teleological readings of Kant’s ethics that are non-consequentialist. Barbara Herman (1993) has urged philosophers to “leave deontology behind” as an understanding of Kant’s moral theory on the grounds that the conception of practical reason grounding the Categorical Imperative is itself a conception of value. Herman’s idea is that Kant never meant to say that no value grounds moral principles. [...]
It is of considerable interest to those who follow Kant to determine which reading — teleological or deontological — was actually Kant’s, as well as which view ought to have been his. A powerful argument for the teleological reading is the motivation for Herman’s proposal: What rationale can we provide for doing our duty at all if we don’t appeal to it’s being good to do it? [...] — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#TelDeo
Therefore your question makes no sense to me. — Leontiskos
Means toward the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony." — Leontiskos
Now if you rewrite your system and say that you're only trying to "minimize harm and maximize harmony," then these two things which were formally ends now become means. — Leontiskos
Here is what I said:
The problem is that your system contains internal contradictions, and framing Kantianism in terms of consequence-ends is already a contradiction that Kant would not have accepted. These contradictions are producing further contradictions, such as the idea that violence is compatible with a "Kingdom of Ends." — Leontiskos — Leontiskos
So, for example, on your scheme violence is simultaneously right and wrong. It is right qua survival and it is wrong qua using-another-as-a-means. The problem is that your principles are not necessarily in sync, and in certain cases they oppose one another (and lead to perplexity). So you could do what most perplexity-views do and weight your principles, but before that you would need to admit that you have two principles in the first place (i.e. that "survival" is distinct from a prohibition on violence).
It doesn't matter that something is not right and wrong in the same respect; such is not needed to produce perplexity. It only matters that something be simultaneously right and wrong. — Leontiskos
Our ability to reason, feel, understand, experience the world in all its qualitative richness is a matter for analysis entirely beyond the reach of evolution in a qualitative analysis. — Astrophel
Or maybe none of those questions are scientific questions per se but philosophical questions prompted by scientific discoveries. — Wayfarer
One point I will note, is that the strictly scientific attitude to h. sapiens treats them - or us - as another species, as an object of scientific analysis. Which is fine, as far as it goes, but when that begins to serve as the basis for philosophical or (anti)religious ideologies then it oversteps the mark, and where the science begins to morph into scientism: — Wayfarer
Buddhism actually has a rather strange and not very well known creation story. — Wayfarer
This corresponds to 'no edges' (in space). If existence (i.e. everything that exists) is the effect, then its cause (i.e. origin) is non-existence (i.e. nothing-ness that is also the absence of any conditions for any possibility of existence) – which is nonsense, no? — 180 Proof
Right - but isn’t there some sense in which even the simplest life forms act intentionally? Not consciously, of course - but a living thing by definition seeks to maintain itself and continue to exist. So I wonder if in some abstract sense whether that adds up to a very primitive intentionality. — Wayfarer
Then I invite you to consider that evolution is in essence entirely "accidental". — Astrophel
Natural selection is the differential survival and reproduction of individuals due to differences in phenotype. It is a key mechanism of evolution, the change in the heritable traits characteristic of a population over generations. Charles Darwin popularised the term "natural selection", contrasting it with artificial selection, which is intentional, whereas natural selection is not.
Variation of traits, both genotypic and phenotypic, exists within all populations of organisms. However, some traits are more likely to facilitate survival and reproductive success. Thus, these traits are passed onto the next generation. These traits can also become more common within a population if the environment that favours these traits remain fixed. If new traits become more favored due to changes in a specific niche, microevolution occurs. If new traits become more favored due to changes in the broader environment, macroevolution occurs. Sometimes, new species can arise especially if these new traits are radically different from the traits possessed by their predecessors.
The likelihood of these traits being 'selected' and passed down are determined by many factors. Some are likely to be passed down because they adapt well to their environments. Others are passed down because these traits are actively preferred by mating partners, which is known as sexual selection. Female bodies also prefer traits that confer the lowest cost to their reproductive health, which is known as fecundity selection. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_selection
Are you saying the random mutation of genes that leads to superior survival and reproduction is intentional in some way?? — Astrophel
If someone had constant thoughts and fantasies about raping, torturing, killing etc people that they may or may not enjoy but were perfectly moral in the real world (either for its own sake or from fear of consequences of acting on said fantasies) is it reasonable to describe such thoughts as evil?
What about describing the person as evil in nature even if they never act on them?
Is this a sound moral judgement or just thought crime? — Captain Homicide
If not evil then what term should we use? Deviant? — Captain Homicide
Only in the post-Reformation world where nature is essentially a distinct, subsistent entity and God is no longer being itself does it make sense to talk about the creation of man as a sort of Humean miracle where God acts in creation in a sui generis manner that is distinct from God's acts in nature. In such a view, God is less than fully transcedent and becomes an entity that sits outside the world. In this view, God is to some degree is defined by what God is not, and indeed is defined in terms of finitude (Hegel's bad infinite), and this also causes follow on problems for the interaction of freedom and Providence. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The theological equivalent to "sognaresexual" and "herstory". — Lionino
I'm really curious what the thinkers here think of evolution. — flannel jesus
As for the idea of political correctness as a 'horror show', I am wondering who determines what the horror is exactly? I am not saying that I am in favour of the rigidity of political correctness in language, but I do think that language sensitivity matters in day to day life. — Jack Cummins
1. (uncountable) Avoidance of expressions or actions that can be perceived to exclude, marginalize or insult people who are socially disadvantaged or discriminated against. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/political_correctness
Not what I quite explicitly stated. — javra
Yeah, it was. — Banno
such that what we empirically experience as occurring at time X actually occurred prior to time X. — javra
Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event. — Banno
Any event we see occurred in the past, therefore we never see any event.
How's that again? — Banno
Based on empirical and simulation data we propose that an initial phase of perception (stimulus recognition) occurs 80–100 ms from stimulus onset under optimal conditions. It is followed by a conscious episode (broadcast) 200–280 ms after stimulus onset, — https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3081809/
Direct, unitary perception of duration occurs up to a maximum period of approximately 1.5 to 2 seconds from the beginning to the end of a continuous sensory stimulus. — https://www.britannica.com/science/time-perception/Perceived-duration
These contradictions are producing further contradictions, — Leontiskos
I hope I didn't give the impression that perplexity-views such as your own are beyond the pale. I think they make a certain amount of sense given the complexity of the moral landscape. — Leontiskos
Thanks for the interesting conversation. :up: — Leontiskos
Nevertheless, the data so far acquired from modern physics will remain and need to be accounted for in whatever scientific developments regarding category (b) that might eventually result. Making the going "back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy" highly inappropriate. — javra
On the contrary we already do this modern return to mechanism except it's not called mechanism.
It's called physical analogue modeling. [...] — substantivalism
Do you think that modern physics, or even philosophy in general, has gone off the rails with regards to non-visualized poetry/metaphor and abstract obsessions? Or is there some way to lean into non-visualization through metaphor or mathematical modeling but without an occultist taste to it? Should we go back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy regardless of what those analogue models may specifically be? — substantivalism
It seems to me it's been written from a perspective of a kind of disillusionment, by someone who formerly believed that the role of science was to develop a true picture of the world, but has now come to see that this seems increasingly remote. — Wayfarer
You are not wrong in that assessment. In my life I have few interests and fewer things to be proud of in their stability as well as their personal meaningfulness. However, the deflationist and deconstructivist views of others upon all philosophy, but especially scientific thought, has resulted in a rather bitter view to it all. — substantivalism
Or perhaps the more pertinent question is, "What happens when we encounter unforeseen dilemmas?" — Leontiskos
What are the two ends?
Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible.
Strive to arrive at destination Z from location A in as short a time as possible, in ideal circumstances. — Leontiskos
Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:
1) Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2) Survive as a community
These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."
But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"?
Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2). — Leontiskos
Hearkening back to the OP, my difficulty is the way that you are apt to class exceptions as non-human acts. — Leontiskos
If you wish to continue, it seems to me that we would need to discuss this issue of moral perplexity. It seems that on theories such as your own, which admit of perplexity, one must either transgress duties or else redefine those duties as being in some way non-obligatory. — Leontiskos
What puts the final nail in the coffin of determinism is the reality of the decision not to choose. — Metaphysician Undercover
Regarding your X, Y, Z analysis, I would want to say that if X is necessary to achieve Y and Y is necessary to achieve Z, then X is necessary to achieve Z. In fact this would seem to prove that it is false to claim that, "[X] does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z." Or am I underestimating the work that your term "optimally fitting" is doing? (Note that if, as you seem to say, Z precludes X, then it cannot simultaneously be true that X is necessary to achieve Z) — Leontiskos
I was clarifying what is meant by "hunger". And, rather than being sophistical, I was exposing your sophistry. When we say that someone has "the desire to eat", we recognize the generality of the supposed "object" by showing that what is actually desired is a particular type of activity, "to eat". — Metaphysician Undercover
As an aside, Peter Simpson has a paper related to a similar issue, "Justice, Scheffler and Cicero." — Leontiskos
Also, your book looks interesting! — Leontiskos
I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" — Leontiskos
I was not expecting to receive this level of engagement in the thread! — Leontiskos
For Aquinas (as for Kant) it is not permissible to lie even in this case. Here is what he says in an article entitled, "Whether every lie is a sin?":
[...]
Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). — Aquinas, ST II-II.110.3.ad4 — Leontiskos
Would you object to my characterizing your view as (a robust form of) consequentialism? — Leontiskos
Perhaps one of the most fruitful entry points is linguistic. First, to nitpick a bit, is the bolded an accurate depiction of your view? "Good and thereby moral"? — Leontiskos
What's philosophically interesting here is that, according to your position, it would seem that a bad end/goal vitiates a good deed, but a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal. — Leontiskos
In other words to advise X such that X non-hypothetically ought to be done is incompatible with X being wrong. Hence the commonly accepted idea that the end will "color" the means (e.g. If Y is necessary, and X is necessary in order to achieve Y, then X becomes necessary). What do you think of this? — Leontiskos
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical—wherein shall be held that it is a moral wrong to insult a stranger:
I am the summoned subject of a tyrannical and mad king who, simply for his own amusement, informs me upon my arrival to his citadel that a) either i) I insult a greatly starved, and thereby physically weakened, stranger that also stands before the king in my presence or ii) I beat this same starved stranger until the stranger becomes unconscious or, else, b) the king will insure that everyone I’ve grown close to will be brutally raped and tortured till they die. Granting that I have no reason to doubt the veracity of the king’s imposition, my first-order choice between alternative (a) and alternative (b) might be considered so coercive as to virtually grant me no choice [...] whatsoever, allowing me only one viable option: that of choosing alternative (a). In then granting this, I nevertheless am in no way coerced in my choosing between alternative (a. i) and (a. ii)—for, other than a potential harm to my conscience, neither alternative possess any significant negative repercussions to my personhood—and I happen to be capable of successfully implementing either alternative. I, in being indifferent to which alternative I presume would please this mad king most, then freely choose what I take to be the lesser of the two wrongs—and I thereby proceed to insult the stranger.
Given my alternatives, do I or others then find me culpable for the wrong of having insulted this stranger in front of the king?
While the answer to this question will be contingent on numerous variables (such as, for example, the given stranger’s, and others, degree of empathy for the conundrum into which I was placed through no fault of my own), it is fair to presume that everyone (including the stranger) will be aware that at least the second-order choice I made was freely made by me, was thereby an outcome I intentionally brought about, and, hence, was an outcome I am attributively responsible for. Furthermore, given that I have a generally goodhearted nature, it is also likely fair to presume that everyone (including the given stranger) will nevertheless neither find me blameworthy for my resulting transgression nor praiseworthy for so choosing it over its alternative (considering this outcome the only decent option to be had given the circumstances I was in).
If so, this case illustrates how an [ego or I-ness; i.e., the first person point of view] which is attributively responsible for an outcome commonly deemed a moral wrong—that of insulting a perfect stranger—might neither be blameworthy nor praiseworthy for said outcome, and, hence, how this [ego] might not be morally responsible for an outcome it is nevertheless attributively responsible for. — www.anenquiry.info / Chapter 11: Validating Our Free Will / Section 11.3.2.
So according to your earlier statement which I quoted* (and assuming we have no other choice), the act would be amoral. Here it seems like you want to say that it is simultaneously amoral and wrong. Or perhaps more accurately, the act would be amoral and yet in so acting we would be "committing a wrong." There is thus an interesting way in which immorality and wrongness are separating. — Leontiskos
For Aquinas the moral decision of which foot to begin walking with is, I think, not a human act. This is because there are no rational criteria upon which to deliberate. Because the reason has nothing to act on, therefore it cannot be an act that flows from reason. The act could only become rational (and moral) if perchance the agent fastened upon some aspect that could support rational deliberation. — Leontiskos
Here is a related quote from Aquinas:
And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. — Leontiskos
Ha - very interesting! Aquinas follows Augustine, and for Augustine evil is a privation of what ought to be, which dovetails nicely with some of this. Further, as you may have noticed from the above, for Aquinas irrationality and immorality are closely related. — Leontiskos
Concepts are crucial to cognition and to understanding of that perceived, but are in themselves extra-empirical. — javra
And still contain no information which is beyond observable reality. — Vera Mont
will necessarily exclude many if not most elements which the concept itself encompasses.
This, I understand not at all. — Vera Mont
my asking what information is there in the extra-empirical? — Vera Mont
Abstract space (as opposed to physical space) cannot be discrete because any minimum unit you propose can be halved. — keystone
The discreteness that ↪Metaphysician Undercover
↪Michael
are looking for is not in space but in measurement/observation. — keystone
Good thoughts! Suppose an evil genius (or maybe an evil non-genius :sweat:) rigs up a scenario where he will murder one of two people given a decision you make. As you are standing still, he tells you, "If you begin walking with your left foot I will kill person A, and if you begin walking with your right foot I will kill person B." You know nothing about either person beyond these simple facts. According to your argument, "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral."
What are your thoughts about this? I don't think this alternative scenario necessarily undermines your reasoning, but I am curious what you would say. — Leontiskos
I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with Bob Ross. — Leontiskos
If movement is continuous then an object in motion passes through every 1nm marker in sequential order, but there is no first 1nm marker, so this is a contradiction. — Michael