If I can talk about my headaches, and ChatGpt cannot, there seems to be something I have that I am talking about, that ChatGpt will always lack. If that something can be discussed, and it is mine alone, this seems enough to talk of this something as an entity, if not a physical "object".
The Direct Realist has the untenable position that i) John cannot possibly feel the same private sensation when sitting in “hot” water that Jane feels when sitting in “cold” water and ii) John must feel the same private sensation when sitting in “hot” water that Jane feels when sitting in “hot” water.
Light does not appear to you. It enters your eyes and, after some other intermediary activity mental images appear to you. Light stops being light at your eyes. Your brain literally constructs images from the data which your eyes derived from that light, as electrical signals, within your brain. This is why you can get after images, because your brain is still constructing an image due to an excess of light enter the eye and distorting the objects its reflected off. This should be sufficient to at least give you pause. You cannot see an object witout light - light is a medium which is not in or of the objects it reflects off of. There is no possible room to call mental images direct, unless you do the thing of saying "direct representations" which is a misnomer because representation already infers intermediacy.
You say that hearing this sound means that I am in direct contact with whatever is outside the room.
I am in a room with the door closed, I hear a sound. I infer that the sound came from outside the room. I may be wrong, but I infer it.
In this case, is it the correct use of language to say “I have direct contact with what is outside the room”?
So point to where in the light and the organism's body I can look to see this "information"? If I open up your head can I see the information you have about the object's composition?
Then your account is insufficient, because you said that we directly see an object if "our senses are in direct contact with the wavelengths in the light affording us information about those distant objects". This would entail that if we look at something through a CCTV camera on a screen then we are viewing that thing directly, which you admit we aren't. Therefore, direct perception isn't just "our senses being in direct contact with the wavelengths in the light that affords us information about those distant objects".
Simply put it: Danes have to keep the heads cool. Trump is a demented idiot and people around him will repeat everything what he says, but the US establishment aren't made of demented idiots. It's something we never should forget here.
What you're claiming doesn't make any sense. Your account is literally indirect. You are claiming that mediated perception is direct. You aren't even making Banno's argument.
The "medium" you want is a total red herring. We have experience as the medium. What we experience is data. Data comes from somewhere. This is not hard to grasp.
Which means what?
It's not a false analogy because it's not an analogy; it's the literal topic of discussion. Under what conditions is direct perception satisfied? Is it direct perception if I see an object through CCTV? Why or why not? If I see it through my phone's camera? If I see it through a periscope? If I see it through a pair of binoculars? If I see it through a pair of glasses? Even the direct realist must accept that some of these count as indirect perception, and so if your account cannot suitably exclude these then your account fails. Earlier you said that our perception is direct if "our senses are in direct contact with ... the wavelengths in the light ... affording us information about those distant objects", but this does not suitably exclude those situations which everyone ought agree is indirect, e.g. with CCTV. You've gone too far in the opposite direction after your previous attempt left you unable to directly see anything other than light.
Your first account entailed that we only have direct perception of proximal stimuli, e.g. light, because these are the only things in direct physical contact with our body’s sense receptors. This defeated your own claim that we see distant objects.
Your second account entailed that we have direct perception of the basement when watching it on CCTV because our body’s sense receptors are in direct physical contact with the light that “affords us information about” the basement. This is both vapid — as even most direct realists will accept that we only have indirect perception of the basement when watching it on CCTV — and makes use of the very same folk psychology that you keep denying; what is this “information about the basement” and can you point to where in the light and the body this thing exists?
If you're going to argue that "first-person phenomenal experience" is a meaningless phrase then all you have left is a physical object being moved by the matter and energy that it comes into direct contact with (and by its own internal energy), and so the concept of this physical entity — whether rock, plant, toad, or human — "seeing" some distant object makes no sense. This object no more "sees" the distant object that sent light its way than it "feels" the distant object that threw a ball at it.
You're still not explaining what it means for a biological organism to "see" a distant object. If eliminative materialism is true then there is just skin and bone and muscles and organs, with sense receptors absorbing energy and converting it into other forms, often causing the body to move. So how do you get from "the rods and cones in my eyes are reacting to electromagnetic radiation" to "I see the distant object that reflected the light", and what does the latter even mean without reference to first person phenomenal experience?
You’ve gone from defining direct realism in such a way that we only directly see light to defining it in such a way that we directly see World War II when watching a documentary on the History Channel.
Just a clarifying point: Are you saying that the astronomer looking through a scope (or, lets go further: having generated an image from mathematical data) is in direct contact with the objects lets say lightyears away? Can you explain that? It seems to be the key example of indirect contact to me (and so dovetails into a perceptual account more generally). Just want to be sure that's what you're saying..
You're still not explaining what it means for a biological organism to "see" a distant object. You're an eliminative materialist so there are no mental phenomena or first-person subjective experiences, just skin and bone and muscles and organs, with sense receptors absorbing the electromagnetic or kinetic or chemical energy they come into contact with and converting it into other forms, often causing the body to move.
That you want to be both an eliminative materialist and a direct realist (about distant objects) strikes me as being entirely inconsistent. You could maybe get away with this if you limited direct realism to touch and taste — as you did before when you tried to explain direct realism in terms of the body being in direct physical contact with the object perceived — but it just doesn't work when you include sight, hearing, and smell, where somehow the body’s reaction to proximal stimuli counts as “direct perception” of distal objects.
And it seems as if this coloured object exists beyond the body, but it is in fact a feature of the phenomenal experience that emerges from brain activity and does not extend beyond the body. Similar to how when playing a VR game it seems as if there's a monster standing 100 feet in front of you.
The distant object.
We aren't watching things occur in our skull, just as when I feel pain I'm not touching something that occurs in my skull. You're misinterpreting the grammar.
Without reference to first-person experience, how do you even make sense of what it means for an organism to "see" distant objects?
What does it mean to say that this biological organism "directly sees" some object located 100m away from it?
Phenomenal experience does in fact exist and some of our words do in fact refer to it and its qualities. All you seem to be saying is "let's pretend otherwise".
It's the way children and uneducated adults intuitively think of perception and the world (hence the term "naive").
Where in time and space is this something you dream about? Where in time and space is this something you hallucinate? Where in time and space are the colours the synesthete sees when listening to music?
In the head.
How are you dreaming about something? How are you hallucinating something? How are you thinking about something?
Because the appropriate areas of the brain, e.g the visual cortex, are active.
It doesn't necessarily involve eyes, but most of the time it does.
Seeing something doesn't require looking at something, just as hearing something doesn't require pointing one's ears at something. We see something if the visual cortex is active in the right kind of way, and we hear something if the auditory cortex is active in the right kind of way, and we think about something if the relevant areas of the brain are active in the right kind of way.
This is like asking where the objects I dream or hallucinate appear. It's a nonsensical question. There is just the occurrence of mental phenomena, with qualities described by such words as "pain", "pleasure", "red", "round", "sweet", "sour", etc.
The activation of these cortexes is seeing, just as the activation of other areas of the brain is thinking and is feeling pain.
Dreams and hallucinations can be coloured (or "have colour" if you prefer), and people with synaesthesia can see colours when listening to music. This is because seeing colours (or even coloured things) is what happens when the visual cortex is active in the right kind of way, regardless of what the eyes are doing or what objects exist at a distance. This is also why cortical blindness is a thing, where the eyes react to stimuli as normal but the person doesn't see anything.
None of this entails a homunculus. That's a tired and lazy strawman.
You don't need to believe in non-physical mental phenomena to accept that experience is something the brain does. We see and hear things when the visual and auditory cortices are active, regardless of what things caused this to happen (whether internal to the body or external). If the visual cortex is active in the right kind of way we see colours, even if our eyes are closed and we're in a dark room, e.g. if we have chromesthesia and are listening to music. However you choose to "cash out" these colours they are evidently not the "direct presentation" — in the philosophically relevant sense of the phrase — of something like an apple's surface, and are the medium through which we are made aware that something (probably) exists at a distance (either reflecting light or, for those with chromesthesia, vibrating the air).
The indirect realist simply argues that this sort of indirect perception of apples happens even without the visor and its screen.
If you just mean to say that (most of) our sense receptors are situated on the outside of our body and react to things that exist outside the body then, to be blunt, no shit.
