But “when” is space, so to speak? Position A and position B can be determined be measuring the distance between the two points based on some established convention. But these concepts are unsustainable on analysis; show me the duration at positions A and B. If positions A and B have no duration, all that can be confirmed is an altogether indeterminate position, for a lack of a better word.

No, I think something like the Sense-Datum Theory of perception is correct. — Michael

"Common Kind Claim: veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences (as) of an F are fundamentally the same; they form a common kind.
Thus, a veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experience, all alike in being experiences (as) of a churchyard covered in white snow, are not merely superficially similar, they are fundamentally the same: these experiences have the same nature, fundamentally the same kind of experiential event is occurring in each case. Any differences between them are external to their nature as experiences (e.g., to do with how they are caused)."

There are significantly problems with what is stated concerning the Common Kind Claim.

(1) The Common Kind Claim is un-verifiable in principle. The non-veridical experiences are private to the subject having them. Thus, there is nothing to verify whether the claim is true or not. Also, that is how we learn that certain experiences are non-veridical because we come to understand that there is nothing to verify when one makes reports on a non-veridical experience.
(2) What is in common to both experiences, veridical and non-veridical. They have the same kind of churchyard and the same kind of white snow. But this is the subject of the experience, not what makes these experiences fundamentally the same. For example, let’s say we take a picture of this churchyard with a camera, a mobile phone, and have an artist create a super realistic painting. Would we say the churchyard makes them fundamentally the same. True, the subject, the churchyard, could be said to be what is common in each picture. But fundamentally? If there was a different subject in each picture, what would be in common fundamentally? The subject should not matter, but what is fundamental between the pictures or the experiences excluding the subject?
(3) Lastly,Is it true that any differences between veridical and non-veridical are external to their nature (e.g. to do with how they are caused)? I do not think so. I could report that I had a hallucinatory experience, and we determine this because it made no sense. The report was of flying rocks and people with four heads. You may have no idea what the external causes might be but the report of the experience is so absurd you can likely draw the conclusion it was a hallucination.

We have different sense-data, and this sense-data is the immediate object of perception. — Michael

As I mentioned before, the duck/rabbit image is the same sense data, yet we can report out there is an image of a duck or there is an image of a rabbit.

“And what does it mean to "see something differently"? It means that we experience different sense-data. I experience white and gold, you experience black and blue. The colours we experience are the medium by which we indirectly see the photo of a dress.”

Based on your logic because two people can report out two different sets of colors, we conclude that they must experience different sense data. But in this case the sense data is the same but they report out two different images. Do we give up the sense datum theory as immediate? Then what, we are immediately aware of the idea of a duck and the sense data is indirect? Are we back to idealism?

This is a very difficult debate when one does not understand what someone means by saying “direct”.

From what I can tell, if it has to do with the five senses, it is not direct. If link to scientific theory, not direct. If you ask, well then what will meet the definition of direct. The answer you get will be something that does not have an intermediary. And if you ask that, there is no answer other than I believe it when I see it. Wait that is already excluded.

It’s not about what people prefer but about what they find the evidence and reasoning shows. — Michael

Before evidence and reason, we need to understand what we are talking about. The private world of sense data has some problems getting us to this point.

Wittgenstein says the following "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing is the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."

So why the indirect realist prefers the limited and impoverished view of his own biology is the real question. — NOS4A2

Because they prefer the certainty of appearances and/or immediate sense data of their private world.

Let's consider a robot that can pick out objects and report out the name of such objects similar to how humans would perform.

We place an orange and the robot reports out "orange". We place an apple and the robot reports out "apple". The scientist seems satisfied of the the performance. However, on occasion he places a particular apple and the robot reports "orange". On another occasion the is no object and just suddenly reports "apple". The scientist response is to examine the hardware or software and determine if there is a problem. And in these scenarios that's exactly what they find, a revision to the software and the robot no longer report "orange" when there is an apple; and a repair to the hardware and the robot no longer reports "apple" when there is no object. Should the scientist wonder if these scenarios indicate they don't have access to the "real" apple or orange? Seems absurd to say such a thing.

If a human does the same, why should our reaction be any different. What if we can re-wire human beings where they don't hallucinate, experience illusion, never dream, can we now say they directly perceive objects?

Thus, a veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experience, all alike in being experiences (as) of a churchyard covered in white snow, are not merely superficially similar, they are fundamentally the same: these experiences have the same nature, fundamentally the same kind of experiential event is occurring in each case. Any differences between them are external to their nature as experiences (e.g., to do with how they are caused).

I would not agree these ever could be the same kind of experiential event. An hallucinatory experience is private to the subject. There is no verification of a subject's hallucinatory reporting, while a veridical experience can in principle be verified since they can report on a public environment.

I do not know how in principle you can make a claim that they a fundamentally the same. How is this comparison to see if in fact they are exactly the same done? Ask the person to describe their hallucination? By seeing how detailed they speak of it? But what if they talk about a book they never read, and I ask him to open it to read page ##. Would they be able to do it? And how do I verify they get it right? If I ask them to examine their hallucinated Plato's Republic which they never read, could they get the passages right?

The brain-in-a-vat and other such hypotheses are just analogies. The underlying principle is best exemplified by Kant's transcendental idealism. There is indeed something that is the cause of experience, but given the logical possibility of such things as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, it is not a given that everyday experiences show us the cause of experience. The causal world might be very unlike what is seen. And that includes being very unlike the material world as is understood in modern physics. So it's not that we could just be some brain-in-a-vat, it's that we could just be some conscious thing in some otherwise ineffable noumena.

At the very least this might warrant skepticism (in the weaker sense of understanding that we might be wrong, not in the stronger sense of believing that we're likely wrong). — Michael

Just because we can imagine something does not mean it is possible.

Lets suppose one day a scientist demonstrates that the "brain-in-a-vat" is not possible due to the "Laws of Nature".

What would be the skeptic's reaction? Well, they could just say, "it could just be another scientist manipulating a "brain-in-a-vat" to think it is not physical possible to create a "brain-in-a-vat" due to the "Laws of Nature".

What are you going to believe? Someone's imagination(hypothesis), or someone's demonstration by theory and experiment that such an idea from someone's imagination(hypothesis) is not possible.

At times, the empirical needs to set the boundaries for the creative mind.

What is interesting is why does he think it follows from his analysis. It does not look like it logically follows, nor can it follow empirically.

Indeed, Russell, in The Problems of Philosophy, says the following after talking about difficulties that arises with his analysis of senses: “Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The real table , if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is immediately known.”

I believe the transition from his analysis of senses to his conclusion is not evident. But for the Indirect Realist, this may be the area to clarify to help their position.

It seems to me phenomenalism is unarguably true. We have five physical senses: sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell. We have no “tree-sensing” sense. So, how can we experience a tree? The answer seems to be we don’t directly experience a tree. Rather, we experience sense data (green patches that feel smooth, brown patches that feel rough, etc.) and our mind accesses the idea of “tree” because the idea makes sense of our sense data. — Art48

Lets give an example how you would directly experience a tree. Lets say you would like to determine if it is a tree and what type. The first thing you would need to do is go directly to the tree, directly touch the tree, and directly take a sample of the tree. With this sample you can send it to a lab to test its DNA and see if it is a match to some type of tree. Would you want to say it was a sample of sense data of the tree I sent the lab? No, your sense data is what you have. Would you say the sample is the thing-in-itself? No, this is something we cannot know by our senses. Would you say the sample is part of a tree and you like confirmation? Exactly!

My eyes only see light. If free-standing 3D holograms existed indistinguishable from real trees, my eyes would see exactly the same thing. — Art48

All this shows is that we need to do a little more investigation into whether it is a real tree or a fake tree. However, it does not show we lack direct access to an external world or to a tree or the thing-in-itself.

What is this thing-in-itself that I do have direct access? To use my house example, it is like you are saying, I don’t have direct access to the house because I need to indirectly access it by climbing thru the second floor window and all along you don't have a front door. I think you can say you have direct access thru the second floor window.

In means no intermediary. I take it I have direct access to what my eyes see, my mind thinks, etc. — Art48

Ok, your eyes don't see sense data of trees, they see trees. You mind constructs the idea of sense data of trees. This seems consistent with your views. Thus, you have direct access.

Does the image show the table's "true" color? No, because the table has no true color independent of the perceiving being. — Art48

Ok, but this does prove there is anything we don't have access to when it comes to “the table”. Like my example with car painted in ChromaFlair, the car has multiple colors depending on the light and the angle of perceiver, but it does not follow that I don't have direct access to car, that there is something additional called the thing-in-itself.

Let try the link again

https://images.app.goo.gl/HXd9kw7vuDCTQ1Tq9

Unless you want to argue that the mind-independent object was in some sort of superposition of being both white and gold and black and blue, with each group having direct access to one "version"? But that seems like quite the reach. — Michael

Is this quite a reach?



I think we would both agree that the sense data is exactly the same whether you call it a image of a duck or an image of a rabbit.

the phenomenal character of experience is not a property of mind-independent objects. — Michael

And

I think that our modern understanding of science shows that both a) and b) are true. — Michael

I think there are two problems with this view:

1. Difficult to understand how a scientist would observe a subject’s phenomenal character of experience since it is private to the subject.

2. Assuming that 1. Is achievable, how can a scientist compare it if mind independent objects are not directly accessible according to phenomenology

Lets look at another example typically given to say that we are only sure or our sense data but not the thing-in-itself. Take a table in the middle of the room, we look at it and say the color is brown. However, it we get real close to it it seems to be grayish brown, and the time a day changes and lighting of the rooms changes the table looks reddish. Is it reasonable to then conclude, “see, this proves that we can never know the actual/the real color of the table, the thing-in-itself.”

I don’t think this necessary follows. Take for instance a car painted with ChromaFlair. ChromaFlair is a pigment used in paint systems, primarily for automobiles. When the paint is applied, it changes color depending on the light source and viewing angle. There is not an actual/real color behind the ChromaFlair but many colors depending on the viewing angle.

. I don't deny the existence of the exterior physical world, only that we don't have direct access to it. — Art48

Please explain what direct access means. What is an example of having direct access? If we want to confirm “Yes, we have direct access” don't we need some idea what that would be like when it is achieved?

For example, do you have direct access to the house? No, I don't have a key to the front door but I have indirect access, I climb to the second floor and enter thru the bedroom window.

Question: do you believe we experience anything directly and, if so, what? — Art48

Yes, like I mentioned, if we both were standing in front of a tree, I am directly experiencing you looking at a tree, I don’t directly experience your sense data of a tree. Another one, I have direct conversations and debates with other human beings not sense data.

I think our disagreements is our starting philosophical positions. Yours: An individual’s private access to their sense data. Mine: Human being’s public access to a shared external world.

In particular, some forms of phenomenalism reduce all talk about physical objects in the external world to talk about bundles of sense data. — Art48

I believe you would say that we do not directly experience electrons and proton but only indirectly. If I follow your views, I believe you will also need to say the same thing with regards "sense data". Let's take the electron/proton example. I do not directly experience electrons/protons; but with my senses and some scientific theory, I can infer their existence indirectly. Similarly, I do not directly experience sense data; but with my senses and some philosophical and analogical reasoning, I can infer their existence indirectly. What is unclear to me is if you mean the idea of sense data, or sense data itself. This confusion arise when you say "I indirectly experience the idea of a tree."

If you, and everyone else, experiences sense data directly, why do you explain what you mean by examples of illusions and other representations of reality? Does not one need a stable real external world to understand what an illusion or representation even is? (I understand what a mirage is because I actual consumed real water.) Imagine a world where the inhabitants never experience hallucinations, illusions, or vivid dreams, would they ever need a sense datum theory at all. But you might say, at least I can point to my direct experience of the sense data itself. Again, as I mentioned before, this is a private exercise that offer very little to how we actually learn, understand, and use language.

Lets say we both are standing in front of a tree. I look at you and see you directly looking at and experiencing a tree. I don’t see you directly experiencing sense data. Is this not being objective? Whatever is occurring “inside” is not in my purview. Whatever is occurring “outside” is shared by both of us and thus we gain an understanding of what we are talking about.

Thanks, something to explore

“We directly experience the idea of a tree and indirectly experience the tree as a physical object.”

Lets re-word this a bit and say: we directly experience the tree and come up with the concepts of a “tree” and “physical object”

I think we can all agree to this.

From John Searle’s “Seeing Things as They Are”

“A mistake of nearly as great a magnitude overwhelmed our tradition in the 17th century and after, and it is the mistake of supposing that we never directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world, but directly perceive only our subjective experiences. This mistake has many different names, Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, and Kant. After Kant it gets worse. Mill and Hegel, in spite of all their differences, would also have to be included.”

A good book of a modern philosopher who attempts to expose the problem of this position and offers his own theory to clear up the confusion.

A is A is kind of boring, but it gets a little more interesting when we think about such things as

Water is H2O
George Washington is (fill in your description)
9 is 4 + 5
Hesperus is Phosphorus

“My view is that ideas already exist in the mindscape, just as trees exist in the landscape. Seeing a pair of apples may awaken our mind to the idea of two, but the idea already exists. Any being which lacks the mental capacity will never perceive the idea "two." Imagine an earthworm, for instance, crawls over two pebbles. I doubt the idea of two ever enters what mind it has.”

Could we not imagine a world where inhabitants sense and emphasizes differences than commonalties that they view all objects as individuals to be named, and that they have memories so great that universals are not needed?Why would I need to hypothesize that inhabitants who use universals can perceive some Platonic realm, when I simply can appeal to our make up that favors detecting commonalities and creating language of universals vs detecting differences and name individuals?

“Suppose you see a hurricane on TV. You directly experience the TV's light and sound; you indirectly experience the hurricane. Similarly, you indirectly experience the tree; you directly experience light, sound, touch, taste, odor. “

This example works if I can directly experience a hurricane. The lights and sounds from the TV are about something that we can experience directly. However, if all I directly experience is light, sound, touch, taste, or odor; the example is problematic because your are not seeing a “TV” or a “hurricane” because all they are is light, sound, touch, taste, or odor.

“Our five physical senses limit us to experiencing sight, sound, taste, touch, and smell. So, we don’t directly experience concrete objects. (I have no special “tree-sensing” sense with which I can directly experience a tree.)”

What could this mean “we don’t directly experience concrete objects” I see a tree, I go over to touch the leaves, smell the bark, hear the creaking of the branches, or taste the fruit it produces. How more direct can we get?

Physical objects and Abstract objects, what do these two things have in common that we want to call them objects? A shared essence or some family resemblance? Hard to say it is either.

I like to think this argument is successful at proving its idea, however, what we are left with is a rather shallow and dull view of existence.

The concept of a contingent being is conceived as existing or not existing.

The concept of a necessary being is conceived as existing only.

The concept of God can only be conceived as a necessary being because the concept of a necessary being is greater than the concept of a contingent being.

Thus, the concept of God entails the concept of necessary existence because of the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived.

OK, great, now exactly what exist here after we stop talking about conceptions of God and necessary existence? After all for contingent beings, I can eventually point to some examples to show you what how we can use this term in the stream of life.

True, but you cant point to God because he is not a contingent being.

Your are right, well, I guess you can always point to your ontological argument.

Yes “someone can believe something that has been proven false”. Here is the proof:

I believe “someone can believe something that has been proven false”. (Call this I believe S)

If “I believe S” is true, S is true

Or

If “I believe S” is false, S is true because I just demonstrated I can believe something that has been proven false.

Does an atom have free will?

“Water” does not have an essence but “H2O” does have an essence. Both are concepts and both can refer. And both could be used interchangeably in many context. So it is quite strange to say one has an essence and one does not.

“Things the words refer to” have essences. Not sure what this could mean. I point to an object and call it a “rock”. So the word I use does not have a essence but the rock I point to does. And what is that? The shape? The color? The chemical composition? I point to another object and call it a “rock” It looks similar to the first rock but does not have the same color, shape or chemical composition. Is there one essence both rocks share, and what is that?

Lastly, “H2O” has an essence. Let us first give it a little specificity. These symbols are used in chemistry as expression of atomic theory. This theory makes successful predictions of our macroscopic world. But like any scientific theory, it can be replace by a better theory, which may do away with the symbols of “H2O” And if this happens, what happens to “H2O”’s essence.

“I can as a philosopher talk about mathematics because I will only deal with puzzles which arise from the words of our ordinary everyday language, such as “proof”, “ number”, “series”, “order”, etc”

And

“But I will talk about the word “ foundation” in the phase “ the foundation of mathematics”. This is a most important word and will be one of the chief words we will deal with.” From Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics(LFM)

Keep this mind that this is what Wittgenstein is trying to show - that philosophers of mathematics are creating bewilderment because these words are being pulled from their typical surroundings.

W “By “seeing the contradiction” do you mean “ seeing that the two ways of multiplying lead to different results”?”
T: “Yes”
W: “The trouble with this example is that there is no contraction in it at all. If you have two different ways of multiplying, why call them both multiplying? Why not call one multiplying and the other dividing, or multiplying A and the other multiplying B, or any damn thing? It is simply that you have two different kinds of calculation and you have not noticed that they give different results” LW (LFM)

I thought this quote from Daniel Dennett might be useful and somewhat amusing for the current discussion at hand:

“Happily, in those days before tape recorders, some of Wittgenstein's disciples took verbatim notes, so we can catch a rare glimpse of two great minds addressing a central problem from opposite points of view: the problem of contradiction in a formal system. For Turing, the problem is a practical one: if you design a bridge using a system that contains a contradiction, "the bridge may fall down." For Wittgenstein, the problem was about the social context in which human beings can be said to "follow the rules" of a mathematical system. What Turing saw, and Wittgenstein did not, was the importance of the fact that a computer doesn't need to understand rules to follow them. Who "won"? Turing comes off as somewhat flatfooted and naive, but he left us the computer, while Wittgenstein left us...Wittgenstein.” From 1999 Time Magazine

I believe Wittgenstein was trying to convince Turing of the following:

1. If you arrive at a contradiction the result would be inaction

2. If a bridge collapsed, an engineer is not wondering if the foundations of math is problematic, but if the calculation was wrong, it was not put together as per plan, or materials used were inferior

As for the Liar paradox, “I am a Liar” has a clear use is ordinary circumstances of life. Take it out of that and put it in the philosophical world, and one gets deep into confusion.

Recognition of evil comes before knowledge and belief of evil. First, we need a group of human beings to experience and react to situations they would call evil. As they come across experiences where they similarly judge to be exemplars of evil, their concept solidifies and they past on their “knowledge” to their community. Obvious, future experiences may be similar more or less to their original exemplars of evil, and so the concept of “belief” may creep in to express uncertainty.

I think a simple passage from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations can be a reply to the sentiment being explored in this discussion: “71. One might say that the concept ‘game’ is a concept with blurred edges. “But is a blurred concept a concept at all?” Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all” Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what we need?”