So perhaps Descartes is never fully convinced that there is an outside world — Lionino

We need to make a distinction between the argument from doubt and his work, specifically his work in medicine, optics, and physics. I don't think he needed to be convinced that there was an outside world because he never really doubted it.

Er, except Cicero, Socrates, Xenophon, and Aurelius were all married men. — Leontiskos

First, this list was prefaced by my saying:

My criticism is not about her misrepresentation of Descartes, it is about her misrepresentation of the history of philosophy. — Fooloso4

The history of philosophy is not the biography of philosophers and their marital status.

Midgley begins by saying:

Practically all the great European philosophers have been bachelors.

Are you able to distinguish a philosopher's marital status by reading his philosophy? What do you know of the married lives of these men? Rather than demonstrating its importance for the history of philosophy it illustrates how misdirected this can be.

In Xenophon's Symposium Socrates is asked by Antisthenes:

how does it come that you don't practise what you preach by yourself educating Xanthippe, but live with a wife who is the hardest to get along with of all the women there are—yes, or all that ever were, I suspect, or ever will be?

to which he replied:

Because I observe that men who wish to become expert horsemen do not get the most docile horses but rather those that are high-mettled, believing that if they can manage this kind, they will easily handle any other. My course is similar. Mankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind.

Is this the kind of married life Mary advocated and you imagine marks an important distinction between philosophers? Do you think Xenophon's Oeconomicus was a marital guide, written for men who were married or intended to marry?

In an earlier post I pointed out a few things that Aristotle said about marriage:

She refers to Aristotle but neglects to address the natural household relation that Aristotle discusses first, namely, master and slave. Nor does she address the numerous problems he discusses regarding marriage including war, destruction of cities, and revolution. Much of what he says regarding marriage centers around the division or labor and property. (Politics, Book 1) — Fooloso4

Midgley says:

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.

This is not true. The pre-Socratic philosophers were natural scientists, but I admit I have not checked their marital status. Midgley does, however, identify two bachelors by name, Plato and Descartes. Natural science was a part of the studies at Plato's Academy. Descartes wrote on medicine and optics.

Moral bivalence is immoral. It is antithetical to the dialectic of moral deliberation.

But perhaps their attachment to ataraxia or apatheia shows their attitude to it. — Ludwig V

I agree, [

quote="Ludwig V;897839"]They thought they were revolutionizing philosophy - making a new start. So they were aware they had a history.[/quote]

Yes, a new start. A break with the past. Bringing clarity to what was confusion. There was a thread last year that addressed this:Here

So I don't think you are on the right track here. — Banno

You have not understood what I said.

Indeed, one of the claims of Metaphysical Animals is that the (women) were to a large degree responsible for the rejection of Ayer's positivism and a returned emphasis on the classics. — Banno

That is my point. Leontiskos said in response to me pointing to Aristotle:

There are many in these parts who fall short for being enamored of novelty. — Leontiskos

As I said to him:

It was the novelty and promise of 20th century analytic philosophy to which many at Oxford and elsewhere were enamored. A disregard for the history of philosophy at its root. A return to Aristotle was a response to this novelty. — Fooloso4

Midgley's "return" was a response to something that was not at issue in Continental philosophy.
In 1924 Heidegger gave an important and influential lecture course: "Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy". The first generation works of his students, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacob Klein, Hans Jonas, Leo Strauss, and Karl Löwith, have slowly but surely replaced the interpretations found in Angelo schools.

The philosophy of history is the counterpart to the history of philosophy. It is not simply that we should attend to human life, but address the fact that human life is historically and culturally situated. Our interpretation of texts must be informed by this.

As agreed, the check is in the mail.

You are wasting your time. — Lionino

I don't think so. I like to think that there are others reading but not commenting. I think of the written exchange as only part of it. I do occasionally get a PM from someone appreciating something I said.

And if someone does not agree with something I said I am okay with that. I will defend my position, but if someone does not agree I don't take it personally. That is the nature of philosophical discussion.

A well-known truth is not worse for wear. — Leontiskos

A well-known opinion, although not as well-known as you might expect, is certainly a
useful measure against the prevailing academic opinions of her time.

There are many in these parts who fall short for being enamored of novelty. — Leontiskos

It was the novelty and promise of 20th century analytic philosophy to which many at Oxford and elsewhere were enamored. A disregard for the history of philosophy at its root. A return to Aristotle was a response to this novelty.

Perhaps if her piece was entirely about Descartes ... — Leontiskos

My criticism is not about her misrepresentation of Descartes, it is about her misrepresentation of the history of philosophy.

As Aristotle reminds his readers, Heraclitus said to some visitors who were surprised to see him by the oven warming himself:

Here too there are gods.

Cicero said:

Socrates was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens… and compel it to ask questions about life and morality.

(Tusculan Disputations V 10–11).

Xenophon wrote the Oeconomicus, a Socratic dialogue about household management.

The Stoics and Epicureans did not disregard daily life or human attachments either.

Descartes' "provisional morality" was about how to live a good life with others, not apart from them.

The examined life is not the married life. They are not mutually exclusive but one does not entail the other.

...the key idea shared by the members of the Quartet is to place the concept of life at the centre of philosophical attention. This commitment has at least four dimensions: (i) an interest in the ordinary; (ii) a focus on virtue, goodness and human flourishing; (iii) an affirmation of our animal nature; (iv) recognition of the normative landscape that structures our lives. — Bakhurst, David (2022). Education for metaphysical animals. Journal of Philosophy of Education 56 (6):812–826.

What do you find here that cannot be found in Aristotle?

There may be some who feel this way, but this does not obviate the fact that there are Evangelical Christians who see him as a messiah in a battle that is playing out on a cosmic scale of the end times.

I was thinking of was by Walter Soffer. — Lionino

A quick look at his list of publications led me to suspect that he knows Caton. Looking a little further I found on the publisher's blurb for "From Science to Subjectivity" that he agrees with Caton "the most outspoken proponent of the minority stance".

I have to imagine that some fraction of WWJD evangelical Christians will be asking themselves sooner or later by this Fall — 180 Proof

I don't think they ask WWJD because they think they know what Trump has done, will do, and what has been done to him. While they may not regard him as The Messiah the do believe his is a messiah and like all messiahs persecuted by the enemies of God.

There is a book that investigates whether the God-elements in Descartes' meditations are fully sincere. — Lionino

There are several books and articles that address this. Years ago I read Hiram Caton's "The Origin of Subjectivity", which led me to look past the standard story to read him again more carefully.

In the thread "Descartes Reading Group" I argued that he was not sincere. We went through the Meditations one by one, starting with the Dedication, Preface, and Synopsis. To sum it up in a sentence, he displaces God with the "I'.

Sure, but what is at stake is not some bizarre or implausible interpretation. — Leontiskos

And yet there is in the history of philosophy many examples. The most infamous in Western Philosophy is Christianity's appropriation of Plato, but I suspect that you might not see it as either bizarre or implausible.

It's as if you first concede that Midgley is right and then, unaccountably, assert that she is confused, again without a supporting argument. — Leontiskos

I did not say that Midgley is confused.

Your rebuttal? "Philosophy has moved past this — Leontiskos

The story of the subjective turn is well known, but our discussion is not a talk on the BBC. We should be able and willing to look back at what Descartes said and not simply accept the story as if that is the end of the matter.

so you back away from your defence of Descartes only to be oddly antagonistic towards Midgley. — Banno

This really is quite strange. I am not defending or backing away from defending Descartes. I am defending an interpretation that is at odds with the standard textbook interpretation Midgley perpetuates.

At the least, there might be some philosophical merit in considering the place of those who are not reclusive white bachelors. — Banno

Why a philosopher or anyone else is a recluse may have little or nothing to do with philosophy.

This is Midgley's analysis:

Because independent thought is so difficult, the philosophic adolescent (even more than other adolescents) withdraws himself from the influences around him to develop ideas in harmony with his own personality. This is necessary if the personality is to be formed at all. But once it is formed, most people recoil towards experience, and attempt to bring their strengthened self to terms with the rich confusion from which it fled. Marriage, which is a willing acceptance of the genuinely and lastingly strange, is typical of this revulsion. The great philosophers did not return. Their thoughts, unlike yours and mine, had powers enough to keep them gazing into the pool of solitude.

I do not think this story tracks the lives of "the philosophical adolescent", but I have not done an empirical investigation. Did she? Rather than withdraw in order to develop ideas in harmony with their own personality, it may be a trait of their personality and/or neurology that leads them to withdraw. Rather than their thoughts having power enough to keep them gazing into the pool of solitude, it may have more to do with neurodivergence.

I will leave it to you and others to sort philosophers along the lines of their marital status. I prefer to pay attention to what they say.

It is shared by others, it is the fruit of a plain reading of his texts, and it is this received interpretation that has had its effect on the history of philosophy. — Leontiskos

And yet when I question the received interpretation you assume this is because I am fond of Descartes and upset, as it all of this is personal. Part of the movement of the history of philosophy has been the reevaluation of major figures.

Philosophers should have foresight about how their texts will be interpreted and how their method will influence their message. — Leontiskos

No one has the ability to anticipate all the different ways in which they will be interpreted. This too is part of the history of philosophy. There has never been an important and influential philosopher who has not been interpreted in various incompatible ways.

Even if Midgley has misconstrued Descartes, her misconstrual is shared by others. — Banno

Right. And she perpetuates it.

she may not be wrong about how the hegemony of the solitary white male has mislead philosophy. — Banno

Descartes was following a common meditative and contemplative practice in both the East and West. In both the same questions arise regarding whether this practice should be solitary and removed from the concerns and activities of public life.

As Midgley attests there have always been solitary thinkers. This is not because of Descartes and will not be changed by some yenta advocating marriage.

She says:

It is commonplace today that this branch of philosophy got into confusion by first artificially separating the Knower from the Known ...

I agree that this has led to confusion and that Descartes is as the center of the subjective turn. I also agree that it is a commonplace today. But philosophy has moved past this. Apparently no one told her. This movement began before her and has continued after her.

I can see that you are very fond of Descartes, — Leontiskos

Not particularly. I am fond of interpreting texts. He plays an important role in the history of philosophy and is worthy of careful reading. Like others, he is subject to re-evaluation from time to time.

but what does this have to do with Midgley? — Leontiskos

She brought him up. She gives a standard textbook reading of him which in my opinion does not hold up under scrutiny.

Descartes helped occasion a shift towards the individual subject — Leontiskos

I agree.

Midgley’s reading is not controversial. — Leontiskos

True. But non-controversial does not mean correct. There is always room for differences in interpretation but there are others that I find hew closer to the text and are more interesting.

Do you have any arguments to offer against Midgley’s thesis, or are you just upset that she spoke against a philosopher you are fond of? — Leontiskos

First of all I am not upset. I find the assumption odd. Second if you look through my posts on this thread you will see that I have made several points where I disagree with her.

Witt seems to want to say that “truth” is nothing more than a manner of situating things in the world based on what we perceive as logically possible. — 013zen

What is true is what is the case. There are things that are logically possible but not true.

we are also incapable of knowing whether our picture is true or not — 013zen

What leads you to say this? He does say:

It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.

(2.224)

But this does not mean we are incapable of knowing whether it is true or false. In order to determine if it is we must compare it to reality-.

A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.

(2.21)

In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

(2.223)

Reality is compared with propositions.

(4.05)

A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality.

(4.06)

Rather, it considered as possible a relation between them that wasn’t considered possible before. — 013zen

More specifically, differences are not differences in kind but differences in degree.

Only in an age as silly as ours could one be taken to task for interpreting a philosopher in light of what he actually wrote. — Leontiskos

What he actually wrote is, as quoted earlier:

I decided to pretend that everything that had ever entered my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams ...

(Discourse Part 4)

I think some here are too preoccupied with defending Descartes to see Descartes' point. — Leontiskos

As far as I am concerned Descartes is not in need of any defense from me. He has done quite well on his own. I am not interested in defending him but in understanding him.

Only in an age as silly as ours could one be taken to task for interpreting a philosopher in light of what he actually wrote. — Leontiskos

I think you have this backwards. In our age of free speech we fail to take into consideration what philosophers of the past had to contend with.See the appendix to Arthur M Melzer's "Philosophy Between the Lines" which contains numerous first hand accounts by philosophers.

A few of the many from Descartes:

Upon hearing of Galileo’s arrest for his pro-Copernican theories, Descartes suppressed the
publication of his just-completed exposition of his own mechanistic and pro-Copernican physics,
The World. Instead, eight years later, he published his Meditations, a work ostensibly confined
entirely to metaphysics and theology. But in a letter to Mersenne, he reveals:

...there are many other things in them; and I tell you, between ourselves, that these
six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But that must not be spread abroad, if you please; for those who follow Aristotle will find it more difficult to approve them. I hope that [my readers] will accustom themselves insensibly to my principles, and will come to recognize their truth, before
perceiving that they destroy those of Aristotle.

– René Descartes to Mersenne, January 28, 1641, Œuvres de Descartes,
3:297–98, quoted and translated by Hiram Caton in The Origin of
Subjectivity, 17

From the first paragraph of Descartes’ early, unpublished “Private Thoughts”:
I go forward wearing a mask [larvatus prodeo].

– René Descartes, “Cogitationes Privatae,” in Œuvres de Descartes, 10:213

From Montaigne's Complete Essays:

The wise man should withdraw his soul within, out of the crowd, and keep it in freedom
and power to judge things freely; but as for externals, he should wholly follow the
accepted fashions and forms.

– Ibid., 86 (1.23)

It is not new for the sages to preach things as they serve, not as they are. Truth has its
inconveniences, disadvantages, and incompatibilities.

– Ibid., 769 (3.10)

By profession they [the philosophers] do not always present their opinion openly
and apparently; they have hidden it now in the fabulous shades of poetry, now
under some other mask. For our imperfection also provides this, that raw meat is
not always fit for our stomach; it must be dried, altered, and corrupted. They do
the same: they sometimes obscure their natural opinions and judgments and
falsify them to accommodate themselves to public usage.

– Ibid., 408 (2.12)

And from Bacon:

I have no objection to your enjoying the fruits of your [old] philosophy…. [A]dorn your
conversation with its jewels; profess it in pubic and increase your gravity thereby in the eyes of the masses. The new philosophy will bring you no such gains…. It does not flatter the mind by fitting in with its preconceptions. It does not sink to the capacity of the vulgar except in so far as it benefits them by its works. Therefore keep your old philosophy. Use it when convenient. Keep one to deal with nature and the other to deal with the populace. Every man of superior understanding in contact with inferiors wears a mask.

– Francis Bacon, The Refutation of Philosophies, 108

I have provided evidence in support of my claim that you got him wrong. But you just skip over that as if it is just a game you don't want to play.

This is why I said that it is very much like a programmer writing a language setting out how the language will operate so that it doesn't run into errors. — schopenhauer1

He is not writing a language. He is using the German language.

In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.

(5.5563)

Sure, but imagine if any other thinker said that he doesn't have to explain themselves any further.. — schopenhauer1

Since you believe so strongly in comparing styles and content you should know that we don't have to imagine it. Other thinkers, both ancient and contemporary, have based their explanations on reality being granular. It seems likely that Wittgenstein was influenced by Plato's account in Theaetetus. (201d)

It just seems like a strange thing to NOT demand from a thinker trying to give you such a comprehensive take on the world. — schopenhauer1

It just seems strange to believe than any thinker could provide a comprehensive take on the world. In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein says:

... the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.

and toward the end he says:

We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of
life remain completely untouched.

(6.52)

The problems of life are not scientific problems. They are not problems that can be solved scientifically. Or by propositional analysis. The focus of Wittgenstein's concern is not ontological or epistemological. He points to the limits of logic in order to safeguard ethics and aesthetics which lie outside its domain. To put it differently, his concern is not with what is on the table, but what we bring to it.

With the purpose of obtaining a one-substance cosmology ... — Process and Reality- A.N. Whitehead

Why should that be our purpose? Why one substance and not two or two million or no substance?

But it does start with a generalization of Locke's account of mental operations. — Process and Reality- A.N. Whitehead

Why should we start with Locke's account of mental operations? Why not start with whatever it is that makes mental operations possible?

Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal intuition of space. — Kant- Critique of Pure Reason

Why? Because Kant says so?

we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space. — schopenhauer1

Why should we begin with an exposition of the conception of space?

the representation of space must already exist as a foundation. — schopenhauer1

Why should a representation of space be the foundation of anything?

... this external experience is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation. — schopenhauer1

The luggage will either fit in the trunk of the car or it won't. It won't fit in this space because you can represent it as fitting.

We just accept that these statements must be true without why, how, what for, etc. — schopenhauer1

The same should be asked of a Whitehead and Kant fanboy.

I will try again. You said;

His definition is like one in computer programming it seems:
"From Gemini: General purpose: More broadly, an object can simply refer to a variable, a data structure, or even a function. In this sense, it's a way to organize data in memory and refer to it using an identifier (like a name)."

That is to say, it is a logical marker, a name. But then what's the use of distinguishing objects and atomic facts if you leave objects so undefined? You mine as well just start with atomic facts.. — schopenhauer1

An object does not refer to a variable. A variable can be used, however, to refer to an object. The term 'object' is not a particular object. It is analogous to a number. The term 'number' is not a particular number,
that is why we use variables such a 'n' or 'x' where no specific number or object is specified.

An object in not a data point. Data points do not make up the substance of the world.
Simple objects do.

An object is not a function. The possibility of and ways in which simple objects combine is determined by those objects themselves.

An object is not a way of organizing data. Objects are self-organizing in that the possibilities of combining are build into the objects.

Objects are not in memory. They subsist independently of what is the case.

An object is not a logical marker. It is a substantive thing.

An object is not a name. It is what is named in an elementary proposition.

None of this is a matter of what I say being right or wrong. It can all be supported and has been supported in this thread by reference to the text.

Wittenstein is not a god to me he could be wrong. — schopenhauer1

Of course he could! But you being wrong about him is still wrong.

He is not explaining epistemology. He is saying that logic is a transcendental condition for epistemology.

but according to the Tractatus and Wittenstein’s view, these errors occur. — schopenhauer1

It is, rather, according to your misrepresentation of Wittgenstein's view in the Tractatus.

In the Symposium Socrates says:

I who declare that I know nothing other than matters of love ...

At first it may seem that this contradicts what he says in the Apology where he claims to know nothing beautiful and good (21d). But eros is a desire for something one does not possess. Socrates knows the desire to be wise. This is a kind of self-knowledge. Eros is a kind of madness. The highest kind, according to Socrates in the Phaedrus, is love of the beautiful. About which Socrates makes a beautiful speech.

Toward the end of the dialogue Socrates says:

Well then, let that be the extent of our entertainment with speeches.

(278b)

With regard to those who make such speeches he says:

I think it would be a big step, Phaedrus, to call him ‘wise’ because this is appropriate only for a god. The title ‘lover of wisdom’ or something of that sort would suit him better and would be more modest.

(278d)

Divine madness does not lead to knowledge of the beautiful or good. It inspires does not not result in what the philosopher loves, wisdom.

The Phaedrus is a play of opposites, of things that pull us in opposite directions. For the philosopher the pull of divine madness is opposed by reason and moderation, which finds its own extreme in the asceticism of the Phaedo. In the Symposium, this plays out differently. Some of the participants are suffering from a hangover and so the usual drinking competition is replaced by the more sober competition of speeches about eros.

As Plato has Socrates tell us in the Phaedrus:

But the person who realises that in a written discourse on any topic there must be a great deal that is playful ...

(277e)

But, considering your point, and reading other remarks that Witt makes, I'm beginning to get the sense that, perhaps, he was critiquing that very project. — 013zen

He was. But since he did so using their language it may seem as though he is in agreement with them.

Concepts like "evolution" are one possible description of the world — 013zen

A couple of remarks from Wittgenstein:

Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favorable to the formation of certain concepts; or again unfavorable? And does experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa. (It is discovered e.g. that what formerly counted as a difference in kind, is really only a difference in degree. (Zettel 352)

He accepts that there are facts, but facts do not determine concepts.

Elsewhere:

What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a new true theory but a fertile point of view.

(CV 18)

The larger issue for Wittgenstein is ways of seeing, seeing aspects, "seeing as". The "fertile point of view" of "a Copernicus or a Darwin" is a conceptual revolution, the displacement of the Earth as the center or the rejection of kinds in favor of variations. We do not simply see things as they are but according to the way we represent or picture them.

I had to read that twice, eventually deciding that "he" must be Descartes — Banno

She. My proof-reader took the day off.

It is no more necessary for him to conclude that others exist than it is for a child to exist others do.
— Fooloso4
Mmm. Perhaps not as clear as was thought. — Banno

I should fire my proof-reader. It is no more necessary for him to conclude that others exist than it is for a child to conclude that others exist. The question of the existence of others does not arise for Descartes unless one takes his rhetorical device literally.

AMEN. But I still ain't placing any bets.

But it risks being ageist and sexist at the same time. — Ludwig V

My concern is that it advocates for a one size fits all standard - a mature person will marry. There are various reasons why someone does not marry, most of them having little or nothing to do with philosophy.

we should extend to our predecessors the sympathy and charity that we must all hope our successors will extend to us when their turn comes to assess what we have done or not done. — Ludwig V

Based on the link to Midgley's Rings and Books, this does not appear to be advice she follows.

- if philosophy is to be a practice based on human life, — Ludwig V

I recommend Pierre Hadot's "Philosophy as a Way of Life". It is a far more scholarly, insightful, and influential work. Although it may be somewhat unfair to compare his work to a radio talk.

Is that what you were saying? It all got a bit muddled.[ — Banno

It is what I said, explicitly and clearly:

Midgley is wrong when he says that other people's existence had to be inferred. — Fooloso4

If in your reading it got muddled that your difficulty.

How does Descartes conclude that others exist, without making an inference? — Banno

It is no more necessary for him to conclude that others exist than it is for a child to exist others do.

Will you be defending substance dualism? — Banno

I won't, but pointing out what Midgley gets wrong does not require defending everything Descartes said.

What did Descartes get wrong, and what right? — Banno

See this thread.

The pop story of Descartes — Banno

Or, you could read and quote Descartes.

And it is this story that the aggravating Grandmother is using, — Banno

In that case, she too should have read Descartes rather than rely on what others get wrong.

The truth is, this is a serious and persistent problem in certain areas of academic philosophy.

Rings and Books reads now as a precursor to more recent streams in philosophical thinking such as enactivism and embodied cognition. — Banno

She is a bit late to the party. See, for example, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

This is at odds with the views offered by Descartes — Banno

Husserl would not agree. See his Cartesian Meditations.

I also disagree with her emphasis on marriage. Although some are well suited to marriage and children, others are not. Her associating bachelorhood with immaturity raises the question of the extent of her interactions with a variety of different people

She refers to Aristotle but neglects to address the natural household relation that Aristotle discusses first, namely, master and slave. Nor does she address the numerous problems he discusses regarding marriage including war, destruction of cities, and revolution. Much of what he says regarding marriage centers around the division or labor and property. (Politics, Book 1)

As to Plato we know nothing of his private life or intimate relations. What we do know, however, is that several of his dialogues deal with love and friendship. The Republic raises serious concerns about marriage and its private, anti-communal effects.

Is it possible to be too preoccupied with defending Descartes to see Midgley's point? — Banno

Grandma Mary believes that those who are not married lack maturity, that they, like Plato, are adolescents. That by not leading what she regards as a "normal domestic life" their development was arrested.

But it is Descartes who is the focus of her criticism, as if if he only he had married there would not have been the turn to subjectivism.

What Midgley does not mention is that Descartes' mother died a year after his birth, that he was sent away at about age ten to the Jesuit college of La Flèche, or that he had a daughter, Francis, who died at the age of five. Rather than a deliberate and immature choice to not develop attachments, his attachments were severed from him.

Descartes has come under a great deal of criticism for the mind/body problem but it is his view of the body as mechanistic that led to advances in medicine.

I doubt that Midgley would have disagreed with your account of Descartes. — Banno

Midgley claimed that for Descartes other people's existence had to be inferred. I said she was wrong about this. Do you think she would agree that she was wrong?

It is a game played by people, plural. — Banno

Descartes wrote of, to and for a community of people past present and future. A community of philosophers and thinkers . But also for humans of lesser talents. His provisional morality, from the Discourse, is about living in the world with people.His idea of the perfection of the will is not simply about one's own advantage but for the good of others, the good of the human community.

Descartes, whose work extents to physics, medicine, and optics did far more for the welfare of man than Midgley. Where the ancients had no choice but to accept may things that were beyond their power to change, the modern philosophers were on the forefront of the mastery of nature. Philosophy was no longer about the problem of how to live but to solve problems by changing the conditions of life.

No philosophy, Descartes included, is without problems, but Midgley is wrong when he says that other people's existence had to be inferred. If blame is to be assigned much if it falls on Midgley and others who have misunderstood and misrepresent Descartes.

Are the simply objects that make up the substance of the world knowable? Wittgenstein says:

If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)
A new possibility cannot be discovered later.

(2.0123)

He continues:

If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all
its internal properties.

(2.01231)

And:

If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given.

(2.0124)

Can we know that all objects are given? Can we know all possible states of affairs? At best we can know what states of affairs have occurred. But actual states of affairs are not the only states of affairs that are possible. If that were the case nothing new could occur.

Without making it explicit Wittgenstein has drawn a limit to human knowledge. This limit is distinct from that of what can be said and what is shown.

And the specific kind of knowledge that characterises the Philosopher is spelled out in Book 6: — Wayfarer

Here is Bloom's translation of that passage:

"About philosophic natures, let's agree that they are always in love with that learning which discloses to them something of the being that is always and does not wander about, driven by generation and decay."

And Horan's:

“Well, let us agree something about the philosophic natures. Let us agree that they always love any learning which would reveal to them something of that being which always is, and does not wander in subjection to generation and decay.”

The philosopher loves any learning that discloses or reveals something of that being which always is.
The desire (eros) to learn this is not to know it. This is not something the philosopher knows, but something the philosopher desires to know.

Are you engaged in exegesis, or advocacy? Sure, Descartes' ideas made sense for Descartes. but do you agree with them? — Banno

Descartes wrote under conditions of persecution that constrained him in ways that do not apply to contemporary thinkers in places where free speech is the norm. We should not overlook the role Descartes played in freeing the mind, and not just his mind, from the tyranny of the Church and Scholasticism.

Roughly, is philosophy to be public or private? — Banno

Philosophy was for Descartes public, and not limited to the society of his time.

And I conceive such hopes for the future that if, among the purely human occupations, there is one that is really good and important, I venture to believe that it is the one that I have chosen.

(Discourse, Part One)

His method, as the title of the work states, is the method of correctly conducting one's reason and seeking truth in the sciences. More specifically, it is a method of experiments and observations.

From the thread Descartes Reading Group:

Although Descartes isolates himself in his room for a short period of time, as a thinking thing he is not isolated. As a thinking thing he is connected to thinking itself, that is to say, to what is thought not just by him but other thinking beings before and after him. The nature of thinking is something we do together, a joint project, something that occurs between human beings. The thinking self is not just the individual but thinking itself, which is by its nature public.

The nature of thinking is not limited by the span of a lifetime. For thinking itself time is not moment to moment. It is a collaborative effort across time periods. Descartes was not primarily concerned with the past, however, but rather the present and future. More specifically, with his project for the perfectibility of man, which takes place over lifetimes.

Thinking for Descartes is not fundamentally contemplative or meditative but constructive. Thus he sought foundations on which to build. Although a lot of attention is paid to his epistemology it was groundwork for a science that would change the course of nature.

This has the uncomfortable result that one ceases to exist when not doing philosophy, or at least when one is asleep. — Banno

From the Second Meditation:

But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands,
affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.

It is not that thinking or doing philosophy is a necessary condition for existing, it is that existing is a necessary condition for thinking is this broad sense of the term.

Cogito ergo sum, more correctly translated as "I am thinking, therefore I exist" is from the Discourse, not the Meditations.

This conclusion follows from:

But immediately afterwards I noted that, while I was trying to think of all things being false in this
way, it was necessarily the case that I, who was thinking them, had to be something; and observing this truth: I am thinking, therefore I exist.

(Part 4)

Doubting is for Descartes a deliberate methodological exercise.

I decided to pretend that everything that had ever entered my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams ...

(Part 4)

Obviously, to doubt is very different from pretending to doubt.

In the Meditations he deliberately secludes himself in order to find some reason to doubt whatever can be doubted. The picture of Descartes as a solitary figure does not tell the whole story. He traveled extensively.

More important, as with all of us, his temperament and character was not simply a matter of choice. There are many factoring influencing who we are and what we desire. He took his motto from Ovid:

Bene qui latuit, bene vixit". He who has kept himself well hidden, has lived well.

He had good reason to hide. By calling everything into doubt he called the authority of the Church into doubt, and gives that authority to the thinking person.

Yet in this passage, and even though Socrates has said 'God knows whether it happens to be true' ... — Wayfarer

He also says in this passage "this is how it all seems to me". Why would he say that it seems this way to him if he knows it is this way?

...he nevertheless says 'anyone who is to act intelligently....must have had sight of this.' — Wayfarer

In the Apology he says that no one is wiser than him for he knows he he does not know anything noble and good.(21d) In other words, there is no one who acts intelligently.

Notice 'present in the soul of each person'. — Wayfarer

What is it that is present? It is not, as you say, the "attainment of this insight" or an "innate capacity for enlightenment". It is the capacity to know. Rather than pursuing those things most people desire, the soul turns its attention to the truth of what is noble and good. It does this using reason.

We who have not made the ascent from the cave act intelligently, to the extent we are able, by having our sight set on the good.