Kant would say you have to reason more better, yes? — tim wood

You said you cannot do as reason instructs, which implies a disability. Given that reason will not instruct the impossible as a moral judgement, and given that reason will not instruct beyond physical capacity, there should be no rational argument to support why you cannot do as reason instructs. Thus, Kant would say you have been morally corrupted by succumbing to a merely arbitrary empirical good, an inclination, rather than standing with the pure moral good of its practical instruction, at the sacrifice of your moral constitution. In short, you have chosen to act immorally, so, yes......you should have reasoned mo’ better.
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motor of morality (apparently not reason)? — tim wood

Feelings, or desires, cannot be the motor.....the ground, the primary condition......of morality, because it is entirely feasible to feel bad upon doing the good act. It helps us to recognize a good act by the good feeling we get from its accomplishment, but we stand in danger of not doing the good act if we fear the bad feeling we might get from its accomplishment. That which either supports or detracts from a pure moral action, and the effects of which we cannot know until after the act is done, cannot serve as ground for it, because morality is always determined before its volitions are manifest in the world.

Such is the foundation of the deontological moral doctrine, in which respect for law in and of itself, regardless of the content of any law in particular, grounds moral dispositions. Herein we may disregard our feelings when it becomes possible we won’t like them, because we have acted out of respect for law, which inspires no feelings at all except having done right. In this respect, it is not reason that is the motor, but it is practical reason that says what form the law will assume, the categorical imperative, for which thereafter our actions respect.

As for the “motor of morality”, meaning that which drives the fundamental human condition, I think Kant would go with the transcendental conception of “freedom”, transcendental in order to distinguish from the conception of freedom associated with degrees of various and sundry empirical restrictions, but rather to denote and prescribe an unconditioned a priori causal principle, that is not itself an effect of any antecedent principle. Hence, moral reasoning is practical, for the determination of its laws, but at the same time absolutely pure, because of its transcendentalism, its source being pure thought alone, having no empirical predicates whatsoever.

What say you?

OK.

Under the presumption that a traditionalist stands for those practicing philosophy before pragmatists and post-modernists, who would you consider a currently practicing traditionalist?

Hey......

First....the phrase “free will” is a mischaracterization of a distinctly human condition. We don’t have “free will”; we have a will that determines its volitions without encumbrance, that is, autonomously, and at the same time obligates itself to those volitions, which we call duty.
Second....The “free” used to describe the will is just a contraction of the idea “freedom”, a pure concept of reason, which makes autonomy possible, and as such does not belong to the will as a description of it, but as a condition necessary for it.
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Your “Free to act in accordance with the dictates of reason as duty” is close enough to:
“....Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason....”
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If reason instructs, then I ought to heed and do. If I cannot, then to that degree I am not free. — tim wood

If you cannot do as reason instructs due to some physical obstruction or incapacity, that is a different kind of freedom than the kind that facilitates such instruction. If you cannot do as reason instructs because you have attained to a conflicting moral judgement, the will is freely exercised in so doing. You are every bit as unencumbered to be immoral as much as you are to be moral, even if the consequences of the former may be somewhat less satisfactory than the latter.

However that may not matter because we structure our lives as if free will exists. — TheMadFool

In support of that particular passage only:

“....I adopt this method of assuming freedom merely as an idea which rational beings suppose in their actions, in order to avoid the necessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect also. The former is sufficient for my purpose; for even though the speculative proof should not be made out, yet a being that cannot act except with the idea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a being who was actually free. Thus we can escape here from the onus which presses on the theory....

....We have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the idea of freedom. This latter, however, we could not prove to be actually a property of ourselves or of human nature; only we saw that it must be presupposed if we would conceive a being as rational and conscious of its causality in respect of its actions, i.e., as endowed with a will; and so we find that on just the same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its freedom....”
(Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785)

If you enjoy positive experiences and endure negative experiences, mustn’t you have active rational agency, insofar as your faculty of judgement appears to be fully functional?

Maybe it’s no more complicated than..... if you’re not dead, then you’re alive.

Is this to say that every product of reasoning (e.g., resolving to tie my shoe because it is untied) has ethical implications? — Galuchat

No, not as stated, although most any empirical situation is susceptible to manufactured moral/ethical implications, re: the various and sundry renditions of the trolley problem.

You could swap “believe” for “accept” — AJJ

Not really, and maintain rational integrity. Acceptance is analytic, insofar as that which is accepted is self-sufficient (accepted because it’s a fact). Belief is synthetic, insofar as there remains a contingency to the proposition which some additional proposition would need to rectify (if one does not believe the fact he should be able to justify his dissention).

To go a step further, acceptance grants that some particular cause and effect are empirically manifest, the primary conditions for facts in general. If one believes he ought not to accept some fact, by association he does not grant that particular cause and effect to be at least sufficient, and at most he does not grant those conditions to be possible and/or non-contradictory.

Much more parsimonious to either accept facts as facts or not, and leave such vagaries as “ought to believe” by the metaphysical wayside.

If facts are acceptable as necessarily the case under a given set of conditions......who cares whether or not we ought to believe them? Acceptance grants their authority, over which belief would have nothing to say.

What: ......the manifestation of pure practical reason in rational agents, employed as a faculty of choice under the auspices of the fundamental human condition of morality;
Where 1: .....innate in humans, initially undeveloped;
Where 2: .....can be subverted by mere inclination or selfish wants.

“....Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognises as practically necessary, i.e., as good....”
(F. P. M. M., 1785)

Best response? Probably not. But still considered the baseline for modern moral philosophy and certainly good enough for non-academics to work with.

Try thinking of 'the senses' as being a human concept useful in some contexts. — fresco

Sure...as in Rorty’s non-representationalist attempt to overthrow Kantian epistemology.
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any supposed 'permanencies' in that world boil down to 'persistences of expectation of events'. — fresco

There was a time when “knowledge” was perfectly adequate for saying that very thing.

Any thoughts ? — fresco

Yes. Never been a fan of ontology in and of itself, so.....an inclination to agree. It contradicts experience in general to deny the existence of that which affects the senses, even if I don’t know what it is. If I merely think something, whether or not it exists reflects the understanding under which it is thought, in which case I must beware of contradicting only myself, my experience be what it may.

“...Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely a priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience—which is in perfect unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining....”
(CPR, A601,B629)

The problem with philosophy in general these days is......how to cope with technology. When the learned can actually see parts of what the brain is doing, as opposed to theorizing all the things the mind is doing, philosophy itself loses some of its power. Now, rather than standing as the explanatory paradigm of all human mentality and/or abstracted physiology, philosophy must limit itself to that which the pertinent science has not yet found the means to address.

For the non-academic closet philosopher in particular, the problem is more personal, insofar as he pretty much rejects anything outside his favorite metaphysical system, and consequently laments the discourse the professionals deem worthy of being called philosophy. In other words, he grants the improvements his choice of doctrine evokes, but frowns on what may even be a subsequent improvement on it, and may even see such pseudo-improvements as merely a business, or a need to be published, rather than a better way for man to understand himself.

My....non-refundable....two cents.

No prob.

Thanks. I guess. Dunno how anything religious got into my simple interrogative, but I do have a very comfortable, very old and well-worn, armchair, I must say.

I will bring back philosophy from the dead. — TheGreatArcanum

When did it die?

Pre-linguistic children are not mentioned in my particular library. I doubt there’s anything I could learn from them. You know......they being not all that talkative.

Recognition of causality was never the issue.

Aye. Methinks ‘tis a mighty fine line betwixt conditions for and causality of.

Half the world thinks causality is a construct of pure reason, half the world thinks causality is an intrinsic property or attribute of Nature thus “existed long before we became aware of it”.

Chalk me up in Column 1.

Close enough.

Once it is established (by experience and the phenomenological examination of experience) just what is essential to all coherent experience (that it be spatial, temporal, causal etc) is a priori in the sense that further actual experiences do not need to be examined in order to know that these conditions will necessarily apply. — Janus

Problem is......no experience or possible experience, from which that kind of knowledge arises or may arise, will ever connect the concept of cause with the concept of effect essentially, or which is the same thing...necessarily. Put another way: immediate knowledge of cause is not given by knowledge of effect.

Once logically established, yes, but such establishment is the purview of reason, not common experience.

Judgements of experience, or judgements with empirical content, are synthetic, yes, but they have nothing to do with experience if their content be a priori, or contain an absolutely necessary relation, re: mathematics.

Would you mind, and how would I be wrong, if I re-wrote your statement as: Kant pointed out to Hume, the question of causation has to do with the synthetic a priori logic of our pure understanding, and in no way our common experience, which had thus far been described by mere habit.

“....But to synthetical judgements a priori, such aid is entirely wanting. (I do not here have the advantage of looking around in the field of experience)....” (A9, B13)

Not sure what you meant by a priori logic. Perhaps you intended it to stand for the categories, which holds cause and effect in the category of relation. While these apply to cognitions with respect to experience, they are derived a priori from conceptions alone.

Bottom line.....Kant was saying Hume misunderstood the power and function of the faculty of understanding.

Just a thought.........

1.)......is more self-regulation than self-legislation, because your example shows merely inclination to obey extant legalities in the public domain, rather than inherent duty to treat law itself as a governing principle in the private domain. Morality is grounded in the major difference between the law of someone else’s determination and to which the non-compliance effects one’s standing, and the law one wills of his own accord, and to which the non-compliance effects his conscience. The former is ethics, the latter is morality proper.

2.) Yes, Kant acknowledges the other, but only as other members of the set of all individual rational beings in whom the concept of morality can be said to reside. All such beings think the same way, and while experiences will determine some difference in conditions under which sub-sets of all such rational agents conduct their public business, if there are any principles under which all rational agents conduct their private business, then the groundwork of morality itself is given.

I wouldn’t say this is a correction, but rather an opinion based on a different understanding.

A couple pages ago you mentioned Kantian self-legislation. Given that self refers to the specifically human subjective condition and legislation refers to the creation of, or amendment to, laws, it raises the question.....what would any sense of “others” have to do with internally legislated moral law, and the respect rational agents in general possess for law in itself which promises their un-mediated compliance with them?

Either self-legislation, and the principle of absolute necessity from which sine qua non law itself with no empirical content whatsoever arises, is false, or, there can be no sense of “others” in reference to it.

I was looking for respect (for law qua law) as the condition which facilitates our “immediate compliance”.

What is this “other” you’re referring to?

that's towards what I mean by law-as-law. — tim wood

Perfect. Or at least close enough.

Now all that’s needed is.......why should it be accepted that

their immediate duty is to comply — tim wood

Perhaps it’s enough to say, if it had been clear, we’d have agreed on some of it, disagreed on some of it.

I can't see why that could not be paraphrased as " than duty may serve as the principle that justifies those determinations. — Janus

I cannot see what else it could be but a principle that we are subject to duty — Janus

In a dialogue where the context has to do with the consideration of duty as a notion or as a principle, these two statements don’t say the same thing. If you wish to say a deontological moral agent operates under the principle of subjecting himself to duty, I wouldn’t argue against it. That, however, doesn’t say anything to qualify duty itself as a principle; there just isn’t any good reason why it should be considered a principle, a quite powerful conception, if notion, a not-so-powerful conception, is entirely sufficient.
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but that the particular duties I have will vary in different circumstances. — Janus

That reflects the point, actually, and FAPP says exactly the same as *as duty requires*. There are no particular duties from a moral perspective. There is only one sense of duty, and adherence to it is volunteered by the moral doctrine to which it belongs. The particular volitions you have will vary in different circumstances, solely dependent on the judgement you make to authorize what those volitions ought to be. This also explains why duty in and of itself cannot be a principle, if you think of duty as variable, because variable principles stand on good ground for contradicting themselves.

Duty is like truth. Any particular truth is just an example of truth; any particular duty is just an example of duty. Reductionism from the particulars in each gives the ideal of each. The ideal duty is the moral duty, and is itself irreducible.

Principles are usually grounds or necessary conditions for law, or at least some form of rule. If duty is considered a principle, than it follows laws or rules should be derivable from it. I don’t think duty gives rules.

Duty is called a notion because there is no examination needed for it. I can never prove even to myself I do this or that because it is my duty, but I certainly can use the concept of duty to represent my own best interests in respecting the very moral laws I make for myself.

*As* duty requires implies duty is contingent on circumstance; *because* duty requires implies duty is antecedent to circumstance.

If one accepts the will as a moral determinant, than duty may serve as the notion that justifies those determinations. It is useless to authorize the will to formulate our moral laws if we don’t have the means integrated within us to regard those laws as such. But I don’t think duty is a principle, per se, but perhaps closer to a feeling, or perhaps an innate predisposition, because there are moral doctrines that do not rely on deontological predicates.

Nevertheless, if one does abide by the deontological moral doctrine, which presupposes his ability to formulate his own choice of moral law, than he is morally obligated to conform his judgements to them, not AS duty requires it, but BECAUSE duty requires it. Otherwise, he has no warrant for deeming himself morally worthy. Very much a closed, self-contained, moral system.

This obligation does not hold in kind for civil law because we do not formulate civil law with respect to our a priori moral attitude, but with regard to empirical community order. Besides, I can break a civil law without necessarily disrespecting it and without considering myself immoral, whereas my non-conformity to a moral law is automatically disrespectful and carries explicit immorality with it.

As I see it, anyway.

breaking the law is not immoral in any way in itself, then what happens to the law? — tim wood

Breaking law is usually related to civil or otherwise administrative conditions, and the law remains unaffected. The consequence of breaking civil law is predicated on the stipulations legislated into it, varies accordingly and is always empirical.

Disrespecting law, on the other hand, is usually related to the deontological moral doctrine, and if such should be the case, the law herein being moral law immediately becomes void. The consequence of disrespecting any moral law whatsoever is being immoral, has no variance and is always a priori.

Law in itself does indeed impose a duty under both moral and civil doctrines.

I also hold general disregard for personal descriptors, and in this particular case, I hold with no opinion which would benefit from having one.

I do not know...is more than an opinion. — Frank Apisa

While this is certainly correct, the OP asked about nothing more than the absence of opinion.

The additional cognition is necessary. Otherwise, the soul remains merely a conception, which is an analytic judgement, without regard to its reality, which is a synthetic judgement.

An opinion on the existence of the soul is entirely predicated on the cognition of a synthetic judgement. No judgement, no opinion.

I would agree. Granting the conception of soul doesn’t require an opinion concerning the possibility of its existence. That would be a separate, additional, cognition.

In this Kantian pure reason sense, no. — tim wood

Reason may not construct reality per se, but it can be said reason constructs our sense of reality, or, constructs reality for us.

“...(...) all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things which we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human race. With this alone we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms thereof; sensation the matter. The former alone can we cognize a priori, that is, antecedent to all actual perception; and for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition. The latter is that in our cognition which is called cognition a posteriori, that is, empirical intuition. The former appertain absolutely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be; the latter may be of very diversified character....”

Good read indeed. Tough as it may be.

While I accept most of this, I find myself wondering what would be accomplished by “....superimposing rational concepts upon existence...” given “...the notion that existence is irrational.”

What logical aspect would arise from superimposing rational concepts on an irrational notion?

Even granting “....it is obvious that subjectivity comes into contact with it (“it” being the so-called irrational notion of existence)...”, there still seems to be some indication a theory incorporating this tenet relegates subjectivity itself to irrational grounds. I don’t think a worthy epistemological theory can afford to do that.

Within the context of continental Enlightenment epistemological philosophy, imagination is a faculty in use both a priori and a posteriori. In the latter, imagination synthesizes appearances to phenomena, and passes to understanding representations of real objects as a mental images, which become our experiences. In the former, imagination spontaneously creates its own intuitions, and synthesizes these to form a representation which it then passes to understanding, not as a mental image but as schema, to which belongs the content of our pure conceptions, re: geometric figures, numbers, colors.
(CPR, B178......loosely....it’s pretty forbidding down here in the weeds)

Given an experience of blue, it is not a problem to imagine a shade not belonging to experience, re: Hume’s missing shade in E.C.H.U., Sec 2. Schema exist only in thought, which makes explicit that if there is experience of a blue, which is technically an intuition of an object with the property of blue inhering in it, as understanding thinks as belonging to it, we can easily imagine a blue of more or less degree, even in that very same object.

Depending on which doctrine one accepts, color either belongs to an object which we then perceive, or color resides in us merely as a pure conception, like extension, size, causality, which we apply to objects as part of our cognitive process.

Anyway.....I know. It doesn’t help when the answer to a question just raises more of them.

Ahhh, yes.....the infamous and oft-misrepresented Copernican Revolution, I’m guessing. THAT kinda messed up for everybody.

Thanks.

objective and subjective do not form an antithetical pair. — StreetlightX

So subjective and objective are not a pair. — StreetlightX

And also because fuck Kant. — StreetlightX

Do you say the last because you think him guilty of the first two? None of his epistemological tenets are being used by name on this thread, so......just wondering.