I don't get that. The only thing they've done that's disruptive is expressing their opinion. — T Clark

So a woman comes to a dinner party at my house and starts saying derogatory things about gay people, ... — T Clark

The framing isn't obvious?

Why didn't you write "... and expresses an opinion about gay people I disagree with"?

Now suddenly it is a lot less obvious that this person did something that shouldn't be protected under the right to free speech. (Though one is always entitled to ask people to leave their house, of course)

So I run a business and one of my employees spouts Nazi slogans in the lunch room, I can't fire him — T Clark

Why didn't you say "... and expresses an extreme political opinion"?

Should this person now be immediately fired? I think not.

So a member of the YMCA curses, swears, and uses inappropriate language, they can't revoke his membership? — T Clark

Why didn't you say "and curses, swears and used inappropriate language in a fit of anger"?


You may agree that your way of framing certainly nudges us into a certain direction, doesn't it?

You're either consciously doing this, or perhaps more worrying, this happens subconsciously and this is how you perceive people you strongly disagree with; as people that are inherently unreasonable and disruptive, and that cannot be talked with in a polite way, or simply asked to keep their views to themselves or not share them in an antagonistic way.

I'm getting the impression that you are not interested in free speech at all, but instead wish to see people punished that hold opinions you strongly disagree with. That's why you seem so eager to frame such individuals in a way that can justify your desire for their punishment.

And also what is being said. — Michael

I don't think that is primarily important, and I'll explain why:

Should a government official be allowed to publish state secrets? — Michael

Of primary importance here is the agreement of the official not to reveal confidential information - not what is being said.

If an outside individual stumbles upon sensitive information pertaining the government, should they be arrested for sharing it? I think not.

Should I be allowed to knowingly and falsely accuse someone of having committed some heinous act and incite vigilante justice? — Michael

The demonstrable damage one is inflicting upon another is of primary importance - not what is being said.

People gossip all the time with malign intent. A sadly human trait.

Should you be allowed to post pornography on some popular website that children frequently visit? — Michael

Presumably the terms of service would disallow such a thing, and my previous reservations about public forums and monopolies on free discourse do not seem to apply in this situation.

Again, of primary importance here seems to be the disruptive nature and potential damage inflicted upon children. "What is being said", i.e. sharing porn, is not in itself problematic.

Unrestricted freedom of speech wouldn't be a good thing and shouldn't be allowed. — Michael

I don't think any of these examples constitute a restriction on free speech. Rather, in the first example it simply means to act according to the terms one has agreed to.

In the second and third, it is not about speech but about being willfully disruptive and/or harmful.

So it's OK for some social media company to remove your account should you violate whatever terms and services or community guidelines you implicitly agree to in signing up? — Michael

That is a complicated issue that must not only take freedom of contract and freedom of speech into account, but also social media's role as a public forum, and the almost monopolistic position it has gained in public discourse.

Ukraine is being destroyed? — Olivier5

Kind of proving my point there, buddy.

They would support retaliation, I think, if it comes to that. But the US is not the only player. Europe cannot tolerate a nuclear terrorist state at its doorstep. Ukraine also has the capacity to build their own nukes, given a year or two.
4m — Olivier5

What sort of fantasy land are you living in where countries can just be given nuclear weapons, or develop their own while their country is being destroyed?

So if I'm at work and I express the opinion that Jewish and black people are inferior to white Christians and ought not be allowed to marry then it would be wrong of my boss to fire me for my remarks? — Michael

Assuming those are one's genuinely held beliefs and one expresses them in a manner that isn't disruptive, I believe one should not face legal consequences (which is what being fired from one's job is), unless it constitutes a breach of the terms of employment as agreed upon in the employment contract.

Social consequences is a different matter. Of course people may treat someone differently for their radical ideas. That's their right.

So a guy comes to a dinner party at my house and starts saying derogatory things about gay people, I can't ask her to leave? So I run a business and one of my employees spouts Nazi slogans in the lunch room, I can't fire him? So a member of the YMCA curses, swears, and uses in appropriate language, they can't revoke his membership? Of course speech has consequences. — T Clark

This conflates two matters: expressing one's opinions and being generally disruptive. A nice bit of framing.

Free speech allows that I may hear something that I otherwise couldn't, something that I might want to hear. On the other hand, free speech doesn't itself mean free of consequences, one might be called out and deplatformed for continually lying for example. — jorndoe

The beauty of free speech is that when people are allowed to freely criticize faulty ideas, these processes will happen naturally and no arbitration is required.

If ideas can hold up to the scrutiny of the entirety of free discourse, they likely hold some merit.

In addition, free speech allows you to hear things you may want to hear, but perhaps more importantly hear the things you do NOT want to hear, but NEED to hear.

The neo-nazism/genocide yarn such an obvious attempt by both sides to paint the other as "the baddies", to lure people into accepting their narratives and adopt a black-and-white view of what is a complicated geopolitical issue.

You are better than this ThePhilosophyForum!

You two are projecting so hard I could point you at a wall to show off PowerPoint presentations.

The sinking of the Moskva could mark a serious escalation in the conflict. And I think as long as the West is content with its role as cheerleader, happy to "fight until the last Ukrainian" it will not bode well for Ukraine.

Yes, but Russia isn't a normal modern state... — Christoffer

Personally, I think Russia is pretty much a normal modern state, or at least no less abnormal than the USA. Being a regional power it of course acts differently than Belgium.

They already broke such laws. If a criminal is shooting at the police after the police have shouted at them to put down the weapon and apply to the set rules of society, the police have the authority to shoot down the criminal. — Christoffer

Yes, but that is all written down in laws that provide legitimacy in such cases.

Nowhere in international law are such things legitimized. States have the right to self-defense, but that only goes so far to legitimize the use of force, and it certainly doesn't legitimize assassinations of non-combatants.

And what is happening in Ukraine right now? What about how Putin and his minions spread the rhetoric that being a "Ukrainian" is "invalid". It's still up for debate if there's a genocide going on, but there's a lot constantly being uncovered. — Christoffer

Considering the amount of restraint Russia has shown so far (that may sound weird, but given the amount of firepower Russia possesses, they have clearIy been holding back, probably to try and save their legitimacy) and the little they stand to gain by committing atrocities, I find these claims of genocide extremely questionable.

But if the claims turn out to be true, international law has ways of bringing war criminals to justice - through tribunals, not through assassinations.

That's what the international community has decided; that in order to uphold international order as best as possible, the international community cannot advocate and use the same methods that they condemn.

I think that's where we differ. Many said the same about Hitler, Stalin and Mao back in the day when information were still being gathered, but I have no problem considering Putin being cut from the same cloth as other authoritarian despots — Christoffer

"Being cut from the same cloth", perhaps. But considering people "cut from the same cloth" is no grounds to treat people as though they have already committed the crimes. That would be arbitrary lawlessness and against any principles of modern law.

If the head of state is ordering top military generals on matters of military actions, isn't that like killing generals on the battlefield? — Christoffer

You may have your own views on this, but at least in the modern nation state there is a clear division between political leaders and military leaders. But even the assassination of military leaders is a controversial topic, as we have seen with the targeted killing of Iranian general Soulemani.

Military leaders plan and execute military operations and Putin cannot be said to be "part of an operation" in a military sense, though he is of course involved, but indirectly.

If Putin is in direct line of command, it's strategic to take him out in order to disorient the chain of command of the ongoing conflict. — Christoffer

Things can be strategic and yet impermissable under international law.

Isn't what you are referring to regarded in peacetime, ... — Christoffer

No, the UN charter and similar international legal documents are active at all times, unless specified otherwise, like with International Humanitarian Law, for example.

Otherwise (and if our modern international laws of war existed back then) if Hitler didn't kill himself, having the invading alliance troops in Berlin send in an operation to kill Hitler would not have been a violation in such times of war. — Christoffer

It's hard to say whether Hitler couldn't also be considered a military leader, and therefore a legitimate military target.

Besides this, even if we consider him a strictly political leader (which he certainly wasn't) he was the orchestrator of a genocide.

As much as I condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, I don't think Putin matches either of these criteria by any stretch of the imagination.

International community; members of the United Nations.

Do not accept assassination of heads of state as legal practice by virtue of having signed the United Nations charter which forbids the targeted killing of non-combatants under international law.

But you already know these things. You're just looking to start an argument for who knows what reason.

Arguing semantics already? Or you really want me to believe you don't understand what I mean with the term "international community"?

The international community, obviously, including those nations that are powerful enough to get away with it when it suits them.

Not accepted by whom, pray tell? The US tried to murder Castro dozens of times. The French helped locate and kill Ghadafi. The Russians tried to off Zelensky too. I could go on. — Olivier5

That certain nations are horribly hypocritical when it comes to their ideals and upholding international law is nothing new, but assassinations are certainly controversial and not accepted.

When powerful nations bully weak nations they may get away with it regardless.

A resolution of this conflict might look like the death of Putin — Olivier5

I hope you're not implying assassination.

It would not be beneficial to world peace that assassinating each other's heads of state becomes an accepted practice in international politics. There's a reason it is not an accepted practice today.

Besides, whoever would succeed Putin would have to deal with the exact same geopolitical, military and socio-economic problems Russia faces, and after an assassination the West will be a lot less likely to be part of a peaceful solution to those problems.

Can a fraud Buddha become a genuine Buddha? — Agent Smith

Of course, but it's unlikely they'll get there through fraudulent ways. "Fake it till you make it" only works when one wishes and manages to deceive others, but to endeavor to deceive oneself is irrational, and the reverse course to spiritual development.

Democritus believed that (modernizing his words) it's better to have the gun pointed at you than you pointing the gun at someone (conscientious objectors). Democritus was a pre-Christian Greek philosopher if memory serves. What did he mean by that? If given a choice, would it be better to be a slave than a slave-master? — Agent Smith

It's a thought many seem to obide by ("better him than me!"), but without the conviction that it is better to undergo evil than to perform it oneself, one cannot be truly moral. Within the "better him than me" mentality lies the admission that any moral conduct is a facade - a matter of convenience, and not truly part of one's being.

The assumption seems to be that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a war orchestrated by Putin and his oligarchs alone.

I think this is clearly wrong.

Ukraine is a key factor in multiple strategic and geopolitical challenges for Russia, including access to the Black Sea and Europe.

Getting rid of Putin does not change the fact that Russia inherently will be interested in control over this region, and whoever were to succeed him will have to face the same challenges and questions.

It would depend on the level of justification. I may sympathise with their position if their argument is articulate enough and may even be slightly swayed? — I like sushi

This is another way of saying "If I like their argments, it may be justified."

What if you don't like their arguments? Is it not justified then? I'm assuming you don't consider yourself the ultimate arbiter of cosmic justice.

So maybe we are talking past each other. When I talk of justification, justice, I talk of morality and to me any meaningful definition of morality must go beyond personal fancy.

As a general ‘rule’/‘law’ I am not for Forced Conscription at all (that should be obvious). Just because I admit there could be a situation that may contradict this does not make my position contradictory. — I like sushi

I assume you wouldn't accept others justifying their practice of forcing people to partake in violence on the basis of their personal fancy, so why do you believe this is a position you should hold?

If you’re going to be silly I can stop talking? — I like sushi

Well, I think you were being silly, which is why I gave you a silly response.

The state decides right from wrong, and everyone who disagrees may choose "of their own free will" to comply or accept the consequences.

You understand that in this context you're condemning young people who can hardly tell right from wrong to choosing between punitive torture, which is what imprisonment is, and actual torture and the torture of others, and death on the battlefield.

Your view would probably be popular in Maoist China.

The idea that we are ‘forced’ is a convenient ‘excuse’ to just follow rules you don’t believe in. — I like sushi

Try to make the argument that being made to do things under threat of violence is something different from being forced.

I believe people should fight for what they believe in. — I like sushi

Your argument advocates that people should be forced to fight for what they don't believe in, after all, they'd be volunteers otherwise.

You confess you'd be the first to abandon ship when drafted into a war you don't agree with, and simultaneously you're preaching about how no force is being applied and people (kids, basically) should accept the consequences.

So which is it going to be?

There is a choice. Stating you were ‘forced’ to do something really just means that you refused to accept the consequences of refusing to do what you were told was right. — I like sushi

Ah, so conscripts are really just volunteers if you think about it. What a remarkable insight.

It is not literally ‘forced’. — I like sushi

To be thrown in jail for refusing is akin to being threatened with violence. It is the definition of being forced. And any nation that considers sending what are by all means children into a war was unfit to make any kind of rules to begin with.

To force young people to make others suffer, and to undergo suffering themselves; it is a terrible injustice.

If that is not unethical, nothing is.

Too one-sided a view of right and wrong is what created this situation to begin with. In international politics (and honestly, I could leave out the "international" part) everyone is a piece of shit (excuse my French) and your only choice is which flavor of shit you'd like jammed into your mouth.

Torture is never justified, under any circumstance.

If one puts themselves in a situation where it is expected of them to maintain security by potentially having to torture others, therein already lies the flawed moral choice.

When the timebomb is ticking it is already too late and one will be caught in a moral dilemma of one's own creation.

A better alternative would be to distance oneself from societies that torture as far as humanly possible; not to embed oneself further in it by becoming a potential torturer oneself, which must have preceeded the situation.

Wars cannot be just or unjust; a war is not a moral agent, nor are states. The individuals participating in wars are moral agents, and whether they act justly must be considered on a case-by-case basis.

To judge wars (or the states the conduct them) as just or unjust is inaccurate.

Ultimately war is about violence, and in my view violence is fundamentally an unjust means. Use of it is always bad and undesirable. Though, one can imagine situations in which one has no choice, or the alternatives are arguably worse. That still wouldn't make violence justified. Rather it creates a dilemma without any good outcomes.

Propaganda works because people are ignorant and believe anything they're told if it confirms their biases or caters to their (often subconscious) desires. (As such, being able to view information through a critical lens requires one to view oneself through a critical lens - a skill only a minority of people possess).

If one wishes to solve the spreading of lies (and I view propaganda as being a manifestation of that, as are most forms of marketing), one should strive to cure ignorance.

Rational selfishness, is meant to denote a conscious valuing of one's life, which is finite, and the value of the requirements of one's rational faculty to meet the demands of a finite life to achieve happiness, success, equilibrium, and sustenance. — Garrett Travers

How is this different from the normal use of the word?

The use of the word "rational" here seems to do little more than introduce bounds to what we consider "acceptable" selfishness, based on Rand's (or presumably, society's) preferences.

As such, if those preferences are self-destructive, so is the concept of an "acceptable" selfishness that they prescribe.

That which is truly good for the individual, is that which makes them a better, more loving human-being. As such, selfishness and selflessness are one and the same. By being truly selfish, and thus truly caring for the positive development of oneself, one will more positively affect all those around them.

Our use of the term "selfish", greed, callousness, etc., is in fact not a selfishness - it is a self-destructiveness. Such behavior should be looked upon with pity, not disdain. Such disdain comes forth from completely misplaced envy.

Not sure what Rand would think about this, but I thought I'd throw my perspective in there.

You are not the only one to have made this connection:



Absolutely fascinating stuff. So fascinating in fact, that if I wanted to talk about it, I'd have no idea where to even begin.

Personally, I am so not racist that whatever skin color whatever person appointed to whatever office has, is of great importance to me.

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy? — Tzeentch

No, your decision not to answr is. Not answering is not a thought it is an act. — Tobias

What does that act consist of? A thought surely, an internal process, and nothing else. And that presupposses we can call it an act to begin with - something which I disagree with also.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly. — Tzeentch

No, you do actually, ... — Tobias

I don't assign people moral duties.

... you think that ethics is independent from the expectations of others, ... — Tobias

Yes, and unapologetically so.

dependent on the social good in the case of lying, but independent of the social good in case of violence... — Tobias

Where have I argued that lying is dependent on social good?

I thought that question was part of the dilemma that I thought was being discussed here, which I discussed, but I think you're extrapolating positions from that that I do not hold.

... apparently there is some Tzeentch who determines the nature of ethic, ... — Tobias

I ponder it more like.

Kant thought we could rationally understand our duties or at least the grounds from which they sprang. He called that 'the moral law within'. It is not Kant that tells you, it is reason, at least according to Kant. — Tobias

I can get behind that to a degree, but in that case we should let reason assign the duties and not our fallible selves.

So in case of violence we have a context independent ethical ethical system and in case of lying we do not. Thank you, much more consistent now. — Tobias

I wasn't aware of some rule that in order for one type of unethical behavior to be categorically unethical, all unethical behaviors must be so categorically. But feel free to share some substantion for that rule.

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things, — Tzeentch

Well, that rather depend on the ' thing' under discussion doesn't it? — Tobias

A handshake is still just a handshake. However, a handshake is also a physical imposition, in which case the desire of the other needs to be taken into account, so I wouldn't call them irrelevant in that regard.

the situation is different because in the situation you have been asked a question you have ignored someone whereas in the situation you have not been asked a question you have not ignored someone. Indeed also ignoring or not ignoring are socially determined behaviors / situations. — Tobias

I have not done anything. I guess that's the issue here - my inaction, where one may have wished for my action.

But one's wishes do not morally oblige me, even if one wishes to morally oblige me.

However I see now that the mere existence of social world has been so far a mystery to you. — Tobias

Bla bla.

The only point I am making is that not answering is an act as well and so does not absolve you from the dilemma of whether you have to tell the truth or not. You are just trying to wiggle out of that question by shifting the subject. — Tobias

I have been very clear. Inaction is not an act, and a perfectly acceptable route out of the dilemma.

Inaction towards problems which are not one's responsibility is acceptable, and by the mere asking of a question one does not become responsible.

Well, this assertion merely proves your utter disregard for decades of learning. — Tobias

There have, even in recent days, been some atrocious laws made. Should those have been accepted on this ground of decades of "learning" that they were supposedly the product of?

I think I'll be a bit more critical of what I call learning.

Your phrase ' the nature of things' is unintelligible. — Tobias

The way things are? Reality? The discussion of which is the purpose of philosophy?

I'll rephrase myself; I don't hold the philosophical ability of lawmakers in a particularly high regard (exceptions not withstanding).

Yes but you decide by assuming he does not want to have the answer. That is the violation of autonomy ... — Tobias

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy?

Oh boy, where is this going?

It is imposed on others via the categorical imperative (at least according to Kant). — Tobias

Well, I am interested in your opinion. If I wanted to know Kant's, I'd read Kant.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly.

Well either ethics is context dependent and then it matters that there are different discussions, or it is not and then it really does not matter what the case at hand is. In the other thread you answered it was not, lying was always wrong. — Tobias

That last thread was not about lying. It was about violence. We may have discussed Kant's ideas of lying, but only insofar as it was relevant to violence.

Whether you like it or not we live in a world with others and with social expectations. — Tobias

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things, nor do I find them particularly relevant in moral discussions.

I gave you an argument, namely that the situation is different when you walk past someone who asked you a question or whether you walked past someone without him asking a question. — Tobias

I don't see how they're all that different for the person who walks past.

The questioner may have all sorts of wonderful expectations and desires, but why would they be of any concern to the walker?

Should I go about having expectations and desires towards other people, and then derive all sorts of moral rights to have those things reciprocated? Or is this the moment we need to start appointing people with opinions on "what is reasonable", and we are back in the mud?

Luckily you are not a lawyer because you would have a damn hard time wrapping your head around crimes of omission. — Tobias

The question of whether action and inaction are fundamentally different (which they are, for the same reason light and dark are fundamentally different) is a seperate discussion from whether inaction is always morally permissable. But that aside, I don't credit lawmakers with having a particularly solid grasp on the nature of things, and morality by extention.

If you decide he really does not want it answered, you violate his autonomy. — Tobias

That's not a violation of someone's autonomy. Whether one decides to answer or not isn't a matter of someone else's autonomy, but of one's own!

The imperfect duty to help. — Tobias

And that duty is one you have taken upon yourself, or do you also impose it on others?

In another thread you argued that context does not matter. — Tobias

They're two entirely different discussions.

You are an inconsistent Kantian. — Tobias

I am not a Kantian at all.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention. — Tzeentch

Because you were asked a question. Not answering a question is an act too. You make it seem like it is not an act. That is a wrong assumption. If I ask you in the street "may I ask you a question?" and you are basically ignoring me, you are being rude, or you did not hear it, or you were in a hurry, but at least I am going to think about why you plainly ignored me. — Tobias

One is not entitled to my response, my time, attention or even basic politeness, just because they asked a question. What gives one the right to impose any of these things?

It is not my problem, and beliefs of entitlement don't make it mine either.

Further, inaction is not an act. Not giving a response is not an action - it is inaction, and thereby fundamentally different.

No, he asked the question, so he wanted to know. — Tobias

Isn't the crux of the dilemma that telling the truth would cause the man significant emotional harm, and thus it was not a question he truly wanted answered?

If that's not the case, then what are we even here for? If the man wants to know the painful truth, then it certainly isn't bad to tell it to him, and lying would be even more clearly wrong.

You deliberately did not help him and thereby violated an imperfect duty. — Tobias

What duty?

Nor is there if you just told the man the truth. He asked for it, you gave it, what can be wrong. Instead you chose to make yourself the owner of the problem by not telling him. — Tobias

Well, if one no longer takes the position that telling the truth causing significant harm, disproportionate to the harm of telling a lie, then there is no dilemma.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention.

The man will suffer his anxiety until the bitter end and will not even know, whereas he did ask.... You have decided he should suffer that fate. — Tobias

No, he decided that fate for himself, however tragic that may be.

There's no reason the cause of his worries and emotions should be projected on some innocent bystander.