In a nutshell, it is about a report done by an analyst at BlackRock in which they predict the next financial crisis (the one we're about to be in now) even before covid, and discuss how to combat it in a way by which the corporate and political elite suffer the least, and the common man is made to bear the cost, mostly through limitless money printing - eerily similar to what we're seeing today.

The video is already a summary, so I don't care to summarize it even more, and I am also not an economist so I wouldn't do a great job at it.

... only Crimea and Donbas were significant to Russian security concerns right? — neomac

Those are not the words I would use, but it's clear that southern Ukraine has been Russia's primary concern since 2013, and probably will be for a long time to come.

Then there is no way to downplay the importance of having Sweden and Finland in NATO as Putin tried to do. — neomac

The Scandinavian countries have been part of mutual defense agreements for over a decade, so what exactly do you believe has changed that would make this so significant?

As much as Sweden and Finland only become a problem as a result of NATO expansion. — neomac

What I tried to make clear to you is that the poor position of Russia in the Baltic Sea is a fact with or without Sweden and Finland, and as such, whether they're part of NATO or not isn't a major factor in anything.

Likely the Russians have been downplaying it because it was in the line of expectations.

The more you nuance or rephrase the Russians' stated reasons and objectives to match what Russians could actually achieve so far, the more overblown the Russian (or anti-NATO) propaganda sounds. — neomac

I don't know what else you'd expect from propaganda. My advice would be, don't watch it, whether it's Russian or western propaganda.

However correct, your argument is far from being conclusive... — neomac

Just so we're clear, I don't pretend to have conclusive arguments. Observers like us are probably only seeing half the picture, and the best we can do is make educated guesses.

1. if Crimea was the issue, Russia could have clearly stated that the problem is not NATO expansion, but the control over Crimea. — neomac

Crimea only becomes a problem as a result of NATO expansion. With a neutral Ukraine, there is no threat of Crimea being cut off, since they'd have to be crazy to try it.

With Ukraine in NATO however, Ukraine becomes a potential pawn in a NATO-Russia power struggle.

As I stated in my last reply to you, NATO expansion in general is an issue to Russia. How could it not be? It is essentially an anti-Russian alliance.

2. Finland and Sweden inside NATO and militarisation are relevant for the control of the Baltic Sea which is of unquestionable strategic importance. — neomac

Strategically, economically and geopolitically, yes.

However the Russian position in the Baltic Sea is extremely fragile in case of war. The Gulf of Finland, and especially the Danish straits are too easily blocked, which is why any breakout into the Atlantic has historically been planned through the Norwegian Sea and the GIUK-gap. This is also why the main naval base of the Northern Fleet is located in Severomorsk (and not for example St. Petersburg or Kaliningrad).

In other words, in a military conflict with NATO, the Baltic Sea would play a secondary role. NATO's position there is simply too dominant.

You've been mouthing off a little too much.

We'll continue our conversation as soon as you elaborate on your ideas about cruise missile SEAD strikes.

Take the stage, bud. We're all ears.

It's honestly bizarre your insistence on Russian military incompetence. — boethius

I believe this issue stems from something I've tried to address before.

It seems a lot of western military experts had a terribly inflated view of the Russian military prior to the invasion. Western academic sources were linked in this thread, claiming Ukraine would stand no chance and that Kiev would fall in a matter of hours.

Probably these sources also underestimated the extent of military aid that Ukraine has received from the United States, turning their military into a respectable force.


If one assumes the invasion would be a one-sided landslide and then sees the Russian military having to fight for every region they occupy, then one may easily chalk that up to Russian incompetence, instead of reconsidering their own conception of the balance of power.


Even as the actual situation began to unfold, western analysts in their analysis of Russian actions implicitly assumed that the Kremlin shared their inflated view of the Russian military. That's why they assume the Russians went into this war intending to invade all of Ukraine, conquering Kiev, etc.

What we know of the Russian force composition and their actions to date seems to imply the opposite. That the Russians aimed for a limited war with the south of Ukraine as its initial goal.

US support for Ukraine has been official US policy since at least January of 2021. Covert support has probably started around the invasion of Crimea. The Russians knew they were going up against a US trained, US armed force, yet they started the war outnumbered by roughly ~50,000 men. That speaks volumes. 200,000 men are not going to occupy all of Ukraine fighting outnumbered against a capable opponent, nor did they have the manpower to spare to occupy and hold Kiev while simultaneously securing strategic areas in the south.

Further, the fact that they managed to go on the offensive while outnumbered implies that they are not incompetent. To state as much would be a harsh insult to the Ukrainian military. After all, if the Russians are so incompetent then why weren't the Ukrainian forces able to defend against them when they had a numerical superiority on the battlefield?


These are simple, rational arguments based on contemporary military logic, in light of which much of the popular narratives can be dismissed outright.

And if NATO expansion in Sweden or Finland is not a problem, neither should have been NATO expanding in Ukraine. — neomac

Well, NATO expanding into Sweden and Finland probably is a problem for the Russians. The only way they can interpret it is as a decidedly anti-Russian move. But they weren't in any position to object.

Further, the difference between Sweden, Finland and Ukraine should be obvious. Sweden and Finland have no strategic relevance to Russia at all, while Ukraine is the most important region for Russia outside of Russia proper.

Sweden and Finland joining NATO is, in my opinion, a rather hasty move. Why would they accept US vassalage when the Russians aren't interested in Finland or Sweden at all?

Europe now sees what it means to let the United States dictate their foreign military policy. Russia's invasion is a direct response to US meddling on Europe's doorstep. The US is now exchanging nuclear rhetoric with Russia, with Europe as its pawns. What a time to be part of NATO.

You are so funny. Making shit up off the top of your head. Read and weep…. — apokrisis

You believe this is evidence?

Apparently you do not understand what constitutes evidence. But since I would not wish to wrongfully dismiss your story, I did an actual search for the evidence myself. (Next time, be a good lad and don't make me do work that you should be doing to support your arguments)

The 18 IL-76 story seems to be based on a Twitter message. This Twitter message. In which a journalist supposedly cites (no actual citation is produced) UKRAINIAN government sources.

No evidence is produced here. Just a Twitter message full of completely inverifiable claims, made by potentially highly biased sources.


Also, where is that explanation of cruise missile SEAD strikes?

Just bomb it if you need to deny its use. — apokrisis

As if bombing things is the only way to deny the enemy. :brow:

Besides, we've already established that airfields are important strategic targets. Why bomb things you may need later? We're talking literally the first day of the invasion here - no one knew what course the war would take.

Your story was there was no intended future use at all. — apokrisis

Incorrect. I had no story at all.

I challenged your story that the Russian attempt to secure an airfield somehow proved the Russian intentions towards Kiev - something for which you haven't provided a shred of evidence.

You attempted to support that position by claiming they were going to airlift BTG's by plane, which is absurd.

That's what I've argued.

Kyiv was a ruse to fix Ukrainian forces who might otherwise head for the Donbas. — apokrisis

And how does such a task exclude the taking of airfields?

I've also mentioned that the drive on Kiev had a different primary purpose, and that it's secondary purpose may have been a feint.

So why would Russia fly crack paratroopers to the front line with the very important job of protecting a transport airfield so no one with bombs might decide to hurt it. — apokrisis

And how do you suppose paratroopers would stop bombs from being dropped on the airfield?


Also, why don't you answer some of the dozens of questions I have asked you and you have never answered?

How were you going to take out all of those MANPADS, IR AA and mobile AAA batteries with GPS-guided cruise missiles again?

Your claims of military expertise are just so laughable. — apokrisis

Weren't you about to land 20 cargo planes in the crosshairs of enemy AA claiming they had "flares and electronic countermeasures" supposedly showing they had "some chance of landing"?

I'm sure the optically guided AAA batteries would have enjoyed the fireworks. :rofl:

What is the military value of taking some random airfield and ringing it with troop protection? — apokrisis

Denying its use to the enemy, securing it for future use, etc.

The issue is, airfields are incredibly important in war, and any occupying force would prioritize securing these, regardless of their future intentions. Not in the least part because the Russians during this time probably did not know exactly how the war would proceed.


Also, what would air assault troops be using an airfield for? Landing helicopters perhaps? Small, low-flying, the types of which could operate more closely to the frontline?

Sounds a lot more plausible to me.

Only “obvious” to you for some reason. — apokrisis

The fact you don't land cargo planes carrying battalions worth of troops under the enemy's AA umbrella should be obvious to anyone with a shred of sense.

Then why does every media report find the airbridge story to be plausible? — apokrisis

Because they're clueless or propagandists, or possibly both.

No one rules out the talk of establishing an early airbridge as “impossible” due to AA defences, just risky ... — apokrisis

Not risky - suicide.

Remember those big, slow-flying silhouettes in the air, the last time you drove past an airfield?

Now imagine you're a Ukrainian sitting on a mobile AAA platform that fires at ~4500 rpm like this one: 2K22 Tunguska, looking at 18-20 of these fifty-year-old unarmored piñatas, filled to the brim with troops and equipment.

So we continue to have the mystery of why secure a working airbridge ... — apokrisis

There is no mystery. They didn't intend to create an airbridge to fly in cargo planes. If any "airbridge" was intended, it could for example have been to supply (BY HELICOPTER) the air assault forces in follow-up operations.

... your persistent refusal to answer that question directly. — apokrisis

I'll chalk that up to your persistent refusal to read my posts then. :ok:

The United States have expressed their desire to incorporate Ukraine into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. In 2013-2014 the Maidan revolution took place in Ukraine, showing the Russians that a pro-Western flip of Ukraine was a real threat. The Russians responded by taking their primary strategic asset, Crimea, by force in 2014.

After 2014, it was clear that the situation with Ukraine's neutrality being at odds and Crimea being cut-off from Russia was not a long-term solution, and that war was looming.

In light of that, the United States started to support Ukraine financially and militarily, furthering the threat of a pro-Western flip.

At least since January 2021 U.S. support for Ukraine became official policy; U.S. Security Coorporation with Ukraine


It was a matter of time before Ukraine was armed and trained to such a degree that would make a limited war for southern Ukraine unfeasible, and even moreso the threat of Ukraine joining NATO, which would have made any invasion pretty much impossible.

Likely because the Russians felt time was running out.

Where’s the contradiction? The cruise missiles were supposed to have done a large part of the job even before the paratrooper first wave. — apokrisis

And how exactly did you envision GPS-guided cruise missiles taking out MANPADS and mobile anti-air platforms? Bomb every single building, ditch or treeline in and around Kiev?

Also, cruise missiles? Are you sure about that? What can you tell me about the use of cruise missiles in SEAD operations?

Again, why have paratroopers ring a cargo airfield unless you planned to use that airfield pretty soon. — apokrisis

The question is:
- Whether they were going to use it to land cargo planes, and the answer to that question is obviously no.
- Whether that proves they were intending to occupy and hold Kiev, which is what you argued and why you mentioned this in the first place.

I’m finding it quite amusing, — apokrisis

I'm having trouble hearing you from inside that hole you're digging for yourself.

By some accounts, Russia had intended to land 18-20 Ilyushin IL-76 transport planes at the Hostomel airfield invasion’s opening hours. An aerial convoy this size could have potentially brought two entire battalion tactical groups (BTGs) worth of troops and equipment to the capital’s doorstep within the first hours of the invasion.

Got any more expert sources to share with us, bud?

What's next?

Experts telling us the Russians "intended" to sail cruise ships up the Dnieper to stage an amphibious assault on Kiev?

What a bunch of dummies, those Russians. :lol:

Aren't we glad we have these "experts" telling us all about their silly intentions.

Just produce evidence to back your speculation. — apokrisis

That isn't speculation. You don't seem to be aware of what SEAD is, how it functions and the obvious issues it faces when targetting non-emitting anti-aircraft platforms.

No one suggested that. So strawman. — apokrisis

Oh, what is this then, and I quote:

By some accounts, Russia had intended to land 18-20 Ilyushin IL-76 transport planes at the Hostomel airfield invasion’s opening hours. An aerial convoy this size could have potentially brought two entire battalion tactical groups (BTGs) worth of troops and equipment to the capital’s doorstep within the first hours of the invasion.

Doesn't sound like these "expert" sources assumed any intention by the Russians to wait until the area was "reasonably safe", does it?

Again, the counterfactual is that no one in any of the reporting raised this as something making the Russian plan impossible. — apokrisis

Likely because they have absolutely no clue of what they're talking about.

The Russians would of course have to have suppressed the Ukraine air defences before the transport planes could land. — apokrisis

SEAD strikes to facilitate landing large, slow-moving cargo planes on the frontline?

What scale of suppression do you have in mind? A nuclear strike on Ukraine?

You understand that even MANPADS, IR AA or unguided AAA batteries would be having a turkey shoot?

The Ilyushins have flares and electronic countermeasures, showing they are intended to have some chance of landing in defended forward areas. — apokrisis

"Some chance of landing"?

Such measures are intended to give the plane a slight chance of getting away in case it gets engaged, not to land under fire. You're absolutely crazy if you think a cargo plane would be doing such things intentionally.

They're flying piñatas. And you're suggesting to land 18-20 of them under fire while loaded up with battalions worth of men and material. Oof.

My choice is between understanding what I can glean from named public sources or believing some random internet “military expert” pushing apologist talking points. — apokrisis

No. Your choice is admitting you're way out of book, or continuing to pretend you're not and fencing with newspaper articles. :roll:

And for the record, you can continue linking articles that state experts supposedly said things - those have zero value. Link instead to the actual expert saying it, accompanied by that which they base themselves on.

You are telling me all I need to know about your expertise and intentions here. — apokrisis

By stating what is absolutely obvious to anyone whose conception of war isn't based on newspaper articles? Ok! :grin:

So there is a reasonable conclusion that this risky mission was warranted to secure an airbridge — apokrisis

No. There is nothing reasonable about that conclusion. Airlifting in battalions worth of troops only several kilometres from the frontline when you even have a land connection available is quite the opposite of reasonable.

I would expect any kind of offensive, feint or otherwise, to include the capture of every possible airstrip in the area. It says nothing about their intentions regarding Kiev, which is what you tried to argue.

I'm not so sure. From what I've seen from Republican sources, they seem critical towards, for example, Ukraine joining NATO, which is essentially what started all of this.

But speaking of western support for the war in Ukraine.

Would the West still be supporting the war in Ukraine under say, a Republican US president and a right-leaning (read, anti-EU) Europe?

If you're not interested in a conversation, just say so.

Huh? Support for Ukraine has been something, both "in spirit" / goodwill in general populations, and materially. Have you checked the reactions all over...? It's not just some elite highups in Washington and Brussels. — jorndoe

When in my country's parliament ministers tried to call the war in Ukraine "our war", it raised a lot of eyebrows.

Given the large economic hardships (rampant inflation and energy scarcity) that are coming for much of Europe, it is my impression that support for Ukraine is very thin, and mostly something that is expressed in media and politics, but not felt among the population.

But that is admittedly just an impression I have.

If Russia was to just take over, say, Donbas and Crimea, then their anti-NATO thing would still apply. Less so if they'd taken over Kyiv and captured/killed the government, I might add. As an aside, without a secured route to Crimea via Berdiansk/Melitopol, they'd still have a route via Kerch. There are whatever plans at work, possibly changing now and then, some possibly rushed or pushed out. — jorndoe

Ukraine becoming NATO and Russia annexing the territories it now occupies would be a very flimsy solution indeed. Without a proper buffer, conflict is almost guaranteed. But trust is needed for this buffer to be re-installed, and that is non-existent. So the Russians have taken the approach that even during conflict their position in regards to Crimea must be 'safe'.

And the issue is of course access during times of conflict. The Kerch bridge would probably not survive day 1 of any future conflict.

So your theory is ... — apokrisis

I haven't posited any theory about what those troops were doing there.

I'm just challenging your view that it somehow proves the Russians were deeply committed in their push for Kiev.

Is it normal military tactics to stuff around taking hold of an enemy transport hub that you never intend to use? — apokrisis

Certainly. Denying that capability is just as important as being able to use it yourself. And who said they never intended to use it? Maybe they did. That doesn't prove the intentions towards Kiev you claim they must've had.

Even if you were asked to construct a feint on Kyiv with this exact force available to you, would this have been your cunning plan? It this the top option? — apokrisis

I have but a fraction of the information required to give a serious answer to that. If any here profess that "they could have done it better" I would find that very cute. The point of education is generally also to make one aware of the many things one doesn't know.

What’s the bleeding point of ringing an unwanted airfield with precious paratroopers when you have a whole country of other more intelligent choices? — apokrisis

What makes you believe the airport is unwanted? Airports are important military targets, either for own use or denying them to the enemy. If a military force occupies an area of land, I would expect them to secure every single airport, regardless of their immediate intentions or use by the enemy.

And yet 30 helicopters made the initial assault. How was that possible? Were they supersonic or stealth or something? — apokrisis

Helicopters fly low, and the type of air defense that can tackle low-flying helicopters have a significantly lower range.

The Russians also fired off 160 missiles to try and suppress the air defences. — apokrisis

Does that sound like the kind of environment you'd be airlifting in battalions worth of troops with cargo planes?

You make it sound like this hasn’t been the universal response of all informed military experts watching events unfold. — apokrisis

Your sources have been largely non-expert journalists. Among military experts there isn't any kind of consensus at all. Mearsheimer makes the exact opposite case that you're making.

Now the whole of the West may be pretending to be surprised by Russian ineptitude. — apokrisis

My point is that they are not pretending. They completely miscalculated the balance of power between Russia and Ukraine (Ukrainian forces would crumble in days, Kiev would fall in hours, etc.). Now they're having to swallow their own words, but they're not yet capable of conceiving that the Kremlin may not have made that same miscalculation.

This is why it is so hard for some to accept that Russia probably went into this war with limited war goals.

What would be the motive for this massive disinformation campaign that is apparently backed by endless factual evidence of incompetence and miscalculation by a regime eroded from the inside by its gangster economics? — apokrisis

You're asking what the point is of framing? Propaganda, of course. Western backing of Ukraine is hanging by a thread. The only parties that truly want it to continue are the Washington and Brussels elite. Both in terms of political willingness and domestic support it depends entirely on the idea that Ukraine can win this war.

I think we're seeing an interesting common theme arise; anything the Russians do is speculated, often without any objective basis, to have been a lot more ambitious than their actual results, and thus can be framed as a failure.

The sources that claim to know the Russian intentions are usually western journalists or military analysts - the same types of analysts who in the winter of 2021 claimed Kiev would fall in a matter of hours.

As I've hinted at before, it seems many western analysts are now having to correct their image of the Russian war machine that they themselves inflated beyond proportion. However, they are not yet at the stage where they're able to stop projecting that flawed image onto the Kremlin's military planning.

They seem convinced that the Kremlin shared their inflated view of the Russian military - something for which not a speck of evidence has been presented.

If Ukraine AA would have made an airbridge impossible, then someone might have mentioned it. — apokrisis

Not "would have made" - Ukrainian AA makes it impossible. You're suggesting to fly in cargo planes carrying entire battalions a few kilometers from the frontline, where even helicopters and combat aircraft cannot operate safely.

I already have.

It’s nice to know we have someone here with such obvious military expertise as yourself to guide us. — apokrisis

I'm presently serving and have a degree in military strategy.

By some accounts, Russia had intended to land 18-20 Ilyushin IL-76 transport planes at the Hostomel airfield invasion’s opening hours. An aerial convoy this size could have potentially brought two entire battalion tactical groups (BTGs) worth of troops and equipment to the capital’s doorstep within the first hours of the invasion.

Airlifting entire battalions by cargo plane under the Ukrainian AA umbrella?

The fact that you wouldn't dispose of such a notion outright is quite telling.

Now the question is, since you seem to lack military expertise, why do you choose to base your opinions on this specific article and this specific author? (or any of the other articles you have shared)

Newspaper articles are all fine and good, but what it seems we're ending up with is the blind leading the blind.

I don't disagree with the analysis here. I'm throwing out some ideas of what a negotiation could look like. But something has to be exchanged, I think. — Manuel

It's tough.

A neutral Ukraine is and has been the long-term solution to tensions between NATO and Russia, but the trust that makes such a thing feasible has been shattered. The United States and Ukraine will not trust Russia to respect Ukraine's neutrality and vice versa, and in both cases I would argue the distrust is well-founded.

Russia holding on to the areas it has currently occupied (creating a safe corridor to Crimea) is probably the bare minimum of what they will accept unless they are militarily completely defeated, but given the rhetoric from the United States and Ukraine, it is unlikely this will be accepted.

That's the issue - what is acceptable to one side is completely unacceptable to the other and vice versa.

Ukraine gets rid of the invaders. Russia keeps Crimea. — Manuel

The problem is that this is completely unacceptable to the Russians.

Their issue is Ukraine joining NATO, turning it into a military bulwark on their borders and making Russian access to Crimea a matter of US goodwill.

This has been in the line of expectations since the early 2010's, and nothing short of war would have stopped it.

Any future-proof solution to this conflict has to recognize that the Russians will go to full-scale war, and even nuclear war, over their access to Crimea.

I see. Then what was your perspective on the situation? — frank

On what part of the situation?

I don't think those who advocated Ukraine's surrender to Russia had any kind of resistance in mind. I think @Tzeentch, for instance, was concerned with casualties of an on going war. — frank

I never advocated any course of action for Ukraine - that would be highly presumptuous.

Simply because the Western media repeats again and again bold claims without justification, does not make it the default position that any dissenters must overcome a high burden of proof to critique, just makes it propaganda. — boethius

Exactly.

Because I cannot take you seriously. — apokrisis

What an odd response to being asked what data one's views are based on.

I guess I'd be pretty reluctant to share my sources too, if all I had were newspaper articles and confirmation bias.

If that is the case, doesn't that condition apply to your assessment that the attack on Kiev was only a feint? — Paine

Mine is not an assessment. It's a speculation, and I've never pretended otherwise. The issue is several here do not seem to realize that all they have is speculations also, and pretend to have some authoritative sources on their side, which they do not.

But in a sense, yes, the same condition applies. Which is why I supported my views with arguments based the type of data and common military logic that anyone can verify. When I asked the opponents of my position to share what data their views are based on, I was met with silence.

As a piece of military strategy, a feint draws forces from the true target. But the attack was sprung before movement of that kind changed the conditions on the ground. If you are going to deliver a sucker punch, you better make it work the first time. Do you have a vision of how things would have been different without this 'feint'? An historical parallel, perhaps? — Paine

In my view, the attack on Kiev likely served a different primary purpose - to show the West the Russians were serious about war in Ukraine, and give them a last chance to veer towards the Russians in regards to Ukraine's position in EU/NATO.

Of course, the Russians had no certainty this would work, and in the case the West did not back down, this attack could serve as the feint I mentioned.

Had the Russians made their intentions clear to march on the south without threatening Kiev, it stands to reason that resistance in the south would have been much higher.

Consider that the number of forces at the start of the invasion were roughly 200,000 Russians versus 250,000 Ukrainians - the Russians did not have anywhere near the 3:1 numerical advantage that is often considered a requirement for offensive military operations.

It was therefore vital that the Ukrainians were kept off balance.

I've also given several reasons why it is unlikely the Russians intended to occupy Kiev, the most important of which is that it would require an incredible investment of time and manpower, while Kiev is not of great strategic significance in the war.

The extent to which the attack on Kiev contributed to the relatively speedy advance in the south and the acquisition of the strategic territories that likely made up the Russians' initial wargoals is unknown. That would be a nice subject for research.

As for historical examples; the ground campaign of Desert Storm featured a feint on Kuwait as its primary tactical idea. The US forces pretended their intentions were to strike directly through the oil fields towards Kuwait, and the Iraqis concentrated their forces accordingly along the Kuwait-Saudi border.

Meanwhile, the US main force, VII Corps, crossed the Iraq-Saudi border instead, and wrapped up their entire flank.

Why don't you respond to my comment, instead of clowning?

With the assumption that the airborne force can be then quite quickly be relieved by a ground force. — ssu

And they were relieved, weren't they?

Nobody thinks of making a landing deep in enemy territory and then just assume that they can be evacuated by air ... — ssu

That just so happens to be part of the job description of airborne troops.

But I fail to see your point. This airport was somehow the critical point in taking Kiev, proving the Russians intended to take Kiev by force?

Not with landing paratroops on them. — ssu

Sure they can. Airports are a classic target for airborne assaults.

The heliborne landings in Hostomel Airport just next to Kyiv show the intent what Russians had. — ssu

It seems to me taking out airports would be a key strategic goal regardless of their intentions.