At what things?

No it wouldn't. You're just begging the question. — Theorem

Theyd have properties, right?

Prime matter and substantial form. — Theorem

What is it with there being so many Aristotelians on this board? Both "prime matter" and "substantial form" are nonsense, as is most Aristotle.

Jesus Christ. I can't believe I got sucked in to that one. Isn't it charitable to assume that when people speak of a correlation, they're not speaking of any old random correlation, but one that is actually relevant and makes sense? Was it really worth trying to score such a superficial point? Go on then. Give yourself a pat on the back. — S

I wasn't trying to "score a point." And if folks have in mind that it has to be something more than a mere correlation, why wouldn't they just say, "Yes, of course (I simply didn't spell that out because I thought it should have been obvious)," when I write that I'd say it has to be more than mere correlation?

Well that now seems to be confirmed as a silly tangent. I've only ever spoke of correlation in a sense that is logically relevant to my argument, not correlation in any other sense that you could randomly pluck out of thin ai — S

This is why I stressed that you were reading something into my comment that I wasn't saying.

All I said was that I'd say that meaning requires something other than mere correlation. That wasn't code for anything else. I wasn't trying to be sly. There were a number of posts that posited meaning simply as a correlation. I was simply stressing that it has to be more than a mere correlation. Maybe sometimes we can just agree and not have to argue about everything.

There's no logically relevant correlation as far as I can make out. — S

If we're adding "logically relevant" to "correlation," then it's something other than a mere correlation, no?

No you wouldn't. That simply doesn't follow as far as I can tell. — S

So, as I asked, what part of the second-to-last post of mine did you disagree with? Are you saying there's not a correlation in dictionaries between the definition of "dodecaphony" and the word "dodge"?

The problem remains that I do not see the supposed logical relevance, so please skip ahead. — S

If you agree with all of that, the point is simply that correlation isn't sufficient for meaning, because otherwise you'd have to say that the meaning of "dodge" has something to do with 12-tone music composition.

It is a layer of reality that somehow lurks beneath or behind language. But yes, we can point and gesture, of course. — S

I thought that everything above this was a way of saying that you can't point at meaning, but your last sentence says otherwise. So what would we point at, where would we be pointing, etc.?

If you didn't mean what I thought you meant, then feel free to clarify what else you did mean. — Michael Ossipoff

Some appearances are not of experiences per se. In other words, not everything appears as "this is an experience I'm having." Some appearances are simply of "things" like doors and sidewalks and so on.

1. I don't know how else to word this: You've directly observationally experienced (in a magazine, a tv show, a book of descriptive physics or astrsonomy, etc.) the work of theoretical physicists. — Michael Ossipoff

Right. But in context, what does that have to do with anything?

Do you dislike novels/fiction, too?

Also, I'm curious whether you like any forms of art or entertainment.

Reports of the work of theoretical physicists are part of your direct observational experience too.

Are you yourself doing something theoretical? Of course. You're theorizing about a metaphysics that you can't define. — Michael Ossipoff

I'm not sure I understand either of those comments in context.

If it's impossible to understand the meaning, because e.g. nothing that speaks any language exists, how are words in a dictionary different from random scratches in a rock, or the pattern of waves on the ocean? — Echarmion

Exactly, but S apparently believes that a "christening of meaning" (at least per communal usage) makes some sort of objective, persistent abstract existent obtain, an abstract existent for which it's a category error to contemplate location, concrete properties, etc.

What you know about the physical world, you know from your experience. — Michael Ossipoff

The point is that to say this, I have to be doing something theoretical.

There's the meaning, and then there's the expressing of it. The expressing of it produces expressed meaning in the form of language. A statement is an expression of meaning in language. The meaning isn't necessarily expressed. The expressed meaning is necessarily expressed. The meaning is different in ways to the expressed meaning, so they're not the same. — S

That's fine, but if so, and definitions in dictionaries, utterances about meaning, etc. are expressions of meaning and not the same as meaning,* is it possible for us to "point to" meaning (even if just indirectly or metaphorically or whatever) as we could point to a potato or orange? What would we be pointing at? Where would we be pointing?

*of course, I'd say that definitions in dictionaries, utterances about meaning, etc. are not the same as meaning, too.

I don't know why you're not understanding what I'm typing. I think it's because you're reading too much into it. Empty your mind for a moment, and just read what I'm typing below. I'm not saying or trying to imply anything other than exactly what I'm typing. I'm explaining this verbosely and as simply as I can. If you don't read anything into it, hopefully this will aid in us agreeing on all of the following:

Let's consider dictionaries for a moment.

Dictionaries are big collections of terms to be defined, arranged in alphabetical order, and definitions of those terms.

Because of this, words to be defined like "dodge" follow words to be defined like "dodecaphony." Why? Because "dodge" comes in alphabetical order after "dodecaphony."

Let's imagine for the sake of this example that there's no English word between "dodecaphony" and "dodge." I don't know for sure if that's correct--if it isn't I can't offhand think of the word(s) in between the two, but whether it's exactly correct doesn't matter for this example.

After the word to be defined is a definition of that word. So the definition of "dodecaphony" follows the word "dodecaphony," And then the definition of "dodge" follows the word "dodge."

This means that there's a correlation between the definition of the word "dodecaphony" and the term "dodge," Why? Because for one (this isn't the only correlation, but it's definitely one correlation we can note), the word "dodge" always follows a set of words such as "the composition of music employing the twelvetone scale" (which is a definition of "dodecaphony.")

So far, that is ALL that I'm claiming in this part. So, we're not reading anything else into what I'm saying. Are you with me so far, or what part of the above do you disagree with?

Whatever you know about your physical surroundings is from your experience. Your experience is primary for your physical world and its "objective" things. — Michael Ossipoff

In order to say that everything that appears is "of my experience," I have to do something theoretical. Phenomenally, many things are not of my experience. They're just doors and computer monitors and sidewalks and so on.

For...? (You still haven't learnt your lesson!). For there to be meaning, I take it. Which is the same problem, — S

Which is the same problem as what? (Seriously, I have no idea what the comparison would be to there)

I still don't accept that for there to be linguistic meaning at the time, there would need to be an intentional act of associating one thing, like bell ringing, to another thing, like a melody; or with dictionary definitions and alphabetical order, at the time.

But I do accept that some sort of human act would have been required at a time in the past for there to be meaning at the time that we're talking about.

That first paragraph above is my understanding of where you were going with that, or where you would need to go for it to be logically relevant. It doesn't seem to take us anywhere new or helpful. It seems to be just a rehash of your psychologism, where you merely assert or assume that psychological requirements for other purposes, like understanding and whatnot, are somehow required for there to be linguistic meaning at the time. That last step, where you misapply these psychological requirements, is unreasonable and without foundation. Or you could be just talking past me by assuming your own interpretations of things like linguistic meaning, when I'm obviously not arguing for your interpretation, I'm arguing for mine. — S

You're reading way too much into my comments about this part. Again, I was simply saying why a mere correlation isn't sufficient.

No. In metaphysics, sometimes non-empirical entities are postulated because the denial of their existence leads to absurdities. It's a mistake to ask for empirical evidence for those. — Theorem

If they exist, then empirical evidence would be available for them--even if we haven't discovered it yet.

At any rate, what would you take to be an example of this?

No sorry, it's a category mistake to expect empirical evidence for metaphysical entities. — Theorem

The bulk of metaphysics is ontology. It's a mistake to expect empirical evidence of existents?

How on earth do you get from that to, "For meaning to occur at a given time, people must exist at that time"? — S

That wasn't what I was focusing on yet for this tangent. The point was simply to suggest that a mere correlation isn't sufficient. There needs to be a correlation, but we need more than that, too.

I don't expect anyone to ever admit it online, but I think that it's possible to get through to some people via patience/persistence-via-trying various different wordings, angles of explanation, etc.

Part of why I think that is probably due to my experience teaching, including times where I taught private students (I've taught music as much as anything else), including teaching kids who had various obstacles to overcome--learning disabilities, ADHD issues, language issues, kids whose parents were basically forcing them to take music lessons when they didn't want to, and so on.

Aside from that, I tend to be an "irrational optimist," lol.

What the...? To get the work done? What does that mean? — S

For meaning to occur.

All you seem to be doing with your example is showing that there's some kind of logical relationship which can be deduced from one set of terms to another. — S

? No. I'm saying that there's a correlation in dictionaries, for example, between the definition of a term and the term that follows that definition.

In other words, we have word A and definition x. Then we have word B and definition y. B follows A in alphabetical order. Well, in dictionaries, there's a correlation between x and B. B immediately follows x after all, and that's the case in multiple dictionaries.

You need to understand that when you say things like, "It has to be...", and, "It needs to be...", but you don't explicitly state what for, — S

I thought that would be clear from what I wrote. It needs to be a direct connection and not just a correlation to do the work that we want done, because if it can just be a correlation, then we get the definition for "dodecaphony" attached to the word "dodge," for example.

Words are not that rigid. — Andrew4Handel

Again, it's as if you can not understand what I write for some reason.

I didn't say anything about rigidity. I simply said that conventionally, "nonconsensual" has a connotation of being against someone's consent.

And then I asked you what terms you use to distinguish between something against an agent's consent and something that involves an entity that is incapable of granting or withholding consent.

I was hoping you'd actually tell me what terms you use for that distinction. If you don't make the distinction, do you not think it's worth making?

I have not claimed that creating someone is against their consent. I am saying it is non consensual in nature. Chopping down a tree is non consensual because it cannot give or withhold its consent. — Andrew4Handel

"Nonconsensual" conventionally has a connotation that something is against someone's consent.

Otherwise, how do you distinguish between an action involving something with an inability to either grant or withhold consent and an action that's contrary to an agent's wishes?

That is what I have been saying all along. You appear to be claiming someone needs to be actively experiencing something for it to matter. — Andrew4Handel

It's frustrating because it seems like you're not at all understanding what I'm writing, but I don't know why.

Someone needs to be existent and to be able to grant or withhold consent for us to be able to do anything in line with or against their consent.

That doesn't imply that they need to have experienced a particular thing to have an opinion about it.

But they can't have an opinion about it if they don't exist, they don't have thoughts, etc.

No it really isn't based on how the body responds to being burnt alive. It is unbearable. — Andrew4Handel

First off, someone having a preference to x doesn't imply that they've experienced x yet.

The contentious matter is about whether or not the linguistic meaning continues to exist when the language users do not, but the writings do. — creativesoul

Exactly.

This past act required subjects, but that's all that they're required for, as far as I can reasonably assess. There's a linguistic meaning if it was set, and if nothing of relevance has changed. — S

I'd add that it has to be more than a mere correlation, it has to be a "direct connection" between two things (I would say an intentional connection, but it's to your benefit for me to not use that term, because we don't have nonmental intentionality).

The problem is that when no people exist, the world that's independent of us has no means of making such direct connections.

It needs to be a direct connection and not just a correlation, because, for example, "the composition of music employing the twelve-tone scale" is correlated with "dodge" in the dictionary, because the former is the definition of "dodecaphony," and "dodge" follows dodecaphony. (At least hypothetically--I didn't actually check a standard dictionary to check the example, but all we need is an example of the types of correlations we find--definitions of a term followed by another term.)

It's certainly possible that someone does.

Here's how you know: you ask the person in question.

You can talk about the general rule that no human past present or future would like to be set on fire. — Andrew4Handel

You can just make up shit, you mean?

There is no "general rule" about preferences that is universal.

In addition, there are no preferences period, when it comes to nonexistent people.

How do you know what there preferences were before? — Andrew4Handel

Because they've expressed them. Sometimes formally: again, here's an example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advance_healthcare_directive

Do you need to consider past preferences to decide that an unconscious person would not like to be set on fire? — Andrew4Handel

If you want to know whether they want to be set on fire, yes. If you don't know, then it's best not to act. But why that matters is because we're talking about a person who has preferences. You can not do this when the person does not exist.

Neither can an unconscious person. — Andrew4Handel

For an unconscious person, their preferences prior to being unconscious are what matter (for example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advance_healthcare_directive). Do people who don't exist yet have that?

If someone cannot consent to being born then they are here in a non consensual manner. — Andrew4Handel

They can't withhold consent can they?

You think all change can be explained in terms of "things in motion". — Theorem

I don't think it needs to be explained.

At any rate, there's no way I'd get into a "Does this work/count as an explanation" discussion without you first giving your general criteria for explanations.

I doubt that you can explain substantial change, the unity and identity of material objects, life, sensation or cognition — Theorem

You'd have to make most of those terms not just gobbledygook first.

but never actually offered a reason for believing this — Theorem

The only reason we need is that there's zero evidence of extramental principles, or extramental abstracts period. That's not a category mistake. If something exists, there's evidence available of it.

This is not true. You can discuss issues of consent in general and in an abstract way and from the experiences of prior people. — Andrew4Handel

The issue is whether the person being born is granting consent or not, correct?

I guess you could say desire to not be in pain, although we could just say pain and not add another step to it.

What accounts for motion if potentiality is unreal? — Theorem

What happened to this part: "Possibilities simply amount to a state not being impossible given contingent facts. "Potential" is often used with a more limited connotation a la possibilities that are statistically more probable than other possibilities"?

C'mon, man, you've got to read.