The point is that some judgements are better than others just as some works are better than others, and we know this is true, and it can be detremined in extreme cases of difference, — Janus

I don't at all agree with that by the way. (Given that you're implying that some judgments are better than others objectively, or that it's true that they are, etc.)

can't play these word games with you. I have restated the concept like 4 times to you - i can't do it any better sorry - I am out of other ways to say it — Rank Amateur

There's no word game to this. I'm not hinging anything I'm saying on any particular words.

I'm trying to explain the point of view to you so that you can understand it. I'm trying to keep things very simple and ask very simple questions.

I think competing stances between moral relativists are on completely equal ground - by definition — Rank Amateur

If moral stances are preferences, and you have preference A, how is preference ~A just as good to you?

but the relative art critic must accept relative judgment of other relative art critics — Rank Amateur

Accept it how? Accept that they have a different judgment? Or accept it in the sense of saying, "Well, that's as good as my own judgment"?

no i am only dealing with relative morality - the whole point is how a moral relativist interacts with a moral view different than his own. Nothing in this case is objective - objective reality in this example does not exist. — Rank Amateur

Okay, subjectively two competing stances aren't on equal ground, are they?

no - we are not understanding each other - my point has nothing at all with objective morality at all - — Rank Amateur

Indeed you're not understanding me. Your framework here is that we have to defer to what's objectively the case. Objectively, the stances are on equal ground. You see that as being a trump card of sorts.

But subjectively, the stances aren't on equal ground, are they? (That's not a rhetorical question. I'm hoping you'll answer it.)

If morality is relative to the individual they should ( pick a word you like accept, respect, not judge, fill in your own word) the relative moral judgement of each other. — Rank Amateur

Why not? Again, the idea of that only makes sense if you think we must defer to objectivity. You're focusing on the fact that objectively, both stances are on equal ground.

But subjectivists aren't advocating deference to objectivity. Objectivity with respect to morality is irrelevant. It's a category error.

Subjectively, both stances aren't on equal ground, are they?

My point continues to be you cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist. — Rank Amateur

Relativism or not, in what sense does anyone not "allow" others to have whatever moral views they have?

I'm not sure I know what sort of thing you're referring to there.

Each one is contradictory in its own right. The first, I assume one thing "multiply present" means one thing that is a multiplicity of itself, which is contradictory, and the second, multiple things which are the same thing, is just a different way of stating the same contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah--well, that's up to realists on universals to try to make sense of. It's their doctrine. :wink:

I think your (1) and (2) are expressed in a way so as to be contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

You mean so that one wouldn't hold both (1) and (2)? Sure. They're different options about what one might have in mind with "shared." The idea isn't that someone would have all three options in mind about the same thing.

My point is i don't think you can be a moral relativist and tell me my stance is incorrect nor should you have any desire to have me see it your way. — Rank Amateur

I just added some stuff to my post that's pertinent to this.

Again, since morality is preferences of interpersonal behavior, our preferences do not wind up only being our own business and that's it. By their very nature, moral stances are about what we are okay or not okay with other people doing. Obviously people are going to try to have an influence on that, especially since these preferences wind up codified into laws, they impact persons' abilities to do various social things, etc.

We're not deferring to what's objectively the case (where everyone's stance is on equal footing), beacuse that's irrelevant for morality. The arbiter is our own preferences.

so if you are a moral relativist, and I am a moral relativist, can we both have different moral judgments on some action, and agree the other judgement is correct for the other person ? — Rank Amateur

On my view, by the way, "correct" is a category error there. We can say that each person feels their stance is morally right.

You're going to feel that a contradictory stance is morally wrong, of course.

This is just another way to say that each person has the preferences re interpersonal behavior that they do, and they don't prefer other preferences regarding interpersonal behavior than their own.

I thought moral relativity encompasses an acceptance of the moral positions of others. — Rank Amateur

The subjectivist brand of relativism doesn't imply this, at least.

The problem understanding this usually stems from difficulties parsing the issue so that we do not defer to objectivity.

When you frame things so that we have to, or so that we should defer to objectivity, then either (a) there's an objective fact that people can get correct or incorrect, or (b) there is no objective fact, and since we have to defer to objectivity, we thus simply can't pass any sort of judgment at all.

But that's not how subjectivists look at it. We can and do pass judgments--we're just passing subjective judgments. At the same time we're not saying that others' moral stances are incorrect--because as I noted that's a category error.

Subjectively, we're going to have likes/dislike, preferences, etc., and that in no way implies that we're going to be okay with others likes/dislikes or preferences, especially when we're talking about preferences of interpersonal behavior, which is what morality is. When we're talking about preferences of interpersonal behavior, those preferences don't just effect the bearer--they're about what someone wants to allow other people to do, too.

But how did they come into being? Or they existed for ever? See below: — Devans99

It's just imagining a possible universe. There's no need to stipulate its origin (or lack of the same).

The point in time following the start. It would qualify as the start if the start did not exist. — Devans99

If the start doesn't exist there can't be a point in time following the start.

Well creation with:
- No time
- No space
- No matter

Seems impossible? — Devans99

It doesn't seem impossible to me, just counterintuitive.

With infinite time, matter density would be infinite. — Devans99

No it wouldn't. We could have a universe with infinite time and two elementary particles and that's it, for example.

Meaning the matter had no temporal start. So this is impossible too* — Devans99

"Matter had no temporal start" isn't impossible.

If the particle does not have a start, then it cannot have a ‘next to start’ — Devans99

What does "next to start" refer to? It's difficult to evaluate this part of the argument when I don't know what it's referring to.

C But creation ex nihilo / without time is impossible — Devans99

Just by fiat, or what?

F. The ‘other’ must have created our time (at time=0) — Devans99

If time was created it had a start, but per your C, that wouldn't be possible.

I did, but no one got the, admittedly obscure, method. If I keep going translating paragraphs into other languages, each step is perfectly understandable (with the odd awkward wording), but before long it becomes nearly unrecognisable. Like a game of Chinese whispers. So if there is some "external" thing being 'shared' then why isn't it preserved through translation. I'd say it's more like a process, than an extant thing. — Isaac

Good points.

No. If we assume only ∅ then nothing else matters, not even time. No thing can come out of this assumption, no matter how one twists it. — Pippen

Again, time matters because that's what people are saying re "something coming from nothing." It's a temporal idea.

You can't successfully argue against a notion if you don't even understand it, or if the argument isn't addressing it but rather a straw man.

Why isn't anyone (else) addressing the ontological ambiguity of "shared"? We need to pinpoint just what sense we're referring to in order to answer the question.

You'll find it hard to get agreement on this, so let's start with something simple. Words are shared. Are they not? Anyone disagree? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd agree in my sense (3) above, at least.

I'm a nominalist, so I have issues with someone having in mind my (1) or (2) above.

One thing that's important to clarify re "shared meaning" is whether someone is positing (1) one "thing" that's multiply present--a la the traditional concept of universals, where there's a solitary universal that somehow obtains in multiple things, (2) multiple "things" that are somehow the same (somehow identical despite not being numerically identical), or simply (3) something that can be observed by or passed around to multiple people--sharing in the "show and tell" sense.

Note that neither (1) nor (2) can be held by nominalists, although (2) is maybe not too far removed from trope nominalism if we don't insist on identity.

People should be allowed, even encouraged, to express, rather than censor, their stupid opinions and racist humour, so as to reveal, rather than keep hidden and festering, their toxic idiocy and unthinking characterizations of others. Wouldn't you prefer Trump. for example, to make clear his zenophobia and his desire to promote it in others, than to keep it and the agenda it motivates well hidden? — Janus

Exactly.

What specific criteria? — tim wood

How am I supposed to know? It was your idea. It's an idea that I don't agree with, hence why I was challenging it.

You say there is not even the chance for meaning. — tim wood

What I'm explaining is that if "X is good" is saying that x matches some standard or criterion for x, so that it's simply a way of saying that x has some objective property, then that doesn't at all capture the conventional idea of the "good" assessment.

Yes, that and every other empirical claim. It's a basic tenet of science methodology, for example, that empirical claims are not provable. They're at best provisionally verifiable.

The notion that atheists don't believe in things which they have no proof of is true of only a portion of atheists. — Judaka

It's nonsense, as no one has proof of any empirical claims.

Sounds like a homework question that I can't help you with, as I don't recall what either would have said that might have amounted to their justification of unequal property distribution (I'm lucky at this point that I can recall that Aristotle's full name was Billy Bob Aristotle), but an easy justification is that (a) we require different people to do different things for society to function, and some of those things--like farming--can only be done via unequal property distribution, and (b) whether it's required or not, different people contribute unequally, and why shouldn't they be rewarded for their contributions? That's a major motivator, after all.

You're writing "consider the needs of others" but I'm guessing you have in mind something more like "acquiesce to the needs of others." There's no evidence that serial killers don't think about the needs of others. They simply reach different conclusions there.

In acquiescing to the needs of others, are you also acquiescing to the needs of serial killers, for example?

And no, I can't imagine a world without morality, because I don't believe it's possible given what human minds are like. Unless someone is a "vegetable," they're going to have stances on acceptable versus unacceptable interpersonal behavior.

I agree with I like sushi. Spears, fire, clothing, etc. are technology. You can try living without if you like. I'd rather not go that route.

A serial killer carefully considers the ramifications of their preferred interpersonal behavior, but they do not extend "moral consideration". — VagabondSpectre

That I don't at all agree with. They reach a different "conclusion" than most people. That doesn't mean that they're not reaching moral stances.

You both still don't seem to realise that that, in itself, is beside the point. Yes, of course I'm imagining it from my human perspective. I am a human after all, and I can't imagine something without doing so from my perspective. That still doesn't mean that I can't imagine a scenario with no humans, and therefore no human perspectives. You're just playing with the language to make it superficially appear as though there's an impossibility which is logically relevant. It involves a sleight of hand, and is therefore an example of sophism, rather than philosophy.

It's impossible for me to imagine something without imagining something: if you're saying something like that, then that's true, but trivial and irrelevant. There's a number of related truisms I could mention here. I can't imagine something without being alive, or without being capable of imagination, or without knowing anything about the thing that I'm supposed to be imagining, and so on. None of them are of any logical relevance.

It's not impossible for there to be a scenario, which can be imagined, whereby in that scenario, there are no humans, and therefore no human perspectives; and that in that scenario, there are rocks, and a sign which says "Caves up ahead". Obviously, I am not in that scenario, so it doesn't matter that I'm human or that I'm imagining it and so on.

If you don't get this, then you're rationally inept, Mww. — S

The idea is the same as "You can't have a perception without it being a perception (obviously), but the perception can be of something that's not itself a perception." The mistake that's often made there is one of the things that leads to general, overarching idealism.

So obviously you have to be imagining things, it has to be from your perspective, etc., but what you imagine can be a world without people imagining things, and having perspectives, and so on.

If the very definition is that it's preferences of interpersonal behavior, why would we need to point that out again? And why would anyone think that it's not influenced by, in response to, etc. other people. Wouldn't that be obvious?

"this orange is good," or, "that is a good pocket-knife," not only do not make any sense, but that "it's not possible to make any sense" of them. Tell us, do you ever yourself engage in this nonsense? — tim wood

We're talking about your notion that those statements are about meeting some specific criteria, no? It's like all of a sudden you forgot the specific idea at issue, even though you brought it up and we'd been going back and forth about it for a few posts.

The orange in question might taste good, look good, be good. — tim wood

So you're saying that rather than being an utterance of preference, approval etc. "X is good" utterances imply meeting a criterion that . . . x is good??? Seriously?

Our starting moral values are not extramental, but they can be inter-mental and intra-mental. Even from an individually subjective starting point, one's value hierarchy can be more or less internally consistent. Objectivity is quite useful when we negotiate our own hierarchy of starting values. The fact humans tend to share so many fundamental starting values also adds a layer of cooperative opportunity that would not be there otherwise, and navigating these opportunities for mutual benefit is the bulk of the ethical work that lays before us. — VagabondSpectre

We can value the same things (nominalism aside). And we can cooperate with each other. I'm not sure why that would need a special classification ( "inter" or "intra").

Statements like, "this orange is good," or "that is a good pocket-knife," are ordinary and meaningful. Criteria, such as they are, are implied, and it's assumed the hearer or reader knows what they are. Do you disagree? Do you deny this? — tim wood

Obviously I disagree, because I just said that it's not possible to make any sense of that.

The challenge I proposed to you was to make sense of it.

So what criteria, for example, would you say "This orange is good" refer to?

If the bones of the house are “good”, then they are also in a state that tends toward structural integrity. — Noah Te Stroete

But that only follows if one prefers "bones" that tend toward structural integrity. Insofar as individuals do not prefer that, what would be good about that? The notion of "good" makes no sense outside of preferences, approval, etc.

If one wants a sturdy structure, then one would want it to have “good bones”. — Noah Te Stroete

Right, and what one wants one prefers.

So, in order for society to continue (something that’s objectively in our biological and cultural DNA) — Noah Te Stroete

There is nothing outside of our minds thatprefers society to continue rather than not continue. The world outside of us couldn't care less either way.

Say, someone says the brakes on that car are good or the bones of that house are good. Does that simply mean that that person approves of them? — Noah Te Stroete

Yes, it's a term of approval or preference. "Yaying," accepting, sanctioning, etc. the thing in question.

How do you define “good”? Is something good merely in the capacity of someone approving of it? — Noah Te Stroete

"good" in a moral sense amounts to the person approving of or preferring the (usually interpersonal) behavior in question, if not directly, then as a means to some other end that they approve of or prefer.

Is that how you would describe a gravitational field or a magnetic field, as matter in action? I — Noah Te Stroete

Yes, in motion/in relation to other matter.

I don't see it as picking on anything if I'm simply reporting the truth to you. ;-)

My point isn't that force and matter are separate but that they're different in how they are and that maybe we could recognise both in our mental faculties. — BrianW

Forces are simply matter in "action," in relation to other matter though.

1. Let's postulate only ∅ (Nothingness).
2. Let's assume some t, but that's contradicting 1., so it's impossible.
3. Conclusion: If only ∅ then nothing can exists no matter in which way or modus, nihil ex nihilo. — Pippen

No one would be saying that there's something and nothing (to the same extent, in the same respect, etc.) at the same time. (2) only contradicts (1) if we assume it's at the same time, to the same extent, etc.

The sense in which you are correct is a narrow one. When it is said (by anyone) that something is good, the word "good" is a shorthand, a code, that the speaker presumably supposes that his auditor will understand, that if understood saves much periphrasis. But this same thing is true of all language acts meant as communication. — tim wood

Say what? How does this answer how anything is good with respect to some criterion, where we'd be at all capturing the conventional sense of what we're referring to with "good," rather than simply using the term as an "empty" synonym for some objective state?

It seems to me, reading your various posts, that you're caught in a whirlpool of destructive relativism — tim wood

I'm definitely a relativist. Nothing destructive about it in my view, though.

Meaning is a community project. — tim wood

No, it isn't, but I don't want to go off on that tangent yet again. Let's stick to how it would make sense to link "good" to some criterion or other.

It’s true or false that cauliflower is good for nutrition, just as it’s true or false that boiling babies is good for society. A psychopath might enjoy boiling babies, but it is still morally wrong. — Noah Te Stroete

No, it's true or false that cauliflower has x effect on nutrition. Having x effect on nutrition isn't objectively good versus having not-x effect on nutrition.

Likewise, boiling babies might have x effect on society (a fact that would be much, much harder to establish than the fact that cauliflower has whatever effect on nutrition, by the way). But it's not objectively good to have x effect on society versus having not-x effect on society.

Objectively, there are just facts. All possibilities, if actualized, would make particular facts obtain rather than other facts. No facts are objectively preferable, better, worse, etc. than any other facts.