We have a sortal concept of 'house', some things count as a house, some don't. Embedded in this sortal are all the things we'd call houses. Imagine this as a set (which is already a simplification). If you consider associating with this sortal a set of expressions which make sense to say of houses. Like "houses are where people live', 'that house is crumbling' and so on. Further imagine that we've collected all things that make sense to say of houses, and associated this with each house in the house sortal - call this the 'philosophical grammar' of the house sortal. — fdrake

The problem with this is what determines "what it makes sense to say" about x?

That can't be limited to the way that x normally behaves. If we're saying that, we're ruling out imagination period, because . . . well, I don't know why we'd be doing that. At any rate, Streetlight said that the issue isn't about the physical stuff that's being referred to.

Is it limited to what's possible re x? Possible in what sense? Logical? Metaphysical? If we're talking about conceivability, that amounts to either imagination or possible in one of these senses. If we're talking about what's physically possible, Streetlight said he wasn't talking about that again.

Is it about the concept qua a concept? If so, we're back to how people think/what they can imagine. Also, Streetlight said that he wasn't talking about concepts turning into other concepts.

So just what is "what it makes sense to say" about here?

But if it includes relations and processes, it can't be reductionism. :chin: Dividing the Big Thing into many Little Things - necessarily destroying and losing all of the interconnections between those Little Things - is central to the technique of reductionism. — Pattern-chaser

Non-reductionists are supposed to be saying that things are more than the stuff, relations and processes that are the "parts." That somehow there's something "emergent" in a "transcendent" sense above that.

The same, I should probably add, goes for the term 'post-modernism'. — StreetlightX

Sure.

I'm not defending either side. It's more than seeing words "race" and "gender," but it's not much different than that.

In any event, there's something they have in mind--the stuff they observe that they're labeling in a particular way.

To say that what we call houses and flowers are not the kinds of things that turn into one another, is to say (to mean, to imply) that (among other things) the world in which these terms take on their significance is not one in which that kind of transmutation is possible. — StreetlightX

"is possible" is important there, though, because it's not possible per what?

I ignored it because it's quite obvious that there are issues of race and gender that can and ought to be politically redressed. — StreetlightX

But that has nothing to do with what I was saying. I was talking about what the people using the phrase "identity politics" are probably referring to. It's something rather specific and limited in reference.

so we divide it into smaller and smaller pieces, in the hope that we can understand them individually, and somehow assemble all the little understandings until we can understand the big thing we started with. This works where the functionality that concerns us is intrinsic to the parts, but not where the functionality depends on the interconnections between the parts, — Pattern-chaser

It doesn't exclude the interconnections between the parts if it includes relations and processes.

And it doesn't reduce anything more than it can be reduced.

What happened to the "squeaky wheels who focus on things like race and gender essentially as a means of " part of the sentence?

Reductionists can say that relations and processes are parts that have to be accounted for.

But feminism and anti-racist movements do not largely conform to the description I gave above. I think - though I could be wrong - we might agree on this. Those who like to wield and weaponize the term 'identity politics' do make it seem as though they do though. — StreetlightX

What folks are probably referring to with "identity politics" are the squeaky wheels who focus on things like race and gender essentially as a means of controlling what other people can choose to do. It's not anything like a broader academic analysis of a movement. It's just a reaction to people who make a lot of noise via media/social media and who have some impact due to that fact (because people are afraid of losing advertisers, they're afraid of being sued, they're afraid of boycotts, etc.)

The fact that 's its rise was contemporaneous with the Reagan-Thatcher-Mitterand-Kohl proto-neo-liberal narrative, — Ricardoc

??? That's some research you did. Postmodernism arose long before the late 1970s/early 1980s.

That is a matter of opinion whether or not knowledge proceeds from the universal to the particular, or the reverse. I would surmise it is a combination of both, and it would be an error to be committed to proceeding only one way. — Merkwurdichliebe

I'm not talking about universal versus particular.

I'm talking about not being able to get on a bandstand and play "Giant Steps" when one doesn't even know what a G major chord is. You need to know the basics before you tackle something advanced that incorporates the basics.

Another way to put it--you're not going to build a house if you can't even hammer a nail.

If true, then there is no room for individual responsibility in regards to the ethical. — Merkwurdichliebe

How does that follow in your view?

What do you mean by this? As far as I can see ALL moral issues are about how individuals should treat other individuals; this to me clearly suggests ethics concerns how one must live among others - a social/communal context. — TheMadFool

I'm talking about what morality is ontologically. Where it occurs, what it's a property of, etc.

"All moral issues are about . . . " isn't focused on that.

The distinction is similar to the use/mention distinction.

A Reductive Physicalist view upon it would not call it phenomena. — SethRy

By all accounts I'm a reductive physicalist. I call it phenomena.

They don't exist as ethereal or non-material or whatever other fantasy could be thrown at them. — whollyrolling

Right, but just say that, then. "There is no mind a la ridiculous, confused notions such as it being nonphysical. There is mind, but it's physical, just a set of brain processes, etc."

What I do not understand is why you think a cause must be identical to what it causes. — DingoJones

I don't. What I kept pointing out was that they're not identical, so we can't conflate the two. That was the whole point. If we're going to talk about morality then, talking about something that causes it isn't sufficient, because the cause isn't identical. I think what came across as confusing is that I said, "If you want to consider cause x to be identical to phenomenon y that we're talking about, then you need to do so and so."

Another confusion here might be over the word "source." "Source" isn't "cause." "Source" is where something starts, as itself. For example, the source of a river isn't what causes a river. It's where the river starts, as the river in question.

If we wanted to just ask, "List some contributing causes to morality" we probably should have asked that. And if people want to focus on that, then we should probably be explicit that that's what we're doing.

Here are some contributing causes to morality in that sense:

The big bang
The formation of the Earth
The presence of water on the Earth

Etc. (and there are important illustrative reasons why I'm listing such things as causes, including that we're not at all tackling the issue of just how temporally or logically contiguous any proposed cause is)

There's been some good discussion here with those who've had no such issues. Considering that I've had to correct some basic grammatical comprehension on your part, I think you've misdiagnosed the source of the issue, to put it politely. — StreetlightX

If I say that I'm surprised that you're not bothering to try to explain it better, and that I'm surprised that you not bothering would come with an "ad hominem" attached, would you believe me?

If you were asked what the source of how computers interact cooperatively with each other is, would you identify the hardware alone? — praxis

I don't think that's really what you want to ask me, because "interact cooperatively" is irrelevant to whether we're talking about hardware alone.

I'll explain why: in my view, the hardware/software distinction is only a conceptual abstraction. It's not real/it doesn't correlate to any objective distinction that holds water. The world is comprised of material in dynamic relations. There isn't anything that's not material and there's no material not in dynamic relations with other material. So everything is both "stuff" and processes. Software is material in dynamic relations, and so is hardware. It's the same thing. Hardware and software are just different ways of looking at the same thing, different abstractions that we make.

Focusing on "interacting cooperatively" is wanting to ask me whether we can talk about just one computer, basically. The hardware/software distinction, with respect to what I think that is ontologicaly, is irrelevant to that. Obviously we can't talk about just one computer when we talk about them interacting cooperatively, because we've stipulated in our ask that we're not talking about just one computer.

When we talk about moral whatever, qua moral(ity), though, we're not stipulating something that's interactive, and in fact, the moral part, qua what it is to be moral, is not interactive, even though it's about interacting. Here another rudimentary mistake is being made: conflating something with what it's about. It's basically the use/mention conflation. Use and mention are not the same thing.

Because an inadequate identification would result in an inadequate explanation. — praxis

You aren't able to correctly/adequately identify moral stances, moral judgments, etc. if you're placing them outside of minds.

The sensation of "mind" is a series of chemical and energetic processes that result in self awareness — whollyrolling

And thoughts and illusions, etc. So how does it make sense to say those processes don't exist?

Like Michael, you're simply mapping your concept of a house (and a flower) to the physical: you're just begging the question (yes, I'm ignoring what terms you've 'resevered'). But it is clear that the concept of a house (or a flower) is not exhausted - if it refers to it at all - by the physical. And importantly, this is a point not about houses or flowers, but about language and our use of it. — StreetlightX

Then you're hopelessly muddled regarding what the heck you're even talking about. You're not talking about concepts per se, you're not talking about imagining a house turning into a flower, you're somehow talking about language and our use of it without talking about either of the two things above. How the heck would that work? And there's some sort of mysterious "exhausting" versus "not exhausting" a concept.

You'd need to be more explicit/straightforward/detailed about what you are talking about if you're going to respond to everything with "I'm not talking about that"

You're not going to ignore that other stuff if you're explaining them, sure, but we shouldn't move on to explaining them if we can't even identify what they are/where they occur. Explaining them more broadly is a more advanced topic that we shouldn't move on to until we've mastered the basics. And no matter what we do, they're fundamentally "caprice."

The chemicals on the end of the match (and their relevant processes of course, I don’t see the necessity in worrying about the specifics here) causes the flame. You disagree with this because there must be a connection of some kind between the flame and the match head, — DingoJones

No, I disagree because the processes aren't optional. You do need to worry about including everything. Philosophy doesn't work well half-assed. We need to be precise, complete (at least sufficiently), etc.

In addition, as I said, causes can't be identical to what they cause unless you want to say that something can cause itself. Normally we say that there are causes and effects, and the two aren't identical, as that wouldn't make much sense re making a between between causes and effects.

If the source of how computers interact cooperatively with each other were asked, it would be insufficient to identify the hardware alone — praxis

Brains aren't dead, static things. They undergo processes. The processes that amount to moral judgments/preferences occur in brains, and only in brains. Conflating influences, preconditions, etc. with what they're influences on or preconditions of is simply--and rather ridiculously--sloppy.

But you said "There's no such thing as mind." There is if we're saying there are thoughts, awareness and illusions. Those are mental phenomena.

Correct. All evolutionary tools. — whollyrolling

Thinking, awareness and illusions are mental phenomena.

Holy moly

I'm considering paying you if you'll post about another topic for awhile.

A body made of cells is not "somehow" able to think. It's able to think because it's made of cells. We're not just cells, we rely on water, minerals, vitamins, bacteria, etc.

There's no such thing as mind, it's a label for an illusion of being we don't understand, what we perceive as a space where thoughts happen but is actually not.

Being self-aware doesn't seem insignificant and very likely isn't. — whollyrolling

What in the world? You've got thinking, self-awareness and illusions but no mind?

"in a debate on whether capitalism or Marxism better leads to happiness." --seriously, that's what they were debating? How stupid.

A body made up of cells that is somehow able to 'think' — Anirudh Sharma

This.

It doesn't imply anything about significance.

if we’re looking at events as part of causal chain without applying emotional weight to them - again the mainstay of the scientific endeavor; to distance the gathering of data from emotional interpretations). — I like sushi

If part of the phenomena we're looking at is emotional, then we shouldn't dispense with the emotional aspects, or we're not really doing science at all. Science's aim is to look at what is and to account for it, develop theories about it, etc.

I would call that something we could imagine, rather than a concept. I reserve "concepts" for type/universal abstractions.

In any event, so what we're imagining is a physical thing transforming into another physical thing. If you're imaginative enough, you can imagine that so that the terms are being used in the normal way re "house" and "flower."

We imagine things like that often in artworks--paintings, novels, films, etc. a la fantasy, surrealism, etc.

In fiction, when the author ascribes something to character, then it means it is true that that character has that property. — Purple Pond

What's true is that the author wrote the character to have that property.

The idea is that there would be a concept of a house that one could imagine turning into a flower, — StreetlightX

Wait, we're supposed to be talking about "concepts turning into other concepts"?

in

Well, you have to say what B is identical to (if we don't say what B is identical to then we're not actually referring to B, but something different than B). That's not the same as causes unless we're saying that something can cause itself.

Why does a cause have to be identical to what it causes? — DingoJones

It has to be if we're trying to say that since A causes or is a cause of B, then A is the source of B. "The source of" is another way of saying "Where it comes from" or "Where it originates", "Where it arises from" or "What is B properties of." If A causes/is a cause of B, but A isn't identical to B, then we don't actually have B yet when we have A, so naming A doesn't tell us where/what/how B happens to be. This is actually because something else has to be necessary for B--some other substance, and/or process and/or context, etc. If that weren't the case, then A would be identical to B.

When I light a match, the chemicals on the end are the source of the flame, aren’t they? — DingoJones

No, because there's something else involved in the flame. The chemicals at the end aren't sufficient to be the flame. So we can't say they're the source. We'd be missing something in our explanation. We need to explain just how/where the flame, qua the flame, obtains.

If someone asks you "What is the source of the flame" and you answer "the chemicals on the end of the match," that wouldn't be sufficient, because the chemicals at the end of the match aren't a flame. The person who asked could point at a match, point at the chemicals at the end, and say, "What the hell are you talking about, there's no flame here." And they'd be right. It's not just the chemicals at the end of the match, but processes, too, and the chemical changes that happen due to those processes. That is the source of the flame. You can't conflate something with causes, preconditions or prerequisites for it.

I'm not a scientist and strongly doubt such scientific studies exist. Also, I didn't claim that moral stances can't occur in brains. — praxis

Then the analogy would simply be arbitrary.

Is moral order or moral frameworks biological? — praxis

Yes. Anything moral is going to be. Saying that "x is moral," either as a judgment (contra immoral, for example) or as a conceptual application (as opposed to gastronomic, say), which are the two common ways to use that phrase, are necessarily biological, because it's only biology that makes judgments, or that formulates and applies concepts.

As it is said, there is no good answer to a stupid question. — Janus

Then the analogy invoked makes no sense, because the idiom in question is only coherent due to a scientific reason that we can easily explain.

So what's your scientific explanation of why moral stances are a phenomenon that can't occur in brains?