Give examples of this evidence. — AJJ

I did this the first time you asked. I gave you five examples that were hyperlinked. At which point you proceeded to completely ignore it. If you're interested in it, look at the evidence and comment on it. There's no need to repeat what it says. Look at it if you're sincerely wondering.

What makes you think what is happening in the brain is identical to the experience, — AJJ

For one, the fact that all of the evidence that we have points to this.

No I can't sense that one thing is a metre to the left of another, that must be measured or in some other way judged. Senses don't make judgements, minds do. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you sense the measurement?

Why then are our brain states identical to our experiences? — AJJ

Earlier when you asked this--well, or something very similar to it--you claimed that you were asking for supporting evidence of it . . . at which point you proceeded to ignore that track once some evidence was given. Are you asking for evidence here, or are you now asking why some x and y would be identical? (Where presumably "because they're the same thing" should be the sort of thing that would count as an answer, but where that should also be obvious to anyone who understands the term "identical," so we have to wonder just what sort of response you'd be looking for.)

Terrapin has simply been insisting without argument that the experience of colour and colour are distinct, — AJJ

You already agreed with that. The only difference is that you're not agreeing to name a particular thing "color" that I'm naming "color" rather than the experience of color. That naming doesn't matter. It's still x versus the experience of x (with the latter bestowed with a unique name), which you agree are different.

By the way, even if the argument you're endorsing didn't rest on a completely inane confusion between x and the experience of x (a confusion where one is supposing that the experience of x should literally possess the properties of x for some unfathomably ridiculous reason), as an argument against materialism, it's even more inane, as it suggests the following:

An experience of x literally possesses the properties of x. And since physical things other than x don't literally have the properties of x (for example, brains aren't fire trucks), then the experience of x must be nonphysical, because . . . well, nonphysical things that aren't x literally have the properties of x (the nonphysical experience of a fire truck is a fire truck) based on . . . Well, who knows, as there's zero evidence of nonphysical things even, and the very idea of them is incoherent, but we're making this nonsensical shit up, akin to making up "God did it" to explain something we otherwise can't explain or that we're confused about, even though what we're making up not only doesn't explain anything any better, it introduces this additional incoherent garbage. Q.E.D. Bow and exit stage left while thinking oneself to be extraordinarily clever.

by if the original state is to retain its truth value, — TheGreatArcanum

"But if the original statement" maybe? Again, could you read this stuff out loud and fix typos prior to posting it?

Truth value is a judgment that an individual makes on each instance, by the way. They do that in conjunction with their meaning assignments on that instance.

The point being, it’s only in the mind that anything ever appears red — AJJ

Experience is mental, yes. What the experience is of isn't mental. The experience of x isn't going to be identical to x. Obviously, right?

Thus forwarding an argument where we act as if it's problematic that the experience of x isn't itself x is stupid.

Mind isn't identical to brain simply because we're insisting it. It's because all of the evidence points to it. Just ignoring the evidence and going back to a more or less retard-level argument doesn't help.

Of course it doesn't "appear red," if we're using "appear" to refer to experience of it, unless it's looked at.

That doesn't mean that it's not red if it's not looked at. It just doesn't "appear red." Because that phrase refers to experience per se.

Again, I'm pretty sure that you're not even familiar with nominalism.

Note that what nominalists are saying is that this:

A

and this:

A

are not actually identical.

What they're not saying, and I think you're thinking that they are saying this, is that we get something like this:

A

changing to something like this:

B

They're not saying that.

They're saying it's:

A

and

A

But that those aren't actually identical.

How would we arrive at the idea that in order for meaning to be meaning, it can't change. It it's changing meaning, it's not meaning at all?

The observation that redness is a quality that exists in the mind but not in the material world; that brain states do not exhibit redness, and that therefore the mind, which does exhibit redness to the person whose mind it is, must be different from the brain, and different from brain states. Brain states is a paraphrase of brain phenomena. This is one of the principle arguments against materialist theories of mind. — AJJ

Once again, this is a simple confusion. "Redness" (or the property of being red) is NOT IDENTICAL to the experience of red(ness). So it's quite silly to expect the experience of red(ness) to BE red(ness). It's not. It's the EXPERIENCE of redness. It's not itself red(ness).

You're confusing the experience of something with the thing that's experienced.

the phases have lost their original meaning altogether and language is altogether senseless and therefore without value. — TheGreatArcanum

Re this, let's clarify how you're using "senseless" there. Is it basically just a value statement?

if they change from moment to moment in time, well what do those phrases then become? — TheGreatArcanum

Okay, so moving on, we already answered this. They are non-identical instances of the phrases.

Maybe it's not clear what you're asking, though. What sorts of answers would you accept to other "what do they become" questions?

Then just ask that. Asking "what makes x and y identical" seems like you're asking for some sort of explanation of how it would work ontologically that some x and y could be identical.

All the evidence we have shows that mentality is simply brain phenomena. I can't list it all, of course, but it includes things like:

https://news.berkeley.edu/2011/09/22/brain-movies/
https://www.headway.org.uk/media/3999/psychological-effects-of-brain-injury-e-booklet.pdf
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29223975
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/01/070131135536.htm
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5649212/

Your responses to this do not bode well for you wanting an editor, by the way. You won't even fix something simple that makes no sense as conventional English.

good thing logic isn't bound by the English language. — TheGreatArcanum

Could you give a reference for anything like "<past participle> to that their own" occurring in logic?

If light refraction is different from the experience of colour, what makes a brain phenomenon the same as an experience of colour? — AJJ

I don't know how that question makes sense to you, really. In the first case we're naming two separate things ontologically. In the second case, we're naming two identical things ontologically. I'm not sure how else to answer that. It's kind of like trying to answer, "If planets are not identical to stars, what makes the morning star identical to the evening star." How do we answer that? What makes the morning star identical to the evening star is that it turns out that both terms actually have the same thing as a referent (namely Venus). But that's just another way of saying that they're identical, no?

do you think light refraction is the same as colour? — AJJ

Light refraction is something we're naming "color." I'm not saying that it's the same as the experience of color. I'm saying exactly the opposite of that, which is important for the confusion you're expressing above, where you're expecting the experience to be the same as the color in some way.

It makes no sense in conventional English. "<Past participle> to that their own" makes no sense in conventional English.

So when you ask "And you wouldn’t answer in what sense you thought light refraction was the same as colour," you're asking me to say, "sight," "smell," "hearing," "touch" or "taste"? You're not asking about definitions/connotations?

Yes. That is the definition of a sense. — AJJ

Where in the world are you getting that idea from?

And you wouldn’t answer in what sense you thought light refraction was the same as colour. — AJJ

With respect to this, I said this and you ignored it, which is why it went no further. You can't ignore it, then: "The question makes no sense. Are you thinking that the only senses there are of anything are experienced senses? "

Maybe you can answer that now?

Yes, colour is something we experience. — AJJ

Didn't we just go back and forth for a ridiculous length of time with me explaining that the experience of a color is not the same thing as the color?

If you have an experience of redness, and your experiences are identical to brain phenomena, then your brain phenomenon must simply be redness — AJJ

Is an experience of a color the same thing as the color?

Is English your first language?

Why would we be supposing that the experience or the brain phenomena are red?

They must be if that’s what we experience, and the signals and the experience are the same. — AJJ

From where are we getting "the signals and the experience are the same"?

"Predisposed to that their own presuppositions"?

You seem to be telling me that the string of symbols, "disagreeing", has a meaning independent of how I feel about it, and if I feel differently then I would be "wrong". — Harry Hindu

That would amount to not understanding the common sense of the term that I just described.

but then the phrases ‘nothing is unchanging’ and ‘all is changing’ become predisposed to that their own presuppositions. — TheGreatArcanum

Before you post something, read it out loud. Does that sentence make sense to you when you read it out loud?

The brain phenomenon of someone experiencing the colour red is not itself red. — AJJ

Right. Because we understand that the experience of a color is not identical to the color, right?

How is the experience of redness identical to particles that are not themselves red? — AJJ

Didn't I just explain over and over that the experience of a color is not the same thing as the color? So we'd not think that the experience of a color should be identical to the color, right?

The person whose brain we observe has experiences based on those brain phenomena. — AJJ

They don't have experiences based on those brain phenomena. They have experiences which are identical to those brain phenomena. The experiences are what it's like to be the brain in question.

So how is it that the experience of colour is generated in something purely material? — AJJ

The experience of color, and all mental phenomena, are identical to brain phenomena.

Or are you asking for something like the schematics of exactly what's going on in brains for this particular phenomena?

I'm not saying anything using the phrase "material basis" for one.

The light refraction is color.

The experience of color is different than light refracting off of an object.

Experience is a mental phenomenon, yes.

In what sense is the light refraction for red a colour if no one experiences it? — AJJ

The question makes no sense. Are you thinking that the only senses there are of anything are experienced senses?

In what sense is it the colour red if it isn’t experienced? — AJJ

Why would you equate anything with the experience of that thing?

That's such a ridiculous approach, to figure that everything is identical to the the experience of that thing.

Seriously, it comes across as if one is dealing with a two year-old or something, where they can't handle understanding the difference between the experience of something per se and what's experienced.

It what sense is light refraction corresponding to the colour red — AJJ

It's not "corresponding to the color red," it is the color red. That's not to say that it's the experience of the color red if no one is experiencing it. The experience and what it's an experience of are not identical. "Simply particles bouncing around" is what the color red is (with the bit in quotation marks not exactly right, but that's close enough for jazz).

Light refraction is the material basis for colour, but is not itself a colour, — AJJ

It is itself color. Color is not identical to the experience of color. You're conflating color (in general) and the experience of color.

It's like I'm explaining this to a retard. How many times do I have to explain the same simple thing?

I didn't say anything like "the material basis of." That's you reading your own confused crap into what I'm saying.