On correspondence theory, "The cat is on the mat" (a proposition, which we're denoting by putting it in quotation marks) matches the cat being on the mat (the state of affairs that the cat is on the mat).

We are naming that relationship "truth," or we're naming the property of having that relationship "being true." We could have named it something else--"sploof" or "wikwak" or whatever sound we want to make. The sound we're using is "truth/true."

So how it is that a proposition is true when it matches something that's not true (or false) is that "true" is what we're naming that matching.

So states of affairs can be considered things, good. But how is that a proposition is true when it corresponds to something that is neither true or false? — AJJ

Because what it refers to to be "true" is that the proposition corresponds to a fact. In other words, it "matches" the fact. The fact itself wouldn't have that property--what would it be corresponding to or matching?

Unrestricted explosion is not a feature of relevance logics. — fdrake

It's as if you didn't read or couldn't comprehend what I wrote. You are giving misinformation if you're saying that under traditional (NOT relevance-logic) validity, contradictory premises do not produce a valid argument.

Aye. So facts are states of affairs. Are states of affairs not things and true? — AJJ

Re "things" it depends on how you're using that term. Some people use it "technically" where they seem to use it as more or less a synonym for "object" (a la a "whole/solid to-normal-human-perspective item that could be handled/manipulated either by hand or at least by machinery"). If you're using it that way, then most facts wouldn't be things. Most facts are comprised of (dynamic) relations (of things in that sense and of other sorts of existents). But if you're using "thing" more in the vein of a variable like x, or in the vein of being describable/depictable/etc., then sure.

Re facts being true. No. They are not true. That's just the point of the standard philosophical distinction. What is true (or false) is a proposition. Not a fact. Propositions are about facts--they're claims about facts. In the most common take on it, propositions have the property of being true if the proposition corresponds to the fact it's about. Otherwise the proposition is false. Facts aren't true or false.

You say, ignoring the summary I just gave of my reasoning. — AJJ

What I was curious about was whether you're not interested in (learning (about)) philosophy.

You've already demonstrated that you're not going to listen to explanations of what's wrong with the argument at hand, or what you'd need to do in order to fix it. We've been through that already.

It seems to me that facts are things, and that they’re true. That’s the definition I’ve been assuming for this argument. Swapping out that definition would be to play a different game anyway; why not define “values” as “baby geese” while you’re at it, and cause the argument to fail that way? “Facts” here means “things that are true”. — AJJ

All you're doing here is telling me why you couldn't care less about the convention in philosophy and the sciences. Which is why I asked if you're not interested in that. I guess you're not.

This talk about contradictions in the premises of an argument ensuring validity is complete nonsense. — fdrake

You're giving misinformation here. You're favoring a relevance logic interpretation, which is fine (I favor that, too), but that's a far more recent interpretation. The traditional interpretation is that validity can (also, in addition to a relevance interpretation) obtain when either it's impossible that the premises are true OR when it's impossible that the conclusion is false.

It's irresponsible to answer with misinformation.

I'm asking because there are good reasons, well-accepted, with long philosophical arguments behind them, why "fact" and "truth" are used as they are in philosophy, and by extension, in the sciences. The OED definition you're quoting has a number of philosophical problems. It might capture a common way that the term is thought of colloquially, but we're supposed to be interested in and at least putatively doing something sort of like philosophy when we post here, no?

Which has what to do with my question?

Whatever man. — AJJ

Aren't you on this site because you're interested in philosophy?

What does this topic seek to demonstrate? That there are objective values? That Objective Reality exists? That facts exist? That the existence of objective values is dependent on the existence of facts? What? — Pattern-chaser

What I got out of it is that (a) we're assuming that (objective) facts exist, and (b) that the fact that objective facts exist is sufficient to imply that there is also a fact that we ought to believe facts, because the fact that we ought to believe facts is somehow more or less embedded in facts period.

(a) I'm fine with as a realist. (b) I don't think is obvious at all. It seems a rather outrageous claim on the face of it, actually, as we're not at all addressing how that part is supposed to basically be embedded in facts, we're not addressing how an objective "ought" could obtain period (what properties, of what, is it?), etc.

Yeah, the claim comes down to something like "It's a fact that we ought to believe facts" or "It's a fact that if there are facts, then there is an implication (not simply a disposition that people have) that we ought to believe those facts," and the claim is that this would somehow be the case even in a counterfactual situation, or even in a possible world, where humans never existed. The problem is that he's not bothering to argue for this. Well, at least not beyond an argument that it's nonsensical/foolish/etc. to claim otherwise.

whether we ought to believe true things, i.e. facts. — AJJ

True things are propositions, not facts. Truth is a property of propositions, which on some accounts, obtain that property via corresponding to facts. (That's it the only theory about how propositions obtain truth-value, but it's one of the more popular theories.)

Facts are states of affairs, ways that the world happens to be.

A statement - as far as I know! - cannot be invalid and sound though. — I like sushi

Correct. Soundness is defined as a valid argument with true premises.

Validity obtains when

(1) It's impossible that premises are true

and/or

(2) It's impossible that a conclusion is false,

or

(3) If the premises true, then it's impossible that the conclusion is false.

Anything other than that is invalid.

The "or" above between (1) and (2) is intuitively weird, because it means that if it's impossible for premises to be true--for example, say that the premises are contradictory --then it doesn't matter what the conclusion is; the argument is valid. (This is why "anything follows from a contradiction." )

Likewise, if the conclusion is a tautology, then it doesn't matter what the premises are. The argument is valid.

With (3), it doesn't imply that the premises are true. The idea is "If it would be the case that these premises were true (then due to them, it would be impossible for this conclusion to be false) ."

A rejection of the "or" between (1) and (2) is what lead to relevance logics ( (3) being a relevance interpretation--in a nutshell, under relevance, the premises and conclusion are required to be related to each other implicationally). But traditional logic, traditional validity, has the "or" between (1) and (2) (or is at least interpreted that way).

I agree with you that meaning isn't objective, but "importance," "what's interesting," and "what makes x so special" certainly aren't objective.

The conventional categorization of life stems from a concern with what makes the ontological difference that evolutionarily leads to us, and a concern with how those sorts of processes get started.

Re AI, you seem to be attributing mentality to something where it's not clear that mentality obtains.

"Organism" is simply conventionally defined as referring to living things. It could be defined differently, of course, but that's why "organisms" are considered living.

If we were to find robots on a planet, the first question most scientists would have is "How did they get there/where did they come from" because as far as we know something like humans are required to at least initially make them. They don't develop on their own.

Your comment didn't make any sense to me in context. (In other words, "Huh?" )

That's right...on the basis that 'existence is relative' is an usual or counter intuitive assertion. — fresco

Huh?

I'll throw that one back at you. How often have you come across debate about 'the utility of theism' ? — fresco

I'm not making any general claim about the frequency of one over the other. You are.

In short, the 'utility debate' rarely happens — fresco

Does that really refer to anything besides you not observing it very often?

No. That word game doesn't work. It is the DEBATE based on ' evidence '
which is futile. There is no debate about 'utility' except where the social implications of theism might be imposed on others. — fresco

Hence why I asked you to give the reason that you're using the word "futile." If the reason isn't that evidence is in the eye of the beholder, then don't say that that's the reason.

People do debate utility, and debating utility was the example I presented. So why isn't utility futile if debating something (that's in the eye of the beholder) makes something futile?

I don’t know what you’re struggling with. We can only judge that a coin has a 50/50 chance of landing on tails by referring to the mathematical truth that this is the case. If there was no truth to refer to, you couldn’t possible have any idea of the outcome. — AJJ

Saying that it's a fact that there's a 50/50 probability that a coin lands on heads or tails is saying that coin flips really are random . . . which is not believed to be the case. What is rather commonly believed to be the case is that coin flips are too hard to predict, because the variables are so fine-grained/subtle--having to do with slight differences in the force applied, plus air movement and pressure, plus miniscule variations in the composition of the coin (as well as dirt etc. on the surface), and so on. The probability reflects an epistemic gap, not a simple ontological fact.

Can't access that section of the book, but I think there is something in the argument. — Wayfarer

If you're looking on Amazon (re their "Look Inside" feature), here's a trick that often works. The "Look Inside" books have a search feature. Utilizing that, you can either search for a relatively uncommon word that you know is in the passage in question, or you can search for a very common word, such as "the," if you know the page number you need. You'll get results of all of the occurrences of the word in question in the book, and when you click on the page number you need, or a page right before or after it (sometimes it takes some educated guesswork via referencing the table of contents or index, which are usually part of the preview), you'll be able to see that section even though it wasn't part of the preview.

That worked for me in this case.

But it's not absurd to deny that facts are what we ought to believe, as the example of the noble lie demonstrates. It is arguable that in some cases it's for the person's own good to believe a lie. If that's the case, then it's not the facts which ought to be believed. We ought to believe what is good for us to believe, regardless of the facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, and also we need to observe the difference between:

(1) It's true that that we ought to believe facts
(2) It's a fact that we ought to believe fact
(3) One (and maybe everyone, or close to it) has the disposition that we ought to believe facts

Those are all saying something different.

(3) may very well be the case. Maybe almost everyone has that disposition, for most facts at least, but that can be the case while we deny both (1) and (2). AJJ is trying to assert (1) and/or (2).

Just to clarify; I'm commenting only on the consciousness side of the world. I'm making no claims on the physical side of things. I don't know how the physical world came into being or what was before the Big Bang!

In terms of sentience and pantheism, I get the impression there's a subdued connection between everyone. Maybe there's an unconscious dreamlike spirit that links us; the whole surreality of dreams. I don't know for sure. — Michael McMahon

That sounds closer to Jung's "collective unconscious" than pantheism. It sounds like you think there's something a bit more robust than Jung's idea, but it sounds pretty far removed from pantheism.

Another factor could be that publishing polling results influences how people vote and just who votes in an election.

If someone is consistently winning polling, it could (for just a few examples):

(a) influence people who would vote for the poll winner to relax and not bother showing up to vote (of course in countries where voting is not mandatory), because they figure "the poll winner is going to easily win anyway,"

(b) motivate people to vote who sometimes don't vote and who are supporters of the poll loser, because they think "the poll loser needs all they help they can get--I'd better show up and vote this time," and

(c) sway the vote of people who were on the fence--"I guess I'll give the poll loser a vote, because I'm undecided/I like/dislike both (or multiple) options more or less equally and the poll winner is going to win anyway, so I want to show some support for the loser/show lack of support for the winner."

People make predictions about what's going to happen in elections, and those predictions influence their behavior. Polling helps reinforce predictions, because "It's scientific and all that," so it has a strong influence on folks' behavior. It's similar to what happens with gambling. People make predictions, experts set odds, and that all influences how people bet, where people utilize that info to follow various strategies--they try to "game the system," but that can have relatively unexpected consequences.

So polling can be very accurate while not successfully predicting an outcome.

So if what we're referring to by "futile" is that something is in the eye of the beholder, utility is as futile as evidence.

So the driver of the getaway car is not guilty of robbing the bank, even though the driver was going to get a share of the loot? — Metaphysician Undercover

Right.

My own view cannot be a surprise. If B offers himself for hire for illegal purposes, and A engages him for those purposes, that at least is the crime of conspiracy. And if the crime is committed, then A might well find himself charged along with B. I think this is the way it is and the way it should be. But you appear to hold a different view. Have I misunderstood? — tim wood

Right, my view is different than this. I'd have no crime of conspiracy if I were king.

Inferred, now explicit. Would you say anyone else could have a complaint: Or no one? — tim wood

I'm not sure what you're asking there. It seems basically you're asking if I agree that we should have conspiracy crimes. If so, see above.

I suppose that, legal considerations aside, we ought to define "responsibility." — tim wood

For what we've been talking about, what matters to me is whether someone is able (that is, whether they're physically able) to make a choice or not. If they are, they're responsible for the choices they make, and no one prior to that, with whatever influence on them, is responsible for the choice someone makes. As long as it's physically possible to make a different choice, only the person making the choice to perform action x is responsible for action x.

Under pantheism I tend to view God as the collective sum total of individuals rather than one omniscient all conscious entity. — Michael McMahon

So "everything is the collective sum total of individuals"?

(I'm an atheist, by the way, but I'm just looking at this under the umbrella of a view that's different than my own . . . I'm primarily examining whether the view is consistent, coherent, etc. relative to itself.)

I was referring to the idea of reincarnation. Even if you are reincarnated, your next life is fundamentally separate to this life by the total erasure of your memories. — Michael McMahon

Under pantheism, aren't we all simply part of God, though?

For starters, I don't think it's solipsistic as we're all separated by the void of death. — Michael McMahon

Huh? If the entirety of the universe is God, how is anything "separated by the void of death"?

Could you answer the question I was interested in:

"Let's say that Joe says that the concept of God has utility and Betty says it does not. How do we move past the eye of the beholder there in your view?"

Correct. I have no complaint against you. The responsibility is with the person who chose to shoot me. My answer here should already be clear from what I wrote above.

Too many questions to answer all of them in one post. Re physicality, location, "where it goes," etc., another analogy that's useful is that it's like, say, a trumpet playing a particular note. There's no question that that's a physical phenomenon (well, or hopefully there's no question about that). It obtains when someone puts their mouth to the mouthpiece of the trumpet, when they blow into the trumpet, which causes both the air moving through the trumpet and the trumpet itself to vibrate, air is pushed out of the trumpet's bell, all of the vibrations cause particular soundwaves to propagate through the air, and that's the note. It obtains via structures (the structure of the player's body/their mouth/etc.), the structure of the trumpet itself, etc. and via processes, which I described above--pushing air through the trumpet, etc.

Mental phenomena are the same. They obtain via structures and processes--the structure of your brain, particular electrochemical phenomena in your brain, etc. (And in fact, all phenomena are really the same--everything obtains via materials, structures (of those materials), and dynamic processes (of materials).)

Asking "where will goes" when it's not present is like asking where the note goes when it's not present.

The stunts being the illegal activities.

Now, my question is: if someone subscribes to any of these stunt channels on youtube, are subscribers responsible for their illegal activities? Legally I have no idea. But ethically, maybe. — orcestra

No, of course not. No one is being forced to do stunts. It's their choice to do them.

...Futile because 'evidence' in the case of 'God' is in the eye of the beholder. The 'utility' of the concept is a psychological and social issue,outside contexts in which 'evidence' is a consensual criterion. — fresco

I'll bypass for a moment whether I agree that evidence in the case of God is in the eye of the beholder, because what I want to focus on is why you'd think that whether something has utility isn't in the eye of the beholder.

Let's say that Joe says that the concept of God has utility and Betty says it does not. How do we move past the eye of the beholder there in your view?

Yeah, I think we should part ways now in this argument. I don’t want to discuss this with anyone who can’t see why the below statement makes no sense: — AJJ

How about trying to support how it would be a fact (of what? what would it be a property of? etc.) that we ought or ought not do anything?

("I'm claiming that it's a fact that if P is a fact, then it follows that we ought to believe that P, and if you don't agree, then I think I should just ignore you, because you're speaking nonsense" isn't a very good argument, by the way.)

Try it this way. Is there a way to not simply be making a value judgment about it (about the question, or alternately phrased, the claim that we're talking about--that it's neither true nor a fact that we ought to believe anything)?

If it's simply a value judgment, then that's what you're hinging a logical argument on? (Or hinging a claim of invalidity on?)