What does me knowing what it means have to do with anything? Don't you know so that you can correct it to the narrower version that's right?

Otherwise it seems like you're stalling/diverting because you have no idea. It's like a Jr. High tactic--"Oh, I know, but I'm not going to tell you." You're supposed to be able to discuss philosophy like an intelligent adult here.

How would we narrow it while saying something accurate?

The words mean the same so by definition it is necessary. — Richard B

That doesn't seem to be using "necessary" in the right way. The definition could be different than it is. The chemical composition could have turned out to be different, too. (So in this regard, it's agreeing with you that "water is H2O is problematic as something necessary a posteriori)

Re the other part, yeah, that's not done by pointing to a glass of water primarily, but isn't it done by pointing to other things?

I didn't make any such claim, only that they all wrote initially and in some cases only fiction and are taken seriously in academic philosophy — boethius

What I was answering is why Rand isn't taught in an academic phil context.

You're agreeing that the authors you mentioned aren't taught in an academic phil context. Yet you're saying "they're taken seriously." I don't understand what "taken seriously" refers to there. They're not taught in a philosophy context, as philosophers. What do we do with them in an academic phil context that equates to "taking them seriously"?

It doesn't work as a necessary identity (if that's what he was arguing--I don't recall). The only way rigid designators work for me in general is in the guise of someone christening something by a proper name (or treating something as a proper name), where the christener would still use that proper name even if the facts about the person/thing/etc. in question were different. I don't see how that works for identities, though (and I can't recall why Kripke would have thought it would work), unless it's something maybe where the identity was known upon the christening, so that the identity more or less functions as a proper name as a whole to the christener.

I don't think "the first chancellor of the German Empire" is a rigid designator. — frank

Right--that was my point. It seems to me that it should be a contingent property of water, where the chemical make-up would be potentially different in possible worlds.

Kripke's point depends on the understanding that H20=water is an identity statement. They're both rigid designators picking out the same object in all possible worlds. — frank

I forgot how that's supposed to work a la Kripke. It seems to me that "H2O" would normally turn out to be something like "the first chancellor of the German Empire" re "Bismarck," so that if what we had christened "water" hadn't been H2O (or wouldn't be H2O in some possible world), most people wouldn't say, "Oh, we can't call that 'water.'"

However, the use of “H20” in a scientific context is not learned by pointing to an object, and not used by pointing to objects. — Richard B

This seems very wonky to me, but maybe you mean something more limited by "pointing to an object" than I would mean?

The idea that anyone in any bathroom is a "violation of privacy" seems ridiculous to me.

What does this change? There are plenty of authors that likewise wrote initially fiction that are taken seriously . . . Aristophanes, Shakespeare, Dante, Goethe, Hesse, Tolstoy — boethius

Which of those authors are you claiming are taught in philosophy departments as philosophers?

There is a reason why we can understand who is a winner of a game, which food is healthier, and what photo better documents corresponding news article. And there is a reason why certain piece of art is better than the other. — Henri

The reasons are that we have ideals, desires, goals, etc. and we can judge whether some things meet them, no?

The point is basically that what counts as science is not defined objectively but through a consensus, and scientific consensus on whether a theory is worth considering is not based on objective criteria but on the subjective motivations and beliefs of influential individuals/groups, which leads theories to be abandoned/rejected/ignored while it would be potentially fruitful to explore them further, and one barrier to doing that is that the scientific consensus and their followers attack/ridicule/ostracize those who want to explore/believe theories that do not follow the consensus. — leo

Sure. That all seems pretty obvious, I'd say.

So if you're not claiming that there are objective purposes, and that art has one, then when you say "Art has a purpose," what you're really saying is that artists can have purposes for their art. Which is fine--they definitely can.

One problem with this, though, is that we need to be familiar with meta information. Namely, we need statements from the artist saying what the purpose of the art in question is, because the purpose in mind can be different for every artist who has a purpose, and for every work they create. An additional problem with this aspect is that we need to be able to sort out whether a stated purpose is really the purpose the artist had in mind, or whether it's not instead just positioning for the sake of marketing, or maybe it was something that's not very accurate but the artist said it because their gallery, or agent, or whatever, was pressuring them for an artist's statement, or maybe the artist see's the statement about purpose as an artwork in itself, or any number of other possibilities.

A more serious problem, though, is justifying, beyond your personal opinion (as well as those who happen to feel the same way that you do), why the artwork's relation to the (meta-stated) purpose is an important factor in judging the artwork.

In the spirit of solving one thing at a time:

There are plenty of authors, taken seriously in academia, that wrote fiction, — boethius

Didn't I write the word "initially"?

Maybe. What do you believe I'm not comprehending?

and plenty of theories involving subjective events that are deemed scientific. — leo

Hence "typically."

For the first part, it's not a demarcation criterion, just a property that science typically has.

I didn't think you were asking for a demarcation criterion by the way. You seemed to be asking a strange question about the relation between definitions and "how we can say to be focusing on objective things" in any arena.

It seems weird and very naive to me that there would have ever been many people, especially educated people, who didn't see politicians/heads of state/etc. as more or less being "professional liars." That's kind of the whole game. It's why "being political," as a more general term, refers to knowing how to position/spin things--basically, how to bullshit a bit, how to gloss over some things, etc.--in order to manipulate actions and opinions to a desired end.

Is it that you're not capable of something like a philosophical discussion about this? Maybe you don't know how to support it?

At least I wasn't labeling you with insults. — Henri

That would be better than the anti-conversation you're having. How about putting on your big boy pants and trying to have a real conversation about this?

Of course, you could just post stupid stuff in a very OCDish way like a jackass, too. I guess that works . . . for something.

By "strong," I mean creative individuals with ambition and determination. By rewarding such individuals with wealth and power, society in general becomes leaner and fitter.

Opposition to this view is essentially an anti-life ethic which promotes mercy and pity over greatness.

Agree?
@Terrapin Station? — frank

How are we determining "fit," "great," etc.?

The demarcation criteria (or criterion) idea is one basically of defining the method against other things we could be doing.

The issue is that attempts to make the description too exact wind up excluding things that are conventionally considered science. While trying to make it too fuzzy (but concretely stated, so that a robot could follow it, say), winds up including things that are conventionally not considered science.

Of course, we can just ask, "Why do we need a definition that a robot could follow?" And I don't think there's a good answer to that.

Thanks. So re this "how could we arrive at the idea that the activities called 'science' follow objective principles and are devoid of subjectivity," first, I'd avoid saying objective principles per se (unless you are intentionally trying to focus just on principles as such), and just point out that science is typically concerned with objective events. What we're going to call something and why we're going to call it that are not objective events.

Keep in mind that in music, harmony refers to things that are different from each other--different pitches--occurring simultaneously.

Especially colloquially, people often use "harmony" so that is has a connotation of "consonance" (rather than "dissonance"), but there's no such connotation in music theory, and consonance versus dissonance are relative/subjective.

Indeed. So if it is subjective to call one set of activities "science" and not some other one, how could we arrive at the idea that the activities called "science" follow objective principles and are devoid of subjectivity? — leo

First, in the spirit of solving one thing at a time, does this mean that you agree that it wouldn't be possible to come up with objective demarcation criteria?

If you believe that there are objective purposes and you wanted to support that, you could try to provide some evidence of objective purposes, for example. Talking about people subjectively having purposes in mind wouldn't do the trick probably (unless someone were arguing that there are no subjective purposes).

So that's a more specific idea, no?

Weird, "Isn't that a more specific idea than 'the first nuclear weapons for attacking N. Korea . . .'?" seems like a yes or no question to me. Either it's more specific or it's not.

Which has what to do with the fact that there are no objective purposes?

Isn't that a more specific idea than "the first nuclear weapons for attacking N. Korea . . ."?

There are no objective purposes,

I did. And the first nuclear weapons for attacking N Korea, and Iran, and Syria, and the Balkans, and anyone attacking Gibraltar, not the least, could be ready in September. That's why Trump is in the UK getting a full military parade. — ernestm

?? In your view, we'd not be able to attack North Korea, say, with nuclear weapons today, but we would be able to in September?

Because Trident defense systems can also mount a nuclear attack, and an SDI system could not stop B2s dropping B61-12s, the 'logic' on whether to pursue SDI as a defense system has become null and void. — ernestm

Tell Wallows. He started the thread.

Your concept doesn't really make sense if you care about my opinion.

First, you would need offensive laser systems to shoot down your enemy defense system.

Second, you couldn't do this without giving away your intentions about the purpose of your "defense" system.

Third, you would need to invade the domain of your enemy due to the fact that no nation would allow your satellites to operate above your territory. — Wallows

Whether anything is called "offensive" or "defensive" doesn't really matter here. That's simply a relative matter of positioning. But it doesn't matter.

There are plenty of satellites that are not in geosynchronous orbit.

the problem is, laser weapons that can shoot missiles down need something the size of three small bank vaults, and then call they can do is burn sensors out. It's not possible to put something into orbit even that powerful, or even in a ground vehicle. Currently they have to be carried on warships. — ernestm

I wasn't commenting on whether an SDI system is currently feasible. Just the logic of it being an advantage given the assumption of present or future feasibility.

You mean a surprise attack? — Wallows

What in the world? Where did I say anything that suggested "surprise"?

Empty your mind. Read what I wrote above slowly.

Let's solve one thing at a time:

If science was an objective enterprise, in the sense that a theory is accepted because it matches objective observations and not because it suits the desires or beliefs of some people, then we should be able to characterize that enterprise objectively. In saying that we can't characterize it objectively, you are agreeing that the objectivity of science is a myth. — leo

We're talking about the supposed objectivity of calling/considering one set of activities "science" and another set of activities "pseudo-science" (or whatever else we'd like to call it), right?

Huu? It's a defence measure, not an offensive one. And, the more SDI's the better for peace and prosperity. — Wallows

This is not difficult:

You build and launch a set of satellites equipped with laser weapons that can shoot missiles down so that they're not a danger.

Someone else builds their own set of satellites equipped with laser weapons that can shoot your satellites down so they're not a danger to their missiles (or their satellites, and so that your missiles are not a danger to them, as well).

I’ve already stated several times things that can be assessed better by people with broader knowledge and know how. You agreed. — I like sushi

If you think I agreed with that, you didn't understand what I was saying.

No one can be more or less right in assessing anything, or assess things "better" or "worse," than anyone else. Period.

That's regardless of how much they know about the thing in question. Because there are no facts about quality re good, bad, better , worse, etc. Period.

So that's why no one can be more of an expert than anyone else when it comes to making value judgments, evaluations, etc.

We can disagree there no problems. If we’re talking about paintings or movies there are discernible differences in quality — I like sushi

No. There are no factual differences in quality (in that sense where you're alluding to the relative value of one thing over another). There are factual differences in things like shapes, colors, textures, lighting, etc. None of those amount to factual differences of quality. There are no facts that x visual composition is better than y visual composition, etc.

just like a classical pianist would appreciate death metal even though they may not find it massively appealing (they’d still likely be a better judge of the music than someone who is tone deaf and into boy bands). — I like sushi

What I said was that they might be more skilled in identifying the objective properties of the music--for example, they can maybe tell you that a guitarist is playing a run off of a locrian scale, that they're playing sextuplets, etc. None of that tells you anything about whether one thing versus another is better. That same thing goes for something like, "Guitarist A is playing a run off of a locrian scale, but half of his pitches are at least 20 cents off of standard tuning, and he's rushing his sextuplets, whereas guitarist B is conventionally 'on pitch' and he's right in the pocket rhythmically."--That doesn't at all amount to guitarist B being better than guitarist A. You can be an expert in identifying those differences, but they don't equate to anything being better than anything else.

If you're using "quality" to simply refer to "property," that's fine, but we need to make that clear, because when we're talking about aesthetics, "quality" conventionally has a value connotation. No one is going to read the word "quality" in an aesthetics discussion so that it refers to whether someone is playing a locrian or lydian scale.

You build the SDI.

What's to stop someone else from building their own SDI to take out your SDI system? And so on.