Music is akin to visualization in that it does not necessarily involve linguistically mediated conceptual thought. — Janus

So "imagination" is "something, not necessarily visualization, that doesn't involve 'linguistically-mediated conceptual thought'."

What's the "something?" And insofar as one might think of what one is doing musically linguistically--for example, "I'm playing a whole tone scale-based pattern over a series of major seventh chords," it's not imaginative then?

Also, what does "linguistically-mediated conceptual thought" refer to where simply "language" wouldn't have sufficed?

This isn't changing the subject. Your argument hinged on a dubious claim about a distinction between imagination and thought.

"X weighs W" is a way of saying something about X's mass. You're trying to claim that it's not a property of X.

NO, you cannot see or smell or lick at Canada. You can visit a certain region of this Planet, and do all these things, but that is not "Canada". How could you smell an idea? — Matias

Of course that's Canada. We're naming that ground "Canada."

Do you think we can smell, taste, etc. "salt"? That's the same thing. "Salt" is what we're naming a particular "type" of substance. The name, the concept "salt," and even types--the notion that different "salt" is the same stuff somehow, are all ideas. That doesn't stop you from being able to taste salt. The word refers to something that's not an idea. Likewise with Canada, at least re one prominent sense of the term.

"Infrared" is a way of saying it's the longer wavelength, lower frequency end of the electromagnetic radiation spectrum, below red, which is one end of the visible light range. Likewise "ultraviolet" is a way of saying higher frequency, shorter wavelength electromagnetic radiation, beyond or above violet, the other end of the visible light range.

"Infra" is "below" --or in this case longer/lower. "Infraorange" would be red. "Ultra" is "beyond," or it's handy in this case to think of it as "above"--shorter/higher. "Ultraindigo" would be violet.

Heavy or light makes no difference.

Quantity is not a property of things, — Trinity Stooge

Huh? It's definitely a property of a brick that it weighs 3kg on Earth, say (because of its mass).

The first requires language, thought and the other requires imagination, the ability to visualize — Janus

So are you saying that imagination is only visualization? So you'd say that music involves no imagination? Does devising personality traits, dialogue,.etc. for characters when writing fiction involve no imagination?

How about trying to answer the question rather than figuring that being ridiculously patronizing will get you anywhere?

Wow. You can't even handle the most rudimentary aspects of forwarding a position. You're forwarding an argument based on a putative distinction between imagination and thought, where picturing something described supposedly counts as one, and describing something pictured counts as the other. To support that argument, you need to be explicit about what the supposed distinction is. So what are the details of the distinction you're claiming?

So the distinction between imagination and thought that you're making is?

Descriptions are not imagined, they are thought so you are talking nonsense again. — Janus

Can you cement the distinction you're making?

When I read a novel I do visualize the events, characters and places described. If you don't or cannot so this, then I can only conclude that you are reading the wrong novels or that you lack a vivid imagination. — Janus

For many people, when they watch films, they do imagine descriptions of what they're shown. If you don't or cannot do this, perhaps you lack a vivid imagination. (I wouldn't say that anything is a "wrong" film or novel.)

That's nonsense. When we witness events, whether in a film or not, no description is required — Janus

No picturing of what's described in a book is required, either.

Why would we be framing this in terms of requirements, by the way?

I think it does — Wayfarer

If it does, then how would we explain how you can produce bile just as well when you've had a toe removed, or both legs amputated, or both legs and both arms amputated, etc.?

Why aren't you answering my question. Let's do one thing at a time.

Well, definitely people can have an opinion that you have moral duties that you don't think of as duties. That doesn't make those folks right, though, just because they think that or just because there's a consensus about it.

(It was a joke, really--look up who Conor McGregor is if you're not familiar with him)

I didn't see Cornor McBride's talks on linear logic. — Mephist

What's really interesting are Conor McGregor's talks on linear logic.

Too narcissistic. It's not all about us.

So, first off, one thing that "Canada" refers to is a particular range of real estate. And you can see and touch and smell and taste it--although I'd be careful with the latter. Don't go around just licking any random bit of dirt, concrete, etc.

I wouldn't say it's necessarily the case that any moral stance either is or isn't duty-oriented. It would just be a matter of how the individual in question is thinking about it.

. But I do think that psychological predicates can be attributed to animals. — Galuchat

If a psychological predicate can be applied to animals, then we're referring to properties of either some part or the whole of the animal's body, no?

So there are moral stances that someone couldn't interpret as duty-oriented if they wanted to?

So if someone who wants to can easily interpret all moral stances as duties, then why would it be worth pointing out--under that interpretational umbrella--that moral dilemmas arise when duties are compared/in conflict, etc.?

Re Bennett and Hacker and their mereological fallacy, they say:

"it makes no sense to ascribe such psychological attributes to anything less than the animal as a whole. It is the animal that perceives, not parts of its brain, and it is human beings who think and reason, not their brains."

Does it make sense to ascribe blood-pumping attributes to anything less than the animal as a whole? Respiratory attributes? Bile-producing attributes? Perspiration attributes?

Why aren't there similar objections to talking about the specific functions of other organs/systems? Why not an appeal to attribute all functions to animals as a whole, as if specific organs/systems have no particular functions? (Is it because they realize that it would be clearly stupid in those regards?)

Isn't that going in the other direction, wholes having qualities parts do not? — Coben

You could just frame it as "lightness" instead, or having the property of "weighing 3-4 kg" or whatever the case may be.

(Just noticed that PossibleAaran pointed out the same thing above.)

Seriously, though, wouldn't this be an issue of whether there are moral stances that someone couldn't frame as a "duty" (if they wanted to frame everything as a duty)?

The transcendental Truth — AJJ

Here you're adding "transcendental." Are you also alluding to religious ideas? Otherwise what is the function of "transcendental" here?

Maybe this is your definition of "transcendental truth"? "The Truth is the transcendental Truth; it is what it is regardless how many different personal 'truths' there are." If so, what does capital-T "Truth" refer to without the word "transcendental" in front of it? Or is it that "transcendental Truth " is akin to saying something like "unmarried bachelor"?

general failure to consider Truth abstracted from any concrete example; to consider a fact as something that participates in the Truth, rather than a material instance of something. — AJJ

What would that be referring to?

Infra/ultra-orange??

Anything described, as opposed to being directly shown, must be imagined, so your point remains irrelevant. — Janus

For everything shown in a film, a description must be imagined.

You said:

if these hard-wired moral feelings were all there is to morality, all cultures on earth would have the same moral norms. — Matias

That would only follow if we all had the same moral preferences.

Since you're pointing out something about babies, by the way, and you used the term "hard-wired" above, it seems like you're thinking that I'm saying something like "We're born with our moral views and they don't change as we go along." Is that right, that you're thinking that I'm saying something like that?

There are certain individuals who entertain solipsistic reasoning, and it is definitely worth wasting time on them. — Merkwurdichliebe

Because we're banking on them being convinced otherwise by something they initially take to be themselves?

Given this definition, any state of affairs cannot be described as impossible because there ain't no such thing as an impossible state of affairs. — EricH

Are you seeing that as controversial? If x is a state of affairs, then x isn't impossible. That seems fairly obvious, no?

You can make statements/propositions about hypothetical states of affairs in ways that are contradictory and/or false. — EricH

Sure, but then what we're describing isn't actually a state of affairs.

It seems as if you're reading your own ideas into it, unless you can point to someplace where he (at least contextually) defines the distinction he's making based on capitalization. The passages I'm seeing all allude to religious ideas.

Scanning through the part of the book I can access online, it looks like he's using capital letters to allude to notions connected to God. I can't find anywhere that he is defining distinctions related to capitalization, but I'm just scanning through part of the book, so maybe I overlooked it or can't access that part.

Hey, we agree on something.

You know that I'm asking you about a distinction signified by lower-case versus capital letters, right?

It's impossible to make choices without some rank of values, otherwise why would you prefer one thing to another? — yupamiralda

Having preferences is a way that our brains work. You can't avoid it unless you have a very, very different psychology that would be diagnosed as some sort of medical disorder.

It's a fact that all values are subjective. It's important to realize this fact and work with it, not expecting values to be something that they're not.

A moral norm or value is not the same as "Well, I like this behavior, let's have more of it." Human beings are born with moralistic preferences and intuitions (even babies like agents who show a fair behavior), but if these hard-wired moral feelings were all there is to morality, all cultures on earth would have the same moral norms. — Matias

Why would you believe that we all have the same preferences?

It’s not novel. Perhaps start reading a little more widely. — AJJ

So give a couple examples of the distinction being used by others.