That's not what this thread is about though. The idea in this thread is that Dennett and others are saying that your experience is not real as an experience. The claim is that you don't have an experience; the notion that you do have an experience is an illusion.

Here's a brief article about it:

https://curiosity.com/topics/theres-no-such-thing-as-consciousness-according-to-philosopher-daniel-dennett-curiosity/

What I've been arguing here is more or less in the vein of what they give as Nagel's view in that article.

This is a good point, but I think they're using illusion in the sense of a magic trick which creates an experience of real magic that's actually smoke and mirrors where the audience is fooled because they can't think of how it's being pulled off. Similarly, our brains are tricking us into thinking we're having these experiences of color, smell, pain, etc. — Marchesk

I don't believe that makes the idea any clearer. We're creating an experience of . . . real experience? But we're saying that you don't really have the experience?? What is the "real magic" part that we're denying here? It can't be experience if we're saying that we have an experience of it.

But the claim talked about in the initial post is the claim that the experience of color is illusory. In other words, it's a claim that we don't really have the experience, even though we think we do.

So are you using "God" as a metonym for religion, "the church," etc. ? You're not referring to a supposed entity?

Cultures subsist in a tension between the sacred and the taboo. That's the energy that holds them together. Threaten that dynamic and they can fall apart. — Baden

What in the world? First, what would be evidence of this?

The "object" would be "the experience of a color," right?

The whole gist of saying that something is an illusion is that we're saying our mental phenomenon--which could be a perception--turns out to get things wrong. For example, we perceive water on the road up ahead, but it turns out that there's no water in the road; it's just refracted light due to road/air temperature differences on a hot day.

But when we talk about something like experience of a color, we can't say that we have a mental phenomenon that turns out to be wrong, because all we're talking about in the first place is the mental phenomenon. If we're granting that we have the mental phenomenon of color (so that we can have an "illusion"), then we can't turn around and say that we don't have the mental phenomenon of color.

What would be the difference between an illusion of consciousness and consciousness, or an illusion of an experience of color, etc. and just an experience of color?

It's not at all clear what the heck the distinction would be.

People who claim to do so are deluded. — Matias

Right. So when we use "Canada" to refer to a particular area of land, your answer is that we're simply deluded? That's what I've been trying to ask you, but you don't seem to want to answer that.

The idea is that what it is to ignore x is to not think about x at all, or to at least intentionally brush x aside or gloss over it.

If one thinks about x, if one takes it into consideration, one is not ignoring x.

The conventional way of doing science takes the human perspective into consideration. It doesn't ignore x. But the way it typically takes it into consideration is via a belief that it's possible (at least largely) to surmount the bias in human perspectives if we make the right moves--if we require corroborating observations from other experimenters in other circumstances, if we develop ways to avoid cherry-picking data, if we require peer review, and so on.

Whether this approach actually removes bias is a different issue than whether scientists think about this sort of stuff and address it. As long as they think about it and address it--no matter how flawed or wrongheaded it might be--it's not the case that it's being ignored.

My tendencies are towards formalism. What I primarily care about when it comes to paintings is shapes and textures and colors/hues, overall composition, etc. I care more about semantic content when it comes to fiction--where I have a preference for fantasy in its broadest sense (so that it includes horror, SciFi, etc.) as well as action, crime, comedy, but even with films and novels, I care at least as much about formal aspects.

It seems nonsensical to me. I have no reason to believe that Marx was exhausting the possibilities of how we can do things, and I have no reason to believe that Marx was ferreting out anything like scientific principles or logical principles or implications.

Sure. Again, the only point I was making was that science (and journalism, and other fields where this is an issue) isn't ignoring human perspective. The whole idea behind overcoming bias, as misconceived as the idea that we can may be, is the belief that it's a feature of human perspective that we can overcome bias.

Sure, again "That would only be the case if you're defining 'based on' as being about contributing factors that aren't identical to what we're talking about. But of course, one wouldn't have to use 'based on' that way," and I explained a reason we'd want to be careful with using the former sense in this case.

I agree with you, but what I'm focusing on is the fact that there is a belief that we can overcome bias, and I gave a couple examples of people with such a belief, examples that you agreed were examples of people having that belief, whatever our criticism of the belief might be.

Re the developmental issue, by the way, what a lot of people with objections to what seems to be an "it's all socially constructed" view are getting at is this: historically, it seems inexplicable to claim that it could all be socially constructed, because it would be difficult to account for how anything got started.

For example, if values can only obtain culturally, then how would the first cultural instantiation of a value begin? It couldn't begin by someone having a personal disposition towards one behavior over another, because that would negate our premise. We'd have to claim that values somehow arise not in persons' individual dispositions, but somehow pop into existence due to people interacting with each other, where they supervene in the interaction somehow. But how? Ontologically, how in the world would that work?

The same goes for social meaning, etc.

that preferences are brain states, which are also genetic and environmental phenomena? I thought they were mental phenomena. — Harry Hindu

Preferences are brain states. Mental phenomena are identical to particular brain states.

Brain states/mental phenomena are not identical to genetics and environmental factors, though those things are important factors in why brains develop as they do.

Factors are not identical to the product. Causes are not identical to the effect. — Harry Hindu

Exactly. Hence why it's important to be careful with "based on" as I explained above.

OK before we get there, consider it like this: Your brain wouldn't work without the "cultural software" that gets installed as you grow, the cultural software that has been undergoing more or less cumulative enhancements and modifications since we evolved into existence. It's not just a matter of values, it's much more fundamental. It's a matter of the very basics of social know-how, technical know-how, language, understandings of options available for action and consequences, cooperation and disruption, etc. If you weren't fully acculturated your brain wouldn't operate as a human brain evolved to operate. You would have fewer options by far. You would be far less adaptable.

So in light of this I wonder why people are wont to insist on human nature being "hardwired" versus socially constructed. — Izat So

I'm glad you explained this more. My first reaction to your fist post in the thread was, "What are you talking about? What mistrust over cultural influence?" But then, later in that same post, you mentioned "mind control" and "murderous cults," and I thought, "Hmm . . . okay, so I guess we're just talking about paranoid/conspiracy-theory-prone people?"

But what I quoted above gives more insight into what you were hoping to get at. The problem, though, is this:

I'm not someone with "cultural mistrust."

But I'm someone who doesn't at all agree with these statements:

* "Your brain wouldn't work without the 'cultural software' that gets installed as you grow."

* "Your culture literally gives you your values." (That's not quoting you, but it seems like something you're more or less claim.)

* "Your culture literally provides the entirety of language for you, including meaning." (Ditto re my parenthetical above.)

My disagreement with those statements has nothing to do with "cultural mistrust." It has to do with a belief that those statements get wrong how brains work as well as the ontology of things like values and meaning, and what it's possible/not possible to do with value and meaning, which results in getting wrong how language works, etc.

I'd definitely agree with claims that cultural and environmental influences are significant factors in the way that people turn out. But that doesn't mean that someone's brain wouldn't work sans culture, etc.

If you steal something from me, you infringe on my possibility to use my property as I wish. — Matias

I don't agree with that definition, by the way. I only steal something from you if I take something that was yours, against your consent, so that you no longer have it. If you still have all of the stuff you had, but something I did has an impact on your opportunities to do things with the stuff you have, that doesn't count as "stealing."

Unsurprisingly, I disagree with the conventional wisdom about "intellectual property."

Cultural appropriation primarily seems to be an idea people adopted to have something else to be offended/outraged by, because people seem to enjoy being offended/outraged, especially lately.

Then one's preferences are based on something that isn't their preference. They are based on genes and environmental factors. — Harry Hindu

That would only be the case if you're defining "based on" as being about contributing factors that aren't identical to what we're talking about. But of course, one wouldn't have to use "based on" that way.

One of the common confusions to avoid here, a confusion that the "based on" phrase is likely to engender, is the belief that any fact that's not a normative can imply any normatives. They can not. (And facts, when it comes to normatives, solely consist of individuals thinking should/ought or value expressions--an example would be, "Bill feels that Marines ought to leave no person behind." It's a fact that Bill endorses that normative.)

That is exactly what I'm saying that you are doing with your subjective/objective distinction - saying confused (contradictory) things. — Harry Hindu

What would be an example of a confused thing that I'm saying (re this distinction) in your view?

So knowing that 2+2=4 reduces to knowing how to do addition. Knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia reduces to knowing how to use maps and political notions. Knowing that this is a photo of N. reduces to knowing how to address N, identify him in a group, ask him about his wife and so on. — Banno

That seems like one of those things that amounts to someone saying, "Hey, check out this trick: I can interpret everything, to my satisfaction, so that it amounts to knowledge how-to rather than propositional knowledge or knowledge-by-acquaintance."

And then someone else could say, "Hey, check out this trick: I can interpret everything, to my satisfaction, so that it amounts to propositional knowledge rather than how-to knowledge or knowledge-by acquaintance."

And then of course a third person would say, "Hey, check out this trick: I can interpret everything, to my satisfaction, so that it amounts to knowledge-by-acquaintance rather than how-to-knowledge or propositional knowledge."

And in my experience, we shouldn't doubt that any of those people can do that--interpret things, to their satisfaction, at least, so that everything is x, and nothing will convince them that they can't interpret everything the way they say they can, and nothing will convince them that it isn't a good idea.

But it's basically just an example of their resolve to jump through whatever hoops they'd need to jump through to come up with an interpretation, as promised, that they'd consider good enough to keep the trick going to their personal satisfaction.

How do you explain why anyone has any particular preference? Why do organisms appear to have preferences? And can one confidently say that all preferences are mental and not merely biological? — Harry Hindu

Again the mental is "merely biological." It's a term for a subset of properties of brain function. Brains are biological, obviously. Why anyone has the preferences then due to brain states, which are the way they are via a combo of genetics and environmental factors.

Sure it is. When you have a synonym specifically for one kind of phenomena that distinguishes it from all other phenomena, and not a similar synonym for any other phenomena, then that use of the term implies something special about it. — Harry Hindu

We went through this dance before, if you recall, but the special thing about it, which I mentioned above, is that people keep saying confused things about the properties and relationships of mental to non-mental things. It's one of the more popular confusions (maybe the most popular) when approaching anything like philosophical talk.

what is the ontological status of institutions?" — Matias

Your initial post was nothing about that.

So you were wanting to talk about God as an "institution" as well?

Why didn't you mention anything about this in the initial post in the thread? The subject line of the thread is "What is the difference between God and Canada," and you write, "Both cannot be seen or touched or smelled or detected with a microscope or any other instrument, but billions of people are firmly convinced that Canada exists. The same is true about God."

In one common sense of "Canada," you certainly can see and touch and smell it.

You sad nothing about only wanting to discuss the senses that you can't see or touch, etc. (and it would hardly be a revelation to say "I only want to discuss the senses that you can't see, touch, etc. . . . So, my first claim is that you can't see, touch, etc. Canada in those senses"), and you said nothing about wanting to discuss Canada or God as an "institution."

Things interacting with each other is not observation, by any stretch of the imagination. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're thinking of the conventional colloquial definition of the term. Think of it as a sound applied to interaction.

but that what Canada references is separate from itself, as it seemingly cannot reference itself. — Shamshir

I don't understand what you're saying there, unfortunately.

You see no problem with saying one's preferences are based on one's preferences? — ChrisH

They're certainly not based on something that's not one's preferences. That would be deriving a normative from a fact.

Unless you're saying his personal feeling/taste is based on his personal feeling /taste? — ChrisH

What else would it be based on?

It's for you to give account as to how I, over here, can have any direct awareness or engagement with the brick over there- or anything else over there. It must be indirect. The only real question is if perception is reliable - it seems to me it is. But how can it ever be direct, or take in anything "as it really is"? — tim wood

"Direct" is opposed to "representational" basically. Basically, representationalists believe that you get data via your senses, that that data is processed into something uniquely mental, and what you're actually aware of is the mental stuff. Direct realists believe that you get data via your senses, and what you're aware of is that data.

An analogy might be helpful.

Take the Eiffel tower. Imagine that this is the tower outside of our perception, the objective tower, or the noumenal tower, so to speak (I'm using a photograph here, and I'll use paintings for our perceptions):



Representationalists believe that your senses get that data, but then it's turned into something mental that can at least potentially be quite different than the objective/noumenal tower. You're not aware of the objective tower on their view, you're aware of the mental "translation"--maybe something like this, where there's no way to know the exact relation of our perception to the objective/noumenal stuff:



Direct realists, however, believe that our awareness, via our senses, is more or less just how the objective/noumenal stuff is from the perspective we happen to be located at--so something like this, which is actually a painting:

it's not based on anyone's personal feelings, tastes, or opinions - it is a personal feeling/taste. — ChrisH

His personal feeling/taste is a mental phenomenon, right?

Ok but I find your usage confusing (it can be confused with the more commonplace usage I cited earlier). If all mental phenomena are subjective why not just call them mental phenomena - the use of subjective seems to be unnecessary. — ChrisH

It's a synonym for mental phenomena, yes. Maybe synonyms are unnecessary, but they're going to arise and be in usage whether we like it or not, and it's common for people to like them when it comes anything that even comes remotely near literary writing or speech, as at least as many people have an aversion to repeating the same word many times in a passage.

So philosophy is a kind of religion that singles out mental phenomena as sacred or divine, — Harry Hindu

It's just making a distinction. It's not attaching any valuation whatsoever to that distinction. The reason to make the distinction is that it's something people frequently get confused about. One of the primary aims of philosophy, in many opinions, including mine, should be to help sort out confusions, so that we can have accurate beliefs about what the world is like.

then we should be looking at how these terms are defined in a more objective way — Harry Hindu

That's an example of the sorts of confusions that occur. Definitions are something we create as individuals. We can agree with others to use terms a certain way, but just because something is common, that doesn't make it correct.

Here are a couple examples of a belief that we can eliminate bias:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2917255/

https://baselinesupport.campuslabs.com/hc/en-us/articles/204305695-Avoiding-bias-in-qualitative-data-analysis

Do you agree that those are examples of the belief?

No, I don't. We can (sometimes) act thusly. But when we do, we necessarily set aside our 'human perspective', which is the biased and partial way we (generally and usually) look at the world. — Pattern-chaser

I'm not asking if you agree with the belief. I'm asking if you agree that there is such a belief, whether you agree with the belief or not.

I'm a big fan of Donald Palmer's books, including Looking at Philosophy, which is suitable for any interested 12 year-olds. At the moment it's available for free online as a pdf. Otherwise you can pick up a cheap used copy (you might have to look for an older edition).

So do you disagree that there's a common belief that humans can be impartial/unbiased, at least in conjunction with each other?

The way I use the terms, which is a common way to use them in philosophy contexts, is that "subjective" refers to mental phenomena (which on my view is a subset of brain function) and "objective" refers to the complement--everything other than mental phenomena, or the mind-independent world.

Taking what you believe to be a "literal" meaning of a dictionary definition, and approaching philosophy as if everyone must be using the dictionary definition you looked at, in what you took to be its "literal" sense, will leave you perpetually confused.

Do you mean that tools as extentions of our experiencing make the observation? — Coben

No. The idea is that any interaction functions as an observation or measurement. That's contra the conventional, colloquial connotations of those terms, but that's how those terms are used in a physics context.

Is it, in your view, simply that one exists as a brain state and the other doesn't? — ChrisH

Yes.

But observation does, that is irrefutable. — Wayfarer

I'm positive that StreetlightX explained to you at least once before (I can't recall the thread, but I know I read it not too long ago) that observation/measurement in the sciences does not imply human observation or human actions. It simply refers to interaction with other things.