There is a fundamental, yet very simple problem with this idea of "primary elements" which Wittgenstein exposes at 48. The problem with the concept of these "elements" is that the very description of them, as something which cannot be described, is in itself, in that sense, contradictory. Something which cannot be described has been described. If we assume the existence of these elements we lose the capacity of the fundamental laws of logic, starting from the law of identity. We assume individual "elements", but they have by stipulation, absolutely no distinguishing features which would make them individual, so they are necessarily all the same element.

So we have the example at 48. Are the three G's three distinct elements, or are they all the same element?

But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our
sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence
consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the
types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as
we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?

But if we go deeper we see that the different squares are already distinguished by some properties. they are different according to their colours, and separated by lines. So if Wittgenstein were to adhere to the stipulation of "primary element", there could be no distinguishing one square from another by means of colour, and if we were steadfast to the rule, even the squares could not be distinguished one from the other by means of shape and position. Therefore the final question is moot. "Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case?" If there really was a type of thing called "primary element", as described, understanding would be impossible.

Actually I believe that numbers ARE things — Fuzzball Baggins

That's fine, but the issue here is whether "numbers" (note the plural) refers to a thing.

I was arguing that just because we can't empirically observe an infinite thing doesn't mean that it's always unreasonable to assume the existence of an infinite thing. — Fuzzball Baggins

I explained to you why it is always unreasonable to assume the existence of an infinite thing. If you have a reasonable rebuttal then please present it.

Here's another example: something caused the big bang. In the absence of any evidence indicating that this event could only happen once, the hypothesis that are physical laws which cause big bangs to spontaneously happen at random point in time and space is more simple and relies on fewer assumptions than the hypothesis that something caused only one big bang to happen and then something else stopped that process from reoccurring. Because of this I can infer that a multitude of big bangs have always been and will always be happening, and therefore there is an infinite multiverse. — Fuzzball Baggins

Sorry, but I can't see any argument here. You seem to misunderstand "the big bang", representing it as something which occurred at some time, in some place.

How do we get to the point of saying that matter is an idea? — Terrapin Station

I discussed this with you earlier in the thread. There is nothing in the physical world that we sense as matter.

You know, so phenomenally, there's a tree say (not as a tree--that is, the concept, etc.--but "that thing"--I have to call it something to type this), and then how do we go from that to saying that the phenomenal tree is an idea? — Terrapin Station

I'm not saying that the tree is an idea, I'm saying that matter is an idea. You sense the tree as a tree, you do not sense it as matter.

Matter is not physical though, strictly speaking. And that's the demonstration which Berkeley makes. It's an assumption we make, an idea, which helps us to understand physical existence. But what Berkeley demonstrates is that this idea, "matter" really doesn't correspond with anything in the physical world. So we really can't say that matter is physical.

46. A passage from Plato's Theaetetus is quoted in which Socrates is observed describing what "some people say"; that the "primary elements", out of which everything is composed, can be named but not described nor defined in any way. Nothing can be predicated of the primary element, it simply "exists in its own right". Wittgenstein states that Russell's "individuals", and his own "objects" in the Tractatus are such "primary elements".

Because it's not much different to saying something like, say, "The feeling of anger is an emotion". You do see the problem, right? — S

Why is this a problem? It's informative, and may serve as a premise for a deductive argument. It tells me that anger is classed as an emotion. If we agree on this, we can make statements about emotions in general, and draw conclusions about anger, because we've agreed that anger is an emotion. That's the process of simple deductive logic.

We already know that a feeling is an emotion. — S

Some people try to deny the obvious as irrelevant, that's my point. But this stymies deductive logic.

And, what's worse, it misses the point, namely that the aim of the game is to score a goal without cheating, so to speak. If you start by speaking about a notion, then that's cheating, because it's setting yourself up so that you can't possibly lose. But as a result of your cheating, your attempt can be rightly dismissed. — S

What are you talking about? We start a logical process by stating the obvious, as a premise, (preferably a self-evident truth) and when we have agreement on the premises, we can draw conclusions about the less obvious. There is no point to dismissing the proposition as irrelevant, or "cheating", without first understanding its position in the argument. It seems like you are saying "I don't like your premise because I'm afraid of the conclusions which it might produce, so I'm going to dismiss it as irrelevant, even though it's obviously true."

My reply to this will be much the same as my reply to Wayfarer. Masterful prose? Perhaps. A very clever piece of writing? May well be. But are the key arguments plausible? No. What's more important? Are you a truth seeker or something akin to an admirer of exotic artifacts? — S

I see your method. You dismiss premises from the argument which are obviously true as "cheating", then you claim it's "a very clever piece of writing". If you were really a "truth seeker" you would not be so anxious to dismiss premises which you recognize as true..

Some people just don't seem to be able to grasp the obvious. Because it's obvious they dismiss it as if it's irrelevant to any serious discussion about the nature of reality.

After all, if something was obviously true and accepted by everyone, we wouldn't have an axiom for it, would we? — Pussycat

We call that a self-evident truth. Some axioms are self-evident truths, other axioms are not self-evident truths.

This is doubtful, and where we might find some contradiction if we dig deep enough. The eternal circular motion described by Aristotle is a form, and therefore a formal cause rather than a final cause.

For Wittgenstein, there are similarly illusions generated by the illegitimate employment of language itself, the confusion of kinds when 'language goes on holiday' and attention is not paid to the language-games or grammar to which uses of words belong. — StreetlightX

40 ...—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name.

This all begs the question. Is there or is there not a real distinction between legitimate and illegitimate in the way that language is used? What is "language goes on holiday" supposed to mean anyway?

These illusions you refer to, are generated by misunderstanding. If the misunderstanding is a result of the way that language is used, we can see that language "goes on holiday" in two distinct directions. The one direction is toward a sloppy, uniformed misuse, but an innocent or naïve misuse, of language. The other direction is toward an intentional misuse, and this itself goes two ways, toward harmless joking like puns, and toward malintent, deception.

When faulty use of language is described by terms like "illicit", and "Illegitimate", it is implied that the misuse is willful. This, I believe is what Witty is trying to get at in his attacks on "philosophers" in general, the willful misuse of language. It's as if he believes that the willful misuse of language is a punishable crime, and he's calling for an Inquisition.

You may not be able to observe through empirical evidence that an infinite thing exists, but that doesn't mean it's unreasonable to infer that it exists. Take numbers, for example. I cannot count all the way to infinity, but I can infer that there are infinite numbers from the fact that if there were a finite biggest number then asking 'what is that number plus one' would break that limit. — Fuzzball Baggins

Sure, I agree that's the case, but "numbers" is not a thing. That's the whole point. So your argument is nothing other than a category mistake. 'I can infer that there are infinite numbers, therefore I can infer that there is an infinite thing', requires the undisclosed premise that numbers is a thing. Don't you think that we're just going around in circles here?

I think that is a reasonable way to define an infinite set of numbers, it is used all the time in mathematics. Just because he didn't list all those numbers separately doesn't mean they don't all exist. — Fuzzball Baggins

Again, you're just missing the point. Tim claimed that all the positive numbers were collected in thought, "I have them collected in my mind." So I asked for proof. A description, or definition, is not proof of that. I can say that there is a circle which is square, I have it in my mind, but that does not prove that a square circle exists in my mind. The fact is that we can say things which aren't true. Likewise, mathematics can use axioms which are not true.

I am a college student studying philosophy, and currently I have a lot of misunderstandings about Aristotle's Unmoved Mover.
1. How is the unmoved mover not a conraditction of everything else Aristolte proposes in the Metaphysics?
2. In this theory, how does the unmoved mover cause motion? — Mattt

It's not a contradiction because his so-called cosmological argument demonstrates that if anything is eternal it must be actual. The actual eternal thing cannot be moved because it is already eternal, yet it moves, as a cause. It is a perfect circular motion, which by the nature of a circle, has no beginning or end.

all positive numbers of the form 2n, n being any integer. — tim wood

I asked for the list, not a description of it.

The razor, then. "What is averred without evidence can be dismissed without evidence." Btw, a request for a respectable source is perfectly reasonable. — tim wood

Did you read my proof? I do believe that a logical proof qualifies as "evidence".

Earlier in the book, Wittgenstein suggested that for philosophical purposes, a name is like a label which is attached to an object. Now, he demonstrates that this is not an accurate description of what a name is, by showing how a name still has "meaning" when the object does not exist. First, at 38, he dismisses "this" and "that" as not really names, and this dismissal is necessary because these words seem to require an object to have meaning. He appears to be claiming that "this" is only a name in philosophy, as if philosophers use "this" as a name, to prove some point, but since 'this" is not really a name, the point is not really proven.

And we can also say the word "this" to the object, as it were address the object as "this"—a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in doing philosophy.

Here are the examples he provides, cases where the name has meaning when the object doesn't exist:


39. "Excalibur has a sharp blade" is a phrase which makes sense even if the parts to the sword are broken up such that Excalibur does not exist. if there needs to be something always corresponding to the word in order for it to have meaning, "Excalibur" would have to be replaced by names for all the distinct parts.

40. When Mr. N. N dies, the "bearer" of the name dies, but the name still has meaning. So he distinguishes here between the meaning of the name, and the bearer of the name.

41. When the tool named "N" is broken, the name "N" can still have meaning in the language-game which it is used.

42. The name "X" might signify nothing at all, and still have meaning in the game, as a kind of joke.

43. The conclusion:

For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

The argument demonstrates that meaning is not a direct relation of correspondence between a name and the object named, it is something other than this. Witty assumes that this "other" thing is "its use in the language". We ought to be careful to notice that if this is meant to be a logical conclusion (as I have represented it), the logic is invalid. The demonstration is that meaning is other than correspondence, and this does not necessitate that meaning is "use", which is a particular instance of something other than correspondence.

So at 44, 45, Wittgenstein proceeds onward to exemplify this premise, that meaning is use.

Which ones would you like me to list? — tim wood

All of them of course. I want you to prove to me what you claimed. "I have them collected in my mind."

I know the difference - I'm by no means sure you do. And your "if you listen" in response to my question to you as to who besides you says so - your answer in response to that question - is simply an example of what I've experienced as your toxic style of discussion. You made a claim, — tim wood

If what I say is true, then what difference does it make, whom, besides me, says so? Can you not read, and judge what I say, for yourself, without requesting an appeal to authority?

I ask you who besides you says so. And you do not answer. Answer or Hitchen's razor awaits you. — tim wood

I'll take the razor, and here's my proof. I'll reproduce from above, as it appears like you haven't read the thread. Tell me which part you dislike

So it appears, at first glance, that there may be an issue with self-contradiction, because it is suggested that a multitude of objects is a single object. However, we do commonly speak of a multitude of objects as a single object, that's what happens in arithmetic; 2, 3, 4, etc., are each representative of a single object, a number, but each number defines a multitude as well. What happens with "infinite" is that the multitude is undefined, and even specified as undefinable. But the object, the particular number, 10, 15, 25, or whatever, only has existence because it defines a multitude. Its very existence, as a number, is completely dependent on its capacity to define a multitude. If any such number which is signified by a numeral, "6", "7", "8" etc.,, did not define a multitude, it would not exist as an object. "Infinite" signifies an undefined multitude. So by the very fact of what it signifies, the possibility of it being an object is denied. What "infinite" signifies is "it is impossible that I am an object like a number", because a number necessarily defines a multitude while "infinite" necessarily does not.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your claims seem a little arbitrary. Especially your claim that the multiverse being seen on the one hand as a multitude and on the other as a single object makes it self-contradictory. A bunch of bananas is both a single object and a multitude of bananas. — Fuzzball Baggins

Yes, I went through this, I reposted it above in case you didn't read it through.

Do you have any logical reasoning (not involving human intuition, but based on the laws of physics or mathematics) for why an infinite thing could not exist in reality? — Fuzzball Baggins

I went through this already. It is unreasonable to assume that any thing is infinite because such an assumption impedes our capacity to know that thing, and it is also impossible to know that a thing is infinite. So it's not the case that it is impossible that an infinite thing exists, in reality, but it is impossible to know that any given thing is infinite, and detrimental to the understanding of that thing, to assume that any given thing is infinite. Therefore it is unreasonable to assume that there is an infinite thing in reality.

I don't think the concept of a set having to be 'collected' quite applies to what can and cannot exist in reality. — Fuzzball Baggins

Of course it applies. We create descriptive terms, and the laws of logic to reflect reality. When something is contradictory, like a square circle, we say that it is impossible because it cannot exist in reality. So, if we produce a concept of descriptive terms which contradict (a contradictory description), we say that this thing cannot exist in reality. That is the case with "infinite collection". As a noun "collection" implies having been collected, as a verb "collection" implies the act of collecting. The noun contradicts "infinite" and the verb when qualified by "infinite" signifies an indefinite act.

I may not be able to create an infinite collection, or even imagine all the members of an infinite set, but reality doesn't have to 'collect' anything - infinite things can exist simultaneously without having to be created one by one. — Fuzzball Baggins

You can say whatever you want about the "infinite thing", that's the problem with assuming an infinite thing. Because the thing is indefinite, it cannot be properly identified, and laws of logic cannot be applied. That is why assuming an "infinite thing" is detrimental.

I have them collected in my mind. — tim wood

You have all the positive numbers collected in your mind!? Can you list them then?

A large number of grains of sand of sand is certainly collectible. — tim wood

My claim is quite simple. A large number of grains of sand is collectible. An infinite number is not.

I guess you can't have a large pile of sand, yes? — tim wood

Do you understand that there is a significant difference between "a large pile of sand", which obviously has a finite number of grains of sand, (as any pile of sand does), and "an infinite number of grains of sand"? The latter is not a pile of sand.

Your opportunity to educate. — tim wood

If you will listen, I will oblige.

I haven't collected them all yet in my mind. So how could they be collected in my thought? Furthermore, "all the positive numbers" does not qualify as "well-defined" in a mathematical sense, because how many positive numbers that there are is indefinite.

Sorry. Just realized I rambled without answering your question. — vulcanlogician

Yeah, I was thinking that, I guess great minds think alike.

Plato's answer is that the philosopher discovers the form of justice by turning away from the body and investigating truth itself via mathematics, dialectic, and good ol' book learnin'. — vulcanlogician

But we're talking about "justice" here. Surely Plato didn't suggest that a philosopher might find the true form of justice via mathematics. Didn't he say that we need to apprehend "the good", and the good is analogous to the sun? The good makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun makes visible objects visible.

The others, in the cave, are not apprehending the good, therefore they do not even acknowledge the intelligible objects (ideas or forms), they just acknowledge existence of the shadows cast by the intelligible objects. These cave people live and exist in the realm of opinion. This is relevant to Dagny's question about censorship:

I didn't expect the Republic to be so interesting, I am up to the point where Socrates is getting weird and talking about how the rulers of state should censor books and fairy tales (???) but hopefully he has a deeper meaning. — Dagny

To Plato, these artists are involved in productions which reflect the realm of opinion (described above). These productions, and I've seen this translated as "narrative" before, are three times removed from the good. Starting from the good we have next, intelligible objects. Then the reflections or shadows of these intelligible objects, which are the visible, sensible objects. Then these artists produce a representation of the sensible existence. Since they are three times removed from the reality of the good, Plato believes they ought to be replaced by philosophical work which apprehends the good directly.

As I mentioned above, we have no indication in the text so far, as to what "public" would mean in this context. We have people playing games, "language-games", givers and receivers in what you might call "the act" of ostensive definition. The problem being that this "act" is divided such that it is really two distinct acts, the act of the giver, and the act of the hearer. There is no premise whereby we might conclude that they are involved in one activity, thus playing one game. Therefore there is no basis for the assumption of anything "public".

You ruined the moment! When anything looks so good, there always has to be something bad hiding behind it. It's that duck-rabbit syndrome. The duck looks so happy and lovable, while the rabbit looks mean and ready to attack. Why did you show me the rabbit?

No it's not quit like that. What I said is that "the" implies a single object, while "multi" implies a multitude. I could have just as easily said that the name "multiverse" identifies a single object, so it's not really "the" which is the problem, "the" was just an indicator. It indicated that "multiverse" is a name which identifies an object.

So it appears, at first glance, that there may be an issue with self-contradiction, because it is suggested that a multitude of objects is a single object. However, we do commonly speak of a multitude of objects as a single object, that's what happens in arithmetic; 2, 3, 4, etc., are each representative of a single object, a number, but each number defines a multitude as well. What happens with "infinite" is that the multitude is undefined, and even specified as undefinable. But the object, the particular number, 10, 15, 25, or whatever, only has existence because it defines a multitude. Its very existence, as a number, is completely dependent on its capacity to define a multitude. If any such number which is signified by a numeral, "6", "7", "8" etc.,, did not define a multitude, it would not exist as an object. "Infinite" signifies an undefined multitude. So by the very fact of what it signifies, the possibility of it being an object is denied. What "infinite" signifies is "it is impossible that I am an object like a number", because a number necessarily defines a multitude while "infinite" necessarily does not.. .

Words cannot tell what lies in unexplored territory, until we go and explore it. — unenlightened

Oh I like that, it's poetry waiting to be written ... love, the unexplored territory, let's go explore it. Almost makes me feel young again, and, in my opinion it holds a lot more potential than the old cliché, "I love you more than words can say".

...the philosophical point, contra Baden, being that it is a showing, not a saying, but with words. — Banno

It actually shows very little, if anything at all. It says "I love you more than words can say". And this is really a meaningless comparison as andrewk points out, the scale is inept. Words really can't say a whole lot about love, love is demonstrated by actions. So what words can say about love is really just an anthill compared to the mountain which love is. And saying "I love you more than..." is an action which only shows the tiniest part, if any (assuming the person speaks the truth), of one's true love.

Justice and beauty partake in the form of the good. The just city will be just to the extent that it partakes in the form of justice. So too with the just man.

The shadows on the wall of the cave are common opinion. One must turn away from the common opinion in order to see the world as it truly is (ie. behold the forms).

So people and cities do partake in the form of the good and the form of justice. It just takes a philosopher to recognize it. — vulcanlogician

So let's say that a just city is just, to the extent that it partakes in the true form of justice. And, a philosopher can recognize the true form of justice. But common opinion doesn't behold the true form of justice. Where is the philosopher supposed to find the true form of justice if it cannot be found in common opinion?

Actually I don't really know what a multiverse is. In one way, "multi" implies a multiplicity of objects, but also in another way "the" implies a single object. It's probably self-contradictory like infinite set.

Yes, the aim of philosophy is understanding. But notice how "understanding" is a multifaceted concept, and part of that is a sort of empathy. So when it comes to the point in philosophical discussions, where we cannot agree on basic premises, we have reduced "understanding" to a point where sympathy toward the other is the only meaning that we can give to this word. And so we understand each other without reason, logic, or agreement, but through some sort of feelings.

Then why do you continue to use the terms if they aren't "good"? What do YOU mean by the term, "physical"? I think it would be more useful to me, because it would be easier for me to understand, if you made the distinction between things in your mind as opposed to things outside of your mind when you write your posts. Remember though, that both types of things have causal influences on each other. They interact. — Harry Hindu

I thought I was making that distinction clear. I think your apparent obfuscation was pretense.

Then how do you know you're thinking about your mother in the past or future, or even seeing her in the near-present? — Harry Hindu

We've been through this, one is memory, the other anticipation. I remember how my mother was, and I anticipate how she will be. Where's the problem? If you have difficulty distinguishing between your memories of something, and your anticipations concerning that thing, then I think you have some serious issues as a human being.

But there obviously is a constant there, or else you'd never be able to recognize her. That is what I'm talking about. Those constant forms that allow you to recognize things (compare forms for similarities). — Harry Hindu

Yes, there is a constant. But the constant is distinct from the memories, and distinct from the anticipations. It appears to have been created within my mind as a means of relating the memories to the anticipations. I don't really understand the constant, do you? To me, it doesn't seem to be a form at all, it's material. That's how I understand matter, under the Aristotelian conception, it's the constant, the thing which does not change. It's not a form though, it's matter.

I think we already came to an agreement here anyway. Information is needed to reason, or think, or else what would you be thinking or reasoning about? — Harry Hindu

Well, I don't think we really agreed. You seem to think that there can be no mind without information. I think that the mind creates information, and can therefore be prior to information, creating its own information.

Terrapin appears to want to have it both ways, appearing to say that meaning can be private even if it's also public. I'm not convinced. — Luke

Just to remind you, at this point in the text there is nothing to indicate that meaning could be private, or "public" (whatever "public" might mean in this context). These terms do not seem to relate. We have the giver in ostensive definition, and the hearer (W appears hesitant to even use "interpret"). There is a gap between these two, and not a sufficient degree of consistency in the relationship between them, such that we could describe this relationship with "rules", though he does describe it with "games".

Yes. Also, I believe that Wittgenstein alludes to judging in section 35 that follows, when he says that it depends "on the circumstances — that is, on what happened before and after the pointing — whether we should say "He pointed to the shape and not to the colour"." [my bolding] — Luke

There clearly is judgement referred to, on the part of the hearer. The hearer must judge the act of the giver, "he pointed to the shape", or "he pointed to the colour", which transposes into "he meant the shape", or "he meant the colour". However, what I was referring to was the need to expose the reciprocal judgement from the giver, "you judged my pointing correctly", "you judged my pointing incorrectly". This reciprocal judgement is not brought out by Wittgenstein, at this point, though you referred to it "...understanding a definition is usually judged by how the hearer goes on to use the word...".

Wittgenstein notes that characteristic experiences are characteristic "because they recur often (but not always) when shape or number are 'meant'." Wittgenstein notes that there is no characteristic experience which accompanies pointing to a piece in a game as a game piece. Nonetheless, one can still mean that this game piece is called the king, rather than (e.g.) this piece of wood is called the king. — Luke

What I interpret as important with this discussion of "characteristic experiences", is the qualification of "not always". The "not always" implies that this understanding is created without rules, referring to the example at #31. This is how Witty is developing his conception of how we understand "types". The way that we understand types, without reference to definite rules, means that a type is a morphological thing not necessarily restricted by rules, like a form of life.

You're confusing your forms (your sensory symbols) with what they represent. Your forms are neither physical nor non-physical. My point in this thread is that the non-physical vs. physical dichotomy is false. I've been explaining myself without using those terms. You should try it. Just talk about forms, not whether or not they are physical or not. You're making things more complicated than they need to be. — Harry Hindu

No I'm not confusing these, I simply believe that there are physical forms which I sense. I also believe that the physical vs. non-physical dichotomy is not a good one. That's what I was arguing when you engaged me.

Your mother takes the same form in your memories of the past and in your predictions of the future, or else how could you say that you are remembering your mother, or predicting what your mother will do? You recognize your mother by the consistent forms you have for her (her appearance, her voice, her warm touch, her smell, etc.). — Harry Hindu

This is not true. I'm going to see my mother today, and I think about how she was last time I saw her, and I think about how she will be this time. My mother does not have the same form in my memories and anticipations, because I know she will not be the same. You say that I am over complicating things, but I am not, you are over simplifying. Reality is such that things change. And, they change at the present as time passes. Therefore I must respect this in my thoughts about things like my mother, she will not be the same as the last time I saw her. You, in your desire to simplify things, appear to have no respect for this aspect of reality. Representing a complex reality as simple, is a mistake, it's misunderstanding.

So then when people are unreasonable, they aren't thinking - there aren't any thoughts in their head? — Harry Hindu

"Reasoning is thinking" does not mean that all thinking is reasoning. I hate it when people make ludicrous conclusions from my statements like that, it makes me think that I am talking to an imbecile.

A robot has senses. — Harry Hindu

A robot is not a sentient being, so you are using "sense" in a different way, and arguing by equivocation.

And not just interpretations, but comments, too--do you think the author is right or wrong? — Terrapin Station

Discussion of whether the author is right or wrong would digress into endless bickering, because in philosophy this question usually cannot be resolved. My opinion is that such discussions should be brought to another thread so as not to hinder our progress.

There is surely an indefinite aspect of infinite, which is not so commonly developed in talk of "infinite". One definition of indefinite is limitless, and, something which continues indefinitely is infinite.

An object must be bounded, because it is an individual, a unity, a whole. Without these conditions it is indefinite. It's not an issue of what can be imagined, or the laws of physics, but it's an issue with the laws of logic, specifically the law of identity. When we identify an object, we point it out, then proceed to describe it by assigning properties or attributes. "Indefinite" refers to what we cannot grasp, what is beyond our apprehension. So, when we assign to an object, the property or attribute of "indefinite", we are saying that there is something about that object which is impossible to apprehend.

This is an act of judgement which is made, the object is judged as incomprehensible. It does not mean that the object really is incomprehensible, it has just been judged as incomprehensible. This is a self-defeating judgement. It impairs the will to understand the object, by identifying it as not understandable. Further, if any aspect of the object appears to be incomprehensible, illogical, or logically inconsistent with another aspect of the object, we can accept these logical inconsistencies of the object, by concluding that they are due to the indefiniteness of the object.

Therefore it is completely unreasonable to identify an object as indefinite, or to in any way assign "indefiniteness" to an object. We must assume that the appearance of indefiniteness is due to our inability to understand, and not part of the object itself. This will inspire us to continue to try and understand the object, to develop our minds rather than just assuming it is impossible to understand. And, from the other perspective, if the object really is indefinite, and therefore impossible to understand, we would never be able to know this with certainty, because this would require knowing the object which cannot be known. So it is completely unreasonable to assume that any object is indefinite, or infinite, no matter how you look at it.

The main point I was wanting to make is that when one points to something and makes a sound, one cannot point to the sound. One does not need to understand the composition and function of the moon to learn the name, but one needs to understand that human sounds have meaning, and that cannot be told in meaningful sounds or by pointing. Small children have that moment of revelation, and cows never do. — unenlightened

I think it is important to understand this aspect of ostensive definition. What is being "pointed" to is the word, that is what is being defined. The "pointing" here is the teacher drawing the student's attention to the word. It's too easy to imagine the physical objects as what is being pointed to, because of the physical act of pointing. But the objects being "pointed" to, in the more physical sense of the word, are just props being used to demonstrate the usage of the word.

Before moving on to and past §37 - which begins a new line of argument dealing with names - do people have questions or interpretive issues they want to raise with the discussion of ostensive explanation in the sections covered so far? — StreetlightX

I find it very interesting how different people interpret the same, short passages, in quite a variety of different ways, by focusing their attention on specific parts of the given passages. As much as possible, I would like to encourage everyone to offer their own interpretations of important passages. I think that this is what is meant by "reading it together".

This example is not even a language-game, it doesn't have the requisite social settings. — Sam26

So you deal with this activity which is not governed by rules, by restricting your definition of "language-game", such that ostensive learning is not a language-game. I would say that this interpretation is doubtful, as the quote from Luke indicates "you must already be a master of a language to understand an ostensive definition".

We've jumped a bit ahead, because in this early part of the book he's trying to show us something about the ostensive model, and how it sometimes lacks what is needed for someone to learn what is meant by a word or concept. — Sam26

The problem with the so-called "ostensive model" is that there really is no such model. Any such descriptions are incomplete, in important ways. That's what Witty indicates at 34, there is no description which relates to both the giving and receiving. Even his description of ostensive definition is quite lacking because he doesn't take into account the "period of time" which you refer to above.

The period of time allows for things like trial and error, and process of elimination. In this way a random "guess", can be transformed into "the right response", in the mind of the learner. Nor does Witty seem to address the learning of "yes" and "no" which are used by the giver to signify correct and incorrect to the learner. It is this aspect which would allow for rules in the social sense of "rules" as "connected up with other people and actions".

Wittgenstein concludes that: "neither the expression "to intend the definition in such and-such a way" nor the expression "to interpret the definition in such-and-such a way" stands for a process which accompanies the giving and hearing of the definition." Again, understanding a definition is usually judged by how the hearer goes on to use the word and react to the word's use. It usually has little to do with a speaker's intention or a hearer's interpretation. — Luke

This is an interesting development. You have used the word "judged' here, and Witty makes no such mention. You seem to be anticipating what will follow in the text. However, do you think that understanding a definition requires being judged as understanding? Couldn't one understand the definition, and go away with that understanding, without ever being judged as having understood? This relates to my discussion with Sam26 above, and the "period of time" involved in ostensive learning as a process. That period of time may consist of "guessing", trial and error, elimination, or what have you, and the student is told when the "guess" is correct. So "being judged" is actually very important because this is the only way that the learner knows when the proper response has been made. It's as if the learner is being conditioned, by being rewarded when the response is consistent with what is wanted by the instructor.

Read carefully 34-36. Notice at 35 he describes how there is no bodily action which has a necessary relation with "I mean the shape", or the colour. No necessary relation means that there cannot be a rule. This is why he claims a separation between what the speaker intends and what the hearer interprets at 34, because there is no necessary relation (like cause and effect) between the two activities, allowing them to be associated. There is nothing to signify to the hearer in any necessary way, what is intended by the speaker. There is no rule which the hearer can refer to, such as "this bodily action means colour", or "that bodily action means shape". Even if there are characteristic actions which occur often, they do not always occur, [so this excludes the possibility of a rule]. He even repeats this at 35:

To repeat: in certain cases, especially when one points 'to the shape' or 'to the number' there are characteristic experiences and ways of pointing—'characteristic' because they recur often (not always) when shape or number are 'meant'.

Wittgenstein is describing this type of learning as one which does not involve rules.

The terminology used was "about the past", not "of the past". and I explained to you why all such memories are "about" the past here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/233608

Of course, if you now want to use "of the past", it makes little difference. "Of" means from, so if it's trivially true that all memories have been acquired in the past, then it is also trivially true that they are "of the past".

Sure, accuse me of "empty word play" again, but you are the one going around in circles, changing your terms attempting to find a way to deny the truth of what is obvious.

Of course all present memories have been laid down in the past and future memories may be laid down in the present or in the future. The present very quickly becomes the past. All this is obvious.
The distinction between a memory which is of the past and one which is not is a perfectly valid one, and you have provided no argument to convince me otherwise. (Crying "Shame on you" is not an argument). — Janus

This is all irrelevant to the point I was making to Harry, which was that memories are of things past, and anticipation is of things future. Harry wanted to deny this distinction saying that some memories are not of things past. It appeared like you were supporting Harry's claim that not all memories are of the past, with the division you were making, and your claim that some memories are only "trivially" of the past.

So, the fact that we can classify memories into all different sorts, all of them of the past, is irrelevant to the point I was making. Why bring it up?

Oh, sorry Janus, I thought I was speaking to TS. That's TS's usual tactic. Any way, shame on you for taking it up.

This is empty word play being used to deny a perfectly valid distinction between memories which are of or about past events, and memories which are of things such as, for example, formulae, artworks or poems which have nothing to do with the past other than that they were encountered, and the memory of them acquired, in the past (which is no distinction at all since it is trivially true that every presently held memeory was acquired in the past). — Janus

Seeing as you have to qualify your claim that these memories have nothing to do with the past with "other than that...", and you actually recognize that it is "trivially true", that all memories were acquired in the past, your so-called "valid distinction" isn't valid at all.

Here you go again with your usual tactic of dismissing the obvious as irrelevant because it is "trivial". Once you have dismissed the obvious as irrelevant, under the false assumption that "trivial" implies "irrelevant", you then claim a principle which is contrary to the obvious, as a "valid" principle. Shame on you!

No, no, no. Let's not go there with that physical vs. non-physical stuff. There is just a form your memories, beliefs, knowledge, language, and the way you see the world, takes. Let's just go with that. — Harry Hindu

isn't that what this thread is about, that physical vs. non-physical stuff. The point is, that when I consider a form which I remember, I believe that that form had a real physical existence, in the past. But when I consider a form which I anticipate in the future, I believe that this form does not have any real physical existence. So I need a separation in my mind, a distinction between these two types of forms, the ones that I believe are directly related to physical existence, as having actual existence, and the ones that I believe are not directly related to physical existence, as having possible existence. The former are forms of actual things, and the latter are forms of possible things.

But the future can be indifferent, or neutral - neither bad or good. — Harry Hindu

I don't see how that's possible. I, as a being with choice, am capable of influencing what occurs in the future. Therefore to the extend of my powers I will make sure that what occurs is good. However, due to things beyond my control bad things will happen. Bad things and good things will happen, therefore it is impossible that the future is neutral.

You have it backwards. Reasoning, just as logic, is the tool for thinking (processing information). We don't always reason. Sometimes, we are unreasonable. — Harry Hindu

This is wrong. Reasoning is thinking. Therefore it is you who has things backward, not me.

How does AI "create" information? From nothing? Of course not. It doesn't create information. It processes it. "Process" is another word for "change". AI processes sensory information in order to complete some goal. — Harry Hindu

AI has no "senses", therefore it has no sensations, nor sensory information. Information is patterns and AI creates patterns, therefore it creates information. Changes to patterns are a creation or destruction of information.

I suppose this is really more a discussion of the definition of the word set rather than whether the universe could be infinite, so I'll agree with you that with the definition that humans have given the word set, the term 'infinite set' is illogical :P — Fuzzball Baggins

Therefore, we have "the measure problem". Doesn't it make sense to rid our mathematics of such illogical axioms? When we realize that such things are illogical, we can apply the same principle in other areas. Consider "the universe" for example. As such, it is an identified and named object. It cannot be infinite according to a very similar contradiction as mentioned above. If it were infinite it could not be individuated and identified as an object, it's existence would be indefinite and therefore not an object which has definite existence. So to speak of 'the universe" is to speak of an object, and an object cannot be infinite. Therefore by the same reason that it is illogical to talk about an infinite set, it is also illogical to talk about an infinite universe.