So if this idealized notion of exactness (transcendental exactness, we might even call it), isn't appropriate, what notion of exactness is? Well, Witty says, it depends on what you're trying to do with the 'exactness' in question: §88: "what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than does what is more exact. So it all depends on what we call “the goal”. So if I just want to be able to find you after i get back from my toilet break, 'stay roughly here' will more or less suffice for that goal. There's no need to get any 'deeper' (just as it's not inexact "when I don’t give our distance from the sun to the nearest metre, or tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of a millimetre"). — StreetlightX

What he does here is replace "the ideal" with "the goal". The degree of exactitude required in any particular circumstance is relative to "the goal". Therefore exactitude is defined in relation to practise, rather than defining it in relation to a theoretical "ideal". Again, this is a rejection of platonic dialectics. Plato would position "the goal", as the ideal, such that the ultimate goal is the ideal, and any particular instance of "a goal", would only have meaning in relation to the absolute, the ideal.

His example of time is quite powerful. We can measure time by seconds, we can measure time by nanoseconds, or whatever, each giving a different level of exactitude for a different purpose. And there is no "ideal' or absolute exactness in relation to time, which we could strive for as a goal, as relativity theory has removed this.

No, that's exactly what I don't need to explain, because that is exactly what I have just explained it doesn't make sense to ask for further explanation of. — unenlightened

All you are saying is that my inability to understand what you mean by "normal circumstances" doesn't make sense to you. That's fine, I'll just go on my merry way, bringing my lack of understanding with me. But no matter how much you insist that it doesn't make sense for me to ask for further explanation, my lack of understanding will continue to exist until you provide for me a satisfactory explanation. You cannot make a person's lack of understanding disappear simply by insisting that the person's questioning doesn't make sense to you.

That's the whole problem with Wittgenstein's approach to doubt. If a person has doubt, then that doubt can only be removed by answering the person's questions, and providing appropriate explanations for that person. You cannot just tell the person, your doubt doesn't make sense to me, therefore it is unreasonable doubt, and assume that this will make the doubt nonexistent.

The answer to, 'how would you know ...?' is 'why would you ask ...? And you might have a good reason for asking, for thinking things might not be normal. — unenlightened

Yes, I had good reason for asking. You used the phrase "normal circumstances", so I asked for an explanation, how would I know if the circumstances are normal or not. This is what Wittgenstein is investigating at 87, such explanations. Is there is a way to end the possibility of infinite regress of explanations required to ensure that one does not misunderstand? Yes, there is an end he says, but this end only exists under "normal circumstances". But if "normal circumstances" itself needs further explanation, then this is not a real solution to the problem.

But you have to bring that forward before your question makes sense, otherwise it becomes one of those endlessly repeating games. How would you know you are asking a sensible question? — unenlightened

Actually, the onus is on you. When you use language, it is always respectable for the hearer to ask for clarification, so such a question (how would you know whether the circumstances are normal or not?) always makes sense. It makes sense because the hearer is asking in order to avoid misunderstanding. It always makes sense to ask for clarification in order to avoid misunderstanding. And, it is disrespectful, and doesn't make sense to automatically assume that the asker is playing an endless repeater game.

If you happen to believe that under "normal circumstances", it does not make sense to ask for clarification of a statement, in order to avoid misunderstanding, then you need to explain how one would know whether the circumstances are normal or not, in order to avoid asking for clarification (in an effort to avoid misunderstanding), in times when it doesn't make sense to ask for clarification..

For example, the so-called rules of grammar were operative long before anyone analyzed actual language usage and explicitly formulated them. So a rule is certainly not merely the statement of it. — Janus

I don't believe this, I think you're fabricating again. How could there be a rule which was not formulated? There's no such thing as an unformulated rule, it couldn't exist as a rule if it wasn't formulated. What form would the rule have, if it were unformulated? It could have no form because that form would be a formulation of the rule. And if it didn't have any form, how could it exist? Saying that a rule exists before it is formulated is like saying that a thing exists before it exists. It's pure nonsense.

Rules of grammar are stated. If they're not stated, they do not exist as rules of grammar. You need to distinguish habits of language use from rules. Just because a person is in the habit of doing something in a particular way, (e.g. I am in the habit of calling this thing a "laptop"), this does not mean that the person is following a rule. Furthermore, people learn habits from each other, through observation and experience, without referring to rules. Rules are created to curb habits. So the habits exist before the rules relating to those habits, are produced. You ought not confuse these two, thinking that people acting in a similar habitual way, are following a rule.

I'm not getting you. What's "a rule" other than the statement, do this under these circumstances, or do that under those circumstances? To understand what the words mean is one thing, but it's not the rule. The rule is the statement itself.

The line is somewhere short of "absolute certainty". — unenlightened

Right, so how would you know whether the circumstances are normal or not, to know whether you ought to doubt your reading or not? What even constitutes "normal circumstances"?

The point though, is that "leave no room for doubt" (85) implies absolute certainty, whereas "under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose" (87) implies something other than absolute certainty. And, since we are talking about the rules (sign-posts) which are foundational to knowledge and understanding, the epistemological difference is significant, depending on which of these two, one chooses to believe.

The latter, "somewhere short of 'absolute certainty'", is what I believe to be the true description. However, in "On Certainty", Wittgenstein proceeds in an attempt to justify some sense of the phrase "it is certain that...", and this is a falling back onto the ideal, 'absolute certainty', which he is here, in his description, trying to dispatch.

I just did. It's there in what you quoted. — S

Where's the rule? I don't get it. I don't see it.

A rule expressed in language is indeed a rule expressed in language. — S

Right, so I'll repeat the point. If rules only exist as expressed in language, then rules are created by language. Therefore language is prior to rules, as a cause of existence of rules, and rules are not required for language.

No, these are all just rules. There's a rule that this new variation is to be called an "apple", there's a rule that "apple" in this instance isn't to be taken literally. Show me something where I can't give you the rule. — S

What rules? Show us one of these rules.

All the rules which I know of are expressed with language, so it takes language to make a rule, as far as I understand "rule". If this is the case, then the existence of language cannot rely on rules, because language is required to make rules.

Of course, Wittgenstein's empirical explanation is doubtful, and most likely incorrect, as I explained above. Instead of describing "explanation" as an effort to minimize the probability of misunderstanding, thus minimizing the degree of doubt, to the point where we can safely proceed, he characterizes it at 85 as leaving "no room for doubt". This difference between excluding the possibility of misunderstanding (W's description at 85), and minimizing the probability of misunderstanding (what I believe is the true description, at 87), is significant epistemologically.

This passage at 85: "So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt." is inconsistent with this passage at 87: "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." The latter "if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose", is inconsistent with "no room for doubt".

Your DNA didn't exist until it was set by a process external to you. Just because your DNA is very similar to the DNA of your parents, you are not your parents and there was no you until you were conceived by them, which is a process external from you, since you didn't even exist at the initiation of conception. Or is it something else? — Henri

I don't understand why you would call this process "external from you". Weren't you internal to your mother, in her womb? That was you in there, in that act of conception, and all those processes going on, which you say, "set' your DNA, were internal to you. When these processes are internal like that, it doesn't make sense to refer to them as "external from you".

Why do you think that it's more rational to think of the cause of your existence as something external to you, than to think of it as something internal to you? Consider that the self, the "being", is a very specific spatial-temporal perspective, and internal/external are spatial terms. It does not make sense to restrict "cause" to necessarily external, when causes could equally be internal. And, if you can separate an external cause, as distinct from the thing caused, why not also separate the internal cause as distinct from the thing caused?

If free will is a willful act of a conscious being which ultimately originates within that being, then a being has to be eternal, without being created at certain point in time, in order to have free will. — Henri

This is a mistaken premise because it assume that a "cause" must be external to a being. That it is mistaken is evident from Newton's first law, inertia. Newton takes inertia for granted, as if there is no cause of it. However, once you accept the reality that mass is the cause of inertia, then mass is an internal cause, the cause of a body's inertia. And if you accept the reality of an internal cause, then the premise stated here is false.

Originating cause of your existence is definitely something external to you. Do you disagree with that? — Henri

No I don't agree with that.

Do you claim that originating cause of your existence is yourself? Then you are the one to prove such claim. — Henri

No, I wouldn't say that the originating cause of my existence is myself, that would be nonsense. However, it looks far more likely that the originating cause of my existence is something internal to me, rather than something external to me. There is no reason to conclude that if I am not the cause of my own existence, then the cause of my existence must be something external to me, because something internal to me is another possibility. And, the evidence points to the internal.

How did first sperm and ovum come into existence? How does continuity of DNA exist? How does process that allows for DNA to exist exist? — Henri

Need I point out, that these processes are internal processes, not external processes?

But that's not possible since we are not eternal beings, but beings who were created at certain point in time. So, nothing can ultimately originate within us. — Henri

The situation is not so simple, as Terrapin explains. If you say that human beings were created at a certain point in time, and insist that the originating cause of our existence is not something "within" us, then to justify this you need to show that the originating cause of our existence is definitely something external to us, and not something which is within us.

When man's sperm meets woman's egg, it can start a process that results in human being. But if sperm meets anything other than woman's egg, nothing will result from it. Why? Because reality is already set in a way to produce new thing in first case, and nothing in second. — Henri

This does not suffice, because it is what is within the sperm and the ovum which are responsible for the existence of the human being, and there is a continuity of DNA through the process. So you haven't shown an external cause of existence yet.

Yes, I reject all premises you erroneously believe to be reasonable, and go by my own premises, which actually are reasonable. — S

OK, I think I've satisfactorily proven my case. Yours is a metaphysics of extreme selfishness. It's reducible to solipsism: "I am the only authority".

I understand and agree with all of this.

To be moral depends on the true existence of the Ideal ethic. This is aspirational, is it not?

“... if there is such a thing remains in the realm of not yet understood.”

There’s two things there: a) is it real?, and b) if it is real it’s not yet understood.

If it’s real, from where does it come?
If it’s not real, then who are we?
If there was no Ideal ethic then we would be immoral creatures because there would be nothing to chose from.

But we don’t know if we are moral creatures, because we don’t know if the Ideal ethic exists. Is that true? — Brett

In response to these questions, this is what I believe.

If the Ideal is real, it must be immanent within us, and this would be what you call innate. It would have to be within us due to its nature as an idea. It appears to us as an idea, something within, not as a physical object which is what is external to us. This is supported by the two senses of "moral" which I referred to. In the one sense, we are moral in so far as our actions conform to the ethics of our society. These codes are external to us. But the inconsistency between the various ethics, differences in those external codes, and the problems caused by those differences, drives us to seek the Ideal, as the basis for compromise, or reconciliation of the differences. This requires review, and renewed understanding of the formal principles which make up the ethics. This is a turning inward, to understand the ideas and ideologies. So the Ideal is how we relate to the necessity for consistency, or coherency of ideas, and this must come from within thought itself.

If the Ideal is not real, then understanding would be very difficult. There would be many differences in ethics, ideologies, and inconsistencies in knowledge. And here's what I think is the problem. Empirical evidence demonstrates that all these factors which would be the case if the Ideal were not real, actually are the case. So empirical evidence points to the Ideal as not real. But the Ideal is only apprehended by the desire to go beyond the empirical realm, and accept the reality of something non-empirical, ideas. So it is as you say, aspirational. What inspires us to act, is the desire to bring into existence something which is presently non-existent. This is the creativity of art. So the "aspirational", and this includes inspiration, ambition, motivation, and the Ideal in general, is what has no empirical existence. Therefore despite the fact that empirical evidence cannot support the existence of the Ideal these human emotions do support its reality.

Whether or not we could be moral creatures, without the reality of the Ideal is a difficult question for me, which doesn't really make sense. I think that we must be, on the basis of the first definition of "moral", which places morality in relation to human ethics. So we could still judge morality based on those principles if there was no Ideal. The problem is that we would have no real mechanism for resolving differences without appeal to the Ideal. And the reality is that we are capable of resolving differences, and this is because we assume some sort of Ideal. So we ought to conclude that the Ideal is real, based on that logic. Assumption of an Ideal is necessary to resolve differences, we do resolve differences, therefore the Ideal has real effect in our world, and is real. Following this, we cannot really make any conclusions about "if there was no Ideal", because our world is a world in which the Ideal is real. And since the Ideal is immanent, it must go right to the core of what it means to be alive, so asking that question is like asking what it would be like if there was no life.

Regarding my conversation with S., in this thread, just for the record, that conversation ended by S. being asked what he meant, and being unable to tell what he meant. — Michael Ossipoff

Welcome to the club. That's the history of the thread, in a nutshell.

I think we all know your argument by now. What's the point of repeating it? That reply of yours doesn't progress the debate or engage productively. It merely reasserts premises I rejected ages ago, and anything that follows from rejected premises is irrelevant to my position. — S

Yes, you reject all reasonable premises which could explain what you are talking about, as non-progressive, and assert "there is a rock an hour after all people die", as the only reasonable premise. OK.

It ended with me informing you that I was going to ignore you, because we reached a dead end whereby you kept asking me to do something which is demonstrably unnecessary - provide a definition - and thus a waste of my time, and I had already explained that. The meaning is understood by both of us, but the difference is that I don't pretend otherwise for the sake of pushing some rubbish argument. — S

Whenever someone gets you to the point where your op might begin to appear unreasonable to you, you say, I'm going to ignore you because this does not progress the debate. Nice work.

But post-human rocks are not simple and easily understandable if you actually think about it. — Echarmion

The problem is that S refuses to think about.

§85: "But where does it [the signpost, the rule - SX] say which way I am to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (for example) in the opposite one?”

It’s worth recalling that one of the imports of Witty's discussion of of ostension was that ostension is thoroughly differential: the same pointing gesture may point out any number of different things, and that

§30: "An ostensive definition explains the use a the meaning a of a word if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear.”

Similarly, rules too must be understood in a differential manner: what rules ‘do’ depends on the role that rules themselves play in a particular language-game. This differential nature of rules is captured in §85 itself: — StreetlightX

I think it may be appropriate to call this section a "de-interiorizing" of rules. The rule is given a physical presence, it stands there, like a sign-post. So in the case of language, the rule is the physical presence of the words. The rule is not what the sign means to the person who interprets it, it is the sign itself.

I believe that this is an acceptable ontological principle, but if we adhere to this premise, we need to respect the implications. The principal implication, as Wittgenstein points out, is the existence of doubt. If the rules by which we know and understand things, are outside of the mind, not directly accessed by the mind (noumena, in Kant's terms), and what is present to the mind is a representation of the rules (phenomena), then doubt is justified in all of our knowledge and understanding. This is because doubt with respect to the rules by which we know and understand, is itself justified.

The infinite regress which would be created by characterizing 'the rule" as a principle within the mind, is an infinite chain of needing a rule to understand a rule. If the rule is positioned outside of the mind, as Witty does, the "sign-post", then it is not by means of rules that the mind interprets and understands rules, because rules are not within the mind. The mind must have within itself something other than rules by which it understands. But if it is not the case that rules are at the bottom, the foundation, the basis for the mind's understanding, but are something which need to be themselves understood by the mind, using something other than rules, then doubt is a real concern.

Wittgenstein grapples with this problem in "On Certainty" and attempts to establish some principles to contain doubt. He attempts to distinguish between situations where doubt is reasonable, and situations where doubt is unreasonable. The problem with his procedure is that his ontology of rules makes some degree of doubt reasonable in every situation. So we cannot separate doubt from the situation, to say that there are situations where doubt could be excluded, as appears to be Witty's intent in On Certainty. So when he proceeds in this way, he's producing an incoherent epistemology. The kernel of this incoherency is evident at #85

---So I can say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one. — Philosophical Investigations 85

I believe this empirical proposition is false. Instead of describing the sign-post as always leaving some room for doubt, even if it's the most minute, infinitesimal degree of doubt, and each different instance of occurrence having a different degree of doubt, he describes the sign-post as sometimes leaving room for doubt, and sometimes not. The difference between these two descriptions amounts to a substantial epistemological difference.

If the idealist can't even handle a hypothetical scenario of a rock (as defined by the dictionary) after we've died, then that's a big failing for idealism. — S

That there's no one to interpret the dictionary definition of "rock", or the meaning of "rock" in any way,and therefore there is no such thing as "what a rock is", after we all die, is a statement of reality, fact, it is not a failing for idealism. Those who refuse to recognize the reality of this fact simply fail to understand.

Am I asking whether there would be a rock? Yes. — S

Since there would be no such thing as "what a rock is", then it makes no sense whatsoever to ask if there would be a rock. Why is that difficult for you to understand?

The meaning isn't objective in the sense that it never required any subject or subjects at any point previously, because it did: that's how it got a meaning in the first place. But it's objective in the sense that it doesn't need there to be any subject or subjects at the time, or all the time. It simply means what it does, and would continue to do so an hour later, even if we all suddlenly die in five minutes. Once the meaning has been set, it is retained, unless there's any reason for that to change, and no one here, yourself included, has been able to reasonably provide such a reason. They've instead assumed or asserted a reason which is inadmissible. There's an unwarranted link that they make. — S

You point to a rock, you say that's a rock, and voila, it's a rock. Now everyone dies, and time passes. As time passes the world changes, and the thing you pointed to no longer exists as the thing you pointed to because it changes along with the rest of the world. Why would you think that the thing you pointed to and called "rock" would still exist as the thing that you pointed to and called "rock"? Are you denying the reality of change?

But they do, we see it all the time, you know you possess it, so do your friends. It’s not something we make up day to day. — Brett

Yes, I agree with this, it is an objective fact that human beings make these decisions. The issue though, with objective morality, is whether or not there is an objective truth to the correctness or incorrectness of those decisions.

Yes, if those distinctions between good and bad haven’t changed These morals are evolutionary, through a set of preferences that contribute to the wellbeing of a society. They have developed in a singular vein to what they are now. They have not swung off on some crazy tangent then returned to begin again. In modern times there have been cases of cannibalism, and those people tried to conceal what they’d done. In the case of Eichmann, he knew he was transgressing a set of moral, otherwise why run to South America? — Brett

This is where we disagree. I do not agree that those distinctions between good and bad have not changed. Here's the reason why. Each judgement of good or bad made by a human being is either made in relation to a particular situation, or made as a generalized statement. These two are distinct. The former refers to how we proceed in daily life, making decisions about what we are doing, and the latter refers to generalized rules such as it is wrong to trespass; it is wrong to take another person's possessions; it is wrong to kill a human being; etc..

The category of "generalized statement" must have come into existence along with communication, a "statement" being the product of language. We can argue that the statement is just a reflection of the Idea, which existed prior to the statement, in the Platonist manner, and that these Ideas have not changed, as you say. However, we need to bridge the gap between these Ideas (generalized statements) and our day to day decisions of good and bad. Human beings often, (and I'll insist on that term "often", so that it's not just incidental), choose in particular situations, to do something which is contrary to the Idea, the generalized statement of what is good or bad. Do you agree with me, that even if these Ideas (generalized statements) concerning what is good and bad, exist in a timeless, unchanging way, morality consists in conforming day to day human choices to be consistent with these ideas?

So I think, that what has changed, evolved over the time of human existence, is the capacity of human beings to conform their day to day choices to be consistent with the objective "rules of behaviour". And this is what morality is, conforming our day to day behaviour to be consistent with the rules. So whether or not there are objective unchanging "rules of behaviour" is a moot point, in relation to "morality" because "morality" is concerned with the human being's capacity to conform one's behaviour to be consistent with whatever rules of behaviour are apprehended. And, since the capacity to express, and understand these rules of behaviour has undoubtedly progressed as communication has emerged and evolved, so has the human capacity to conform one's behaviour to be consistent with such rules. Therefore morality, being a description of this capacity to be consistent with the rules, rather than being a description of the rules themselves, must have changed considerably over the time of human existence.

Do you really believe you have been taught not to kill, not to rape? Do you really think that’s the reason you don’t? In your life did you ever get a message from anyone that rape was wrong! Did you ever think, at any age, that causing pain to others was okay? It’s not necessary for each and every generation to learn morality all over again from scratch. Not only is it not necessary, it’s unlikely. Our evolution would be too slow, if not actually reaching a dead end. It’s part of you, just like your thumb. — Brett

So the issue is not whether you've been taught that killing, stealing, and raping, are bad, or whether these ideas are innate. The question is whether the habits which help you to avoid making the wrong decisions (with respect to these rules), in your day to day life, are innate or learned.

Only if you can prove they have changed. First you’re suggesting that they’re not objectively true without proving it, you only suggest it might not be true, and then using that claim as a fact to argue the second point, that moral differences exist, as if it was proven. — Brett

So my argument is that our ability to understand these moral Ideas, rules, which are expressed as generalized statements, has changed in accordance with how our ability to communicate has changed. And, our ability to conform our day to day decisions to be consistent with these rules (this is morality), has changed in accordance with our ability to understand these rules.

You begin to partly define “morality’ as the ability to negotiate these differences. Even if it were true that there are moral differences, where does the idea of resolving them come from. If there are such differences that clash why would we feel the need to resolve them without possessing some sense of morality? If it wasn’t morality then what would you call it? If you call it co-operation then I suggest you have to consider where the idea of co-operation springs from. Co-operation requires an understanding of reciprocity, empathy and fairness.

Is your conclusion that there must be differences, there has to be differences, because without those differences to be resolved there would be no morality?

It’s like a trick question; if I agree that there are differences then there can’t be a singular morality, and if I don’t agree to the idea that there are differences then there can’t be a morality. — Brett

I believe that this is an important issue which can only be resolved through a more strict definition of "morality", to avoid equivocation. I suggest we start from the bottom, and define "morality" as concerning the particular choices which one makes in one's day to day activity. The rules which the day to day activity ought to conform with are called "ethics", this is the top, perfection in conforming to the rules, the Ideal.

From one person to another, or from one society to another, there are differences with respect to ethics, the rules. The desire to resolve the differences comes from the assumption of an Ideal ethic, an unchanging law of good and bad, an ethic which is innate within us, such as you describe. We can attribute the differences between us to the differences in our ability to apprehend and understand the Ideal ethic. Without the assumption of an Ideal ethic, I believe there is no inclination to resolve such differences, because there would be no assumed further principle to appeal to in any such attempt. The differences between us would just be considered as a fact of nature.

I described this attempt to resolve such differences as "morality", because these activities fall into the class of day to day activities. However, these activities cannot be said to be consistent with one set of ethics, nor the other set of ethics, because they are intended to resolve differences between the two. So to be "moral" instead of "immoral", these activities rely on the true existence of the Ideal ethic. From one set of ethics, or the other differing set of ethics, the person's actions would appear inconsistent with the rules, and immoral, but in relation to the Ideal ethic, if we allow that there is such, the person's action may be moral. The problem being that all we understand is this or that set of ethics, in the form of statements, and the Ideal if there is such a thing remains in the realm of not yet understood.

"I'm unable to make sense of what you're saying because I'm not interpreting it right" is not a sensible criticism. It's not a criticism at all, it is an admission of failure. — S

The problem here though, is that I've asked you to explain what you mean, in a way that does make sense me, and you've failed to do that. You keep resorting to unconventional and improvised definitions of your terms, which indicates that what you are saying doesn't even make sense to yourself. If you have to improvise fabricated meanings of the words you use, in order to convince yourself that what you are saying makes sense, then it's quite clear that you do not even know what you are trying to say, yourself.

The use of fabricated, improvised, unconventional definitions of your terms indicates that there is a problem with what you are trying to say, the meaning you are trying to purvey, not with my interpretation of what you have said. It's evident that you cannot say what you want to say in a way that makes sense. And it's not just me, but other people have told you that in this thread as well. This is evidence that there is a problem with what you are saying, rather than a problem with my interpretation of it.

All I have to do is point this out, and I've done that here in this comment, and once is enough, so even if you repeatedly make the same error, I would've already dealt with it. — S

To insist "the problem is yours if you can't make sense of what I am saying", is pure selfishness. There is no point to even trying to communicate with an attitude like that.

Here's the problem, see if you can resolve the problem in a way that makes sense. How can there be such a thing as "what a rock is", or "what an hour is", if there are no human beings with those ideas? And if there is no such thing as 'what a rock is", when all the people are dead, it doesn't make sense to speak as if there is. If you admit to "Platonic Realism", under this ontology there is an Idea of "Rock", and an Idea of "Hour", independent of human existence, I will accept this as a reasonable explanation.

This is not too far form free will, either. If one follows a rule is one acting freely? — Banno

I explained this earlier, one may freely choose to follow a rule. The more relevant question would be whether one could act freely without following a rule. Could something which does not follow a rule be an act at all?

So go look at the Wiki argument on private language. I wrote much of it, anyway. — Banno

That's why we're best to avoid getting our information from Wikipedia, it's very unreliable.

All good. Half of irrational is still irrational. — Mww

Rather than this way is half of irrational, I'd say the other way is doubly irrational.

So, when I ask how many hours would pass in a year after we've all died... — S

It's just as nonsensical, to talk about years when there's no human beings, as it is to talk about hours, and as it is to talk about rocks. So this approach gets you nowhere. What "a year" is, is a human idea, and without human beings there are no such ideas. So without human beings there is no such thing as what a year is, nor is there what an hour is, nor what a rock is. And the op is nonsensical.

The scenario would be exactly the same if it had been stated as, POOF!!! All humans are gone. Are there still rocks and do rocks have the same meaning? That would have saved exactly half the argument’s intrinsic irrationality. — Mww

Half an irrational argument still leaves us with something irrational. S likes to veil behind semantic maneuvers, the simple fact that without anyone to establish a relationship between words like "rock" and "hour", and what those words refer to, the words really are meaningless. So regardless of the fact that you and I and everyone else have ideas of what a "rock" is and what an "hour" is, after we all die there is no such thing as what a "rock" is, or what an "hour" is, because what a "rock" is, and what an "hour" is, are ideas, and there would be no one who holds those ideas. Therefore it's irrational for S to speak about there being such a thing as what a rock is, and what an hour is, after everyone is dead.

In saying this however, Witty also wants to stave off another misunderstanding that may follow from this: the idea that language is somehow then a degraded or less-perfect thing than logic. The basic idea is that logic if not an 'ideal language' of which specific instances of human language are lesser forms of. In saying this, Witty interestingly sheds light not only on language, but on logic as well: following (his understanding of) Ramsey, Witty understands logic to be a matter of construction, something 'made' and not 'found'. — StreetlightX

I think that this is the importance of 81. It is a separating of the notion of "perfect" from the notion of "ideal", such that perfection can be something other than the ideal. We can characterise mathematics and logic as ideal languages, but everyday language is no less perfect in its existence as everyday language, than the constructed ideal languages of logic. So it will come out in the following sections that "inexact" does not mean "imperfect". Metaphysically, or ontologically, perfection inheres within the existence of language itself, and is not to be found in the form that it takes.

This has deep implications with respect to how we apprehend the relationship between rules and language. If we characterize ideal languages as languages whose existence is dependent on rules, and strict adherence to rules, then everyday language escapes this characterization, of "rule-based" and does not appear to be governed by rules. But if we characterize "rules" in a different way, such that the ambiguity found within everyday language inheres within the rules themselves, then everyday language can still be said to consist of rules. The two perspectives create two distinct possibilities for the relationship between language and rules. On the one hand, only ideal languages are instances of following rules, and so the construction of rule based languages follows from everyday language which is not rule based. On the other hand, all language use involves rules, but rules are inherently ambiguous, such that different people can go different ways following the same rule.

The two different perspectives create completely different interpretations of what Wittgenstein is saying at 81, and indecision as to exactly what he is saying is evident in the different translations. Here I will repost what I said about #81 last month.

81 is quite difficult, and I believe pivotal to an understanding of Wittgenstein's belief of how rules apply within language. Here's the concluding paragraph from each, ed. 3, and ed. 4

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning,
and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and
did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or
understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. — Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, ed. 3

All this, however, can appear in the right light only when one has
attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning
something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may
mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a
sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating a calculus
according to definite rules. — Philosophical Investigations, trans. Anscombe, Hacker, Schulte, ed. 4

Notice the disagreement between "lead us", and "mislead us". I believe that this ambiguity is indicative of what Wittgenstein means when he says that someone operates according to a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

I believe that what follows in the next section of the PI is indication that Wittgenstein takes the position that all language use is an instance of following rules, and that ambiguity is inherent with rules themselves. The reason for the reference to being "mislead" is found in the reference to "definite rules". Ideal languages such as logic use "definite rules", but everyday language uses more ambiguous rules. That one is not more "perfect" than the other is found at #98:

"That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence." --- Philosophical Investigations. #98

At 82 - 84 you'll see that he describes situations in which rules are being followed, even when we cannot say what the rule is which is being followed. Even if we play a game in which we make up rules as we go, we would be following rules in making up the rules. At 85, a rule is described as a 'sign-post". The sign-post does not tell you which way to go, your interpretation of the sign post tells you which way to go. From this, we can conclude that Wittgenstein opts for the position that rules are inherently ambiguous, and that all instances of using language are instances of using rules, despite the fact that the rules are not "definite rules", and the same rule (sign-post) might lead one person in one direction, and another person in another direction. Therefore the "perfection" of language is found in its very existence, as the existence of rules (signs), despite their ambiguity, and it is not found in the exactness, or the ideal nature, of any rules.

If you're not willing to engage the argument on its own terms, but instead misinterpret it and bring in your own premises, then what are you even doing here? Please go away. — S

The terms of the discussion are specifically:

There is a rock, but no one is there to perceive it, because we all died an hour previously.

Is there a rock? Yes or no? — S

You have failed to explain how "we all died an hour previously" makes any sense at all. Who is going to determine this point in time an hour after we all died?

Set an alarm clock of some kind for an hour, kill off all the humans.......what does the alarm sound or look like? — Mww

Right, you, or S more likely, is going to set the alarm clock the moment you die, and assume that you are the last to die.

If the alarm is not sensed, the indication for the duration of an hour is not intelligibly given. If there is no intelligible indication given for an hour, there is no reason to think there would be an intelligible indication given for the duration of a day. If not an hour or a day, then no intelligible division of time at all follows. If no division of time, then there would be no indication of time itself. Humans “tell” time; no humans, no time “telling”. No time “telling”, no temporal reference frame, time itself becomes nothing. — Mww

Yes, this is what S refuses to acknowledge. Human beings "tell time", and "an hour" is a human being telling time. Not only would the ringing of the alarm not be sensed, but the alarm would not even be set. This whole talk of "an hour after all human beings died", is utter nonsense.

Nicely said. I am starting to enjoy how much I can disagree with a person in one thread, then completely agree in the next. Even if it may suggest I (or they, but I will usually assume I) have some inconsistencies in how I analyze each separate topic. — ZhouBoTong

I think we all tend to look at various different issues, or subjects individually. But the more that we can fit them all into one big picture, the more consistency we get within out beliefs.

a) that morality exists in people as “a suite of interrelated other-regarding behaviors that cultivate and regulate complex interactions within social groups (that) includes empathy, reciprocity, altruism, cooperation, and a sense of fairness”. (Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce). These have evolved and are no less a part of being human than having a thumb. I regard them as being objective in the sense that we did not chose to grow a thumb. — Brett

This is slightly different from how I interpreted your reference to objectivity earlier. When you said before, that "morality exists as an objective set of guides", I thought that you meant that there is an objective truth to what is good and bad. Now I interpret what you are saying as it's an objective truth that humans have morality. This leaves open the question of whether our determinations of good and bad are objectively true or not, or whether there even is such a thing.

But, this morality as we understand it, is essentially the same as it’s always been. — Brett

How can this be the case though? It is quite common that two different people, or two distinct societies disagree on moral issues. And it's not just small things, some societies used to practise human sacrifice. Even in the Old Testament, God was portrayed as jealous and vindictive, He'd smite you if you were unfaithful. These are not good moral traits by today's standards.

So you say that it's an objective fact that human's have morality, that they distinguish bad from good. And, you seem to want to say that since the classifications, of which sort of actions are good, and which sort are bad, haven't changed much over the years, these distinctions which we make concerning bad and good, are to some extent, objectively true. But doesn't this really exclude the possibility of moral differences and the difference of opinion on moral issues, which exists between us? And if we downplay these differences, don't we also downplay the need to make the effort to resolve these differences? Wouldn't you agree that a big part of "morality" is being able to negotiate these differences, and work out solutions, compromise?

Oh look, another misrepresentation. I claim no such thing. I claim that an hour would pass, not your nonsense-claim that a measurement of time would pass. For an hour not to pass, time would have to stop before an hour had passed, and I don't recall you making that argument. Instead, you make the argument of a sophist where you play around with semantics like a child with Play-Doh. — S

We've been through this already. Time passes continuously. An hour is a measurement of time. You said it yourself, an hour is a unit of measurement. For there to be a point in time an hour after all human beings died, requires that someone measure and designate that point in time. Otherwise there is just continuous time without any human beings to determine specific points in time. So "an hour after all humans died" is nonsensical. Your op assumes such a point in time, and asks whether there would be a rock at this point in time. But despite your insistence, there are no such points in time. These points in time are human determinations.

For an hour not to pass, time would have to stop before an hour had passed, and I don't recall you making that argument. — S

This is very clearly false. For an hour to pass requires that someone measures an hour. Without anyone measuring, time could pass forever without any hours passing. You have reified "an hour", which you have already insisted is a unit of measurement. But time rather than "hours" is the real thing. So without humans, time passes, not hours. Regardless of your false representation of time as hours passing, there are no such hours passing, just time passing and human measurement of hours.

The reason why I say that physicalism is not the biggest problem for free will is that we could even grant that physicalism is false and idealism is true, but if it is the case that for every event that occurs, there is a cause for that event's existence, then libertarian free will is still false.
Is it necessary for uncaused causes to be possible for libertarian free will to be possible?
Can anyone here present a theory of causation that allows for libertarian free will? — Walter Pound

It's not hard to propose a theory of causation which allows for libertarian free will. It is easily done with dualist principles, and a separation between efficient cause and final cause. Final cause is what you call the "uncaused cause", and efficient cause is when one event causes another event. So a final cause is not itself an event because according to dualist principles it is not physical, yet it may cause an event.

You may well call time a dimension but Kant does not follow; he calls it a pure intuition, one of two, the other space. — Mww

Right, as an intuition, time for Kant is ideal, just like space. So uniting time with space, as a dimension, naturally follows from this act of classifying the two together. Notice that I classed space as ideal, and time as non-ideal.

Thinking away every possible property belonging to an object, such that all that is left of it is the time of it......that’s what makes time ideal. — Mww

Properties are ideal, they are how we describe our perceptions. If you think away all the properties of objects, until you are left with only one thing, time, then that is the thing which is non-ideal.

Same for space. The two things that cannot be thought away. — Mww

Space can be thought away though. That's what gives us imaginary things, and concepts in general, these are objects which have no spatial existence.

But the actual morals themselves do not change that much over time, hence my including Doestoevsky. — Brett

But my point would be that related to morality, Shakespeare is not cliche, but just outdated and wrong. — ZhouBoTong

Brett assumes the existence of objective moral principles, so the changes in moral customs over time are downplayed, human beings at some times are just not properly representing the objective principles.

I guess I’m trying to focus on two things:

a: that morality exists as an objective set of guides on our behaviour (I await the howls).

b: that art, primarily writing, explains it: Homer, Shakespeare, Doestoevsky. — Brett

The problem is that even if there are such objective moral principles, upheld by God or some such thing, then we have to allow for human knowledge of these principles to grow and evolve, just like our knowledge of the natural world grows and evolves. This means that ancient mores and customs, may now be determined as "wrong". But also we need to respect the fact that any mores and customs at any time, may be "wrong", and this applies even now. At any given time of "now", the practised customs may be wrong. If an artist apprehends an existing custom as wrong, that person must employ creative skill, tact, in shedding light on that custom as wrong, to avoid scorn by the general population.

I’m too old-fashioned for that, I guess; to me dimensions are what make standards of measurement possible. — Mww

Call "dimensions" "what make standards of measurement possible" if you like, but it's still ideal, just like the idea of "unity", or "unit" is what makes counting possible. Making time a dimension is what makes time ideal, this follows Kant. Space is ideal, time is not. I believe that such category mistakes are very destructive to metaphysics. But there is a monist approach which denies that such categories are based in anything real in the first place. To me, this produces incoherent, unintelligible metaphysics

I think you’re right about those who desire to be good but can’t resist the temptation to be bad. Except I’m not sure that they’re giving into a temptation to be bad. That’s like being bad for the sake of it, choosing to be bad. It’s possibly more like something overriding their morality, like making a decision which will enhance their position, like Eichmann, who made a career move and put his morals aside for the moment. But did he actually have morals to ignore, for instance had they not been cultivated enough by his environment? I imagine he simply pushed them aside. So the desire to be moral was not there at each one of those decision making moments. — Brett

I like to put this issue in the context of habits. Sometimes we form bad habits, and they are often difficult to break. We know that the habit is bad, and that it is good to break that habit, but one might not have the willpower to do it, and end up continuing to do the bad thing. I also believe that moral training is more than just learning good behaviour patterns, the critical part is in learning good thinking habits. Thinking is an activity like any other activity, and a large part of it is habitual. So when we're extremely young, babies, our consciousness, and therefore thinking habits are just starting to develop. At this level, where the conscious borders on the subconscious, or unconscious, is where emotions affect our thinking habits. I think it is essential to develop good thinking habits at this level, when we're very young, because it is much more difficult to break bad habits later in life than it is to develop good habits when we're young.

To be moral you would at least need the desire to be moral. Otherwise to act morally would just be an automatic action instilled in you from outside, an unquestioning act, which is not morality.
...
I guess this means that we must always chose to be moral. — Brett

I believe the relationship between choice and habit is complicated. Habitual actions are often carried out without choice, or there's a choice for a related action, which necessitates the habitual action. For example, if I choose to go to the corner store, I will get up and start moving my legs to walk. I don't really choose to move my legs when I'm walking, it just happens by habit. But my choice, and the willingness, to go to the store, makes the habitual actions take over. So the "automatic action", is instilled in me from an earlier time, when I had the desire to learn. The desire to learn allowed me to make the great effort required to learn how to walk, then it became a habit, requiring little effort. You see this in learning to ride a bike, learning to play sports, learning to play a musical instrument, etc.. these things are very hard to learn, at the time, requiring strong desire, and great effort, but once they are learned they become second nature. I think that learning good thinking habits, and learning morality are like this.

We choose, and choose agin and again. If that choice follows a pattern, it follows a rule. But then,if the choice follows a rule, is it free? — Banno

This is not a case of that person following a rule though, it is a case of the person's choices following a rule. So you cannot proceed from this premise, that the person's choices follow a rule, to make any conclusion about whether or not that person is free. That is why it is necessary to determine what it means for a person to follow a rule, before we can make any conclusions about the person's freedom. The person might have freely chosen to follow a rule in making those choices.

First, I was leaving the argument with that as the major premise to you because you brought it up, and second, I don’t think S is ready to accept the absolute ideality of time with respect to human experience. — Mww

I wouldn't accept the absolute ideality of time either. But S claims that the measurement of time, "an hour" in the op, could occur without a human being to measure it.

Still, scientists nowadays are attributing to time a reality most philosophers are reluctant to admit. Hell, they’ve even made it a dimension, of all things. Can you believe it???? — Mww

Dimensions though, are just standards of measurement. The convention is to assume a line as one dimension, and then construct other dimensions with right angles. Time is added as a fourth dimension to account for movement within the three assumed spatial dimensions. But it is not necessary to use any particular number of dimensions, as an infinity of them can be conceived.

. Rocks before means rocks after, without regard to any other conditions. Period. That’s that. I didn’t recognize the reasonableness of the argument because the reasoning is irrational, insofar as no room is allowed for explanatory or logical alternatives. — Mww

S continues in refusing to recognize the true nature of temporal existence. Human beings are living at the present, and there is a fundamental difference between past and future which makes the present a real temporal perspective, and change a reality. But this fundamental difference, and the reality of change, denies the possibility of making the deductive conclusion that what has been in the past, will be in the future.

Is it your thought that empathy has contributed to morality? — Brett

Yes, I would agree that empathy contributes to morality, but in itself as an emotion, it is neither moral nor immoral. And I believe that feelings, emotions in general, are prior to morality. Perhaps non-human animals demonstrate emotions. But one might also argue that training house pets is a form of morality.

Is the desire to be moral itself moral? — Brett

No, the desire to be moral is definitely not the same as being moral. This is demonstrated by those who desire to be good, and learn what is good, but cannot resist the temptation to do what is bad, despite knowing that it is bad. The desire to be moral would have to be classified with the other emotions, like love and empathy, which are likely necessary for morality, but do not necessarily produce morality. These emotions which are conducive to morality, because they co-exist with other unwanted emotions like frustration and hate and they feedback in a sort of bipolar way, need to be cultivated to actually bring about a moral being

This is why I think that the concept of innate morality is fundamentally inconsistent with the concept that art is important to morality. Art is a form of communication, and communication is the way that we learn things from others which we do not know innately. So if morality were innate, there would be no reason for art to express morality, and artwork could not be important to morality. But if we separate the desire to be moral, from actually being moral, then the desire to be moral may be innate, and art may help us to satisfy that desire.

If to follow a rule, in the sense of willful human actions, is to hold within one's mind a principle, and adhere to that principle, then all rules are private. If to follow a rule, in the sense of willful human actions, is described as something other than this, then I think it's likely that you have an incoherent description of what it means to follow a rule, in the sense of willful human actions.

Secondly, if you want to claim that mere logic tells us anything about the world, then provide an example. — Janus

As I said, I really don't know what you would mean by "mere logic". Human beings use logic, as a tool like S says, so there's no such thing as logic telling us something, we tell ourselves something with the use of logic.

Thirdly, when you say we can use logic to know about places we haven't been that would, if anything, only tell us what kinds of things we could possibly experience if we were there. It tells us about the forms our experiences could take, not about their content. And it cannot tell us anything about whether, as per the example, a rock is there when no one is around. — Janus

And I don't understand how you use "content" here. In such an experience, logic would be the "content". If you were at the place, your perceptions would form the content. In neither case would the supposed object being perceived, be the content of the experience.

The world is such that it is of certain ways, and we use logic to find out these certain ways. A rock is a certain length, and we use a ruler to find out this certain length. — S

You still do not seem to be grasping the reality of the temporal aspect of the world. The world is changing from one moment to the next. If the world is "a certain way", then it can only be that way for a moment in time, and at the next moment it will be another way. Due to the nature of passing time, and possibility, how the world will be at the next moment is always uncertain. So if the world was a certain way in the last moment, and how it will be in the next moment is uncertain, then at the present it is something between being in a certain way, and being in an uncertain way, or both, or some such thing. However, this is unacceptable according to the law of excluded middle. So to avoid this problem we ought not even talk about "the world" as if "it is of certain ways". Such talk only creates a situation in which the fundamental laws of logic are violated.

I think it's a profound mistake to believe that logic alone can tell us anything about the way the world actually is. — Janus

Logic tells us a lot about the way that the world is. Consider mathematics for example. But I really don't know what you are insinuating with "logic alone". Logic doesn't tell us things, it must be applied, used. When we use logic it is not the logic which is informing us, we are informing ourselves. So we use logic to find out about things, especially concerning things where we haven't been. That's why it doesn't make sense to say that if you haven't been there, you cannot know about it. We can use logic to know about places where we haven't been.

To that I simply would say: "how do you know; you haven't been there"? — Janus

It's demonstrated by logic. That's what logic is good for, telling us about things we haven't experienced. But people like S refuse the logic by finding a way to reject the premises. That way, is to reject conventional definitions of terms, and fabricate new definitions for the purpose of supporting faulty metaphysics.

Oh look, a non sequitur. — S

Do you know what non-sequitur means, or do you just use any words in any random way that pleases you? A simple statement of observation cannot be a non-sequitur, because non-sequitur refers to a conclusion drawn from previous statements. If you think that my observation is false, then say so, and explain why. But why use fancy words which you don't even know the meaning of?

People are always making the wrong moral decisions in life, despite being instructed in what is right and wrong. Why is this? It’s because it’s a continuous necessity to address it in ourselves, to consider our decisions and consequences, to look at the problem we’re confronted with by addressing previous concerns and experience and weighing up our choices. That’s who we are. — Brett

Plato demonstrated that morality is not simply a matter of knowledge, when he argues against the sophists who claimed to teach virtue. It is often the case that we know what is right yet we do what is wrong.

It’s not there to teach morality, it’s to demonstrate the continuous endeavour required by people to be moral, that the problems people may face in themselves have been around a long time and that people overcome their doubts and eventually take the moral position, or they refuse to and pay the price. — Brett

If it is an endeavour, requiring effort, to be moral, then this is inconsistent with morality is innate. I think that morality involves developing good habits and breaking bad habits. I also think that sometimes innate features will incline one toward some bad habits, and this is why it is an endeavour, requiring effort, to be moral. It is also why it is impossible that morality is innate. Morality often involves resisting desires derived from innate features.

When I say that morality is not innate, and that it is learned, I do not mean that it is "imposed" on us. I think it is learned, and learning is a product of the will to learn. So morality must come from within, as the desire to be moral, and that must be an innate tendency, but the desire to be moral is not the same as actually being moral. And this is what Plato demonstrated, one can have the desire to be moral, and learn moral principles, but still behave in an immoral way. So moral behaviour is something which needs to be cultivated, learned, but it is a distinct form of knowledge in the sense that it is a learning-how as distinct from learning-that. There is a sort of separation between what we know, and how we behave. We develop our habits of how we do things, prior to actually understanding exactly what we are doing with those methods; in many cases forms of behaviour are learned at a very young age. So when we learn a different, better way, of doing things, we may not have the will power to break the old habits and follow the new way. That is why it is important to show individuals good behaviour from a very young age.

There is plenty of research out there demonstrating the sense of empathy among young children as young as 12 months. Behaviour also observed in primates. If the answer is that it is something learned then it has to have existed prior to learning, it had to exist to enable small communities to form and thrive. — Brett

The sense of empathy may be innate, but it needs to be cultivated in order to produce morality. That is what I described in the artist's work of creating an audience. Creating an audience brings people together, and the togetherness which is created by the artist, and enjoyed by the audience, allows for morality to be produced through the cultivation of emotions like empathy which are conducive to morality.

So it's not like morality itself must have existed prior to learning, it is these emotive features, like empathy, which are conducive to morality which existed prior to social structure. The problem is that these innate tendencies toward various emotions are very difficult to describe, and they vary greatly from one person to the other, and also they are prone to develop in different directions in the very young child, depending on how the child is cared for. So to create morality the emotions must be directed. The act which directs them toward morality must be capable of grabbing the attention of (entertaining), multiple different children with various different emotional capacities. This is why there is a need for ambiguity, and the art, as well as the moral story, is presented in a general way rather than in a particular way.