There are some natural occurring instances of the pattern. The mathematical Fibonacci series are intentionally produced. — Janus

Is the naturally occurring pattern a different pattern from the intentionally produced pattern then?

Wittgenstein's solution is to provide a circuit breaker to the regress. We don't need to justify every word or statement, as the regress problem would have it; we only need to provide an explanation in order to avoid a misunderstanding. Wittgenstein cuts off the regress near the surface level of language use, rather than at the foundation. — Luke

If these sign-posts (rules) do not need further explanation, then they are foundational. You are simply calling them "surface level". Anyway, whether it's properly called foundational or surface level is irrelevant, the point is that whatever you call it, it doesn't succeed as an attempt to justify certainty.

It is hard to see why you think that this is a foundationalist philosophy. There is no chain of justification ending at basic beliefs here: "none stands in need of another - unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding". — Luke

There is a problem of infinite regress of explanation described by Wittgenstein at 87. Unless it is the "final" explanation, it is as if the explanation is just hanging in the air. He makes "an attempt to respond to the regress problem", as per your definition of foundationalism. The "none stands in need of another
- unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding", represents that attempt. Call it surface level rather than foundational if you want.

The problem, as I just explained to Banno, is that to avoid misunderstanding requires that we eliminate the possibility of misunderstanding. (In On Certainty he describes objectively certain as logically excluding the possibility of mistake). Remember, what Wittgenstein is trying to curb is doubt, and doubt is induced by the possibility of misunderstanding. But, due to the nature of rules, having the characteristics of sign-posts, there is always a possibility of misunderstanding. Therefore an explanation would always be required to avoid the doubt incurred by the possibility of misunderstanding. So, Wittgenstein's attempt to avoid the infinite regress fails.

That is, the signpost is in order if, under normal circumstances, no further explanation is required to avoid a misunderstanding. Conversely, we avoid a misunderstanding if, under normal circumstances, the signpost (or words used) fulfils its purpose. — Luke

Right, I took this up with unenlightened already. How would one determine "normal circumstances" to know whether an explanation is required or not, to avoid misunderstanding. Further, how would you know whether or not the sign-post fulfilled its purpose, and avoided misunderstanding until after it is too late to avoid misunderstanding. This principle is completely impotent as an attempt at indicating when an explanation is or is not required. It amounts to stating "If there was normal circumstances, and the sign-post fulfilled its purpose, then misunderstanding was avoided". It tells us nothing about how to know when misunderstanding is probable, and therefore an explanation is required.

Indeed. — Banno

Misunderstanding, therefore explanation was required.

What do you mean by "Fibonacci sequence"? Do you refer to natural phenomena such as the whorls of seeds on the face of a sunflower, or a written series of numbers where each one (except of course the first) is the sum of the two preceding numbers? — Janus

That's what I asked you, don't turn the question back on me. I don't use your system of classification, so I'm asking you, how you would class the Fibonacci sequence. Does it qualify as a naturally produced pattern, or is it an intentionally produced pattern, under your system of classification?

Damn, I didn't want to get drawn in to this. — Banno

Hi Banno, I welcome your contribution to this little problem which seems to be mine only. Getting bored elsewhere?

You added the word possible. — Banno

Right, that's the point. To prevent misunderstanding, requires having measures in place to prevent it, every time misunderstanding is possible. This is implied by "prevent misunderstanding". If you wait until after misunderstanding occurs, and try to fix it at that time, then you haven't prevented misunderstanding. Wittgenstein seems to be trying to dodge this fact.

Following the rule, or not, is shown in the doing. If the actions are in accord with the rules, that will suffice; if the signpost leads us in the right direction, that is all that we require of it. There is no need to dig further; but moreover, digging further would be an error. — Banno

I agree, if by "right direction" you mean as Wittgenstein says, the sign-post (rule) fulfils its purpose. If it fulfils its purpose it has lead you in the right direction. However, the possibility that it will be misunderstood is very real, and that's when explanation is necessary.

Wittgenstein could have stopped there, accepting that the possibility of misunderstanding is very real. If epistemologists said to him, you have a problem because doubt arises from the possibility of misunderstanding, he could have just replied that doubt is a fact of life, if that's a problem for your epistemology, then deal with it. Thus he might provide us with some grounds for skepticism. However, Wittgenstein did not stop there. He seems to have become obsessed with the idea that doubt is some sort of problem, and proceeded in On Certainty, in an attempt to limit doubt in some foundationalist way. But why? If his description of rules is accurate, and the result is that propositions of doubt and skepticism are valid propositions, then so be it.

it's as if you were asking why the bishop only move diagonally, and wanting not an explanation from the history of the game, but a further rule within the game. — Banno

I don't see what you are saying. The rule is the sign-post. I see a sign-post, (rule) and I'm not certain that I understand what it is telling me. If I need other sign-posts to understand that sign-post, then the probability of misunderstanding likely increases. Also, infinite regress is possible. My best option might be to proceed in the direction that I think the sign-post is telling me, but without certainty, with some degree of doubt.

Again I'd suggest moving on, since there is no further way to convince Meta that it's a rabbit and a duck if he only sees the duck. The point must be taken as moot. As the conversation moves on, other points of disagreement will arise. — Banno

I think you have the roles reversed. I see the rabbit and the duck, skepticism and foundationalism. The problem is that to assume both is incoherent. If the sign-post (rule) is designed such that it will tell you both "I'm a duck", and "I'm a rabbit", then it's not a sign-post (rule) at all, because it's designed to confuse you. And when the purpose is to confuse you, we call that deception. We ought not allow so-called sign-posts, whose purpose is to deceive, fulfil their purpose.

What is not being appreciated, is that the OP is written 'post Descartes'. Descartes divided the whole issue along completely different lines to Aristotle. So from a post-Cartesian point of view, of course Aristotle's conception of matter doesn't make sense. But the question uncritically operates from a post-Cartesian point of view, which of course we nowadays all embody, without understanding what that shsift in perspective really entails. In order to properly critique the Aristotelian conception of 'hyle' requires an understanding of the context in which such an idea made sense. — Wayfarer

The Cartesian division, body and mind is a step backward from Aristotle. That's the division, along with its problems, that Plato dealt with. The problems, in dividing reality along those lines are irresolvable as Plato demonstrated. Aristotle's solution was to divide the entirety of reality by dualist principles (matter and form). So as where Aristotle made a move to bring dualism into the range of intelligibility, the Cartesian shift is a move which makes dualism appear incomprehensible.

Intentionally produced patterns are not the same as naturally occurring patterns; the former are semantically meaningful, and the latter are not — Janus

How would you class the Fibonacci sequence? Is it a naturally occurring pattern, void of semantic meaning, or is it intentionally produced?

To remove doubt, we seek an explanation. But then the explanation requires an explanation, and unless it's the final one, it's as if the explanation is hung in the air. Wittgenstein prevents this possibility of infinite regress of doubt and explanation, by asserting that an explanation is only needed, "if required to prevent a misunderstanding".

That is the point I've been arguing. Notice that "to prevent a misunderstanding" implies that an explanation is needed any time misunderstanding is possible. If we cannot remove the possibility of misunderstanding, then an explanation is required. The nature of the rules for understanding, as Wittgenstein describes them as sign-posts, is such that there is always the possibility of misunderstanding the rule. That's the nature of a sign-post, as W describes. Therefore it appears like an explanation is required for everything, if we are to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding. Wittgenstein recognizes this problem in the following statement:

It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap
in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we
first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then remove all these
doubts. — 87

So he offers as a resolution, to eliminate that doubt, and secure the foundation, "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." But this principle is completely impotent. for its intended purpose,

I didn't say it wasn't philosophical thinking; I said it wasn't foundational philosophical thinking. See Foundationalism. — Luke

In relation to what is said at 87, this statement is questionable.

But, of course, you should follow Wittgenstein. :grin: — Luke

I agree, but despite his claims that doubt can sometimes be excluded, he hasn't shown me any principles whereby we can actually expect to exclude doubt in relation to any of our knowledge. So his position, even though he may have claimed otherwise, seems to be very supportive of skepticism.

Wittgenstein in no way attempts to "establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed". This type of foundational philosophical thinking is rejected by Wittgenstein, and is a way of thought he is attempting to subvert via his therapeutic writing. The next 40-50 passages in the text seek to disabuse the reader of thinking in these ideal terms. Most of us - philosophers and non-philosophers alike - proceed in many of our daily activities with certainty without the need for any perfect epistemological foundation. — Luke

I suggest you reread 85-87. It is all philosophical thinking, regardless of whether Wittgenstein says otherwise.

85: "the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one."

The proposition that a sign-post sometimes leaves no room for doubt is not an empirical proposition, it's a philosophical proposition. The degree of doubt which an individual has, cannot be observed. empirically. And, the fact that an individual will proceed into an activity does not mean that the person does not have doubt concerning the success or failure of the activity. We often proceed into actions with doubt concerning the action's success. So we cannot use the empirical observation that the person is proceeding to act, to conclude that there is no doubt. This is a philosophical proposition made by Wittgenstein.

Further, the entirety of 87, discussing the need for explanation to avoid misunderstanding, along with the conclusion, "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." is philosophical, and not empirical. The status of one's understanding, like the status of one's doubt cannot be empirically observed. And the judgement of whether something fulfils a purpose is not an empirical judgement because a purpose cannot be observed empirically, to determine whether the thing has fulfilled that purpose. So this quoted statement is clearly a philosophical proposition rather than empirical.

Therefore, if Wittgenstein proceeds to reject such philosophical thinking, then that is just more evidence of the incoherency of his position. The means by which he attempts to exclude doubt, is a philosophical argument, and a defective one at that. He really should not have ventured into that philosophical issue, and completely left aside the subject of doubt. It clearly is a philosophical subject, rather than an empirical subject, and his attempt to make it empirical is a failure. That his intent, in venturing into the subject of doubt, was to establish a foundation for an epistemology, is evident in On Certainty.

Most of us - philosophers and non-philosophers alike - proceed in many of our daily activities with certainty without the need for any perfect epistemological foundation. — Luke

I agree with this, many people, myself included, often claim to be certain. That is our habitual way of talking which is derived from our background of platonic idealism. Platonic idealism provides the grounds for certainty, in independent Forms, and it is the principal ontology of Christianity so it is bedrock in our linguistic habits. The point is that if we adhere to Wittgenstein's principles, that rules are sign-posts, we ought to recognize that these claims of certainty are unjustifiable. This leaves us with two options, either we accept that we ought not claim certainty, because such claims are false under our ontological principles, or we reject Wittgenstein's principles, which may allow us to find a way to justify our claims of certainty in another form of ontology. The problem is in trying to maintain both, our claims of certainty, and W's ontology of rules, because they are inconsistent with each other.

When you say 'phrase', I assume you mean 'tasty sausage', is that right? — unenlightened

You've almost got it, but "phrase" is different from "tasty sausage", so that's not quite it. Every time someone says "phrase", they mean to say "phrase". But every time someone says "phrase", they might not be using the word in the same way as another time. So how can you be certain of how the person is using "phrase" at any particular time? Look at Wittgenstein's example of "Moses".

What I said, or at least meant to say is that my certainty of whether or not there is "a green growing thing that I can see through my window", is dependent on the certainty that I have an unmistakably correct understanding of what that phrase means. If I cannot be certain that my understanding of the phrase is not mistaken, then I cannot be certain as to whether or not the phrase is true. And, the belief that the rules for understanding are like sign-posts, leaves me in the position where I cannot be certain that I am not misunderstanding the meaning of the phrase. Therefore I cannot be certain whether or not the phrase is true, and so I do not agree that there is no uncertainty.

We can argue about nomenclature, but it is a different kind of uncertainty entirely, and one that W. also goes into exhaustively. Why muddy the waters instead of dealing with the example given, and the special circumstances given? — unenlightened

I am not the one muddying the waters, nomenclature is what is at issue here. The rule stands like a sign-post. The words, as sign-posts, are themselves, the "rules" for understanding themselves. The question is whether we can remove the possibility of misunderstanding the words, and thereby remove doubt.

Yeah language can become divorced from context and so meaning can become less clear and certain.
But again you are not dealing with the challenge but posing a different language problem. Deal with the tree, or the shrub if you want to call it a shrub. Deal with the source of the uncertainty of its being, not the uncertainty of its name. You seem to me to want to run to a linguistic confusion in order to avoid dealing with the argument. — unenlightened

The problem is this. One cannot proceed to judge the certainty of the truth or falsity of the statement "that is a tree", until one has certainty with respect to the meaning of the word "tree". Certainty of meaning underlies certainty of truth or falsity. If there is no certainty of the meaning, there can be no certainty as to truth or falsity of the statement. Wittgenstein is questioning the certainty we have in relation to what the words mean, at 87 specifically, whether or not an explanation is needed to avoid misunderstanding the words (sign-post). The doubt we are concerned with is doubt in relation to understanding or misunderstanding the sign-posts. The foundation of certainty is certainty of meaning, and there cannot be any certainty with respect to truth or falsity without certainty of meaning.

Wittgenstein's ontology removes the certainty of meaning, which is granted to us in an ontology like platonic realism, which asserts an objective, and independent meaning to the words as independent Forms. Assuming independent Forms can give us certainty that there is "the meaning" to the words, and we can base certainty that we understand 'the meaning" on this certainty. But if we deny that there is such as thing as "the meaning", which Wittgenstein does, then where do we base any certainty that we have understood, and not misunderstood the words?

Despite your talk of uncertainly you seem certain that you have understood Wittgenstein, and that his epistemology is incoherent, and that those who do not agree with you have not been paying sufficient attention. — Fooloso4

I wouldn't be inviting people to explain to me where I've gone wrong, if I was certain that I hadn't gone wrong. That's nonsense. I put that out there as a topic to be discussed, to see if someone else could provide the foundation which I believe Wittgenstein has not provided. Or, to show me where I've misunderstood the words which are supposed to provide the foundation, which I have not found.

The irony is that you have not "been mislead by Wittgenstein's words". It is not the words that are misleading. Like the signpost, someone can always interpret it in the wrong way, but that is not the fault of the signpost. — Fooloso4

Right, that's my point isn't it? If there is the possibility that I might be interpreting the words in the wrong way, how do I remove the doubt I have in relation to my understanding?

When I come to stop sign I do not wait for a go sign to appear before proceeding. There is no room for doubt, but someone who does not know what a stop sign is might never go any further once he has seen "stop". — Fooloso4

Another person might not even stop at the stop sign. So, when you proceed from the stop sign, after stopping, you ought to proceed with doubt, being aware of the possibility that another person may not stop. Being certain, I understand, and the other person misunderstands, doesn't protect you from the other person's folly of misunderstanding. Therefore the form of certainty which you are pushing for, is an unjustified certainty.

Not really, because in the very next sentence of §85 - which is unchanged in both the third and fourth editions - W says: "Or rather, it sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes not." You've willfully ignored this sentence for the last few pages of this discussion, and built your 'incoherent epistemology' thesis around the claim that W says "leaves no room for doubt" (only). — Luke

I haven't ignored this statement, that is the very quote I referred to when I started this discussion. My argument was, that according to Wittgenstein's ontology of rules, every situation leaves some degree of uncertainty, and therefore some room for doubt. He does not provide the premises required for the conclusion "sometimes there is no room for doubt".

This is Wittgenstein's view, which is what everyone here has been trying to tell you. — Luke

I fully realize that this is "Wittgenstein's view". The question is whether his stated "view" is consistent with his description. His description is what I have called his ontology of rules, rules exist like sign-posts. His stated "view" is the foundation of his epistemology. If there is inconsistency between these two, as I have argued, then his epistemology is incoherent. So the question is whether we can proceed logically from his ontology, the description of rules existing as sign-posts, to his epistemology, his "view" that sometimes there is no room for doubt.

At 86 - 87 he proceeds to describe the need for explanation in order to exclude the possibility of misunderstanding the sign-post, the rule. It doesn't make sense to him, that we would always need an explanation to avoid doubt, because this would mean that the explanation would need an explanation, etc., resulting in infinite regress, then doubt could not be avoided. So his claim is that we only need an explanation if an explanation is necessary to avoid misunderstanding. And, therefore, the sign-post requires no further explanation if under "normal circumstances" it fulfills its purpose.

My argument is that to exclude doubt, to leave no room for doubt, requires that the possibility of misunderstanding be removed. So I can say that what is stated here, at 87 is insufficient for removing doubt.

"Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none stands in need of another—unless we require it to prevent a misunderstanding."

What is needed to remove doubt, is to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding. Wittgenstein's statement here really makes no sense, because we often do not know whether or not there is a misunderstanding. In these cases we do not know whether misunderstanding has been prevented. So we do not know whether an explanation is needed or not. Therefore doubt is justified. But if Wittgenstein had made the necessary statement, "an explanation is needed when required to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding", this would not support his epistemological principle, that sometimes doubt can be removed. An explanation would always be needed to remove the possibility of misunderstanding, and an explanation of the explanation, etc.. If there is a possibility of misunderstanding, then doubt cannot be removed, no matter how low the probability of misunderstanding is.

The appropriate way for Wittgenstein to deal with the infinite regress of explanation which is required to remove the possibility of misunderstanding, is to accept the fact that doubt cannot be excluded. This simply means that we proceed in our activities without certainty. And, this thing which he attempts to do, establish the foundations for an epistemology in which doubt has been removed, and there is certainty, is impossible. His description of rules, as sign-posts, does not provide what is needed to remove doubt and provide certainty in any circumstances.

Doubt (as we are addressing it) is a conscious activity. Do we agree? — javra

No, I don't agree with that. I am closer to unenlightened's characterisation which has doubt and certainty as a frame of mind. It's an attitude, the way we approach things, which affects our conscious activities. Either way, the attitude of doubt, or the attitude of certainty, is cultured into our habitual ways of acting and thinking, such that it is not necessary to consciously choose to be certain or doubtful. However, I do agree that there are levels of certainty and doubt which are properly conscious certainties and doubts.

I did not understand you division between uncertainty, and doubt, but now I think I see it. You seem to be positioning uncertainty and certainty as frames of mind, attitudes, and then placing doubt as a conscious activity. Your argument appears to be that we cannot proceed into any activity without certainty, therefore the activity of doubting requires certainty. My argument is that we can and do proceed into activities without certainty, and this is evident in other animals which do not have the rational capacity to produce certainty, but still act.

But let me take your premise, that doubting is an activity, and see where it leads. Let's start with the assumption that animals may act (and this includes mental acts), without certainty. Do you agree that certainty comes into existence from rational activity? If so, wouldn't this rational activity which creates certainty be going on when the animal is uncertain. And wouldn't this be a form of doubt? Or, do you place certainty as some underlying attitude, which even animals without rational capacity have?

So, when doubting the location of the cup, can one simultaneously doubt that one is doubting, and furthermore doubt that one is in doubt about one's doubting of where the cup is, and this in infinite regress, at a level of momentary conscious awareness? If not, one will be psychologically certain that one is in doubt at the moment one is in doubt. Thereby making global doubt a psychological impossibility. — javra

As I said already, I see no inconsistency between doubt and infinite regress. Doubt is a feature of infinite regress. Doubt is inherent within infinite regress because infinite regress is a lack of resolution. So when one considers the possibility of infinite regress, that person is doubtful, and this does not mean that the person is actively thinking about an infinite number of different thoughts. This argument, that certainty must underlie doubt, or else there would be an infinite regress of doubt, is fundamentally flawed, because infinite regress is consistent with doubt. It is only certainty which requires the removal of infinite regress. If we cannot find the principles to remove the infinite regress, then doubt is what we have, as doubt is consistent with infinite regress, and therefore certainty is lost.

But, then, if by "global doubt" one intends to express the held psychological certainty that there are no infallible certainties, this would in itself be a position one is certain about - and this, of itself, contradicts the position of global doubt. — javra

This is just not true. One can hold a belief without being certain that what is believed is true. Faith and religion are based in this fact. We believe without certainty. So to believe that there are no infallible certainties does not require that one is certain about this. The opposite, what you've described, is blatant misrepresentation produced for the purpose of supporting your untenable epistemological position.

Notice that engaging the clutch does not stop the engine; it just sits there spinning away - not unlike Metaphysician Undercover, with whom I and others have had this discussion many times over the years. — Banno

You mean disengaging the clutch don't you? If it is true that we need certainty with respect to our understanding of the sign-post before we proceed, as some here seem to be arguing, we'll sit here spinning away, forever. And, if we proceed on the premise that certainty can be produced without removing doubt, we proceed on a false premise. Equally false is the premise that doubt can be removed without removing the possibility of misunderstanding the sign-post. So, do we or do we not proceed on the premise that doubt cannot be removed from our interpretation of the sign-post, and therefore we are uncertain as to whether or not we are proceeding in the right direction?

I think you're packing several weeks of a course on Aristotle into a few paragraphs. I accept it as ground for thinking about Aristotle's thought on this topic. — tim wood

The truth is, I've had more than one course on Aristotle, and have written numerous papers on his work. There's a heck of a lot there to study.

As I understand your representation of his argument, it goes something like this:
"This thing here, this "X," I called X yesterday and I call it X today. Yet clearly today's X is not the same as yesterday's X. If not the same, then it changed. But if it changed, then what was X is no longer X."

On its face this seems merely a naming problem. Whether the kitten that becomes a cat or Theseus's boat, what they are called is a matter of convention and the understanding of language in context. I'm not telling or arguing, I am instead supposing that Aristotle would have figured this aspect out faster than it takes to write it. — tim wood

It's not just a naming problem though, it's a problem of getting an epistemology which is consistent with one's ontology. If it was just a naming problem we'd say that yesterday it was X and today it is Y. But this means that we have two distinct objects, X and Y. But we really believe, and our ontology follows our belief, that X and Y are one and the same object with temporal continuity, despite having changed. So for the sake of epistemology we want to say that it is two distinct objects, name them as distinct objects, and get it over with. But our ontology, and true belief, is that there is a temporal continuity, one object which is changing.

Supposing Aristotle dismissed the naming - language - aspect of the paradox as trivial (which I think it is), that leaves his problem of accounting for change. No doubt he observed and was sensitive to change all around him: he could not have questioned the sheer fact of change. In standing beside a mountain stream he would have observed himself captivated by the turbulent inexorability of change flowing and splashing at his feet! — tim wood

it is clear that Aristotle had great respect for the reality of change, that's why it was such an important part of his physics. The problem is that we understand "change" in a way such that some aspect changes, while another aspect stays the same. We do not understand it as a complete ending of what was at one moment, with a completely new beginning at the next. We understand that something persists, and stays the same through the change. So we have contradictory principles within the concept of change, one aspect stays the same as it was, while another aspect is not the same as it was.

It seems to me that invoking a concept of continuous process gets Aristotle from t1 to t2 in complete safety, sophists notwithstanding and in any case mere annoyances (maybe large annoyances, but annoyances nonetheless). The sparkling stream a his feet, the smooth movement of dancers, the wind even in his face, or his kitten that became cat; all these must have been suggestive: why didn't he take on their instruction? — tim wood

The problem is that "continuous process" was fundamentally unintelligible to the logic of his time. That's evident in Zeno.s paradoxes. And, I would argue that quantum physics demonstrates that continuous process remains fundamentally unintelligible. Aristotle posited "matter" as the aspect of reality which gives us the appearance of continuity. The problem is that this concept really tells us very little. It tells us that we observe a certain temporal continuity, but this temporal continuity is fundamentally unintelligible. Nevertheless, he posited "matter" to account for the temporal continuity which appears to us. Newton described the temporal continuity with what we call inertia, and now the inertia of mass has been replaced by the conservation of energy. But continuous process remains fundamentally unintelligible.

As astute a mind as Aristotle's must have grasped this. Indeed did, inasmuch as he recognized a problem that he tried to solve. But his solution I find peculiar in that he retreated to metaphysics, the thinking about the thinking, and then apparently tried to make the μετα, the about which, the real. Had he remained in the physics of the thing, I think he would have buried the problem for all time. I wonder why he didn't. — tim wood

The thinking about thinking is central to his ethics. The problems of metaphysics were far from solved, as they remain today, but Aristotle figured contemplation, thinking about thinking was the most virtuous activity.
,

Of course we have his problem's difficult descendant in quantum theory, in which the continuity of the discontinuity of things is resolved in probability. — tim wood

Right, the problem of continuity remains, but it is now in an evolved state. Probability is not a resolution though, because it cannot replace explanation.. Mathematics with probability brings us to the point of prediction. But being able to predict is far from understanding. Consider that Thales predicted a solar eclipse far before the heliocentric model was proposed. That's the power of mathematics, we can predict without understanding. The spatiotemporal map gives us the capacity to follow patterns, but it doesn't give us the principles behind the patterns..

Let me make it clear: you have misunderstood Wittgenstein. — Fooloso4

To justify this assertion, you ought to address this section of the text, and show me where I've been mislead by Wittgenstein's words.

The third edition has it as "leave no room for doubt", but the fourth edition has it as "leave room for doubt" (at §85). — Luke

Good, this supports my claim that "leaves no room for doubt", is inconsistent with what Wittgenstein was trying to say. And, if he goes on to introduce epistemological principles in "On Certainty", where doubt may be excluded, that would be inconsistent with what he is saying here in PI.

Since you agree with me that he is saying that the rules, as sign-posts, leave room for doubt, then for what reasons do you not agree that his position is consistent with what I've described, what you've called "radical doubt"? This so-called "radical doubt" is the consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology of rules.

I'll have one more go with you Meta, as all my other threads are full of trolls at the moment. — unenlightened

Thanks for the reassurance, I get the impression that the other two here have placed me in the troll category.

It is not by some complex argument or power of reason, but in exactly the same way as the non-philosopher, by going about the world, and coming across these special circumstances, and learning to recognise them in exactly the same way that he learns to recognise a tree. — unenlightened

I would not agree with this statement. I think that the "special circumstances" are brought to light by the power of reason, and complex arguments. Suppose your example goes another way, suppose the person who is asking, differs from the person answering, and says "no that's not a tree, it's a shrub", and then produces of argument for that point of view. The person who claimed that it was a tree, and insisted on certainty, did not know of the special circumstances, without the power of reason and argument.

Remember the knights who are the keepers of the sacred word Ni? Living in a forest of trees, they want a shrubbery.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MYSMPjMVnAU

Each person gets set in one's own habits of seeing the world in a particular way, but the way that each of us sees it, is slightly different from each other. The "special circumstance" which is conducive to doubt, is the situation where we disagree. It's not by going out in the world, that we learn to recognize the special circumstances, it's by having them pointed out to us. Imagine people thousands of years ago. One person points out a rock to another and says look at this rock, I can put it in the fire and separate an element (gold) out from this rock. Until that point, the other person doesn't even see the rock as a special rock. Metaphysicians seek those special circumstances at the foundational level.

I think that this is what the capacity to understand language consists of, seeing every instance as a special instance. This is a fundamental reversal from the perspective of relating the sameness of the use of words, to say that each word has "a meaning". Meaning is related to context, and every instance of usage has its own special context and therefore its own special meaning. The view that each word has "a meaning" is a mistaken view, because the meaning is peculiar to the context. This means that in the context of language usage, every instance is a special circumstance.

Consider what might happen when the context gets old, written material has aged for hundreds of years. Living in a different era now, we have great difficulty determining the meaning of old texts, because this requires putting ourselves in that context. This for example, is always a problem in interpreting religious texts, and has become a notable issue in the interpretation of the 2nd amendment of the USA.

The apparent sophistication of doubt turns out to have no firmer foundation than the naive certainty it replaces. — unenlightened

The point is that there is no firm foundation. The shifting sands of time are what supports the theory of social collapse spoken of by Dr. Bendell in your other thread. Whether a "collapse" or a "shift" is unknown, but change is inevitable. Are you familiar with Kuhn's concept of paradigm shift? The paradigm shift is only made possible by a foundation which is not firm. Wittgenstein was no stranger to Kuhn.

The leading implicit (psychological) certainty in this hypothetical is that “I’ve lost my cup”. Devoid of this certainty, how would doubts as to where it might be begin manifesting? — javra

I don't see how you can make a valid argument here. I'm doubting the location of my cup. But at the same time I might also be doubting if I even had a cup. I'm thinking where's my cup, and start looking, then right away, I realize that I might not have even gotten a cup in the first place. Now I'm wondering where is my cup, and looking for it, but I'm at the very same time wondering if I even have a cup. So I don't see how you can claim any necessary, underlying certainty. It's simply not there. We may proceed into action without certainty of what we are doing. Perhaps it's a function of habit. I want my coffee, so I proceed into looking for where I set it down, before I properly consider whether or not I even got a coffee yet. Proceeding into an habitual action is not a function of certainty.

Aristotle developed the position that knowledge always must lead from the more certain toward the less certain. This means that something with a higher degree of certainty always underlies and supports the thing with the lower degree of certainty. But now we're talking about doubt, and there is nothing to indicate that there must be certainty underlying doubt. We naturally doubt the less certain things first, but this may lead us to doubt the underlying things which are more certain. I doubt where the cup is, but this might lead me to doubt whether I even have a cup. And, when we find, as Wittgenstein demonstrates to us, that the meanings of the words which express our knowledge, are themselves dubitable, this justifies doubting the entire structure of knowledge.

Emotive reasons for such statements aside, when it is said, “It is certain that the planet Earth is not flat,” one here affirms, what I’ll term, an ontic certainty: a determinate state of affairs that thereby holds no alternative possibilities. — javra

What is at question in the context of this thread, is the understanding of the phrase "the planet earth is not flat". There is no point to saying "I am certain that ...", until I am certain that I understand what "..." means. Certainty that the statement is true can only be supported by certainty that the statement is not misunderstood. If there are "alternative possibilities" to the meanings of these terms, "planet", "earth", "flat", as Wittgenstein explains that there are possibilities for meaning, then we need to assess the certainty we have with respect to the meaning of the phrase. If I cannot say with certainty, that I know what "the planet earth is not flat" means, then I cannot proceed to have any certainty about whether the statement is true or false.

Devoid of our subjective certainty that there is a relevant, underlying ontic certainty to be discovered, states of uncertainty and doubt become meaningless. — javra

This appears to be fundamentally untrue. We can proceed with doubt as to whether or not such certainty is possible to obtain. This doubt does not prevent us from proceeding. I do not need certainty that I will win the game, before I proceed into playing the game. I do not even need to be certain that winning is possible before I proceed. And, we might never know until after we proceed, whether or not such certainty is possible. Perhaps certainty is impossible, but we do not know that it is impossible, we might never know whether it's possible or not until we attempt to obtain it.

“The cup is on the table” doesn’t express a probability but a fact, which, as facts go, are taken by us to be absolute/total/complete actualities (in so far as they are not mere possibility, or mere potential regarding being). — javra

So what is at issue here is what is meant by "the cup is on the table". We cannot proceed to discuss whether it is certain or not, that this is true, until we are certain of the meaning of the phrase. Since there are a number of possibilities for meaning, then any determination of the meaning of this phrase, whether it is the intended meaning, really is a matter of probability.

More briefly, one must first be certain that something is in fact the case in order to be uncertain or in doubt about what the case might in fact be. — javra

This is a fundamental misrepresentation. One can be uncertain, and in doubt, without even knowing "what the case is" means. So you are assuming that one must know what "what the case is" means, prior to having doubt about what is the case. But that's irrelevant, because the person can still be uncertain and doubtful about what is going on, without even knowing what "what the case is" means. Sure, the person would not be doubting what "is in fact the case", but the person would still be doubting and uncertain. Therefore one does not need to be "certain that something is in fact the case", in order to be doubtful of one's knowledge of the situation.

I think it is no longer worth my time and effort trying to help you see more than your myopic vision allows. It is one thing to discuss the texts but quite another when you resort to personal insult. — Fooloso4

I apologize for classing you with Luke, or any other thing which you may have apprehended as an insult. Insult was not my intention. But it's very frustrating for me, with a sincere desire to discuss the text, to have people showing no indication that they have even read the section in question, insinuating that I have misunderstood what Wittgenstein has said. Only unenlightened has actually engaged me on the basis of the terms in the text. The issue was whether or not Wittgenstein's appeal to "ordinary circumstances" (87), is sufficient to "leave no room for doubt" (85).

My reading of Aristotle. thin enough to be nearly transparent, did not cover anything so deliberate and conscious as his identifying such a problem and trying to resolve it tactically. I'm not arguing here or even asking for citation. But can you expand even a little on that part of Aristotle's thinking? I think of him as mainly an observer and secondarily a thinker about what he has observed. — tim wood

Aristotle is more famous for his principles of logic than anything else. Long after his observational works were replaced by the modern sciences of physics and biology, his logic remained a respectable subject of study

There's a number of concepts involve in what I wrote, and the relationships between them are best explained in his Metaphysics. To begin with, there's at least a couple distinct places, one in his logic, Categories I believe, and another in his Metaphysics where he discusses the incompatibility between being and becoming, this is a problem outlined by Plato. If reality only consists of "what is", and "what is not" being and not being, then change, or becoming is unintelligible, as it escapes the logical principles of being and not being. When there is change, what is at one moment is different from what is at the next. You might say that change is in between. At each moment we have what is, and what is not, and this is different at each consecutive moment of change. If, when we posit something between the two states of being to account for the "becoming" (changing), we posit another state of being, then we have the same problem all over again, and we set up an infinite regress, never able to account for what happens between two states of being. What happens between is becoming, or change. Aristotle complained that sophists had taken advantage of this problem to prove the reality of ridiculous scenarios.

He discusses two possible resolutions. One would be to allow for violation of the law of non-contradiction to account for becoming. The thing could be, some sort of unity of what it is at t1, and what it is at t2, and also what it is not at t1, and what it is not at t2, all together, when it is changing from the first state of being to the second. The other possible resolution is to allow for violation of the law of excluded middle. He pushes for the latter option through development of the concept of potential. "Potential" refers to what neither is nor is not, it may or may not be. It is a concept derived from the way that we understand future events which may or may not be. It is not acceptable to assign true or false to a future event which may or may not occur (there is the famous sea battle tomorrow example). And, even if it comes to pass that the event occurs, it is unacceptable to look back, and say that before the event occurred, it was true that the event will occur. There is simply neither truth nor falsity to the subject, and I believe this is the basis for modern modal logic. Aristotle's might be a firm denial of eternalism. But positions like eternalism make change completely unintelligible, whereas Aristotle allows some fundamental principles in an attempt to bring becoming and change into the realm of intelligibility. Some modern positions like dialethism, and dialectical materialism, move to dismiss the law of non-contradiction, to deal with the reality of becoming. This stems from Hegel's dialectic of being, in which being and not-being are subsumed within, so as to co-exist within the concept of becoming.

So in Aristotle's physics, matter is placed in the category of potential. As the potential for change, it gives reality to, as the foundation for understanding, that which neither is nor is not, in the physical world. And, in his logic, the reality of a thing's inherent material element is implicit in his law of identity. His law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. Those who misunderstand the importance of this principle will dismiss it as a useless tautology. But this principle of identity removes a things identity from what we say it is (that's what contributes to the sophistry), and dictates that each thing has its own identity proper to itself. It's the grounding for realism. And, the particular thing, the individual, the material object, is what substantiates all logic. "Substance', in its most fundamental use of the term refers to the material individual, so that when it's not grounded in the reality of material particulars, logic loses its substance. However, the material element of the particulars, and this might be characterized as the accidentals, leaves a part of the particular as fundamentally unintelligible to logic.

Aristotle thought that matter was eternal and that there was a prime mover that made matter change. — Walter Pound

The unmoved mover is an eternal form, circular motion. He introduced this idea after the demonstration, in his Metaphysics, that anything eternal must be actual, formal. It is a faulty idea because the circular motion requires something which is moving, matter. An eternal motion without anything which is actually moving is incoherent. Then the matter (potential) which is moving would also be eternal, and this contradicts his own conclusion that anything eternal must be actual.

Firstly, it isn't a consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology or position; it is only your misreading. — Luke

I noticed you haven't participated in our discussion of this section of the book where doubt is discussed, so that claim is rather hollow.

That is how we use the term. — Fooloso4

Speak for yourself. I wouldn't use "certainty" in such a deceptive way.

The rules of grammar according to W. are arbitrary. — Fooloso4

Where did I say rules are arbitrary for W? They are like sign-posts, which one might understand, or misunderstand. Haven't you been following the book? Or are you like Luke, just joining in to add your two cents worth in some haphazard fashion, with no respect for what is written in the book?

That depends on what you think stands as justification. See the discussions of the river banks of knowledge, hinges, and his call for a step like that of relativity in On Certainty. See also what he says about groundlessness. It is not incoherent it describes what terms such as certainty and knowledge actually mean based on their use. Consider scientific knowledge. It does not establish eternal, unchanging truths. It represents how we understand things at present, and that will change over time. — Fooloso4

All this does is support my challenge, that Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. He provides his own definition of objectively certain, in On Certainty, as excluding the possibility of mistake. Why would he provide a definition, then proceed to use certainty in some other way, unless equivocation was his intent?

What makes you think it is unwarranted? — Fooloso4

"I am certain that I am sitting here typing" adds nothing to the statement "I am sitting here typing", other than an air of confidence. The air of confidence is unwarranted, because the nature of possibility is such that you may not have used adequate words to describe the situation, therefore misunderstanding cannot be ruled out as impossible, even if it is highly improbable.

Really? If you doubt that you are reading this or that your fingers are moving or that their moving is part of your response to what I have said then why do it? Or that is not the right question because you cannot even be certain that you are doing it. — Fooloso4

That you can act, and put words to your actions, does not mean that you understand what you are doing. I really doubt that you even know what it means for a human being to be doing something, let alone understand what a human being is actually doing.

Once again, the ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. — Fooloso4

Sure, but the possibility of mistake is reason to doubt. I went through this with unenlightened. Each lottery ticket is highly probable to be a loser. However there is still a possibility that it is a winner. Therefore we have reason to doubt that it is a loser, so we verify the numbers. You might insist that it is unreasonable to buy a ticket, but if someone gives you one, it is not unreasonable to verify the numbers. That is because no matter how improbable, it is still reasonable to doubt, because the improbable thing is still possible.

The ability to doubt is not a reason to doubt. The kind of certainty Wittgenstein appeals to in On Certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible. It is the certainty of our everyday lives. The certainty that I am sitting here typing this. The certainty that I have read On Certainty. — Fooloso4

I consider this to be contradictory. If certainty is not indubitable, necessary, or infallible, then how is it "certainty"? What is the point in saying "I am certain", unless you truly believe that the thing you are supposedly certain of, is indubitable, necessary, or infallible? You could only be using "certain" as a means of deception. As unenlightened described, to be certain is a frame of mind, I would call it a confidence. If we accept Wittgenstein's ontology of rules, then we ought to face the consequences, that such an attitude of confidence is unjustified, as I explained to unenlightened. This is the point, and why I insist Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. You could use "certain" in another way, as Wittgenstein tries in On Certainty, but what would be the point of that?

Why not just say "I am sitting here typing this", and "I have read On Certainty". What does "I am certain" add to these phrases other than an unwarranted air of confidence?

Now one might invent a situation in which it is possible that I am mistaken about these things, but the more serious and sinister mistake is the philosophical mistake that because such a thing is possible that anything that follows from it disrupts the certainty with which we live and act and think and speak. Descartes' Archimedean point of indubitability is a philosophical illusion. — Fooloso4

Of course it disrupts the certainty with which we act, that's the whole point. If you are fully aware that there is a possibility of mistake in your actions, how is it at all logical for you to proceed with certainty? But as I explained, this does not impede our capacity to act. We will still proceed in actions, only without the unwarranted air of confidence. This is not a "sinister mistake", it is the virtue of prudence.

You should ask yourself this question, given that you are the one making claims of radical doubt — Luke

Just let me be clear here. This "radical doubt" as you call it, is the consequence of Wittgenstein's ontology of rules. I am explaining how this form of doubt is the consequence of his ontology. I am not necessarily supporting this ontology, but it appears to be very forceful, and I see no good reason yet, to reject it. If you believe that this so-called radical doubt, which comes as the logical consequence of this ontology is reason to reject the ontology, then you might reject it. I do not judge ontology in this way. If the ontology is based in good solid principles, I'll accept it and allow the epistemological consequences to follow.

Are you certain that your words mean what you think they mean? — Luke

No, I am never certain that my words mean what I think they mean. I have a dictionary beside me which I use incessantly, attempting to find words to fulfil my purpose. I don't even know how I could judge whether I am certain of such a thing, because the words have families of meanings, as Wittgenstein describes. Therefore there is no such thing as the meaning of the word that I am using, only numerous possibilities for meaning. So how could there even be such a thing as what I think the word means, when I see the word as numerous possibilities for meaning? Therefore, I try very hard to make a conscious effort to bear in mind, every time that I print words on the page, or speak words, the possibility that people will misunderstand me, so I choose my words in a deliberate way, hoping to avoid such misunderstanding.

According to you, you cannot be certain what the word "doubt" (or any other word) means, so how can you maintain your argument? — Luke

I don't see a matter of maintaining an argument here. We have a description, from Wittgenstein, of the nature of using words and language. The description is that there is no precise, exact, ideal, meaning to the words, a word indicates an area of possible meanings, like "stand roughly here" indicates an area of possible places to stand. Either you agree with this description or you do not. If you agree, with this, then we can proceed into the epistemology of doubt which follows from the nature of possibility. But if you do not, then there is no point, simply reject Wittgenstein's ontology of rules.

Is matter eternal in the sense that it is timeless or is matter eternal in the sense that matter has always existed in the infinite past? — Walter Pound

Matter cannot be eternal, Aristotle demonstrates this with the cosmological argument. Matter is placed in the category of potential, as being the potential for change in relation to the forms of things, which actually change. According to the cosmological argument, anything eternal must be actual. This means that there is no such thing as prime matter, matter without form, as the idea of prime matter, is unintelligible.

Isn't the "whatness" a thing's essence? — Walter Pound

Yes, essence is a form. And we need to distinguish "form" in two distinct senses. The thing's essence is the form of the thing, what human beings have within their minds, the abstracted essence. But each particular thing has a form proper to itself, in its material existence, making it the thing that it is rather than something else. The difference is that the form of the thing, which is proper to the thing itself, in its material existence, includes accidentals, whereas the essence of the thing, the form in the human mind, does not include accidentals.

then why not just say that features are all there is- the bundle theorists could explain our experience without leaving things unexplained. — Walter Pound

This leaves us with the problem of temporal continuity in a changing thing. At one moment the thing is "X" according to its features, and at the next moment the thing is something different, "Y", according to its features. These are two distinct things. Aristotle posits "matter" as an underlying thing which doesn't change, to allow for temporal continuity. At both times, the thing is the same thing "X", but having different features at each moment of existence.

Still, to hold any form of uncertainty—including that of doubt—one must first hold a psychological certainty that some contextually relevant given is real/true. E.g., to be uncertain about whether one forgot a cup on a table, I must first hold a psychological certainty that there is a reality/truth to whether or not the cup is presently on the table, that there in fact is a table, and so forth. — javra

I cannot understand this. I've seen similar statements, by many different people, and no one has been able to justify this claim for me. Why must there be a foundation of certainty? If reality consists of possibilities, then we face reality in terms of probability. And, we create certainty within our minds, by excluding things as impossible. Necessary is equivalent to impossible to be otherwise. But as I've been explaining to unenlightened, there is a fundamental inconsistency between probabilities and impossible. Any impossibility created through probability is not a true impossibility, as the principle of plenitude indicates.

Further, the threat of infinite regress of doubt is not a problem. Infinite regress is simply repugnant to the mind which seeks to understand, as is doubt. So an infinite regress of doubt is not at all inconsistent.

So maybe you can explain to me what the others have not been able to. Why must there be an underlying psychological certainty? Take your example. I've lost my cup. I think, perhaps I left it on the kitchen table. Why must I be certain that there is a kitchen table, to consider this possibility? Suppose my memory is quite bad, and I'm confused perhaps by illness, can I not at the same time consider as a possibility that I do not even have a kitchen table? Maybe I sold the kitchen table last week, or moved into a new place without a table. Where comes the need for an underlying certainty?

I could conceivably doubt any of these things, but I couldn't conceivably doubt everything - that is the philosopher's fiction, because one would have to doubt that the words mean what one thinks they mean and so whether one's doubt itself is something or nothing. — unenlightened

This is exactly the point. Are you certain that the words mean what you think they mean? With Wittgenstein's position, there are possibilities as to the meanings of the words. I approach your words assuming that there is inexactness in my understanding of how you are using those words. Therefore I cannot exclude the possibility that I misunderstand what you are saying. The certitude you express in your examples, I am certain of this, and I am certain of that, is really irrelevant, because the goal here is to determine whether this certitude is justified. I think that from Wittgenstein's perspective, his ontology of rules, this internal certitude which you cannot be justified. Therefore you ought not claim to be certain about the things you claim to be certain about.

It's a debilitating affliction, not a philosophy. — unenlightened

That's a matter of opinion. As you said in the last post, doubt is a frame of mind. When you develop the attitude, that all the things which you might otherwise claim to be certain of, (such as the things you list), might not actually be as you think they are, this does not impede your life. You may simply live your life in the same way as one who claims to be certain, yet recognizing that certainty is an illusion, it's not real. All it does is give you a different world view, the view that we may have a fundamental misunderstanding about the way that the world is, and therefore certainty is unjustified. This does not impede one's daily life.

We live in a society with a foundation in Platonic idealism, and that idealism supports the belief in certainty. Because of this, we have an attitude of certainty. You claim "I am certain", because that's your attitude, you tend to use those words in that way. Wittgenstein demonstrates that these ideals ought to be removed, they are not supported by a real description of language. if this is the case, then we can conclude that the attitude of certainty, and the tendency to say "I am certain" is a statement of falsity created by the illusion of idealism. Removing the attitude of certitude does not incapacitate one's ability to act. It just produces a more realistic description of human actions, and that is that we act without being certain. And when you state "I am certain that...", it is not a statement which is consistent with the possibilities of the human condition, it's a falsity, a self-deception.

Additionally, could you recommend me either videos or books on Aristotle that can help explain his thought to me? Thanks! — Walter Pound

I really can't recommend anything to you here, because I see so much variance in interpretation. The best is to read Aristotle yourself, but there is so much material it takes a long time.

This tells me what matter does and not what matter is. — Walter Pound

The problem with this question is that we really cannot say "what" matter is. This is because the "whatness" of a thing is its form. So any statement of what a thing is, is a formula, a statement of a thing's form.

If the form is not material, then why suppose that the form changes at all when time passes? We don't see how immaterial entities behave and we don't see how forms behave alone as Aristotle believed matter and form must exist together. — Walter Pound

The shape, size, colour, etc., all the descriptive terms which we use to explain what a thing is, are referring to the thing's form. All that we see, and in anyway perceive of the thing is its form. So we do see a thing's form changing.

Given that the substance of the Rubik's cube is a composite of form and matter and that the matter is the only thing that we see change, why should the Rubik's cube change its identity when it is being altered? — Walter Pound

The problem isn't quite the same today, as it was in Aristotle's time, because logic has progressed, and Aristotle did a lot for that. At his time, a thing was identified by the description of "what" it is, its form. So, the Rubik's cube at one moment, has a different description from the description that it has at the next moment, therefore the two instances of existence, are instances of two distinct things, the identity of a thing being given by its description.. Aristotle's law of identity is designed to avoid this problem. But the assumption is that the matter, of which the cube is composed, remains the same, therefore the cube's material identity remains the same, while the form of it changes.

Unless we start qualifying what it means for a substance's matter to be a substance's matter, why does the spatial arrangement of the Rubik's cube's "matter" determine whether the Rubik's cube is the same as it was before the toddler's manipulation? — Walter Pound

Under the logic in use at Aristotle's time a thing's identity was its description. Therefore if the cube had one description at one time, and another description at another time, these two instances could not be instances of "the same" thing.

However, from your previous sentence, it seems that Aristotle wanted to say that although a thing's matter changed, such as Theseus' ship, it does not mean that the thing itself was altered. — Walter Pound

The thing's matter does not change, the form changes, that's the point. Theseus' Ship is a more complex issue which mixes the two forms of identity.

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When you say, "does not change" do you mean to say that matter does not come into or out of being or that matter is static? I have heard that Aristotle subscribed to a relational theory of time and if Aristotle really believed that matter did not change, then that would suggest that matter is timeless. — Walter Pound

Yes, that's the whole point, matter itself does not change.

If an apple is a substance, and a substance is a composite of matter and form, then I only experience a change in the substance's matter when I cut the apple in half with a knife. I don't experience a change in the substance's form. — Walter Pound

When you cut the apple, you have change its form, by dividing it in two. All the matter remains as the same matter, but it is now in a different form.

But if you could somehow see space-time...but couldn't see matter, could you put it the other way, ie
'matter isn't a thing in itself, it just supervenes on space-time and its relationships' ?

or maybe separating space-time into space and time:
'matter and time aren't things of themselves, they just supervene on space and its relationships'? — wax

This is an interesting thought experiment. Let's say that we "see" space-time with our minds, in the sense that we apprehended it only with the mind. And matter is somewhat unintelligible so we do not "see" matter with the mind. Now, we have observed the existence of objects, and their movement, and from this we have apprehended with the mind, the conception of space-time. However, something is missing here, and that is the substance, what gives reality to the objects which are observed to be moving. So we posit "matter" as that substance, the reality of the objects which are moving.

So, would you agree on this? Our understanding of "matter" is dependent on our understanding of space and time, which itself is based in observations of moving objects. Now, if our concepts of space and time change, due to changing empirical data, so must our concept of matter. However, let's say that space, time, and matter all refer to something real, and this is what we observe as objects and their movements. We need to disentangle these three aspects of objects in motion (which forms our empirical data) in order to properly answer your questions.

What exactly is matter in Aristotle's eyes? — Walter Pound

Consider that in Aristotle`s physics, matter is the aspect of a thing which does not change when change occurs to a thing. It is therefore the principle which provides for the reality of the temporal continuity of existence. Imagine a changing thing. At one moment it is assumed to have a definite form, and at the next moment it is assume to have a slightly different definite form. Strictly speaking, from a logic of formal identity, at the second moment it is not the same thing as it was at the first moment. The idea that it is logically necessary that these are two distinct things, provided fodder for sophistry and paradoxes of infinite regress. So Aristotle wanted a law of identity which would corroborate our observed experience, and allow that one and the same thing could have temporal extension despite the fact that changes occur to that thing during the time of its existence. So he posited "matter" as the underlying thing which does not change, providing for the observed temporal continuity of existence of a thing, despite the fact that the thing's form is continually changing.

Behavioural patterns can be evidence of rule following. — S

Sure, I agreed with Janus on this point. But not all cases of behavioural patterns are cases of rule following. So the premise "if there is behavioural patterns, there is rule following" is not a true premise.

There are two disagreements about rules I have with you. One is your assertion that rules are created in being formulated, and since it takes language to formulate a rule, then it follows that rules are created by means of language.

The other disagreement I have with both you and Terrapin Station, is that the way I am using 'rule' does not conform with common usage, and the pedantic and overly strict way you are both using the term does. — Janus

Yes, we disagree on what "rule" means.

Two common kinds of expressions refute that: "As a rule he has eggs for breakfast" and "It is an unwritten rule that people should respect others and wait their turn". You see the latter operating without the need for any explicit expression of it, for example, where two lanes merge, and most people give way to every second car. — Janus

I don't see your argument here. Both, "he has eggs for breakfast", and, "people should respect others and wait their turns", are written in words. The fact that you say "it is an unwritten rule" does not negate the fact that it is actually written in words.

Try this. Take away the words "he has eggs for breakfast", Now, the person gets up every morning and has eggs for breakfast, nice pattern. How does this pattern become a rule, unless it is stated as such? Or do you think the person gets up and thinks there is a rule that I must have eggs every morning for breakfast therefore I must have eggs, and so decides to have eggs? And try the other, so-called unwritten rule, "people should respect others and wait there turn". Take away those words, and what are you left with? It's certainly not "a rule".

You see the latter operating without the need for any explicit expression of it, for example, where two lanes merge, and most people give way to every second car. — Janus

If it is true, that when people are merging in their cars, they are following the rule "people should respect others and wait their turn", then they must be following that rule, as it is written, meaning that they have been exposed to that expressed rule, and are obeying it. Otherwise they might be following some other rule, or more likely, doing it for some other reason, and you are simply making the false statement that they are following that specific rule when they really are not..

Even animals do it; social predator species commonly have unwritten (obviously!) and unspoken (presumably!) rules about who gets to feast on the carcass first. — Janus

See, this is the problem with your perspective, which I've already explained to you. You assume that there are rules here, where there are none. Then, instead of looking for the real reason why these animals behave in the way that they do, you'll be totally distracted by the false premise that they are following rules, and maybe even go off on some wild goose chase, looking for some rules which don't even exist.

I think I'm noticing a general link between problems and overly strict adherence to rules at the expense of resolving the problems linked to them. — S

This is a problem isn't it? To follow a rule means strict adherence. You argue that using language is a matter of following rules, but now you complain that we cannot resolve these problems because people are too busy following rules. See the hypocrisy? Problem solving requires that we ditch the rules, and be innovative. That's what language is really all about.

No. If I am certain, I have no doubt. If I am doubtful, I am uncertain. But since these are both frames of mind, I don't even know what it might mean for them to be absolute. — unenlightened

I suppose that if you could exclude all doubt from your mind, you would have absolute certainty. I do not think that this is humanly possible. You mentioned "absolute doubt", so I assume that this would be to exclude all certainty. Why would absolute doubt be a bad thing? An attitude, or "frame of mind" of doubt does not prevent you from proceeding, it simply produces a cautious attitude toward procedures, with due respect for the possibility of mistake. While certitude produces a careless attitude toward procedures, because it inclines disrespect for the possibility of mistake. It appears to me, that to exclude the attitude of certainty (absolute doubt), would be a good thing.

The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, but removing your doubt does not remove doubt? — Luke

I would think that having a reason, or reasons, might quell your doubt to the point where you might proceed based on probability. But since a complete removal of doubt is unjustified, you ought not proceed as if you have no doubt at all.

If I were to add anything, I might say a rule presupposes a principle, whereas a habit presupposes an interest.

Another way to look at it is, a rule is reducible to a principle from which a corresponding behavior is obliged to follow, but a habit is not reducible to any principle, which permits habit to be merely a matter of convenience with arbitrary benefit. — Mww

I like this. I think that a principle is something particular, we might say that it's an object, but an interest is more general, directing one's attention in a more general way rather than in a specific or definite way like a rule.

Also, a rule presupposes a language for its expression. That which the rule expresses by means of language must already be given before the rule or the language, otherwise the expression has no content, therefore cannot stand as a rule. — Mww

Right, I think this is the important point here. And to relate this to what I say above, it is this expression in language which gives the principle, or rule its particularity and this is its existence as a thing. That's what I told S, in the question about abstraction. An abstraction only exists as a thing, if there is a symbol. The symbol is what allows the abstraction to have actual existence as a thing. One might try to separate the principle or rule, from the language which expresses it, like one might try to separate the abstraction from the symbol which represents it, but there is no sense to this unless we allow that the symbol is prior to the principle represented, and then what is the symbol at that time before it represents something? It can't be said to be a symbol.

So this is a dilemma which leaves us with no choice but to say that the rule or principle cannot exist independently of the symbol which is said to represent it. Then the rule cannot exist independently of its symbolization. But this allows that language might exist prior to principles or rules, but this language would have to consist of something other than symbols, the words could not be called symbols. That is because it would not be proper to say that the language symbolizes, or represents anything, because if it did it would be rules or principles, being symbolized or represented, and we've already denied that possibility.

So you'd agree that being a convention isn't sufficient to be a rule? — Terrapin Station

Right, "convention" is a rather broad term. In one sense "convention" may refer to a rule, but in another sense it might refer to a custom which is not a rule. So not every convention qualifies to be a rule.

I don't know what you would mean by "absolute doubt". To me, an absolute is an ideal, and the ideal is "certainty", and certainty excludes doubt. So "absolute doubt" appears contradictory. In the context of absolutes, doubt is relative, relative to certainty which is the ideal, the absolute. "Absolute doubt" would be like "absolute evil". In the context of absolutes, "good" is the ideal, the absolute, and "evil" only has meaning insofar as something is deficient in relation to that absolute. But it would be contradictory to make "evil" the absolute because this would make it equivalent to "good", both being the absolute.

So the question for you. If we exclude the ideal, "certainty" from being the absolute, deny that certainty is absolute, doesn't this open the door to doubt as the absolute? The issue being whether or not an absolute is necessary. Wittgenstein denies the ideal, "certainty", but can he deny the absolute? If not, then the absolute may be what is left by the exclusion of certainty, and that is doubt. So "absolute doubt" is very real if we cannot dispose of the need for an absolute.

According to normal usage conventionally established patterns of behavior are rules. — Janus

That's not true. There are many conventionally established patterns of behaviour which are not rules. Are you familiar with "customs", and "mores"? "Rules" can be used to refer to some patterns of behaviour, but not all, depending on whether or not we have apprehended a principle which the behaviour conforms to.

Think of the road rule: drive on the left hand side of the road (in Australia). If one consistently drives on the left hand side of the road merely on account of following what everyone else does; that is following a rule. — Janus

That's a stated rule though.

Standing in queues is another example. — Janus

in some cases standing in the queue is a rule, in other cases it is not, and people just do it as their pattern of behaviour.

I have shown that rules are prior to, are not dependent on, and also underpin language. The point of your claim that an unformulated rule is not a rule is apparently to support a further claim that "rules are created by language". This is nonsense, since rules are created by people not by language, and even animals have rules and hierarchies that determine customary behaviors. — Janus

I never said anything yet about how a rule is "created". I said that language is necessary for the existence of a rule, so it doesn't make any sense to talk about rules existing prior to language. You clearly have a completely different idea of what a rule is than I do, and I think that your idea is counterproductive to understanding the reality of rules.

Language itself is a customary behavior. Whether you call these pre-linguistic customary behaviors "rules" or not doesn't change the fact that they exist and determine linguistic, as well as moral, behavior. — Janus

This is exactly why your notion of "rule" is counterproductive. When you characterize these customary behaviours as instances of obeying rules, instead of as instances of habitual behaviour, you produce an inaccurate description. Under your description you have "the fact that they [the rules] exist". because you assume as a fact, that these rules exist. Therefore, to understand these customary behaviours you will proceed to seek those rules. Under my description there are no such rules, and customary behaviours are habits of free willing human beings. Therefore to understand these customary behaviours I will seek to understand the habits of free willing human beings. From my perspective, your approach could be nothing more than a waste of time and resources, seeking non-existent rules.

That's a good point in that there's a lot of conventional behavior that people do not condone. For example, it's a convention to acquire alcohol and drink in excess at parties organized by high schoolers. Is that thus a rule? It has to be if being conventional is sufficient to be a rule. — Terrapin Station

One reason why I think it is a very good idea to distinguish habits from rules is to see that each of these two actually have a very different nature. The nature of a habit is that it arises from the choices of a freely choosing being. The nature of a rule is that it is designed to curb those choices, those habits which have been determined as bad. Consider that a lot of what the freely choosing being learns, is learnt through trial and error. By the time that the freely choosing being learns that a particular type of choice is an error, that choosing pattern may already be habitual. Then rules are needed to restrict that choosing pattern.

This is what you have a burden to demonstrate without begging the question, as you are want to do. — S

I can give you countless examples of rules which exist in the form of language, and could not exist without language to express them. In order to disprove my inductive conclusion, that rules require language to express them, you need to present some rules which do not require language to express them, or demonstrate how the rules which we express in language could exist without language. Otherwise you might reject my inductive conclusion, but your rejection is rather meaningless. And, an inductive conclusion is based in observation and reason, it is not a matter of "begging the question" as you are wont to say.

I have some questions for you. What do think an abstraction is? And do you think that an abstraction is composed of language? — S

An abstraction requires language, because a symbol is required to represent the thing abstracted. Otherwise the thing abstracted has no presence, and there is no such thing as the abstraction. You are using "abstraction" as a noun, not a verb.

I make lots of mistakes, that's not really relevant except to show that doubt is always called for. The point is that Wittgenstein's epistemology is incoherent. His ontology of rules necessitates doubt. There cannot be absolute certainty in understanding, he excludes Ideals, rendering absolute certainty as impossible. Then he proceeds in his epistemology as if there could be a situation which leaves no room for doubt. He seeks to ground his epistemology in the Ideal (the exclusion of doubt) which he has already designated as impossible.

When the absolute is excluded, then certainty can only be a function of probability. We can name some arbitrary degree of probability, and claim that at this level of probability doubt is excluded, but this claim that doubt is excluded at this arbitrary level, cannot be justified because of that arbitrariness. The arbitrary level of probability could be one in a thousand, one in a million, whatever; and we could take each lottery ticket, and claim that without a doubt this ticket is a loser, but at the end of the day, one of the tickets wins, so those claims are not justified.

The point being that the exclusion of doubt is inherently incompatible with Wittgenstein's ontology. That's why he's "written a great fat book going into it in exhaustive detail from every possible angle with many many examples". He's trying to do the impossible, and he could continue that great fat book to infinite fatness without success. Not even the principle of plenitude could save him because instead of leaving absolute certainty as a possibility, he has denied it as impossible.

As I said above, I have no problem with this ontology, I think it's strong. But we need to accept the ramifications, and principally this is that doubt cannot be excluded. Consider doubt to be a natural product of the physical constitution of the human being; that physical constitution disallows the possibility of absolute certainty, therefore the claim that doubt can be excluded cannot be justified.

What sort of a reason? — Luke

Any reason. You might think, I've seen this type of sign before, and I've learned what it means, therefore I know what this one means. You might think, someone has explained to me this type of sign, and told me what it means, therefore I know what this one means. Perhaps your reason is even some sort of superstition, or intuition. The point is that having a reason quells your doubt, allowing you to decide, and proceed. But removing your doubt with respect to the meaning of the sign, no matter what the reason is, does not justify the claim that there is now no room for doubt.

Language is not merely an individual habit, but a collectively evolved and utilized system. Of course there are patterns of usage, but without those there would be no language. Those patterns are equivalent to rules; they reflect the communally shared ways of doing things with language which have become established by convention. — Janus

As I said in my post that you rejected as "empty tendentious assertions", we can learn habits from others. This is not an empty assertion, it has been proven by observation. We copy the actions of others, it is one way of learning how to do things.

Also, a pattern is not equivalent to a rule. Patterns are described by rules, and there is a reason for a pattern. For instance, meteorologists study weather patterns, and assume reasons for the patterns, and describe the patterns with rules. But a pattern is not a rule, because a pattern is an observable arrangement of order, and a rule is the principle which the order conforms to. Do you apprehend this difference?

These communally shared ways of doing things with language are effectively rules, whether or not they are explicitly recognized as such. The 'chess' example I gave, where someone could learn to play chess, that is to follow its rules, by imitation, without actually explicitly formulating those rules shows the same thing. Rules of etiquette are another example of rules that can be acquired just by imitation without needing any explication. — Janus

Your example does not prove your point. That a person could imitate another who is following a rule, and therefore act as if following the same rule, does not prove that when a person imitates another, that person is following a rule. Imitation is just a matter of repeating what has been observed, it is not a matter of following a rule.

If you want to pedantically say these examples are not 'really' rules; what could that "really" mean, when what I have outlined is in accordance with common usage of the term 'rule'? — Janus

I do not think that what you have said actually is in accordance with common usage of "rule". A rule is a principle, so to learn a rule is to learn a principle. When one person imitates another, that person is copying. To copy another is not to learn the rule, we learn this in grade school. That's why copying is not allowed. We must each learn the rules, the principles involved in what we are being taught, and copying from another does not qualify as learning the rule.

Rule-following, even when it is not made explicit, is ubiquitous in human communal life, and obviously necessary for that life, and that is really the point, whether this social phenomenon is called "rule-following" or not. Even animals do it. — Janus

What are you trying to say here? Are you saying that there is an activity which most people would not call "rule-following" because they do not consider it to actually be rule-following, but it really is rule-following according to your superior knowledge of what rule-following really is? I think you're wrong, imitating and copying each other is not "rule-following". So I'll repeat my tendentious assertion. You need to learn that there is a distinction to be made between activities which are habitual, and activities which are instances of following a rule.

So that while playing can work for a one-night stand, it is a completely inadequate basis for a long-term relationship. That especially is the case if there are children involved. They will see you and they will judge you even if your wife does not. — Ilya B Shambat

Would you say then, that "playing" is a validly ethical activity if the man is interested only in one night stands? The way you describe it, playing only seems to take on the characteristics of being an unethical, deceptive activity, if the man uses it in an attempt to produce a long term relationship, and playing for the sake of one night stands is not unethical because the deception is not there.

If you produce an argument that addresses any of what I have written, I'll consider responding, otherwise I will ignore you. MU. — Janus

OK. I'll give it another go then.

For example, the so-called rules of grammar were operative long before anyone analyzed actual language usage and explicitly formulated them. — Janus

This is simply false. It may be the case, that people were using language in identifiable ways or patterns, prior to the formulation of "rules of grammar", but this in no way means that the rules of grammar were operative at this time. Language use is an habitual behaviour, and habits are not based in rules. That people can come along and formulate rules which reflect those habits, does not mean that the rules were operative as the cause of those habits. A habit is not necessarily formed by someone obeying a rule, so it is an invalid conclusion to say that habitual behaviour such as linguistic habits are cases of rules being operative. And your claim that the rules of grammar were operative before anyone formulated the rules of grammar is false.

The whole point is that one does not need a reason not to doubt, but a reason to doubt. — unenlightened

This is clearly not the case. Our natural approach to all circumstances is to consider possibilities. And, the nature of possibility makes doubt natural, whereas certainty is only created by subjecting possibilities to the principles of probability. Therefore the reasoning of probability gives us reason not to doubt. But without probabilities we are presented with possibilities and no certainty, so doubt is natural. Doubt is fundamental, and reason is needed to exclude doubt.

If I notice the ground around the post is disturbed, or the paint is still wet, then I might have a reason to doubt - I don't need a reason not to doubt that the sign post is doing its job. — unenlightened

The job of the sign-post is to direct you in the intended direction. You are the person reading the sign. You need a reason to believe that you are reading the sign correctly, otherwise you are unsure as to whether you are reading the sign correctly (doubt). Doubt as to the intent of the sign-post, is the natural state when you approach the sign-post, unless you have a reason to believe that you know how to understand the sign. If you have such a reason you can proceed from the sign-post without doubt. Without such a reason there will be nothing conclusive within your mind, that you are reading the sign-post correctly, and doubt as to how to read the sign will be pervasive.

Now let's say that you have good reason to believe that you know how to read this type of sign correctly, you have much experience with this type of sign. You assume that your understanding of this sign, under "normal circumstances" gives you no reason to doubt. But what if the person who posted the sign doesn't follow the same conventions as you, and planted the sign in a backward way, or the sign has been tampered with as you allude to as a possibility, making the circumstances "not normal". If you approach these signs with the certainty that you know how to read this type of sign correctly, you will not doubt your capacity, and you will not notice that the circumstances are abnormal, until after you make your mistake. If you approach these signs with uncertainty, doubt, then the probability that you will notice an abnormal situation will be greatly increased.

The possibility of a "not-normal" situation creates the possibility of a mistake in understanding. The goal is to avoid mistakes in understanding. This requires that we doubt the normalcy of every situation. If we are inclined to assume that the situation is normal, because there is a high probability that the situation will be normal, and therefore we do not doubt the normalcy of the situation in each instance, then when the improbable "not normal" situation occurs, it will slip past our attention and mistake will occur.

Have you ever worked in a factory with multiple levels of safety precautions? You would think that one simple form of safety precaution would be adequate. But no, we tend to let down our guard with respect to one level of safety precaution, assuming to be certain that we would apprehend the not-normal circumstance, and a mistake would not be made, and so the second level of safety precaution is required to save us when we fail to apprehend the not normal situation.

Neither does activity between the sperm and the egg. Everything what man does and what sperm "does" and what woman does and what egg "does" is part of causal chain. And not one of those is the root cause, which is prior to man, and woman, and sperm, and egg. — Henri

Well that's not the case, a lot of things are unrelated and some are incidental. We are looking for a causal chain for the existence of the baby, examining to determine whether it is internal or external. We follow the sperm and the egg, and see where they come from. Exactly what the man and woman are doing, is incidental, so long as the egg and sperm are brought together and supported under the right conditions. I agree that external factors play an important role as causal factors, what we are arguing though is your denial of internal causes.

I was talking about an action of eternal being, not the cause of eternal being. So we can say, in keeping the theme of root cause, that the root cause of an action of eternal being is eternal being, and not something prior to eternal being. If one wants to say that there is actually no root cause, or no cause, of an action of eternal being, that's ok too. Eternal being is different category of being than us, so some translation of terms is necessary one way or the other. — Henri

I don't follow you. Before you seemed to be talking about a cause of eternal being, which I explained is contradictory. Now you are talking about "an action of eternal being". But it's not clear to me what you mean by this. First, this requires the assumption of "eternal being". I believe that "eternal being" refers to something which never ever changes in time. If it changed, it would become other than what it was, and therefore be a different being. So it's arguably the case that eternal being cannot change and therefore it is also contradictory to talk about an action of eternal being. So I am really not following what you mean by "an action of eternal being".

Your point is that you're being unreasonable? We agree for once! — S

Wow, your (dim) wit never ceases to amaze me. It would be unreasonable for me to expect you to do anything else. But that something else is what is required of you to support your claims. So it would be unreasonable for me to expect that you could support your claims. You seemed to recognize this as well, in which case we would have agreement.

As you honestly don't seem to understand, I've thought of an example to elucidate. Every morning when I leave the house I have a little routine of chores that I do outside before I go to work. One of the things I do is to feed some cats outside, so I bring a little plastic bag with some cat food. So under "normal circumstances" when I go out the door I am carrying a little bag of cat food. But some times I'm bringing other things, or I'm distracted talking to someone, or thinking about philosophy, and I forget the cat foot, so this is an "abnormal circumstance". Now, when I'm going out the door, it clearly makes sense to doubt myself in the abnormal circumstances, before I proceed, because then I will notice that I've forgotten something. Also, it appears like it doesn't make sense to doubt myself before proceeding in the normal circumstances, because that doubting would be a useless waste of time. However, I will never know whether the circumstances are normal circumstances or abnormal circumstances, unless I doubt. So it actually does make sense to doubt myself every time I go out the door, in order to distinguish the normal situations from the abnormal situations.

Compare this to understanding the sign-post, or another person's use of language. Under normal circumstances I have a correct and adequate understanding of what the other person is saying. It is an abnormal circumstance if my understanding is mistaken. In the abnormal circumstances, when my understanding is mistaken, it clearly makes sense to doubt my understanding. And, it appears like it doesn't make sense to doubt my understanding in the normal circumstances when my understanding is correct and adequate. However, this appearance is an illusion created by the way that the situation is being described. In reality, I cannot determine whether the circumstances are normal or abnormal without doubting. Therefore, if we base whether doubting is justified or not, on a determination of normal or abnormal circumstances, doubting is always justified because this determination requires doubt.

In other words, one cannot avoid doubt by judging the normalcy of the circumstances, because the very premise which produces the need for that judgement, the possibility that the circumstances might be abnormal, itself justifies doubt.

No I'm not. I'm saying it doesn't make sense at all, to me to you, or to Norman the Norm. — unenlightened

It makes sense to me. Every moment I live from day to day is different from the last. How would I say that the circumstances at one moment are normal, but the circumstances at another moment are not normal?

You can accuse me of this, but not Wittgenstein. He's "just" written a great fat book going into it in exhaustive detail from every possible angle with many many examples. Me, I'm about ready to make with the poker already. — unenlightened

Have you read "On Certainty"? If he takes it for granted that "normal circumstances" requires no further explanation, then his epistemology has a big problem. The problem with "many many examples", is that each example is different, so the more examples that one produces the more evidence one gives, that "normal circumstances" is incomprehensible. If it requires normal circumstances to exclude doubt, then doubt will never be excluded because circumstances are never normal.

It's expressed in the quote. It's unreasonable for you to expect me to do anything else here. How can I show you without expressing it? You're basically asking me to express it without expressing it, which is obviously an unreasonable request. — S

Right, that's my point. A rule can only exist as expressed by language. The rule requires language for it's existence, it is dependent on language. Therefore language is prior to rules, as required for the existence of rules, and it is impossible that language depends on rules.

The antecedent in your conditional is false. — S

If you think that it is false that a rule can only exist as expressed in language, then the onus is on your to give evidence of this. You said above, that this is an unreasonable request. It is not, an unreasonable request. You are claiming X is false, and the request is for evidence to back up your claim that X is false. If you cannot show me a rule which is not expressed in language, then it is your claim, that X is false, which is unreasonable.

You know how babies are made. There is a specific action man does to a woman, before sperm even comes into contact with the egg. That action is part of the process of making you, and you are at that time non-existent. — Henri

Yes, now what is the proper "cause" of existence of that baby? Is it the internal activity which happens within the sperm and the egg, or is it the external activity which happens between the man and the woman. Notice that the activity between the man and the woman doesn't necessarily produce a baby.

If a being is eternal, cause is internal, within that being. — Henri

This is incorrect. If a being is eternal, then it does not have a cause. So it is contradictory to say that an eternal being has an internal cause.