My suspicion is that there is an implication here that might be dangerous for a certain philosophical convention - that ethics cannot be discussed? — unenlightened

If we're talking about rules for getting things done, then I think ethics is unavoidable. If there are rules for getting things done, which are incompatible with ethical rules, this would be a problem.

So contra Banno above, I want to say that meaning is being able to play the game, or in this case, stopping playing the game when the whistle blows, and restarting when the whistle blows again. Exactly as one says that a dog understands 'sit' just in case it sits when the trainer says 'sit'. We don't require that the beast can explain itself. I suppose I would say something like that meaning is how the rules play out in the form of life. — unenlightened

Wouldn't this put meaning into the minds of the individuals then, and not something shared? The rules are shared, but the meaning of the rules is what is in the individual's mind. So if one person misunderstood what the whistle is supposed to mean, that person might keep playing, having assigned a different meaning to the whistle.

Sure it is, and we do it with language, but it's secondary, and parasitic on the practical uses of language to coordinate social action. First we hunt, then we tell hunting stories, and then we theorise hunting. — unenlightened

Yes, I think that's the point which puts practise ahead of theory in Aristotle's ethics. First, he was moved to assign a theoretical thing as the ultimate end, "happiness". But a further analysis of human nature revealed that we are fundamentally active, involved in activity first and foremost, and the highest good must be an activity because an inactivity is inconsistent with what it means to be human. So the so-called ultimate end is overruled, as incompatible with human nature, which is to be active, and therefore the new ultimate end would have to be an activity.

Notice in your example, "then we theorize hunting". You might have said we theorize ways to make hunting more efficient, or to avoid having to hunt altogether, in order to do more important things. But if you said that we theorize ways to spend less time having to hunt, so that we could sit around and do nothing, this would outstep the boundaries of this sort of ethics which dictates that good is found in activity. Practise is given a higher priority to theory. This provides the principles to judge theory through practise (empirical method). And theory is not coming from the truth of eternal forms, rather it comes from the activity of thinking.

If most interpretations reject objective reality, then how is the article referred to in the op saying anything new?

I would like to see a thread called "What is a door?". — Banno

This question assumes essentialism. If there is such a thing as what a door is, that is the essence of "door". For Aristotle this essence becomes the basis for deductive logic. There is for example, a specific definition or formula, which is correct, and therefore forms the essence of "man". If the thing we call Socrates fulfils that essence, then by deductive logic, Socrates is a man. Deductive logic requires such essences to be applicable.

What Wittgenstein is arguing is that this representation of language is false, created with some sort of ideal in mind, an ideal which cannot be upheld in practise, and is not evident in common usage. So as much as we might use language in this way, as though there is such a thing as what a door is (essence), it is a fundamental deception, because there really is no such essence. Therefore in our inquiry as to what language is, we must put aside this type of language use, the deception based in the illusion of an ideal, to describe how language really is.

I don't believe in objective reality so this is a bit moot for me. — andrewk

The wording of the paper seems to be a argument against counterfactual definiteness (an objective reality). I'm all for that since I don't think there is such a thing, and Bell's theorem demonstrated long ago that you can't have both that and locality. — noAxioms

If you reject "objective reality", is there any interpretation other than Many Worlds which is acceptable?

If I understand correctly, you are saying that there is an understanding which is shared (mutual), and this understanding concerns some rules about actions. What do you think is the relationship between meaning and rules? Are they the same thing, meaning is rules, and rules are meaning? Or, are rules a type of meaning, or is meaning a type of rule? Or is there some other relationship?

This is annoying for philosophers, to find that words are not really for arguing the toss, or exploring the mind, but for getting stuff done. — unenlightened

Isn't exploring the mind an instance of doing something? Here's a little problem that Aristotle uncovered. A goal, the end, is an object, the thing desired. Activity is the means to the end. So getting to the end constitutes "getting stuff done". But Aristotle found that it is the activity itself which is judged as virtuous or vicious, so the highest goal, the final end, as the most virtuous thing desired, must itself be an activity, rather than an object, as thing desired. This is why he posited thinking about thinking, as the most virtuous, divine activity. But this is an instance of doing something without ever getting anything done.

There is no such thing as the middle ground between these two because they are two distinct forms of art which cannot be united into one. One is static, the other active. Any attempt to cross the boundary, to make something which is supposed to be static, active, or vise versa, just makes a mess.

When the builder says "slab" and the assistant passes a slab, they are both using the language in the same way to do the same thing together. And meaning is use, so meaning is co-operation, and cooperation is sharing. — unenlightened

Let me see if I can understand this. The builder and the assistant are doing something together, building something. This is cooperation. I would say that the act of building, in this instance, is something which is shared. So "cooperation" refers to a sharing, and in this case what is shared is the act of building.

Let's suppose that "meaning" refers to an act of cooperation, so it is also a type of sharing. What is the act which it is a sharing of? In the example above, the act of building is shared. In the case of meaning, is it communication which is the act that is shared? If we share in the act of communicating, then I think that the question of the thread is whether meaning is a property of the act of communication (and therefore shared), or is "meaning" something particular, something which each individual who shares in the act of communicating contributes.

So back to the example. Each builder adds something to the act of building, and also each assistant adds something to the act. However, each of these individual acts only has significance in relation to the overall, cooperative act of building. Does "meaning" refer to something like this, something that each individual adds to the act, but only has importance in relation to the overall cooperative act of communicating? Or, does each individual act contain meaning within itself, regardless of the act's relation to the overall, shared act of communicating?

You mean so that one wouldn't hold both (1) and (2)? Sure. They're different options about what one might have in mind with "shared." The idea isn't that someone would have all three options in mind about the same thing. — Terrapin Station

Each one is contradictory in its own right. The first, I assume one thing "multiply present" means one thing that is a multiplicity of itself, which is contradictory, and the second, multiple things which are the same thing, is just a different way of stating the same contradiction.

I'm a nominalist, so I have issues with someone having in mind my (1) or (2) above. — Terrapin Station

I think your (1) and (2) are expressed in a way so as to be contradictory.

So, what is it that is being shared between language users? — creativesoul

You'll find it hard to get agreement on this, so let's start with something simple. Words are shared. Are they not? Anyone disagree?

Consider the inquiry at 88. It appears like there might be a distinction between an exact explanation and an inexact explanation, as two distinct types of explanation. In reality though, "exact" and "inexact" are judgements (reproach and praise) concerning the relationship between the explanation and the goal. The "final explanation" is not a different type of explanation, it simply has a different relationship to the particular goal, being the "ideal" for that particular goal. If you could choose the ideal explanation for a particular purpose, from all possible explanations, this would not make the one designated as "the ideal" into a different type of explanation.

Consider 98. Every sentence has perfection proper to itself on account of being a sentence. If you judge one sentence as the ideal, or "the final explanation" for a particular purpose, that judgement does not place the sentence into a different category of type. That judgement is determined in relation to the goal, so any sentence may be "the ideal", depending on what the goal is..

Sorry MU but I found Luke's explanation of different kinds of explanation clear and correct. — Fooloso4

The point though, is that Wittgenstein is making no such distinction between types of explanation at 87. Luke is making this distinction. So that distinction is misleading, and ought not be considered in the context of this text.

Ideal. A word no so much encumbered by baggage as buried in it. Your use of it makes your point obscure. — Banno

The term "ideal" has gotten a lot of use in this section, and we need to grasp the way that Wittgenstein is using it. That's what I'm trying to do. Remember at 98, he created a separation between "ideal" and "perfect". And there was a similar reference at 81 There is a related metaphysical separation between "good" and "beauty", which also manifests sometimes in the division between ethics and aesthetics. It seems to me, that at this point in the text, the separation between "ideal" and "perfect" corresponds roughly to the separation he has now made between "explanation" and "description". An explanation is related to an ideal, following definite rules like logic. But a description, being other than an explanation, may be unclear, and vague (which is not permitted of an explanation), yet the description still has a perfection about it, just by being a description, as 98.

Do you agree with Wittgenstein here? — Banno

For me, the principal point for judgement is consistency. A point of inconsistency would be a point to disagree with. I don't think I see anything to disagree with here. But if we assume that he is trying to describe something here at this part of the text, I haven't quite put my finger on it, because I don't think he's done a good job of pointing out what it is that he is describing. He seems to be pointing to a fork in the road, or something like that, two distinct ways in which language is used. One way is to assume ideals, and proceed in the manner of using language in relation to the ideals (explanation). This, I think, amounts to "the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". The other way, is the way of true philosophy, which is to use language in description, to describe what is. Until I get a firm grasp of what he is trying to describe here, I cannot say whether I agree description.

Yeah, they'll panic, as they sit there stuffing their faces, while the hordes prepare to attack. Wall building is itself already an act of panic.

Consider it this way: The type of explanation that Wittgenstein says must disappear at §109 is the same sort of "complete" and "final" (i.e. philosophical) explanation that he mentions at §87. — Luke

He said we must do away with "all explanation", to be replaced with "description". The point being that explanation is always intended to clarify some meaning, so it is always to some extent, clouded by an ideal. It's intentionality is grounded in the ideal. Only by opting for description instead of explanation can we free ourselves of the ideal, and get a true understanding of language as based in our "real needs" (108), rather than the false description as based in an ideal (notice the influence of Karl Marx). Language is derived from real material needs, not from some ideal.

SO, could it be done? — Banno

Wittgenstein is saying that it cannot be done, and implying that we're fools for trying. That's the point about the ideal, we cannot make language into something which it is not. Our description of what language is, tells us that it is not idealistic like that. The very nature of language disallows the possibility that it could be ideal. No degree of explanation can take away that fundamental aspect, that it is not ideal, because such explanation would only be carried out in language which is not ideal.

See how he is distinguishing between what we require of language (it must be like this) through the lens of the ideal, and what language is really like ( the description: it is like this). The point being that what we want language to be like (the ideal) clouds our vision with respect to our description as to what language really is like. So we must discard that ideal, and produce a true description of what language really is like.

This subject of an ideal, faultless language, is related to the point Aristotle made about logic, it can only lead us from the more certain to the less certain. Adhering to this principle, we can conclude that if there is some degree of uncertainty in the fundamental aspects of language, and language is what is used to express logic, then we cannot produce a logic with an ideal (faultless) certainty. Since such an ideal, faultless language, would be produced from existing language which is not faultless, such an effort is impossible and therefore useless.

Sorry Luke, I can't even begin to understand what you're saying about "explanation". It's completely out of line with what's in the text. And the rest of your post makes no sense either. Here's some examples:

A description of how our language actually works is not necessarily an explanation of this type (i.e. an hypothesis or theory). However, it is another way of removing misunderstanding, which can therefore be considered as a more general type of explanation. — Luke

Do you not see, that he has made a distinction between explanation and description? That was the purpose of my quote above. "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." Notice he says "all explanation", not this or that type of explanation, and recommends replacing explanation with description. It is incorrect for you to characterize description as a type of explanation.

think you have misread. He says at §31 that we can imagine someone who has learnt the rules without ever having been shown a chess piece (therefore, not by observation); or we can imagine someone having learnt the game "without ever learning or formulating the rules". The purpose of this example is to support what he says at §30, that an ostensive definition can only explain the meaning of a word "if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear". — Luke

He clearly states at 31: "One can also imagine someone's having learnt the game without
ever learning or formulating rules. He might have learnt quite simple board-games first, by watching, and have progressed to more and more complicated ones." It is incorrect for you to say that this is "not by observation".

You appear to assume, along with Augustine, that a child can reason before it has been taught language; that it can already think, only not yet speak. Your attribution of this "possibility" to Wittgenstein is antithetical to the text. — Luke

This is an incorrect interpretation of what I said. It isn't even close.

think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is not trying to do any such thing, assuming that by "bottom" or "foundations" you mean something like the "essence" of language; something beneath the surface or hidden from view. As Wittgenstein states at §97: "We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound and essential to us in our investigation resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable essence of language." — Luke

It is incorrect to say that the foundation of a thing and the essence of a thing are the same.

It appears to me like you are just disagreeing with whatever I say, for the sake of disagreeing. You've shown nonsensically incorrect interpretations of what I've wrote, combined with nonsensically incorrect interpretations of passages from Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations to support your disagreement with me. If you prefer to disagree rather than to understand, then my efforts
are pointless.

Would you agree that confidence is required for activity, and doubt being an activity therefore requires confidence, but certainty is a special type of confidence which is not required for doubt?

He is not rejecting explanation. He is only rejecting the philosophical misconception of a complete and final explanation. — Luke

I think that explanation in general, as the means by which we remove doubt, is being rejected, for the reason that explanation cannot remove doubt unless it is the final explanation. Consider the section we've moved up to now, at 109 he says "We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place."

Signposts also require explanation or training in their use. What did you make of Fooloso4's example of the male/female bathroom signs? — Luke

There's two different approaches to how one might learn a rule, which Wittgenstein has been stressing almost from the beginning of the text. One is that the rule is told to us (explanation), and the other is that we might learn simply by observation. I think that this is first mentioned at 31, where he says one might learn the rules of a game just by watching. Explanation is not required to learn signposts, because we might learn simply by observation, and this is the case with bathroom signs. I don't think that anyone has every explained to me the meaning of bathroom signs.

I think it is important to note that Wittgenstein is trying to get to the bottom of language, the foundations. We can't simply assume that we learn rules through explanation because explanation requires language, and so the language by which we learn the fundamental rules, could have no rules at all. But how could there be such a language without rules? So he is pointing us toward the possibility that we might learn rules simply through observation, without any explanation required, as his effort to avoid this problem. I think that this would be like a basic form of inductive reasoning. Only females are observed to go through the door with this sign, and only males are observed to go through the door with that sign, so what is meant by the sign-posts, may be produced with inductive reasoning without any explanation.

Perhaps he is being inconsistent with your idea of certainty, but he is not contradicting himself. — Luke

I am not claiming explicitly that he contradicts himself, only that there is some inconsistency evident, which may produce ambiguity, or confusion as to which way he is pointing with his words. At 85 he says the sign-post "sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not". I find this to be misleading because inductive reasoning, it has been argued, always leaves some room for doubt because it is based in probability. So Wittgenstein's description would be more accurate if he said that sometimes the probability of mistake appears to be so low, that we do not doubt. However, there is always room for doubt, in every instance of inductive reasoning, but sometimes we do not doubt, for reasons such as those described by unenlightened.



I see no reason to disagree with you. If, to proceed into an activity, confidence is required, and this confidence is by definition "certainty", and doubt is by definition an activity, then it follows logically that certainty is required for doubt.

You also want to pigeonhole the term “certainty” to in all cases signify “the property of being indubitable”—which is not how the term is commonly used: e.g., I’m very certain (rather than somewhat certain) that the term holds the synonyms of sureness and certitude. — javra

I am trying to deal with Wittgenstein's expression at 85, in which he implies that sometimes there is no room for doubt, which I find misleading. So I'm not trying to pigeonhole the term "certainty", but I find your definition (certainty as defined by confidence) insufficient to account for the situation described by Wittgenstein, when there is no room for doubt.

The problem specifically is that I often have the confidence required to proceed with an action, while I am actively doubting whether I will be successful in that procedure. This confidence I would not call certainty, because I am doubtful. So I am really calling into question your definition of certainty. If certainty is a type of confidence, as you claim, then it must be a type of confidence in which doubt is excluded, because it makes no sense to say that I proceed with certainty and with doubt concerning the same action. But as described, I can proceed with confidence and with doubt concerning the same action. Therefore I find your definition of "certainty" unacceptable. We must disassociate "certainty" from "confidence", to allow that I have confidence in relation to an action which I am doubtful about (this is courage), yet I do not have certainty concerning that action.

Deficient in what respect? — Luke

I've described that so many times now, in so many different ways, at least three, so if you still don't understand, then I guess that's the way it will stay.

As far as I can tell, so far W has made only a few remarks on doubt from §84-§87. You are placing a lot of emphasis on these few sections. — Luke

That's right, because the section has made me doubt. When I understand what he is doing, and everything appears consistent, I can breeze through the section without discussing it, confident that I understand. But in this section, he brought up the possibility of misunderstanding, and doubt, along with the apparent need for explanation, along with the notion of removing doubt. He seems to be rejecting explanation as the means by which we remove doubt as to what the sign-post is telling us, because explanation is not grounded, it would produce infinite regress (87). He is replacing explanation with the observation that the sign-post fulfils its purpose. When we observe that the sign-post fulfils its purpose, doubt is remove. However, I see this as insufficient because doubt is prior to the action, while observation is posterior.

This problem makes me wonder why he is even concerned about removing doubt. I think that "On Certainty" is a good example of when being obsessed by an ideal obscures one's perception of reality.

That's funny, because you appear to talk about doubt and certainty in ideal terms. — Luke

Doubt is clearly not an ideal. Certainty, in the sense of "leave no room for doubt", is an ideal. That is why I am arguing that it is inconsistent for Wittgenstein to be seeking certainty, in "On Certainty", when he is telling us here, that there is something wrong with this approach of seeking the ideal, it clouds our perception of reality. This attitude, the one which seeks "the ideal" explanation, which removes the possibility of misunderstanding and doubt, distorts the way we see things. It's like looking through glasses (103). We need to take off the glasses and describe the way that we really perceive things, as they are, instead of trying to explaining things through the lens of the ideal (what we want).

Notice the bracketed remark "(One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)" We must remove the ideal, which is the requirement we place on logic, the burden that we place on logic is that it be ideal. Once we have done this, we can examine it in the light of our real needs, our real goals, to get a true description of logic, because this is how we really use it, not to obtain ideals.

Yes, notice Fooloso4's reference to 108. "The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round." That's what I'm talking about, removing the ideal.

Didn't you already say that you were having trouble with 109? Try reading it from my perspective, 109 makes perfect sense.

That's not true, in this section 95-105 he is telling us that the notion of "ideal" is distorting the way that we see things. Go back and read what he says about logic at 81. Then at 107, the ideal is a "requirement" which we hold for logic, it is not derived from a description of what logic really is. That's what he's leading into here, the separation between what we think of logic, based on what we want to get from it, that it is somehow "ideal", or "sublime", and what it really is, by description.

Have a look at §99.

This is the other voice, answering §98.

Then look at §100. Perfection does to belong here. — Banno

Of course there is room for perfection here, that's what 98 says, even the vaguest sentence is in its own way perfect. There is no room for "ideal" though. What he has done at 98 is separate "perfect" from "ideal", such that we can have perfection without "ideal". The notion of "ideal" is distorting the way we see things, we are dazzled by it. But notice at 103, he implies that we might take off these glasses (the ideal).

Are they incommensurate? Or are they doing different things? Talking past each other. They do not contradict each other. — Banno

Two things don't need to contradict each other to be incommensurable, it just means that the two cannot be measured by the same standard. I would say that if they are doing different things, then they are incommensurable, because the standard for measurement here is the goal, or purpose.

IS this what Metaphysician Undercover is doing - seeing the frame rather than the picture?

I think it is something like that. His points always seem off-target — Banno

Luke sees boundaries, I just see the picture. Targets might be what creates boundaries within the picture, but there is no such thing as "the target", because that's an ideal. The only targets are individual goals.

"Inexact" is really a reproach, and "exact" is praise. And that is to
say that what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than what is more
exact. Thus the point here is what we call "the goal". Am I inexact
when I do not give our distance from the sun to the nearest foot, or
tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?
No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know
what we should be supposed to imagine under this head—unless you
yourself lay down what is to be so called. But you will find it difficult
to hit upon such a convention; at least any that satisfies you. — PI..88

There's no such thing as off-target or on-target, except in relation to a goal. So consider this:

98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable
sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence. — P.I.98

Every sentence, every statement, exists in relation to its own individual purpose. That's how it has meaning, it has purpose, and in the sense that it has its own purpose, a purpose which is proper to itself and nothing else, it has its own perfection in that existence. It is perfect. So it doesn't make sense to say that someone's remarks are "off-target", because each remark has its own target, proper to itself. It is the notion that there is an ideal "the target", which is not in line with what Wittgenstein is saying.

I don't know if Wittgenstein thought pictures and language games incommensurable, but I think Davidson has shown that they can't be, that if there is a contradiction between them, then one is wrong; or more likely, one is talking past the other. — Banno

76. If someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge
it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or had drawn in
my mind. For I did not want to draw one at all. His concept can then
be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it. The kinship is
that of two pictures, one of which consists of colour patches with
vague contours, and the other of patches similarly shaped and distributed,
but with clear contours. The kinship is just as undeniable as
the difference.
77. And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the
degree to which the sharp picture can resemble the blurred one depends
on the latter's degree of vagueness. For imagine having to sketch a
sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter
there is a blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a sharply defined
one. Of course—several such sharply defined rectangles can be drawn
to correspond to the indefinite one.—But if the colours in the original
merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless task
to draw a sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won't
you then have to say: "Here I might just as well draw a circle or heart
as a rectangle, for all the colours merge. Anything—and nothing—is
right."——And this is the position you are in if you look for definitions
corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics.
In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning
of tliis word ("good" for instance)? From what sort of examples?
in what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the
word must have a family of meanings. — P.I.

The blurred picture is incommensurable with the one that has sharp boundaries, at least it is a "hopeless task" to try to make them commensurate.

You know they weren't even using IQ tests back then, don't you?

What method? — Luke

There is definitely a method which is being described here. That's what learning is, a method for restricting doubt, and this is what Wittgenstein is focused on, that method. He started off the book with simple descriptions of ostensive definition, and showed how these description were deficient. Now he has progressed to the point of addressing doubt in the same context, the context of learning. If we learn rules, the rules are like sign-posts, and we must learn how to restrict the doubt we have in relation to what the sign-post is telling us, to have confidence in understanding, in order to proceed.

What I am pointing to, at this place in the text, is that he is reversing the perspective. At 87 he speaks from the perspective of the person learning, or attempting to read the sign-post. This person, to restrict one's own doubt in one's own understanding of the sign-post, asks for explanation. But by the end of 87 he has reversed the perspective to the third person observer, to say "The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose." This third person perspective does not assist the person at the beginning of 87 who is asking for explanation, so it does not suffice as a principle to remove the threat of infinite regress implied at 87. He does a similar thing at 88 with the concept of "exact".

We can see the root of this procedure, of reversing the perspective, well exposed at 85.

85. A rule stands there like a sign-post.—Does the sign-post leave
no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which
direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road
or the footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I
am to follow it; whether in the direction of its ringer or (e.g.) in the
opposite one?—And if there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain
of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the ground—is there only one
way of interpreting them?—So I can say, the sign-post does after all
leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leaves room for
doubt and sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical
proposition, but an empirical one. — PI 85

If we take "the sign-post sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes does not leave room for doubt" as an empirical proposition (third person perspective of the observer), it cannot be justified. That the person proceeds from the sign-post does not justify "the sign-post has left no room for doubt". The person reading the sign-post may or may not proceed with doubt, so the observer cannot conclude that the one who proceeds has no doubt.

So the point is that Wittgenstein is describing a method for limiting doubt, a description of learning. And, his description of how doubt is limited, and certainty is produced is inaccurate. There is exposed here, a relationship between the first person perspective (my experience of learning), and the third person perspective (me as the observer), which is not properly drawn out. It is a very important relationship because it is how we move from our own experience of possibility, toward making inductive conclusions about the way things are, as an observer. We first approach the sign-post with doubt, 'what is it telling me, I need an explanation'. With experience, we approach the sign-post with confidence, 'under normal circumstance its purpose is this'. What happens in between is the means by which doubt is restricted.

We can proceed in our reading of the text, to switch perspectives, from the perspective of the learner, the reader of the sign-post attempting to reduce doubt through the process of learning, to the perspective of an observer, if that's the way that the text goes. But the perspective of the observer has not yet been supported with any firm principles, and we ought not proceed with any false premises, such as, that inductive conclusions which are the basis of the third person perspective (observer) have removed doubt. And the distinction between learner (one who doubts) and knower (one with confidence), if there even is such a division, has not yet been laid out.

That's right, it's the point I've been trying to make for days now, Wittgenstein's method for restricting doubt does not fulfil its purpose. Clearly the doubt is not at all absurd. If someone told me "stand roughly there", I'd wonder why they were saying "roughly there" instead of "stand there". I'd have doubt as to where they actually wanted me to stand, and for what reason they phrased it in that strange way. I'd think perhaps it's a trick, to see if I would stand there, or some other place which I thought qualified as "roughly there". To apprehend where that person actually wanted me to stand, I'd ask for an explanation, "what do you mean by 'roughly there'". We can't limit doubt by saying that we need as much clarity as the situation calls for, because we are all different, and see the situation differently. As Sam26 says, we have different IQs, so what is cause for doubt for me may not be cause for doubt for you, but this does not mean that my doubt is absurd.

It wouldn't surprise me that we're wrong about 50% of the time, in terms of paraphrasing his thoughts. — Sam26

That's why it's best to take our time and consider each passage individually, most of them contain an important point. This way we can lower that number substantially.

Wittgenstein's IQ was probably somewhere around 190, so to think we can get into his head all the time is a fool's errand. And for anyone to think, as MU does, that he was wrong about this or that thing, is just silly. — Sam26

Whose head can you get into at any time? No one but your own. That's why doubt is justified. And, no matter how high one's IQ is, we all make mistakes, and sometimes it's the person with the low IQ who points out the mistake of the person with high IQ. It's just a matter of how we see the same things in different ways.

However, the purpose of this thread is to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy and his Philosophical Investigations. You appear to have no interest in either, and only seem interested in discussing your own personal philosophy about Christianity or something — Luke

To disagree with the effectiveness of my example is one thing, but the conclusion you've made about my purpose is absurd, so I think this serves as a good example of what Wittgenstein is calling misunderstanding.

§89 - if you will permit me to take my own advice... — Banno

I would argue that Wittgenstein' characterization of logic at 89 is completely backward. Logic does not seek to see the bottom of things. It relies on premises, and can only proceed outward (or upward) from the premises. The premises are the bottom, and logic proceeds from that bottom. The premises dictate the conclusions. So logic is not at the bottom of the sciences at all. What is at the bottom is the empirical descriptions (the propositions), which provide the premises from which logic may proceed.

Of course, Wittgenstein says logic "seemed" to be like this, so I would think that his effort is going to be to dispel this backward opinion of what logic is.

You originally used the "stand roughly there" example in the context of doubt/certainty, which is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's usage of it. Now you want to pretend that you were originally using the example in the context of exactness as he does at §88? Please. — Luke

It seems you still haven't read 88. His reference to doubt at 87 is in the context of understanding, and his reference to inexact at 88, is likewise in the context of understanding. Therefore the two are related through the means of the context, "understanding". But this relationship does not necessitate the claim that doubt is anything like "inexact understanding". As I said already, doubt relates to the possibility of misunderstanding.

As he explains at 88, "inexact" and "exact" are expressions of judgement (reproach and praise), as to whether the words used are sufficient to achieve the intended goal. Notice the necessity of a judgement in application of the terms exact and inexact, and therefore the possibility of doubt in making that judgement. It is very similar to the earlier judgement referred to at the end of 87:
"The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose."
What he is talking about in both of these instances is a judgement as to whether the sign-posts (the words used) are sufficient to fulfil the purpose. A judgement of sufficiency would constitute a judgement of understanding, but this requires knowing the purpose. Your attempt to exclude "doubt" from this judgement is totally unjustified. Likewise, Wittgenstein's attempt to put an end to the infinite regress of explanation which is required to ensure understanding (by removing the possibility of misunderstanding), with this principle which itself is a judgement subject to doubt, is a failure.

There definitely is such a thing. — Luke

If you really believe that there is such a thing as certainty, then you ought to be able to show me this thing empirically. Doubt can be seen in a person's actions. Confidence can be seen in a person's actions. Certainty cannot be seen in a person's actions. Where do we see, or perceive certainty in any way?

Let's be clear: the idea of exact understanding is yours, not mine. — Luke

No, that's your phrase, not mine, that's why I said to you, I don't know what you would mean by "exact understanding"..

The reason for his direction is irrelevant. — Luke

Did you not read 88 yet? Exactness is relative to the goal. The "reason for his direction" is the goal. Therefore, the reason why he says "stand roughly there", instead of marking a spot, and saying "stand exactly there", or some other thing, is relevant. The exactness required to fulfill the goal intended by "roughly there", can only be known by apprehending the goal. So to fully understand what is meant by "stand roughly there" requires understanding the reason for saying those words. To go where the sign-post directs (the goal), requires apprehending the goal.

As Fooloso4 said, Wittgenstein "is not arguing that it is possible to eliminate doubt but that the role of certainty in our lives and language is not the certainty that Descartes and others sought". — Luke

I don't see how Descartes is relevant. If Wittgenstein is seeking a certainty which is other than the exclusion of doubt, I haven't yet seen this other type of certainty described. And he did mention at 85, that sometimes there is no room for doubt. Simply saying that Wittgenstein is seeking a type of certainty different from the type of certainty Descartes was seeking doesn't tell me anything; especially since Wittgenstein is telling me that he's seeking a certainty which leaves no room for doubt.

Why the obsession with certainty? Certainty is an ideal. Wittgenstein is arguing here that these ideals are not real, and ought not be sought. Forget about certainty, there is no such thing, discussing it is a waste of time. What we need to discuss is doubt.

Consider this proposition. There is a certainty which is foundational to Christian society, certainty in the existence of God. But don't you see that it's not a real certainty at all? It's a false certainty. There is no certainty there at all, in fact it's an uncertainty, a fundamental doubt, which is foundational to Christian society. However, this fundamental uncertainty, this doubt which is foundational to our society, somehow managed to get itself disguised as certainty. Confidence allows us to overcome our doubt, and that's often a virtue, like courage, but when confidence makes what is uncertain appear to be certain, that's a vice. So if, when you say that Wittgenstein is looking at a different type of certainty, you mean that he is looking at a type of certainty which is really not a certainty at all, it's really an uncertainty, a form of doubt, then I might believe you.

You are mistaking 'acting as if...' for a claim that it is the case. The PI is a method, not a book of facts, Wittgenstein makes this pretty clear when he states quite unequivocally that philosophy does not discover new facts. Philosophy is not capable of deducing what exists and what does not. — Isaac

It is a statement. If you want to describe statements as "acting as if...", I have no problem with that. But then all ontological statements are "acting as if..", and Wittgenstein's instance of "acting as if..." is no different from any other ontological statement, which are all instances of 'acting as if...".

No, the point is that we are certain about some things whether we think it to be a good idea or not. The psychological state comes first, then we seek to understand it. — Isaac

This is where you, along with what seems like everyone else here except fooloso4, have things backwards. Doubt is the primitive condition, which precedes certainty. The first time you see a specific type of sign-post you will not know what it is telling you unless someone explains it to you. Certainty is created through things like memory exercises and logical practises. Logic, certainty, and belief (which is a form of certainty), follow from language. Prior to this, we have curiosity and wonder, which Socrates described as the foundation of philosophy, and these are forms of doubt.

The result of this reversal which you express, is things like people claiming that doubt must be justified. Doubt does not need to be justified, it is the product of not knowing, it is the primitive condition. Certainty is what needs to be justified. So if unenlightened asserts that there is a tree outside the window, and I doubt that, I need to give no reason for my doubt, because doubt is inherently grounded in a lack of understanding. The burden of proof is on the one who claims certainty, because certainty requires justification. If psychologists disagree, then perhaps this is just another instance in a long history of psychologists being wrong. Or perhaps, Wittgenstein's ontology of rules is wrong, and there is some sort of underlying certainty, as expressed by Plato's theory of recollection.

The ratios between successive pairs of numbers in the sequences;
1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34
2, 2, 4, 6, 10, 16, 26, 42, 68
3, 3, 6, 9, 15, 24, 39, 63, 102
4, 4, 8,12, 20, 32, 52, 84, 136
are identical. Look at the vertical columns. the numbers in the sequences below the numbers in the first sequence are multiples of those numbers. You can start with any number and the ratios between the numbers in any vertical column and any other vertical column are the same throughout. This means that every number is part of a Fibonacci sequence, which is as it should be. — Janus

OK, now you have the same ratio, but you've changed things. You have a repeating digit in each case now, as the fundamental unit. It doesn't matter if the fundamental unit is represented as 1, 2, 3, 4, or whatever, what is required is the fundamental unit. In so-called natural occurrences, the fundamental unit might be 2mm, 4 mm 1cm, whatever, the actual measured size is unimportant, what is important is that there is a fundamental unit. The point is that there is a fundamental unit of a particular size in each case, which is the starting point. The fundamental unit is a size which may or may not be arbitrary, but it is necessary to assume a fundamental unit, as a starting point. And so, that unit is the essential foundation of the mathematical operation which follows.

So the question was, when this occurs in "nature", is nature assuming this fundamental unit, and performing the mathematical operation which follows, or is there intention involved. If it is nature, then why wouldn't it be nature when human beings assume this fundamental unit and proceed with the mathematical operation?

Exact understanding is where there is no doubt; where there is certainty. You state that we need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to an acceptable degree, implying that the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed. If the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be completely removed (without any doubt), then we can never be certain to have understanding. Therefore, understanding is impossible. — Luke

Read Wittgenstein's example of time at 88. We settle on the degree of precision required for our goals. To talk about exact understanding does not make sense. Your conclusion does not follow from your argument, because it requires the premise that certainty, or exactness is essential to "understanding", that a person cannot be said to have understood unless there is exactitude, and certainty to one's understanding. But that's not reality, as Wittgenstein is trying to say. If he says "stand roughly here", I understand that he's telling me that he wants me to stand somewhere in this general area, but I don't understand why he's just telling me to stand in this general area, rather than telling me to stand at this point or at that point. So despite the fact that there is understanding, there is also much which is also not understood.

But in that case, what is the threshold level of doubt at which understanding turns to misunderstanding? How many percentage points below 100% certainty before I am no longer sure whether I understand, or at which I misunderstand? — Luke

Well that's a complex problem isn't it? And that's where doubt is useful, to prevent unnecessary haste in such a judgement. But just because it's a complex problem which has no one solution to fit all situations, doesn't mean that we should reject this conclusion as not the way reality is. When our description of reality gives us a complex problem, it doesn't solve the problem to just say that the description must be wrong.

How? — Luke

It is explicitly stated, at 81 and 98 for example, and implied all over the place, such as right here at 88, that seeking the ideal is the wrong approach. So if in this book, In which seeking the ideal is portrayed as the wrong approach, Wittgenstein is actually seeking the ideal, wouldn't his efforts to portray seeking the ideal as the wrong approach, defeat his purpose, of seeking the ideal?

I only asked whether you have ever avoided a misunderstanding before. Have you ever understood something, or is it a matter of degree? — Luke

I'd say it's very clearly a matter of degree, as Wittgenstein describes. When someone says something to me I often grasp what the person intends, to the point of fulfilling that person's purpose. Sometimes not. I never assume to understand with certainty, another's intentions.

I think a lot of the misunderstanding around the PI comes from a misplaced attempt to treat it as a treatise, as MU has done ("Wittgenstein's ontology" , "Wittgenstein's epistemology" ... neither of which he is presenting here), but it is also worth attaching to the comments of others about foundational beliefs. It should be borne in mind the the significance of Wittgenstein's view on such hinges are that they are post hoc, they do not represent a 'discovery', we have not learned some new fact about what is the case in learning the nature of such a device, only relieved ourselves of the burden of seeking further assurance. — Isaac

I disagree with this. Wittgenstein presents an ontology of rules which is very clearly stated in this section. The rule is the sign-post. This positions the rule as existing externally to the mind which interprets it, it is the sign-post. It is contrary to any ontology which positions the rule as a principle within the mind, an idea. It is also contrary to the common definition of "rule", which states that a rule is "a principle". This is clearly an ontology which gives the existence of "the rule", an unconventional description. If you do not fully understand this, and give respect to the ontological status which Wittgenstein gives to 'the rule", you are likely to equivocate in other parts of the book, thinking that Wittgenstein talks of "rule" in the conventional way, as a principle.

The consequence of this ontological status which Wittgenstein gives to "the rule", is the need for interpretation of rules. This suggests the appearance of an infinite regress of explanation. The problem of infinite regress can be approached in two distinct ways. It can be approached as an ontological problem, in which case the appearance of infinite regress is assumed to be the result of a deficient ontology. Or, it can be approached as an epistemological problem, in which case the appearance of infinite regress is treated as a deficiency in the mind which is trying to understand according to the description established by the ontology. Wittgenstein chooses the latter. He wants to stand fast with his ontology of rules, but this means that the real existence of possibility lies between the mind and the rules by which we understand. Therefore the doubt created by the existence of possibility between the mind and the rules, is inherent within knowledge and understanding.

Debates on this whole site would be a lot more interesting and fruitful if people stopped trying to deduce what 'is the case' from their armchairs. — Isaac

I suggest that the armchair is the best place for reading and trying to understand books like this. Do you think that philosophers ought to follow the example of Socrates, wondering around with their heads in the clouds? I suppose you believe that philosophers should all meet the same fate as Socrates as well.

Most modern psychologists would disagree with you here. Considering some of the outrageous things you claim to doubt, why so certain of this? — Isaac

That's exactly the point. If we cannot be certain concerning something so basic, like one is not the same as the other, why think that we can be certain about anything at all?

Because sometimes we have no doubt when following the signpost but other times we might. That, he points out, is an empirical proposition. — Fooloso4

This is the statement I disagree with. Doubt is not an all or nothing proposition, it exists by degree, because it is based in the possibility of error, and therefore we limit doubt through probability. So it is not the case that after one reads the sign-post, that the person either proceeds with certainty, or does not proceed because of doubt, the person may proceed with some degree of doubt. Therefore, it cannot be an empirical proposition, because even if the person is observed to proceed this does not mean that there is no doubt. Further, since the possibility of misunderstanding cannot be eliminated, it is illogical to conclude that there is no doubt. So not only is the claim "sometimes we have no doubt" not supported by empirical evidence, it is also illogical, and therefore an extremely irrational statement.

Wittgenstein is saying that we should replace the picture of knowledge as what is built on unchanging foundations. There is no fixed point or ground: — Fooloso4

This is inconsistent with your quote, in which he is talking about learning "propositions which stand fast for me". That sounds like an unchanging foundation to me.

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing. — On Certainty

This is why I say there is incoherency. He was talking about learning proposition which are firmly believed, "stand fast". But at the same time he wants to say here, that there is no grounds for these beliefs. So we have beliefs which stand fast, and he also seems to say that it is irrational to doubt these beliefs, that being why they stand fast, yet they are "groundless" It makes no sense to say that there are beliefs which are groundless, yet it's irrational to doubt them. Since they are "groundless", what is really irrational is to accept them, believe them, and allow them to stand fast, without doubting them.

The second is that despite this he does think it irrational to doubt such things in practice. — Fooloso4

Do you not see this as fundamentally flawed? How can one truly believe that it is possible that one day there will be an abyss outside the door, but also say that it is irrational to have such a doubt? If the person truly believed that it is irrational to have such a doubt, then wouldn't the person in a move of reason deny the belief that it is possible. if you tell yourself such a doubt is irrational, then you will no longer believe it as a possibility, it's irrational. But if your belief in the possibility is stronger then your capacity to tell yourself that the doubt is irrational, then you will not think that the doubt is irrational, and you'll believe in the possibility. Isn't it impossible to truly hold two beliefs which you know to be incompatible, at the same time?

The importance of this is far reaching. It reverses the order that has long been held and cherished by philosophers. Logic is arbitrary. It does not stand independent of language and thought, imposing a necessary order on all things, or on determining truth.

The logical rules or grammar are derived from within the lived context of the language game. — Fooloso4

Right, I think that this is important. Logic is built on belief, which is a confidence, a type of certainty. These are simple principles which we can have confidence in, like I cannot believe that X is the case, and also that X is not the case, at the same time. And so logic is constructed on a firm commitment, confidence, belief. Language is prior to logic though, and doesn't require the same confidence and certainty. Language can exist without belief, it can exist and be used in cases when people do not know what to believe. Not knowing what to believe is the realm of doubt. So the foundation of language, being prior to logic, is doubt, language is based in doubt, a condition of not knowing what to believe. And from language came logic and belief, which is a form of certainty, because doubt is not a comfortable position to be in.

Perhaps one way to set out what is at hand that might satisfy Metaphysician Undercover would be to say that we have no foundations as he thinks of it, but that the fact remains that we get on with it anyway. — Banno

I agree with this, so long as we do not use the fact "that we get on with it anyway", as empirical evidence that doubt has been removed. That's what I object to, because I believe that despite having doubts, we get on with it anyway.

I'm with you there. Now the question I've been asking is why does Wittgenstein appear to persist in this misguided objective, to find the principles which exclude the possibility of misunderstanding, in On Certainty? And even here, at 85, where he says that the sign-post "sometimes leaves room for doubt and sometimes not"? If he has determined here, that there are no such principles of certainty, no such logic which excludes the possibility of misunderstanding, underlying our language and knowledge, and that it was misguided or wrong to have assumed such, then why does he proceed in that text, On Certainty, as if he is seeking these principles? Do I completely misunderstand his intention in On Certainty, is he trying to give "certainty" a different meaning which does not consist of excluding the possibility of mistake? Or does he misunderstand the principles he has stated here, himself?

The point being that if there is a possibility of misunderstanding, then some degree of doubt is justified. Therefore doubt cannot be completely dismissed as irrational. But Wittgenstein appears to have a desire to completely dismiss doubt in some situations, as completely irrational in those situations, without completely excluding the possibility of misunderstanding in those situations, and this itself is irrational.

are those two patterns the same?

What about these?: — Janus

Your examples are not the same, because you cannot represent the Fibonacci series in a partial way, starting in the middle. It has a unique starting point of one unit, which is replicated. And the whole series relies on replicating that original unit. The pattern is not properly represented without the starting point.

No physically instantiated pattern can represent the whole series, or even any more than the tiniest part of it. So, although both natural and man-made patterns may instantiate the intentionally conceptualized series, the series as mathematically expressed is not a visual pattern, but a pattern that consists merely in a recurring specific operation of addition. — Janus

So the question then. When a thing, produces a pattern based in that sequence, is this not necessarily an intentional pattern rather than a natural one? The pattern relies on assuming a fundamental unit, and then a "specific operation of addition" follows from that assumption of a fundamental unit. If this operation is intentional, then I would think that all so-called natural instances are really intentional. The thing creating the pattern must assume a fundamental unit and perform a specific operation of addition. But if the so-called natural occurrences of this pattern are not intentional, they actually are natural, then why assume that the human occurrence of the pattern, the assuming a fundamental unit, and performing a specific operation of addition, is necessarily intentional?

You complain that doubt can always remain; that we can always fall short of an exact understanding, but these are merely imagined possibilities. The logical result of this claim is that understanding (or exact understanding) is impossible. — Luke

They are not imagined possibilities, they are what Wittgenstein describes. I believe what he describes, but if you think his description is imaginary, that's between you and him. Look at how he describes exactness at 88. The degree of exactness which we strive for, which is required, is relative to our purpose, the goal, what we are doing (his example of time is very good).

I think we should have the same attitude with respect to misunderstanding, and doubt. We should limit the possibility of misunderstanding (this is doubt, recognition of the possibility of misunderstanding), to the degree required for our purposes. Wittgenstein is rejecting the notion that we strive for "ideals". But if he posits "certainty', or "leaves no room for doubt", as what he is striving for, he is just being hypocritical. In this case he has made his goal an ideal, an absolute, and this is inconsistent with the way that he says we use words. We do not strive for ideals, we settle for what is required relative to the purpose at hand.

The "logical result", of "misunderstanding is possible" is not "understanding is impossible", and I don't know what you would mean by "exact understanding". The point is that we ought to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to a degree acceptable, relative to the situation. If the president of the USA has his finger on the nuclear button, there is a need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to a high degree. When my wife gives me a list of items for the grocery store, I need to limit the possibility of misunderstanding to a lesser degree. But striving for certainty, in the sense of leaving no room for doubt, is nonsense in the context of PI. To strive for the ideal would actually defeat the purpose of the book.

Can you honestly state that there has never been an occasion on which you have understood a signpost or what someone tells you? Understanding signposts and what people say is both possible and actual - it happens every day. — Luke

This is judgement after the fact, it's irrelevant. What we are talking about is avoiding misunderstanding, preventing misunderstanding. We are talking about a judgement made by the person planting the sign-posts, prior to the act of reading the sign-posts. But I'll tell you one thing, the fact that understanding is possible, does not produce the logical conclusion that misunderstanding is impossible. You seem to be employing some bad logic.

You simply repeat the interlocutor's concern at §87: "But then how does an explanation help me to understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!”

Yet you fail to acknowledge or be satisfied by Wittgenstein's response.

I have no further interest in attempting to explain it. — Luke

Yes. The so-called interlocutor's concern is a concern which Wittgenstein had about his description of rules, or else he would not have brought it up as a concern. And, as I've explained, Wittgenstein's response to that concern is lame. It's inconsistent with his description. He may have been better off not to have broached the issue of doubt. It's an issue he was not prepared to deal with.

[

I thought that large numbers of buffalo were wantonly shot -- and not slaughtered, maybe just skinned for their hides -- as a way of depriving the plains Indians of food. Is that true? Don't know for sure at this moment. — Bitter Crank

Could have been partly that, but I think that the buffalo's land was wanted for cattle, competition for the grass. The best way to take their land is to kill them. Kill two birds with one stone?