Your account of what Aristotle says the intellect depends upon confuses this question. Yes, a living creature who has the capacity to know is only possible because they also have other capacities needed by other living creatures. Yes, the more advanced forms of life depend upon the structure of the more basic forms. But this is not to say that what is possible for the more advanced form is framed only by the possibilities available to the less advanced. Otherwise, there would be no point in distinguishing between them. — Paine

Yes, I completely agree with this. And if you think that what I said confuses the issue, I apologize for that, it was not my intention.

There is a relationship between the types of soul that conditions what is possible and Aristotle describes this in a manner that addresses your question regarding 'immediate intuition'. From Posterior Analytics: — Paine

Thanks for the reference Paine. He also addresses the issue of intuitive knowledge in Nichomachean Ethics. He places it at the highest level, then questions whether it is innate or acquired. There appears to be intuition which is proper to theoretical knowledge, and also intuition in practical knowledge. His conclusion here is consistent with what you've quoted. He seems to say it is a combination of both innate and learned.

I must admit that I do not agree with how Aristotle has characterized this type of knowledge. Notice that he says this is how "man knows the primary immediate premises". And he assigns to this the highest form of knowledge. So he will later claim that the logical process leads us from the more certain, to the less certain. But I think that he has this backward. The primary immediate premises, grasped by intuition only, are not proven, and cannot adequately be proven. So this inability to know with certainty, the truth or falsity of primary premises, is what really brings uncertainty into our knowledge. It is not the source of certainty. The logical process provides us with a very high degree of certainty, and we can know without a doubt, the validity of the conclusion. So uncertainty in the conclusion is primarily the result of uncertainty in the premises.

Therefore I believe that Aristotle has this all backward. Direct intuition does not give us the highest level of knowledge, with the highest degree of certainty, it gives us the base for our knowledge, the lowest level, and the base has the lowest level of certainty. To understand this, all you need to do is look at the hypotheses of modern science. These are derived from intuition. However, they are unproven, therefore the hypotheses, as hypotheses, have a very low degree of certainty. Then we take the hypotheses and find practical ways to test them. If an hypothesis proves useful we keep using it, because nothing has falsified it, and it has passed the test of usefulness. As we use it more and more, we build logical structures on it, and it becomes a "primary premise". But just because it has not yet been falsified, doesn't necessarily mean that its status, as having a relatively low degree of certainty, has changed significantly. Then it becomes built into our structure of knowledge, and since it is a base premise for all sorts of different procedures, we suffer from the illusion that it has a high degree of certainty, when actually the opposite is the case. Because of this deficiency at the base, problems arise. Only when the problems from unsound conclusions become so unbearable, that people are inclined to revisit the base premises, is the uncertainty exposed, and the primary "intuitive" premises are dismissed. Kuhn described this phenomenon as the paradigm shift.

The active intellect's immateriality, immortality, and independence in relation to the body-soul is not refuted at all, it is affirmed as the passages I quoted clearly show, and as acknowledged by scholars like — Apollodorus

Right, it is "affirmed" in those specific passages, but it is refuted by the principles and the logic laid out in the rest of the book. This is common in philosophy, that what is proven in a particular piece of work, differs from what is asserted in it. As part of the discipline, we learn to differentiate between these two.

The very definition of intellect according to Aristotle is “that which thinks itself” as stated at Meta. 12.1074b and as quoted earlier. — Apollodorus

This is wrong. That is not the definition of "intellect", it is the definition of "divine thought". And your earlier quote says " but we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us". The whole point of this discussion between Wayfarer and I, for me, was to stress the difference between the human intellect, and the divine. Such misquotes, and misrepresentation of what the quoted passage actually says, and your conflating of the divine and the human, do nothing for your purpose .

I can't agree with it, because I think it's mistaken. Ideas such as mathematical ideas and scientific principles are not the possession of the human mind, but are discoverable by any rational intellect. — Wayfarer

Would you argue that I am not human and I do not have a rational intellect? I could not proceed beyond basic arithmetic and geometry in high school math. I tried algebra and trigonometry because other members in my family were very competent in mathematics. However, my mind seems to understand by using a type of imaging system which left me incapable of understanding these abstractions. The abstract correlations were beyond my capacity to imagine, and I could not understand. Rather than taking for granted the principles which the teachers fed me, memorizing them, and moving along with the rest of the class, I tried my best to understand the principles. I could not rapidly make sense of them, I got left behind, and I dropped out of abstract math.

This is the problem with your stated principle. It's just a matter of defining terms in a way which is simply begging the question, and completely ignoring the actual evidence. The evidence is that all sorts of different animals think, and therefore have some type of mind, But these animals do not seem to apprehend mathematical ideas, therefore you would say that they do not have a rational mind. However, the classification "mathematical ideas" encompasses a huge expanse of conceptual structures, and the majority of human beings are not capable of "discovering" the majority of them.

So your stated principle "mathematical principles... are discoverable by any rational intellect", requires that we draw an arbitrary boundary (drawn only for the purpose of supporting your principle) between simple math and complicated math, the latter being unintelligible and undiscoverable to many human beings, who appear to be otherwise rational. But then we need to draw another arbitrary boundary at the other end, to ensure that other animals which seem to comprehend the difference between two objects and three objects are excluded from the category of "rational". In other words, we need to completely distort the concept of "rational intellect", as well as completely distort the concept of "mathematical ideas", in a way designed to support your principle, which ends up being nothing other than contriving definitions for the purpose of begging the question.

You're speaking from your own perspective, not that of others. I've previously referred to the passage on Augustine on Intelligible Objects. Note this comment:

In the Confessions Augustine reports that his inability to conceive of anything incorporeal was the “most important and virtually the only cause” of his errors. The argument from De libero arbitrio shows how Augustine managed, with the aid of Platonist direction and argument, to overcome this cognitive limitation. By focusing on objects perceptible by the mind alone and by observing their nature, in particular their eternity and immutability, Augustine came to see that certain things that clearly exist, namely, the objects of the intelligible realm, cannot be corporeal. When he cries out in the midst of his vision of the divine nature, “Is truth nothing just because it is not diffused through space, either finite or infinite?” (FVP 13–14), he is acknowledging that it is the discovery of intelligible truth that first frees him to comprehend incorporeal reality.

That’s pretty well what happened in my case when I realised the truth of mathematical Platonism. — Wayfarer

I do not deny that we can "see" the reality of the incorporeal, or immaterial. What I deny is that we can grasp the essence of it, "the whatness", of the immaterial. Do you see the way it's described in this passage? "By focusing on... eternity and immutability" "Augustine came to see that certain things... cannot be corporeal." Eternal and immutable refer to things outside of time; time and change being categorized together, as the corporeal.

The reality of what is outside of time and change, outside of material existence, is what Aristotle's cosmological argument brings our attention to. It shows by logical necessity, that we must conclude an "actual" reality which is outside of material reality, as prior to it. The reason why I say that we are incapable of understanding the essence or "whatness" of the immaterial, is because it appears to us as incomprehensible or unintelligible by way of contradiction. We can "see" it as a logical necessity, but we cannot understand it. The priority described by Aristotle is a temporal priority defined by causation; it is necessary to conclude the immaterial as the cause of the material. The logical demonstration shows an "actuality", as a cause, which is temporally prior to the material realm of time and change. So this appears incoherent to us, because we are now talking about an actuality, as cause (a temporal term) which is temporally prior to time itself. There lies contradiction.

But when we accept the deficiency of human conception, we see that what this really reveals is the deficiency in the human conception of time. We fix time to material change. Material change is what defines and measures the passing of time for us. When the logic of the cosmological argument shows us an 'actual' cause which is outside of time (by this conception of time), we have no capacity to understand this logically necessary 'activity'. It is impossible for us to say "what" it is, because it is already contradictory to talk about an activity with no time. The only way which I see to rectify this problem is to rebuild the conception of time, such that the passing of time is represented as occurring outside the realm of material existence, rather than as dependent on it. Then we bring that realm of activity, which is outside the realm of material existence, the actual immaterial, into the realm of intelligibility by resolving that contradiction.

I find it ironic that we have essentially reversed our positions from the last time we approached this issue. Then, I argued that God is fundamentally intelligible, and you said that human beings cannot understand God. Now you are arguing that the immaterial is intelligible to us, and I am arguing that we haven't the capacity to understand it.

Well, you are saying that you "do not deny it" but you are also saying that it is an "idea which is actually being refuted". What exactly is being "refuted" and how? — Apollodorus

The idea that the active intellect (or mind) is completely immaterial, and directly united with the soul, is what is actually refuted by Aristotle's principles. The active intellect is a higher power of the soul, and the higher powers are dependent on the lower powers, therefore, the lower powers and the material being, are a medium between the active intellect and the soul, and the contrary idea, that the active intellect is completely immaterial and directly united to the soul, is refuted.

Aquinas actually demonstrates this very well with reference to free will, and the power of self-movement. The active intellect with its power of discernment using immaterial principles cannot ultimately control the will. We often do what we know is wrong. That was an issue for Socrates and Plato, who used this argument to defeat the sophists who claimed virtue is knowledge and therefore could be taught. It was also a significant point of interest for Augustine, the soul's capacity to act contrary the intellect, to do wrong when it was known to be wrong. What is shown is that the soul's power of self-movement, which is a most base power, comes between the soul and the active intellect.

We must bear in mind that the immortality of the nous was central to Plato’s teachings and that Aristotle was Plato’s long-time pupil. If Aristotle had disagreed with Plato on such an important point, he would have made this clear in no uncertain terms. But nowhere does he do so. — Apollodorus

That disagreement is made clear in Metaphysics Bk9, what is called the cosmological argument.

Aristotle asserts the immortality of intellect again later on: — Apollodorus

As I said already, these statements of immortality of the intellect are inconsistent with the logic of Aristotle's overall conceptual structure, and ought to be dismissed as oversight, or mistake.

Clearly, the active intellect is an uninterrupted contemplative activity that is immortal and eternal and that endows the passive or thinking intellect (a.k.a. reasoning faculty or logos) with the power to think when in the embodied state. In contrast, when separated from the body, it reverts to its essential, contemplative state. — Apollodorus

The problem is that we can use Aristotle's own conceptual structure to refute this idea, as Aquinas demonstrated. So the validity of that idea is highly doubtful. And since we cannot perform the reverse, to take this disputed statement and overthrow Aristotle's conceptual structure, because the conceptual structure is well supported by evidence, we ought to dismiss this disputed idea as inconsistent with reality.

These are not some obscure and random remarks that we can lightly dismiss. On the contrary, the more we look into it, the more we see that they are consistent with Aristotle’s overall framework. — Apollodorus

So far, all that I've seen in this thread, to support the notion that this idea is consistent with Aristotle's overall framework is some quotes by Wayfarer, of secondary sources, bearing extremely poor representations of Aristotle's "overall framework", like Brennan's discussion of "the proper knowledge of the senses".

In any case, since the intellect according to Aristotle is capable of existence in separation from the body, I don't think it can be argued that it is dependent on the body in an Aristotelian context. — Apollodorus

Have you not read "On the Soul"? It's made very clear in the first half of BK2 that the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower, despite the fact that he says "...the mind that knows with an immediate intuition presents a different problem." Read it, because I will not explain it again.

The relevant question is not whether it can be argued that the intellect is dependent on the lower powers. The hierarchy of powers is well described, so the argument is inevitable. The relevant question is whether a mind can know with "an immediate intuition". This is what supports the opposing idea which you hold.

But you repudiate that: — Wayfarer

Yes I repudiate it. It's a nonsensical passage. It starts with ""if the proper knowledge of the senses is...". Knowledge is not proper to the senses. The senses have no knowledge so there is no knowledge proper to the senses. This is described in Bk3 On the Soul, where he discusses whether there is a sixth sense. Knowledge is proper to the thinking part of the being, not the sense-organs. The phrase "sense knowledge" is used numerous times in the passage, and it really has no intelligible meaning. That's what I mean about textbook type quotes. They tend to be of the lowest level of reliability.

So, you're saying that Brennan and therefore Aquinas are 'mistaken' in this analysis, are you not? — Wayfarer

No, I am just saying Brennan is mistaken. The passage shows a complete lack of understanding.

Anyway, I don't see how that passage relates to hylomorphism.

Your basic conflict is that you adopt the modern (for most here, the superior) point of view, that the mind is the product of evolution. There is no way in your view to understand how 'ideas' or anything of that nature could pre-exist evolutionary development. So ideas are 'a product of' that evolutionary process - which is where we started this debate. You can't see (quite logically, I suppose) how there could be ideas before there were any people around to have them. — Wayfarer

Right, human ideas are a product of human minds, which are a product of evolution. But this is a very small part of reality remember. We still have the soul, which is prior to evolution, and prior to the material body as cause of it, therefore immaterial, to try to understand. And, we still have what some refer to as Divine Ideas, or separate Forms, or God and the angels, which are the cause of all material existence in general, therefore prior to it, and just like the soul, immaterial, to try to understand. So life on earth, evolution, human minds, and the ideas which they have, is just a small part of reality .

So, all I request is that you respect this separation, between the ideas produced by human minds which are posterior to, and dependent on the material body of the human being (therefore imperfect), and the truly immaterial things, (separate Forms, God and the angels), which are prior to material existence, as cause of it. Is this too much to ask for? Can you apprehend the truth of this principle, that if there was some sort of Divine Ideas, which were here before there were any people to have them, they were most likely radically different from the ideas which people have? The ideas that people have are a feature of the human condition, just like the ideas that other animals have are a feature of their conditions.

Plato demonstrated this to us. Think of The Republic where he asked for the definition of "just". The different human beings asked, each have a different idea of what "just" means, but it is implied that there ought to be a divine idea, the true idea of "just". But no human being knows it. You are quite fond of numbers, and you probably think there is a difference between ideas like "just" and ideas like "2". But how many different types of numbering systems do you know of? Natural, rational, real, imaginary, complex, how many more are there? If there are so many different ways to conceptualize numbers, what is the true, divine way?

So Aristotle and Aquinas just built upon this basic fact which Plato exposed. We approach ideas as if they are some sort of immaterial entities. But when we examine them very closely we see that they fail in bringing to us the true immaterial existence which we seek. However, they do demonstrate to us, through the use of logical reasoning (cosmological argument for example) the reality of the true immaterial existence. The problem is that being only human, we haven't determined a way to get our minds into that true immaterial existence.

It is not clear at all to me that the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower. — Apollodorus

This is what Wayfarer and I discussed to some length in this thread already. It's fundamental to Aristotle's treatise On the Soul. The power of sensation is dependent on the power of self-nutrition, and the power of intellection is dependent on the power of sensation.

If the soul or any other part of man preexists the body then it can equally well postexist it. — Apollodorus

I do not deny that, I haven't discussed the soul after the body, at all.

n this particular case, I can see no reason why he would have suddenly decided to “contradict” himself. So I think it would be better to ignore the “it seems” bit and take the rest of the sentence as it stands. — Apollodorus

The problem is that taking the sentence as it stands is what is inconsistent with the conceptual structure he has laid out in the book. That's why It's better to recognize the "it seems", and notice that this might be an idea which is actually being refuted.

As you said, the reconstructionist is guided by values, and reconstructionism is essentially hedonistic, it makes no claim of being right. On the contrary, even though it sticks to the content like a dog to his bone, it isn’t at all about being right (cf. Manifesto). To summarize, what’s subjective is the choice of these correlations. What’s objective is the quoted content and the correlations. These are formal correlations by the way: transpositions, inversion, repetition, scaling, and so on. — thaumasnot

I don't see that you have any claim to objectivity. Content is inherently subjective, the subject matter. The artist chooses the medium so the medium is subjective. The only way that art approaches objectivity is through the form, the correlations which the artist employs. A semblance of objectivity is obtained if the artist can use these correlations to achieve some sort of meaning or aesthetic value in a universal way.

If you strip the piece down to its most subjective level, and reconstruct, then all you are doing is creating a new level of subjectivity by removing any semblance of objectivity which the piece might have had in the first place. Even if you leave in place some of the "formal correlations", by changing others you are allowing your own subjectivity to invade the objective aspect.

If it is an “illusion”, then Aristotle himself contributes to it in no small measure by making frequent references to the mind being controlled by the intellect which is the “divine” and “guiding” principle in man. — Apollodorus

I agree that Aristotle is inconsistent on this point, as he sometimes is. This is probably why the Scholastics had so much disagreement concerning the active and passive intellect. However, I find that Aristotle is for the most part very consistent and logical. So I think the best way to understand him is to adhere to the principles and logic which he has laid down in an overarching structure, and when points arise which are inconsistent with the overall logical structure, to simply dismiss them as oversight on his part.

So we have one aspect of man, the “active intellect”, that is immortal and survives the death of the body-soul compound. — Apollodorus

So I would dismiss this point as inconsistent with his overall logical structure. Clearly, the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower, and the active intellect is described as a higher power than the passive intellect. So if he happened to mention at a couple places that the active intellect might exist separately from the body, I would simply dismiss these mentions as inconsistent, and therefore mistaken. Notice his use of "it seems" at your referenced paragraph: "The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed. If it could be destroyed at all it would be under the blunting influence of old age." 408b 18.

So in one sentence you're basically dismissing Aquinas' hylomorphism. — Wayfarer

Aristotelian "hylomorphism" refers to the duality of matter and form in a material object. Each particular material object consists of matter (the potential to be or not be what it is), and form (what the particular object actually is). In the existence of a material object, as present, the two are not separable. But the form of the object is necessarily prior to its material existence, just like the soul is prior to the material body. So I do not see why you think my statement denies hylomorphism.

By Aristotelean principles, when a human mind abstracts the form of a material object, it does not take the very same form which exists in the object. The form in the object has inherent accidents and the form in the mind does not grasp those accidents. This marks the separation between two senses of "form". First, the sense of what exists within the human mind, as formula and essence, and "form' in the sense of independent Forms, which are responsible, as cause, for 'what the particular, material, object is'. The latter being the form of the particular. Since the mind doesn't actually receive the forms of the material objects, we can conclude that the forms which the mind has are created by the mind. This leaves an open question of what exactly do the senses and mind receive from the material object, when these powers are "acted on". That's the passive part of the intellect, being acted on, and the active part is the creation of the forms, formulae and essences.

But, the ability of the intellect to discern the forms is a separate faculty to the sensory. In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which animals possess. Nous is what grasps the universals, which is what endows the human with rationality and what enables them to grasp philosophy. But this has also been already denied by you. In fact you're dismissing the tenets of hylomorphic dualism whenever you mention it. — Wayfarer

Grasping universals, by the active intellect, is what Aristotle calls "actualizing" them. This is the process whereby the formulae and essences receive actual existence. Prior to this they only exist potentially. We might say that the intellect creates them, Aristotle calls them "constructions". This is very clear in Metaphysics Bk9. And, it is here, where Aristotle distances himself from the Pythagoreans and Platonists.

I really don't understand why you think I deny hylomorphism. It seems like you might not have a clear understanding of it.

Notice that is the opposite of what is stated in that textbook I quoted. — Wayfarer

I'm not fond of philosophy textbooks. They are generally the lowest level of secondary source, very unreliable.

I think I finally understand you, but I think you're mistaken. — Wayfarer

Take your time. Continue with your studies. It took me probably twenty years of studying philosophy before this reality set in. The biggest piece for me was understanding Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument. This really put the actual/potential relation in perspective, revealing the need for two completely distinct types of actualities (forms). Consequently I'm a true dualist.

Thanks.

Even though it’s not interesting, it’s different from analysis in that reconstruction transcribes variations almost transparently. It makes no effort to add value to the content (except try to be readable and not too tedious). — thaumasnot

Isn't that exactly what analysis is though, to break something down into its parts, in an objective way? This is to make the divisions in accordance with what is inherent within the piece, rather than according to some values. It is synthesis, when we put the parts back together (reconstruction), which is necessarily guided by values. We cannot "reconstruct" in a manner which is not value-driven because the end, or goal, of the reconstruction must be chosen, and it acts as a guide in the reconstructing activity.

It won’t even try to categorize the piece. In practice, it will rather apply to melody (not harmony), more precisely the motifs. It will transcribe how patterns arise from correlating melodic structures. This is already unusual (not unique, of course), but it will take that approach further by looking at piece-wide networks of correlations. — thaumasnot

So I think the issue is these "correlations". This is how the parts are supposed to be related to each other. An artist will proceed with a very unique, peculiar, or even mysterious idiolect, or way of correlating parts in general. Let's say that the reconstructionist breaks down the parts, and starts to describe a correlation of parts, attributing this correlation to the artist. How does the reconstructionist know that these correlations are the ones produced by the artist, rather than ones created by the synthesis (complete with inherent intention and values) of the reconstructionist?

So despite your voluminous posts about metaphysics, you're actually materialist? — Wayfarer

Haha. How many times have I said, that the soul is immaterial, in this thread? I simply recognize the reality of a material separation between the soul and the intellect. It's what Aquinas taught, and fundamental to most reasonable philosophies of the mind. Otherwise we]d have no way to account for material existence prior to the human mind, and we get mired in panpsychism.

if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.

It's a mistake to separate "intellectual knowledge" from "sense knowledge" in this way. As Aristotle explained, intellectual knowledge requires images received from the senses. And the images received from the senses are already distinct and fundamentally different from the form of the thing itself (as per Kant). The "accidents" inhere within the material thing. So the separation is properly represented as existing between the senses and the objects sensed, while the intellect and the senses are united in the activity of producing knowledge, as described by Aristotle.

I'm interested in the view in ancient and medieval philosophy of reason as both a faculty of the mind, and an ordering principle of the cosmos. — Wayfarer

This is an ancient idea which was outdated and archaic any time posterior to Plato. Plato laid the foundation for the proper separation between "the mind" as a feature of the human being, and "the ordering principle of the cosmos", as the reason why there is inherent order within all material existence. Understanding this separation is crucial to understanding the full extent, and incredible magnitude, of the fallibility of the human mind, and human knowledge in general, that is including the so-called objective sciences. This is why many follows of Plato appropriately turned to skepticism.

Yes, we look for patterns, patterns that have been ignored. While this yields a formal kind of review, it's not like an AI though, because in the last instance we're guided by personal inclinations when choosing the patterns. In fact, if anyone publishes a reconstruction, it’s probably because they found patterns they deemed remarkable. An essential difference from traditional reviews is that this personal inclination is implicit and not a focus, and the patterns are content that can be shared objectively and can ultimately lead to emotions (but this is not talked of, because it's something best left to the discretion of the reader IMO). My hope is to show patterns that are worth your while, but whether they are is yours to decide. — thaumasnot

So I don't really understand where the "reconstruction" comes from. Let's take a simple pattern for example. Suppose a piece of music has a rhythm, a beat, and this you choose as a medium-specific narrative. So you might go through the whole piece and determine what parts are the fundamental rhythm, and what parts are variations, or maybe some parts are even completely different. That's an analysis, but where does the reconstruction come into play? How would a reconstruction differ from an analysis? What am I missing?

But I think the main problem with Aristotle is the vague language he is using. — Apollodorus

I don't think his language is very vague. It just requires a very thorough reading of much material, to get a good grasp of how he is using the words. He was very careful in his attempt to maintain an interdisciplinary consistency through all the fields he discussed. This is a type of consistency which is quite lacking in modern science.

The answer seems to be that Aristotle posits a “material intellect” and an “active intellect”. The material intellect is the soul’s faculty of thinking. It is capable of being affected and perishable. In contrast, the active intellect is not a part or faculty of the soul but is independent of it. As such it is immaterial, eternal, imperishable, and self-existent, and it makes thinking possible. Aristotle also calls this intellect “divine” and “impassible” (De Anima 408b13, 430b5). — Apollodorus

The active intellect, for Aristotle, is not separable in the way you describe, from the passive intellect. The active and passive parts are united as one intellect, both being required for intellection. The two parts are described in Bk3, On the Soul, as being active, and being act on. The human intellect requires both, to be active in discernment and judgement, and also to be acted upon by sense images.

So there are two parts to the human intellect, and if we were to separate a lower power from a higher power, the lower part would be the passive, in its relation with the senses. By the principles already stated, a higher power (the active intellect) cannot be separated from a lower one (the passive intellect) which it depends on. So for instance, if the active is portrayed as top-down causation, and the passive is portrayed as being acted on from the bottom-up, the top-down activity is fundamentally dependent on the bottom-up, and cannot be separated from it. However, the bottom-up is separable because the soul is positioned at the bottom. It's counter-intuitive because we want to believe that the conscious mind has control over the material body, in the Platonic way, because that is the illusion we get from the perspective of the conscious mind. But in reality the material body has a fundamental grip on the mind. This is evident in certain chemical imbalances which affect one's capacity for rational thought.

That does not seem very correct, or at least it seems only a way to imagine something. such as numbers. 2 and 2 is 4 independent of there being 2 things and 2 other things. — Tobias

Sure, but "2+2=4" is rather useless accept when applied to actual things, just like "if P, then Q" is rather useless without any things that P and Q refer to. Arne was saying the opposite, that numerals are especially useful when there is no spatial thing which they refer to.

The way I read Aristotle, he believes that the soul depends on the body, belongs to the body, and therefore it perishes with the death of the body (De Anima 414a20ff.) — Apollodorus

The problem with this interpretation is that you are not accounting for the order of dependence of "the parts" which Aristotle clearly explains.

From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate certain parts of it are (if it has parts) --- for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. — Aristotle On the Soul 413a,3-6

The higher powers, sensitive and intellectual, are very clearly not separable from the material body, being dependent on it. But when we get down to the very basic powers, self-nutrition, and self-movement, these may be separable. And the soul itself is clearly separable, in the way I described. As cause of the material body it is prior to the material body, therefore it existed independently from the material body at that time.

The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and source have many senses. But the soul is the cause of its body alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. — 415b, 7-12

It appears to me like you are not respecting the temporal order, and priority explained by Aristotle. So you say, that a soul cannot exist after the death of a living body, therefore a soul has no existence independent from the body. However, Aristotle clearly explains how the soul has existence independent from the body prior in time to the body. Therefore we cannot conclude that "the soul depends on the body". The "parts" of the living being which are prior are not dependent on the parts which are posterior. The soul itself, is the first in temporal priority, and as the cause of the material body, its existence is temporally prior to the material body, so it is separate and immaterial. However, the parts which are posterior are dependent on the parts which are prior, so no posterior part can have independent existence.

If we are saying that the intellect depends on the soul, then there can be no intellect after the death of the body-soul compound. — Apollodorus

Correct, and this is why I disagreed with you in the other thread, when you discussed independent intelligence. I believe that independent immaterial existences, such as God and the angels in Aquinas, which account for the necessity of assuming immaterial and separate Forms, ought not be called "intellects" or "intelligences". These immaterial existences are prior to material existence whereas the human intellect is posterior to material existence. That is why there is a huge separation (the medium of matter) between human intelligible objects (concepts and ideas) and independent Forms. So I conclude that referring to these independent Forms as intelligences is very misleading because the immaterial Forms are temporally prior to matter while intelligible objects are posterior to, and dependent on matter.

If Aquinas accepts everything Aristotle says, he may find himself in conflict with his own Christian views. — Apollodorus

That's what I said already:

So Aquinas had a fine line to walk here, between two completely incompatible doctrines, personal immortality, as a traditional tenet of the Church, and the immateriality of the soul according to Aristotelian principles (science?). Aristotelian immateriality is based in the concept of "prior to matter", and assigns particular, individual, and personal identity to an object's material presence, posteriority. This directly conflicts with the classic Christian teaching of personal resurrection. What is prior, the immaterial soul, cannot be postulated as posterior, to support personal resurrection.

If you look closely into Aquinas' metaphysics and theology, you'll see that ultimately he chooses the Aristotelian doctrine, as it is more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. Take a look at the first line from your quoted passage. "I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent." This is consistent with Aristotle. The soul, as the source of activity, actuality, is the first principle of intellectual operation. This is the very same for all the powers of the soul. The soul is the first principle, as the source of activity, for self-nutrition, sensation, and self-movement, each and every power of a living being. — Metaphysician Undercover

The point being that the Aristotelian view was more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. So Aquinas lead his church in that direction, with his metaphysics, saying just enough concerning personal resurrection and immortality, to appease those with the ancient religious views, and maintain good standing relative to the authorities of the Church. His work of thoroughly analyzing the metaphysical perspective of Aristotle did very much to lead western society out of the dark ages of ancient tenets, into the scientific era.

I think it would be more consistent to see reality as a hierarchy of intelligences and both soul and body as created by a higher intelligence, as in Platonism and similar systems. — Apollodorus

The problem though is that this is not scientific, i.e. not consistent with the evidence. Which do you think is better for metaphysics, to try and twist around the meaning of words like "intelligence" and "soul", to produce consistency with advancements in science, or to change fundamental principles of metaphysics to maintain consistency with new collections of evidence?

Plato laid out, exposed and explained all sorts of ancient (ancient to him) metaphysical principles concerning soul and mind and their relations with matter and human intentions. Many of these were inconsistent with the science of the time. So there was a great project to determine the fallacies of the ancient metaphysics, as well as the fallacies of the contemporary science. When there is such incompatibility, it is not a matter of choosing one side or the other. So we need to take the evidence from the scientific side and the theories from the metaphysical side, which make a match.

The evidence shows that intelligence is a product of the living body, dependent on it, therefore posterior to the body, while the theory shows that the immaterial soul is prior to the living body. So we have that temporal separation between soul and intellect. It makes no sense to bring the posterior (intellect) around to the prior (soul), and start talking about prior immaterial existences as if they are intellects, just for the sake of appeasing some ancient ideas. This only creates an inability for proper education of the subject matter, and consequently confusion. Therefore we must establish new, distinct terms for the immaterial existences, Forms, which are prior to matter, rather than calling them intelligences.

Here, I am afraid, I shall require once more the assistance of the giraffe...How did he come by his long neck? Lamarck would have said, by wanting to get at the tender leaves high up on the tree, and trying until he succeeded in wishing the necessary length of neck into existence... Darwin pointed out—and this and no more was Darwin's famous discovery—that [another] explanation, involving neither will nor purpose nor design either in the animal or anyone else, was on the cards. If your neck is too short to reach your food, you die. That may be the simple explanation of the fact that all the surviving animals that feed on foliage have necks or trunks long enough to reach it...Consider the effect on the giraffes of the natural multiplication of their numbers, as insisted on by Malthus. Suppose the average height of the foliage-eating animals is four feet, and that they increase in numbers until a time comes when all the trees are eaten away to within four feet of the ground. Then the animals who happen to be an inch or two short of the average will die of starvation. All the animals who happen to be an inch or so above the average will be better fed and stronger than the others. They will secure the strongest and tallest mates; and their progeny will survive whilst the average ones and the sub-average ones will die out. This process, by which the species gains, say, an inch in reach, will repeat itself until the giraffe's neck is so long that he can always find food enough within his reach, at which point, of course, the selective process stops and the length of the giraffe's neck stops with it. Otherwise, he would grow until he could browse off the trees in the moon. And this, mark you, without the intervention of any stockbreeder, human or divine...

Darwin's so-called "explanation" is incomplete. It is explained here how the animals which survive are the ones which happen to have longer necks, but it does not explain why they happen to have longer necks. Therefore it does not account for the "cause" of giraffes having longer necks. Lamarck's theory on the other hand addresses the issue of "causation". He says that a being's inclination to repeatedly act in a specific way affects its material body in a way which may be passed on to its offspring. Here, we can see that Lamarck accounts for the cause of existence of "animals who happen to be an inch or so above the average". Darwin simply takes this condition for granted, and produces an evolutionary theory based on the evidence of this reality.

So there is no fundamental and significant incompatibility between Lamarck's theory, and Darwin's theory, until we get to the idea of "chance", "accidental", or "spontaneous variations". Lamarck attributed such variations to the desires of the individual beings (notice that "desire" also includes sexual orientation).

But I think we ought to consider that Darwin has posited the cause of variation as unknown, not as "chance", or "random". This idea of chance or random variation might be an interpretive fallacy. The problem with Lamarck's view, which Darwin exposed, is that variations appear to be as likely to have a negative affect as they are to have a positive effect.

Under domestication we see much variability, caused, or at least excited, by changed conditions of life; but often in so obscure a manner, that we are tempted to consider the variations as spontaneous.
...Variability is not actually caused by man; he only unintentionally exposes organic beings to new conditions of life, and then nature acts on the organisation and causes it to vary.
... As geology plainly proclaims that each land has undergone great physical changes, we might have expected to find that organic beings have varied under nature, in the same way as they have varied under domestication. And if there has been any variability under nature, it would be an unaccountable fact if natural selection had not come into play. It has often been asserted, but the assertion is incapable of proof, that the amount of variation under nature is a strictly limited quantity. Man, though acting on external characters alone and often capriciously, can produce within a short period a great result by adding up mere individual differences in his domestic productions; and every one admits that species present individual differences.
...Variability from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life and from use and disuse: a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. — Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, Chapter XV: Recapitulation and Conclusion

https://infidels.org/library/historical/charles-darwin-origin-of-species-chapter15/

I'm not saying anything new here. — Agent Smith

If you say that color is a property, then when something changes from being green to being red, it still has the same property, color. So you assert change is a property, because for you a property is something which changes. But if green and red are distinct properties, then when something changes from green to red, the change is not a part of either of these properties, and change is not a property.

You are saying that "it is not necessary that the intellect be a part of the soul". But some souls apparently do have an intellect. In their case, the intellect is part of the soul. The intellect cannot be at once part of the soul and separate from the soul.

This means that the parts of the soul have no separate existence from each other . The "separation" is only hypothetical. — Apollodorus

Sure, but if we go in this way, then as Aristotle shows, the separation of the soul from the body is only hypothetical.

However, the hypothetical separation is shown to be consistent with the evidence of temporal priority. The sensitive power is prior to the intellectual power, in time, therefore it exists independently of the intellectual power, at that time, so the hypothetical separation is scientifically proven by evidence. Likewise, the hypothetical separation between the nutritive and the sensitive power are proven by evidence.

There is no evidence though, to support the reverse separation. At no time does the intellectual power exist separately from the sensitive. And at no time does the sensitive power exist separately from the nutritive.

Therefore the hypothetical separation is very real, proven and true, when taken in one direction, but it is disproven in the other direction. The separation is evidently time dependent, and only the base powers exist separately from the higher powers, not vise versa.

It doesn't exclude the possibility, though. Who decides that "humans cannot obtain pure unaffected intelligence" and on what basis? — Apollodorus

This is the exact point of the discussion I was having with Wayfarer. This is what Aquinas explains, through reference to Aristotle's principles. The fact that the human intellect is dependent on the material body (by the principles described above) renders the human intellect as deficient. Human beings will never obtain pure unaffected intelligence because their intellectual power is dependent on the material body.

The theory of evolution states that intelligence evolved from physical matter. Yet you are saying that "the soul constructs the physical body". How does the soul do that? — Apollodorus

No one knows how the soul produces the living body. But the same principle which is derived from the hierarchy of powers, along with the principle of the cosmological argument, demonstrate that the soul is necessarily prior to the material body (being an organized body), as cause of it.

The powers are demonstrated by Aristotle, to be potentials, because they are not always active and potential is the feature of matter. Since there must be an actuality which gives actual existence to any potential which is actualized(the cosmological argument), there must be an actuality which is prior to the material living body, giving it existence as an actual organized body with powers. This actuality is the soul. So the cause of the material body having actual organized existence with powers, is the soul. Since it is prior to the material body as cause of it, (therefore separable by the principles above), it is immaterial.

Asfar as I'm concerned change happens to properties (colors, shapes, temperature, weight, etc.) — Agent Smith

"Color" does not refer to a property, nor does "shape", "temperature", or "weight". Otherwise red and green would be the same property, round and square would be the same property, hot and cold would be the same property, and 5 kg and 100 kg would also be the same property. Surely you've got something confused AS.

Numerals are symbols and as such they are especially useful when that for which they stand has no spatial existence. — Arne

Call me daft if you want Arne, but you'll have to explain this to me. In my usage 2 stands for two distinct things with spatial separation between them, and 3 stands for three spatially separated things, etc.. Therefore, contrary to what you say, numerals seem especially useful when they refer to things with spatial existence. And I really don't see how they would be at all useful (except for the purpose of deception) to refer to things without spatial existence, i.e. fictitious things.

If you would have spent a tad more time reading the last full paragraph of the comment you clearly spent a significant amount of time criticizing, you would see that I already addressed the possibility that even if we accept for sake of discussion that there are non-spatial entities, wouldn't they necessarily have to refer to an entity that is or was a spatial entity. — Arne

As I said, I see no point in accepting for the sake of discussion that "there are non-spatial entities", until someone can explain in a reasonable way exactly what a "non-spatial entity" could be. It's one thing to accept the possibility of non-spatial entities, and then move to discuss what a non-spatial entity might be, but it's a completely different thing to accept that there are non-spatial entities, when no one has made it clear how an "entity" could be non-spatial.

To be quite honest, the idea of the higher depending on the lower sounds a bit strange to me. Either the soul has powers or it has not. If it has, then it has them by virtue of being a soul, i.e., a living intelligent being endowed with powers. — Apollodorus

I don't see why this is difficult for you, it is simply a statement by Aristotle of what has been observed. We cannot think without some kind of images which are derived from sensation. And without nutrition we lose the capacity to sense. Therefore the intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power which is dependent on the nutritive. It's very consistent with the evidence of evolutionary development, so unless you reject evolution I don't see why it sounds strange to you.

n that case, humans can never attain higher states of consciousness either through Philosophy or by any other means.

Moreover, if the “intellect” continues to be affected even after being separated from the soul, what is the difference between an “intellect” with and an “intellect” without soul?

What is the purpose of Philosophy or spiritual practice? — Apollodorus

The fact that people can obtain different levels of consciousness does not imply that a person can obtain "pure unaffected intelligence". It's like you are arguing that if a person cannot obtain the status of 'the biggest thing possible', people cannot differ in size. That there is a limit to the human intellect which makes it impossible for a human being to obtain pure unaffected intelligence, does not imply that there is not different levels of intelligence within human beings.

The point is that it is impossible for an intellect to exist without a soul, but not impossible for a soul to exist without an intellect. So the intellect is dependent on the soul but the soul is not dependent on the intellect. The mode of dependency is what is described above; intellectual capacity is dependent on sense capacity which is dependent on the nutritive capacity which is dependent on soul. Therefore there is a medium of separation between the intellect and the soul, i.e. the intellect is not directly dependent on the soul, it is dependent on what lies between it and the soul, and this in turn is dependent on the soul.

.

Change is what happens to properties. Yes, that's what I wanted to say from the very beginning. As far as I can see, change isn't a property. — Agent Smith

That's not really true AS. Change is what happens to the thing. The thing either has or does not have the property, and in the time between it is changing. The property cannot change, or it would not be that property. It is, by definition, the stated property and there is no possibility of a changing property. Change is what happens to the thing in between having, and not having, the stated property.

It appears like your project is to remove all human feeling and emotion from the review of an artistic piece, and analyze it as an AI would. You would look for patterns in the content, specific to the piece itself, limiting the meaning of "content" in that way, by disallowing that the content be related to anything external to the piece itself, in the production of interpretive "meaning". Is this a fair summary of what you are promoting?

Someone other than I postulated a mortgage as an example of an entity that is not in space. — Arne

The mortgage example is not good, it's just a ruse. Numerals have spatial presence, along with the other stated conditions of a mortgage. If we couldn't refer to the numerals and the conditions somewhere, no one would ever know how much anyone owed, and we wouldn't have to pay our mortgages. So that's just wishful thinking, but not reality.

And it occurred to me that if we accept for the sake of discussion that mortgages are not in space, we can differentiate them by the order in which they are created, i.e., we could differentiate them by time. — Arne

If there is not any spatial difference between them, they would all appear to be exactly the same. So how would you be able to say when one or another got created? If there was one in existence, it would just seem like there was still one in existence, because you'd never be able to observe any change, no matter how many, and how often new ones were supposedly created.

Simply put, if we accept for the sake of discussion that there are entities not in space, then time is one method by which we can differentiate them. — Arne

I don't think we should accept such a proposal without some sort of demonstration as to how such proposed entities could exist. Banno is prone to making assertions, then refusing to justify them, so you ought to take this suggestion with a grain of salt.

But this raises an additional and perhaps more fundamental issue, i.e., even if we accept for the sake of discussion that there are entities not in space, do they not necessarily refer to an entity that is or once was in space? — Arne

I don't think it's very useful to "accept for the sake of discussion" a phrase which no one has any real understand of what it means. "Entities not in space" is such a phrase. Banno's examples refer to things whose spatial presence is difficult to describe, being very complex, not things which do not occupy some space. It is the approach of a lazy, unphilosophical mind, to simply assume that these things have no spatial presence, just because their spatial existence is difficult to understand.

The difficulty arises when we separate the intellect or intelligent spirit (nous) from the soul (psyche). — Apollodorus

Clearly, this separation is possible, warranted and not a difficulty, because plants have a soul, but no intellect. Therefore intellect is not an essential part of the soul, and it is not necessary that the intellect be a part of the soul. So we must allow a separation between the intellect and the soul. This is explained by the hierarchy of powers. The intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power, which is dependent on the nutritive power. The nutritive power is not dependent on anything but the soul itself. Therefore those other lower powers can be seen as a medium between the intellect and the soul.

We can see a similar description in Kant. Knowledge is dependent on the a priori intuitions of space and time. Those intuitions are a medium between the soul, as knower, and knowledge, as property of the mind. The soul knows through the medium of those intuitions, it does not have direct access to the thing known.

If, pure, unaffected intelligence (nous) is separable from the soul (psyche) on the death of the physical body, then there is no possibility of divine judgement. — Apollodorus

The point being, that there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings. Human beings do not make divine judgements. The evidence is clear, intelligence is "affected". So setting up a model in which human intelligence is not separable from the soul, for the purpose of supporting the concept of "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings, is a mistaken intention, therefore a mistaken representation.

by time. — Arne

Why would this not be the same individual, extended in time?

As with any company, the balance sheet is what is important. That only sick people use pharmaceuticals is a long outdated idea. But it may be the case that a lot of fancy names are given to the conditions of non-sick people, to help ease them into the pharmaceutical market, in case that old idea might still persist. In many cases though, pharmaceuticals are used just to make one feel better, and so they are often not intended to cure.

Geez MU, who in the world ever said there was a norm of use with regard to a private language? — Sam26

You criticized me for interpretations of Wittgenstein which are "far from the norm". Aren't we discussing private language? As you say here, in regard to a private language, there is no norm. So, how is 'far from the norm" something to be critical of, rather than what is intended by Wittgenstein in his discussion of "private language"? And if it is what was intended by Wittgenstein, I would say that it is "the true" interpretation which is far better than any 'normal' interpretation.

We are only able to talk about the false assumption of having a private language, in light of the social nature of meaning, namely, it's a necessary feature of a concept that its meaning happens socially within forms of life, both linguistically and non-linguistically. — Sam26

It really doesn't matter if private language is a true or false assumption. Mathematics is full of axioms which are neither true nor false, yet we must adhere to the principles if applying the mathematics. Now we are discussing "private language". So we must adhere to the principles of that premise. Therefore there can be no such thing as "the norm" for interpreting Wittgenstein's conception of "private language". If there was a norm, then it would not be "private language".

So, the proposition is a language which is not based in norms. We cannot just dismiss the proposition as impossible, or false, because that would just circumvent the intent behind Wittgenstein's discussion of "private language", leaving Wittgenstein's whole discussion as pointless. Therefore we must accept the proposition, a language which is not based in norms, rather than rejecting it as false, in order to engage with his discussion.

If we separate the intellect from the soul, for example, we run the risk of falling into a similar trap to when we say that the soul has "separate" parts. — Apollodorus

The soul does have separate parts, that is well explained by Aristotle. That is why one soul has many different powers, what we might call different faculties. One soul cannot have distinct powers if it doesn't have distinct parts. So a living body is a composite of parts and I think it would be impossible for one soul to be the principle of actuality for many different material parts, if it did not have corresponding immaterial parts itself.

Equally problematic are the hypotheses that the soul constructs the body, that the body is a medium between soul and intellect, etc.

We would need to explain how the soul “constructs” the body, etc. — Apollodorus

This is exactly the problem which the science of biology has yet to resolve. Yes, "we need to explain" it, but we do not have the capacity, just like we do not have the capacity to explain how the universe was "constructed". Of course the biological problem ought to be easier to resolve than the cosmological problem, being nearer to us in space and time, but we can't even figure that one out yet.

That's a very good passage, and the sick man's tongue being affected by a bitter humour, is very similar to the tinted glass analogy which I think you and I discussed at some other time.

The fact that Aquinas holds "the soul" to be separate and immaterial is not at all debatable. That's what I've been saying all along, and it's consistent with how I interpret both Aristotle and Aquinas. The soul is necessarily prior (in time) to the living body, therefore it is not dependent on matter, it is separable in theory, and is therefore an immaterial principle.

The issue at hand is in what way the intellect is related to the soul. The passage you have provided states "...the human soul which is called the intellect...", so it equates the "human soul" with "the intellect".

I don't know where that passage is from, but a thorough reading of the section of the Summa Theologica, which I referenced, will demonstrate to you that we cannot equate "the soul" with "the intellect", as is demonstrated by Aristotle and accepted by Aquinas. Now, "soul" here in your passage is qualified with "human", which is a descriptive term of a living being with a material body. Therefore if there was a type of "soul" like the one referred to as "human soul" it would be dependent on a material body, the human body, and this dependence would negate the principle by which we say that the soul is immaterial, i.e. that it is prior to, and therefore not dependent on a material body.

In other words, saying "the human soul", implies that the soul referred to is dependent on the human body. And, if it is dependent on the human body, then the "soul" defined in this way as "human soul" cannot be immaterial by the principles employed to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul.

That is the problem which Christian theologians have with the type of immortality promised by Jesus and his disciples. I believe it's Paul, who offers a lecture on 'personal' immortality following human resurrection. This idea of personal resurrection, and personal immortality, is basic to early Christianity. It is however fundamentally inconsistent with Aristotelian principles which assign the uniqueness of the individual person to material accidentals, therefore one's personality is attributed to one's material existence. So when we release the soul from its material confines, which provide for the material descriptive terms, "plant", "animal", "human", "Wayfarer", etc., to allow for the true immateriality of the soul, we also lose personal identity (under Aristotelian principles). The soul cannot be immaterial, and also personal.

So Aquinas had a fine line to walk here, between two completely incompatible doctrines, personal immortality, as a traditional tenet of the Church, and the immateriality of the soul according to Aristotelian principles (science?). Aristotelian immateriality is based in the concept of "prior to matter", and assigns particular, individual, and personal identity to an object's material presence, posteriority. This directly conflicts with the classic Christian teaching of personal resurrection. What is prior, the immaterial soul, cannot be postulated as posterior, to support personal resurrection.

If you look closely into Aquinas' metaphysics and theology, you'll see that ultimately he chooses the Aristotelian doctrine, as it is more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. Take a look at the first line from your quoted passage. "I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent." This is consistent with Aristotle. The soul, as the source of activity, actuality, is the first principle of intellectual operation. This is the very same for all the powers of the soul. The soul is the first principle, as the source of activity, for self-nutrition, sensation, and self-movement, each and every power of a living being.

So we have no substantial difference between "the soul" as the principle of intellectual activity, and "the soul" as the principle of sensitive activity, and "the soul" as the principle of self-movement, and "the soul" as the principle of nutritive activity. This is very consistent with Aristotle, and vitalism in general, where the soul is the first principle of actuality of a living body. Where the difficulty for Aquinas, and the Scholastics in general, arises, is that this actuality, or first activity, which is responsible for, as cause of the activities of the living body, requires something passive, something receptive, to receive that immaterial activity which is proper to "the soul", and be 'actualized' into motion by the soul.

In the case of the power which is called intellection, this calls for "the passive intellect". And here begins the debate. We have two distinct approaches to the passive intellect, analogous to top-down, and bottom-up, each of which provides an understanding in an 'opposite way' to the other. The Aristotelian approach is most properly described as a bottom-up approach, because "the soul" is understood to be at the base, prior to the material body, and the material body is constructed by the soul in a bottom-up manner. The power of intellection is therefore something produced by the soul through the means of the material body. The top-down approach starts with intellection as a direct activity, derived directly from the soul. There is no medium of passivity between the soul and the intellect, and the intellect is an active part of the active immaterial soul.

You can see that the top-down approach has the intellect directly united to the soul, immediately active, with nothing passive between the soul and the intellect. Then the intellect itself is directly active, and the passive element is the forms, ideas, phantasms, etc., which are derived from the senses. The bottom- up approach has the biological, material body, as a medium between the soul and the intellect. The material body therefore serves as the passive element, which receives the activity of the soul. Under this view, the intellect itself is essentially passive, a potency or power, which is actualized by the soul. And you can see how there is a medium of separation (matter) between the activity of the soul, and the activity of the intellect. In this way the intellect can passively receive the actual forms, phantasms and images received through the senses, and also be receptive to the actuality of the soul. This makes the intellect itself the divisor between the two distinct types of actuality (substance dualism) described by Aristotle, the immaterial actuality of the soul, and the actuality of material objects.

A thorough analysis will reveal that the bottom-up way of understanding is more consistent with the evidence and the scientific understanding which we have. We can learn this lesson from Plato's description of vision in the Theaetetus. Here, sight is described as an activity, a motion which is emitted from the eye, and meets with the object, similar to a bat's sonic sensing. This is analogous to the top-down understanding of the intellect within which the intellect is directly united with the activity of the soul, acting on things. In reality though, we need to understand the intellect as a passive receiver, just like the eye is a passive receiver, and it is acted upon from both sides, the forms which it receives, and its primary actualization from the soul.

If you proceed onward in your study of Aquinas, toward understanding the appetites, you will see more clearly why it is necessary to posit this separation between the soul and the intellect, to account for the reality of the will. The will must be placed as higher than the intellect, in an absolute way, to account for the reality of the free will. That the rational human being can move and think in a way which is irrational, is very clear evidence of the medium between the soul and the intellect. And to postulate that the intellect always controls the will is simply an unreal representation.

Of course it is! That is the whole point! You said: — Wayfarer

Of course the rational power is specific to human beings. It is that way by definition. We have no disagreement with this. What I said is that the rational power is not separable from the lower powers, because it is dependent on them. Therefore we cannot separate a "rational soul" from a "sensitive soul", nor can we separate a "sensitive soul" from a "vegetative soul", though we can make the inverse separations. The higher power is dependent on the lower. That is the point which Aristotle makes at your reference. This has nothing to do with how we define the rational power as being specific to human beings.

The key point is the levels of dependency of the powers, what you call being "nested". The lowest power, self-nutrition is first, so it is dependent on nothing but the soul itself. Therefore we can say that this power is separable from the others, and not dependent on any of the others. But as we move to the higher powers, sensation and local motion, we see that they are not separable from the lower power, but dependent on it. And the even higher power, intellection, is not separable from the lower ones, but is dependent on them. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is in direct contradiction to the understanding of rationality that is in both Aristotle and Aquinas. Reason, rationality, the power of abstract thought, is unique to humans. It is through that power that humans grasp the essence or forms of things, though in a limited way (except, as noted, for 'the blessed' who see in a way that the rest of us don't.) — Wayfarer

You've already demonstrated to me that you are not very well-read in either Aristotle or Aquinas, so the fact that you think what I say directly contradicts them both doesn't hold much weight for me.

Consider, that reasoning and abstract thinking are the way that we apprehend the immaterial, but this does not mean that reasoning and abstract thinking are themselves immaterial. Actually, they are clearly dependent on the material, as Aristotle demonstrates, and so they cannot be truthfully said to be immaterial. For both, Aristotle and Aquinas, the immaterial aspect of a living being is the soul, and this is the same whether the living being is a plant or an animal.

That the human being can grasp the reality of an immaterial soul which is proper to all living beings, as necessarily prior in time to the material body of a living being, does not imply that the tool used to apprehend that reality, the rational intellect, is itself immaterial. This leads us into the need for a duality, the passive intellect, and the active intellect. As Aristotle explains at 432a, no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, as the activity of the mind depends on images which provide sense content.

Aristotle says the rational soul is a power unique to the human which enables her to speak and think. — Wayfarer

Sorry to be blunt Wayfarer, but I don't think you've read the material. If so you wouldn't be saying "the rational soul is a power", you'd be saying that the soul has a power which is rationality. There's a big difference between these two. At Bk4 Ch.3 he turns to the rational "part of the soul". "Turning now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks...". And what he means by "part of the soul" has already been explained in BK3, as a power of the soul.

We cannot describe "the soul" as rational because "the soul" is the fundamental actuality of all plants and animals, but only human beings have rationality. And we cannot say that the soul of the human being is rational because the soul of the human being, as "soul" is no different from the soul of a plant.

But for Aristotle a soul is necessarily united with a material body, just like the union of matter and form in material things. So when we say that a human being is rational, we do not say this of the human being's soul, that it is rational, we say that of the union of body and soul, the human being is rational.

In relation to the soul itself, rationality is a potential, and this allows that the human being may act rationally and may not act rationally. We say the human being is a rational animal, but since rationality is related to the soul as a power, or potential, this means that the specified animal has the potential to be rational, but is not necessarily rational all the time. So we cannot describe the soul (the first principle of actuality) of the human being as "rational", because it is not rational all the time, it only has the power to be rational. If we defined it as necessarily rational that would be a false premise leading to unsound logical conclusions.

There is no mention of "the rational soul". That would be a completely different concept from "the rational part of the soul", which is what he is talking about.

OK - 'powers of the soul'. The rational power is unique to humans. That is the point at issue, which you've spilled thousands of words obfuscating. — Wayfarer

That the rational power is unique to humans is not the point of disagreement. I said that when we first engaged, it is unique, but as explained by Aristotle it is dependent on the lower powers. What is at issue is the relationship between the soul (which is actual) and the power (which is potential).

That's a nice image. I once read that the ancient Greek saw the human body as loosely connected parts, instead of the harmonious whole it seems to be nowadays. Seems a whole lot closer to reality. In fact, it looks that my hands have some kind of life of their own, typing and holding! — Raymond

I think the view was that the soul is what causes the body to hold together as a harmonious whole.

:up:
And Sam26 says my interpretations of Wittgenstein are "so far from the norm". What Sam refuses to accept, is that when we are talking "private language", there is not such thing as the norm. How can one even discuss the possibility of private language if one insists that language use must be normative?

The capacity to perceive other beings reaches the highest level when a being is actually what they are in one's presence. — Paine

I don't understand what you're saying here. Could you explain?

The soul, according to Aristotle, is the animating principle of all living things (hence the name of the text 'De Anima'). The soul is the principle that enables a body to engage in the necessary activities of life. The more parts of the soul a being possesses, the more evolved and developed s/he is. The three types of soul are the nutritive, the sensible, and the rational. — Wayfarer

These are not called "three types of soul" by Aristotle. This is clearly a misreading, and he is quite explicit. These are stated as "powers" of the soul, potencies, or capacities. Also, it is questioned whether the soul is one and indivisible, as is commonly said of the "soul", or in what sense can these be said to be "parts" of the soul.

He explains why they are described as "potentials" (powers) when he discusses sensation. Rather than something actual, as the soul is, he explains how the powers are not always in activity. A being is not always eating, one is not always sensing (we sleep), so these powers are potencies which need to be actualized. The soul is the principle of activity, the actuality which actualizes the distinct powers. So there is necessarily a logical separation between the soul itself, and its powers, the former being actual, the latter being potential.

Now, "potential" according to the principles of Aristotle's physics and metaphysics, is the defining principle of "matter". Therefore we can conclude that the "powers" of the soul are proper to the material body.

Aquinas tackles this issue extensively. He questions where does the "habit" reside. A habit being a property which a living being has, which is the propensity to act in a specific way. He concludes that habits, including intellectual habits like reasoning, must be seated in the material aspect of the being. The free-will is a completely different issue though, which complicates the subject. The actions of the free will cannot be classed as habits. Free will is a capacity to act independently, even from the conclusions of reason, which is an habitual action.

This was one of the biggest problems Plato, Augustine, and the early Christian theologists faced. How is it that we can act in a way which is contrary to what we know is good, right, and reasonable? That principle provides the strength by which Plato attacked the sophists who proposed "virtue is knowledge", and claimed to be able to teach virtue. Augustine developed the concept of "free will" as the solution to this problem.

Are you familiar with Lamarckian evolutionary theory? Jean-Baptiste Lamarck proposed an evolutionary theory prior to Darwin. His theory delved deeply into the relationship between habits and the material body of a living being. He proposed that a living being developed a habit, and that the material body of the being evolved in such a way as to support the habit. You can see how this is somewhat contrary to Aquinas who concluded that a habit is only supported by the appropriate material body. And western science scoffed at Lamarck when Darwin produced an evidence based theory.

The problem of course is that scientific evidence is material, and material arrangements (organization), are apprehended as the cause of specific activities. So unless we include final cause (intent, desire, and want) as an immaterial cause of action, we cannot ever conceive of how the propensity to act in a specific way could produce a material body suited toward that activity. This is the problem which Lamarckian evolution faces.

So if we position "free will" (being the capacity to act in any way, free from the influence of material or efficient cause), at the base of the powers of the soul, then we have the principle required for such an evolutionary theory. We can say that the soul itself is a first actuality, which has the capacity to act freely from causal influence. However, then we still must account for intent, desire, and want. So we need to place final cause (intention) as inherent within the soul. This places what we call "free will" as fundamental to all living things, at the base of life itself, allowing that things such as desire and want may be responsible for the souls activities, and such activities may cause the existence of a material body to support habituation, and Lamarckian evolution.

Aristotle is very clear in Bk2, Ch4, to state that the soul is the cause of the material body. Where you and I seem to disagree is whether it is a distinct type of soul which causes a distinct type of body. I think that this would render "the soul" as unintelligible, being particular to a material object, and this is exactly what Aristotle was trying to avoid.

The nutritive soul is the first and common to all living things. — Wayfarer

"The nutritive soul" is a misrepresentation. Look at Bk2, ch2, 413a, 31-34, for example: "The power of self-nutrition... This is the originative power...".

A "power" is a potential, a capacity, as Aristotle explains. The soul is an actuality. So "nutritive soul", "sensible soul", and "rational soul" are all misconceptions. The powers which are described as nutritive, sensible, and rational, are all potentials, so they cannot be said to be souls, as the soul is something actual.

The sensible soul is the part of the soul by which the environment is perceived. — Wayfarer

And this is incoherent. You are saying the sensible "soul" is a part of the soul. If it's a soul, how can it be a part of the soul. That's why Aristotle calls it a "power". It is an attribute, something which the soul has as a property. But all these parts, being powers, capacities, or potentials, are all housed in the material body, which consists of parts.

I highly recommend that you read Aristotle's work yourself, to avoid the sloppy terminology you present here. That is the problem with most modern, popular representations of classical philosophy. The modern attitude has already dismissed the classics as irrelevant, so they are presented in a careless way which demonstrates this dismissal. Aristotle was very logical, and he was very clear to represent self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection, as powers of the soul, not as distinct souls.

I've read "On the Soul" a number of times. Book two starts with a definition of "soul".
"That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body which is organized." 412a28

There is nothing to indicate that "soul" means something different for every different living thing. In fact Aristotle is very clear to say that he is asking "what is soul?", in general. And his answer indicates that he will use It always to mean the very same thing, the first grade of actuality of a living body, no matter what type of living body it is.

Indeed! The argument went like this: tell the alien (who speaks English and physics) to rotate an ἤλεκτρον (a Greek electron, supposing they are not made of anti matter...). Or better, a bunch of them. Tell them to take a circular electrical wire put a voltage on it, and the electrons start to rotate. The electron rotation and the direction of the ensuing magnetic force have a fixed relation. Coordinate the rotation direction and the direction of the magnetic field (like you can coordinate your up direction and front direction with positive numbers).Then place a bunch of Cobalt atoms at the origin of this coordinate frame. Cobalt sends positrons in one direction only. Coordinate this direction with plus. But then... It depends on the way you place this new axis orthogonal to the other two in two ways. To put it differently, you can connect you plane with the two plus directions in two ways with the direction in which the positrons come flying off the Cobalt. So surely he was joking, mr. Feynman. — Raymond

I think that the reliability of this sort of method is doubtful. There may be a larger context which determines a left or right rotation which we are unaware of. Take the Coriolis effect for example. The flow around low pressure is counter-clockwise in the northern hemisphere, and clockwise in the southern hemisphere. If a person lived only in the northern hemisphere, and did not know about the forces of this larger context which changes the direction of spin, one might use this cyclonic spin as an example of right and left. The person would be unaware that in a different context (the southern hemisphere) the spin would be reversed.

You're not seeing the big picture Wayfarer. "Human being" is a classification of animal defined as "rational animal". Therefore all human beings are animals, and it is illogical to separate "human being" from "animal". That would contradict the definition. Have you read Aristotle's "Prior Analytics"? The defining idea is said to be "within" the idea defined. So "animal" is a defining idea of "man", therefore the idea of "animal" is within the idea of "man". Human beings cannot be separated from animals in the way that you propose, because "animal" inheres within "human being".

In a similar way, both "plant" and "animal" are described as living, aka things with a soul. Just like it is illogical to separate "rational animal" from "animal", because "animal" is inherent within "rational animal", it is also illogical to separate "the soul" of the rational animal from "the soul" of the plant. This would be like saying that it means something different for a rational animal to be living (have a soul) from what it means for a plant to be living (have a soul). That would make "soul" mean something different for every different type of living being, defeating any logical attempt to understand the reality of the immaterial (soul) with the consequent equivocation. If we follow this route, ultimately "soul" would mean something different for every particular, distinct living being, and the real immaterial existence which is represented as "soul" would be rendered as unintelligible, meaning something different in every particular instance where it appears.

Instead, we ought to allow as Aristotle describes, that "soul" means the same for all living beings, thereby making "soul" something intelligible. So it is defined as the first cause of actual being of a living body. Therefore to say that "the soul" of a rational animal is something different from "the soul" of a plant is to contradict this definition.

Go for it baker, it sounds like Baden has challenged you. Express your hatred, maybe you'll get banned, and maybe not. It seems kinda like Russian roulette, a lot to lose in comparison with what you might win.

Look closely at what Aristotle is saying here. These are called "powers" of the soul. They are not distinct souls, or degrees of soul, but capacities of "the soul". You'll understand this better if you read what he says about "habits" (I'm sorry I can't remember the references). The word "habit" is very closely related to "to have", in the sense of a property or attribute. So the capacities of the soul manifest in a way like habits. So these "powers" are not different "degrees of soul" as if one power makes an individual more of a soul than another, they are properties of the soul, as in what the soul has, as a habit. Habits, including intellectual habits are discussed at length by Aquinas.

The key point is the levels of dependency of the powers, what you call being "nested". The lowest power, self-nutrition is first, so it is dependent on nothing but the soul itself. Therefore we can say that this power is separable from the others, and not dependent on any of the others. But as we move to the higher powers, sensation and local motion, we see that they are not separable from the lower power, but dependent on it. And the even higher power, intellection, is not separable from the lower ones, but is dependent on them.

So, when we look at the rational being, with the power of intellection, we must conclude, by these principles, that the rational soul is not a separate soul from the nutritive soul, the rational part being dependent on the nutritive part, therefore inseparable from it, while the nutritive part is not dependent on the rational part, and is separable from it. Notice that this dependency is within the parts, the attributes of the soul, not the soul itself.

You'll see that at 413b25 he says the power to think "seems to be a widely different kind of soul...", but he proceeds to describe how this is contrary to the evidence already stated. Therefore I think we need to conclude that the rational soul cannot be a distinct, or separate kind of soul.

I never heard that one from Dr. Feynman. He was a good joker though. There might be some truth to this. If the right and left of the observer transposed exactly to the right and left of the weak force, then one who knows the weak force ought to be able to determine one's own right and left from this principle, in the reverse fashion. The principles of the weak force would be the larger context.

Suppose the principles of the weak force are like the directions NSEW. If we can communicate to an alien which directions are NSEW, then the alien can determine right and left from this. The problem though, is that if N and S are the opposing aspects of a true symmetry, then there is no way to tell one from the other without reference to something further. So we'd have to refer to a larger context in order to differentiate N from S. And, in the case of the weak force, as you say, the larger context would end up being right and left.

//ps// one more thing - how do you interpret this definition from an online dictionary:

Definition of rational soul: the soul that in the scholastic tradition has independent existence apart from the body and that is the characteristic animating principle of human life as distinguished from animal or vegetable life
— compare ANIMAL SOUL, VEGETABLE SOUL — Wayfarer

It's not a definition of "soul" which I would accept. I really try to steer away from online dictionaries, especially for philosophical purposes they're often pop oriented. Even SEP I find is heavily slanted in a direction heading toward popularism, in relation to IEP for example, which itself is quite deficient.

I completely accept the Aristotelian tradition, in which "soul" is defined as the animating principle, the first form of a living body, as the actual cause of existence of that material body. This is similar to vitalism. So, as "soul", there is no difference between the soul of a plant and the soul of an animal, or even the soul of a human being. And the soul is the immaterial base, being prior to the material body. Any other attribute of a living being is posterior to the material body, therefore not properly Immaterial in the sense of being independent from matter.

It is evident that what differs between the living beings is their material bodies. And, the difference between these material bodies is what enables the distinct and particular activities of the immaterial soul; rational thinking being one of those activities.

The level of immaterial existence, from which the soul comes, is unknown to us because we barely even recognize the reality of immaterial existence, let alone have a real understanding of the different levels of immaterial existence. Suffice it to say, that I believe all earthbound living beings are of the same level of immaterial existence, being like one big family. But unless we accept the reality of immaterial existence, and bring this idea back into mainstream culture so that proper study of it is appropriately encouraged, and we can achieve adequate education in this field, any suggestion of different levels to immaterial existence by you, I, or anyone else, are just statements of opinion.

How can you define left and right without to referring to spatial arrangements in the first place? — Raymond

You can't, that's the point, "right and left" requires context.

We have the context built in to our bodies.
We have a built in forward: this is where our eyes look. We have a built in up: this points out of the top of our heads. These two directions together create a plane. Our bodies are symmetric about this plane. We call one side of the plane right, the other left. No reference to a larger context here. — hypericin

Ok. let's take this one step at a time Hyper. There is a built in front and back, and a built in up an down. Do you agree, that the reason why we can say that these are "built in", is because there is a distinct difference between up and down, and also between front and back? If there was not that built in difference we would not be able to make those direct distinctions simply by referring directly to the body.

Now, lets take the plane created here, up and down along with front and back, and lets suppose each side of the plane is perfectly symmetrical with the other side. There is no differences which would distinguish one side of the plane from the other. By what principle would you say that one side of the plane is right and the other side left, without referring to some further context like NSEW?

But I don't think that any of those sources presume the radical division between the human and the divine that you are suggesting. — Wayfarer

I think you misunderstand classical philosophy if you do not apprehend this as a radical division. It is the division represented by Kant as the distinction between phenomena and noumena. It starts with Plato, who produced a vague outline in the cave allegory. Notice the difference between the fire in the cave, and the sun itself. Suppose the fire represents what people think is "good", then the sun represents the true or divine "good". This division, or separation between what people think, and what is the true, or divine Idea, is paramount in the method of Platonic dialectics.

Aristotle expounded on this separation, and firmly refuted the Pythagorean cosmology which held that the universe was composed of mathematical objects. This is the problem which occurs if we do not uphold the radical division. The principles of mathematics which are being applied at any particular point in history, being observed as extremely successful in their application, are assumed to actually be the constituent parts of the universe. This negates the possibility of truth as correspondence, because the principles are supposed to be the very thing which correspondence theory would say that they must correspond with.

It is precisely because of the ability of reason to discern the Ideas that differentiates humans from animals. — Wayfarer

It is this differentiation by species of animal, that I am arguing is wrong. It fails in it's ability to account for the reality of evolution by falling into the trap of the incompatibility between being and becoming, which Plato and Aristotle exposed. This incompatibility is exploited in sophistry to produce all sorts of absurd conclusions.

Here's another example of this incompatibility. In the science of the psyche, the concept of a "state of mind" is often employed. But the mind is always active, and such a concept is a generalization which is very useful in many ways, but it doesn't truthfully represent the reality of an active mind. This is the same problem we have in representing life forms as "species". It is a very useful for many purposes to represent life forms as static "species" which exist at any moment in time, but it doesn't truthfully represent the reality of actively evolving beings because it doesn't properly represent the temporal extension.

It seems odd that, on the one hand, you deny the radical difference between humans and animals, which traditional philosophy ascribes to reason, and claims is a fundamental distinction, but on the other hand, you wish to ascribe a radical difference between the human and the divine, when according to Christianity man is created 'imago dei'. — Wayfarer

The divisions I propose are well justified. The divine Forms are temporally prior to, as cause of, matter, and all material existence. Living beings on earth are temporally posterior to matter, and material existence. That is a radical difference. There is no such radical difference between the individual species of living beings, as genetics and evolution demonstrate to us.

Where we need to impose divisions is with respect to types of matter, or substance. We have divine Forms, which as I explained are prior to, as cause of, matter and substance. But there are levels of priority, some types of substance or matter, are temporally prior to others. So Aquinas for example, posits angels to account for the different levels of priority. Then we have the soul, which is prior to, and cause of all the organic matter, or substance on earth, but not prior to other types of matter.

So in as much as I divide the divine from the living soul, by placing matter as the medium between them, I allow for different types of matter, some temporally prior to others. This is the complexity of material existence. Immateriality can be defined as temporally prior to matter, but since there is a temporal order to the types of matter, the living soul might be immaterial in relation to one type of matter, as temporally prior to it, but still posterior to other types of matter, placing the soul at a lower degree of immateriality than the angels and God. An immaterial being is required as cause of each and every material existence.

Here, it is said 'the blessed who see God know all things in the eternal types'. The blessed are able to see something which the run of the mill do not. So again the separation from the human and the divine is by no means absolute. — Wayfarer

To "see God", and to know that God knows, in no way implies that the person who sees God knows what God knows. And this is where the division between types of intelligible objects lies. If there was no way of knowing that there is anything at all on the other side of the division, it would not be a division, just a boundary, and we'd all be atheist. But since there is a medium between the immateriality of the living soul, and the divine immateriality, and the medium we know as matter, we understand matter as a divisor rather than a boundary.

Thanks for your efforts to explain these things to me.

Your right side and left side of your body is identifiable independently of your location. The notion is unconnected to your current environment. — hypericin

Think about it, if you have no location, you cannot have any right or left side. To have a right and left side implies that you have parts existing in a relation to each other, which is defined by reference to a larger context, north, south, east, west. To have such direction means that you occupy some place on the earth. This means that you have a location, which fits that context.

You cannot have parts existing in spatial relationships with each other unless they have that relation at some place, that's what "spatial" means. You can have an abstract square, and define the relations of its parts, but these relations are not spatial, they are geometrical, so there is no right or left side of the square. To make them "spatial" is to apply the geometry to "space". The concept of "right" and "left" are already "spatial", being defined by north, south, east, west. So right and left only have meaning in a larger context. If you removed that defining feature, the larger context, how would you know which side of your body is right and which is left?

It is the nous, the 'rational soul of man' that corresponds with the incorporeal element, is it not? (Regardless, I will try and slog through more of the Summae.) — Wayfarer

I believe it is the soul itself which is the incorporeal element. And this is the same for all living things. This is the Aristotelian structure. Then it is the various powers, capacities, or potencies, of the soul which define the type of living being. Plants have the power of self-nourishment, other things have self-movement, and some have sensation, while human beings are rational. Each of these powers, being a potency, is in that way incorporeal. But the specific nature of any particular potency is determined by the material body which it depends on. So the rational power of the human being differs from the power of thought which other animals have, because the human being's material body differs.

My approach is not as detailed as that laid out by Metaphysician Undiscovered. It's simply defending the assertion that 'there are real ideas'. This means that there are ideas that are not dependent on some particular mind entertaining them or that are casually dependent on individual minds. It doesn't mean that these ideas exist in a separate domain, other than in the sense understood by expressions such as 'the domain of real numbers'. In that usage, I'm inclined to say that 'domain' should not be understood to exist temporally or spatially as an actual place, but is nevertheless real - hence, transcendent, or 'real in all possible worlds'. — Wayfarer

What comes from the work of Plato and Aristotle, and culminates in Aquinas, is the reality of a completely separate domain of Forms. This is the realm of the divinity, God. These separate, or independent Forms are responsible for, as cause of, the material universe, just like human ideas are the cause of artificial things.

It is very important to acknowledge the separation between the independent Forms, and human ideas, because this is recognition of the fallibility of human knowledge. You can think of it as the idea that the laws of physics are meant to represent something which has causal influence in the material world, but how well these laws actually represent the independent Forms, is questionable. So as much as we desire to be God-like, it is fundamental to theology, that having the power of God is not possible for any human beings.

This lesson is told by Aquinas with reference to the fallen angels. Lucifer, or Satan, desires not only to be like God, but to be equal to God, or to actually be God. This required that Lucifer relinquish the belief that God is higher. But to position oneself as equal to God is the greatest sin.

This is why we need to maintain the separation between the independent Forms of divinity, and the ideas of the human mind. The former being properly immaterial, the latter being dependent on material existence.

Other than scholarly interest, how does this model of reality play out in your daily life? What value is there in accepting this version of idealism? — Tom Storm

It helps me to obtain mental peace.

How does Aristotle demonstrate that if ideas exist prior to being "discovered" by human minds, it is the activity of the human mind, which discovers and actualizes these ideas? — Tom Storm

Aristotle explains this by describing what he calls "geometrical constructs". We must assign some causality to the act of the mind which "discovers" the geometrical figure. But the principle discovered must in some way exist prior to being discovered. So he assigns actualizing to the process of discovery, and potential to the existence which the principle has, prior to being discovered. He proposes this as a way to avoid the difficulties which arise from Plato's demonstration of the theory of recollection.