Did you not read Colin's last post, when he actually came around to starting to describe his experience?

No, that wrong, that's what I said, but I wasn't thinking it. That's how deception works, saying something other than what your thinking, and deception is very really. And, its reality is proof of the secret inner world.

When you experience something, you can say "I know what that was", and proceed merrily on your way. That is simplicity. Otherwise, you can stop, analyze, and try to understand exactly what it was that you did experience. This is not simplicity.

OK then, tell me what I'm thinking about now. If you can't I'll believe that all you are saying is bull shit.

The coming upon what may be right should bring about a journey, a journey of exhaustively flagellating and fighting with a profoundly unsettling idea that could, in time, deeply shape the living of one's future life. In contrast, it would seem that you, Colin, have come upon something very easy, something distinctly simple — Heister Eggcart

Why do you think Colin came upon this "something" very easily? That's not what he said:

My point is, it takes work. You have to earn enlightenment. Otherwise, it would lack any meaning. — colin

The ridiculous thing about people that think that there is an internal is that they have zero deferences. They're entirely transparent as if they're the only one's in the world. I can tell people what they're going to say before they say it, and then tell them that I can read minds. It really mind fucks them. — Wosret

What's this supposed to mean Wosret?

Do we believe that Mr. Paws is alive and well in the great beyond and broke through and made contact with Granny, who is intransigently convinced, or do we think the more likely explanation for Granny's experience is that Granny's grieving brain generated the whole incident? — Brainglitch

In this case, Granny has offered us some specifics. Mister Paws was on her bed. But we might know Mister Paws was buried in the ground, dead, with a cement block on top. So with a few other premises we can deductively conclude that for some reason granny is not giving us accurate information.

Colin hasn't given us such specifics. All Colin said in the op is that he had "profound religious experiences", and he now knows that God exists. We cannot disprove the descriptions of his experiences because he hasn't provided any. All we can do is to attack the claim that he knows that God exists, if we happen to believe otherwise. But unless we have some proof that God does not exist we have no justification for attacking Colin's claim of profound religious experience, nor his claim to know that God exists. It is completely logical that someone else could know something which is contrary to your belief, if there is no evidence to back up your belief.

I found God (and thus, joy and fulfillment) when, and only when, I opened myself to it. That is, when I really embraced positive behaviour to connect with others. Often at my own discomfort. But I was determined to at least know that I tried my best and couldn't find God. That is, before I discarded the idea that gave many millions such a seemingly profound sense of joy, that deep down I knew I was just envious of. My point is, it takes work. You have to earn enlightenment. Otherwise, it would lack any meaning. — colin

I empathize with this experience. For much of my life I scoffed at the idea of God, and especially religion. I never went to church, and as a child I considered that to be a ridiculous exercise. But of course I heard mention of God, and in the back of my mind there was insecurity in my atheist practise, a feeling of "what if" God was real. I knew that I needed reason to truly reject God. So I worked hard to find that reason, read the Bible, studied religious materials, and guess what? It didn't work. All that hard work, to find reason to reject God only allowed me to find God.

Yeah, I find this chapter difficult, it seems to be full of inconsistency. I'd better read it again to see what I'm missing.

Pretty soapboxy. — Brainglitch

"Soapboxy", I like that. Does that mean I have something to stand on?

And mistaken. — Brainglitch

The fact is though, that you used "equal", and so I commented on your use of that word. If you meant something different from "not equal", then the mistake is yours for using that word, which is not the word you should have used. You were talking about qualitative differences, and I was merely pointing out that it is a mistake to even talk in terms of equality. Yes, you are absolutely right to say that different explanations are "not equal", this we can take for granted. All I was pointing out, is that your use of the term betrays a perspective which already assumes an equality, an identity, as "same", such that you had to verbally negate this equality, in order to discuss the fact that there are different ways of explaining things.

My point was, that once you negate this equality, you have no principle of identity whereby you can claim that Colin and you for example, are even talking about the same thing. So as soon as you acknowledge that explanations differ, as you say there are differences between explanations, we need to produce some principles of identity if we want to feel confident that we are describing the same thing. Notice that Colin is crafty, and avoids any specifics concerning the experience, so that we have absolutely nothing to identify with.

Well, people's expressions may be "very real," but that doesn't entail that we must accept that what they say is true, or even intelligible, just because they've expressed it, whether what they assert is conventional or not. — Brainglitch

But we have to first identify what is being referred to by the explanation, or description, before we can make any judgements about the truth or falsity of the description. When the description is a description of one's own personal inner experience, how are you, as another, able to identify that experience in order to verify what is being said about it? The only access which you have, to enable identification, is through the means of the other's description. You can only identify that experience through the other's description of it. The described experience can be assumed to be no other than the description of it, without an accusation of lying. So how could you say that the description is false unless it contained inconsistency, or blatant contradiction? But Colin is careful not to go there.

Ever consider the possibility that you've come to the wrong place?

I see that the OP has never returned. — andrewk

In Wayfarer's words, "driveby contributor".

But not all explanations are equal. Different explanations fulfill different purposes and have different consequences, reliableness, and degrees of confirmability. — Brainglitch

This statement betrays a slight scientific bent. The term "equal" is inapplicable here, it is derived from a scientific reductionism which intends to reduce all qualities to quantities. When we compare one description, or explanation, to another, we cannot start with any assumptions of equality. Even that a plurality of descriptions might be differing descriptions of the same thing, is something which must be determined, i.e. that they are referring to the same thing. If we enter this process of determination with any premise of equality, such that we assume that two explanations are of the same thing for example, then we allow the possibility of mistake. So we dismiss equality altogether, and move to your second suggestion, which is purpose.

Purpose necessitates inequality in a number of different ways. What is relevant here, is that one's intended purpose influences the aspects of the observable object which, that individual has interest in, thereby influencing one's attention, consequently influencing one's description, explanation, or observation. "Purpose" is highly influenced by, but if you allow free will, not dictated by, social and historical context. The limits to the influence of social and historical context are the extent to which we follow conventions. Of course we must allow that conventions are themselves "becoming", coming into existence and evolving. This is the manifestation of free will, how we are, in actuality unconstrained by conventions. Conventions are the means by which the free willing being constrains the physical world, not vise versa.

But there's also a more general convention at play jere across history and cultures--namely that such experiences are of some kind of breakthrough from some other realm of reality. — Brainglitch

If you understand what I described in the last paragraph you will see that we must allow as "very real", the expressions of individuals which are completely non-conventional. It is only by allowing the merit of the non-conventional that we allow the constraints of conventions to be transcended, and the evolutionary process to proceed. But the interesting thing here, which you have just pointed to, and which Wayfarer is highly in tune with, is that once we transcend the conventions of the particular culture which we exist within, we approach another layer of much more general conventions which seem to be proper to all of humanity.

There appears to be a true separation between these two layers. This I believe is due to the separation between what is important to us here and now, within an individual's life within a particular culture, and what is important in the very long term, important to life in general. So one set of conventions focuses the attention according to the intentions of here and now, very short term, while the other looks to the most long term intentions, I'll call this the timeless. This creates the separation, as the intermediary intentions become negligible, unimportant.

The particulars of this realm are often understood in terms that reflect the conventions of the particular social context, but the pattern of realm crossover is virtually universal. This, and other patterns that are found across cultures, are taken by some people as evidence of the existence of some other actual realm that's non-physical, and perhaps timeless. But that's just one category of explanation. The various sciences, increasingly the cognitive and evolution sciences, offer alternative, naturalistic explanations for the ubiquity of such patterns. — Brainglitch

Our terms of description and explanation are proper to the short term conventions, the societal constraints of common communication. That is why, when we move to describe the constraints of the timeless, the descriptions can only be understood according to the conventions of a particular culture. Despite the fact that one tries to explain something which transcends all social contexts, that individual is restricted in this effort by the constraints of a particular social context.

Now we've come full circle back to the concept of "equality". It is concepts such as these, equality, mathematical principles, identity (the notion that we are actually talking about the same thing), which are common to all cultures, that validate and justify the assumption of a non-physical, timeless reality.

Here's the difficulty with respect to purpose. Communication evolves from the very short term intention. Mathematics and other fundamental logical principles strive toward the long term, the timeless, to be always true. Science is relegated to an intermediary position. It tries to uphold and adhere only to the highest standards of timeless principles, but it is nonetheless forced by the particulars of social context to conform to short term principles. This is an act of the materialist short term intentions overwhelming the timeless. In this position science exposes weakness in timeless principles (ones that aren't actually timeless), while also exposing weakness in short term principles (ones which aren't consistent with proper long term principles). As I alluded to above, the intermediate position is somewhat unimportant, expendable, as the evolutionary forces produce the necessity of freeing the timeless from the constraints of social context. The important point being that the constraints of social context (conventions) must be transcended.

And I would add the question 'what do you mean by genuine?'.

Isn't genuineness a little like naturalness? We say cities are unnatural for humans, yet we regard them as natural for ants and bees. I would argue that anything any human does is natural for a human - thereby rendering the word meaningless. I suspect the same applies to genuine - and to its close Sartrean cousin 'authentic'. — andrewk

Yeah, but it's all paradoxical. Natural is contrasted with artificial, but anything a human being does is something artificial. It is natural for a human being to do something artificial, so this is genuine for the human being to do this. But is it genuine for a human being to be artificial, this would appear as contradictory?

Isn't there a difference though, between being as such, and doing as such? "Being" might be how we appear to others, we are as they describe us, such that being artificial would mean that we appear to others as such, and therefore disingenuous (because ingenuous is not opposed to genuine, disingenuous is). But when we act in an artful and skillful manner, to create something artificial, to pull something from within, one might believe oneself to be ingenious, while still appearing to others as disingenuous. Therefore acting in a genuine way does not ensure that one is genuine, though the others who are judging you might themselves be disingenuous by a further standard( that's if you allow the possibility of an "objective" standard of genuineness).

What I claim is that there are various ways of looking at, ways of understanding and explaining the phenomena at issue, and it is perfectly legitimate to do this from perspectives outside the perspective "from within"--which you privelege as the only legitimate one. — Brainglitch

As I said, the issue here is one of convention.

Whereas what they say they're about is the disclosure of the eternal, which in my view is definitely out of scope for naturalism. — Wayfarer

The convention of natural science is one which takes time for granted. Under this convention, eternality, as understood in theology (outside of time), is not even a possible subject.

Now children, let's stick to the topic.

Birds gotta fly, fish gotta swim, and we gotta invent technology because its built into the very fabric of existence itself where everything revolves around what's missing from this picture. — wuliheron

Are you putting forth a radically hard-determinist perspective?

Does suppressing the bad in ourselves actually do anything to get rid of it in humanity or does it just make us acceptable by society? — MonfortS26

Yes, of course, suppressing the bad in yourself actually does something toward getting rid of it in humanity as a whole. It is one step toward that end, what you must do, personally, if that end is to be accomplished. Think of it this way, if everyone else suppresses the bad, and you do not, it will still exist in humanity, and ridding humanity of it will be all up to you.

It is entirely legitimate to explain anything in whatever way such explanation provides insight.

The OP assertion can be expressed as "I experienced God, therefore God exists."

It is this that I've challenged. — Brainglitch

What I think is at issue here is the conventions employed when we describe our experiences. It is by means of these conventions that my description of my experience is consistent with how you would describe your experience, or consistent with an experience which you would think is possible. There are certain conventions whereby "I experienced God" is a perfectly legitimate statement. However, there are atheists who would openly challenge such conventions, claiming that there is no such thing as God, therefore any convention which allows for such a description is illegitimate.

In comparison, consider empirical sciences, and the conventions in play, whereby observations are described. In high energy physics there are conventions whereby certain phenomena are described in terms of elementary particles. There are scores of such "particles", referring to different observations incurred under distinct conditions. But these aren't "particles" in any common sense use of the word "particle", this is something completely different. It is simply the accepted convention, within the field of physics, to refer to "elementary particles" in describing such observations.

Now, just like an atheist would oppose the conventions whereby an individual might refer to an "experience of God", an 'anti-particle physicsist' might oppose the conventions whereby physicists refer to "elementary particles" in describing these observations. There is really no difference here. In theology, the conventions are in place which allow us to say that we have experienced God, in the same way that physicists claim to have observed elementary particles. But just like atheists claim that it is impossible for the individual to experience God, because God does not exist, it is equally justified to claim that it is impossible that physicists have observed elementary particles, because fundamental particles do not exist. Just like the atheist argues that "God" is a misconception, we could equally argue that "elementary particles" is a misconception.

In each case, it is simply a question of whether the person describing one's own experience is doing so in a way which is acceptable to others (conventional). And of course, what is acceptable to some, is not acceptable to others.

The truth can pack a pretty good punch itself. I think that might be what Colin refers to in the op.

...it seems you'd have thrown down a Summa Theologica... — Heister Eggcart

This work explores, and expands Aristotelian concepts such as matter, form, potential, actual, the four types of causation. Without a prior understanding of how Aristotle developed these concepts himself, the work would prove to be a very difficult read.

I'll add that many of the modern theologians that I've read are just poor writers. They'll use terminology with established meanings, yet ruin it with poor writing. — Heister Eggcart

It's a real shame to see deep conceptual structures completely ruined, laid to waste, simply through misuse of words. Words of philosophical significance enter the mainstream, and pick up common meaning. Then the philosophical concepts which these words originally signified are completely hidden, lost behind those who use the words in the haphazard way. The ruin is caused by those who are insisting that the words have no meaning deeper than the common meaning, and are not tied to any deeper, foundational conceptual structures.

What about the question, 'is the Universe an intentional creation, or is it the product of unconscious processes?' Who is an 'expert' on that question? — Wayfarer

Looking for an expert? Look no further. With confidence I'll fill that position.

To be an object, a state which may be experienced, can only entail being more than an object, else existence (thing-in-itself) is reduced to our experience (our representation of a thing). — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't see the logic here at all. Why does being an object entail being more than an object? Why must a thing be more than what it is?

So any unknown object must also be an unknown subject-- any unknown thing, like anything, is more than any representation of it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Since a subject is an article apprehended to be discussed or otherwise dealt with, it is overtly contradictory to speak of an unknown subject. That's nonsense.

The point is that any state must be an object AND a subject. Fictional entities aren't an issue because they don't exist. They.aren't a state of the world. (unless we are talking within the context of their fictional world, in which case they are both subject and object). — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't see how you can believe this. A fictional thing is clearly a subject, that is why we can talk about unicorns and things like that, they are subjects. By what principle do you assert that such subjects are also objects? That they are not objects is the reason why we say that they are fictional.

But it's never the whole story. Any "object" I might experience is also more than my experience. A ping pong ball, a computer, a car, a tree, a planet, a star, a human arm or a memory of what someone had for breakfast are all subjects. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Wait, you're making objects into subjects, or vise versa, which is the case? A subject is an aspect of your experience, how an object appears within your mind, as a subject. What justifies your assumption that a subject is an object, or that an object is a subject?. Surely an object is not necessarily a subject, as there are unknown objects. And a subject is not necessarily an object as there are fictions. So your conflation of these two is mistaken.

But that is precisely the argument by which talk about durations less that the Planck time is considered to be physically meaningless. The Planck scale tells us what the smallest possible unit of change is. And its already "larger than zero". — apokrisis

So the point now, is that physical change requires a Planck time duration, but we can still conceive of a time period shorter than this. In this time period no physical change is possible. Therefore we can conceive of time without physical change. Duration less than Planck time might be "physically meaningless", but it is not philosophically meaningless, and it should be considered as a logical possibility, in philosophical speculation.

We have a very similar question with respect to space. Is empty space, space without substance, possible? Or, is space just a conception, the means by which we measure existing things? The argument above demonstrates that time without physical change is possible, but can we do the same thing with space? If not, then space and time are radically different. The problem which occurs with our conception of space, is that we assume a dimensionless point, as a means for measurement, and this inclines us to believe that the dimensionless point is spatial, when it is not. Then one might be inclined to allow that a physical object could occupy a dimensionless point, but in doing so, there is inherent contradiction.

That's my point. No I can't. An absolute lack of change makes no sense to me. What kind of thing is that? — apokrisis

Well, time is just duration, so every change requires a duration of time which is appropriate to that change. Now, imagine a period of time which is a lesser amount of time than that required for the fastest change. In other words, imagine a period of time which is so short that no change could possibly occur in that very short period of time. Then you have conceived of time without change.

So why do you say "time itself" makes no sense then? Can't we conceive of the backdrop without the events in the foreground?

Yep, the Big Bang exactly represents the situation of a wind up toy. Your argument is devastating. — apokrisis

Well, you haven't answered the question, how does it get up to speed, so that it can start slowing down? A wind up toy accelerates rapidly until it reaches peak speed, then it starts its steady decline. What you have described is just the steady decline, the Big Bang being the fastest, so it's not like a wind up toy at all (even disregarding the fact that the toy requires someone to wind it up). Is the rapid acceleration supposed to be prior to the Big Bang?

You keep asking about "time itself", as if that notion made sense. It doesn't. It's the philosophical equivalent of the sound of one hand clapping. — apokrisis

Why does "time itself" not make sense for you? For this to make sense, all one needs to do it is to consider time as the necessary condition for change, rather than as TS says, change is the condition for time. There is no reason why the latter should be preferred, but there is reason to choose the former. We can conceive of time passing without any change occurring, yet we cannot conceive of change occurring without time passing. So "time itself" is not at all a nonsense notion.

But doesn't morality deal with attempting to control such instincts? Don't we determine that some instincts are not good, so we attempt to curb them, opting for a course which is better? Isn't this how we evolve to be better beings, by suppressing such instincts in favour of principles which we have determined with reason, to be a better source of direction? So to be a better being is to analyze the good and bad of such innate knowledge, replacing the bad with newly developed principles which are understood to be better.

Well, I would say then, that time is passing incredibly slow right now, if the temperature is only 2.725 degrees above absolute zero, because when time started passing, the temperature must have been extremely high, in comparison.

Doesn't this seem extremely absurd to you, that time would all of a sudden start passing extremely fast, and then slowly slow down? What kind of reverse acceleration is that, something that all of a sudden starts extremely fast, then slows down? Even if you pack a huge amount of power into a small thing, then let it go, like a wind up toy, that thing has to accelerate to get up to top speed, before starting to slow down. How is time supposed to get up to top speed, before starting to slow down?

What do you mean by "intuition"?

It defines simultaneity in terms of a standard temperature. Right "now" the cosmic time is 2.725 degrees above absolute zero. And there is a thermal arrow that points from when the Universe was hotter to when it will be even cooler still. — apokrisis

That's a damn cold universe! If this is the current temperature, and the passing of time is the universe cooling, and the temperature limit is absolute zero, then there must be a relatively small amount of time left for the universe.

People concluding geocentrism as a result of observing the obscured and then not obscured visibility of the sun at a particular point on the visible horizon shows how sometimes perception CAN be misleading, but nothing we have yet discovered through reason or science suggests that the observation or experience we colloquially refer to as "sunrise" is an illusion, or a farce, or inherently not reflecting of a true external reality. — VagabondSpectre

That's the whole point though, what we see as "the sun rising" is not a true external reality. You keep insisting that it is, refusing to face the reality of the situation. The sun does not rise, despite the fact that we see the sun rising. I would like it if you could create in your mind, a better imaginary model, so that you do not see the sun rising anymore. Tell yourself that the sun is staying still. Then imagine what is happening without getting dizzy. What science has demonstrated very clearly to us, is that we do not perceive the external reality the way that it truly is. We do not perceive molecules, or atoms, or sub-atomic particles. Sure, you might argue that we taste and smell molecules, but we don't, we taste tastes, and smell smells. Let's face the facts, the way that we perceive things is not the way that they are, according to what science tells us.

You're willing to say that geocentrism is clearly false because heliocentrism has greater explanatory or predictive power (it's supporting evidence), so what makes you then so quick to assert that heliocentrism is equally as false? — VagabondSpectre

It's not predictive power which makes me prefer heliocentrism. As I explained, prediction is based in recognizing consistencies, and geocentrism had great predictive power as well. What heliocentrism gives us is the capacity to understand many inconsistencies. The reason why I believe that heliocentrism is still false is that there are many inconsistencies which persist. There are inconsistencies in our understandings of space, time, electromagnetism, and such things. Further, when I go outside in the morning, I can feel the sun touch me with its warmth. And as much as our sense perceptions may be inaccurate, touch, as a fundamental feeling, is fairly reliable. So I do not believe that there is space between the sun and myself. Just like we talk about space between you and I, I know there is not space there, there is air, I can feel it on my face, and the air is the earth's atmosphere, part of the earth. Likewise, we talk about space being between us and the sun, but that's not space, it's the sun's atmosphere, or field or something. So just like I am within the earth, being in its atmosphere, I am also within the sun, being within its field, or some such thing.

Even if my mind creates everything I experience, there can still be consistency in my observations. Whether or not my perception of something (a shadow I mistake for a person for instance) is actually a perception created by my mind might not alter the fact that I consistently observe or perceive it. Even though I may totally misunderstand what something is, I can still observe it (and misunderstand it) consistently. — VagabondSpectre

Yes, this is the point I was trying to make, our minds could be creating all the consistency which we observe. In this case, the consistency would not be within "it", the thing being observed, it would be within the mind only. The thing being observed would be totally inconsistent, but the mind is making it appear to be consistent. Do you believe that this is possible?

In either case the observations themselves have consistency. — VagabondSpectre

This might be true, but do you not see a big difference between "there is consistency in the thing being observed", and, "there is no consistency in the thing being observed, but my mind is creating the appearance of consistency"?

If past observations (despite a prevailing misunderstanding) are more and more consistent, the predictions of future observations (despite the same prevailing misunderstanding) become inductively stronger and stronger. — VagabondSpectre

So this is the problem I was referring to earlier. The observations become more consistent, the predictions become more reliable, but the misunderstanding remains. The problem is that the misunderstanding becomes stronger and stronger, because the reliability of the predictions creates the illusion that there is no misunderstanding, that all is understood. Then we do not bother to doubt this, what is perceived as an understanding but is really a misunderstanding, because the predictions are so reliable, that we don't even think that it might be a misunderstanding.

You can measure it's average position, the rate of jumping, it's average instantaneous speed between jumps... I'm talking about speed in the sense of rate of change.

Another reason time can have no speed: change in time over time makes no sense. — hypericin

Change in the rate of change is observed empirically, it is known as acceleration. You may be right, it may not make sense logically, and that's why physicists have found that it is a difficult subject. It is similar to the concept of "becoming", which doesn't make sense logically. It requires something in between two describable states, and this forces an exception to the law of excluded middle. But when things appear to disobey our laws of logic, this does not mean that they are unreal, it just means that they are not well understood.

Are you familiar with Aristotle's distinction of two types of change? There is change of place, locomotion, and change to an object. The latter is a change which is not a change of place. There is nothing to necessitate that change to an object must be consistent in the way that you describe. It is only when that object is related to another object, as the cause of that change, or as a standard of measurement for a "rate of change", that a change of place is established, and the consistency which you refer to is developed.

I would say it is logically impossible for something to have no speed, and yet be dynamic. — hypericin

What if it's jumping around in a totally inconsistent manner, one moment here, the next moment over there, then somewhere else, etc.. How could this thing have any speed?

They too deny the reality of mind and they too treat humans as being essentially automata or robots. — Wayfarer

Very strange.

Also, this is like one of my favourite places to point to, to anyone who says that Derrida is an idealist in any kind of straightforward manner. It baffles me that for years and years Derrida was considered so by so many of his detractors. — StreetlightX

I don't think it is important, or productive, to attempt to class philosophers in this way, idealist, materialist, and such, because this is to place the philosophy within a particular conceptual structure defined by that classification. What is important is to understand the principles put forward by the philosopher, and these may not be so confined.. It is the original aspects of any particular philosopher's philosophy which offer us the most value. So to place the philosopher within a particular classification, is to neglect the principles from that philosopher which go beyond the conceptual structures of that class. And of course, this is the philosopher's originality.

For instance, if Derrida is invoking an objective principle which is more originary than matter itself, then it is impossible to class him as materialist. By going beyond the fundamental principles of a classification, a philosopher cannot be placed within that class. Perhaps some would assume an opposing name, idealist. But his method is not idealist. So what's the point in imposing such names? This is just the progression of philosophy, old principles are overturned by new ones. Then those who classify must produce new classifications.

The first part of this chapter seems super dumb. Any thoughts on that? — The Great Whatever

I think that the point here is to outline what exactly expression could be. It seems to be imagination, a sort of fiction, so it takes the form of theory and logic. But Derrida is already inserting a wedge between expression and voice by characterizing expression with things that are more commonly expressed in writing. He later he turns back to question why expression is not more closely related to writing than to voice. This is an important point for Derrida to make because he wants to dismiss Husserl's claim that voice is the most pure form of auto-affection.

They're both dealing with almost identical material, but they move in diametrically opposite directions: where Derrida more or less tries to problemetize auto-affection... — StreetlightX

It appears to me, like Husserl has chosen voice to substantiate expression. He chooses voice over writing because it is seen as a more pure form of auto-expression. But Derrida appeals to an even more pure form of auto-expression which he calls "originary impression" at the bottom of p71. This is where language fails us, and we must speak in metaphor.

"The intuition of time itself cannot be empirical. It is a reception that receives nothing. The absolute novelty of each now is therefore engendered by nothing. It consists in an originary impression that engenders itself:..."

The chapter begins with a renewed examination of the distinction between indication and expression. Derrida refers to a double reduction. First the reduction of indication, which requires an other, then the reduction of expression, which has a fictional other. Expression is reduced to theory as not supported by sense (fictional). Here we have the basis of logic. Derrida questions this pure theoretical expression, as there always seems to be a "pointing" to an object, and therefore indication. This culminates at p62 where Derrida claims that the same thing which makes expression non-indicative paradoxically makes it non-expressive, as a fictional signification. The unity of the Zeigen is verified.

We proceed to a short analysis of the present indicative, third person, form of the verb to be, in the form of predication, "S is P". The "is" of predication forms the kernel of expression. But the examples provided by Husserl "you have gone wrong, you can't go on like that", do not utilize that "is", and it is claimed that the "S" must be a name, the name of an object. So we must speak.

It appears to me, that the need for a pre-expressive "sense" leads Husserl to the claim that one must hear oneself. The relationship between sense and expression produces the need for an object. The ideal object is one whose monstration can be indefinitely repeated, and this is related to the historical advent of the phoné. The ideal object is the most objective of objects, it can be repeated indefinitely while remaining the same. But it must be expressed, preserving its presence by means of "the voice". The subject is "immediately affected by its activity of expression"p65. The immediate disappearance, or erasure of the voice is significant in separating it from the written sign. The difference is that the ideal form of the written signifier is "outside".

Derrida calls this "the 'apparent transcendence' of the voice" p66. It is based in the immediacy of the relationship between the "expressed" and the act of expression. The body of the signifier erases itself the moment it is produced. This means that the phoneme is the most ideal of the signs. "Hearing-oneself-speak" is a unique auto-affection because there is no agency of exteriority. It is a pure auto-affection. It is a reduction of space, making it apt for universality, and there is no obstacle which the voice encounters. It is suggested that this universality results in the fact that no consciousness is possible without the voice. Pure auto-affection is produced without the aid of any exteriority. And the voice may be heard by others, and repeated immediately and indefinitely. There is an "absolute proximity" of the signified to the signifier.

Derrida asks, how is this claim, that there are ideal objects only in statements, consistent with the claim that there are scientific truths. The relationship between speech and writing, for Husserl, is discussed. It is proposed that writing is a secondary stratum which completes the constitution of ideal objects.

Husserl's explanation of writing doesn't suffice for Derrida: "the possibility of writing was inhabiting the inside of speech which itself was at work in the intimacy of thought." p70. Further, auto-affection as voice assumes that a pure difference divides self-presence. This is space, the outside. That auto-affection is the condition for self-presence is seen by Derrida as a problem for transcendental reduction. We must pass through the reduction to find the closest proximity to the movement of différance.

So he poses the question "why is the concept of auto-affection imposed on us?"p71. This is the issue of temporality. "Husserl describes a sense which seems to escape from temporality... he is considering a constituted temporality." p71. However, "Even prior to being expressed, the sense is through and through temporal." p71.

So we must move to a different conception of "pure auto-affection", the one which Heidegger uses, derived from Kant. We have now a "source-point", such that pure auto-affection is prior to the movement of temporalization. This is called "the originary impression" p71, and is conceived as the absolute beginning of this process. This impression, this "pure movement" is describable only by metaphor, as it is where language fails. Each now is an originary impression, affected by nothing other than itself, and this is pure auto-affection. When we insert a "being" into the description. we speak in metaphor, speaking about what this "movement" makes possible.

Self-presence, as the living present, is a pure difference with respect to the originary impression. This difference is called a "strange 'movement'", but is described in terms of space. The inside of non-space, time, appears to itself, and presents itself as this movement, while the outside insinuates itself into the movement. Such that, space is "a pure exiting of time to the outside of itself" p73. Derrida closes the chapter with an explanation of the implications which this notion of time has on the phenomenological reduction, and how this relates to expression. Time cannot be an absolute subjectivity.

In closing I'll make reference to the long footnote on p72. I recommend that everyone read this thoroughly, because it is explained here how "absolute subjectivity" is deconstructed through reference to temporality. A constituted temporality has no objectivity, and this lack of objectivity leads us to a point of "now" as a point of actuality, an originary source-point. But this assumption undermines any absolute subjectivity.

I know, I've read it twice already before really apprehending anything. But a few things are now actually starting to come through. I'll go back and take some notes.

Consider the brain in a vat scenario. A powerful scientist could be feeding impulses from a simulation into your brain in exactly the same way as if your brain was in a skull, rendering you unable to determine if the world you perceive actually extends beyond your potentially simulated or deceptive perceptions.

This isn't exactly full blown solipsism, but it establishes a primitive case which can cast some (albeit minimal) doubt on whether or not our perceptions even indirectly reflect an external or objective world.

Skepticism can really do away with a lot if it is applied to the extreme, but luckily pragmatism regularly steps in and sets us straight. — VagabondSpectre

Your brain in a vat example does not cast doubt on whether or not there is an external world. There is still the need for your "powerful scientist" feeding impulses. The scientist comprises an external world. It is just that in this example, the real external world is not anything like the external world as the brain in the vat perceives it.

That is what I've been arguing is really the case, the real external world isn't anything like the way that we perceive, and describe it. That is evident from the example which we've already discussed, "the sun rises". The description refers to what we perceive, but we now know that what we perceive is not anything like what is really the case. We could extend this to our understanding of substance in general, molecules and atoms etc., what we perceive is completely different from what is really the case. Since this extreme difference exists, between how we perceive, and describe, the external world, and what we've determined is really the case, it may just as well be a brain in the vat scenario. We still haven't gotten beyond analyzing the impulses, understanding them well enough, to the point of determining the necessity for a "powerful scientist" sending us these impulses.

How we've progressed in this discussion, you and I, has been painfully slow, because we each have vastly differing perspectives on this. You want to assume that consistency in observations implies necessarily that there is consistency in the external world, but we haven't accounted for the brain itself, which in this example is assumed to be in a vat. So let's start with a real skeptic's position, let's assume that it is possible that there is no scientist at all, absolutely nothing external, just a mind, and the mind itself is producing all the images of perception.

Notice that I introduce this premise as a possibility. This is to counter your assumption that consistency in observation necessarily implies consistency in the thing observed. If we allow that the mind itself is capable of creating, and this is what is implied by the concept of free will, that the mind can create without the necessity for external causation, then it is possible that the observed consistency is completely created by the mind.

This is the point which I've been attempting to bring to your attention. If we allow the principles of free will, we allow that the mind itself creates without external cause. So when we proceed to analyze consistency in observations, we need to be able to distinguish which aspects of that consistency are created by the mind, and which aspects are proper to the thing being observed.

This is why we need to consider semantics, the words which we use, and the ways in which we describe things, as having real influence over the observations which we make, and especially the consistencies which we observe. I say this because it is clear that we actually seek consistencies, as consistency is what leads to understanding, so we describe things in terms of consistency. But of all particular things, in general, there are differences and similarities between them. We may overlook the differences to focus on the similarities. And this is what happens with our habitual word use, we call things by the same name, because they are similar in some way, overlooking the differences, and this creates consistency. The use of the same word to describe different things creates an illusion of consistency, through overlooking the differences.

So for instance we say "the sun rises in the east". This is a statement of consistency. However, each day the sun will appear to come up in a slightly different location on the horizon. So the sun isn't consistently rising in the same place, directly to the east, it varies from south to north, despite the fact that we say it rises consistently in the east. We create a generalization, overlooking the various differences, and say that the sun rises in the east. Now we have a consistency which has been created by this generalization, which acts as a description of many slightly different occurrences, describing them all with the very same words, "the sun rises in the east". This consistency has been created by our mode of description, which is to overlook slight differences, and focus on similarities. However, overlooking the inconsistencies, to focus on the consistency, produces a false consistency. It is necessary to negate this false consistency "the sun rises in the east", and focus on all the slight inconsistencies, in order to truly understand the relationship between the earth and the sun.

You think pragmatism sets us straight, but that is not the case at all. Pragmatism is what inclines us to create consistencies, and in creating these consistencies the real inconsistencies are hidden. By loosing track of the real inconsistencies through the claim of consistency, misunderstanding thrives.

I suppose it's my turn to do the summarization, so unless anyone else has a strong desire to do that, I'll volunteer.