It's all a good example of why Plato said democracy is a bad form of government.

According to quantum mechanics the passage of time is discrete and can never be shorter than 10^-27s and if there is such a thing as a present moment it can't get any shorter than that and supersymmetry implies this could be the actual moment of the Big Bang. — wuliheron

Assuming that the passage of time is discrete, as you say, let's say that there is a moment, which consists of a very short period of time. That's the inverse of what I said, that there's a moment which consists of no time, then a short time passes between moments. The difference, is that from my perspective change occurs between moments and from your perspective change occurs within the moment. If it is as you say, what do you think separates one moment from the next, in order that the passage of time can be discrete?

I'm lost for words. — Sapientia

If you can't find the words to justify your assertion then why cling so strongly to that belief?

What you describe reminds me of what the Buddhists say, that the world ends and is remade from moment to moment, as you say, like a movie. — Punshhh

The Buddhist perspective is very interesting. If we consider that anything in the world can be changed at any moment of the present, as time passes, the we must accept the logical conclusion that the entire world is remade at each moment of the present. Anything which can be changed at any moment of the present has no necessity for its existence at any moment as time passes. If its existence at each moment is contingent, then it requires a cause of existence at each moment.

Observation of time is inextricably linked to change. — Mongrel

That's true, but what is change other than that we notice things to be in a different state, at a different time. That's the thing, we describe the world in terms of states, and assume that change necessarily occurred between two consecutive, but differing states, so we conclude that time has passed between these states. We deal with change by applying mathematics, and this creates the illusion that the mathematics is actually describing change. But that is not the case, the descriptions still describe states, and the mathematics simply establishes the relationships between these described states.

It's very difficult having a discussion with you Sapientia. You keep making unsupported assertions, and when I ask you to justify them, you insist that you never made such an assertion.

You see?! You've just done it again! Why would you ask me to justify an assertion that I haven't made? — Sapientia

This is what you did claim:

But I am saying that the case for considering temperature to be objective is stronger than the case for considering morality to be objective, because the former has been demonstrated scientifically, and the latter has not, and therefore they are not analogous in that way. — Sapientia

Clearly your claim is that science is objective, and ethics is not. So I asked you to justify this claim. If you meant something other, than justify what you meant. Can I assume that you mean that science is more objective than ethics? Then justify this. If this is not what you mean, then tell me what you do mean, and justify that.

Let's take a look, for example, at the first post of yours that I replied to, which began our discussion: — Sapientia

Right, I was talking about "goods".

Now, let's compare that to your own claim about what truth deals with: — Sapientia

Right, truth has not been shown by you, or me, to be related to "good". Yet you seem to be somehow linking the two. What's your point?

Furthermore, I already said that this criticism about appealing to the consequences stands - even if it isn't about truth, but instead about a reasonable means of accepting one over the other, in the meta-ethical context of our discussion - but you haven't addressed this counter point. Either your intention is to be reasonable, in which case you would have failed, or your intention is not to be reasonable, but instead go with whichever one you prefer based on how appealing you find the consequences, which you're free to do, but which would be no good reason for any reasonable person to do likewise. — Sapientia

When we are discussing "goods", we are necessarily discussing consequences, so I really don't see what you are criticizing. It appears like you would like to dismiss "consequences" in favour of "truth". But we are talking about "goods", and I see how consequences are related to goods, but I don't see how truth is related to goods. So I wish you would stop trying to change the subject, and then telling me that I am the one straw manning.

So you're saying that time is discontinuous? If so, what separates the past from the present? — Mongrel

We have two distinct ways of understanding the world,1) in terms of what is, and what is not, 2)in terms of becoming. Being and not being refer to what is at any particular moment. Becoming refers to what happens between moments. Becoming is what separates the past from the future. "The present moment" is a way of speaking which refers to the most recent moment, but we also refer to future moments in anticipation. We can refer to "the present" in terms of our own presence, and this is distinct from the moments of the past, as one's subjective experience of becoming, while the latter is objective. The statement "I am" already separates the subject from the experience of becoming, placing it into the objective moments of being. To properly refer to my subjective presence, I would say I am becoming.

My angle was that eternity is in the now, and it is our limited awareness and experience of time as a series of moments bleeding into each other, like a strobe light, that makes us think of time passing. — Punshhh

I am talking about a proper separation between moments, so there is no "bleeding into each other", they are truly individual objects.

You have misunderstood, and then attacked your own misunderstanding. I am not saying that we should not follow ethical rules. — Sapientia

At least you're not accusing me of straw manning.

Please stop with these straw men. — Sapientia

Oh, I take that back.

But I am saying that the case for considering temperature to be objective is stronger than the case for considering morality to be objective, because the former has been demonstrated scientifically, and the latter has not, and therefore they are not analogous in that way. — Sapientia

Science is objective, and ethics is not. Could you justify that assertion?

Justification for what?! It is just as fallacious as a justification for reasonable acceptance over an alternative, even if we put truth to one side. So, basically, if you're trying to be reasonable, then no, it isn't irrelevant at all. It is very relevant. — Sapientia

OK, so explain to me, how truth, which deals with "what is", is relevant to ethics, which deals with what ought to be.

I have just suggested that there is reason to believe that in at least some cases, such as that of a perfect circle, they might not actually exist, and that the same might be true of God, if conceived of in this way. — Sapientia

All you are doing is defining "exists" in such a way that things like circles, squares, numbers, and all concepts in general, immaterial things, do not exist.

I don't really care whether or not God is necessary if God is just a definition or a concept. I care whether or not God actually exists. — Sapientia

Since God is known to have the same type of existence as these things which your definition of "exists" excludes, i.e. immaterial things like concepts, then I think it is quite clear that God does not exist. That is, unless you are ready to change your definition of "exists", to allow that things like circles, squares, numbers, and other concepts actually exist. If you're ready to change your definition of existence, then the question of whether God actually exists might become meaningful.

We can look at time in two distinct ways. One is as an undivided continuity, in which any insertion of "a moment" as a point of division between one period of time and another, is purely artificial, conceptual, carried out for the purpose of dividing one period of time from another. Or, we can assume that there is a real present moment, and the appearance of continuity is produced by our perception of a continuous series of moments, like a series of still frames produces, in perception, a continuous movie.

In the latter case we have a series of moments as real objects, each being a moment of the present, and this series is being perceived as the continuous passing of time. Each moment would have no temporal extension (outside of time, or eternal), and the passage of time would occur between moments. As a describable object, we can treat the present moment as a subject for predication.

Consequentialism is a normative ethical theory for determining the moral value of an act, whereas you were talking about the truth value of meta-ethical theories. — Sapientia

As I just said, I don't think we were discussing truth values at all. This claim of "truth value" is a diversion from the subject.

No, that isn't what really matters. It doesn't really matter if it can't be knowingly applied, and it can't be knowingly applied if all you know is that there is an absolute good, or that there is an objective standard, without knowing what it is, or how to make comparisons to it. — Sapientia

Huh? How does that relate to what I said? Are you saying that the thermometer is useless if you don't know how to read it? I think that's kind of obvious, and it's equally obvious that ethical standards are useless if you don't know the language which they're communicated in

Yes, if you can produce such a scale. But that is a big if. The temperature scales we use are scientific, and, the last time I checked, ethics wasn't. So this analogy of yours only goes so far. — Sapientia

I don't see the basis of your claimed difference. Scales, codes, and rules are produced by human beings as principles to be followed. Why would you say that we should follow scientific rules, but not follow ethical rules. Your insinuation, that rules for measuring temperature are somehow better than ethical rules, because they are "scientific", doesn't make sense.

Another point is that the concept of an absolute can form part of a scale, but need not exist in actually. In fact, it can even be the case that, not only does it not actually exist, but cannot possibly exist. Consider a perfect circle, for example. Perhaps God, like a perfect circle, doesn't actually exist - even if we can use the concept as part of an objective scale. — Sapientia

Of course, the ideal, or absolute, doesn't exist in such a limited sense of the word "exist", it only exists through definition, but this doesn't make the absolute any less necessary. Pi is defined as the ratio of the circumference of the circle to the diameter of the circle. It cannot be given in its exact numerical form, because it is an irrational ratio, but that doesn't mean that it is not necessary. This point you make does nothing to deny the necessity of God.

And, like Brainglitch rightly noted, and which should not be glossed over, the desirability or benefit that having recourse to such a scale would bring about cannot be a reasonable basis upon which to judge the truth of a proposition. It is a known fallacy. — Sapientia

And as I replied to brainglitch, we are not judging truth here, we are judging justification, so this point is irrelevant.

No, such a principle need not be absolute. It can be fallible. And the assumption of the absolute does not allow you to know that one is higher than the other. That would be begging the question. It only really allows you to assume that one is higher than the other. — Sapientia

Why do you think that an absolute is necessarily infallible? That doesn't make sense. What about being absolutely fallible? But if absolutes help us reduce fallibility, why deny them?

And, yes the absolute does allow you to know that one is higher than another, just like you can know that 3 is higher than 2, by means of knowing number, which is an absolute. When there is an absolute, then if any given good is described, it can be known by means of that description to be higher or lower than another described good, just like the number which is described as 3 can be known to be higher than the number described as 2. When there is an absolute, then each good receives its definition, and description as "good", by being related to the absolute, like 3 receives its definition by being related to the absolute. By your argument, the absolute of number only allows you to assume that 3 is higher than 2, and it is begging the question to say that 3 is actually higher than 2.

Not at all, get right on it.

That's kind of odd. You could also pick "centimeter" as your thing. Neither of those could be the ultimate subject of a predicate, so thinking of a moment as a thing is mistaking time for something absolute. — Mongrel

I saw you briefly in our Derrida's "Voice and Phenomenon" reading group Mongrel. Check out the summary of Ch6 which I'll quote here: "The ideal object is the most objective of objects, it can be repeated indefinitely while remaining the same". Doesn't that described object sound like the present "moment"? And doesn't that description, the possibility of indefinite repetition, appear to be predication? On what principles do you believe that the moment is not a thing?

And, in answer to your last question, the ability to judge and to form hierarchies are natural human abilities that don't depend on there being an absolute of any kind whatsoever, nor even on it being possible, which is all that really matters. — Sapientia

This may be the case, that we can make such subjective judgements without the need for an absolute, but that's not "all that really matters". What really matters is the capacity to make objective judgements, and it is the absolute which allows such judgements to be objective rather than subjective.

So take for example, temperature, we can subjectively judge something as warm or cold, but not until we produce a scale, which is an absolute, do we have an objective judgement of temperature. Likewise with any measurement, we make a subjective judgement of big or small, but when we produce a scale, we have an absolute which acts to give us objectivity.

If you are of the opinion that there is an absolute good, then you can never reasonably seek goods higher than that. But you can seek goods higher than others whether you believe that there is an absolute good or not. — Sapientia

How would you know whether one good is really higher than another, unless you assume a principle for comparison? Such a principle is an absolute, and it is the assumption of the absolute which allows you to know that one is higher than the other. Otherwise it is just your subjective opinion that one good is higher than the other.

This reasoning strikes me as an appeal to consequences. — Brainglitch

Isn't that what morality is all about, consequences? I think it would be odd to attempt to base moral principles on something other than an appeal to consequences. Don't you?

Sure, our beliefs have consequences, sometimes consequences that are widely judged to be positive, inspiring, life enhancing--as indeed many religious beliefs are. But desirable consequences do not entail that the proposition driving the behaviors is true, they indicate simply that belief that the proposition is true motivates behavior. — Brainglitch

Well, you and I both know that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether any particular belief is actually "true". We can justify a belief, but this doesn't necessarily mean that it is true. The scientific method is to accept the theories which have favourable results, predictability. It would be a demonstration of inconsistency if we were to dismiss ethical beliefs which have a favourable result but a possibility of falsity, while keeping scientific beliefs which produce favourable results, but may not be true.

It seems to me, that if a belief is producing favourable results, then we need something more than the possibility that the belief is false, in order to reject that belief.

It's not that every moment is a return. You have to name the thing. — Mongrel

I did name the thing, "moment". So I have the principle of identity right here within the moment, as an identified thing. But each moment is a difference from the prior moment, though it's still the same, as "the moment".

Right, science cannot identify, explain, or prove an asdolute good.

And neither can you or anybody else. You can just express your opinion, your own value judgement that something is an absolute good. And your defense of your belief can consist in nothing more than reasoned argument--which, by the way, is also part of what science does. — Brainglitch

But I think the issue is whether or not there is an absolute good, not exactly what such a good would be. If we are of the opinion that there is an absolute good, we can forever seek higher goods, always in pursuit of that absolute good. But if we are of the opinion that there is no absolute good, then the good determined today, or yesterday, as the highest good, might be continually forced upon us, into the future, as the highest good, denying the possibility that we could discover higher goods, And if we allow that there are higher goods, how would we create any hierarchical system without any direction toward an assumed absolute good?

Each moment in time is a return, like you say that each Sunday is a return, but there is difference in each moment, and so it is unique. I would say that the "selection" referred to in this thread is the selection of which differences will occur at each moment. My argument has been that the return itself is an instance of the same. And further, that volition, or will-power, is the capacity to resist this natural selection of difference, which occurs at each moment, in preference of the same, return.

I was a little hasty with my replies yesterday, so let me explain a bit better the way I see this issue. I am actually very interested in the idea of non-voluntary selection, that's why I asked you for an explanation of eternal return. I was hoping you could assist me in understanding.

As I tried to explain, I find the essence of volition to be found in will-power, which is a resistance to selection. So the idea of non-voluntary selection is very consistent with what I understand as will-power, the will actually being opposed to selection. Like I said, we have two different perspectives of the very same thing. You characterize selection as non-voluntary, I characterize will, as being opposed to selection.

The result of this, is that selection, though it is non-voluntary, must be something other than necessary. It cannot be necessary because the will has the power to resist selection.

How logical distinctions are defined. How is it there is difference between myself and the computer screen? Why is one me and the other one not? I'd say "selection" is used because it refers to the presence of one difference over another. If we consider the uniform (e.g. substance, the world) which has no distinction), any distinction that occurs is but one possibility over many.

How come within the unity the world, I am distinct from my computer monitor rather than not? Why are those logical meanings "selected" rather than not? What makes it so that I have a different meaning than the computer monitor? — TheWillowOfDarkness

We say that they are different because we notice that they are not the same. The reason why you are distinct from the computer screen is that we perceive these as be being not the same. So it is a matter of choice, to use one word to refer to "you", and other words to refer to "the computer screen". Such "logical meanings" are "selected", as you say, but that is a voluntary selection. To characterize these as non-voluntary is an error, because I can if I want, switch the names and refer to thing which we call the computer screen, "you", and the thing which we call you, "the computer screen"..

The problem though, is that if I start to switch up words like this, and choose to use them randomly, it makes my speaking incoherent and unintelligible, rendering communication impossible. I have no desire to make communication between us impossible, so I choose to use words in a more acceptable way.

You act like you don't know what I'm talking about, but I don't think this is true. I think you are aware of what I'm talking about and want to say it's impossible. What I think you want to say is that logical distinction depends on the act of experience. That for selection to occur, for difference to be defined, it has to be performed by an act of will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I think it's quite clear that defining difference is an act of will. The use of words is voluntary activity, isn't that quite clear? If it is not voluntary acts which create definition, then what is it? I think I know what you are talking about, you are trying to characterize the use of words as involuntary, but I think that this is an error. To characterize the use of words in this way is simply to avoid the true essence of word use, which is as a willful activity. And this avoidance will simply produce an unreliable metaphysics.

So while my usage of "selection" is not yours, I suspect you think your usage of "selection" is the one which applies to the topic we are discussing. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's very clear to me that my use of "selection" is the one which applies here. The use of words is clearly a voluntary activity. If there is another type of "selection" which is non-voluntary, as you and StreetlightX seem to believe, then this is not the type of selection which applies here. It appears like you and StrretlightX are operating on some form of equivocation whereby you introduce a definition of "selection" which is non-voluntary, then proceed to discuss voluntary acts of selection as if they are classed as your newly defined "non-voluntary selection".

The point is, more or less, than the identity of a thing is wider than merely empirical manifestation or idea. I am different to everyone else. A truth not defined by a a decision of will (e.g. "I now think the distinction of Willow the poster on ThePhilosophyForum" and it happens) or particular empirical distinction (The distinction of Willow is defined by their location in time and space, what other people observe of them, etc., etc.), but given necessary by logic. I am a distinct thing-in-itself. A non-voluntary difference. A "selection" in which I, nor anyone else, had any choice. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The only reason why you are a "distinct thing-in-itself", is that the living functions of the creatures which apprehend you, their perceptive capacities, produce a separation, or distinction between that particular aspect, or part, of reality, and the surrounding environment. This is called individuation. You, as a thing distinct from the rest of reality are created by this process of individuation. That you, as a distinct entity, are called "Willow" is a matter of voluntary choice. Since all logic relies on the use of names and symbols, and the use of such is a matter of choice, then the necessity of logic is reduced to a matter of choice.

This is how living creatures operate, through choice. If you desire to argue that the individuation which the creatures perform, in distinguishing you from the rest of reality, as a particular entity, is a type of "selection", which is non-voluntary, then I would like to see some logical support for this idea. Since it is clear that the naming of these entities is a matter of volition, and the individuating of the entities is intricately entwined with the naming of them, then you will need to provide a clear separation between the naming and the individuating, in order to support your position that individuating is non-voluntary.

It appears like both StreetlightX and Willow of Darkness want to think about things which words cannot describe, then discuss these things using words. So we have things without identity, which we cannot say that they are not the same as anything else, because this identifies them according to sameness. And we have a form of selection which we cannot associate with willing, because willing identifies with sameness as well. Why are we attempting to discuss these things which are defined in such a way as to make discussion about them contradictory?

I know that's your point. Mine is that that doesn't make sense. Selection, as spoken about in this thread, cannot be an action. It's incoherent. Without a defined difference, there is no-one to act and no actions to take. The point here is the definition of "selection" you are using cannot apply. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, so you take a well used, well defined word, like "selection", give it a secret definition, which no one has heard of, or knows about, then claim that the way we normally use that word is contradictory according to your secret definition.

So what is your definition of selection, "defined difference"? Defined difference requires that it must be different from something else, so all you are saying is "not the same". So "selection" means not the same thing as what it normally means.

Your usage of "selection" just doesn't get the topic of discussion and so fails to speak about it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK fine, you want to talk about selection which is not selection at all, it is something different from selection. So what is it that we are talking about?

Oh, and by the way StreetlightX, it was you who brought up the notion of will, by saying that selection is non-voluntary. And this is indicative of this whole philosophy of difference, you cannot say what difference is, only that it is not the same. You cannot say what selection is, only that it is not voluntary, it is necessary.

The subject of the inquiry is not "nothing." It is selection. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, selection is the subject of the inquiry.

In both questions, the subject (God, selection) is treated as real and I am asking what thing acted to make it so. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Now you ask what thing acts to make a selection.

For either question, "nothing" is a truthful answer because there is no thing which causes either. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Your answer, "nothing".

My point: if nothing acts to make a selection, then there is no selection, just like if our subject is "going to the store" and nothing acts to go to the store, there is no going to the store.

For selection to be an action of something is a contradiction. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Since "selection" is most commonly defined as an act or instance of selecting, what you say here is nonsense. In all actions there must be something which carries out the act, or the described act is just a fiction.

Selection must occur regardless of states of the world, else the different meanings expressed in the world would not be defined. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This may be true, but it doesn't change the fact that for selection to occur there must be something which selects.

I didn't address this because I have nothing to say about 'free-will' that isn't disparaging. Nobody has any idea what a 'will' is, let alone a 'free' one. If 'free-will' is your (completely arbitrary) criteria for a metaphysics, then I've nothing to say to you. — StreetlightX

I consider that a very odd response from someone who starts a discussion entitled "Metaphysics as Selection Procedure". If you want to discuss selection without discussing will, then go ahead and have a good conversation with yourself.

You haven't yet addressed the key point of my argument though, and that is the nature of selection itself. Deleuze characterizes selection as non-voluntary, necessary, whereas I consider selection as a free act of will. As an act of free will, we have to allow for will-power, which is to resist the temptation to choose, and to resist the habituated choice. As I described, the act of will-power is resistance to change and difference, therefore a selection of the status quo, lack of change, the same.

Sure, just to be different, Deleuze can but forth a metaphysics of difference, and claim all the things which you have stated, identity and the Same have failed us, so we must base epistemology in difference, but who is going to select such a metaphysics? If selection is characterized as non-voluntary, and individual human beings experience selection as voluntary, then why would any human being choose such a metaphysics which is contrary to one's own experience? And as soon as one allows that selection is voluntary, then there is no apparent reason for one to choose Difference over Same. As I described above Same is what allows us to communicate, proceed with logic, and obtain knowledge. If we choose Difference we select to isolate ourselves within our own thoughts unable to communicate.

So here's the point, as I said in the last post, the two perspectives are two sides to the same coin, two different ways of looking at the very same thing. Each of the two perspectives are inherently different, and this validates Deleuze's argument for difference. One cannot dismiss Deleuze on any claim of unsoundness. However, I assume that we are talking about the same thing, and this allows us to have intelligent communication. I validate my assumption of "the same thing", by referring to similarities. Of course one can focus on the differences, and insist that this is not two different perspectives of the same thing, moving to deny the validity of the Same, but what good is this? The thing I am talking about is metaphysics. If Deleuze wants to talk about something which is different, not the same thing as what I am talking about, that's fine. But if he calls it "metaphysics" he is acting in deception, implying that it is the same thing which I am talking about, while claiming that all he refers to is difference, without the assumption of difference within the same thing. I know that my metaphysics is the real metaphysics because it allows for voluntary selection, Deleuze characterizes selection as other than voluntary.

Chapter 7 is rather long and convoluted, and no one has offered a summary yet. I vote we give it another week. I, for one have been rather busy, and unable to give it a proper reading.

think I know what you're getting at, and part of the complexity here is that Deleuze ontologizes the selective principle. That is: if every metaphysics implies a selection, Deleuze's whole objection to the history of metaphysics is that it never sufficiently justifies it's particular 'method' of selection. — StreetlightX

If you have an inkling of what I'm saying, I'll proceed deeper to what really concerns me. What is at issue here is the nature of "the same". "The same" is very important epistemologically, as the basis of "identity", the basis of "one, of "unity", of "the set", all the geometrical figures, etc.. "The same" is the foundation of all of these, and therefore the foundation of epistemology itself. Identity is how we know that you and I are talking about the same thing, and unless we are talking about the same thing, any knowledge which we may claim to have, is really nonsense.

So consider your quote of Aristotle to Nagase:

"We call contraries (1) those attributes that differ in genus, which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject, (2) the most different of the things in the same genus, (3) the most different of the attributes in the same receptive material, (4) the most different of the things that fall under the same capacity, (5) the things whose difference is greatest either absolutely or in genus or in species.

...Things are said to be other in species if they are of the same genus but are not subordinate the one to the other, or if, while being in the same genus they have a difference, or if they have a contrariety in their substance; and contraries are other than one another in species (either all contraries or those which are so called in the [5] primary sense), and so are those things whose formulae differ in the infima species of the genus (e.g. man and horse are indivisible in genus, but their formulae are different), or which being in the same substance have a difference. ‘The same in species’ is used correspondingly." (Book Δ, 10).

And in book Zeta: "Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence--only species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that the subject participates in the attribute and has it as an affection, or has it by accident; but for everything else as well, if it has a name, there be a formula of its meaning--viz. that this attribute belongs to this subject; or instead of a simple formula we shall be able to give a more accurate one; but there will be no definition nor essence" (Book Z, 4). — StreetlightX

Notice that all the differences referred to are said to be different, because they are observed to be not the same. So for Aristotle, difference is really just a determination of "not the same". What is "selected for" is similarity, whatever is noticed to be "the same". This is what produces essence, properties which are the same, and are selected for. If X,Y, Z attributes can be predicated of the subject, it is of species A. This is a determination of "the same". If the subject lacks attribute Z, it is different, but by means of X and Y, it may still be the same in genus.

So what Aristotle describes here is selecting for similarity, not difference. Something which is different is outcast from the species, it is not selected, but it might still be selected for the same genus, on the basis of similarity though, not difference.

These are "subjects", which Aristotle refers to, subjects of the mind, the subject matter of knowledge. I think, that Deleuze is looking from an ontological perspective, from the perspective of being an object itself, rather than a subject, and claiming that what is essential to the object, as a particular individual, is difference. So difference inheres within the being, as essential to its nature as a particular object. Therefore selection, even if it is an act of selecting for the same, like we do as rational human beings in the act of identification, is an act of difference itself, as the difference inheres within the act of the object.

Let me put "difference" and "same", with respect to selection, into a temporal perspective now.

As I said to Moliere earlier in the thread, the associations of language here might lead us astray, because despite it's 'voluntarist' tenor, 'selection' is anything but voluntary in Delezue, and selection is always the result of an 'encounter' with or 'interference of' a 'question-problem complex' which forces one to creatively engage and fabulate responses as a result (the quoted phrases are Deleuze's). The kind of 'phenomenology' - if we may call it that - of Lewis being 'gripped' by the necessity of imposing the sorts of divisions he does is very much in keeping with the Deleuzian conception of philosophy as involving a 'pedagogy of the concept', where creation - or in this case selection - is very much a matter of imposition, of 'subjective dissolution', if we may put it that way. — StreetlightX

The Deleuzian perspective of selection which you put forward here is non-voluntary. There is a selection which is imposed at each moment of time. This is the object's existence in time. One might say that selection is necessitated by the passing of time, and that selection is a selection of difference, such that the object is different with each passing moment. But if we consider voluntary selection now, this type of selection has the assistance of "will-power". Will-power is the power not to choose, not to select. When we use will-power not to select, then no difference is selected for, and we maintain the status quo, the same. This is how voluntary choice, as a form of selection, is based in a principle of "the same". It is based in will-power, which is inherently the desire not to select, avoiding the difference which is created by the selection which is inherent within the passing of time.

The naïve argument would be that the will-power, the power not to select, is itself a selection, the choice not to choose. But this position is untenable when selection is seen as a selection of difference as Deleuze assumes, because the will-power not to choose is not a selection of difference, it selects to have things maintained as the same, undecided. Therefore the will-power is a non-selection when selection is defined by difference.

What I see is two sides of the same coin, the Deleuzian side in which difference is necessitated and therefore selected, by the passing of time, and the free-will side, by which we choose, or select things to remain the same. The problem with the Deleuzian perspective, as you present it, is that you have provided no basis for consistency in metaphysics. Consistency is provided for by maintaining the same principles, not difference. So this perspective portrays metaphysics as having no principles of consistency. But clearly when we do metaphysics, we seek rational clarity, and we select according to some principles of consistency. This is extremely evident in the op. The op mentions numerous philosophers, referring to a vein of similarity. These similarities have been selected in order to create a consistency. Without this, metaphysics would be inconsistent nonsense.

It a bit like answering the question "What causes God?" Yes, we can say that such a notion is incoherent. But saying "nothing" is also truthful. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's not at all like asking what causes God, because God is conceived of as a real actuality, you are talking about "nothing".

Does being selected by nothing somehow mean a selection hasn't occurred? — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, being selected by nothing means that a selection has not really occurred. Selection is an action, and if nothing carries out this action, then the action has not occurred. It is very common to have a described action, like "going to the store", but if nothing carries out this action, it has not occurred, and it is just a fiction. It appears like you are trying to reify "nothing" so that nothing is a thing which acts. Then you say "nothing selects", and claim that selection is a real action, rather than a fiction.

In this respect, I'd read "eternal return" quite literally here. Selection always returns. No matter what is (or is not) a difference is defined. Expression of form is necessary. I'd say it's almost a combination of the two you are asking about: that which selects (eternal return-- "nothing") and that selection is necessary. — TheWillowOfDarkness

What you say doesn't really make sense. You claim that immanence denies the possibility that form may act to select. OK, form cannot select. So, what selects then? Your answer, form is necessary, and "nothing" selects. How is selection important if nothing selects? Why not just dismiss selection as an incoherent concept of transcendentalists?

I probably can, but I really don't want to. — StreetlightX

OK sure, I can understand that. But you've already said that this eternal return "ensures that a selection must be made at every point". So I take it to be a kind of necessity rather than a selection itself. As the thing which necessitates selection, it cannot itself be selected for, it is a necessity. So if eternal return is a metaphysical principle of Derrida's, then metaphysics goes beyond selection, according to this necessity.

However, I see that you have defined a separation between metaphysics and ontology, and eternal return appears to be an ontological principle. Am I correct to assume that there is a separation between selection, as metaphysical, and eternal return as ontological? Ontology deals with "what is", and this is necessity, while metaphysics deals with selection.

I think that there is a question concerning the relationship between these two. In the op it is said that metaphysics selects the field, and ontology operates within that field. But when you refer to Deleuze, the inverse is implied, that the ontological, eternal return necessitates selection. However, you also said "it's the eternal return that 'selects' what returns, and of course what returns is 'difference'". Now, there seems to be some ambiguity in your posts, could you clarify one thing for me? Do you think that the eternal return actually selects, or does the eternal return necessitate selection?

This is why univocity becomes so important: univocity 'ontologizes' selection, it gives it the status of being itself. Thus re: the 'hinge' of selection in my post above, Deleuze's own 'hinge' will be the eternal return: it's the eternal return that 'selects' what returns, and of course what returns is 'difference'. — StreetlightX

As far as selection is concerned, it takes place at the level of the first and second syntheses of time (contraction of habit and synthesis of memory), while the third synthesis (eternal return) ensures that a selection must be made at every point. It's basically the imperative of an inescapable 'NEXT' which forces the affirmation of selection at every 'point' in time. — StreetlightX

StreetlightX, are you able to explain a basis for the assumed "eternal return"? I ask this, because there must be a principle whereby a "return" is necessitated. And, whether or not a true selection is indicated here, would depend upon the nature of this "return".

"Return" implies a repetition of the same. By means of return, the very same would be repeated, unless difference was selected for. If there is difference within this repetition, then it is false or misleading to call it a "return". The difference therefore, must be separate from, or independent from, the return, which is I beliueve, by definition of "return", a necessitation of the same.

If Deleuze proceeds on a principle of difference, then selection of that difference is allowed for, but true "return" is denied. Then this so-called "return" is not a return at all. If there is no return, then the very thing which ensures the continuity of existence, that actuality which forces the immediate selection of difference from the realm of possibility, at each moment of time, must be accounted for by some principle other than return.

I don't think the argument intended zero-dimensional "moments", or a particular quantification, as such.
It was given to me in a much less formal format; it's also possible my rendition remains a bit hokey. :) — jorndoe

But the argument assumes a particular quantification, a first, second, third moment of time, etc.. Without this quantification of time, there is no argument.

A similar principle acts as the grounds for Aquinas' cosmological argument which speaks of quantifiable things, actual individual entities. If individual things are generated and corrupted in time, then we can assume that there must be a first thing, as per your argument posted. That forms the basic definition of finite existence, individual, bounded objects. So if there are such finite things in existence, there must be a first. The definition of "existing things" is such that they are finite, and this denies the possibility of infinite regress.

Now we proceed, if there is a first thing, then the potential for that thing must be prior to the thing itself, from inductive reasoning. So the cosmological argument insists that there must be something actual which is prior to all these individual things, in order to actualize this initial potential. The potential for the first thing could not actualize itself, so it is necessary to assume an actual cause, which is prior to all actual things.

Nonsense.

1. if the universe was temporally infinite, then there would be no 1st moment — jorndoe

Time is continuous. To assume that there are moments in time is to contradict "time is continuous". Therefore either my assumption that time is continuous, or the posted argument's assumption that time consists of a succession of moments, is false. Or both are false, and time is neither.

What I meant, though, and should have said, is that as far as most people are converned, their own personal experience is the gold standard--"Seeing is believing." It is notoriously difficult, to the point of impossible, to change some people's minds about certain beliefs, particularly of the kind that are not repeatable, even if others who witnessed the incident contradict the belief. Disoutes about remembered events are a common example. — Brainglitch

I guess we're pretty much in agreement then, but this "seeing is believing" thing is a little bit disturbing. It seems quite selfish to hold this perspective, though it is rampant in our society. We really do tend to insist that things are as "I saw them", despite the fact that others may dispute this. We might have a better time cooperating if we weren't so convinced that our powers of observation are infallible.

And personal, first-hand experience is the epistemic gold standard--"I KNOW what I experienced." — Brainglitch

I don't agree, I think we ask others to corroborate, and this is the epistemic gold standard. I realize that in common experience there is a tendency to claim that I know it because I experienced it, but I think that this is hasty sloppiness in relation to true epistemic principles. Justification requires that the correctness of the belief be demonstrated, and justification is essential to knowledge under most epistemologies. This is the power of communication. If we can describe our experiences in a way which makes sense to others, we can justify our beliefs concerning these experiences. If others are unaccepting, there is no justification for those beliefs.

Only problem is that there is much reason to be skeptical about certain kinds of beliefs, even if they are based on personal, first-hand experience. — Brainglitch

I think that this is very sketchy, and not a quality principle, to say that we should be skeptical of certain kinds of beliefs. The problem is that that all individuals are different, having vast differences in their perceptive capacities. Some have better ears, some have better eyes, and these qualitative differences extent right into the capacities of the brain. So the type of belief which we should be skeptical of in one person is different from the type of belief which we would be skeptical of in another. And we couldn't ever really know a person's strengths and weaknesses in this regard, until we moved to have that person justify those different types of beliefs. Therefore I think that any first-hand experience must be subjected to justification before it cam be classified as knowledge in any formal sense.

I agree with you though, that when a person is convinced of one's belief, that individual will claim to know. But this is not knowledge according to any formal epistemology, it is just belief. There are differences in how strongly we will cling to our various beliefs. But the strength of this clinging is deeply psychological, often stemming from long ago experiences, even instincts, such that the clinging to beliefs (being convinced), is often irrational. So as much as we say, in common vernacular, "I know", when we are deeply convinced, this really has very little epistemic value.

I haven't said that "we have sufficient reason to reject the claim that an experience could cause one to know that God exists. — Brainglitch

But don't you think that there's a difference between believing something and knowing something? I don't think that anyone here doubts that Colin had an experience which made him believe that God exists. The contentious point is that he claims that the experience has allowed him to know that God exist.

Do you think that experience itself is sufficient for knowing? It seems to me, like experience must be interpreted, and knowing is conditional on interpretation. So experience itself is not sufficient for knowing, knowledge is related to how the experience is interpreted.

Rather, I have offered an alternative explanation for the experience, in which people's brains are producing the experience and casting it with beings they already believe in.

We have, as I argued in some detail a post or two ago, much reason to be highly skeptical of such claims. — Brainglitch

I would say that these cases are most likely a misinterpretation of one's experience. It's not that the entire experience is produced by the individual's brain, but there is some real input, something real is going on, which perhaps triggers the wrong thoughts of interpretation. This would be like an hallucination, the mind doesn't completely make up the experience which is going on, but it distorts what is being sensed, to such an extent, that the interpretation is far out.

When we experience something, we often claim "I know X is the case, because I saw it", or something like that. But it is always possible that one misinterpreted what one experienced, so I really don't think that experience justifies the claim of "I know".

The way I think of it is this: "our particular kind of processing system" is phemomemal--a conceptualization, a mental construct--based on certain phenomena which are grounded in the noumenon/ And the noumenon also is a mental construct, one inferred from phenomenal experience as a realist hypothesis to explain the source or ground of phenomenal experience. — Brainglitch

Isn't it necessary, that as real existing things which can be seen and heard by others, we are also ourselves noumenal? So why would we not be able to have direct access to the noumenal through our inner selves?

Punshhh,
Do you agree, that noumenon is described by Kant, as "intelligible object", similar to what Wayfarer has explained? As such, it must be inherently knowable, under any consistent understanding of "intelligible object". The issue which Kant points out, is that it is not accessible through the understanding of, or knowing of phenomena, So we have a categorical separation between phenomena and noumena.

The issue I see is that Kant has created an epistemological principle, that knowing, knowledge, is of the phenomenal. Under traditional Platonic principles, the intellect may grasp intelligible objects directly, unmediated by phenomena, and this is the highest form of intelligence. This form of "intelligence" could not be classed as "knowledge" under the Kantian system. Because it is not understood as knowledge under the Kantian system, its status as intelligence is highly questionable. And the entire activity, which is described as the intellect grasping intelligible objects directly, without the mediation of sense, and phenomena, is doubtful. Then the whole intelligible realm appears as some sort of phantasm which is nonetheless real, something we know about, but can never really know.

Therefore, it is evident to me, that the Kantian categories are unacceptable. Something must be altered to bring the real noumena into the realm of "knowable", or else we have created a vast aspect of reality which is deemed unknowable. This is contrary to the philosophical mindset which is the desire to know, in an absolute sense.

You've said both (1) that unless there's internal inconsistency or blatant contradiction in what a person claims, the experience can be assumed to be no other than the description of it, and we have no grounds for saying it's false, AND (2) that we can reject a person's claim if we think we have "sufficient reason" to reject it.

So which is it? — Brainglitch

With respect to (1), what I said is that the experience must be identified. We have only the person's words to go by in identifying the experience. So we cannot simply reject the experience per se, as unidentifiable, or unintelligible unless the identifying words are inconsistent or contradictory. And, we cannot proceed to reject on the basis of sufficient reason unless a particular experience has been identified.

In the example you gave, a particular experience of a particular cat has been identified. We can reject based on (2), sufficient reason, but sufficient reason requires that the claimed experience be identified. Without identifying what has been claimed to have been experienced, how can you have sufficient reason to reject the claim?

Here's the difficulty. We have only the person's words to refer to in order to make that identification. The person said "I had an experience which makes me know that God exists". The experience has been identified as the experience which has resulted in me knowing that God exists. The person has only given us, as a description, or identifying features, that the said experience makes him know that God exists. All we have is the outcome of the experience, the result, the effect, we have absolutely no description of the experience itself. It is impossible that we have sufficient reason to reject the description of the experience, because we have no description of the experience. What we have is a description of the effects of the experience.

The effects of the experience are described as "I know that God exists". The only way that we have sufficient reason to reject the claim that an experience could cause one to know that God exists, is if we know that God does not exist, or if God's existence is something which cannot be known from experience. Then we could say that no possible experience could cause one to know that God exists. Therefore we could reject the identified experience, the one which results in the individual knowing that God exists, as impossible.

The fact is, that deception remains as a very real aspect of our existence. And, this fact supports, as evidence, the reality of the secret inner world. Until you demonstrate to me, the existence of a person who cannot be deceived, I see no evidence of your claim.

When you deny the reality of your own secret inner world, you have acted in self-deception, thus demonstrating to me, the reality of your own secret inner world. To reveal yourself to me is to release yourself from such deception.

Those are "others" whom Colin refers to. He envies others who seem to understand easily what he had so much difficulty with. There is nothing here to support your claim that Colin's understanding is simplistic.

What you've demonstrated here is that you really think that if we think we have sufficient eason to reject a person's claims about contact from the supernatural, then we reject their claim, and explain what they say they experienced according to our own alternative explanation. — Brainglitch

The point being, that in the case of Colin's op there was no sufficient reason for rejection, only a bias concerning the nature of the thing which Colin referred to as "God".