There is in the first instance, no such thing as the individual mind. One is always 'in' some state or other 'with' others. Mind is responsive sensitivity, and the fundamental unit is the relationship, not the organism. The individual is an epiphenomenon if you like, of the group mind, or perhaps, mind is the product of culture, rather than culture the product of mind. — unenlightened

Isn't this a lie though? We experience ourselves as individuals, with our own individual thoughts, with freedom to think what we want in secret, fundamentally, and much more so than we experience ourselves as a part of a "group mind". The "group mind" has to be created within our individual minds, we have to convince ourselves that we are part of such a thing, and such a convincing can be rejected as self-deception by a person without good social skills. Being such a "part" requires having particular necessary social skills, and one lacking in these will reject as a lie, the idea that the relationship is more fundamental than the organism.

One can see at once from this perspective that personal identity of the form of I am this nationality or this religion, or this race or football club, is a fragmentation of the mind, and also that a lack of truth and trust, is not just harmful to our sanity, it is the very fabric of madness. To be mad is nothing more or less than to be incommunicado, to have reached the point where no communication can be trusted - to have lost contact with the world. — unenlightened

So, how do you expect that we can build a relationship of honesty from a premise which will be seen by the antisocial person as a lie to begin with? This will only drive the antisocials away, making them madder.

This idea just occurred to me a while ago but it seems that the second timeline, which would be a series of my passing "now" experiences of the eternalist block, would constitute another eternalist block. It would be a series of my brain states or mind states, each state being an experience. And since my subjective experiential timeline is bound up with the objective world timeline we might fuse these two timelines into one timeline of a world that includes both the objective world and our brain or mind states. — litewave

I follow, except there is a lot more than two timelines, because every subject has one's own timeline. Then the "objective timeline" is assumed to have real existence because we can find consistency between the different subjective lines. The real issue though, is the experience of time passing. I don't believe it is possible to disassociate the "now" experience from the experience of time passing, so we have to work this "time passing" into the objective timeline.

Funnily, it also occurred to me that the "passage" of time may be a phenomenon that is not only our subjective experience but in some weird sense also a property of the objective world. Let me explain. What we experience is, strictly speaking, not the external world but the representations of the external world in our minds. But since these representations are particular mappings, via causal relations involving the senses, of the external world onto our minds, there is some significant similarity between the external world and our representations of it. For example, when we see a triangular traffic sign in the street, the triangle of the traffic sign in the external world is similar to the triangle experienced in our mind. Also presumably, when we experience the red color of a tomato, there is some similarity between our experience of red color and a property of the tomato that is represented by our experience of red color. And so, when we experience the passage of time of the external world there seems to be a property of the external world that is somehow similar to its representation, that is, to our experience of the passage of time. That property would be an objective "passage" of time. It would be like an "experience" of the eternalist external world block itself, associated with structural properties of the world (the relativistic structure of spacetime, the laws of physics, the second law of thermodynamics...). — litewave

Exactly. We conclude that there is an objective timeline from the fact that there is consistency in our experience, so from the consistency in this aspect of our experience, time passing, we can conclude that there is an objective aspect of reality which corresponds to this experience the passage of time. So the question is, how do we reconcile this with the eternalist block time. I don't think it is possible, and that's why I don't think that the block time is an acceptable representation of reality.

Because abstraction is a process, from A to B, from input to output. Yes, the output is in the mind, and so could be the process; but the input is not from the mind; or else what would change from A to B? It would be like shovelling dirt from one place to put it back in the same place. — Samuel Lacrampe

So, how do you conclude that because the input is not in the mind, therefore the abstraction is not in the mind? "Abstraction" refers to either the process, or the output, it doesn't refer to the input. The input is what the abstraction is abstracted from.

It just means they have not yet found the explicit definition of the concept. Not a big deal in everyday discussions because we still all have the implicit definition of it. E.g. you and I can still agree on whether a particular event is just or unjust; we just could not figure out general truths such as if justice is by definition always more profitable than injustice. For this one, we need the explicit definition. — Samuel Lacrampe

If we both agree, then this indicates that we both have a similar concept within our minds. What is being discussed is the possibility of a concept which is not within our minds. If your claim is that a concept exists as a definition, that definition is only symbols on a piece of paper, which needs to be interpreted by a mind.

Thus, if there exists a case (1) that is undeniably just, and a case (2) that is undeniably unjust, then there must be some properties in case (1) to make it just, which are not found in case (2) to make it unjust. And these, by definition, would be the essential properties of justice. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't buy this at all. By the method you've proposed, accidentals can be mistaken for essentials. Suppose I want to know the essential properties of the concept of "wet". I have some cold water which is undeniably wet. And I have some warm sand which is undeniably dry. According to your logic, this property, "cold", which is found in the water, but not in the sand, is an essential property of "wet".

I have mislead you by adding the things in parentheses. I meant that fiveness can be represented by IIIII or *****. The particular object doesn't matter, as long as the quantity is correct. — Samuel Lacrampe

So you are saying that the essence of fiveness is a particular quantity. I do not agree with this. I think that the essence of five is defined by order. I learned what five is by learning to count. Five comes after four, and before six. That five is a particular quantity of counts, one, two, three, four, five, is accidental, not essential, because one could start at zero, then five would be six counts, or one could start at a negative number. Therefore, what is essential to five is that it holds a place between four and six, within a particular order, not that it represents a particular quantity. I think that you are wrong because you've already demonstrated that you use faulty principles in determining what is essential, such that you may confuse accidentals with essentials.

Since we cannot agree on the essence of fiveness, what makes you think that there really is an essence of fiveness? What if we were to trade places between five and three? Then five would represent a different quantity, and a different place in the order. In reality, the essence of fiveness is just a convention, one which we can't even agree on. What kind of convention is that?

So the essence of triangle-ness is not to be a triangle (that would be circular), but to be a flat surface with three straight sides. — Samuel Lacrampe

Suppose I agree with you, that the concept of a triangle exists by means of this definition "a flat surface with three straight sides". Would you agree with me, that this definition only exists as physical symbols? How do you propose that we get beyond this, to say that the concept, or definition, has an immaterial existence, without being read and interpreted by a mind? In which case, the immaterial existence would only be within a mind? The definition would be material symbols, but the immaterial concept would be in the mind. So we have a division between the definition, being material and outside of minds, and the concept being immaterial and within minds. How do you propose that the immaterial concept could exist within the material symbols, independently of a mind?

To be clear though, I am not referring to an experience of time as passing in a world that isn't; that is another issue for another topic. Instead, I am talking about the fact that currently, I have the subjective experience of this particular moment of asking this question. — Alec

I don't think that you can separate these two. The particular experience of asking the question, takes time, it has temporal extension. So it is impossible to separate the experience of this particular moment, from the experience of time passing, because the experience of this particular moment is an experience of time passing. By the time you say "now", time has passed, so even the moment of now involves an experience of time passing.

If we assume a block universe, then the subject must be somehow propelled through this block to create the feeling of time passing. The propellant must be something external to the universe, but within the subject, to create the subjective experience. So there must be something within the subject, which is external to the universe, causing the subject to experience a procession of time. This suggests dualism.

The only other option that I see is that there would have to be infinite versions of me (or an incredibly large amount) which exist corresponding to every moment of my life. — Alec

The problem with this perspective is to account for the connection between the different versions of you, and the relationship of order, between them. If there are different versions of you, then how can you have memories from different versions of you. This requires that you assume a relationship between the different versions of you. What is this relation, and why is there a particular order to the memories of the occurrence of different versions of you? So you end up having to assume something else, to account for these relationships. What is that something else? Is it time passing? If it is, then we have two "times", one in the eternalist block, the other to account for the ordered relations, the passing of time..

So we can't call this "time", because it would create contradiction, two distinct definitions of "time". What is it then, other than that special feature of the subject, which I've already spoken about, that causes an ordered relationship of memories? Either way, if we assume the eternalist block, dualism is unavoidable.

Not at all; things can be conceived as agents or manifestations of activity, rather than as bearers of states. Things must then be thought of as extended instantiations of temporal activity, rather than as entities that exist merely in successions of static point-instants. — Janus

OK, if you want to take that route, and deny that a thing is a state, then the laws of logic do not apply to any thing. An activity, is by definition a change. So instead of explaining activity as a thing which is active, carrying out an activity, for you the activity is the thing. There is no thing which is carrying out that activity, because the activity is the thing. As an activity, then,what that thing is, or is not, cannot be stated because it is changing, and this depends on one's perspective. It is relative. Are you satisfied with an ontology which denies that the laws of logic can be applied toward understanding real things?

Indeed, concepts are not necessarily in the mind, because they are first abstracted from the particulars. E.g. 'triangle-ness' is abstracted from particular triangles we observe. — Samuel Lacrampe

The abstraction occurs within the mind, a process which the mind carries out. So how does this make an argument that concepts are outside of a mind?

There may be an ambiguity of the term 'concept'. In philosophy, concepts are the essence of things. In informal language, it is indeed synonymous to a mere idea. I think ideas are essentially in minds, but concepts are not, because they are abstracted into the mind, from "somewhere outside of it", so to speak. — Samuel Lacrampe

"Abstracted into the mind" makes no sense to me. A mind abstracts. Abstraction is a process which the mind carries out, completely within the mind. If there is a thing called an abstraction, it must exist within a mind. Nothing is abstracted into the mind.

E.g. we can all use the word 'justice' correctly in a sentence, but we don't necessarily know its essential properties. — Samuel Lacrampe

So what happens if no one can say what the essential properties of "justice" are, or, like in Plato's republic, there is no agreement as to what the essential properties are? What makes you think that there is such a thing as the essential properties of "justice"?

Let's try it with fineness. I think its essence is: "IIIII" (or whatever other object, as long as there are five of them). — Samuel Lacrampe

How does that make sense? You say that the essence of "fiveness" is that there is five of them. So the essence of justice is that it is just? And the essence of greenness is that it is green? That doesn't make any sense.

Your argument falls down because the idea of things being "in a state" is a merely formal abstraction which does not correspond to actuality. — Janus

If you deny states, then you deny things. Objects exist as a describable state with a temporal extension. You might claim that this is just a formal abstraction, but unless you allow in your ontology, that it is also reality, your formal abstractions have no grounding, they are just imaginary. This is the problem with any process ontology, which denies the reality of "being" in favour of "becoming". There is no grounding for formal logic, what is and is not, as all reality is described as becoming, what may or may not be, and you are left with apokrisis', or Peirce's vagueness, where the law of non-contradiction does not apply. Dualism avoids this problem by providing an ontology with the principles for this duality of existence, being and becoming.

It is analogous to the use of infinitesimal calculus to model motion as a series of infinitesimal differences, differences that for practical purposes don't make such a difference that the series would not be close enough to actual motion to make calculation workable. — Janus

See, you are faced with a question here. Which is real, what is depicted by the model, a series of states, or what you call "actual motion"? If you cannot produce a model to represent it, on what basis are you claiming that this is "actual motion". It appears to me, like you have an imaginary idea of "actual motion", which cannot ne justified. Why insist on the realityof this "actual motion"?

would have thought that the law of identity, a=a, is central to logic and meaning. 'a' is not similar to 'a', it is the same. That's what '=' means. — Wayfarer

= is a mathematical equivalence. "Same" cannot be reduced to =. That would mean that all qualities could be expressed as quantities. This assumption actually denies the possibility of dualism, by saying that every difference can be expressed as degrees of the same type, quantity. That's a monism.

I take it, that by "actual forms of things" of things, you mean material things. If so, then the argument is that the "actual form" is the immaterial Form, and this determines the form of the material thing.

You are not distinguishing between being and becoming. A describable form is a state, static. The "evolution of actual forms" implies a change from one state to another. The "becoming" which is implied by this change, cannot se described as an intermediate state, or else we would need another intermediate state, and so on ad infinitum. The activity of the independent Forms, is within the intermediate of becoming, so it is not describable as the form of a material thing, which implies a static state.. So, the actual forms of material things is determined priorly by the Ideal Forms, but they are not "forms of things", meaning material things, because they are immaterial, acting on the passive material, in the act of information.

OK, I get that particular ideals are particular ideals, but I don't see how that makes them particulars in the kind of sense that particular objects are particular objects. But perhaps you didn't mean that...? — Janus

The same thing which makes a material object a particular (i.e., that it is unique, and there is no such thing as a difference which does not make a difference), is what makes an ideal a particular as well. Clearly, there is a difference between the two, and that difference is matter. But in the sense of being a particular, there is no difference.

Yes, but if what it is to become is not predetermined, then there is no need to think of it as having its future form determined by an ideal form. — Janus

The determination is made within the act of "becoming", not prior to. So it isn't "predetermined", it is determined at that time. The determination is made in the same way that human choice determines. We cannot "determine" things (in the sense of fix the outcome) prior to the occurrence, nor posterior to the occurrence, it is done during the occurrence. If you do not understand, it is probably because our concept of "time" is inadequate here. It creates contradiction between a point in time, and an activity occurring at a point in time..

Becoming is explained by the concept of matter, and matter has elements which appear to be unintelligible, the existence of potential, which allows for both what may and may not be. This is indeterminacy, in the common use of "determined", i.e. determined by the past. Material existence occurs only at the present, it is the human being's description of what is, at the present. When we allow for this indeterminacy, we allow for "determined by the present", which is determined by the Forms, in the act of "information". But this power is limited by the power of the being which utilizes the Forms. (Remember, these are not ideas in the mind, generals or universals, these are independent Forms, particulars, acting in the world, with particular effects.) If one assumes an omnipotent Being, this creates certain difficulties which St Augustine is famous for grappling with. The powers of the lesser beings must be willfully allowed by the omnipotent being.

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It seems contradictory to say that an ideal or an absolute is a particular, Can you support this contention? — Janus

If it is "the ideal", it is the absolute perfect, meaning that everything about it must be precisely according to that ideal, or it will be less than the ideal. Therefore it is completely distinct from all others, it is particular, as nothing but the ideal could be the ideal.

This is why the phrase "a difference which makes a difference" is very misleading. It implies that there is such a thing as a difference which doesn't make a difference. But in the case of the ideal, as in the case of the particular, there is no such thing as a difference which doesn't make a difference. In fact, this is a bold contradiction. If we allow contradiction into our ontological principles, intelligibility is lost as in Peirce's vagueness. To hold that the ideal is necessarily particular, as a singular, unique, unity, "One", and not just any "one", is very important.

The form of material objects is not fixed, but is something which evolves over time. It is hard to see how it can be "independent" if it evolves over time, as that would make it dependent both on its interactions with other forms, and on time itself. — Janus

Yes, the form is changing with the passing of time, that is exactly the point. For a material object to exist as a definite state, we must assume a time when it exists as such. However, prior to existing as that material object, it is becoming that object. The argument demonstrates, that at this time, prior to the object having material existence, when it is "becoming", the form of that object exists independently of the material object (being prior to it), causing the "becoming" to create that particular object rather than something else.

There is nothing here to indicate that Forms wouldn't interact with other Forms, clearly they do. And that's why Neo-Platonists like Proclus described a complete procession of forms.

If nature were rigidly deterministic, then what objects will be, the forms they will take, would be predetermined by nature itself. If this were not the case, then the future would be open, which would mean that the evolution of the forms of objects would not be predetermined, but instead would be subject to novel circumstance. I can't see why the absence of predetermination would preclude the existence of objects. Can you give an argument to support that? — Janus

The future is open, that's what the freedom of the will demonstrates to us. Because the future is open there are many possibilities for material existence at each moment of the present. There is no material existence on the future side of the present, but there must be something there that "chooses" which possibilities will be actualized into material existence at each moment of the present. The Forms are responsible for this. So the future is open, but material existence, existence at the present, is determined by the Forms which exist on the future side of the present, prior to material existence. Therefore we must assume the procession, which occurs at each moment of passing time, and determines the material existence at each moment of the present. The future is open, but what exists in the future, the Forms, determine which possibilities will have material existence at the present.

Of course no object could "come into existence as an object other than itself" whether nature were deterministic or not, determined by God or not, the very idea of such a thing is meaningless, like the idea of a round square. — Janus

This is correct, and that's why Aristotle's argument is so forceful, it begins with this principle of identity which cannot be denied without leaving one in the meaninglessness of contradiction. But that's what happens when we allow that there is differences which do not make a difference, we open the door, and allow ourselves to walk right into this realm of meaningless contradiction. If we hold fast to this principle of identity, we disallow such nonsense which threatens to undermine the foundations of logical process. Then we can accept the reality of, the beauty of, and the importance of, particularity. From here we can proceed toward a true ontology which has respect for the greatest aspect of existence, particularity.

Again, I can't see that you have provided any argument to support this assertion, or even any explanation as to what it could mean. — Janus

I'll state the same argument again then, in slightly different words, because it appears like you didn't apprehend it as an argument. This time, pay attention, and address whatever problems you perceive. A material object cannot come into existence as an object other than itself. You seem to agree with the premise. Material objects exist, so it is not the case that what is existing is random, disordered, or nonsense, there are objects. Therefore there must be a cause for every material object being the particular object which it is, and this is what we call the object's Form. As the cause of the object's material existence, it is prior in time to the object's material existence, and therefore independent from the object's material existence.

The material object exists as the object which it is, at each moment of the passing time. There must be a cause of this, and the cause is the object's Form. As the cause of the material object's existence, rather than being the material object itself, the Form is independent from the material object

I don't think this is right. The form of a tree, say an oak, might be prior to the existence of any one particular tree, but the form of an oak is not prior to the existence of oaks in general. The unique form of a particular oak might be thought to be inherent in the acorn and thus prior to the existence of the oak as tree, but it would not be not prior to the existence of the acorn. This would be so, even if the unique form of the particular oak were entirely determined by the acorn. But this is not so, either, the form of the tree will depend on its environment with all its conditions as well. — Janus

Each material object is a unique physical thing, that is what is expressed by Aristotle's law of identity, a thing is the same as itself. In The Timaeus, Plato argues that the Form of every object is given to every object in the manner of creation. In The Republic, he could not escape the idea that an independent Idea (in the sense of a general idea) required a divine mind to support its existence. But under "the good", the divine idea is necessarily "the Ideal", and the Ideal, being the absolute, the best, is necessarily a particular. So "the good" puts Plato on a whole new path which is inconsistent with Pythaqoreanism, in which Ideas are universals. Plato develops this new path. In The Parmenides he starts to grasp the nature of time, and realizes that every particular material object requires an independent Form to account for its existence.

The argument which Aristotle makes, which I described above, indicates that the Form of each material object is prior in time to the material existence of that object. Any object is necessarily the object which it is, or else it would be other than itself, and this is contradiction. So, when the material object comes into existence in time, it must be predetermined, in some manner, what it will be, because if it were not, there would be no objects whatsoever, simply randomness. The material object could not come into existence as an object other than itself, and that it is the object which it is requires that its Form determines this prior to its existence.

So the argument is not that the form of the particular oak is determined by the acorn, it is determined by the independent Form of that particular oak tree. The acorn itself is a material object, and its existence is determined by its Form. There is a need here to distinguish between the potential for something, and the actuality of that thing, and this is provided by an understanding of the nature of time. The acorn provides the potential for an oak, in general. The independent Form actualizes this particular oak tree.

But this is not so - Plato inherited mathematical idealism from the Pythagoreans; he was frequently referred to by Aristotle as being of 'the Italians', i.e. Pythagoreans. Certainly he adapted it. But it was the sense in which the Forms truly existed that was the point of difference between Aristotle and Plato. Plato held they exist eternally in the 'realm of ideas'; it was the literal existence of that abstract realm which Aristotle took issue with. — Wayfarer

Plato did a deep analysis of Pythagorean Idealism, exposing the weaknesses. Since he spent so much time discussing this position many think that he adopted it. However, there is no doubt that in his dialogues he did expose the weaknesses, and some argue that he effectively refuted Pythagorean Idealism prior to Aristotle's conclusive refutation, in The Parmenides. In my memory, Aristotle refers to "some Platonists" as following Pythagorean Idealism.

Are you familiar with Plato's Timaeus? If not, you should read it. This is where Plato's beliefs concerning independent Forms are revealed. The independent Forms are particulars, each individual existing thing has a Form which is responsible for, as the cause of, that thing's existence. Aristotle is consistent with this, in his Metaphysics. He says that the question of why there is something rather than nothing is one which is meaningless to ask because it has no approach. Instead, he suggested that the important question concerning "being", is the question of why there is what there is, instead of something else.

The argument he produces, is that whenever something (a material object) comes into existence, it must necessarily be the thing that it is, otherwise it would be something other than itself, and that is impossible by contradiction. If the "whatness" of the thing were not prior to the physical existence of the thing, the thing would be something completely random, nothing. But this is not what is the case according to observation, things are particular things. Therefore the whatness (form) of the thing must be prior in time to the existence of the material thing. This allows for immaterial forms.

Notice that both Aristotle and Plato are consistent in arguing for a Form, or "whatness", of a thing, which is prior to the material existence of the thing, and therefore independent from material existence. But these Forms are the forms of particulars, they are not universal forms. Rejection of the notion that forms, as universals, or generalities, which was held by the Pythagoreans is implied by Plato's writings, and firmly refuted by Aristotle with the cosmological argument.

You haven't explained it, you've made an assertion which I have taken issue with, by referring to pure mathematics, which is by definition a matter of the relationship between ideas, which (physical) symbols are used to denote. And ideas are mental, not physical, by definition. As you don't accept this, then we're back at square one. — Wayfarer

Actually, I explained it, perhaps the explanation was deficient. Imagine pure information, in the sense of pure content, without any physical form. There could be nothing to distinguish one mathematical object from another. Consider the numbers 1,2,3. On the page, they are distinguished by the form of the symbol. So let's go to the ideas behind the symbols. Without referring to something physical, how can you distinguish the idea of one unity from two unities. "Two" implies some sort of separation, and this separation is necessarily physical. There is no way to conceive of separation which is not a physical separation. Without this separation, all the numbers, 1,2,3..., are all united as one idea. To separate 1 from 2 from 3, requires an appeal to something physical, space or time. It is the same with all the mathematical ideas, they only have meaning in relation to some physical reference. Remove the physical reference, and they are all meaningless, random nonsense, one cannot be distinguished from two or three or four. Without the physical reference there would be no meaning to one, two, three, four, so they would not exist as ideas.

What is essential to information is what it specifies. — Wayfarer

That is what I called the subject matter, or content. But since information cannot exist without a physical form, physical form is just as essential as content. The physical form is what makes the information, information, and not something random.

The point is, there could be huge variation in the written or printed or electronic form of the information, but the meaning, the output, has to be exactly the same - otherwise, no 'bang'. It's very precise. — Wayfarer

The content may remain the same, in many different forms, but that does not prove that the content can exist without a form. And if the content cannot exist without a physical form, then that it has a physical form is just as essential to the nature of information as is the particular content.

Again, there is the whole domain of pure mathematics. The 'physical form' that it takes is only the symbols in which it is notated, but the domain itself comprises purely the relationship of ideas. — Wayfarer

You may believe that there is a real, ontological realm of pure mathematics, in which mathematical objects exist independently of any physical symbols, you have much company here. But this is Pythagorean Idealism, and it was refuted by both Plato and Aristotle. As I explained, it really doesn't make sense, because without the physical form, we have nothing to posit as the means for distinguishing one mathematical object from another, and we get sucked into the vagueness of Peirce's pure, infinite generality, apokrisis' apeiron.

The resolution of this problem is offered in Plato's Timaeus, which became "The Bible" of Neo-Platonists. The independent Forms are given the existence of particulars. Each particular physical object has a Form which is necessarily prior to it in time, therefore necessarily independent from the physical object. The "particularity" of the independent Form is essential to it. This allows that one Form is distinguishable from another Form, through the Form itself, rather than through the form of a physical object. However, the fact that the independent Forms are necessarily particular forms, creates a categorical separation between these Forms and human ideas such as mathematical objects, which exist as universals or generalities.

As you were totally unimpressed with my argument, I've found a completely different way to describe the problem. Please take a few minutes to read this and let me know what you think.

I think you will agree with me that there are different types of information. If there wasn't different types, then all information would be the same. So information about one thing is different from information about another thing. These are the different subjects of knowledge. For example, information about how to drive a car is one subject, and information about how to grow corn is another subject. The different subjects are different types of information, and this describes one sense, or one way of using "different types of information".

The second sense of "different types of information" refers to the different physical forms in which we find information, what you call the medium. In this sense, radio waves are a different type of information from sound waves, which is different from a book. According to this sense, we can say that our eyes receive a different type of information than our ears do, which is a different type from what our nose receives.

These are two distinct ways of using "different types of information", and although they are obviously distinct, we still must be careful not to equivocate. The first refers to differences in the subject matter, while the other refers to differences in the physical form. You will find that this distinction manifests itself in certain circles of criticism as the distinction between content and form. Content is the subject matter, the idea, while the form is the means by which the content is presented, the physical attributes of the presentation.

When you argue, as you do, that the same information can be conveyed through different media, you say that the same content (subject matter) can come in all different types of physical forms. I'll disregard my dispute over the use of "same" here, and accept this principle along with your use of "same", for the sake of argument. From this position, your claim is that what is essential to information is the subject matter, and the physical form is accidental. When the same subject matter has different physical forms, you call this "the same information". So you conclude that the physical form plays no part in the information itself, as "the same content" is equal to "the same information". .

Here's the problem. If this were the case, then we ought to be able, in principle, to remove the physical form from any piece of information, and be left with pure content, pure subject matter, and this would be pure information. Now imagine if there were such a thing as pure content, pure subject matter, a pure idea, this would be pure information with absolutely no physical form. If we distinguish information from non-information, by apprehending an order or structure of the physical form, then pure content, or pure subject matter, would be unrecognizable as information. So if somehow, we were able to apprehend pure content, or pure subject matter, we would not be able to distinguish whether it is information or not, because it would have no physical form by which we could make such a distinction..

(By the way, this is essentially the same argument you used against me, when you said that we cannot know God, when I said that God is the most highly intelligible of all intelligible objects).

Now we turn the table on the question of what is the essential aspect of information. Since we can only distinguish information from non-information, by apprehending the physical form, then having a physical form must also be an essential aspect of information. The physical form is what distinguishes information as information, rather than non-information, though it may have nothing to do with the content, what the information is. Without a physical form there is only random nonsense, like apokrisis' apeiron, and this cannot be said to be information. So this is the first and most evident essential aspect of information, that it has a physical form. If it has no physical form it is indistinguishable from non-information. The physical form allows us to identify something as information. Once we identify something as information, rather than non-information, by apprehending the physical form, then we move to the other essential aspect of information. We assume that since it is information, it must contain material content, subject matter. Then we act to determine that content.

So in you example of the op, that there is information, is somewhat taken for granted. The horn is synonymous with "there is information". But the op asks us what is information. So this example doesn't serve us because it already designates that the horn signifies "information", then the clerk seeks the content. We must include the horn, the system of alert, "that there is information", as part of the information. Now let's remove the horn. How is the clerk ever going to know "there is information", in order to seek content, unless there is a physical signal? Without a physical signal, there is no differentiation between information and non-information. So the physical signal is just as essential to the nature of information as the content is.

Alas, a concept is a peculiar thing, which by definition is composed only of essential properties, and contains no accidental properties. Using again the triangle example: A particular triangle may have accidental properties such as a size, colour, and location. But the concept "triangle-ness" may not have any accidental properties, or else it is not a concept, by definition. Consequently, the accidental property of 'being in my mind' or 'being in your mind' cannot be attributed to concepts. Instead, when we say "the concept in my mind is the same as the concept in your mind", this is just an informal way of saying "The concept I speak of is the same concept you speak of". — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't think I can agree with this. If being within a mind is not an essential property of a concept, then we must consider concepts which are not within a mind. So the concept which you speak of "fiveness", is not necessarily in a mind. What identifies it as a concept then?

To me, what identifies something as a concept is that it is an idea, a notion in the mind, so being in a mind is an essential aspect of a concept. If it's not within a mind, it's something other than a concept. Now you've denied me of that identifying feature. So ideas and notions within your mind are not necessarily concepts either, they could be something else. I have a notion in my mind of "fiveness". I cannot assume that it is the concept of fiveness. Where can I find the concept of fiveness in order that I can confirm that my idea of fiveness corresponds with the concept of fiveness.

When you call free will a cultural fiction, I know you have very little metaphysical education. And that explains why you would say that Peirce is the smartest modern metaphysician, you really don't know what metaphysics is.

See how freewill works? It is mostly the power to say no even when by rights you should be saying yes. It is the way people justify their irrationality. — apokrisis

There must be a reason for the existence of irrationality. If the concept of free will explains why there is such irrationality, then that's good evidence that free will is more than just a fiction.

Creation by a creator is efficient cause masquerading as something else. — apokrisis

Have you never heard of the concept of free will? This is a cause which is not an efficient cause.

Sure, somehow there must be a "miraculous" connection if the story is going to work. — apokrisis

You can call free will miraculous if you want, I prefer to call it final cause.

When our smartest modern metaphysician and the full weight of our highly successful physics community agree on something in terms of ontology, that seems a good reason to take it seriously, don't you think? — apokrisis

Where do you find this "smartest modern metaphysician"? If you mean Peirce, I can only take that as a joke.

I know, that's just the way it is.

You're use of the term "beneficial" makes moot the preliminary paragraph. If the poison I give you sickens you, it is immoral to give it, regardless of whether it damages your gut flora, your kidneys, or whether it just irritates your throat. If it benefits you, it's not. — Hanover

I don't see your point. It is not immoral to quit doing something which is beneficial to someone else. Consider that it is beneficial for me if my neighbour picks up my groceries at the store, and brings them to my house. It is not immoral for my neighbour to quit doing this.

Obviously 'prior' is not about time in this quote. — mcdoodle

Huh? Check the first line:

...actuality is prior to potentiality in respect of generation and time. — Metaphysics of Aristotle 1050a

You're not actually interested in having your views questioned and thinking through them honestly. — Agustino

That's the conclusion I came to a few days back. Apokrisis is very convinced that the position expressed is the correct one. So no matter how many times the illogical, irrationalities of that position are pointed out, apokrisis just continues to assert, this is the way things are because I adhere to Peirce's principles. There is a complete disrespect for all the problems which are pointed out. It is an act of self-imposed ignorance.

Sure we framed them to explain the world as we have found it. The deeper question is why the existence of that intelligible world? — apokrisis

Correct, we find the existence of an intelligible world, and the laws of logic are developed to help us understand that world. We have no reason to believe that the world ever was anything other than intelligible, because experience demonstrates to us that it is intelligible..

If the laws were merely social constructs, they would hardly hold a foundational place in our methods of reasoning. — apokrisis

The laws are expressed in words, therefore they are human constructs. I don't see how they could be anything other than that. They are foundational in the sense that they are created to support conceptual structures, just like the foundations of buildings are created to support structures. I don't see what you are trying to claim. The laws of logic might in some way represent some real, independent aspects of the universe, or be a reflection of the reality of the universe, but these laws are still artificial, human constructs which reflect whatever that reality is.

That the laws of logic work, is evidence that there is such a reality. But to proceed from this, to the assumption that there was a time when there was not such a reality, is what I see as irrational. The passing of time itself is an intelligible order, so to claim that there was a time when there was no intelligible order, is irrational.

Fer fuck's sakes. If existence isn't eternal, it must have developed or been created. Being created doesn't work as that leads to infinite regress in terms of claims about first causes. So development is the metaphysical option worth exploring - rather than being pig-headed about, as is your wont. — apokrisis

You have reduced the existence of the universe to three options, eternal, created, or developed. I'm sure an imaginative mind could come up with more options, but I'll look at these three.

The infinite regress you refer to is only the result of assuming efficient cause, and this infinite regress is no different from "eternal". The first cause of intention of a creator, which is commonly referred to as "final cause", does not produce an infinite regress. It is introduced as an alternative to infinite regress. The act of the free will is carried out for a purpose, and that purpose is the final reason, there is no infinite regress, so long as you respect the finality of purpose. So your claim that creation leads to infinite regress is false.

The "development" of a universe with intelligible order, emerging from no order, does not make any sense without invoking a developer. So this option leads to the need to assume a creator as well. Your mistake is that you attempt to remove the developer from the development, so you end up with irrational nonsense.

And then cosmology gives good support to that metaphysical reasoning. Look back to the Big Bang and you don't see much evidence for the existence of a collection of objects. — apokrisis

The Big Bang theory only demonstrates that current, conventional theories in physics are unable to understand the existence of the universe prior to a certain time. The Big Bang theory is just the manifestation of inadequate physical theories. It says very little about the actual universe accept that the universe is something which our theories are incapable of understanding. To attribute the "vagueness" which results from the inadequacies of one's theories, to the thing which the theories are being applied to, in an attempt to understand, is a category mistake.

Here's a challenge Wayfarer, if you haven't hit the ignore button on me. Reformulate your argument with the proper premise, a true premise, which respects the fact that similar information is transmitted by different media, rather than the same information. I'm interested to see where you can get with that.

I agree that each thing (a) to (d) do not have all the same properties, because they all look physically different, but they still all have the same property of pointing to the concept of "five-ness". This should clarify why only V is the correct answer to the question "what is the Roman numeral for five?", while all of them are correct answers to the question "What results from 2+3?".

By what principle of identity do you claim that these are the same concept? — Metaphysician UndercoverI will indeed use a principle of identity: If things have the exact same properties, then they are one and the same thing; and if not, then not. Two sticks may look identical, but are not one and the same because they have different x, y, z properties. What about the concept of 'triangle'? To me, its essential properties are 'surface' + 'three straight sides'; nothing else. What about for you? If your concept has the exact same essential properties as my concept, then they are one and the same. — Samuel Lacrampe

OK, so your principle of identity involves "exact same properties". How does the concept of "five-ness" which is in my mind, qualify as the same concept of "fiveness" which is in your mind, when they are described by these different properties ("in my mind" and "in your mind"). Clearly they don't have the exact same properties, and are therefore not the same concept.

You didn't 'refute' it, you're obfuscating the meaning of 'the same'! As I said, endless obfuscation. No further comment. — Wayfarer

Now that's a load of crap if I've ever seen one. I'm merely pointing out the difference between "similar" and "same", and you call this "obfuscating the meaning of 'the same'". Don't you know that logical process begins with the law of identity, and to say that something which is similar to X is the same as X, is to start with an unsound premise? So it is quite clear that your argument contains an unsound premise. So your argument is refuted on this basis.

Call it obfuscation all that you want, but I am only trying to establish a clear distinction between same and similar, whereas you entire argument relies on an ambiguity between these two. Your argument is nothing but equivocation at best.

You are avoiding the point. Peirce is dealing with how the laws could even develop. You are talking about the laws as they would apply when the world has crisply developed, when everything is mostly a collection of objects, a settled state of affairs, a set of atomistic facts.

So sure, generals can have universality predicated of them. They can be said to cover all instances of some class. They can themselves be regarded as particular subjects. That is what make sense once a world has developed and generals come to be crisply fixed within the context of some evolved state of affairs. — apokrisis

The laws of logic were produced, and developed by human beings. They are human statements of how to proceed in logical process. Surely they have only existed in an evolved state of affairs. The claim that there was a time when the universe didn't consist of a collection of objects would need to be justified. The logical principles, and evidence which would be used to justify this claim would provide information as to whether this universe without particulars would consist of anything like what we call generalities. As discussed, the logical principles demonstrate that this is an irrational claim. If you have evidence, you should describe it, rather than repeating over and over again assertions about symmetry-breakings.

So the laws of thought don't apply until they start to do. That is what a developmental ontology is claiming. Peirce described the Cosmos as the universal growth of reasonableness. The lawfulness the laws encode are the product of evolution and self organisation. — apokrisis

The laws of logic are only applied by human beings, who started to apply them a few thousand years ago, along with the development of language. If some human beings believe that there was a time when the universe existed, but its existence cannot be understood by the laws of logic, then the principles for this claim need to be demonstrated, because it appears to be an irrational claim when examined in relation to accepted ontological principles.

There is no point you just telling me you don't see the laws as a product of development. I already know that you just presume their natural existence. You have never inquired how the laws might come to be as the result of a larger ur-logical process.

So why not set aside your predudices and actually consider an alternative metaphysics for once? Make a proper effort to understand Peirce rather than simply assert that existence exists and that's the end of it. — apokrisis

I see the laws of logic for what they are, principles set down by human beings for the purpose of carrying out logical proceedings. There is no question of whether they are naturally occurring, that would be a very odd thought, because they are clearly artificial.

As for making an effort to properly understand Peirce, you've referred me to some of his papers in the past, and I've determined some mistakes, one of which we are going over in this thread. So you should actually set aside some of your Peircean bias, to consider these problems in a reasonable way.

Are these answers not all true? If they are, then this also answers your objection on what basis could we claim that the media is different: — Samuel Lacrampe

If there are different correct answers for the same question, this means that there are different correct ways of interpreting the same question. It doesn't mean that the different answers have the same information. Some of the answers would be the correct answer for other questions, while others would be incorrect for those questions, like "what is the Roman numeral for five?". So it is quite clear that each of these answers does not carry the same information, despite the fact that they might all be the correct answer to some specific questions.

Different media may point to the same concept. — Samuel Lacrampe

What I am trying to get at, is what is meant by "the same concept". If I have a conception, within my mind, of what "five" means, and you have a conception within you mind, of what "five" means, then these are distinct conceptions because one is in my mind and one is in your mind. By what principle of identity do you claim that these are the same concept? We can say that we both see the same word "five", but how does this mean that we both have the same concept?

My initial argument, which as far as I am concerned hasn't been rebutted, was simply this: an item of information can be encoded in a variety of different media, and/or a variety of different languages, whilst remaining unchanged. — Wayfarer

I soundly refuted that argument, perhaps you weren't paying attention. The claim that "the same" information is carried by different media is a false premise. The fact that we interpret 5 in a different way from V, and in a different way from ***** is evidence of this. We have been trained to focus on the essential features of the information, ignoring the accidentals. This focus on the essentials induces the idea that "the same" information is being transmitted through different media.

But ignoring the accidentals invalidates the claim of "the same" information, it only allows for "similar" information. The fact that one medium is better than another depending on the information to be transmitted, and that we may forfeit accuracy for the sake of speed, as well as many other factors like this, demonstrates that it is not true that the same information is transmitted in different media.

Here's the final point. If different media conveyed the same information, on what basis could you claim that the media is different? You must refer to some difference in the information received, in order to support the claim that the media is different. The words "same", and "unchanged", imply no difference. If you allow for any change or difference whatsoever, you deny yourself of the right to use these words. Using definitions such as "a difference which makes a difference" already implies essentialism, that accidentals are excluded. The capacity to use "same" or "unchanged", in referring to information has already been negated by that definition. So that, of course, is a faulty definition, because any difference at all, must consist of information, or else we could not discern a difference, and we could not say that there is a difference.

Of course the LEM applies to any particular triangle. It doesn't apply to the notion of the general triangle. — apokrisis

The laws of logic are rules of predication, how we attribute predicates to a subject. If your subject is the general notion of a triangle, the rules apply. The subject is identified as the triangle, by the law of identity, and the other two rules of predication apply.

The LEM fails to apply. It doesn't even make sense to think it could. It is definitional of generality that it doesn't. — apokrisis

It is only when you define "generality" in the odd way which you do, as a potential particular, that the laws of logic might fail to apply. But this definition is a category mistake because there is a well respected categorical separation between the general and the particular, and you seem to define the general as a type of particular.

You justify this denial of the categorical separation by claiming that the distinction between general and particular is relative only. The triangle is general in relation to isosceles but particular in relation to geometrical figure. But all you have here is relations of generalities. You have not identified a particular. The PNC and LEM rely on the law of identity, the identification of a subject. Until you ,move to identify a particular, it is a foregone conclusion that the laws of logic do not apply.

So you can talk about your generalities all you want, and how the laws of logic are inapplicable to your talk about generalities, but this is just an epistemic failure on your part. It is a failure to identify a particular in order to move forward using the laws of logic. These claims you make about generalities have no ontological bearing, because there is no evidence that such unidentifiable generalities exist anywhere but in the indecisive human mind. And when you move to identify "generality" as a particular thing with ontological status, like apeiron, vagueness, or pure potential, we can apply the principles of logic, despite the fact that you do not want us to, and will not listen to our conclusions.

Before a particular triangle has been drawn, it may be scalene or isosceles. — apokrisis

Don't you see this as nonsense? There is no triangle. It hasn't been drawn, it isn't even conceived of in the mind of a person who might draw it. Yet you say that it may be scalene or isosceles. That's nonsense, there is nothing there. If you instruct a person to draw a triangle, we might say that the person has these options, but that is not to say that there is a potential triangle which is both scalene and isosceles.

And so while still just a potential, it is not contradictory to say this potential triangle is as much one as the other. That is, what it actually will be is right at this moment vague - as defined by the PNC not being applicable and any proposition that pretends otherwise being a logical failure. — apokrisis

That's nothing but irrational nonsense. You have identified the potential for a triangle, a person might draw a triangle. From here, you want to identify the triangle which might be drawn, and say that since it's not drawn yet, it's both isosceles and scalene. But that's nonsense, because the person might draw a square or a circle, or nothing at all.

The triangle is identified as potential, and this means that its existence is contingent. If its existence is contingent, then it may or may not be. If there is reason to believe that the existence of the triangle will be necessitated (the person was instructed to draw a triangle), we can consider the possibilities. It may be isosceles, it may be scalene, etc.. But to say that there is an identified triangle, the "potential triangle", and it "is as much one as the other", is pure nonsense, because what is actually the case is that the probability for one triangle is equal to the probability for the other triangle.

Therefore there is not an identified "potential triangle" which consists of all the contrary possibilities. There is the possibility for many different triangles, contrary triangles. Each potential triangle has features which are consistent with the laws of logic. So we can adequately describe the situation without the irrational nonsense which insists that the laws of logic do not apply. The situation of "potential triangle" is treated as the possibility for many different triangles, as well as other things, each consistent with the laws of logic. It is not treated as one triangle which has features which are inconsistent with the laws of logic. The latter is irrational nonsense, and there is no need for the claim that laws of logic do not apply.

I have no time for endless obfuscations. — Wayfarer

In other words, you don't care about the relationship between the symbol and the idea. You start a thread "is information physical", but you really don't care about this subject.

You want to maintain a naïve division between things in the mind, such as ideas, which are non-physical, and things outside the mind, like symbols, which are physical. But you refuse to respect the fact that the mind thinks using symbols.

Perhaps you should consider, that when we are talking about things like symbols, meaning, and information, the physical/non-physical division is not applicable. And the attempt to apply it, is itself an obfuscation.

Any chance there is some relation between the object out there and the image of the object in my mind? — Srap Tasmaner

Sure there's a relation, but they are not the same thing.

All I can say is that there are some disagreements that are unproductive to debate, and I judged this to be one of them: — Wayfarer

Fair enough, that's your opinion, but I think it's a route of inquiry which may lead us to a deeper understanding of the nature of ideas. Many people will acknowledge that there is a difference between the numeral, and the idea which the numeral stands for. But if no one can explain to us exactly what the idea is, which the numeral 5 signifies, then how can anyone argue that 5 means the same thing to every person.

My opinion is that there is a deep psychological division between the symbol, 5, in this case, and the idea which is behind it, so much so that we can go on using the symbol indefinitely without even really understanding the idea.

I suppose one bit of evidence I could produce in support of my contention that it's the relationship of ideas, rather than symbols, would be the fact that mathematics and science has constantly had to develop new symbols to express concepts and ideas, for which the symbol didn't yet exist.

Were what you say to be true, this could never have happened. — Wayfarer

The people who are developing new symbols for new ideas are producing hypotheses and speculations, these I believe fall out of the realm of logical proceedings. I explained this in my post, I called this dialectics. And it is only through this intermediary process, where ideas are related to symbols, that formal logic and mathematics, which deal strictly with symbols, have the power of relating ideas. But dialectics is not mathematics, nor is it a form of logical procedure. We might say that it is a form of reasoning which is not particularly logical. But what does that mean?

Consider Plato's Republic where the participants are asked, what does "just" mean. Each participant has a different answer for this question. Now "just" is the symbol, and we could create a logical argument with the premises of "John did a just act", and " all just acts are good acts", "therefore John did a good act". But since each participant has a different notion as to the idea of "just", this conclusion is rather meaningless. So it is more important to proceed with the dialectics which determines the relationship between the symbols and the ideas, then the logic, or mathematics, which produces conclusions from working with the symbols.

The further issue which occurs to me, is that we might not ever even relate ideas to each other. We might always engage in relating symbols to each other, and symbols to ideas, and never idea to idea. This would indicate that ideas are inherently separated from each other by means of the symbols, which are a medium between them.

But another example of the vagueness/PNC~generality/LEM dichotomy which is basic to his logic is the triangle. A triangle is a general concept that forms a continuum limit - a global constraint - that then can't be exhausted by its particular instances. An infinite variety of particular triangles can be embraced by the general notion of a triangle.

So the LEM does not apply to this generality as a triangle can, in genus~species fashion, be equilateral, isosceles, or scalene. Of course the triangle must be a three-sided polygon, but that is talking of a still higher level generality of which it now partakes as a definite particular. — apokrisis

OK, so the concept of a triangle is "a plane figure with three sides and angles". Let me see if I can figure out how the LEM does not apply here. You say that any particular triangle, must be one of a number of different types of triangles. Where does the LEM not apply? It doesn't make sense to say that the concept of triangle in general must be a particular type of triangle, just like it doesn't make sense to say that the concept of animal, in general must be a particular type of animal. So it's just a case of categorical separation. It doesn't make sense to attribute a species to the genus, that's a category error, not a failure of the LEM. If we insist that the concept of colour must be either red or not red, and find that this is impossible, it is not that the LEM does not apply, it is a simple category mistake.

Then vagueness is defined dichotomously to the general. Where generality allows you to say any particular triangle can be either scalene or isosceles, vagueness speaks to the indefinite case where there is as yet no triangle specified and so there is no fact of the matter as to whether it is scalene or isosceles. It is not a contradiction to say the potential triangle is both. — apokrisis

This I can't make any sense of. We have the concept of triangle. Your claim seems to be that if there is no particular triangle, then this particular triangle the potential triangle, may be both scalene and isosceles. I'm sorry to have to disappoint you, but yes, this is contradictory. Don't you see that you are saying that there is no particular triangle, then you say that this particular triangle, the potential triangle, which has already been denied, is both. Don't you see that to affirm something and deny it, both, is contradiction? To say that there is the potential for a triangle which is either isosceles or scalene, is not the same thing as saying that there is a potential triangle which is both. The latter affirms that there is a particular triangle, the potential triangle, which is both isosceles and scalene. And that's contradictory nonsense.

Very well then, thank you for your comments. — Wayfarer

Well, I told you where I disagree, and it would be helpful to me if you told me where you disagree. Do you disagree that there is a distinction between the symbol and the idea which the symbol represents? Or, do you disagree with my claim that we carry out logical procedures with the use of symbols.

***** doesn't re-present the number five. The number five is present (immanent) in *****. It doesn't matter if you don't know that it is there or don't know how to count. It also wouldn't matter if there were no sentient beings in existence. The number five is there as a consequence of the asterixes being there. — Andrew M

Yes, that's a good demonstration, to show that the idea which the numeral "5" is supposed to represent, is something completely different from the thing which brings it to mind. Now, can you demonstrate to Wayfarer that when we carry out logical proceedings we do so with the use of symbols rather than the use of ideas.

it's not that redness is separable from red things, not physically, but we can separate it from red things in our minds. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes it is the case that the redness is separable from red things, because the redness actually is separate from the red things, it is in our minds, the thing is not.

The very word "separating" starts to look wrong, so we might say "distinguishing" instead. We merely distinguish the property from the objects that possess it. And what is distinguishing? — Srap Tasmaner

You seem to be missing the point. The redness which you are seeing, when you see a red thing, is in your mind, the image is in your mind. So it is not the case that you are distinguishing the property from the object, but you are separating the property from the object. The redness of the object is in the image, within your mind, while the object remains out there, being sensed.

In relation to sameness being a property of temporal continuity: A guy builds a toy ship made up of legos. His wife gets upset at his wasting of time with the toy ship and smashes the ship to bits. Many years later he builds himself the same ship out of the same lego pieces. It will be deemed the same ship by its builder despite there having been no temporal continuity between instantiation A and instantiation B. Therefore, temporal continuity is not necessary in order for sameness to hold presence. — javra

It is not the same ship. And despite the fact that the builder deems it "the same ship", we know that it is not, by two reasons according to your description. First, the original ship was destroyed, and therefore ceased to be in existence, prior to the second ship coming into existence. And second, the second ship was built, and therefore started its existence after the first ship ceased to exist. Since the two ships existed at completely distinct times, it is impossible that they are the same ship.

In relation to meaning being identical to phenomenal information: There’s a phenomenal object A and a phenomenal object B. Object A is the same relative to itself. So is object B. The relation of sameness remains unaltered in relation to objects A and B, this despite both objects holding different phenomenal properties of information. Hence, the relation of sameness—in this case, as a cognitive abstraction that one can hold awareness of—is not itself identical to any particular phenomenal information that may be discerned as being the same relative to itself. — javra

There is no such "relation of sameness". A relation requires two distinct things. "The same" implies only one thing. So object A is object A. There is no "relation of sameness", there is only object A which is the same as itself, and object B which is the same as itself. "Same" implies one thing, not a relation between things.

I know what you are saying Metaphysician Undercover. You presented your case well, but I put you in a bind by getting to you to concede to a determined past. In doing so, two different ways of looking at time became conflated. — MikeL

Your "two different ways seems to neglect other possibilities. The way I look at time is that the future is substantially different from the past. And this is extremely evident in the way that we approach everything we do and all aspects of our lives. So to deny this is to deny the obvious. But you do deny the obvious, claiming that if the past is determined then so is the future.

Which one do I think is truest reflection of reality? The second. The timeline is the construct in our mind. — MikeL

No, neither the first nor the second is the "truest reflection of reality". The option I've given you is much more consistent with our experiences and learned lessons.

Like I said, I think you did a good job at articulating your case. I was playing a devil's advocate roll to see if there was a deeper truth about it all I could find as well. When you push back against ideas you find their strength and weaknesses. — MikeL

Good job then MikeL! At least you were very attentive, and stuck with it trying to understand my twisted logic, right through the entire description. As you say, we'll meet on another thread.

To use the currently popular definition of information on this thread, awareness of “sameness” is a difference that makes a difference, and is thereby an awareness of information. Yet sameness, though it can take innumerable phenomenal exemplars, is of itself a meaning that is other than—and a priori to—the phenomenal information which we discriminate as either “the same” or “different from”. — javra

If "sameness" is what is important, then it appears like any difference makes a difference, because any difference negates the possibility of sameness. To speak of "a difference that makes a difference" in relation to sameness, is rather meaningless and somewhat illogical because in relation to sameness, a difference, by definition makes a difference.

In relation to a type, or a concept of generality, we identify what is essential and what is accidental, and in this case it makes sense to talk about a difference which makes a difference. However, any difference is critical to sameness. Therefore a type is determined by criteria other than sameness.

In the case of information now, there is a need to identify two distinct types of information. We need information related to the particular, which will allow for the identification of the same particular, and we also need information concerning types, to identify the type. The latter may consist of differences which make a difference, but the former consists of something completely different.

We can never perceive the same river in terms of the same phenomenal information. Yet we can nevertheless acknowledge that what we perceive and interact with is the same river over time, or that we as multiple subjects do in fact perceive the same river at the same time. — javra

So here we have this use of "same". You want to say that the river is the same river despite all of its activities and changes, flux. I suggest that identity in this case consists of a temporal continuity of existence in the same spatial location. We overlook all the differences, created by the changing river, to say that it is the same river because of observed temporal continuity of existence. And even "the same spatial location" is not necessary, because we identify objects as the same object, despite them moving around as well. So we can allow any category of difference, and still designate the identified thing as "the same". What is important to us, in designating the particular as the same particular, is temporal continuity. If we identify the temporal continuity, we can say that it is the same particular. This is the case with "energy", it is a case of identifying the temporal continuity of a particular, it is not a case of identifying a type of thing, or a difference which makes a difference. Differences are irrelevant when something is identified as the same, through temporal continuity.

To emphasize: where does the meaningful understanding of “sameness” come from, then? — javra

The answer to this question is quite simple now. We develop an understanding of sameness from our capacity to recognize the temporal continuity of things. However, there is a certain degree of self-deception which occurs in this process. What is most evident in temporal continuity, and what brings temporal continuity to our attention, is a certain degree of unchangingness in the world. Because of this we are inclined to attribute "same" to "unchanging". But this is the naïve and self-deceptive perspective. What really is referred to when we call a particular object "the same thing", is not its unchangingness, but its temporal continuity.

For the record, so far my hypothesis is that sameness is a Kantian-like a priori property of awareness—itself as property being a meaningful understanding regarding what is and what can be, one with which we are birthed with. Be this as erroneous as it may, however, the very awareness of sameness cannot itself be derived strictly from physical information—else one will debate against the very notion that everything phenomenal is in perpetual flux. — javra

From the Kantian perspective, "sameness" is attributable to the internal intuition of time.

All this being a more metaphysical means of arguing that not all meaning is identical to phenomenal information. — javra

I don't think you've yet provided an argument for this. If the internal intuition of time is what allows us to apprehend, and interpret the world in terms of "sameness", phenomenal information is necessary to make this interpretation. How do you propose to separate this "phenomenal information" from "meaning"?

I can look at the symbols and tell you quite clearly, 'x' is on the left hand side of 'y', and about an inch apart. But ask me what is the value of x, given that y is such and such - then I have to do the math, that is the domain of ideas. — Wayfarer

This is where I disagree. I think doing math is dealing with relationships between symbols. What the symbols stand for, the ideas, is something which doesn't enter into "doing math". It does enter into understanding the principles of mathematics though. So if the question is 1+1=?, then I must put the symbol 2 there. This is completely the result of the conventions of how to use arithmetical symbols. And this is independent from the ideas which the symbols stand for.

This is the whole point of Searle's Chinese Room argument - you can logically execute a series of instructions to translate Chinese, without knowing what they mean. In which case, you haven't grasped the ideas - which illustrates my point. — Wayfarer

Exactly, we can do math without understanding. what the conclusions mean. Grasping the ideas is something different from doing the math, just like translating from Chinese is different from understanding the ideas, and a voice recognition computer is carrying out a process which is different from understanding the ideas. So this illustrates my point, and denies the validity of your claim. Doing math is simply dealing with symbols, it is not understanding the ideas. The computer does math, it carries out the logical processes assigned to it, but it doesn't grasp the ideas.

Logic is the relationship of ideas - surely you of all people aren't going to disagree with this. Otherwise I might revise the above opinion. ;-) — Wayfarer

Sorry, but I do disagree. Logic involves the relationships between symbols. What the symbols represent is ideas. So logic isn't directly involved in relating ideas, it is only involved in this in a secondary sense, because the symbols which logic relates to one another, represent ideas. The art, which involves relating symbols to ideas is something other than logic, it's called dialectics. So the relationships between ideas requires more than just logic, first and foremost, it involves dialectics.

Sure, we can agree to disagree. But I hope you respect the fact that I've explained to you why I believe what I believe, and you haven't yet answered my question of how you can believe that everything in the future is already determined, like it's just behind a curtain, yet you also believe that human beings can change things. How can you hold contradictory beliefs?

(Actually I read an interesting comment the other day on the etymological between 'idiosyncratic' and 'idiot'. An 'idiot' wasn't originally someone who was intellectually disabled, but someone who spoke in a language nobody else could understand.) — Wayfarer

You calling me an idiot?

Teacher writes a problem on the board, and I have to solve the problem. The chalk marks on the board are surely physical, but the algebraic problem that I have to solve, comprises the relationships between ideas, I would have thought. — Wayfarer

Is this really the case though? Does the algebraic problem deal with the relationships between ideas, or does it deal with the relationship between symbols? I think the latter. There is a process to follow, and the process involves rules concerning the relationships between symbols. What the symbols stand for (i.e. ideas), does not enter into the process, and is something completely different.

This is how formal logic works. There are rules concerning the relationships between symbols, which must be followed in the logical process. What the symbols stand for (what they mean), is irrelevant to the logical process itself.

So I don’t yet understand how your arguments can support the reality of different subjects sometimes sharing the same meaning. — javra

I do not believe that different subjects ever share the same meaning unless the meaning is within the physical object which is shared between them. They share the same physical object. Sometimes there are copies of the same book, and this is as close as we can get to saying that two distinct things have the same meaning. What exists within the different subjects' minds is always interpretations, and interpretations always have differences. So I think that if you want to say that different subjects share the same meaning, you need to allow for meaning to exist outside of the minds of subjects.

No two subjects will ever experience identical phenomenal information at any given time, this because each will be a unique first person point of view (nor will the same subject ever experience two identical bodies of phenomenal information during the entirety of its lifetime—but I’ll drop this second line of argument for now as regards stable meaning over time). — javra

We all have our unique points of view, but this does not mean that we cannot be viewing the same object, or hearing the same spoken words. So when we hear the same spoken words, we share the same meaning, regardless of the fact that we interpret the meaning in different ways depending on one's point of view.

Then, how does your argument not result in a solipsism regarding the body of meaning that any individual subject holds?

Seems to me this very conversation would then be nonsensical as a conversation since no meaning whatsoever would be common to us (i.e., the same relative to each of us). — javra

I think that you have things backward here. Those who claim that meaning is only within a mind are the ones who cannot show how any meaning could be common to us. Once you allow that the meaning which is within words and symbols, is not only within the mind, but outside the mind as well, then you have the grounds for common, shared meaning.

Good argument. Here is another argument to prove that information is indeed non-physical.

P1: All that is physical abides to the law of conservation of mass and energy. E.g. if I give you a physical thing, I have less of it.
P2: Information does not abide to this law. E.g. if I give you information, I don't have less of it.
C: Therefore information is not physical. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is like the argument for independent Ideas in Plato's Parmenides. The Idea is said to be like the day. It doesn't matter how many different places partake in the day, the day loses nothing of itself. And no matter how many things partake in the Idea, it loses nothing of itself.

It seems that by the same arguments you’ve articulated, no two languages could share any meaning whatsoever, since the two languages are utterly different in their phenomenal information—and, as your given argument goes, for them to share the same meaning is for whatever so shares the same meaning to be indistinguishable phenomenally. But this would result in the conclusion that all translations are fully untrue in their correspondence to any meaning conveyed in the original language. — javra

That's right, my argument is that all interpretations are subjective. Because of this, no two interpretations are the same. So even two people interpreting the same statement in the same language get something different from it, they see different meaning in it.

I’ll argue that meaning itself has multiple layers such that, for example, the core meaning to “yes”, “da”, and “si” is identical to itself while there is additional meaning which, for instance, endows recognition of the specific language utilized to express the core referent of meaning. This, then, is noncontradictory to the reality of language translations (granting exceptions where meanings may overlap but will not be the same in different languages). — javra

The problem though, is that the same word has different meanings dependent on the context of usage. So you claim "the core meaning" of a word "is identical to itself". But what do you mean by this? There is no such thing as the core meaning, it is just an assumption that you make to support your claims. Each instance of usage has a particular meaning, and of course there are similarities, but to claim that there is a core meaning is just to claim that you could make some inductive conclusion concerning these similarities. Even if you could actually make such an inductive conclusion, like the authors of a dictionary do, where does that leave you? All you would do is create a descriptive rule about how the word is used. There's a big gap between being able to produce a descriptive rule about how a word is used, and the claim that a word has "a core meaning".

Herein lies the essential difference in our positions on "meaning". I do not conceive of information as semantic only, but also physical. Thanks very much for your comments, but we will have to agree to disagree on this matter. — Galuchat

Now you're showing less disagreement. I conceive of information as physical as well. So we agree here. But I also conceive of meaning as physical, and this is where we disagree. I think that you are attempting to create an unwarranted separation between information and meaning, in order to support your untenable premise that meaning only exists in minds.

The operation of the human mind consists of psychophysical (simultaneously mental and physical) processes. Whether I choose to focus on the mental or physical aspect (or both) depends entirely on the conceptual task at hand.

In fact, mental conditions and functions, and their anatomical and physiological correlates, are one of the best (or most complex) examples of the interaction of physical and semantic information. — Galuchat

The issue here is related to objects. I think you referred to psychophysical objects. We can identify, as Plato does, sensible objects and intelligible objects. We can also note that there is interaction between the two, and you might call this psychophysical processes. But this doesn't justify "psychophysical objects".

So if we attempt to understand psychophysical processes, we need to distinguish between the activities (as properties) of sensible objects, and the activities (properties) of intelligible objects, in order to develop this understanding. To mix these two together, claiming some type of vague psychophysical objects, when we are really referring to processes, is to invite category error. This conflation, and consequent category error is evident in concepts like "mental state", and "inter-subjective object"