Yes (2) requires an unchanging physical law. The error analysis is performed over a one month period. The "error rate" is derived from that one month period. In (2) the error rate is stated as "per second", instead of as "per second of that particular one month period". So there is a generalization, that whatever occurred "per second" in that one month period will occur "per second" in every second, in this is indicated by the generality of the statement "x per second". Therefore the derived error rate of "per second", is derived from the inductive conclusion (unchanging physical law) that what occurred "per second" in this one month period will continue to be the same throughout the passing of time. Simply put, you have taken what is true for one month, "x is the case in that month", and sated it as an unchanging physical law "x is the case", such that it now is a law for all time instead of just a description of what has occurred in that month.

This is your mistake. According to you, there are no types. — Wayfarer

Of course I allow for types, why would you think that I don't? But if two things are members of one type, that does not mean that the two are the same thing, it means that they are of the same type. The latter is a qualified "same", where "same" refers to the type, not the things themselves.

In your argument for information being non-physical, you do not qualify "same" in this way, you say the "same information", not "the same type of information". So you have used "same" in the unqualified way, the same. If, in your argument "same" does not mean the same in the unqualified sense, the argument fails. It fails because if the information is not the same in the unqualified sense, then differences in the information is implied, just like there are differences between two things of the same type. And, these differences may be the result of the physical medium. So the conclusion that information is non-physical cannot be drawn if you use "same" in this way.

Two instances of ‘a triangle’ are two instances of the same thing. — Wayfarer

That's clearly not true. A triangle drawn on one paper, and a triangle drawn on another paper are very obviously not two instances of the same thing, they are very different. If, by "the same thing" you are referring to the concept "triangle", then you must respect the fact that the physical representations on the paper are not instances of the concept itself, they are representations of the concept. This is fundamental to Platonism. So the physical triangles on the paper are not instances of one concept, they are two distinct representations of that concept

Apparently this simple fact is contradicted by your view. — Wayfarer

Calling this falsity a "simple fact" gets you nowhere. You would have done better to say that two distinct instances of "a triangle" are two examples of the same thing, the concept triangle. In this way, you allow that the concept referred to by "triangle" is a thing. But we then need to be careful not to confuse the physical representation, the instances of "a triangle" which are on the paper, with the concept itself.

There is no absolute sameness — Janus

There is absolute sameness, it's described by the law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This refers to the thing in relation to itself.

So, it's not true that A equal to A - it's only ever true that one particular instance of A is equal to A. — Wayfarer

To be equal to, and to be the same, is not the same thing. "Equal" refers to an equivalence of value, it is a mathematical term which relates quantity. This is where we have to be careful not to allow the arguments of mathematicians and logicians to mislead us. Some might argue that all qualities are reducible to quantities and therefore we can express "the same" as "equal". The problem though, is that even if this were true, that we could reduce all qualities to quantities and express "same" as "equal", this is not at all how "equal" is used by mathematicians. Mathematics allows that things which are not the same, are equal, we overlook certain differences to claim equality. Two apples is equal to two oranges in the sense of two. However, we know that the differences exist, so if we proceed to argue that "equal" means "same", we engage in self-deception because we already know that the differences exist and equal things are not the same. Clearly, "2+2" is not the same as "4", yet they are equal.

Does that mean that when we say that two balls are the same, in the sense that they have the same color and the same size, that we are wrong because the two balls occupy different positions in space? — Magnus Anderson

When you use "same" in this way, you use it in a way which is other than the way prescribed by the law of identity. It is not wrong to use "same" in this way, it is just a different way of using the same term, and that is common with most words. Where it becomes wrong is when someone equivocates to make an argument. That is my charge against Wayfarer's argument of the op, it relies on equivocation. It uses "same" in the sense of "similar", like your example of two balls, but the conclusion to the argument can only be made if "same" means the same in an absolute sense.

One and the same thing can be different at different points in time. For example, a man in his 60's can be very different from the man he was in his 20's. We wouldn't say that the young version of that man is an entirely different person than the old version of that man. — Magnus Anderson

This is why the sense of "same" which is defined by the law of identity is completely different from the other sense of "same" which is developed in relation to similar. The law of identity allows that one and the same thing may undergo changes through time, while continuing to be the same thing so long as the temporal continuity may be identified. Without the law of identity, a single object would necessarily be a different but similar object at each moment of time with each tiny change to it. Instead, we associate "sameness" with temporal continuity rather than similarity. So, we have two very distinct ways of using "same". The most common way, is that of temporal continuity, so that the object is the same object from day to day. Logicians, like apokrisis want to base "sameness" in similarity, so we must recognize that this is a completely different meaning of "same".

Conversely, two different things can be identical at different points in time. For example, a man and his clone are two different persons that are identical. We wouldn't say that they are one and the same person simply because they are identical. — Magnus Anderson

This is what Leibniz disputes with the "identity of indiscernibles". If they are in fact identical, in every aspect, then they are necessarily one and the same thing. To say that two different persons are identical is to overlook some differences which make them different persons, or else they are really one and the same person.

Anyway, the point I was clarifying, is Metaphysician Undiscovered's continual obfuscation of the meaning of the term 'the same': — Wayfarer

Actually, I am clarifying two distinct ways of using "same". And, I've already demonstrated that your argument of the op relies on equivocation between these two different ways, to make the conclusion that you do. You have not yet addressed this charge of equivocation, just continually reasserting that I am obfuscating, without addressing the matter of the two distinct ways of using "same".

Does a 100% similar = the same? And if not, how not? — apokrisis

Unless you didn't read my posts, you know I already answered this at least twice. 100% similar does not = the same. It cannot because this would be contradiction. I've made this clear to you already.

We are talking about a similarity with a lack of any actual difference. — apokrisis

This statement is contradictory. You might just as well ask me a question about a square circle. Just because you can say it, and ask the question doesn't mean that it's a coherent question If there is no difference, then we are not talking about similarity, we are talking about the same. Similar and the same are clearly not equivalent. Similar implies a difference. So, "similarity with a lack of any actual difference" is contradiction, plain and simple. "Similar" implies difference, and "lack of any actual difference" contradicts this.

Where I might disagree with MU is with his apparent claim that "the same" means "the one". If two things are the same that does not mean they aren't two things. Sameness is a relation and as such it exists "between" two things and not within a single thing. In order to say that two things are same they must first be two things i.e. distinct things. — Magnus Anderson

I disagree with this. What is expressed by the law of identity, is that a thing is the same as itself. There is no relation here between two distinct things, there is only a relation between a thing and itself. This is the crucial point of the law of identity, any relationship which allows us to say "the same" is necessarily a relationship between a thing and itself.

This is also expressed by Leibniz as the "identity of indiscernibles". If two things are said to have the exact same properties then they are necessarily one and the same thing. Some will disagree with the law of identity, as you may, but disagreement has extensive logical consequences

He's defining similarity to mean "the percentage of elements the two sets have in common". Thus, "100% similarity" means "the percentage of elements the two sets have in common is 100%" or in plain terms "the two sets have all of their elements in common". But that's not the standard definition. The standard definition of similarity, as Google can tell us, is "having a resemblance in appearance, character, or quantity, without being identical". Similarity, in other words, implies difference. But even if we accept his definition, it does not follow that "the same" is "the limit of the similar" or in plain terms "the value similarity can approach but never attain". The problem is created by his inability to fix his attention. — Magnus Anderson

Great. Glad you agree. — apokrisis

As I told apokrisis already, to define "similar" and "same" in such a way that two sets which are 100% similar are the same, while maintaining that they are two distinct sets and not one and the same set, is to use definitions which are inconsistent with the law of identity.

The problem which occurs with these definitions of "same" and "similar" which apokrisis introduces is that they still leave Wayfarer's argument unsound. Wayfarer's use of "same" cannot be replaced with 100% similar, for the reasons I have already indicated in this thread, so "same" in Wayfarer's argument really means "less than 100% similar". Once we replace "same" in Wayfarer's argument with "less than 100% similar, then the difference in the information value, no matter how slight it is, must be accounted for. The argument does not hold up because these differences may be attributable to physical differences.

So, in the case of 'the triangle', you are denying that a triangle is the same for you and Apokrisis - that because your idea of a triangle, is different from his idea of a triangle, that they're not two instances of the same thing? — Wayfarer

Correct, that's what I am saying, two distinct instances of a triangle is not two instances of the same thing. Nor are you and I, as two instances of human beings, two instances of the same thing. These are instances of similar things. The purpose of the law of identity, as stated by Aristotle, "a thing is the same as itself", is to prevent the sophistry of logical arguments which proceed by referring to two distinct things as two instances of the same thing.

For instance, a sophistic argument could be derived from the following.. If you and I have the same model of car, and I am allowed to refer to these two cars as two instances of the same thing, then it follows logically that your car is the same thing as my car. Therefore you should give me your car, because it is my car.

Because that is what you seem to keep saying, again and again and again, so it seems to me that you're the one participant in this debate who is 'arguing nonsense' which you have accused him of doing. — Wayfarer

I am just adhering to the firm ontological principles which form the basis for good epistemology. If you think that's nonsense, that's your opinion. However, the principle which you have stated above, allows that two distinct things can be referred to as "two instances of the same thing", just because they have been judged to be similar. Any reasonable person can see that this is where the nonsense really lies, in such principles as that, which allow for two distinct things to be called two instances of the same thing.

Sameness isn't something that can only be approached. It is something that is regularly attained. This is, in fact, why sameness is a perfectly meaningful term. The fact that we can think of infinite series where a value, such as sameness, is approached without ever being attained does not mean that every infinite series is of that kind. — Magnus Anderson

This is very true. Sameness, as described by the law of identity, allows for the temporal extension of existence. So the computer in front of me is the same computer which was in front of me two minutes ago. That is why "same" is a meaningful term, it is used to signify that one particular object is being referred to whether it is at the same time or not. It has nothing to do with similarity.

Another sense of "same" is derived from "similar", and this is what apokrisis is drawing from. But these are distinct meanings of "same" and equivocation is what is causing the problem here.

For any two things to be the same (sharing 100% of all properties and attributes) then doesn't that mean that for any two things to be the same they'd have to occupy the same space at the same time? Wouldn't that be impossible? — Harry Hindu

That's exactly the point, by the law of identity, "same" refers to one thing, and one thing only. The law of identity relates that thing to itself, saying a thing is the same as itself. But there are not two things which are the same as each other, there is one thing, which related to itself, is the same as itself. This is expressed by Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. If two things are said to have 100% properties the same, then they are necessarily one and the same thing. Calling them two things is a mistake, they were only identified as two distinct things until it was determined that they are one and the same.

Through a socratic dialogue, either with yourself or with others, which serves as a falsification method. Much like the correctness of a scientific theory is tested through particular experiments, we can test the correctness of a definition through particular examples. Say your first attempt to define triangle-ness is "a plane with three angles". I falsify this by pointing out that this shape is a plane with three angles but is not a triangle. So we must add to the definition that the sides must be straight. Then, I might add the property "red" to the definition, and you falsify this by pointing out that some triangles which are not red remain triangles. So we remove "red" from the definition, and the result is "a plane with three angles and straight sides." If it cannot be falsified any more, then we have obtained the perfect definition. — Samuel Lacrampe

What you have described here, is us discussing and agreeing on a description. If this is what the concept is, then we have created the concept through this discussion. I don't see how this supports your claim that the concept already exists within us, prior to this discussion. The fact that we are both described as changing what we already thought was part of the concept, indicates that what was already in us was not the concept, but something different which needed to be changed, in order that the concept could exist within us.

But... notice that we both seem certain about the correctness of the examples used to falsify the definitions. Where does this knowledge come from? It must come from the concept which we already had. As such, the exercise was never to find the concept, but to express it correctly with words. In other words, we all have the implicit knowledge of concepts, and we just try to obtain explicit knowledge from this. This explicit knowledge is useful to deduce universal truths such as "no triangle can fill up a circle", because we now know that all triangles have straight sides where as no circles do. — Samuel Lacrampe

Now you have lost me. I cannot follow what you are arguing here. You speak about "examples used to falsify the definitions". I assume that these examples are drawings on a paper or some other medium, or in some cases a verbal description. These examples are constructs, created by the person drawing, doing the demonstration. So when an understanding is produced in this way, why do you conclude that it comes from a concept already within? I see that the person must have the capacity to understand the demonstrations, but this is not the same as saying that the concept already exists within the person. To me it appears like you are referring to the capacity to understand as "the concept within". But the capacity to understand the concept is not the same as having the concept actually existing within.

So why would to decide to have a discussion with strangers if there is a possibility that none of the words used have the same meaning? — Samuel Lacrampe

It's the same reason why we communicate with anyone, in general. We want something from them, or want to give them something. That is the reason behind communication, we have intentions. So for instance, if I want you to help me with something, and you are a total stranger who speaks a different language, I will try to communicate with you despite the fact that we don't understand each other's words.

Actually, inasmuch as a 'better' implies a 'best'; and a 80% mark implies a 100% mark, then a 'more correct' implies a 'fully correct' or 'ideal'. This is necessary. If the ideal does not exist, then neither does the 'more correct' in any objective sense. As such, if you believe that no ideal definition for triangle-ness exist, then it follows that the definition "three angles" is no more correct than "four angles", which is absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe

Exactly, this is the point I am making. Concepts do not exist in any "objective sense". They are property of subjects and so are subjective. The "more correct" doesn't exist in an objective sense, it is something agreed upon by the various subjects. Some call this inter-subjectivity, but inter-subjectivity doesn't create a true objectivity. But "correctness" is created by inter-subjective agreement, so "three angles" is more correct than "four angles" because it is what is agreed upon by convention. This is what constitutes "correctness", what is agreed upon by convention, not some "objective" concept.

This claim sounds ad hoc. Can you back it up? If I obtained a 100% mark on a math exam, then my answers have reached the ideal, and I cannot better myself on that exam. — Samuel Lacrampe

Your example is of one particular math exam. Just because you got 100% on one exam, this does not mean that you have the ideal understanding of mathematics. You have a lot more to learn.

You seem to be missing the point apokrisis. "The same" implies one thing, the same thing, that's the point of the law of identity, to ensure that we are talking about the one and only same thing, the very same thing, when we designate something as "the same". On the other hand, "similar" implies two distinct things. Therefore "same" does not represent an ideal limit to similarity, it is a matter of indicating one thing, the same thing, while "similar" indicates distinct things. In no way can "same" be reduced to a form of similarity without equivocating to a meaning of "same" which is inconsistent with the law of identity. Give it up, you are only arguing nonsense.

So you are presuming that dichotomies are dualities and not in fact dichotomies? I see where you are going wrong.

Dichotomies describe complementary limits on being. Thus they talk about the being that lies in-between two opposing limits of the possible.

You are then treating the limits on the possible as the actuality which has the being. Rookie error. — apokrisis

No, A dichotomy is a separation between two things. You are the one making the error assuming that a dichotomy is two limits of the same thing.

Anyway, it's likely the word can be used in different ways, but this is all irrelevant. As I said, what is relevant is that "same" expresses an exclusion of difference while "similar" expresses necessarily, difference. They are categorically different and cannot be "complementary limits" of the same thing, that would be contradiction.

So back to the 100% similar. Why are you so reluctant to admit that this is no different than any claim about "the same". A complete lack of difference could only be a complete presence of the same. — apokrisis

As I told you, I really did not know what you meant by "100% similar". "Similar" implies necessarily, some degree of difference. Therefore 100% similar implies some difference. You only contradict yourself now, when you say that "100% similar" means a complete lack of difference. It is impossible that similarity lacks difference, by way of contradiction. As I suspected, what you mean by 100% similar is nothing but contradictory nonsense. That's why I couldn't answer that question, I was afraid that what you meant was some such contradictory nonsense. Now my fears have been confirmed, what you mean is contradictory nonsense.

But you must avoid admitting this otherwise your sophic house of cards collapses. — apokrisis

Simply put, if I know something as contradictory I will not accept it. However, I know from experience that you have no qualms about accepting contradiction. You seem to believe that reality is fundamentally contradictory, so you readily accept such contradictions, and spout them out at will. I refuse to follow you.

The macro-domain, Metaphysician Undercover, as opposed to the micro-domain of quantum mechanics, as mentioned by ↪tom. Much effort has gone into and is going into unification. — jorndoe

OK, so back to my questions then. What is it within the macro-domain, which relativity is supposed to provide the most accurate description of?

Where is the difficulty in recognising that "the same" is the idealised limit to "the similar"? — apokrisis

The "same" and "similar" express two distinct things. One excludes difference while the other includes difference, so the two are logically dichotomous. "The same" is not an idealized limit of "similar", it is a distinct category, the category of no-difference whereas similar refers to things which are different. There are two distinct categories here, different things (similar), and not different (same thing). Notice that the former implies a multitude, more than one thing, while the latter implies one. They are distinct categories.

Why are you obfuscating the matter with your unsound sophistry? — apokrisis

I am adhering to sound principles. Those individuals, such as yourself, who would place "the same" in the category of "similar", when "similar" necessarily implies difference, and "same" necessarily excludes difference, are the ones who obfuscate this issue through category mistake, and proceed to produce sophistic arguments based in this category error.

If things are 100% similar, are they the same? And if things are 99% similar, are they nearly the same? — apokrisis

I really do not know what you mean by "100% similar". Similar implies that there is difference, and same dictates that there is no difference. Therefore whatever you mean by 100% similar, it cannot mean "the same", without contradiction.

Your entire (wasted) effort in this thread has been about a completely different subject, namely, the principle of individuation. — Wayfarer

Your argument, to paraphrase, is that if the same information is conveyed through different physical media, then information is something distinct from the physical medium. So you claim that the same information is conveyed through different physical media, therefore information is distinct from the physical medium.

If it is the case, as I have argued, that similar information, rather than, the same information is conveyed through different physical media, then it follows that your conclusion, that information is distinct from the physical medium, is an unsound conclusion. I believe that I have successfully demonstrated in this thread, that the information is similar, rather than the same. Your response, and apokrisis' response has been that this is an insignificant difference, a difference which doesn't make a difference.

However, it clearly is a difference, and in this case the difference is significant because we must place the thing referred to, information, into the category of things which are "similar" to each other, rather than "the same". Any difference whatsoever necessitates the category of "similar", because "the same" excludes any difference. This is the same category where we place physical particulars similar but not the same. So your argument that information is not physical has been proven to be false. Furthermore, since information is placed in the same category as physical particulars, we should proceed now to consider the probability of information being physical.

Imagine yourself you are the first human in earth and you know nothing about it, you are trying to learn how to move and you failed alot of times, then you understand the "secret of moving" and you don't fall, from that experience you think you will never fall, you are now moving from a place to another and then you see a a really big hole, you know nothing about gravity and from experience you think that there's no way to fall from your new way of walking, you try to walk on it then you fall, then you gain another experience and that is you can fall even if you discovered a new way to move, from this you understand that even if you understand something you can fail on it and this is all thanks to observation. — Jalal1002

Ever think that you might have to go back even beyond the first human being? Animals already knew the "secret of moving" before there were humans, and they had also developed a fear of falling as well. Do you think that animals other than human beings are engaged in "observation"?

We would both draw different triangles. I am just clarifying, and adhering to the meaning of "the same" which is stipulated by the law of identity, and which also is necessary to adhere to, in order to produce a sound deductive argument. You are obfuscating the meaning of "the same" appealing to "similar" as if it were "the same", in order to put forth an unsound argument as if it were sound. That's why I accused you of sophistry.

Do you? How odd. — Banno

Yes, I've read that in quite a number of different places. I thought it was odd too when I first came across this. Why do you think that it is odd?

Simply not true. You might express it one way, and I another, but there is no room for difference. You’ve been arguing this useless distinction for hundreds of posts. — Wayfarer

Actually, Samuel and I compared our definitions of "triangle", and they were obviously different. Samuel used "flat surface" while I used "plane". I mentioned three angles and Samuel did not. Therefore it is quite clear that there is a difference here. And despite your insistence that such a distinction is useless, that's just a matter of opinion. So, in your opinion this difference is useless, and in my opinion it is useful. In my opinion the difference is useful because it may be referred to, to refute the premise of your argument. You do not want to accept the fact that your argument is based on an unsound premise so you claim that the difference is not a difference at all, and cannot be a difference because this would shatter your faith. Your opinion amounts to a self-deception of contradiction, that there is a difference which is not a difference. So be it.

Where? Plato was hardly concerned with individuation. — Wayfarer

My example was "The Symposium". Each individual, each member of the group, gives a different account of what the word "love" means. But this same theme is consistent throughout many of Plato's dialogues. You can find a similar discussion of "just" in The Republic, and of "knowledge" in The Theatetus. It is quite clear that what Plato was demonstrating is that different individuals have different ideas which are associated with the same word. You seem very insistent that there is no room for difference here, when in actuality difference is unavoidable.

So, if you or Metaphysician Undercover think there is something captured by the A-series but not by the B-series, set it out; but if all you have to say is "you lose the tense", then you have nothing to say. — Banno

I don't general discuss time in these terms, A-series, and B-series. I think "series" already implies an unjustified assumption, as we seem to experience time as continuous, not as a series. I find that past present and future are much more useful descriptive terms when discussing time.

How can you ask such questions? Again, it seems you do not understand physics. — Banno

A description implies that there is something real which is being described. Jorndoe stated that relativity provided the most accurate description in "this domain". I understand that most physicists do not believe that time is something real, so I was asking jorndoe what is the thing, "in this domain" which is being described by relativity.

I know the special theory of relativity quite well. Your claim is that "relativity is the most accurate description to date within this domain". Which domain is that? If you think that it is the most accurate description in the domain of time, then I think that this is quite clearly a false statement. Within the domain of time, we describe things as past, present, and future. The present is understood as the point of division between the past and the future. Special relativity asserts that there is ambiguity with respect to this division between past and future. Any description which introduces ambiguity to a point which was previously clear, cannot be considered to be more accurate. Therefore relativity is not the most accurate description in this domain.

However, that they can change doesn't entail they will change in a way that destroys the accuracy of the clock. So, tell me when they will change, and how they will change so that the accuracy of the clock is destroyed. — fdrake

If you allow the possibility of change, then you cannot derive the conclusion that the error rate will stay the same for that extended period of time. The possibility of change, and the claim that the error rate will stay the same are incompatible, they are contradictory. To insist that the error rate will stay the same is to say that change is impossible.

My argument therefore, does not require proof that the rate will change. This is the point which you do not seem to grasp. You keep insisting that I need to demonstrate that the rate will change, to make my argument, but that is not the case. Because your assertion requires of necessity, that the rate will stay the same, all I need to do is to demonstrate that change is possible to refute your claim. Therefore you cannot assert that the rate will stay the same if you also state that change is possible. This is contradiction. You might want to adjust your assertion to reflect this, by saying that it is possible that the rate will stay the same. And with some evidence you might claim that it is probable that the rate will stay the same.

Nor is it an extrapolation to translate the error rate to a different numerical scale. — fdrake

You have translated the error rate to a different temporal scale, not a different numerical scale. You have gone from an error rate derived from one month of application to an extrapolated error rate of 100 millions years of application.

It isn't an extrapolation to say if nature keeps working as it does then the clock will. — fdrake

Yes, that's exactly what an extrapolation is. So this is your principle of extrapolation then: "things will continue for 100 million years, in the same way that they have done for the last month". This premise, or assumption, makes the extrapolation is valid. The question is whether or not this premise is sound. My claim is that the concept of dark energy is evidence that things will probably not continue for 100 million years in the same way which they have for the last month, so the assumption is not sound. Notice that I have produced evidence, the concept of dark energy, and this evidence puts probability on my side. If you want to bring probability to your side, you need to produce some evidence yourself, and refute my claim of evidence.

An extrapolation is an extension of an analysis outside the data range for which it was estimated. — fdrake

Check your facts. Any extension outside the range of known facts is an extrapolation. Your "estimate" is already an extrapolation.

Besides, if you admit that your claim is based in estimation, you've forfeited any claim to necessity in your conclusion.

How so? How is relativity a description? What does it describe, and why do you claim that it is the most accurate description of that thing?

It isn't an extrapolation, it's a rounding of the error rate translated to a timescale that denotes the sheer precision of the measurement to a lay auidience. See tom's post. — fdrake

It is an extrapolation. Your changing of the scale, "translating" the "timescale" is by definition an extrapolation. You proceed from known values to estimate values which lie outside the range of the known. That is extrapolation.

Sure they mean something to me, just as inches, meters and light-years mean something to me. They are units of measurement. Hours, days, and years are all units of measurement, too, not units of time.
An hour is the change of position of the small hand of clock. Days and years are changes in the position of the Earth. — Harry Hindu

OK then, what does a metre, or an inch, mean to you if it is not the length of some thing? And what does an hour mean to you if it's not the length of some thing?

Sure, we can measure a meter by using inches and measure light-years by using kilometers. — Harry Hindu

But we do not measure using inches, we measure using a measuring instrument with one inch increments marked on it.

Measuring time is comparing different changes. You never measure time. You measure change. — Harry Hindu

That's not true at all. For example, the rotation of the earth is my measuring stick, it provides me with one day increments. I count the rotations, one, two, three, four, five, and conclude that five days have passed. I have measured time, five days. I am not comparing different changes. I am observing one particular change which I assume to be constant, and I am using that change to measure time. To verify or falsify my assumption that the change is constant I may compare it to other changes. This validates the accuracy of my measurement, but it has nothing to do with the question of whether or not I am measuring time, it relates to whether or not my measurements are accurate.

If the measurement error analysis in the paper isn't wrong, that means the 1 second in 100 million years isn't wrong. Since that corresponds to an error rate of about 3 * 10 ^ -16, which was derived within the month. The unit of the error rate is in seconds per second... Take the reciprocal, voila! — fdrake

You don't seem to understand the issue fdrake. You haven't disclosed your principle of extrapolation, and this is what validates your extrapolation. Suppose I can eat one hot dog in thirty seconds. This is a rate of one hot dog per thirty seconds. You extrapolate and claim "therefore I can eat 120 hot dogs in one hour". Do you see the problem with this type of extrapolation? You need a principle whereby you can assert that the rate which was obtained in the short term will continue over the long term. Without that principle your extrapolation is just a baseless assertion.

We've had scientists come along and provide a better explanation of time since then (does Einstein ring a bell?) — Harry Hindu

The idea that Einstein provides a "better" explanation of time is what is laughable. You define "better" in relation to what, more useful, or more truthful?

We measure change by comparing one change to another. We don't measure time. We measure change. Time is the measurement of change. — Harry Hindu

Of course we measure time. Do the words "hour", "day", "year", have no meaning to you? These refer to units of time. You can validate that unit of time by referring to a physical change, but this does not mean that the words refer to the physical change rather than the unit of time. And, in referring to those physical changes, you will see that each of those units of time is measured by those physical changes.

We measure change with time, yes, but as a said, any measuring tool must be itself measurable or else it is meaningless. So if we take time, and use it to measure change, as you suggest, we must also be able to measure time or else "time" is just a meaningless word. Then all of our measurements of change, since they are measured with time, are also meaningless.

Can you tell me how their combination entails:

(11) The measurement error analysis of the caesium-133 clock and the optical lattice clock are wrong. — fdrake

I didn't say that the measurement error analysis of the caesium-133 clock is wrong. I said your extrapolation is wrong. The measurement error is for a one month period. You extrapolate this to a 100 million year period. You base this extrapolation on the following principle: "the universe will still be in the same regime of energy distribution for billions of years". My argument is that the uncertainties involved with the concept of dark energy indicate that such a claim is unsound, and therefore your extrapolation is unprincipled.

But what criteria is used to determine that one definition is more correct than the other? I answer that the criteria is the concept, which is the same in all of us. — Samuel Lacrampe

This is very difficult for me to grasp. I have one definition of "triangle", and you have another. We want to determine the correct definition of "triangle". You say that we turn to "the concept" which is already within us, and which is the same within all of us. But I don't see that concept within me, all I see is my inclination to define the term the way I have, and a willingness to make some changes to my definition if necessary. If I believe that I understand the word well, I am only willing to make small changes, accidental changes. But when I recognize that I don't understand the word very well at all, I'm willing to make substantial changes, essential changes. How do I access the concept within me, such that I can determine which changes need to be made?

You did not refute my argument that if all words can have different meanings for each individual, then we get infinite regress because all definitions are made of words. — Samuel Lacrampe

The meaning of words is not necessarily derived from other words. That is a false premise. We can get the meaning of words from physical demonstration. There is a word for this, it's called "ostensive". So your claim of infinite regress is not justified.

This does not prove that individuals necessarily have different concepts. — Samuel Lacrampe

What Plato gave us is a clear, ostensive, demonstration that different individuals have different concepts for the same word. If you are inclined, as I am, you can go onward to discover that there are differences between all individuals, as to how they understand the same word. Some of the differences are very significant, some of the differences are very insignificant.

Since these differences are seen to exist for all words, we can make the inductive conclusion that individuals have different concepts for the same words. Of course, you can choose the position that inductive reason never proves anything "necessarily", and reject this conclusion if that is what you desire. However, I suggest that if you have the will to understand the nature of reality you should accept this as a fact, and move onward. Failure to do so will just put an unnecessary restriction on your mind.

Do you not agree that if I said my definition of the concept of triangle was "four angles", then it would be incorrect? It is pretty much in the name, that "triangles" have "three angles". And an incorrect definition implies that there exists a correct definition. — Samuel Lacrampe

We determine that a particular definition is "incorrect", based on the assumption that there is an ideal definition. The ideal is the best, the most perfect, and need not be something existent, it is simply the assumption of a goal, strive for the best. Assuming that there is an ideal inspires us to always seek a better conception, knowing that we've never actually arrived at the ideal.

In common practise we proceed using a concept which is less than ideal, but adequate for our purposes. So despite the fact that you and I have differences between our individual concepts of triangle, we ignore these differences as insignificant, accidental, and allow that these concepts are both correct. They are "correct" in relation to pragmatic principles, meaning that each one is sufficient to serve the purpose. However, any one of us could appeal to "the ideal", and argue that since the concept which I hold, or the concept which you hold, is not the ideal, it is incorrect.

Your entire argument depends on the premise that meanings are always different for every individual.
For the sake of argument, let's suppose that our definitions are different to start with. As you said yourself here, "we discover these differences, and attempt to correct them through discussion, communication", thereby making it possible to agree on one definition or meaning for words. Once this is achieved, then concepts become one and the same, by the same law of identity. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't agree with the conclusion here. I think that the ideal is never achieved, and this is what inspires us to always better ourselves in our understanding. We agree because it is pragmatic, and this allows us to proceed with those actions which are dependent on those concepts. Agreement, compromise, and proceeding despite differences, does not necessitate the conclusion that the concepts are "one and the same". If the concepts are one and the same by the law of identity, then the ideal has been achieved. But the nature of the human being, and the imperfections of the material existence of human beings denies the possibility that human beings can achieve the ideal. The fact that we will never reach the ideal need not discourage us, it only encourages us to keep on bettering ourselves.

If you want to use the word 'proof' in that bizarre way, then go ahead. There's no point in discussing it further. — andrewk

That's so childish: "you have to use the words my way, or I don't want to talk to you". Is "compromise" not in your vocabulary?

Really, I think you're just upset because I demonstrated that your position is contradictory. Now look what you've done. First, you say that an argument must proceed from a clear definition. Then, when I define "proof", and make such an argument proving that you contradict yourself, you decide that you do not like my definition of "proof". Your hypocritical actions are just proving my point, which is that there must be a method to determine how terms ought to be defined. And, that this type of reasoning, which makes these determinations, is just as important as the reasoning which proceeds from these determinations.

SO where will you go with this - do you agree with McTaggert's argument that time is not real? If so - well, I will answer that later. — Banno

I don't know McTaggart's argument, but I believe that time is real. I base this on the knowledge that there is a real difference between future and past.

That's true. Similarly, if we have no evidence that God exists that does not mean that God does not exist. Nonetheless, in the absence of evidence that God exists, we have no choice, if we have some intellectual integrity, but to act as if God does not exist. — Magnus Anderson

"Evidence" is a difficult concept. Some people see all sorts of evidence for God, while others will insist that the same things are not evidence at all. What determines whether the things seen are evidence or not? It is the way that the things are looked at. So there might be a group of things, and you point to those things as evidence of X. I just see them as that group of things, and not evidence of any X. You must explain to me how these things are evidence of X in order that I will apprehend them as such. Nevertheless, they are still evidence of X, regardless of how I perceive them, so long as someone else perceives them as evidence of X.

But it isn't; they are truth functional equivalent; this is just your failure to understand relativistics — Banno

"Truth functional equivalent". What does that mean? I happen to know that equivalent and the same are not the same thing. 2+2 is equivalent to 4, but not the same as four. So if you claim that a spatial separation is equivalent to a temporal separation, "equivalent" does not mean that there is no difference between them.

We resolved that already. Arguments can be proofs or dialectics. Proofs have to meet that higher standard of definition. Dialectics do not. The Aristotelian argument in the OP is a dialectic, not a proof. I thought that was all agreed. If not, which part do you disagree with? — andrewk

There you go again with your insistence on particular definitions, wanting to define terms in ways other than how they are used in reality. So long as an argument is sound, it is a proof. So why are you saying that there is a type of argument, the dialectical argument, which cannot be a proof? That's contradiction. There is nothing essential to the definition of "proof" which dictates that a particular type of argument, so long as it is sound, is not a proof. You are clearly biased toward one particular type of proof, thinking for some reason, that other proofs, such as dialectical proofs, are not real proofs.

Two events separated by space, but occurring a the same time. Is that different to two events separated by time, but occurring in the same place? — Banno

Yes, I think it's quite obvious that there is a big difference between these two. Prior/posterior is very different from here/there, because the concept of causation is dependent on the former.

You're entitled to that view. I think you are taking too wide an interpretation of 'meaningless'. Science is useful and it is also beautiful, to those that understand it. You may not be in a position to find it beautiful but there is no question that you find it useful. If you don't also find it meaningful, be content that it is useful. — andrewk

Oh, don't get me wrong, I find science to be meaningful, and beautiful, as well as useful. But I believe all these things are dependent on context.

You are forgetting how that discussion arose. It has nothing to do with dismissing any activity. You claimed that the proliferation of interpretations of QM imply that QM's definitions are nebulous. My response was that interpretations talk about things that QM does not even seek to address, and that they are completely different activities, not that one is more important than the other. To complain that QM does not address the issues with which interpretations concern themself is like complaining because biology tells us nothing about how stars are formed. — andrewk

No, you are the one forgetting how the discussion arose, only going back part way, and not to the beginning. What I took issue with was your claim that a good argument requires clear and concise definitions, rather than demonstrating the meaning of words through examples. You claimed that the latter form of argumentation, demonstrating meaning through examples, required a leap of faith, that the words actually have a meaning which could be used in reasoning.

You gave QM as an example of a science with clear definitions in comparison with the nebulous definitions which are derived from philosophical works like Aristotle's which demonstrate meaning through examples of usage. I made no complaint, but I confirmed your statement of "completely different activities". My claim was that one of these forms of reasoning is not more important than the other, and each, to be meaningful is dependent on the other. So I'll reassert my point. To dismiss one of these types of reasoning, that which speculates and reasons about the meaning of descriptive terms through the use of examples, as inadequate for reasoning about the nature of the universe, is a mistake.

It is a mistake because to understand the nature of anything requires both of these forms of reasoning. The one proceeds from clear definitions. The other determines whether the definitions correspond with reality. To proceed from clear definitions is pointless if the definitions don't describe reality. So we have to turn to the reality of how the terms are actually used in describing things to determine whether the definitions are accurate or not. If one produces a clear definition of a word like "potential", and proceeds to make a logical argument based on this definition, the logical argument is useless if the word potential cannot be actually used in this way to describe anything real. That is why we must turn to examples of usage, in which the terms are used to describe different aspects of reality, to determine whether the definitions being used represent anything real.

But, yes, the oil that greases social interactions is distilled from the faeces of male bovines. — Baden

Huh, distilled bullshit? What is produced when bullshit is distilled? I think what is at issue here is that a complete stranger might ask you a very personal question (how are your?). If you are completely uninclined to tell that complete stranger anything personal, you shoot the shit and answer with something like "fine", "not bad" etc.. Otherwise you might actually tell that stranger something personal. The choice is yours. Most opt for the impersonal reply.

It's also not clear that what the non-natural world would be. — Hanover

I think it's "supernatural" which is used to refer to what is outside the natural. Whether there is anything which is truly supernatural, or this is just an imaginary category, is another issue.

I guess the correct question here is whether the human/nature distinction is a useful one. I think saying that human productions are artificial does not mean that humans are not part of nature. — T Clark

Right, that's what I just explained to Harry, that human beings make artificial things does not mean that human beings are not part of nature. As for the question of whether the natural/artificial distinction is useful, I believe that it is. It is useful because it gives us an approach to the nature of intention, purpose. Intent and purpose is evident in artificial things, and since it is essential to them, it becomes a defining feature of artificial things. On the other hand, intent and purpose are not evident in natural things so the purpose of the thing cannot be used as a defining feature of the thing.

But human beings are natural things themselves. It makes no sense to call the things that they create, "artificial". — Harry Hindu

Why do you claim this? It doesn't make sense to me, and appears like a claim that what is true of the creator is also true of the creation. And that's not sound logic. So if human beings are a product of nature, how does this preclude the possibility that the things which human beings create are artificial? All that is necessary is to understand the human being as a boundary between the natural and the artificial.

As I have already pointed out to Apo, iron and other heavy elements didn't exist prior to the stars making them by pressing lighter elements together in their centers and then ejecting those elements out into the universe when they explode. If the new material that stars create isn't artificial, then why are the new materials that humans make artificial? — Harry Hindu

Things produced by human beings are artificial by definition. To be artificial means to have been produced by human beings, and this is why things produced by stars are not said to be artificial. An important aspect of "the artificial" is that it is created with intent, a reason, purpose, and that the intent is attributable to the human beings which make it.

Time is a measurement of change. — Harry Hindu

This is not a good description of time. Even the thing which is used as a measure, must itself be capable of being measured, or else the measurement made by that thing is arbitrary and meaningless. As Aristotle indicated, in one way, time is what measures, and in another way time is what is measured. Therefore your conclusion that just because one is not using time to measure something then one is not experiencing time, is not a valid conclusion because you neglect the fact that one could be experiencing time without measuring it. The fact that something like time can be measured does not necessitate the conclusion that it must be measured in order to be experienced. Measurement is just a special type of experience.

The universe is either ordered in certain aspects or it is not. — Magnus Anderson

Sure, but the issue is to answer this question of whether or not it is. If something appears to us as disordered, this does not mean that it necessarily is disordered, because it may be the case that we just haven't developed the means for figuring out the order.

This cannot be. See my previous response above about infinite regress. If my concept of a triangle is not the same as yours, then how could we ever (1) discover this, and (2) correct it to be the same? I could say that "triangle" = "plane" + "three straight sides", but this assumes that the concepts "plane", "three", "straight", and "sides" are the same in both of us, otherwise, we are groundless. — Samuel Lacrampe

We already discovered that my concept of triangle is not the same as yours. Mine included "three angles", yours did not. We discover these differences, and attempt to correct them through discussion, communication.

But this is where your position proves to be nonsense, because you claim that we could not communicate unless our concepts are the same. See, you have things backward. It is through communication that we establish consistency, and sameness between our concepts, the sameness doesn't exist prior to communication as a prerequisite for communication, it is produced from communication.

Sometimes, as is evident on this forum, we disagree, and do not ever establish this consistency. If I am unwilling change my concept to match yours, and you are unwilling as well, and there is no compromise, we will continue to hold a different understanding of the same word. This is quite common.

Your assertion here, "this cannot be", is nonsense.

I don't disagree with what you wrote, but it does not refute my claim. If Plato's intent is to determine the real nature of concepts, then the concept must be the same in all minds. Otherwise, even if successful, each person would come up with a different result according to their own concepts, and the dialogue would be pointless. — Samuel Lacrampe

Again, this doesn't make any sense. Consider Plato's Symposium. Socrates sits around with a group of people, and they each make a speech as to what "love" means for themselves. Why do you think that "love" must mean the very same thing to each of them or else the dialogue would be pointless? The very opposite of this is what is really the case. If it meant the same thing to each of them, then the dialogue would be pointless. Instead, each person gets to hear every other person's opinion as to what "love" is, and they have the option to adjust their opinions accordingly. Therefore the dialogue is meaningful. "Meaningful" implies much meaning.

That is right, I make no distinction between "meaning" and "concept", such that a word pointing to concept x is the same as a word meaning x. That is my position. As such, you cannot disagree that meanings are identical in all minds if the definitions coincide. — Samuel Lacrampe

The problem is, that definitions do not coincide. We already determined this with our definitions of "triangle", yours is different from mine. Accordingly, "x", which is what is assigned to "what the word means", is different for you from what it is for me. That is what Plato demonstrated.

Now, by the law of identity we cannot assign "x" to what the word means, because there is no such individual, or particular thing as what the word means if it is different for you and me. The word means something different dependent on context, whose mind it's in, under what circumstances, etc., so we can't assign a single identifier "x" to all these different things.

Where does this leave the concept? Either we conclude that there is no such thing as the concept, or we conclude, as I do, that a concept is specific, particular to the individual, and specifically formulated for each instance of the usage of the word. In other words, each time that a word is used, there is a meaning, or definition which is specific to that very instance of usage.

Basically correct. If you want to talk about dark energy, you have to be able to accept solutions to Einstein's field equations as correct and the web of theory and experiment around them. Dark energy only makes sense as a concept on the background of the acceleration of the expansion of the universe; and is contained in a few explanations of it. — fdrake

Your claim of "basically correct" is nothing more than an assertion. So you support your assertion that the measured activity of the caesium clock will be precisely the same in 100 million years, as it is today, with the assertion that the laws of the universe, as stated by human beings today, are "basically correct". What does "basically" mean here? Does it mean that some parts of our understanding may be incorrect, but the part which relates the activities of the caesium atom to a hundred million years of time passage, is precisely correct?

Your argument so far has been based on an equivocation of the following: the beliefs of scientists and the practice which generates them; usually called science, and the phenomena they study; usually called nature. If a pattern is observed in nature, and it becomes sufficiently theorised and experimentally corroborated, it will be a scientific law. Note that nature behaved that way first, the scientists adjusted their beliefs and inquiries to track the phenomenon. — fdrake

I don't see any support for your claim that I have equivocated. I see however that you have fallen victim to two distinct unsound premises. First, you assume that if an activity of nature has been observed, as following a pattern then the description of this activity is necessarily correct. Second, you believe that one can proceed without that firm (correct) understanding of the activity, just an understanding of the pattern, to claim that the pattern will remain the same for an extended period of time.

You want to have it so that the changes in the beliefs of scientists over the ages implies that nature itself has changed over that time. — fdrake

This is a misunderstanding. What I am saying is that changes in the beliefs of scientists, over time, indicate that what scientists belief at any particular time, is not the "correct" understanding. You claim that what scientists believe now, is all of a sudden "basically correct", despite the fact that this has never been the case in the past. On what principles do you claim such a change? This is totally inconsistent with what we have observed, the believes of the scientific community change. How do you support this claim, that scientist now have a correct understanding?

You keep attempting to justify the idea that assigning a small measurement error to an optical lattice clock is unjustified because the laws of nature possibly will change. Besides being an invalid argument - the laws of nature would have to change , not just possibly change, in order to invalidate the current error analysis of the clock, you're using the above equivocation to justify it. — fdrake

Now you are equivocating. What do you mean by "laws of nature" here? As I said already, "laws" refer to descriptions produced by human beings. We know the laws will change because we know that human beings do not have a complete and precise understanding of the universe. So it is not the case that the laws of nature will possibly change, it is the case that they will change.

You seem to be equivocating from the human descriptions to the activities described. But we are talking about the human descriptions here, the laws, and their accuracy. You are assuming that the description is necessarily correct. That's your first unsound premise.

You thus have to show that the laws of nature (read - how nature behaves) will change in a way that invalidates the error analysis of the clock within 100 million years. — fdrake

This is untrue. To make my argument I don't have to show anything about "how nature behaves". What I need to show is how human beings behave. We are discussing the human activity of measurement, not "how nature behaves". This is where you are loosing track of the argument, you assume the argument is about how nature behaves, not about how human beings behave. Human beings have demonstrated over and over again throughout history, that at one time they believe to have a correct, and accurate measuring device, only to find out later that it wasn't as accurate as they thought. This is especially true in the case of measuring time.

very suspicious to me that something you could have understood by reading the papers thoroughly and researching the things you didn't know to enough standard to interpret the results, but now you're attempting to invalidate a particular error analysis of a clock by either the cosmological claim that the way nature operates will change in some time period or undermining the understanding that scientists have of reality in general. Engage the papers on their own terms, show that the laws of the universe will change (not will possibly change), or stop seeing nails because you have a hammer! — fdrake

As I said the laws of the universe will change. Human knowledge of the universe is incomplete. Things such as spatial expansion, dark energy, and dark matter, provide undisputable evidence of this fact. Human knowledge of the universe is incomplete. If you are not ready to face this fact, then that is not my problem, it's yours.

An interpretation of QM is not about working out what is meant by the things QM says. Those things are beyond question, as all QM does is make predictions about observations. An interpretation of QM is about speculating about the things that QM does not talk about. It is essentially proposing a set of metaphysical hypotheses that is consistent with QM. — andrewk

This explanation of what QM says is nebulous. Making mathematical predictions about observations is doing nothing more than saying that if we put two groups of two things together, then we'll have four things. Unless we know something about those things which we are dealing with, then the mathematics with all of its axioms and definitions, is meaningless. And to know something about those things, we refer to descriptions rather than definitions.

Understanding the mathematics without understanding the thing which the mathematics is being applied to, does not constitute a complete understanding. I can predict that the sun will rise tomorrow, and even the time at which it will rise, without understanding anything about the solar system. The predictions are derived from definitions. To understand the thing which the prediction is concerned with, requires descriptive speculation, and this is a hit and miss operation, with much trial and error. The use of this trial and error activity, along with its descriptive terms, and the assessment of this process, is just as important toward understanding the object, as is the use of mathematical definitions.

So it is wrong to dismiss an activity which is an attempt to understand, as less important, or not as reliable, as an activity which uses clear definitions, simply because it takes into account the many different ways in which specific words are used rather than adhering to clear definitions. They are simply aimed at different aspects of understanding. Mathematics and predictions are used to understand the activities of things. Descriptive words are used to understand the things themselves.

Because you talked about the central importance of consistency - ie checking out that Aristotle uses the term with the same definition/meaning throughout. That's irrelevant. — Agustino

If there is no consistency in word usage then there is no conceptual structure, and the work is unintelligible. It's quite clear to me that consistency is extremely relevant. If you think that you could read any material, philosophy, science, fiction, or whatever, in which the author does not maintain some degree of consistency in word usage, and find that work to be intelligible, I think you're fooling yourself.

To understand the genesis of the term means exactly to understand the process through which Aristotle went to come up with the term. — Agustino

Then why did you say that what I said was crap? That was a senseless insult.

'Getting a sense of what Aristotle was getting at' from reading hundreds of pages can never substitute for a definition, because all those pages can contain is a finite number of examples of how he used a word, and examples - be they ever so many - are not a definition. — andrewk

It's a completely different form of argument from what you're used to. It's not deduction. It's not induction in the sense of scientific induction, but another form of induction concerning conclusions relative to the way that words are used. It's called dialectics. In dialectics we do not proceed by first defining words, we start with particular words and proceed toward determining the significance of those words. This requires putting those words into all sorts of familiar contexts. If consistency is maintained then a concept can be developed.

Both quantum mechanics and general relativity could be fully defined and all the laws laid out in less than ten pages each, and a mathematically-literate reader could check that the definitions were well-defined, even if she had no idea what the purpose or applicability of any of it was. It's the purpose and applicability that accounts for the other few hundred pages of any relativity or QM text. — andrewk

I disagree with this. I find that there is a whole lot of ambiguity within commonly accepted definitions in physics. Why do you think that QM is subject to so many different "interpretations"? If there wasn't ambiguity as to what the applied terms really meant, there could not be multiple interpretations.

If there are any that are not nebulous, it should be able to be presented here in a short post, just as with the definition that a Hilbert Space is a vector space over the real or complex numbers, equipped with an inner product, that is also a complete metric space. — andrewk

The problem is not one of nebulous definitions, it is whether or not the definition corresponds with what the word really refers to.. So physicists can define "Hilbert Space" in a way that suits their purpose, but this does not necessarily mean that their definition represents anything real. In ontology and metaphysics, the intent is to describe reality so it is not a case of producing useful definitions, but a case of finding the correct words to apply to the appropriate aspects of reality. Describing something is a completely different endeavor from using mathematics to make predictions. Definitions are posterior to the former, but prior to the latter.

The claim that the laws won't change in that time is based on 1) that the current understanding of things is basically correct and 2) that this current understanding entails that the universe will be much the same for that time period. — fdrake

OK, then how do you make 1) consistent with dark energy and dark matter? These are enormous features of the universe which cosmologists admit that they do not understand. How can you say that the current understanding is correct, when the consequence of that understanding is the need to posit all of this mysterious substance?

Even if science is wrong, that doesn't mean nature will change. Nature does not change to accommodate the beliefs of scientists. The scientific description of patterns in nature may change when previous descriptions are found incorrect or novel phenomena are studied. — fdrake

If your claim is that the universe is the way that it is, regardless of how we understand it, then how is this relevant? What we are discussing is our capacity to measure the universe, specifically to measure time. So the fact that time is how time is, is irrelevant to our discussion of our efforts to measure time.