This came from Sam26 musing about beliefs as both mental states and states of the brain.

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Whatever we use to reasonably explain his behaviour. — Banno

States of the brain, mental states, cannot reasonably explain behaviour, because the former is passive and the latter is active. So this belief is lacking in truth.

Jack forms and holds belief, but not in the manner described in the common historical account(JTB) of belief. — creativesoul

The JTB account of belief requires that the belief be true. I suggest that if you take a good look at the criteria for "true", you will find that it requires what you call "thinking about thought and belief". In its primitive form, truth refers to an internal process, a process of thinking about thought and belief, requiring sincerity and honesty.

Memory for example is based in repetition, and honesty is imperative to accurate memory. In this process of thinking about thought and belief, we establish an association between the symbol and what is symbolized, which must remain true (not permitting variance). In the case of memory, repetition without variance constitutes "true". Repetition without variance may in some cases be referred to as a state.

It is very doubtful that Jack has the capacity to hold a true belief, memory without variance. The fact that memories change over time calls into question Jack's ability to "hold" a belief. And holding is essential to maintaining truth. Written language, and other physical markings such as monuments have always served to aid human beings in the endeavours of truth.

You have equivocated by referring to a rule as both a rule and your interpretation of a rule. — Luke

It's not likely that I equivocated, when what I was doing was explaining to you the difference between these two ways which the same word is used. To equivocate is to disrespect the different uses, or meanings of a word, in order to produce a false conclusion, as you were doing.

If belief is an explanation, and one offers an explanation that they do not believe, then not all explanations are belief.

There is no issue. — creativesoul

You can't really say that there is no issue, because you've just used "believe" in the common way. Rather than maintaining consistency with "belief" as an explanation, you go and use "believe" the old way.

If you maintain consistency with Banno's definition, then what the explanation describes, what it refers to, cannot be a belief, it must be something else.

Consider that the explanation is a description, and the thing being described is what you would normally call the belief. Instead, the explanation itself is the belief. If there is not correspondence between the thing being described, and the explanation, then the explanation is false, a false belief. A true belief therefore requires the two components, the explanation, and the thing being described, with correspondence. If there is no correspondence, then there is no truth, and therefore no real belief. A false belief cannot be called a real belief. Likewise, the content without the explanation cannot be called a belief either.

Banno explains Jack's behaviour. This is Banno's belief. Not Jacks.

That's the issue. — creativesoul

I think, that if the explanation is accurate, then it is supposed to be an objective statement, which is a true belief, regardless of who may have made the statement. The explanation, why jack behaved in this way, corresponds with the reality, so it represents the content of no particular individual's mind, it just represents the truth. And if it doesn't represent the content of any particular person's mind, yet it is true, then it is simply a true belief.

Well yes, assuming sincerity... — creativesoul

There is a consequence here. The explanation can only be directly related to the action, as the reason for the action, and therefore the belief, as Banno proposes, if the explanation is a true explanation. This produces a somewhat odd definition of truth. True belief would have to mean the true explanation for one's actions. If the person has an odd understanding of reality, like a schizophrenic for example, one's beliefs would be true beliefs if they were true explanations for the behaviour, but they would be incorrect in relation to reality, when judged by others. Then we could not say that such a belief is a "false belief", its an incorrect belief. We would judge the belief (explanation) as wrong or right (justified in relation to the communal understanding of reality), but we could not say whether it is true or not unless we knew whether it was an accurate explanation.

This person does have beliefs however... despite his/her deliberately misrepresenting them. — creativesoul

If, as Banno proposes, belief is an explanation for behaviour, then I can only assume that "true belief" signifies an accurate explanation. This gives "true belief a different meaning from what you're used to. If an explanation is a misrepresentation, that's a false belief. We ought not to say that there are any real, or in any way "true" beliefs which are hidden behind the misrepresentation of an inaccurate explanation. So whatever it is, that is hidden, private, secret, behind the misrepresentation which is deception, ought not even be called a belief. To grant existence to what has been willfully suppressed is a mistake. And if we mistakenly explain another's behaviour, then we cannot insist that this mistaken explanation refers to anything real either. Therefore there is no reason to grant existence to anything behind the inaccurate explanation.

If you refer all the way back to Parmenides and Plato, you'll find that it is impossible to support any claim of existence of a false belief, with logic. So the assumption that a false belief has some type of existence as a belief which is other than a true belief, is best dismissed. The only real belief is a true belief. We ought to discard the idea that any belief could be false, for the assumption that only true beliefs have any type of real existence, because "false beliefs exist" only presents us with paradox and logical contradiction.



As I said, numerous times, I use "rules" in different ways.

Notice, that in your quoted passages, I am referring to "following rules". In order for a person to follow a rule, one must hold a principle within one mind, which is adhered to. So, when I follow a rule, I am following this principle which I hold in my mind. This is despite the fact, that there may be a written rule, and I might call this written rule, the rule which I am following. In this case, "rule" refers to two distinct things. The writing on the paper is called the rule, and the principle in my mind which is my interpretation of what's on the paper, is also called the rule which I am following. We could say that this is "the same rule".

Remember the example I gave, of "the concept". My associate says "I have concept". Here, "concept" refers to something in the mind. Later, the associate puts it on paper, hands me the paper, and says "here is my concept". Here, "concept" refers to what is on the paper. In each case, we would say that "concept" refers to the same concept. But that same concept is in different forms. In one case, it's in the mind, in another it's on the paper. It is the same situation with "rule".

So there is no problem for me to refer to the thing in the mind as the rule, and the thing on the paper as the rule, this is consistent with accepted usage. As I said, words are in my mind, and they are on the paper, and it is completely acceptable to call these the same words, despite the fact that they have a different form in my mind from what they have on the paper. It is nonsense for you to insist that I must choose one or the other.

If one claims 'X', then one believes that 'X' is true, assuming a sincere speaker. 'X' here is held as the belief itself. Let 'X' be a statement. A belief statement, as it were. Stating 'X' is to state that one believes 'X'. In light of all this, Banno's definition of "belief" as an explanation makes perfect sense. — creativesoul

There's one significant problem here. This conclusion requires that the speaker is sincere, and speakers are not always sincere. As we see when someone is on trial, one's explanations for one's actions are not necessarily one's beliefs.

How else can we make sense of questions and the things each type of query implies?

Yes. I agree but do you really think my inquiry is a dead end? — TheMadFool

I don't think the inquiry is a dead end per se, but I think it's rather pointless and misdirected. Ask yourself what kind of question are you asking with this inquiry. Is it an "is there" type of question? Notice all the questions that start with "is". Any statement which claims "it is the case that..." can be turned around to ask "is it the case that...?" That is skepticism.

I think that most serious inquiries involve a number of the factors you mentioned, mixed together. So I don't think your technique of dividing or classifying is quite right. For instance, who, why, and how, might all be asked together, as one class of inquiry, while where and when, might be classed together as another type, etc.. In other words, I don't think that your way of classifying the different types of questions really represents the different types of inquiries that we make. You would really need to take a serious look at all the different types of studies, sciences, social studies, philosophy, and maybe even art, all together, to determine the different types of inquiries that we, as human beings make.

But that's why I gave up; there is no point in entering into a discussion with someone who constantly misrepresents what has been said. — Banno

What's even worse, is having discussion with someone who denies saying what was said, and replaces it with something else, as if the something else is what was said.

Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? — Banno

My argument is that beliefs are explanations for behaviour, such that they set out what would be true in order for the behaviour to make sense. — Banno

Do you recognize, that it makes a substantial difference to change what you say from "nothing more than the collection of tomato related behaviours", to "explanations for behaviour, such that they set out what would be true in order for the behaviour to make sense"?

As I really do not want to misrepresent what you say, care to explain what you mean by "set out what would be true in order for the behaviour to make sense"? As far as I can tell, "what would be true in order for the behaviour to make sense" refers to a capacity of the one trying to make sense of the behaviour, rather than a capacity of the one who is performing the behaviour.

Are you, as I suggested, saying that belief is a property of the person explaining the behaviour, and not a property of the one performing the behaviour? Or, do you take the position which I ascribe to Sam26, that belief is attributable to the explanation itself, that the statements, along with the meaning and belief, exist independently of the person making the statement?

What question does simple curiosity express? To see something unusual and wonder about it doesn't necessarily imply any particular question. There is no necessity to assume "what?" is being asked, or "why?", or any such question. That is why your attempt to divide basic inquiry into these distinct categories, and place one as prior to the other, is ill-founded. The fundamental curiosity, or inquisitiveness, allows for the possibility of all these different questions.

I think the issue is thinking that the belief is either... — creativesoul

Actually I'm with you here, I don't agree with either either. That's why I'm pointing to the inconsistencies. Banno's stated arguments can direct us in two very distinct ways. One being that belief is nothing more than behaviour, the other that belief is a description of behaviour.

The latter requires someone to make the description, so the belief represented by the description is really nothing more than the belief of the author of that description. Sam26 has proposed separating the statement from the author, such that the statement with its meaning, is communal, and not proper to the author. To me, this just points toward Platonic Realism. The other direction leaves us with the need to account for the animal's observed behaviour. If it is not belief, then what is it?

This is where we get to the relation between belief and things like habit, and conditioned response. If belief is a type of habit, or a conditioned response, then what distinguish it from other conditioned responses. If we do not adopt any principles of distinction, then all animals and even plants might be said to have beliefs.

I do not think that it is absurd to propose language as the distinguishing feature of belief. If the individual who is active, can express the reasons for the action in terms of language, then we might say that the reasons for the action are beliefs. But if one cannot express the reasons for one's action in terms of language, then we cannot say that the reason for the action is belief. To adopt principles like this is to place defining limits on "belief" making the term more useful. But this particular definition would exclude other animals from having beliefs. We'd have to refer to other elements to explain those animals' behaviour.

You're conflating the written rules with your interpretation of the rules again. Just answer me this: are the written rules the rules, or not? Or do they not become rules until you have interpreted them? — Luke

I told you, we can use "rules" to refer to the written rules. I have no problem with that. And, they do not need to be interpreted by me to become rules, because they were written as rules.

If it's the latter, then how can you break a rule? Because then it seems that each of us can only act contrary to our individual interpretation of the rule [rather than contrary to the rule itself], and nobody can ever be certain of what the rule actually is, or whether we each have the correct interpretation of it. Who the hell knows what "checkmate" really means, right? — Luke

Despite the fact that that I didn't say it was the latter, what you claim is not logical at all. There is the possibility of cheating in games. One can have a principle within one's mind, to follow as a rule, and still break that rule. Plato demonstrated this thousands of years ago, and Augustine discussed it at length. Plato discussed the sophist's position that virtue was a type of knowledge, knowing the correct action, and being a type of knowledge, they insisted it could be taught. But then there was still the issue of the person who knows the correct action but chooses to do wrong. So it turned out that virtue, doing what is right (or what you call following the rule) requires more than just knowing the what is right, it requires the will to do it.

No, you equivocate. How are 'private' rules different from written rules? That you have interpreted the former? Then they are not rules, but an interpretation of them. — Luke

I gave you the examples of how we use "rule" in different ways. If you insist that a principle in my head, which I follow as a rule, like a New Year's resolution, is an interpretation of a written rule, then so be it. There's not much point in carrying on this discussion if you can't see beyond that.

Stop pussyfooting around and just admit you think that the written rules are not rules, just some uninterpreted symbols and God knows what they really mean. — Luke

I told you, and demonstrated very clearly to you, that we use "rules" in different ways. I accept that all of these instances refer to rules, but I claim that we need to respect the differences. If I said there is two dogs in front of me would you insist that I must think one is not the real dog?

I'll make it simple: the actual rules are the rules (that have been written down or agreed upon or whatever). The rules are not some individual's private interpretation of the rules. — Luke

"Or whatever"? So you think that answers my question?

Is there any difference between them (besides that fact that one's a number and the other's your so-called interpretation of it)? Well, is there? — Luke

Of course there is a difference. It is the difference between the symbol and the thing symbolized. Do you not apprehend the difference between a symbol, and the thing represented, or symbolized by the symbol? Do you understand the difference between a numeral and a number? Or does "number" have no more meaning to you than as a numeral?

Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? — Banno

Jack's beliefs are ascribed to him by language users in order to explain his behaviour. — Banno

I think the issue here is whether the belief is the behaviour itself, or the description of the behaviour. Remember Sam26's categorization is to place meaning, language, propositions, and statements as communal. If "belief" falls into this category, as communal, then it would not refer to the behaviour but the description of the behaviour.

Mathematics is now the language of science. Without numbers people don't take you seriously. Yet English still asks quantitative questions with ''how many?'' Of course it's not that inconvenient to ask ''how many?'' but the concept of quantity not having its own question is very odd given what I said. Some languages like Hindi (India) have a specific question on quantity viz. ''Kitna?'' which translated means ''how many?'' So, shouldn't English develop its own dedicated question for quantity? — TheMadFool

Isn't "how many?" very similar to "how much?", which is what we commonly ask for the cost or price of something. The fact that we say it as two words in English, while other languages say it as one word, seems irrelevant.

Contingent means that something could be otherwise, correct? But propositions cannot not be part of language, they're a necessary feature of language. — Sam26

While it might be true that a language might not contain any statements, it would not be possible to have a statement without a language. — Banno

Indeed. — creativesoul

Sam26 seems to imply that any language would necessarily have propositions, though this may not be what is meant by sam26.

Now consider this:

Third, it's the contention of this theory that not only are actions reflections of a thought life, but that language is also a reflection of a thought life.

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It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. — Sam26

Sam26 has produced a division between language and meaning. Language is a reflection of a thought life, while meaning is a reflection of a community. But since Sam26 then goes on to describe language as public, communal, what Sam26 should really have said is that language as well as meaning is a reflection of a community, not a reflection of thought life.

So Sam26 then makes the further claim "statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language", to confirm that what is really meant is that language is not a reflection of thought life, but a reflection of the community.. This is what I disagree with, especially since Sam26 began with the premise that just like other human actions, "language is also a reflection of a thought life". This seems to acknowledge a relation between language and the private. If by making language a reflection of the community rather than a reflection of the thought life, the problem can be avoided, this would disassociate language from action, such that language is no longer a human action, but a passive thing, as a property of the community.

Therefore Sam26 has exposed two distinct ways of looking at language. One is as a reflection of the community (public), and this according to sam26 is where language relates to meaning, and the other is a reflection of thought life (private), and this is where language relates to thought and human actions. I would think that unless these two ways of looking at language, (1)in relation to meaning and the community, and (2)in relation to thought and human actions, are completely distinct, there should be some degree of compatibility between the two.

I also note that you never answered my question about whether it is possible to break a rule, which I consider to be a related problem for your position. — Luke

Yes, it is possible to break rules. I don't see the problem. One can hold in one's mind a rule to follow, yet still not follow it. Some other conflicting rule might overrule it.

If the words in your mind are identical to the words you speak, then I have no problem calling them both words, but I do think you are equivocating when you refer to both the written rules of a game, and everybody's alleged differing mental interpretation of those rules, as "the rules". — Luke

The words in my mind are not identical to the words I speak. The words I speak have a physical presence, as sound, and are public. The words in my mind have no such physical presence, and are private. There is only equivocation if we say that our use of "words" to refer to these two distinct types of words, is the same usage of "words".. That's why I am trying to differentiate these distinct usages, such that we do not equivocate.

When an associate comes to me, and says "I have a concept", then later hands me a paper with symbols on it, and says "this is my concept", these are two distinct ways of using "concept". The former refers to what is in a mind, while the latter refers to symbols on the paper. This is despite the fact that we would say that "concept" in each of these instances refers to "the same concept". I believe that this indicates that the same concept can exist in two distinct forms, in the mind (private), and on the paper (public). There are clearly significant differences between these two instances of 'the concept", despite the fact that they are called the same concept.

We have the same two distinct ways of using many words, "rules" being one of them. "Rules", just like "words", and "concept" may refer to what's on the paper, or it may refer to what's in the mind. After I read and understand the rules, I would say that the same rules are in my mind as are on the paper, despite the fact that the use of "same" here is not in strict accordance with the law of identity. The "rules" in my mind are not really the same as the "rules" on the paper. The word "rules" refers to two distinct things here, regardless of the fact that we call them the same rules. This must be the case to account for the fact that I might interpret the rules in a way slightly different from you.

Your attempt to call them "private rules" just adds to the confusion and equivocation. — Luke

Well, the confusion and equivocation is on your part, because you seem to be in denial of the distinction which I have explained above. When someone is using the same word in two distinct ways, and clearly indicates these two distinct ways (as I indicate with 'private' rules), yet the reader fails to acknowledge these two distinct ways, then the reader equivocates.

So, you have made a mention of "actual rules" in the last post, and I asked you in one post to clarify what you mean by this. I'll repost below, so you can address this.

Hi Luke,
Can you just confirm for me that I properly understand what you arguing with respect to the "actual rules". Let's start with the assumption that there are symbols on the paper. I would say that the symbols must be interpreted, and it is the particular interpretation which each of us makes which constitutes the "actual rules". Some would argue that there is a real, objective, or true interpretation of the symbols, independent of how any individual would interpret the symbols, and this constitutes the "actual rules", which would be Platonic Realism. Since I know you reject Platonic Realism, are you arguing that the symbols on the paper are themselves the "actual rules", and that calling them symbols is a false description? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you understand what I am asking? Suppose we take the numeral "2". I would say that this symbol represents the number two, and the actual number two is the interpretation of that symbol which exists in my mind. A Platonic Realist would say that there is an ideal interpretation of this symbol "2", which exists independently of all human minds, and this is the actual number two. Are you arguing that the numeral "2" is the actual number two? Are you saying that there is no difference between the symbol, and what it represents, that since we commonly call the numeral "2" the "number 2", it actually is the number two

Hi Sam26, that's all pretty agreeable for me, except one important part. If you're interested I'll explain it to you.

It's also important to point out that words, statements, or propositions, get their meaning from how the community uses them, i.e., meaning is not a reflection of things in our mind. Our actions, though, are reflections of what's happening in our minds; again, linguistic meaning is derived from a community of language users, quite apart from what's happening in the mind. — Sam26

What you appear to do here is to separate statements and propositions from their contexts, and that is the mind which creates them. So actions, you leave in the context of the mind which creates the action, but a statement or proposition is not placed in the category of an action because you separate it from that context. Now I believe that meaning is inherently related to context in a way such that to take something outside of its context is to take something away from its meaning. This will leave whatever meaning that the statement or proposition is claimed to have, somewhat incomplete or deficient.

Statements can and do reflect beliefs (what's happening in our minds, viz., private thoughts), but statements themselves are not private things, and moreover, statements are completely dependent upon something that's not private, viz., language. So unlike actions, statements serve a duel purpose. However, where actions are used to communicate, then these actions would be similar in kind to statements, so not all actions have the requisite privacy I'm referring to, i.e., they too can serve a duel purpose. — Sam26

I agree that statements are not private, just like meaning is not private, and statements are dependent on something not private, and that's language. But wouldn't you agree that statements and meaning are also dependent on something which is private, and that's the thinking which goes on in our minds when we create propositions and statements? How then, is a statement or proposition any different from any other action? Each of these seems to have an aspect which is private and an aspect which is public.

Hi Luke,
Can you just confirm for me that I properly understand what you arguing with respect to the "actual rules". Let's start with the assumption that there are symbols on the paper. I would say that the symbols must be interpreted, and it is the particular interpretation which each of us makes which constitutes the "actual rules". Some would argue that there is a real, objective, or true interpretation of the symbols, independent of how any individual would interpret the symbols, and this constitutes the "actual rules", which would be Platonic Realism. Since I know you reject Platonic Realism, are you arguing that the symbols on the paper are themselves the "actual rules", and that calling them symbols is a false description?

(1) There is a self-contradiction in the assertion that "the complete truth cannot be obtained but truth in the lesser sense, of pointing to reality, is implied by human agreement". If complete truth can never be obtained, then this statement can never be validated to be completely true. — Samuel Lacrampe

I don't see any problem with this, no self-contradiction. It's like the statement "any statement may be doubted". That statement may be doubted too. But there is no self-contradiction unless I state that it is undoubtable that any statement may be doubted.

2) It fails the principle of parsimony: If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a duck. Thus if everyone perceives the same concept, it is reasonable to assume the concept is pointing to the real thing; until it is invalidated. But it cannot be invalidated, for the same reason that your position cannot be validated, as shown in (1). — Samuel Lacrampe

The principle of parsimony is very weak as a proof. It suffers in the same way as the problem of induction. To conclude "it probably is", does not give us what is needed to state, beyond a doubt, that it is. We can't avoid that degree of uncertainty, that it still may not be a duck.

So this doesn't get us any closer to proving that there are real, independent universal forms. The point I've been making throughout this thread is that we do not all apprehend "the same" concept. "The same" implies one unique individual. When we say that we have "the same" concept in each of our minds, what we really mean is similar, due to personal peculiarities, idiosyncrasies. We dismiss the differences as accidental (a difference which doesn't make a difference), such that the concept which we each have is essentially the same. But when we adhere to a solid principle of identity to define "the same", then any difference makes a difference..

It appears to me, like you are arguing that these similarities "point to", a real concept, a real universal form which is independent. I say that the differences, the peculiarities, which we each have, "point to" the lack of a real universal form. I support my claim by pointing to differences, and saying that there are no examples of human concepts which are "the same" between individuals. So the assumption of "the same" is faulty. How do you support your claim?

Take your example. We see an object as a duck. and call it a duck. We call another thing a duck, and another, and another, and so on. You say that we call each one a duck because it looks and acts like a duck. This implies that there are some criteria whereby a thing is a duck. What is that criteria, other than what we say it is? You say that because we all agree, this indicates that there is a real form, or defining criteria. The problem though is that we do not all agree, we have our personal peculiarities. We overlook the personal differences for the sake of agreement, but how does this validate the real existence of the ideal?

3) You wish to escape the absurdity that no judgement can ever be determined as true or false, by arguing that we can have mutual agreements among everyone, and claim "this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality". I agree that we can have mutual agreement among everyone, but why is this an indication that we are pointing toward reality? If the concept of a single individual is not true, then why would the whole group, which is nothing but the sum of all individuals, be any more true? — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree with you here. It is that very principle of probability discussed above. Agreement indicates that we are probably pointing toward reality, but not necessarily. However, my reality is a reality of difference. Agreement is a function of difference, it is made necessary because of difference. The fact that we must obtain agreement to proceed in communion indicates that difference is fundamental. Agreement is necessitated by differences. It is not a function of any real sameness or similarity, it is derived from the desire to overlook our differences, and this is a desire for sameness. Desire for something indicates a lacking, a wanting, of that thing. Now sameness, like the ideal, is what is desired, what is lacking, or non-existent, and this drives agreement in the form of intent. Desire relates to the future, what is not yet existing, what is lacking, and that's where the sameness of the ideal is categorized. And that's why the ideal doesn't have real existence.

This objection (3), would only create a difficulty for my position, if your objection (1) above was a valid objection. But as it stands, it is exactly what validates my claim that universal forms have no real independent existence.

If you were to speak nothing but gibberish (e.g. Forest the upon warmly eight marshmallow Lebanon it unicycle), then you might get kicked out of a conversation. — Luke

I don't see what speaking gibberish has to do with anything. I don't think you have a point here at all. It seems totally irrelevant. If one judges what another says as gibberish then so be it. Sam26 judges what SR Hubbard says as gibberish. So what? Claiming that what another says is gibberish, to me, is just another way of saying that you are uninterested in trying to understand the person. Intentionally saying something that others will not understand, as you have just done, is done for a reason as well.

That's a huge dodge. You claim that the rules are not part of any external object such as a game, yet you refer to the written rules of the game to help settle disputes? Clearly the written rules of the game are external to you. If the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind" (which individual, btw?) then why do you need to consult the external written rules? Are they not the rules? — Luke

I don't mind saying that rules exist externally to me, in the form of symbols on paper, just like I don't mind saying that concepts exist in that way. Someone might hand me a paper and say "here is my concept". But I do respect the fact that in order to follow such a rule, I must interpret the symbols, and accept the meaning which I derive, as a principle to adhere to. So if I am "following a rule", I am adhering to this principle in my mind which I have derived from my interpretation. You seem to have no respect for this fact.

Either the rules are entirely "within the individual's mind", as you claim, or else the external written rules printed in the game's instructions are not rules at all. But if they aren't the rules of the game, then why do we call them that? Is everybody but you using the word "rules" incorrectly? — Luke

As I said, we us the word "rules" in different ways, and we must be careful not to equivocate. I have words in my mind, and there are also spoken words. You seem to be implying that I ought only refer to one or the other as "words". You say either the "rules" exist in my mind or the "rules" exist on the paper, in ignorance of the fact that we use "rules" in both ways. But that's just you being completely unreasonable.

Strategies aren't rules of the game. The rules set the boundaries of permissible moves; strategies are employed within these boundaries. — Luke

Right, now you're starting to understand. When we play games, we use strategies, and strategies are private rules, which are not part of "the game", they are part of the player. This is where we reach the limits of the game analogy. We cannot understand the act of playing the game, by referring to the game. We need to look directly at the player, instead of the game, to understand the phenomenon which is the player creating one's private rules (strategies) for winning the game. Then "the game" becomes irrelevant, because these strategies, private rules, are similar to what the person employs for all of life's endeavours, and we might get a better understanding of this phenomenon by looking at something other than game playing.

Okay, but you aren't the only one using the language, and if language is a "method of communication", as you say, then you might want to adopt the habit of using language in mostly the same ways that everyone else does if you want your communication to be effective. — Luke

Sure, we agree on this.

Right, don't conflate actual rules, such as the written rules of a board game, with some imaginary private mental "rules" that only apply to you. — Luke

As I said, we use "rules' in different ways. To say that one usage refers to "actual rules", as if they are more real than what another usage of 'rules" refers to is just arbitrary without an ontology to support that designation.

You were talking about where the game analogy breaks down, but I still don't see how language is any different. The rules of both games and language are man-made and we can make up new rules for both. — Luke

The last time I tried to make up my own rules in a game I got kicked out of the game. No one yet has denied me the right to use language, though Sam26 might like to kick me out of the thread. Games have explicitly defined parameters, boundaries of in and out, and this makes the game a definite object. Language is not like that, it is a method of communication with no definite boundaries. Banno seems to believe that specific bounded language-games may be identified within language as a whole, such that one might step outside of a particular language-game, but all the overlap and vagueness of any proposed boundaries make this assumption unrealistic. Therefore we ought to just face the fact that the game analogy, while it may give us an approach, can only take us so far in any understanding of language.

Why would you consult the written rules of the game when you claim that the rules are not external to you? — Luke

I went through this, I interpret the symbols.

The strategy you employ in any given game is not a part of the rules of the game. Otherwise, where can I find this in the rules? — Luke

Right, that's another reason why the game analogy fails. Not only do we follow "the rules of the game", we make up our own strategies, private rules, which are part of the play, but not part of "the game" itself. So the rule-following employed in actually playing the game goes far beyond the actual rules of "the game". We could not even understand playing a game, by studying the game itself, because how one plays a game goes far beyond the game itself. To understand how different people play a particular game, we must refer to something other than "the game". If studying a game cannot even provide us with an understanding of how different people play that game, and we must turn to something else to obtain that understanding, then clearly the game analogy can only go so far, and it must be dropped at this point. If we cling to it, it will mislead us.

What are these other ("in general") rules, besides the rules, that you are attempting to make an allowance for here? You mean thinking, or something? — Luke

I told you, the principles we hold in our minds, which we adhere to in activity. When I get up in the morning I put the coffee pot on, that's a rule I follow.

And what relevance does it have to the rules of games and language that we are discussing here? — Luke

It's clearly relevant to the principles or "rules" of language use, because I choose my words in a similar habitual way. It's not very relevant to "rules" of games though, and that's the point. We use "rules" in numerous ways and we ought not to equivocate when doing philosophy.

We already covered this issue here. It is solved by making the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge of the universal form or concept. The implicit knowledge is obtained through abstraction from observing particulars; and then if our explicit definition agrees with the implicit knowledge, then it is the true definition. This explains why we all sense that the definition of justice for humans, "equality in treatment", is a more accurate definition than "don't steal". — Samuel Lacrampe

We're pretty much going around in circles but we are at a slightly different point, because now you mention truth. I don't believe that the implicit/explicit description can be used to explain truth. Truth itself is an ideal, thus to know the truth would require having explicit knowledge of the universal form. Truth, which is a complete exclusion of mistake from our belief, cannot be obtained through what you call implicit knowledge.

If the definition of concepts is only produced by a human judgement, even if agreed upon by all men without dispute, then the definitions would not point to anything objectively real, and thus no judgement could ever be true or false, that is, point to reality or not; which is absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe

You slightly misrepresent this, and when properly represented, it is not absurd at all. Definitions can point to something real without obtaining "truth", because truth must be a complete lack of mistake in such pointing. If you use "true" or "truth" in a less strict sense, then we can say that if human beings agree, that this is an indication that we are pointing toward reality. If you release "true" from its strict sense which renders it an ideal, complete lack of mistake, in order that it be grasped by implicit knowledge, then there is nothing to prevent us from saying that truth is what human beings agree on.

What is the case is that a judgement concerning the relation between a particular and a universal, cannot ever be known with certainty to be true or false. And this is not absurd because we must always allow that each, our understanding of the particular, and our understanding of the universal are not necessarily without mistake, even though we might believe that they are without mistake. So "truth" as the ideal cannot be obtained, but "truth" in the lesser sense, of pointing to reality, is implied by human agreement.

Furthermore, even the particular form of individual things is defined by its properties which are all universal forms or concepts, aside perhaps from the x, y, z, t properties. E.g. The particular form of this individual chair is: A chair (concept), made of wood (concept), red in colour (concept), located at position x, y, z, (not a concept I think). If it was not so, then we could never know any general knowledge like "chairs made of wood can burn", without testing every individual wooden chair. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think that this is not at all true. Our knowledge of particulars is known to be incomplete, and that is precisely because we can only know the particular through universals. So no matter how we describe any particular, the fact that we describe it in terms of universals, will always leave our knowledge of the particular, incomplete. It is very evident that our knowledge of particulars is always incomplete. And regarding your comment about "general knowledge", this is exactly what is expressed by the commonly cited "problem of induction". The conclusions we make through inductive reasoning are never absolutely certain, as they are based in probability.

This is patently false. Board games don't exist? — Luke

I think you misunderstood what I said. I didn't mean to say that board games do not exist. I meant, that if "game" refers to something which consists of a set of rules which must be followed, then in the case of language, there is no game.

Why do we have written rules, sports referees, teachers, driving instructors, ombudsmen, judges, police, etc. if "each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning"? And what does it mean to break a rule in that case? — Luke

What is the case, is that written rules are physical symbols on paper, or whatever medium, which must be interpreted. When the symbols are perceived (read), they are interpreted. If the individual desires to play the game, then the person will create principles within one's mind, and adhere to these principles in the act of playing the game.

If you and I are playing a game, and you carry out an action which is discordant with my interpretation, I will claim that you have not followed the rules. If you insist that you have, we may have to consult the written symbols, and each of our own interpretations, to try and decide who is right.

In the case of the various authorities which you have named, we trust them as authorities due to their training, such that we grant to them different degrees of power, to provide an official interpretation in the relevant situations. The statement "break the rule" is based on the authoritative interpretation. So for instance, we assign to the police the power to make arrests based on their interpretations. But what the police do is charge the person, whom according to their interpretation has broken the law. This still does not mean that the person has necessarily "broken the law" though, because the person has the right to go in front of a judge, or jury, to provide a more authoritative interpretation. So in the case of "law", in which breaking the rule is taken very seriously, we employ multiple levels of interpretation to ensure fairness.

What you seem to want to say is that 'each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning the rules', but 'one's own rules' is redundant here. Following rules is a normative practice, rather than something mentally private. — Luke

Yes, each one creates one's own principles within one's mind, and adheres to these principles. It is something mentally private. This is very evident, all you need to do is take at look at how you personally follow a rule. You have your own interpretation of what you ought to do to follow that rule, you hold some principles within your mind, and you adhere to them. Consider Banno's chess example, the bishop must move diagonally. You hold this interpretation within your mind, and adhere to it when you play chess. That is how you follow a rule, you hold a principle within your mind, and adhere to it in your actions, you do not consult some externally existing rules each time you are going to act. The actual rules, or principles, which one follows when playing chess go far beyond one's interpretation of the written rules, to include principles of strategy. They must be mentally private or else one could not proceed with a strategy.

When you say that "following rules is a normative practise", what you refer to is a judgement as to whether or not a specified set of rules has been followed. That specified set of rules constitutes "the norm". This is determined by some authorities. Falling outside the norm does not mean that one has not followed rules, it means that one has not followed that specific set of rules which are designated by the authorities as the norm. So I may have principles within my mind, which I adhere to, and I firmly follow those rules, but if my actions are eccentric, or in some other way odd, I may be judged as being outside the norm. We might commonly say that I do not follow "the rules". But "the rules" here refers to that specific set of rules which is determined as constituting the norm, it in no way means that I do not follow any rules in the general sense. So "normative" refers to a judgement as to whether specific rules have been followed, not a judgement as to whether rules have been followed in general.

One problem anyway is 'state' versus ' process'. A still picture, if that is the equivalent of 'state', can be very deceptive about what 'process' is going on in the course of movement, taken in isolation. — mcdoodle

I agree that this is a problem. A brain is always active. To say that there is such a thing as a "brain state" is a misleading claim because "state" implies a condition of inactivity. So to say that a belief is a "brain state" is only to give an unrealistic description of the brain which is understood as active.

I'm not sure "process" helps you either. Why would a sequence of states tell you what is going on? The only way to tell what's going on, is to run the program. — tom

Aristotle demonstrated an inherent incompatibility between "being" (state) and 'becoming" (process). He claimed one could not be resolved, or reduced to a form of the other, such that the two must be considered as distinct categories. He proposed exceptions to the law of excluded middle to account for the reality of "becoming" with the concepts of "potential", and "matter".

Hegel in his dialectics of being implies that being is subsumed within the category of becoming, through a process of negation; being, negated by not-being, then the negation of the negation, etc.. That is how becoming is explained, such that becoming is a sort of synthesis of being and not being. This is fundamental to dialectical materialism, many of whom call for exceptions to the law of non-contradiction, which is called dialetheism.

I disagree that concepts or universal forms are dependant on human judgement. The reason is that judgements can be either true or false: if the judgement points to reality, then it is true; and if not, then it is false. Thus the reality or existence of the concepts in the judgement precedes the judgement. If concepts or universal forms were dependant on human judgement, then no judgement could be either true or false; which is absurd. — Samuel Lacrampe

Consider that we have two things, the particular, and the universal form, which is the class, or genus. The particular has a unique form, what it is, and the universal is also a case of what something is. Yet the two are not the same, because the universal must allow that many of the particulars are of the same class. So there are two distinct forms, the form of the particular, and the universal form.

The issue is how does a particular become a member of any class (universal form). My claim is that this can only occur by judgement because a certain type of relationship between the particular form and the universal form is required, and this relationship is established by a judgement. A mind compares the two forms and passes judgement. It is clear that the human mind through judgement does make this type of relationship, so I don't think that I am wrong there. But perhaps the human mind is not the only way that such a relationship can be made.

You argue that there is truth and falsity to this type of judgement therefore the relationship which is being judged must be something real. But this argument will turn out to be circular. The truth or falsity of whether any particular is a member of a specified class, depends on how that class is defined. But the definition is commonly produced by a human judgement.

So if we assume that the universal form is defined independently from human judgement, we have no way of knowing whether our definition matches the independently existing definition, whether our understanding of the universal form matches the real universal form. Then how would we ever know whether or not it is true that any particular is a member of any class? Since we couldn't know whether our definition matches the independent definition because all we have is the definitions we produce anyway, then truth and falsity, to us, are just a matter of judgement anyway. Then whether the particular was "really" and "truly" a member of any class, would require a judgement by God.

So we still do not avoid the need for a judgement, unless you can say how one form could have that specific relationship with another form, without being judged to have it. Suppose it's a relationship of similarity for example. All particular forms are by their nature distinct, unique, so they are essentially different. What could unite them within the same class, as "the same", except a judgement?

don't see a contradiction in the statements; only an ambiguity in the term "particular". The term in statement (1) means "unique only". The term in statement (2) means "unique yet belonging to the same genus as other particulars". — Samuel Lacrampe

Let me see if I understand what you're saying. The universal becomes a particular, as per my arguments, and is represented as (1). Now this particular, may be a member of a class (which itself is a universal), and therefore also a particular. So you say that there is no contradiction in claiming that the universal is really a particular, as the particular may be unique, distinct, yet also the member of a class(2).

The issue though is whether the universal, as universal, has any real existence. What I've argued is that it has real existence only as a particular. I don't deny its real existence absolutely, only its real existence as anything other than a particular. You seem to want to insist that it still has real existence as a universal as well. The problem I see is that "universal" refers to what you call "class" or "genus" in (2). And, that a particular is a member of a class or genus, requires a judgement. So in (2), you assume that a class has real existence, as group of particulars, from which individuals may be singled out. But we do not have the premise to give real existence to this group, or class. The premise is that the universal is necessarily a particular, and there is no premise that the particular might consist of a number of other particulars.

The issue is how to validate this "class". The class is what we call the universal form, and if it has real existence, it exists as a particular. You want to assume that this particular, has numerous members, other particulars within it. How do you validate that this is real? It appears to me like this is only a matter of an assumption, and if so, it is simply judgement. And if it's just a judgement, how can it be real?

If it is true that all humans are humans, and all rocks are rocks, then the universal forms of human genus and rock genus exist. It is possible that these genera cease to exist if all humans and rocks cease to exist; but nevertheless, the human genus is a different thing from the individual humans it comprises. — Samuel Lacrampe

That a particular object is a rock, or that one is a human being, is a matter of judgement. So I would say that these categories, these classifications, the genus of rock, and the genus of human come into existence as a result of such judgements. I agree that the human genus is different from the individual human beings, because the genus, as the universal, comes into existence through human judgement. The existence of the universal, the genus is dependent on human judgement. The question is how do we assign real existence to something which is dependent on human judgement.

If we assume that the universal has real existence independent from human judgement, then we are right back around the circle, stating that the universal is a particular. If you wish to say that some particulars are members of other particulars (these are the particulars which we call universals), then we still have the problem that this is a matter of judgement. So it appears to me, that this relationship which makes something a member of a class, or genus, is a matter of judgement. In order to make the universal something real, we need to make the judgement something real.

At some point, there isn't any reason to keep arguing, and I think we have reached that point. — Sam26

I don't think so, I think that this is how we resolve issues, by going over them again and again and again. Most of the things you have said make sense to me, but then you stick in this hinge-proposition notion, and it doesn't make sense to me, it's out of place. You seem to whole-heartedly believe this idea, but you are unable to explain it to me, or give examples, in a way which I can understand. I am very interested to understand why this is. So I see this as an instance where I am unable to understand what someone else strongly believes, and I'm not so quick to give up on it.

I think we agree that in instances of justification we reach bottom, or fundamental statements, which we agree are unreasonable to doubt in those instances. These could be self-evident truths, axioms, premises for deductive arguments, etc.. You seem to proceed from this fact to make some sort of inductive conclusion, a generalization about statements themselves, which says that there are propositions (hinge-propositions) which are unreasonable to doubt. I apprehend this as faulty logic.

You seem to proceed from a description of how people behave, that they accept certain propositions as beyond a doubt, to make a general conclusion about propositions themselves, that some of them are beyond a doubt. I think that this is a faulty procedure. Consider this analogy. We state as a fact, that all people find that some foods taste good. Then we proceed to the conclusion that therefore some foods taste good. That is the type of faulty logical procedure I believe is supporting your belief in hinge-propositions.

How does the analogy break down if those rules are all man-made? — Luke

The game analogy breaks down at the point where we have to account for the creation of the rules. If we allow that the rules are man-made, then we ought to also allow that they change and evolve according to how human beings decide they should be. This is contrary to the principal point of the game analogy, which implies that we must follow the rules in order to play the game. We as human beings do not only follow the rules of the game, we create the rules as much as we follow them. Therefore if a "game" consists of a stated set of rules which must be followed, there is no game because there is no such set of rules.

As I explained to Banno, the game analogy assumes a faulty description of what it means for a human being to follow a rule. It assumes that there is a set of rules, which are part of an external object, a game, which the human being follows. In reality, when a human being follows a rule, that individual holds within one's mind, a principle which is adhered to. The principle, or "rule" which is followed, is within the individual's mind. It is not part of an external object such as a game.

If you apprehend the rule, or principle, which the individual adheres to when following a rule, as existing within the individual's mind, then you may understand that the process of learning is a process whereby such rules are created within one's mind. This perspective allows us to understand the fact that rules are created by human beings, because it respects the fact that each human being creates one's own rules to follow in the process of learning.

The problem seems to be that you think you can use terms like "hinge-proposition", which have no real referent because there is no such thing as a hinge-proposition in the real world, only some vague definition or description of what one would be like, and expect to have people understand what you are talking about.

None of us are probably as objective as we think; and we are all probably swayed more by arguments we tend to agree with, so nothing new there. Now just consider the statement you just made, viz., "Clearly what he has written is not as you say, gibberish, because he has millions of followers." I would not associate good thinking or good arguments in terms of having millions of followers. There are millions of followers of astrology, but I surely don't think there is any logic to astrology, or any way one can coherently justify such a belief. So having millions of followers doesn't do anything to lend support to your criticism of my remark. This is an example of the kind of basic mistake that a beginner would make. — Sam26

If it is gibberish, this means that it is unintelligible, meaningless, nonsense. If it is meaningless, unintelligible, nonsense, then people would not be able to follow it. Therefore if the person has millions of followers, it is extremely unlikely that what the person wrote is gibberish, because these people would not be able to follow it if it were. They might be following for other reasons, but that is not likely.

So the issue is that you are seeing what the person wrote as gibberish (meaningless), while millions of others are seeing it as meaningful, and good. You are in no position to judge it as good or bad until you see it first as meaningful, and then take the time to understand it.

You can take the time to understand arguments, judging premises and conclusions for soundness and validity, but to simply dismiss something offhandedly as gibberish, indicates that you have not done that. I have no problem with you dismissing what I write as gibberish in this way, because there is no reason for you to believe that anything I would write would be meaningful. So you might dismiss it as gibberish, not being inclined to take the time to try to understand it, and having no reason to make the effort. But when you dismiss someone like Hubbard in this same way, or something like astrology in this way, as some atheists dismiss religion in this same way, when the evidence is clear that these things are meaningful because they have millions of followers, then I think that this is a problem for you. And this leads me to think that you dismissing me as gibberish is probably an extension of this problem which you have.

What irritates me is not that you supposedly point out some weakness in my argument. It's your constant misunderstanding of basic things; and it's not just what your saying to me, but this is a hallmark of many of your posts with others. Your remarks with Michael in another thread show an inability to understand basic things. People have to continuously correct what your saying, and you seem to change the meanings of words based on private interpretations. — Sam26

Look, I asked you to justify your claim that there are hinge-props which are outside of knowledge, which it is unreasonable to doubt. I explained that if they are outside of knowledge, then it is clearly reasonable to doubt them. Now, I reposted a large part of your reply just above. You started to talk about bedrock propositions, and how they are correct, and not doubtable, then you ended with some example like "triangles have three sides". Then you came right back and said that you never meant this as an example of a hinge-prop.

Sure, I've misunderstood you, but this is not to be blamed on me. You gave me an example of a hinge-prop, then came right back to say "I never said" that was an example of a hinge-prop. In order for me to understand what you are trying to say, you must state it and explain it clearly, and stick by your examples. Double-talk is not conducive to understanding. And the fact that there are numerous others around this sight who employ double-talk and various other forms of sophistry does not justify your mistakes.

What exactly is your background in philosophy MU? — Sam26

BA Hons, plus some post grad courses, and lots of reading. I may have idiosyncratic interpretations of the work I read, but I don't think you can say that my interpretations are wrong. I did pass my courses, and some with quite good marks. My mind tends to focus on different aspects of the work from what other people tend to focus on. With respect to Wittgenstein I did an undergraduate course dedicated solely to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and I've read thoroughly Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.

The reason I ask is that you talk using philosophical jargon, but it's as though it's generally not connected with what I would call good philosophy. And this has nothing to do with agreeing with me, because there are members that I don't agree with, but I respect their arguments. You can tell by the way they write that they aren't just blowing smoke. — Sam26

Ever consider that your capacity to distinguish between "good philosophy" and "blowing smoke" isn't as objective as you think? Perhaps you are swayed more by what "agrees" with you, than you think you are. Consider your reference to LR Hubbard. Clearly what he has written is not as you say, gibberish, because he has millions of followers. I suggest that you simply do not agree with him, like you do not agree with me. And, since I need to repeatedly point to the same weakness in your belief, over and over again, because you refuse to acknowledge this weakness, this irritates you.

Rubbish. The first 250 paragraphs in PI are a series of arguments against your position.
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Here again is that odd refusal you have to read what was actually written. — Banno

I've read all PI. most of it numerous times. Remember when we did that debate, all the direct references I made. There is no coherent argument against my position, just a demonstration that the true reality concerning this issue is within the mind, and because of that it is veiled, inaccessible to observation. So an alternative was proposed, that we ignore all of this in the mind stuff and focus on what is accessible to observation. As I said, it's just a proposal for an easier way. But of course, it skirts the real issue.

A language learner combines a large but limited vocabulary to develop novel utterances using a large but limited grammar. If the language had an unlimited vocabulary, a new word for each situation, it wold be unlearnable. If it had an unlimited grammar, such that words could be arranged in any way, it would be unusable. — Banno

As I said, we have very distinct models, and I think yours is deficient. How could a person learn the first word?

It's not bout the desire to learn, but the capacity to learn. — Banno

The capacity to learn is useless without the desire to learn.

This is exactly the account that Wittgenstein shows to be faulty; here you do no more than blandly assert its truth. — Banno

Yes, I clearly disagree with Wittgenstein on this matter. But Wittgenstein doesn't show my account as faulty or inept, he just proposes his as more simple, easier, less complex. I can go forward producing endless examples and evidence as to how my position is a more accurate description of what really occurs in rule following, such as the example I just gave, the New Year's resolution. But you do not want examples.

I can explain to you why Wittgenstein's perspective on this matter is insufficient though. He defines "correct" as acting according to the rule. This leaves no principle by which to judge rules as correct or incorrect. Therefore when different groups of people have different conflicting, or contradicting rules, each group is correct so long as they are following their rules. Following Wittgenstein's principles, such conflicts are, in principle, unresolvable because each of the conflicting sides is correct. This would require referring to something outside of correct or incorrect, to resolve the issue, like good and bad. But that would be nonsense because it renders correct and incorrect totally impotent and meaningless. Correct and incorrect would have no real value because correct might still be bad.

That is the problem with defining correct and incorrect in relation to the rules, instead of producing rules in relation to a determination of correct and incorrect., where 'correct" is determined in relation to some further principles, other than rules. In the end, we have to refer to the further principle anyway to establish which rules are more acceptable when there is conflict.

We can't step outside of language as a whole, but we might be able to step outside any part of it. — Banno

If you think that you can step outside of any part of the language that you're already using, then you are delusional. What do you propose, that one forget the words which one already knows?

I think I know what I'm saying, but he wants to tell me what I'm saying, as though I don't know my own thoughts. It's just crazy. — Sam26

If this is the case, then you haven't expressed your thoughts very well, because I still don't know what you were trying to say..

It's quite evident that using language is not a matter of following rules, isn't it? There is the matter of trying to best represent what you are thinking, in words, and the matter of having those words interpreted in the way that you were thinking that they would be. There's no rules to consult. Using language is not the simple matter which you, Banno, or Wittgenstein present it as.

never said those propositions were examples of hinge-propositions. We've been talking about this stuff for years. You'd think by now you will know my position. — Sam26

Are you serious Sam26? Must I reprint your entire post?

I'm suggesting based on my understanding of Wittgenstein, that it's senseless for anyone to doubt Moore's proposition, and that it's not an arbitrary decision, but one that's rooted in the nature of Moore's proposition. What is this nature? Certain propositions have at their core something basic, foundational, or bedrock, which makes doubting them nonsensical. This is rooted in the language-game of doubting.
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Correct usage can be seen in particular contexts, but it's not the context itself driving correct usage.
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So is there a general principle that dictates whether some statement is doubtable?
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There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism. There are also statements that are contingently correct, for example, the Earth has one moon. — Sam26

So you produce all this talk about "basic, foundational, or bedrock" propositions, which it would be nonsensical to doubt. Then you give a couple examples, "triangles have three sides", and "bachelors are unmarried" which are "necessarily correct". Now you say that these examples are not examples of hinge-propositions.

Earlier you said:

However, the claim is that this is generally the case, because as Wittgenstein points out, there are cases where it would makes sense to doubt that this is my hand. Thus not every statement of the form "I know this is a hand," would fall into the category of being outside of our epistemological conversations. — Sam26

So I assume that "I know this is a hand" cannot be a hinge proposition because it makes sense to doubt such propositions in some cases.

What I see is "the category of being outside of our epistemological conversations" as a defining feature of a hinge-proposition. But how does it make sense to say that such a statement is beyond doubt? Often we doubt statements if we have no faith or trust in the speaker of the statement, and this is not an epistemological matter, it is a matter of faith.

This is how I understand the situation here. You have given me examples of statements which it would be unreasonable to doubt, but since these statements are of epistemological concerns, they do not qualify as hinge-propositions. Now can you explain how there could be a statement which has no epistemological bearing, yet it would be unreasonable to doubt it. Are these statements of faith? But how could it be, that it is unreasonable to doubt a statement of faith?

This is what you said:

There are statements that are necessarily correct. For example, triangles have three sides, or bachelors are unmarried. There are many necessarily correct statements. And I would disagree that this would validate Platonic Realism. — Sam26

To which I replied that to avoid Platonic Realism you would have to be using "necessarily" in the sense of "needed for some purpose". And if you are using necessary in the sense of needed for some purpose, then the statement is doubtable depending on whether or not the purpose of the person considering the statement is consistent with the purpose for which the statement is needed.

If you are using "necessarily" in the sense of predetermined existence, "impossible to be otherwise", then you have eternal truths, which are nothing other than platonic Forms.

If you think that I misunderstood you, then you should have clarified your position after I made my post explaining this interpretation. But to keep saying the same thing over and over again, insisting that I misinterpret you, without explaining how you could possibly be interpreted in any other way, does not help.

Fuck you, and your childish, insidious games.
I overthrow the game, then I rule.

The living human body is a product of physics. The phenomena of physics is the reason the human body is the way it is. — SonJnana

As I said, I don't understand your usage of terminology. "Physics" refers to a field of study. You claim that you use it to refer to the phenomena studied by that field. The human body is not studied by the field of physics, so your use of terminology is inconsistent to the extent of being very confusing.

How could a formula/direction for the universe have existed prior to the universe? You have to assume that there was a time prior to the universe. That has to be demonstrated. How can spacetime exist before spacetime exists? — SonJnana

You're going backwards. My demonstration indicates that direction must be prior to the physical activities which constitute the living body. therefore direction is prior to the existence of the body. If you want to extrapolate this, and assume that the activities within the physical universe are directed in a way similar to the activities of a living body, then we could come to the same conclusion concerning the physical universe.

But those are assumptions. And it doesn't appear to be appropriate to assume that the activities of the universe are directed in the same way as the activities of a living body, so this might not be a sound assumption. That there is formula/direction prior to the existence of the universe would be a conclusion drawn from that assumption, if you were to accept it. Whatever preconceived notions you may have concerning the universe, and spacetime, are irrelevant to the demonstration, but I think you would find that they would prevent you from making that assumption.

Okay, then I'm confused by you making a distinction between the existence of rules as man-made vs the existence of rules as Platonic Forms. Why make this distinction when games, language and knowledge all have man-made rules? — Luke

This goes back to Sam26's claim that hinge-propositions (I'll just refer to them as "some rules") ought not be doubted, because they are necessary. If these rules are "necessary" in the sense of determined, necessarily existing, such that they cannot be doubted, rather than "necessary" in the sense of needed for some purpose (in which case it could be reasonable to doubt them) then they are nothing other than platonic Forms. In other words, these rules would require the status of "eternal truth", which is equivalent with platonic Form, in order that it would be unreasonable to doubt them.

The point being that the game analogy is good, until we get to the point where the rules need to be justified. To say that you ought to follow this rule requires justification because someone might doubt the correctness of this rule. But justification heads toward an infinite regress when this rule is justified by that rue which is justified by another rule, etc. So Wittgenstein and Sam26 propose that some rules, hinge-props have a special status as "unreasonable to doubt", which makes them necessary. But unless they are claimed to be necessary in the sense of "eternally true" platonic Forms (therefore cannot be doubted), then any claim of special status and "unreasonable to doubt" is just arbitrary, as they are really no different from any other propositions.

So I set up that game again, in which we do make up the rules as we go. — Banno

Now Meta can't mean this as it stands; because obviously if we are making our language up as we go along, and there are no rules, then language would be unlearnable. — Banno

This is not necessarily true, because the learning of language could be grounded in something other than rules. It could be grounded in the desire to learn, and the desire to learn could inspire one to create rules which enable learning. Just because you are unable to conceive of learning language in any way other than learning rules, doesn't mean that this is the case. It may just be that your model of learning is inaccurate.

I submit to you, that the inaccuracy of your model is produced from a misunderstanding of what it means for a person to follow a rule. When a person follows a rule, that person establishes a principle within the mind, and adheres to that principle. This is what following a rule is, like a New Year's resolution, you adopt a principle, hold it in your mind, and adhere to it in your actions. So the "rule" only has real existence within the mind of the individual who is following that rule. You, on the other hand, think that a rule is something existing externally to the individual's mind, and this external rule is what the individual follows. So you have an odd model of learning where a person comes to obey rules which are external to that person's mind, instead of the more accurate representation in which the person creates rules within one's own mind, to follow.

You model "learning" as the person coming to follow certain rules which exist outside the mind. In reality, learning is the process whereby a person creates principles and rules to follow within one's own mind. Once you apprehend learning as a creating of rules within one's own mind, which to an extent mimic the rules of others, then you will see that your objection here is meaningless, because learning just requires the capacity to create rules to follow, and this is something other than actually having rules to follow.

Now, we could name these bits; let's see, they have simple rules to hold them together, like games, so let's call them language games...

Now, in such games, we can hold some bits constant while we are playing; but outside of such games, we could muck around with words as much as we like.

What would then be important would be working out which games we re playing, and which rules we ought be following. Because when we mix the rules of different games, all sorts of weird things might happen. We could invent a sort of therapy that looked carefully at the game we were playing and sorted out what rule goes were, so that we don't get confused... Let's call it "Analytic Philosophy". — Banno

I don't see your point. You appear to be suggesting that we could take a language, and use that language to get outside of language. That's simple contradiction.

This is what I said:

I came to learn this from my study of philosophy, many years of reading. It is a difficult subject requiring much study. Here's something to consider though. A living body consists of parts which are active, and the activity is directed. The activity must be in such and such a way or there would be no living body. The living body would not exist without these parts carrying out their specified activities. If this is the case, then a living body could not come into existence without these parts each carrying out their specific activities. Therefore the formula, or direction (and this is immaterial), as to which parts must carry out which activities, must be prior to the existence of the living body. So we can conclude that this immaterial formula must be prior to the living body. The living body is dependent on the immaterial formula, and follows from it, not vise versa. — Metaphysician Undercover

You were talking about how DNA somehow gives direction. — SonJnana

No I didn't say that DNA gives direction, I said that the physical parts of the living body are directed. DNA is a physical part, and therefore It follows direction.

So with all the terms, I'm referring to the phenomena itself. Why is the phenomena that we study in biology the way it is? Because the phenomena of physics is the way it is. Why is the phenomena of physics the way it is? We don't know. — SonJnana

I agree, you don't know, because you deny the immaterial. I have studied in the field of philosophy, and I do know, the phenomena is the way it is because of the active cause which is immaterial. So you ought not say "we" don't know.

Now it's up to you to demonstrate how we go from our lack of knowledge about why the physics is the way it is, to a metaphysical soul. — SonJnana

I described this already, maybe you should go back and reread, and ask me if you have any questions about what I said..

I don't see your point. I agree that to play such games you must follow the existing rules. My point is that in language and knowledge we do not need to follow existing rules, we make up the rules as we go. Therefore, in this respect, the game analogy fails.

Right, if the rules are created by human beings, then human beings do not have to follow any existing rules because they create the rules which they follow, as they go..

The way biology is the way it is is because of complex biochemistry. Chemistry is the way it is because of the underlying physics. If you're gonna make this argument, you have to go further at a fundamental level and then ask why physics is the way it is, which is what I think you are essentially doing. — SonJnana

You are losing me with your terminology. Let's see if we can straighten some things out. These terms, biology, biochemistry, chemistry, and physics, all refer to fields of study. Do we agree on this? These fields of study, are the way that they are, because human beings developed them to be this way. Do we agree on that? So if we need to ask why physics is the way that it is, this question is very easily approached with the answer that physics developed in this way because it is the result of human intention. Human intention is the cause of the field of study called "physics" being the way that it is. Do you agree?

We create formulas to describe physics. Science creates models to describe the universe. Why is physics the way it is? We don't know. But to leap frog from we don't know to assert there is a metaphysical soul, you have a lot of demonstrating to do. — SonJnana

You seem to be using "physics" here in a way which I am not familiar with. Physicists create formulas to describe the activities of the physical world. If we want to create formulas to describe what the physicists are doing (physics), then shouldn't we turn to philosophy?

Sure, and the existence of the tree is dependent on the seed, the sunlight, the rain and the nutrients within the ground in which it is anchored and growing and so on. I don't see the relevance to the point, though, which was concerned with the discernibility of entities. — Janus

The point is, as I stated earlier, that we in general, do not have a good clear idea of what it means to exist. Therefore doubt concerning claims of existence is warranted.

You know MU, I read your responses not only in this thread, but your responses to Micheal in another thread, and the only one misguided is you. What you write isn't even coherent at times. You talk about Wittgenstein, but you don't even understand much of what he is saying. So don't give me this crap about being misguided, or that Wittgenstein's proposals fail, because it's clear that you're the one who doesn't understand what you're criticizing. Reading your posts reminds me of reading Ron L. Hubbard, most of it is gibberish. — Sam26

Thanks for your opinion Sam26, though this post is not at all helpful. Hubbard is an extremely accomplished author so you honour me with this comparison, despite your idiosyncratic designation of "gibberish".

Consider board games that usually come with a written set of rules. These games are man-made, but this doesn't mean that anyone can use their "free will to decide" what the rules of this game are. You have to follow the rules to play the game, otherwise you aren't playing that game. — Luke

Right, I agree with this.

If two (or more) players agree to play by a different set of rules then they are no longer playing the same game. In order to play the game named on the box, you can't make up the rules as you go. Even if two or more players agree to play a different game with a different set of rules, one person can't simply decide that those rules don't apply to her (and still be playing the same game). — Luke

The point I was trying to make is that in the case of language and knowledge, unlike games of chess and such, we actually do make up the rules as we go. This is very evident from history. So that is where the "game" analogy falls short. When we reach the limits of an analogy we ought to drop it and move on, rather than trying to clutch for straws and apply the analogy where it is not suited.