I couldn’t even begin to untangle the misconceptions in all that. — apokrisis

Yet you just said:

The epistemic cut is perfectly straight-forward. — apokrisis

What is very straight forward is Pattee's category mistakes. Take the map/territory example. These two are both objects, so there is no epistemic cut between these two. They are both things to be observed, and not of the subject, or observer. The epistemic cut is defined by Pattee as the division between subject and object, observer and observed, so there is no epistemic cut between the map and the territory.

Pattee claims an epistemic cut between "initial conditions" and "laws", but these are both of the subject. Then he claims an epistemic cut between "system being measured" and "measuring device", when these are both of the object. The article is just one category mistake after the other, as if Pattee's intent is to create so much confusion surrounding the epistemic cut, that it disappears into vagueness, where he can then claim that it has been bridged. Not at all surprising if he's following Piercean principles.
"

Take a look at the Pizza thought experiment. — Banno

It's just more of the same. What Manzotti is arguing is that we have no need for the word "thoughts". "Thoughts" is a fictional word, it really refers to nothing. But if we must say that it refers to something, then what it refers to is nothing other than the external things which are the objects of thinking. However, he clearly maintains that thinking is an activity which is going on within the human body. Here's a telling quote:

"What we call thinking is a form of action, a way our body organizes our behavior in response to those external causes that our so-called thoughts are about."

But let's cut out all the feigned shock and horror. The epistemic cut is perfectly straight-forward. — apokrisis

Thanks apokrisis, I read the referred article by Pattee. I disagree that the epistemic cut as described, is perfectly straight forward, because Pattee's categories are confused. He starts out by describing it as the division between subject and object, observer and observed. Then he proceeds to compare this to the symbol and what is symbolized, but this is where he looses track of his own categories. Both the symbol, and the thing symbolized are objects, and neither qualifies to be placed in the category of subject, or observer. He tries to represent this as the proper division by allowing that the symbol actively changes, as if it were an aspect of the active subject, but it is not an aspect of the subject, it is an object which is changing. Thus he proceeds to discuss the symbols as if they were active constraints (on the subject side of the epistemic cut), claiming to have bridged the epistemic cut in this way, but all he has done is made a category mistake.

Yes and yes. — Banno

All I see is mention of thought being objects "active within our bodies", like this:

"All the objects we encounter, the objects we call experience, continue to be active in our bodies and brains, continue to be our experience. It is the nature of our fantastically complex brains that they allow these encounters to go on, and to go on going on. The encounters are not “stored” and are certainly not static. They are continuing to happen. They are us."

What makes you think that the thesis is that thinking is outside of our bodies?

Apo seems to use "epistemic cut" as a catch-all phrase.

Well, that's the thesis of the series, so that leaves us nowhere to go. — Banno

Are you claiming that the thesis of the series is that thinking is going on somewhere other than within the person thinking? Did you read any of the articles?

A source mentioned before.

http://www.nybooks.com/topics/on-consciousness/ — Banno

I don't see how the referred articles describes thinking as going on anywhere other than within the person who is thinking. It just appears to be a unique way of explaining what thought (within a person) is. I don't think it is counter-intuitive to say that the person is thinking, rather than that the person's head is thinking. This seems like the way we normally speak. I thought you were trying to say that thinking goes on somewhere right outside of the person.

If so then you as a multi-sensory being who's locus is your body, your body in this limited sense thinks. — Cavacava

I have no problem with this idea, that it is more accurate to say that your body is thinking, rather than to say that your brain (or head) is thinking. The brain is just a part of the whole, which is the self that is thinking, by itself the brain would not be thinking. But this is no different from saying that it is more appropriate to say "I am thinking", rather than to say "my brain is thinking", and this is the normal way of speaking. I thought Banno was suggesting that thinking is going on somewhere outside of the person.

I agree with their definition. That's what I mean by anxiety. It absolutely is troubling. So have you experienced that sort of anxiety? — Agustino

OK, I thought we were discussing anxiety as anxiety, not a defined medical disorder entitled "anxiety". Yes I've experienced anxiety which was troubling, most of us probably have, but as I said, I've never been diagnosed as having an anxiety disorder. So even though I've experienced troubling anxiety, I've probably not experienced "anxiety" according to your definition.. And, as I've explained to you, I've managed to maintain my anxiety at a non troubling level. I've learned to respect it, and I've actually come to enjoy it for it's ability to uplift me.

If you want to restrict this discussion of anxiety to your definition of "anxiety", then you'd better count me out of that discussion.

Well, are you happy about always having to be active in order to avoid anxiety? Many people who experience this aren't happy about it. It's not optimal since it doesn't permit adequate rest and relaxation, nor is it rational to be active just to avoid anxiety - that's just allowing yourself to be controlled by it. Though I'm not sure what to say now that it seems to me you have an entirely different understanding of anxiety than I do. — Agustino

I think your wrong here. Maintaining a reasonable amount of activity tires one, and helps one to rest and relax, as well as sleep better. Without an appropriate amount of activity, your efforts to rest and relax may be futile because you have no exertion to rest from. Then your effort to rest and relax will be your only form of exertion. And that's not a good situation because all you are doing is making things difficult for yourself. Have you ever had difficulty getting to sleep, and found that the harder you try to get to sleep, the more difficult it is to get to sleep? Your arguments on this subject are completely illogical.

Not for the sake of health. And the point isn't that anxiety can be avoided by doing this. On the contrary - the person who practices meditation can avoid being troubled by anxiety (cause you can't eliminate feelings, just be detached from them) when they are active and when they are inactive. This is clearly superior to merely being unaffected by anxiety while being active, since such people are unaffected by it through both inactivity and activity. — Agustino

As I said, being active allows me to avoid being troubled by anxiety. So, if as you say, meditation allows one to avoid being troubled by anxiety, I don't see the basis for your claim that meditation is a better approach. As I've explained, I get enjoyment and pleasure from my anxiety, and being active. So not only do I avoid being troubled by anxiety, I also get benefits from it.

Doubt is grounded in belief (cf. Wittgenstein's On Certainty). — Agustino

Since I've just demonstrated that your claims here are contradictory, your appeal to authority is of the fallacious type. You need to address my demonstration that what you have said is contradictory. I've argued elsewhere that it's very clear Wittgenstein is wrong on this point, due to contradictions such as yours, which arise.

Depending on what you mean by anxiety, it may be possible that you are avoiding the situation of being inactive "out of worry" as the quote says. — Agustino

No, I don't maintain activity out of worry of being inactive, I truly enjoy it and I find that I get much benefit from it. Sorry Doctor, but I think you're reading too much into this.

I think your idea that you can treat the brain as separate is simplistic. — charleton

I'm not treating the brain as separate. It is those who say that the brain is the cause of anxiety who are treating the brain as separate.

Anxiety is a different medical condition than panic attacks. Why is that? Are the doctors idiots? — Agustino

Sorry Agustino, but I will not engage in this childish bickering.

I didn't feel effects to be honest apart from not being able to sleep, and fast heart rate - but it wasn't troubling since it also gave me a lot of energy. — Agustino

Do you know what anxiety is? I mean, know it by having experienced it, not by having read a definition. What makes you think that anxiety is "troubling"? As I explained in my post to TimeLine, my anxiety is not at all troubling, so long as it can be associated within some identifiable future event. It is only if it is allowed to exist as an irrational sort of anxiety, that it might become troubling.

Well, if your "monkey mind" to use a Buddhist expression, forces you to stay active, cause otherwise you experience anxiety, then I think there is something wrong with it. One should be able to be inactive, without experiencing anxiety - that is called relaxation, and it's important. — Agustino

If a Buddhist deals with the threat of irrational anxiety through inactivity, and I deal with the threat of irrational anxiety through activity, then unless I am engaged in bad activities, by what principle would you claim that the Buddhist technique is better than mine?

Only if you equate "not being anxious" with "being healthy". — Agustino

I truly belief that irrational anxiety is a form of unhealthiness. So if I can avoid irrational anxiety by being active, then I can truthfully state that I am being active for the sake of health.

Namely, if it is possible to be inactive at times without being anxious, that is what "being healthy" would qualify as, not distracting yourself (being active) so that you avoid experiencing anxiety. — Agustino

If you, Buddhists, or whoever, find that you can avoid anxiety altogether, by being inactive, and you believe that this is a healthy state, then you might maintain a condition of inactivity for the sake of health.

I however, find that anxiety of the normal variety, that which is not irrational anxiety, is completely healthy, so I have no desire to kill my ambition altogether just because it is associated with some degree of anxiety. In other words, I find most anxiety to be beneifical, and good, because it is a "looking forward" to something, a positive outlook, therefore I encourage this anxiety. Anxiety can be a very encouraging experience, and this is very uplifting, joyous, pleasant, and good. What needs to be avoided is the "let-down", which is often associated with a higher level of anxiety. Since anxiety is such a joyous, uplifting, and encouraging experience, it seems very rational to increase it as much as possible so long as this may be accomplished while still avoiding the associated let-down.

So through my actions, I'm not disclosing my belief? You can't infer, from the way I act, what I believe about the location of the keys? — Agustino

No, your example clearly indicates that you have acted in a deceptive manner by telling me something you know to be false. Why would I believe that any of your actions are anything other than contrived deception?

Right. So does one who experiences an inferiority complex not have the belief that they fail to measure up to whatever standard is under question? Or at the very least the belief that they MAY very likely fail to measure up to it? — Agustino

As the Wiki definition states, the person with an inferiority complex experiences doubt and uncertainty. This is a condition of not knowing what to belief. You construe this as a person who believes oneself to have a certain condition. Your construction is contradictory to the condition described by the definition.

While there is an intimate relationship, what is questionable is whether anxiety disorders contribute to heart disease or the other way around. PTSD symptoms, for instance, where there is a persistence of anxious thoughts, poor and irregular sleep, poor eating etc could be the factors that cause heart problems and so anxiety contributes to the overall health of your heart, but it is not the heart itself that causes anxiety. — TimeLine

You describe anxiety in a person who is in an abnormal state, a condition of illness, PTSD. I think that you would agree with me that anxiety within a person, to a certain extent, is normal. What I suggest, is that we look at anxiety in its normal state, to get a true understanding of what it is, because the abnormal state is a complex, and therefore complicated situation, rendering examination or analysis of individual components nearly impossible.

I have been an anxious person all my life, for as long as I can remember. This is not to say that I have been diagnosed with any anxiety disorder, but that I have been consciously aware of my anxiety for a long time, such that I could look back at my young childhood in a way that I could see how anxiety influenced my psychological response to many different events. Do you agree that to be anxious is to anticipate and to anticipate is to expect? So anxiety exists as a relationship which one has with the future. There are two distinct classes of things anticipated, the good and the bad. We might be able to say that anxiety related to these two types of events is normal anxiety because it is reasonable to be anxious in relation to an impending good thing and to an impending bad thing. But then there is anxiety when there appears to be no such impending good or bad event, and this anxiety is unreasonable. Let's just say that an event is anticipated but it cannot be distinguished as a good event or a bad event, because it is completely unknown.

Now let's take this unreasonable anxiety and see if we can expose it. It cannot be created by thoughts in the brain, because there are no beliefs about any impending events, good or bad. If an impending event was apprehended by the brain, then a judgement could be made concerning this event. But no such impending event is apprehended, and that's why the anxiety remains unreasonable. This is how I would classify unreasonable anxiety, anxiety which is not supported by the brain's judgement of something impending. It cannot be the brain which is creating this anxiety because the anxiety is completely unreasonable to the brain, and the brain's response to that anxiety is one of confusion.

When I had a major car accident, this feeling was ongoing for months after and it was a long while later that realised it was PTSD from the accident. Just prior to the accident, I was being harassed with indirect threats and it re-surfaced some childhood memories to add to the anxious confusion and I was always physically shaking. — TimeLine

Now consider what you've said here. Your anxious condition preceded your car accident. The accident intervened as a significant event which would alter your psychological condition Therefore you ought not attribute your post-accident condition directly to your anxiety, as the post-accident condition may have come about due to the accident, and the anxiety preceded the accident.

What I have found, by examining my childhood experiences with anxiety, is that I was very prone to high anxiety when I anticipated something good. The anticipation of something bad caused significantly less anxiety. The anticipation of something good created a looking-forward, an expectation, which caused the anxiety to build as the time of that good thing approached. Then, when the event occurred, there was a release from that anxiety. The release consistently manifested in some form of disappointment, a "let down", because the event itself could never match the expectation of it, or so the posterior "down state" seems to suggest. Depending on the magnitude of failure in the actual perception of the anticipated event, the disappointment could be significant, with effects that were much more significant and lasting than the actual anxiety prior to the event. Thus my strongest "bad feelings" were associated with the failure of some anticipated event. The bad feelings could progress in any direction, leading to anticipation and anxiety concerning more impending bad things, or perhaps even the completely irrational production of anxiety in relation to no impending event. The condition of anxiety being the preferred condition over the disappointed condition.

So I am suggesting that you differentiate anxiety, which is by its very nature something which is an anticipation of something significant, whether or not the significant thing ever occurs, from the mental conditions which follow from anxiety. In a complex situation these feelings will get all tangled up in a complicated and confused manner, such that a person may not be able to distinguish one from the other.

... but it is not the heart itself that causes anxiety. — TimeLine

I would ask you then, what causes anxiety. Let's put anxiety in its most raw, naked condition, and see if we can determine what it is. I think it's just a feeling that something is going to happen. As I explained above, it cannot be produced by the brain's thinking that any particular event is about to happen. Can we say that the passing of time is like a force upon us? The future is always impending, and the things which are coming must always be dealt with. Anxiety is how our bodies are disposed toward this fact that the future is impending.

So if I tell you I believe the key is on the wardrobe, but then I go and search for it under the cupboard, wouldn't you conclude that I probably lied about what I believe, and my actions indicate better than my words what I truly believe?

Belief cannot be divorced from action. — Agustino

This is not relevant. You have not disclosed any unconscious belief, only the fact that you can consciously hide your belief from me by being deceptive.

An inferiority complex is a belief. — Agustino

WIKIPEDIA: "An inferiority complex is the lack of self-worth, a doubt and uncertainty about oneself, and feelings of not measuring up to standards."

According to Agustino, doubt and uncertainty are belief. You are scaling a wall of contradiction. Be prepared to fall when the reality that there is nothing but contradiction supporting that wall hits you.

*facepalm* - no, an inferiority complex does not cause the belief, it IS the belief. — Agustino

Right, doubt and uncertainty "IS the belief". Wall of contradiction falls on your head.

No, panic attack isn't the same thing as anxiety. One can be anxious without having a panic attack. And people who are generally not anxious at all may have, all of a sudden, a panic attack. But prolongued anxiety may lead to panic attacks or make them more likely. — Agustino

Of course one can be anxious without having a panic attack, but a panic attack is a condition of anxiety. You said: "That's not anxiety, that sounds more like a panic attack". Here's an example of your ridiculousness. Suppose having a "fever" is defined as a particular level of high body temperature, say above 38 degrees. This allows that one can have a high body temperature without having a fever, but fever is still a case of having a high body temperature. Then I refer to someone with a body temperature of 40 as someone with a high body temperature. You object and say "that's not a high body temperature, that's a fever". See how ridiculous your argument is?

I said that if you have to keep active in order not to be anxious, something is wrong inside your mind, and you ought to address whatever that issue is so that you don't have to keep yourself active for the sake of combatting anxiety. — Agustino

This is clearly false because the anxiety is not directed toward any specific object of thought, so it is not my mind which is creating the anxiety. I would call it a state of hyperawareness, similar to what some might call hypervigilance. It is a condition attributable to my entire body, and therefore not something "wrong" inside my mind. Have you ever consumed caffeine and felt the effects of this drug? Would you characterize the condition produced by caffeine as something wrong inside your mind?

Your an odd sort, if you think that the need to stay active indicates that "something is wrong inside your mind".

no, I don't see how it's good to be active for the sake of being active. — Agustino

What I've described is the need to stay active for the sake of being healthy. Again, I say that your an odd sort if you think that the need to stay active for the sake of being healthy is indicative of something wrong inside one's mind.

I'm increasingly intrigued by externalist ideas - the notion that thinking occurs outside of heads. Counterintuitive, but interesting. — Banno

I don't know if such a notion is interesting, as I have no approach to it, never heard that before. I think, and it seems like my thinking is going on in my head, and I have seen no reason to believe otherwise. I must admit that dreams are a bit odd though, seeming to occur somewhere other than in my head. Perhaps you could outline some principles whereby I could consider that my thinking is going on outside my head.

Is belief irrelevant to epistemology? I think not. — creativesoul

The issue is not whether belief is irrelevant to epistemology, it is a question of how an epistemologist ought to define "belief". One could define it as "what is expressed by a statement or proposition". That is what I suggested. But you go on to demonstrate that animals without linguistic capacity demonstrate behaviour which indicates the existence of something belief-like. So you want a definition of "belief" which includes this as belief.

If we proceed in this direction, then we must dismiss the notion that a statement or proposition expresses a belief. We would have to define belief as something deeper within the mind, than what is expressed by the statement. Making a statement, might demonstrate the existence of belief, like the cat "makes a statement", but we cannot say that the statement is an expression of the belief, as the belief is something deeper than the meaning of the statement. We could say that what the statement expresses is "a meaning", or something like that, but the meaning of the statement is not a belief. This would allow us to get beyond the problem of deception, which I was concerned with, because the meaning of the statement would not necessarily be consistent with the belief.

Now there's two problems which need to be resolved. First, the obvious, is that we need some sort of definition of belief. What exactly is a belief if it is not what is expressed as the meaning of the words? The second problem is a little more complicated. We have now driven a wedge between meaning and belief, creating a bifurcation. Assuming that we can come up with a definition of belief which would suit our needs, we now have to account for meaning. The words of a proposition or statement do not represent any particular belief, they simply have meaning. Surely there is a relationship between belief and meaning, but how would we describe this relationship?

What do you think would constitute the completion of a thought? We think with words, so we scramble them around, swap them out in trial and error, so having words for the act of thinking is not what completes the act of thinking. It may be that making the statement is what completes the thought, but then finding the proper words to say is not what completes the thought because this is something other than that. What do you thinking completes the thought, finding the proper words to say, or saying the words? I think it's neither of these two, it's something else which we call judgement.

That is, there is a meaning that is seperate from the public utterance.

That is what is being denied. — Banno

I think of interpretation as value based. So when I say my interpretation is not exactly the same as you, I am not claiming a meaning which is separate from the public utterance, I am claiming that we value, or evaluate that meaning differently.

Do you recognize a distinction between value and meaning? Meaning only obtains purpose when it is related to something else, and in such a relationship it has value. So the meaning which is in a public utterance only becomes purposeful when it is related to something else, given value. The way that each of us relates that utterance to other things varies, and so the way that each of us values that utterance varies.

The folk view would be that you have a meaning in your head that you cannot quite translate into English.

But perhaps instead what is happening is that the thought is incomplete, the meaning unfinished, until the right words are found.

That is, the words make the thought as much as the thought makes the words. — Banno

I don't see the point of this, but I do not see how your conclusion follows from what you present. It is the act of thinking which puts the words together. If one cannot find the required words, this does not mean that there was no act of thinking. So you cannot conclude that just because one could not find the appropriate words to say, that there was no thought there, because there still was thought there. Nor can you say that the words make the thought.

My professors taught me that to demonstrate how I understand another's writing, I should put it in my own words. That's what I got marked on. Can you demonstrate an understanding of what Pattee means by "epistemic cut"?

What I really want is an account of how you use this.

All emotions are primarily generated by the brain. — charleton

I agree that there is much brain activity associated with emotions. But emotions are feelings, and feelings involve many aspects of the nervous system as well as the associated organs. So I think that you hold an overly simplistic opinion to say that emotions are generated by the brain.

That would seem to depend on the kind of anxiety you're referring to. A prey animal may get anxious after catching the scent of a predator, but it's not going to imagine getting attacked and eaten or its children becoming orphans or any other mental simulations that may heighten its anxiety. — praxis

I think it is a simple case of reversing the symptoms with the illness, to say that anxious thoughts cause anxiety rather than to say that anxiety causes anxious thoughts.

Ruminations that bring anxiety don't require any external stimuli. — praxis

Are you suggesting a brain in a vacuum scenario? Are you saying that a brain in a spacious vacuum would be anxious? Anxious about what? Where did the rest of the world go?

The cut is another relative thing, never absolute. And it creates the "private" realm from which either communities or individuals would construct meaning in terms of a sign relation. — apokrisis

I would like to see a good clear explanation of exactly what "epistemic cut" refers to in your usage apokrisis?

It might be private, but how can it be a language, especially if the private aspect is what is not, or what is unable to be, communicated (per your depiction above)? — Luke

I agree that it wouldn't be properly called language, but that makes it no less real. Banno doesn't like "mental furnishing", or any suggestion that the private aspect is real. In reference to the game analogy which we discussed earlier, I argued that the analogy falls short because there are things like personal strategies which are completely outside of the game itself, but nevertheless have significant influence over the way that the game is played. So here, if language is compared to a game, the private aspect goes far beyond language itself (as strategy goes far beyond the game), and has significant influence over the use of language. And that is most evident in my example of the extreme, strategies of deception.

I would avoid such talk. Too close to reification; too much. — Banno

Reification is what is needed though. There is a need to take seriously, as real, the private aspect. This is because things like misunderstanding, misleading, and deception, are very real, though they are of the private aspect. If we do not consider these as real possibilities, we will not consider the need for justification as real either.

Yep. The difference is that a private language is one that cannot be made public even in principle. — Banno

So you do agree that there is private mental furnishing though, private things which will remain private unless made public? Whether there are any private things which cannot be made public even in principle, I do not see as really relevant. What is relevant is that there is private mental furnishing which will remain private if not made public.

Private language speaks to the notion that I have private thoughts in my head that I translate into English and put "out there", that you read and then translate into your private language. Rejecting a private language amounts to rejecting this model, and hence accepting that language is intrinsically a public enterprise. — Banno

Do you recognize that each person has one's own peculiarities, and idiosyncracies, which make one's own interpretation of any statement particular to that individual? If it is impossible for me to communicate to you, exactly, and precisely what I mean, how is that not an indication of private language? In other words, if the public part is always missing something from ideal completion, and perfection in translation, then isn't this the part which is private (cannot even in principle be made public)?

It's not contradictory at all. We don't consciously know everything that we believe. That's why we have things like unconscious drives, or why in CBT the therapist tries to get the patient to become aware of deeply held beliefs that he's not aware of on a conscious and linguistic level. — Agustino

You can assert this all you want, but it would take a lot more than that to convince me that unconscious drives are beliefs. I think that's a simple misuse of the word "belief".

Someone, for example, may have internalised that he is inferior to others, and so, every time he sees someone laughing, say at a party, they assume that they must be laughing about them, and then they will start feeling bad, unwanted, etc. etc. — Agustino

Again, I think that to characterize an inferiority complex as a belief is to misuse the word "belief".

So the therapist has to show the patient that he actually believes, on a feeling level, that he is inferior. Bringing this belief into consciousness allows the patient to dispute it, or to practice cognitive distancing for that matter. This is standard CBT practice, I really don't understand why you're not familiar with it. — Agustino

This is not a case of bringing the belief into consciousness, it is a case of the therapist diagnosing the patient, such that the patient now believes that the symptoms are caused by an inferiority complex. This is no different from when I go to my doctor with symptoms, and the doctor diagnoses me as having the flu. When the doctor tells me this, I then have the belief that I have the flu. It is not the case that the doctor is bringing my already existing belief that I have the flu, from my unconscious into my consciousness.

That's not anxiety, that sounds more like a panic attack. Not the same thing. — Agustino

Yes Doctor. But isn't a panic attack a case of anxiety in your medical textbook?

No, that would be a life controlled by anxiety masquerading as a balanced life. — Agustino

..

Exactly - so your way to "keep it in check" is actually to give free reign to the anxiety to structure your life. You got to keep yourself busy, or else... That's a terrible situation to be in imo, since you lose control, and your anxiety controls you instead. It keeps you continuously on the move, giving no respite.[/quote]

Ha, ha. I'll take this as a joke. All you're saying is that I'm in a terrible situation because if I loose control of myself I'll be in a terrible situation. Doesn't this apply to anyone? You loose control of yourself and you're in a terrible situation.

Edit: It's good to be active.

Isn't there a reason why emotions are said to be "of the heart"? I wouldn't say that anxiety is an emotion, but it's likely more closely related to emotions than to thoughts. Emotions have great influence over the thoughts. The reason I said anxiety seems to be of the heart, is because of the way it feels, like it is centred in the chest, and radiates outward through one's whole body.

The whole body experiences anxiety. — Rich

I think anxiety is a heart based condition rather than brain based.

I had a physio do some work on my back today. She was asking for descriptions of pain here and there, and how deep, what sort - quite precise. And she appeared to use this information to fathom where to push and prod, because my spine is now much straighter and less painful.

So those pains were not private. — Banno

But don't you think that those pains were private prior to you describing them to the physio? And, that it was your capacity to refer to these private things, when they were private, which enabled you to make them public?

I think that the way in which we make public, those things which are private, is an important aspect of epistemology. This is how beliefs are justified. If you deny that things like beliefs are ever private, you ignore the reality of deception, and the need for justification.

I find regular doses of Vitamin D3 to be very helpful.

But it does mean that When we talk about Uluru, we are talking about that very thing, and not about some concept-of-Uluru that is distinct from the rock.

...

That leaves private concepts and notions and languages and so on. Which is an odd but interesting way for us to differ.

Because I reject the very notion of such things, and suppose myself to be following Wittgenstein in so doing. Yet you also understand Wittgenstein but apparently leave room for private mental furnishings.

How can this be? — Banno

How would you interpret a situation when a word is being used to refer to a private concept, a mental furnishing? You might say that the word is being used to refer to something imaginary, something which doesn't exist, but wouldn't that just be validating the existence of such things, by saying that there is something imaginary which is the thing that the word refers to? You could insist that the word is just being used to refer to nothing, but how would that work, that we could use words which are referring to nothing?

All that's needed, is to understand that there is brain activity that precedes or coincides with our actions, and that some actions are expressions of beliefs, quite apart from statements or propositions. — Sam26

This is the point I took up with creativesoul. I don't believe that the claim that any actions other than those such as statements of claim and propositions, "are expressions of beliefs" could ever be properly justified. There is far too much involved in an action, other than a belief.

There is a very complex relationship between many beliefs and many actions, and numerous other aspects of the human psyche which are related to beliefs and actions, that no single belief will ever be adequately correlated to any single action, except in the case of statements. Simply put, there is a lot more to actions than belief, so actions cannot be considered to be expressions of belief, unless the expression of belief is explicit.

So in your opinion, anxiety is biological, and the anxious person cannot do anything involving the alteration of beliefs, to reduce anxiety? — Agustino

No. that's not what I said. I said that anxiety gets directed toward particular beliefs, so the anxious person can, with conscious effort, direct the anxiety toward various activities, aiming for a balanced life.

I disagree with you - a belief is what translates in a way of acting. If I act a certain way, then that is what I really believe. Beliefs go deeper than what one is conscious of - we can have beliefs we're not even aware of. — Agustino

I do not believe that a belief translates into a way of acting. I think that's a simplistic notion. It is very clear, that we cannot deduce, in a necessary way, the existence of any particular belief from the observance of any particular action, nor can we demonstrate that any particular belief will necessitate any particular action. Life is far more complex than how you make it out to be.

And, since "belief" is commonly defined as an opinion, or acceptance of an idea, I think that your claim that we can have beliefs which we are not aware of, is contradictory.

Anxiety may not relate to any knowledge, belief or information. It can come seemingly uncaused, but due to chemical factors in the brain, or can even be induced electromagnetically. — charleton

Right, that is my experience with anxiety. it always comes on as a general feeling, over my entire body, especially in the chest area, almost like an extreme form of anticipation, as if my whole body is prepared to act, but with no particular act being imminent. This inclines me to think about what needs to be done. I may experience it day after day, but if I manage to maintain a high level of activity, directing my mind toward this and that, as important objects, and things already determined as needing to be done, this is effective in expending the energy build up, subduing the anxiety and the urge to think about what needs to be done. If I allow the anxiety to well up, I may be overcome by irrational thoughts and beliefs.

Anxiety is only elicited as a response because, somewhere deep down, you believe you may not be able to handle what the world throws (or can throw) at you.

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As I said in my previous post, there is a reason why you experience anxiety, and it often has to do with some deep-seated beliefs about yourself and your capacities. — Agustino

I would not agree with this. I would think that anxiety is deeper seated than beliefs. Having an anxious condition, or disposition, leads one to feel anxiety toward certain beliefs, not vise versa. Anxiety is probably developed directly from the condition of one's metabolic system, and manifests, or in some cases festers as anxiety concerning specific beliefs.

There is a distiction between generalized anxiety (and depression) and situational anxiety. — Hanover

That is what I think, but I also think that anxiety itself, properly exposed and described, is of the generalized variety. Situational anxiety is just the particular manifestation of general anxiety. And if this is the case, then anxiety in general can in principle, be dealt with through channeling it toward appropriate situations. Maintaining numerous objects of anxiety may help to maintain a high level of activity, and avoid obsession. Inactivity and depression may feed off each other.

One of the problems of anxiety is that there are drugs which offer speedy, effective relief: benzodiazepines (Xanax, Ativan, and others; some people still rely on barbiturates. Then there's alcohol and various recreational drugs). They do a good job of suppressing anxiety, but people become acclimated to the drugs; gradually increased doses are needed and eventually they just don't work anymore. In the long run one has to find other solutions. In the long run we're all dead, as John Maynard Keynes observed. — Bitter Crank

One ought not consider anxiety to always be an evil to be suppressed with drugs. That, as you imply, is a problem. Anxiety is very closely related to things like anticipation, and ambition, which may be beneficial. In other words, there are probably more productive ways of dealing with most instances of anxiety, than the attempt to suppress it. Suppressing anxiety may lead to depression. The issue being one of maintaining balance. As the metabolism of each individual human being varies, so does our need for activity.

We might be genetically conditioned to be sensitive to "in-group" and "out-group" distinctions--in-group ones being favored. The capacity to feel hatred might be genetically supported, and hatred is one way to defend the in-group from the out-group. Or putting it differently, we feel antipathy towards out-groups. — Bitter Crank

I think that there is evidence which is significant to evolutionary theory, which demonstrates that "in-group" "out-group" discretions are deep, to the core, and fundamental to living organisms.

I've often wondered how it is, that with the genetic variation which is necessary for evolution and the variation of species, why is there not just all sorts of random individual living beings, completely different from each other, in random ways. Instead, life has developed into very specific, and distinct species. In order for what has occurred, to occur, it is necessary that members of a particular variation stick together, breeding only with each other, excluding the others, thus proceeding toward the creation of a distinct species. In other words, in order that the process of evolution has created distinct identifiable species, it is necessary that the organisms have inherent within them, some sort of "in-group" "out-group" perspective.

But if we are genetically inclined to distinguish between in-group and out-group, we also seem quite capable of embracing people who belong to out-groups and to expel in-group members who violate some norm. — Bitter Crank

This might be a question of the role of morality within a society. And there is wide ranging belief as to the role of morality. Some might say that morality is there to encourage and enhance what comes naturally to the human being. Others might argue that morality is meant to suppress what comes naturally, as bestial tendencies which ought be replaced with artificial principles.

Wouldn't it be much wiser to establish what all mental ongoings are existentially dependent upon? Wouldn't it serve our interests here more if we were to 'look' at every example imaginable, from imagining to dreaming to doubting to...

All of them. What do they all have in common in terms of their elemental constituency? — creativesoul

The subject is epistemology. So our goal ought to be to limit the object of inquiry to that which is relevant to the subject. If we were discussing metaphysics or ontology here, we would be looking to broaden the object, as you suggest, to consider what all thinking has in common, and consider what all activity has in common, but since this is epistemology, we want to limit our field of observation, to focus directly on what we call "knowing".

There is a classical division made by some epistemologists, which separates knowing-that, from knowing-how. We do not deny that animals without language know how to do many things, but epistemologist make this division in order to focus specifically on knowing-that, as the type of knowing which is important to epistemology. Even though it is a well-argued point, that knowing-that is just a special type of knowing-how, making this classification allows the epistemologist to limit the field of inquiry and focus on a more specialized object.

Is it your argument, that the epistemologist ought not give value or respect to this division, and broaden the field of inquiry to include all instances of knowing?

It's simply a term that refers to mental activity that precedes our actions, and I don't think that when philosophers and others use the term, that they had in mind some one-to-one correspondence between one's belief and a particular brain state. — Sam26

The separation between one's actions, and the mental activity which precedes one's actions, may not really be called for. One's brain activity is a part of one's actions. To position the mental activity, or brain activity as prior in time to one's actions, seems to express some form of prejudice which hasn't been justified. In reality, one's brain activity, and the rest of one's actions, all coincide in time. So even if you think about what you are going to say, prior to saying it, you are still thinking about it as you are speaking, and readjusting what you are saying, as you are speaking. The situation is such that one's brain activity is extremely complex, and far reaching, constantly extending far toward things past and future, near and far, such that the activity is involved with much more than just one's actions which may be observed as outward expressions.

So if we think of brain states as generalized brain activity that precedes one's actions, and by extension one's beliefs, then we get a picture that these actions/beliefs don't arise in a vacuum. I think you would agree with this. So when you say, "...there must be a brain state that corresponds [with] Banno's belief that tomatoes are good;" I say, yes and no, which means, it depends on what you mean by corresponds with. If you mean some one-to-one correspondence, then no, I don't think that. If you mean that there is brain activity happening prior to your actions/beliefs then yes, but there is no brain state X that one can point to that says, ahhh, Banno believes Y. — Sam26

Belief becomes a very difficult subject to understand under the terms of brain activity. One could demonstrate brain activity which corresponds with, or more precisely, coincides with, Banno stating "tomatoes are good", but this brain activity would not correspond with Banno's belief that tomatoes are good.

The belief itself, must be classed as some sort of memory. The brain activity, which is the act of recollection, and Banno making the statement, "tomatoes are good", is completely different from whatever activity it is which supports that memory in a state of belief, which is more properly the referent of Banno's "belief" that tomatoes are good

The animal mind is embedded in the flow of the moment. It is responding directly to the here and now in terms of some adaptive system of conception and exploration. There is just no mechanism to transcend that flow. So an animal doesn't "hold beliefs" in that it could objectify a thought and wonder whether it is actually true or not. It just expresses a belief in interpreting the world a certain way. And the "truth" is then discovered in terms of the pragmatic consequences. The animal prospers or suffers. — apokrisis

The here and now is always gone and past, by the time you say it's here and now. And when we reflect on the past, how would one really know whether it's the truth or not? It appears to me, like defining truth "in the terms of pragmatic consequences" is just an escape from real truth. It's like saying that we can't know real truth, because as soon as anything happens it's in the past, and we can't be absolutety certain about what we've sensed, and our memories, so let's just define truth in terms of pragmatic consequences.

So the measurables - the truthmakers - are not grounded in "the world", or even "our direct experience of the world". The truthmakers are grounded in our conception of how the world should look in terms of some set of signs, some set of measurements, that usefully converts a running temporal reality into the kind of timeless representation of reality that our theories of the world can deal with. — apokrisis

All this is very questionable to me. First, why would you say that measurables are truthmakers? Wouldn't it be more precise to say that the act of measuring is the truthmaker? And so we would produce our signs such that they will best enable us to make our measurements. Then truth must be related to how we produce our signs, not to how we apply them.

So... how do we know what Jack believes?

I mean, that's what it boils down to... — creativesoul

If Jack cannot tell you what he believes, then what would lead you to think that Jack believes anything? You refer to Jack's behaviour, and claim that Jack displays signs of belief. But is this really true? What are the real signs of belief? The real signs of belief are statements of belief. But you seem to look for actions in Jack which would be consistent with specific statements of belief, and claim that because these statements are consistent with these behaviours which Jack demonstrates, then Jack must have these stated beliefs. But is it so simple? We know that a person demonstrating behaviour which is consistent with a specific belief, does not necessitate the conclusion that the person holds that belief. So why make such a faulty conclusion with respect to other animals?

If we restrict "belief" to what is stated, we avoid the problem of trying to determine what one believes through the analysis of one's other actions. A belief is what is represented by a statement. This allows us to focus strictly on the statement. Only if there is reason to think that the individual is not sincere in the statement, do we need to turn to other actions to prove that the statement is not a real belief.. In this sincerity is where we find the elements of truth.

I'm talking about not only Jack's behaviour(the evidence) but also Jack's mental ongoings... Banno rejects all things mental(I think). — creativesoul

Yes, I'm concerned with mental ongoings as well. The position I'm taking is that we need to distinguish what type of mental ongings constitute belief, from those which are something other than belief. As I was saying in another post, we talk about "holding" a belief, so it is implied that belief is a static thing, which remains unchanged. If a belief changes, it is no longer the same belief, so a changing belief is not a belief. This I compared to our ability to maintain a memory. If one's memory of some incident changes over time, it is no longer a true memory. And though the person might insist, I remember this, if it is inaccurate, it cannot qualify as a memory. When the person's memory is wrong, we can't truly say that it is a memory which the person recollects, it's a sort of fabrication.

Surely by now you've seen my definition for "belief", "thought", and any/all other terms referring to mental ongoings? It is as precise as they come and has the broadest possible scope of application. There are no exceptions.

You're working from the presupposition that behaviour alone is adequate for establishing belief demonstration...

It's not.

There's a bit of critical thinking involved as well, particularly when the beasties in question do not or cannot tell us what's going on 'in their heads'... — creativesoul

Actually, what I'm thinking is that behaviour is an indication of the mental ongoings. What I want, is to be able to say what type of behaviour indicates the existence of mental ongoings which would qualify as belief. And so I say that making statements and proposition is a natural choice as that type of behaviour. When mental ongoings are put into words, there is a type of stability which is provided by this. Words are much easier to remember in a precise way, than observed images and other sounds, and things like that. So when we memorize something, we put it in words in our minds, then we remember the words, telling us what happened. So the use of words, as static, unchanging symbols, provides that stability which I am looking for as the qualifying feature of "belief".

I'd agree with Harry, that hate speech is generally the result of hate. Where that hate comes from, and whether it is the result of other hate speech is a more difficult question. Hate is an attitude, and the formation of different attitudes, though it is extensively studied, is not well understood. I think that a large part of attitude is learned though, and much of what is learned is set by example. Hate though, being a strong and irrational attitude may stem from things much deeper than just what is learned. So as with many other traits, we'd have to ask if hate is genetically conditioned.

OK, hovering, I never thought of that. Thanks.

Witt talked about belief being shown via behaviour. Banno, Sam, and others have also talked in such terms as well as directly attributing belief statements to Jack and saying that Jack believes. — creativesoul

Belief is definitely shown by behaviour, I think that's beyond question. I can't think of any other way to show anything other than through behaviour. The question would be if there is a special type of behaviour which shows believe, so that we can separate behaviours which are demonstrating beliefs from behaviours which are not. The defining feature, of "showing a belief", might be the expression of propositions, statements, claims, and assertions. These are expressions of language.

The problem being, that if we don't define "belief" in some precise way, so as to draw the line between what behaviour does and does not show belief, then the argument will be made that all animals, and even plants show belief. The panpsychos will even argue that rocks show belief. But there seems to be a natural division in types of behaviour, between language use, and behaviour which is not language use, which serves as a good basis for the definition of belief. Belief is the type of thing which we express with statements and propositions, so why not define belief in this way, as the thing which is expressed by the proposition? Then those types of behaviours, that you mention, like Jack's, which appear to show belief, don't really show belief under this strict definition, they show something else. The something else we would have to explain with other words, such as "habit", "instinct", or other mental capacities which aren't quite as specialized as "belief".

Are you charging my explanations here with having logical problems? — creativesoul

I am saying that there are logical problems involved with not producing a clear and precise definition of "belief", which distinguishes behaviour which demonstrates a belief, from behaviour which does not. Otherwise, it may be argued that any behaviour which demonstrates consistency demonstrates belief.

A state of turbulence is a state of change. — Janus

Since my OED defines "state" as the existing condition of a person or thing, and "change" as the act or instance of making or becoming different, I think that you ought to recognize that you have just stated a contradiction. There is no such thing as "state of change", it's no less contradictory than the square circle.

So which one of you is going to offer a sensible and coherent explanation of how Jack is capable of believing, if he cannot form and hold belief, has no language, has no ability to think in statements, and all belief has linguistic content? — creativesoul

Ever consider the possibility that Jack is not capable of believing? Perhaps your description of what is going on with Jack is wrong. You describe jack as holding a belief, but maybe there is really something else, other than believing, which is going on within Jack.

And don't ask me for an alternative explanation, because this is not necessary, in order to suggest that another explanation is wrong. If an explanation has logical problems it is likely wrong, but it doesn't require an alternative explanation to demonstrate this. In other words, we can dismiss a belief concerning a certain phenomenon, as unacceptable, without necessarily producing an acceptable one.

"The fluid was in a turbulent state". — Janus

"State" here, signifies unchanging, static, passive. You have designated a static turbulence, like in my post I said that repetition without change could be called a state. But without change, and therefore passivity is essential to "state". A turbulence without change is passive.

How could a state be anything other than static?

What is a neurological token?

This came from Sam26 musing about beliefs as both mental states and states of the brain.

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Whatever we use to reasonably explain his behaviour. — Banno

States of the brain, mental states, cannot reasonably explain behaviour, because the former is passive and the latter is active. So this belief is lacking in truth.

Jack forms and holds belief, but not in the manner described in the common historical account(JTB) of belief. — creativesoul

The JTB account of belief requires that the belief be true. I suggest that if you take a good look at the criteria for "true", you will find that it requires what you call "thinking about thought and belief". In its primitive form, truth refers to an internal process, a process of thinking about thought and belief, requiring sincerity and honesty.

Memory for example is based in repetition, and honesty is imperative to accurate memory. In this process of thinking about thought and belief, we establish an association between the symbol and what is symbolized, which must remain true (not permitting variance). In the case of memory, repetition without variance constitutes "true". Repetition without variance may in some cases be referred to as a state.

It is very doubtful that Jack has the capacity to hold a true belief, memory without variance. The fact that memories change over time calls into question Jack's ability to "hold" a belief. And holding is essential to maintaining truth. Written language, and other physical markings such as monuments have always served to aid human beings in the endeavours of truth.