My statements are:

1) Nothing is immune to doubt
2) The logic of doubt, i.e. when we decide to doubt and when we decide not to doubt, is relative
— Magnus Anderson

That's a good way of stating the issue with doubt. Because of #2, the fact that doubt is relative to the particular individual, in the particular situation, therefore #1 is true.

For every individual there are many things which are and are not subject to doubt. But these things vary from one individual to another, such that nothing is beyond doubt in relation to everyone in every situation.

There are many things which I doubt, which Banno finds unreasonable to doubt, and there are completely different things that I doubt which Sam26 finds unreasonable to doubt. And there are also things which Banno and Sam26 doubt, that I do not doubt. There is not a whole lot of consistency between one person and another with respect to what we doubt, and this is what makes it unreasonable to claim that there are some things which are beyond doubt. But of course Banno and Sam26 doubt this, just like I doubt that there is anything which is unreasonable to doubt.

Why is the illness different than just the thinking there is a conspiracy against him? I would say the illness is the thinking itself. That has certainly been my experience with anxiety - there is nothing behind the thinking that causes it as it were. — Agustino

We all think, thinking is not an illness. What is "behind the thinking that causes it" is the person's interests. We all have interests, and we all think. Our interests determine the objects we direct our thought toward What makes the thinking that there is a conspiracy theory against him, different from normal thinking, is that it is an odd and unsubstantiated object, produced by an unhealthy form of personal interest, paranoia.

There is a very very big problem with what you're saying here. You assume anxiety is like having the flu, and that's NOT the same thing, not even close. — Agustino

No I don't assume anxiety is like having the flu. We've been through this already. I assume that anxiety is a normal aspect of a normally functioning human being, just like body temperature. Raised anxiety is a symptom of illness just like raised body temperature is a symptom of the flu. You just can't seem to grasp the concept that normal, highly functioning human beings have anxiety. You want to insist that having anxiety is not normal, that it's an illness.

The flu is caused by something that is clearly biological - namely a virus, which we can find and identify in people who have the flu. There are no such things in the case of anxiety. — Agustino

I think it is clearly false to say that there are no biological causes of anxiety. The human body is a very complicated biochemical system. Adrenaline for instance is known to be associated with anxiety, as a cause. And, there are many other chemicals which are known to influence anxiety.

That is why CBT - which is basically curing your anxiety by thought - is one of the most successful methods. — Agustino

CBT is not curing anxiety with thought, it is activity. It is a therapy of coordination between thought and behaviour.
WIKIPEDIA:"Instead, CBT is a "problem-focused" and "action-oriented" form of therapy.

I already told you that I deal with my anxiety through the means of activity, and you scoffed at me, saying that I had a monkey mind and that I should meditate instead. You still persist with your double talk.

So I don't see why you find "curing pathological anxiety through thought alone" so hard to get your mind around. It seems to me that you just don't have solutions to the problems I raised earlier. — Agustino

If CBT is your evidence of curing pathological anxiety with thought alone, then you haven't got a case. As I said in the last post, I haven't seen these "problems" with my position, which you keep alluding to, yet. I think you're imagining things.

The thinking itself is the illness, and quite possibly contributes to the persistence of the illness. — Agustino

Wow, thinking is an illness which contributes to the persistence of itself. Now I've heard everything. Are you sure you're not suicidal?

Well, let's take a condition where rumination is one of the primary symptoms. What would you say about the case of a man who, for example, thinks that there is some government conspiracy against him and continuously ruminates on that? It's something called paranoid delusions, thinking that someone is out there to harm or hurt you, and often people ruminate on such issues to no avail, since these problems cannot be solved. — Agustino

I think that such a person has an illness which makes him feel like there is a conspiracy against him. The rumination itself is not the problem, it is what he is prone to be ruminating on, that is the problem.

It seems to be a problem with thought itself, with the very nature of possibility. — Agustino

No it isn't a problem with thought itself. It is a problem with what the person is inclined to think about, the person's attitude toward thought.

So since according to you, there is no difference between the healthy type and the ill type of rumination (or anxiety, they are somewhat associated), how would such a man go about extricating himself from such habits of thought? It is the nature of possibility, that no matter how much evidence to the contrary you get for something, you could always interpret it as actually confirming evidence! The less pathological cases of this, we refer to them as "being in denial". — Agustino

As I said, I am not a doctor. The man in your example has an illness which affect his attitude toward thinking. Preventing him from thinking (ruminating) may address the symptom, but it doesn't address the problem.

So it seems that it is the nature of thought itself that such a person does not have means, through thought alone, of extricating himself from that condition. — Agustino

Right, the man is ill. The man cannot cure his own illness "through thought alone". Would you expect to cure a flu by thinking about it?

I agree with you somewhat, however, the point is that you can never be 100% certain that the so-called problem cannot be resolved. And you never know if what you're trying to do is really impossible - maybe you've missed something, etc. So the mentally ill person will generally find refuge in this - not being able to be certain. Not to mention that if a problem is very very big - let's say that their survival depends on it - even if it is just a teeny tiny bit short of impossible to succeed in it, it is still worth trying to solve it! So as you can see, for these two reasons, the approach you suggest is problematic when it comes to pathological types of anxiety and rumination — Agustino

I don't see the "problematic" you refer to. The healthy person has a healthy attitude toward what to think about, and what not to think about. The attitude does not come from the thinking itself, it comes from elsewhere. So the thinking itself is not the problem.

Now you claim that there is no clear distinction between the healthy type, and the unhealthy type - so does this mean that the unhealthy type can switch over to the healthy type, and how would this happen? — Agustino

Yes, the unhealthy type can switch to the healthy type if the reasons for the unhealthy disposition are determined and cured. And vise versa of course. Imagine for example, a person who uses psychoactive drugs habitually, for recreation. That person might suffer delusions similar to what you have described. That person can quit using the drugs and develop healthy thinking.

And this is the dichotomy that I'm criticising. When I say that I doubt something, I'm not just saying that I don't have certitude; I'm saying that I think it unlikely. — Michael

Oh, I see that you insist on using "doubt" differently than me. You want to restrict "doubt" such that it would only be used if you thought something unlikely. For the purpose of epistemology, I do not think that this is a good definition. I think that knowledge ought to held to a higher standard.

That's not right at all. To put in some semi-arbitrary percentages, it's certain if the probability is 100%, likely if the probability is >=75%, unlikely if the probability is <= 25%, and impossible if the probability is 0%. — Michael

Your numbers are totally arbitrary. If you use "doubt" in this way, you have no clear division as to what probability ought to be doubted, and what probability ought not be doubted. Therefore you have just deferred the doubt, such that we must now doubt whether or not to doubt any particular probability. Do we doubt a 60% probability, 80%, 90%? If we make a determination that we ought to doubt 90%, but not 91%, then we can still doubt that judgement, and also doubt the judgement of the judgement. All you have done is inverted the infinite regress of justification so that it now appears as an infinite regress of doubt. .

We often use the term "doubt" to refer to something with a low probability, not just to anything that isn't certain. If the likelihood that I will win the game is 95%, then I'm not certain that I will win, but neither am I doubtful. I'm pretty sure that I will win. — Michael

But 95% probability does not remove doubt. Nor does 99%. I've been explaining doubt as an attitude. It is dichotomize with certitude, not certainty (in the sense of "it is certain"), so let me straighten out my categories.

If, when it is 95% certain that you will win the game, you do not proceed with the attitude that it is possible for you to lose (doubt), then you probably will lose. It's like a work place accident, if your attitude is that statistics show it's highly unlikely for me to be injured on my job, therefore I do not need to be careful in my actions, then you will be the one to get hurt. So doubt is the attitude which encourages us to avoid the possibility of mistake. It is to be respectful of the possibility of mistake. Even when that possibility is very low, we must respect it, and this reflects in our actions, as an effort to avoid mistakes wherever they are apprehended as possible. Doubt must coexist with confidence, in order that we will proceed, but certitude is a type of extreme confidence, like arrogance, which negates doubt, making us lose respect for the possibility of mistake.

"Pretty sure" isn't "certain", but neither is it "doubtful". You're setting up a false dichotomy. — Michael

As I said, the dichotomy is between certitude and doubt, as these are both attitudes which negate each other. The dichotomy is not between "doubt" and "certain". "Pretty sure" is not certitude. It inspires the confidence required to proceed, while allowing the doubt which inspires the effort to avoid mistake. Certitude inspires the confidence to proceed but without any respect for the possibility of mistake. "Pretty sure" indicates some degree of doubt.

If by doubt you just mean "not certain". But it can also mean "not likely". — Michael

Yeah, that's how we've been discussing doubt, in relation to certainty, in the sense of "it is certain". "It is likely" has a different meaning from "it is certain". If we can exclude doubt with "it is likely", then "it is certain" and "it is likely" end up meaning the same thing, as without a doubt. Wittgenstein's proposal was to base certainty in something which is unreasonable to doubt, but then "it is certain" is reduced to "it is likely", i.e. that which it is unreasonable to doubt.

It's possible that I will win the lottery tomorrow, but I'm not justified in doubting that I won't. — Michael

This would exclude anyone from buying a lottery ticket. And that's why Wittgenstein's argument, that doubt can be excluded if it is unreasonable, is itself an unreasonable argument. Many would agree that it is unreasonable to buy a lottery ticket, yet they still do it.

As I said, if you cannot demonstrate certainty, then doubt is justified. If you cannot demonstrate with certainty, that I will not win the lottery, then my buying a ticket is justified.

The possibility of mistake pertains to all of our beliefs; does this mean that we are justified in doubting all of our beliefs? — aletheist

Yes, it extends to all beliefs. But it is personal, private, as an attitude. You decide which beliefs you will and will not doubt, and I decide which beliefs I will and will not doubt.

In any case, what you state here is a belief, and it may be wrong; therefore, by its own criterion, I am justified in doubting it. — aletheist

Right, that's exactly what I am trying to demonstrate. I don't doubt this, because I have an attitude of certitude toward it. But my attitude of certitude does not make it a certainty. I haven't been able to demonstrate to you that it ought to be accepted, therefore you have an attitude of doubt toward it. So it is clearly not a certainty. However, unless you demonstrate to me that I ought to release my attitude of certitude, I will not doubt it.

Each person has certitude toward some beliefs which are held by that person. Each person has doubt toward some beliefs held by others. The beliefs which one has certitude toward, and doubt toward vary from one person to another. Therefore, when I take into account the attitudes of all human beings, I cannot say with certitude that there is any belief which will not be doubted by someone. So I cannot accept the claim that there are some beliefs which it is unreasonable for anyone to doubt.

Okay, so then how would you differentiate between the kind of rumination expressed in the article, and the kind of rumination you're talking about? Should a different word be used for each? And what is the difference between each? — Agustino

I don't claim to be a doctor on this matter. You, not I, seem to think that there is a clear distinction between anxiety of the healthy type, and anxiety of the ill type, so perhaps you should offer your expert opinion. I would say though, that if one consistently ruminated on some problem, and failed to ever resolve that problem, the person's failure to recognize one's own inability to solve the problem, might be a problem itself.

It would be like an issue of trial and error. How many times can you keep trying to have success in relation to a particular endeavor, before you realize that it is time to quit trying? Notice though, that an athlete never gives up, by initiating a strategy of practise, with increments of success as goals. The athlete keeps trying and trying, and in so doing, betters oneself. I would say that the same thing is probably the case for mental activity. The more you ruminate, the better you get at it. So if one can discipline oneself to ruminate over the same problem for a very extended period of time, without suffering negative consequences (frustration, panic, etc.), this would be very good. But if an individual without practise in ruminating suddenly found oneself to be immersed in it, this might be like a person with no experience in skiing suddenly finding oneself in the middle of an Olympic slalom course, with skis on.

How would you describe the case of a person (it happened to me when I suffered of anxiety/OCD) who spends 2 hours trying to remember if he has closed the door to the house when he left, and questioning every detail of his memory, while he has other work to do at the same time, and therefore doesn't get on with that work? — Agustino

That is an issue of determining one's inability to solve the problem, knowing when to quit. If you are driven toward attempting to resolve problems which cannot be resolved, and you cannot recognize your own inability to solve that problem, that is an issue. It is a case of trying to do the impossible, setting yourself up for failure. And the more time you spend trying to do it, the bigger the disappointment when the reality hits you. Imagine someone hands you a jigsaw puzzle in which each piece came from a different puzzle, so that no pieces fit. How long would you work at that puzzle before you realized, something's wrong here, I'm trying all these different things with no success, this is a waste of time? If something drives you to continue, thinking for some reason that you can actually make things fit, by sheer willpower, then you've got a problem.

That certainly is exactly what I mean; ever had those dreams where you need to move or get out of somewhere, but you physically just cannot go and try all you can, your body will not move? Or, say you are afraid in this dream and want to scream but there is no sound to the scream? — TimeLine

Recently, in a dream, I climbed onto a high roof with someone else, to do some repair. Suddenly, I started screaming as if for help, like a little child. This surprised me, even in the dream, because the roof wasn't extremely steep and I'm not afraid of heights. Then I was going down the sloop of the roof as if I was being drawn toward the edge. I was panicked with fear, but at the same time, I knew that this is not difficult, the roof is not too steep, I must just keep away from the edge, and I will not fall. For some reason though, I could not control the fear. And the fear overwhelmed my power to do what I knew I could do, stay away from the edge. The fear overcame me to such a great extent, that I was ready to give in and let the thing I feared take me. It was like the fear was so strong that it forced me to give in to the thing that I feared, when I knew that I could avoid it. This dream very much surprised me because that is not something I would normally do. In a dangerous situation, such as driving a car which has gone out of control, I'll fight it to the end, trying to regain control.

The only real life thing which I can find to compare this to, is falling asleep when I'm driving. As I get mesmerized by the monotony of the road, my eyes want to close all by themselves. I know very clearly in my mind, that I cannot let this happen, and I believe that I have the power to prevent this from happening. However, the more I concentrate on, or focus on preventing my eyes from going closed, it is such a singlized, simple, boring thing, that it produces an inactive mind which actually increases the urge for my eyes to go closed.

I suppose this is just like death itself. It's one of those things that you try to avoid, and we can usually avoid it by being in control of ourselves. However, eventually we have to face the decision. Am I going to resist and fight it to the end, in which case, the fear, panic, or even just the effort, might actually bring it on earlier, or should I just go with the flow?

I do not agree with the suppression of this voice, but really to simply transcend the noise that makes it hard to hear what it is attempting to convey. Like a muscle that requires exercise, we need to build a new language as an autonomous agent, similar to synaptic pruning where we begin to selectively discard what is unnecessary and keep what is necessary. — TimeLine

The synaptic pruning is to throw away all the errors of trial and error. The inner voice may be very excited in fits of passion, and that's why those passages need to be pruned, to ensure that we don't mistakenly go back to what was already been determined as the wrong way. But that does not mean that we cannot continue to seek new ways, continue in our method of trial and error, long past the days of childhood.

What you say doesn't make sense. You are claiming that the mere possibility of mistake is grounds for questioning a belief--and therefore that we have grounds for questioning all of our beliefs, which is absurd. — aletheist

You just keep asserting, but I have justification. The possibility of mistake indicates that the belief may be wrong, and if the belief may be wrong, we are justified in doubting it. You simply assert that's absurd, but clearly it's not.

Belief is a constraint on doubt. — apokrisis

I don't agree that belief is a constraint on doubt. Doubt, like its opposite, certitude, is an attitude which we have toward beliefs. Having beliefs does not free up one's certitude, nor does it constrain one's doubts.

The point isn't that I know and doubt at the same time, but that one's knowledge is always questionable, up to a point. If I say I know X, you might naturally want to know how it is that I know. You want to see for yourself that I'm not mistaken, so your questioning my knowledge. — Sam26

An important aspect, not to lose sight of, is the difference between "I know" and "you know". Usually, our attitude toward what another claims to know, is of less certitude than what oneself claims to know. So if someone else claims to know something, I might doubt this, but if I claim to know something, I wouldn't be doubting it, or else I wouldn't be claiming to know it.

In general then, certitude relates directly to "I know", and doubt relates directly to "you know". When you justify to me, what you claim to know, then I can claim that I know it as well, therefore the doubt which was related to what you know has been replaced with certitude relating to what I know. I now know what I previously doubted that you knew. The certitude is always related to what I know, and the doubt is always related to what you know.

If it's something we both know, then there is no need for me to say to you that I know, especially if we both know that we know. A doubt just wouldn't arise, at least until there is good reason to doubt that we know. — Sam26

The problem with this is that there may be nothing which we both know, until we discuss it and rule out the inconsistencies. Even if we both observe the very same event, we know it in our different ways, with our different words, and discussing it produces consistency. So we probablycannot say that there is anything which we both know, unless we've discussed with each other, and confirmed, that this is what we both know.

As soon as you speak of these foundational or basic beliefs in reference to being justified, or as being true, or as something known, then you are bringing them into the domain of epistemology. Of course the classic example's used in this thread are Moore's proposition's that he claims to know, e.g., - "This is a hand," or "I live on the Earth." — Sam26

To assume these foundational beliefs, hinge-propositions, is to assume that there are certain things which we both know, without having discussed them. If we discuss them to confirm that we both know them, we bring them into the realm of epistemology. To assume that we both know them, without having discussed them is a faulty assumption.

The only thing that I would question is this statement. Why can't my belief be private? The language which states a belief is not private, but my belief, it would seem to me, starts out at being private before there is any showing or stating. — Sam26

See, this is the point Sam26. As soon as you recognize that "my belief" starts out as private, and not public, then every belief must be justified. There can be no such thing as hinge-propositions, because "hinge-propositions" implies that there are beliefs which start out as public beliefs, beliefs which we all have in common, which need not be justified. If you allow that beliefs start out as "my beliefs", i.e. as private, then this is inconsistent with "hinge-propositions".

If you deny private beliefs, as Banno does, then hinge-propositions make sense. Beliefs start out as public. We all start out with the very same fundamental beliefs, hinge-propositions, which do not need to be justified because they are the very same, in agreement, right from the start. Consider that these are beliefs given to us by instinct, or something like that. They just come to us naturally, and they come to us all the same, common, shared, so they are public. However, if these instinctual beliefs come to us as something private, uniquely individual to each of us, then there can be no hinge-propositions, as each one of these needs to be justified.

Looks like a very twisted description of rumination. Rumination is not repetitive in the negative sense described, as if the exact same thing is gone over in the exact same way. It is to look at the same thing over and over again in numerous different ways, to find minute differences which constitute the key to resolving the problem. If, through rumination, one never resolved any such problems, then it would be negative. Rumination is what gets you out of that vicious circle, it is not the vicious circle itself.

They can try to convince him otherwise, but if it's an order, it cannot be refused - that would be treason. — Agustino

It's called "insubordination". Look it up.

Where did I say anxiety should be restricted to a pathological condition? I recall multiple times in this thread when I told you the opposite. — Agustino

Here:

It's true that we can sometimes call the feeling one has before having to go on stage for a musical performance as "anxiety", and it involves a fluttery feeling in the chest and stomach, and heightened focus. But that's not what I mean by anxiety when I talk about anxiety the medical condition. — Agustino

Where's your evidence that ruminative behaviour and obsessions are productive, healthy, high-functioning or good?! That seems to be only YOUR idea, not the idea of scientists, doctors, and researchers. Really, your lack of knowledge in this area seems to me to be appalling. — Agustino

My OED defines ruminate as "meditate, ponder". And you insist that meditation is so good, and rumination is so bad. How do you spin "rumination" such that it is suddenly something bad?

You say so much without even having a clue as to what you are saying, constant double-talk, just spouting out words in a critical manner; criticizing everything you come across, merely for the sake of criticizing, without understanding the thing you are criticizing, or even your own criticism itself. That's the form of the inauthentic, an individual nervously spouting words without even knowing what oneself is saying. If you would direct that energy inward to actually think about what you are saying (ruminate), then you might learn to avoid putting your foot in your mouth

You misunderstand the nature of constraints. The free actions of the world are only limited to some threshold variety of differences that don’t make a difference. So it is the probabilistic view built into science. No two events are the same. But the question is whether they are similar enough? Is the variety essentially random rather than significant, that is due to some further undiagnosed cause? — apokrisis

None of this makes any sense. First of all, I was talking about the relationship between certainty, certitude, doubt, and mistake. I don't see how "constraints" is relevant. Secondly, to say that a free choice decision by a human being is limited to a difference which doesn't make a difference, is clearly wrong, because then we wouldn't have to think about any of our decisions, because they wouldn't make a significant difference.

You say, all that needs to be answered is "whether they are similar enough", but you've denied the means by which one could answer this question. You are saying that anything which the human mind decides is a difference, is necessarily a difference which doesn't make a difference, because free acts are constrained to differences which don't make a difference. So your conclusion about the nature of mistake is completely wrong. According to your premise, a mistake couldn't be a difference which makes a difference anyway.

What you say doesn't make sense. You are claiming that the possibility of mistake is not grounds for questioning a belief.

If we wait until a belief actually confounds our experience then it is an actual mistake, and the belief has already been proven wrong at this point.

Doubt is justified prior to the confounding experience, in order to avoid that mistake. Your position could only be correct if you didn't think it was reasonable to attempt to avoid mistake. But that's nonsense.

So you tell me, you tell TimeLine, you tell fdrake that we ought not to talk about the pathological anxiety, because that's a complicated phenomenon, we ought to talk about the normal one, and I'm the liar? Yeah right... — Agustino

I never said that, that's why I called you a liar. I said that if you define anxiety as a pathological condition, then count me out of that discussion of anxiety. I do not object to discussing pathological anxiety, I object to restricting "anxiety" to being a pathological condition.

As I said, I consider anxiety to be the result of normal bodily functions. And, like things such as body temperature, and blood pressure, etc., we might determine a normal range of anxiety. But also like things such as body temperature and blood pressure, I believe that when anxiety goes out of the normal range, it is a symptom of an illness, it is not an illness itself.

There are no benefits to monkey-mind - what makes you think there are? Why do you think people work so hard to get rid of it? — Agustino

As I said, we as the monkey-minded, do things, we get things done, and this is very satisfying, extremely enjoyable. And then there is the wide ranging, and extremely important fact, that being active is the only way that we can serves others. If you insist that these are not benefits, then I can't help you. Go meditate yourself, (pleasure yourself), because you are obviously ill if you don't see activity as a benefit.

Put down the crack pipe. I honestly have no clue what you're smoking now, but it must be potent. So according to your silly logic, highly functioning human beings like Steve Jobs, Admiral Stockdale, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, Miyamoto Musashi, and so on aren't really highly functioning because they have taken control over the monkey mind. What nonsense. You should read some more. — Agustino

Consider the people whom you have just named. Do you think that these people have never ruminated, been preoccupied, or obsessed? These are the symptoms of anxiety, which you seem to associate with the monkey mind. And you think that these are symptoms of illness?

You should read some more. — Agustino

That's contradictory,coming from the one who keeps telling me to do philosophy from experience rather than from what I have read. Now I am doing philosophy from my experience, and you tell me I should read more. Get a life, and quit criticizing for the sake of criticizing. It will get you nowhere if you don't at least think about what you are saying.

While her voice is essentially trapped in this social network, her anxiety is evidence of this inner voice calling out to her that she still does not know or understand how to use
...

It was only when I got harassed and then had the car accident that the anxiety surfaced because my identification started changing; it became the impetus to recognise this 'voice' within me that something is wrong. — TimeLine

I think you might do well to recognize that this "inner voice" is not a voice within you, it is you. Otherwise you're like Agustino, seeing a need to suppress it. That is authenticity, the voice that comes from within you. the most trustworthy source. It is necessary to recognize this in order that there is a whole you, unified. We, as members of society are urged to suppress the inner voice, to parrot the others, what Plato called the mob. But the mob is a false unity, an inauthentic sameness of individuals, created by those who desire similar pleasures. You will not understand unity until you grasp the authentic unity, yourself. Then only you can tell yourself what you really want, and sometimes this is not easy to determine.

No, simply recognizing our fallibility--i.e., the fact that certitude can never truly be justified, since the mere possibility of mistake cannot be logically excluded for any of our current beliefs--does not warrant genuine doubt. It is only justified when one has a positive reason to question a currently held belief, regardless of whether one has certitude toward it; e.g., because of a surprising experience or disappointed expectation. — aletheist

If the possibility of mistake cannot be ruled out with respect to any particular belief, then this
is a positive reason to question that particular belief, i.e. doubt is warranted.

The critical issue seems to be identifying the mind as the part that has some understanding that can’t be wrong. — apokrisis

We are still questioning the assumption that there is some understanding which can't be wrong. You are jumping the gun, wanting to proceed as if it has already been demonstrated that there is some understanding which can't be wrong. If you think that you have such a demonstration, then please be my guest and put it forward.

So the material world itself is re-imagined as lacking in counterfactual definiteness. It is at base vague or indeterminate. It requires the mind-like thing of developed functional habits to give it definite shape and direction. — apokrisis

If you maintain a principle like this, that the world is lacking in definiteness, that it is fundamental vague and indeterminate, then how can you produce consistency between this and your prior assumption that there is some understanding which can't be wrong? Even the fact that the world is vague and indeterminate (if it is a fact), could change at any moment if the world is vague and indeterminate..

The relevance is that you should not say "I only talk about normal anxiety". You need to talk and understand both to understand each one individually - it is only by understanding the extremes that you understand the normal kind. — Agustino

In response to you saying that I said that, I can only say, you're very strange and you're a liar.

Because being always active is restrictive - it means that you don't have control over when you rest and relax. — Agustino

I didn't say, nor imply that I was talking about "being always active". Portraying this as "always active" is just a lie. Being "always active" would mean not getting any rest or relaxation. Since this is not the case, then by what logic do you conclude that being active produces "no control over when you rest and relax". I don't mean to offend you Agustino, but I feel a duty to tell you that there appears to be no bounds to the ridiculousness of your very strange logic.

Here are the benefits of conquering your monkey mind through meditation: — Agustino

I see what you might call benefits of meditation, but I don't see any comparisons to the benefits of the monkey mind, so I think that your little advertisement is rather pointless. If we went to compare the benefits of the monkey mind, we'd come up with a completely different list of benefits. By what principle would we compare one set of good qualities against another set of good qualities, to say which is better, unless one set beat out the other hands down. But it all depends on the particulars of the person.

What highly functional human beings practice rumination, preoccupation and obsession? I see none of them — Agustino

That's not surprising, because you don't seem to be a highly functional human being. I, for one, practise all of these, preoccupation being very similar to obsession, which means highly focused. And rumination means to be thoughtful. So by experiencing these simple mental practises, I have eliminated the first four of your supposed benefits of meditation as being no different than the benefits provided by the monkey mind. The only thing left is the final one "less stress and anxiety". I remove stress by converting it to anxiety. Now the only benefit you show from meditation is the removal of anxiety. Why would I want to remove anxiety when it's a good which provides me with all these benefits that you have listed, plus a whole lot more, such as all the things which I accomplish with my increased activity, and the joy I get from this. I think your meditation is beaten, hands down.

And this is actually very well-studied scientifically. — Agustino

Yes Doctor. You know what I think of you now don't you? Your a very strange liar.

I am not arguing that your way of dealing with your anxiety is any worse than my way of dealing with my anxiety. I am arguing against your claims that my way of dealing with my anxiety is worse than your way to deal with my anxiety. And, your claim that I ought to conform to your way as a better way to deal with my anxiety, as if conforming to your way would raise my quality of life.

As I said, as symptoms they are pathological forms. And. like my examples of fever, and swelling, it is sometimes beneficial to lessen the symptoms.

You're not thinking very deeply about this. To be ill is to be sick, unhealthy - that's a tautology. My point is just that a doctor - meaning a person - just decides that these symptoms/behaviour correspond to an illness. The illness doesn't exist out there, the doctor calls it an illness. So take anxiety - a bunch of medical professionals have decided that these symptoms should classify as a mental health illness. So what? It doesn't necessarily mean that it is an illness. It's just what the doctors have decided to call it.

These classifications are man-made - they don't exist in reality. A doctor once classified me as having a pilonidal cyst - that thing is usually only treated by surgery. But I thought practically about it - I said, what is a pilonidal cyst really? It's just an infection located around the buttocks. How do you treat a bacterial infection? Antibiotics. So I went and found a doctor, and I told him, I want you to give me antibiotics for this, not surgery, otherwise I will go look for another doctor until I find one willing to treat me as I want to be treated.

So just because something is a "diagnosable" form of unhealthiness - that really means nothing. So we should treat conditions of health and conditions of unhealth the same way - if you're willing to speak about the one, you should also speak about the other. It's just a matter of categorising them - this one goes in that box, this other in the other box - but doctors could also decide to categorise them differently in the future. The categorisation is irrelevant. — Agustino

I don't really see the relevance of all this.

I actually had pathological anxiety. There was no doubt about that. — Agustino

So you give me a long lecture above, about how any illness is nothing more than a doctor's opinion, and this doesn't mean that there is any real illness there. Then you go and contradict all that here. I really can't understand what you're trying to say.

But to say more about this, it is self-evident. Having a monkey-mind is restrictive, and lowers your quality of life. — Agustino

I disagree, and see no self-evidence. As we agreed, the monkey-mind allows one to increase one's activity. How is that in anyway restrictive? Thanks for your opinion anyway, though it is most certainly wrong.

Nonsense MU. — fdrake

You seem to be trying to change the subject, to "attention" this time. Can you not stay focused on "anxiety" itself? You keep heading off toward all these different conditions which are sometimes, but not necessarily related to anxiety. This only clouds the picture.

Rumination, preoccupation, obsession, frequent disturbing and uncontrollable intrusive thoughts are a cluster of incredibly common - near universal - pathological thought patterns in anxious disorders. Far from being isolable from anxiety, they are one of the core constituents and present themselves as a commonality between these disorders and their tightly correlated comorbids. — fdrake

You haven't addressed my post, which was to argue against the notion that these forms of thought pattern are pathological. Rumination, preoccupation, and obsession, are all common and normal thought patterns, which in an increased level may be symptoms of illness. That illness is not anxiety, because anxiety exists with these thought patterns in normal and common situations. Therefore anxiety itself is not an illness. But increased anxiety, if it is pathological, is a symptom of another illness.

You're no different from Agustino, insisting that these normal thought patterns (rumination preoccupation, and obsession), forms of thinking which are practised by many highly functional human beings, is somehow inferior, unhealthy, leading to a lower quality of life, and therefore ought to be controlled. But this premise, that these thinking patterns necessarily lead to a lower quality of life is false, and therefore the conclusion that they ought to be controlled is also false.

Belief needs justification. So does doubt. — Banno

Let's see if we agree on what is required to justify doubt. Doubt is an attitude toward belief, just like certitude, but the two are opposed to each other such that one necessarily excludes the other. The important thing, from my perspective, which you may or may not agree with, is that doubt is defined in relation to certitude as a lack of certitude. This means that anytime when certitude cannot be justified, then doubt is justified. In other words, an inability to justify certitude with respect to a belief, justifies doubt with respect to that belief.

Certitude is justified by demonstrating certainty. So if we take Wittgenstein's definition, certainty is to logically exclude the possibility of mistake, then certitude is justified when we logically exclude the possibility of mistake. Accordingly, doubt is justified anytime the possibility of mistake cannot be logically excluded. Agree?

What does "illness" mean to you? — Agustino

To be ill is to be sick, unhealthy. A physician may diagnose a person as having a particular form of illness, unhealthiness. So an "illness" is a particular, diagnosable form of unhealthiness. I agree that doctors are sometimes wrong in their diagnosis.

I also don't like your naive view of saying "oh that's an illness, it's something different, let's not talk about it" - I don't see how these things are "illnesses", except that they are STATES OF MIND - or HABITS OF MIND - that decrease quality of life for those who have them. There is no illness beyond this here. So this attempt of yours to avoid talking about these things (which are actually relevant), is just that - you're avoiding because you know it will become clear that your views are wrong when we investigate these aspects. — Agustino

I agree that a person with a decreased quality of life does not necessarily have an illness, nor would we say that this person is ill, because to say someone is ill is to imply that the person has a form of illness. Otherwise we'd have no standard whereby we could say one is ill. We'd just say that the person with any decreased quality of life is ill, not knowing what qualifies as a decreased quality. Instead, we assume that if the person has an identifiable form of illness, then that person is ill.

Where we disagree, is whether anxiety necessarily causes a decreased quality of life. I believe that anxiety is a very normal part of life, and adds to one's quality of life by increasing the fullness of one's experience. So for instance, if a person such as yourself has been misdiagnosed with anxiety disorder, but then medicated to the point of eliminating that person's anxiety, this would be a decrease in the quality of life for that person. The person really had normal anxiety, which is a good and fundamental aspect of living as a human being, and the medication removes this anxiety thereby lowering the person's quality of life. Therefore I belief that anxiety is necessary to enhance one's quality of life.

You seemed to be intent on proving me "wrong", in my claim that anxiety may be good, with a positive contribution to one's quality of life, so you moved to define "anxiety" as an illness, proving me wrong through a restrictive definition.

So try as hard as you want, but if you really are surprised at the claim that you must tame your mind, then quite frankly, you're not very well read, and you should read more, because it seems that you identify yourself with your mind, which according to many philosophies is wrong.

You are still stuck entirely in the discursive mode, and know of no other kind of existence - completely stuck in your mind, and using all these strategies (tire yourself out, etc.) instead of identifying the problem - you have a monkey mind that you need to bring under control. In Buddhist thought, we say that the mind is like a bull, and you must tame that bull. It seems that you have taken the opposite approach and have allowed the bull to tame you. — Agustino

You are working off the premise that the "monkey mind" is bad. Until you prove this premise, that the monkey mind is misbehaving, your insistence that I ought to tame this monkey mind, bringing it under some form of control, is just meaningless babble to my monkey mind. Sorry if this disappoints you, but that's just reality. All you are doing is insistently claiming that my way of thinking is inferior to yours, and I ought to conform mine to yours, but that's ridiculous. Who is really being childish here?

Anxiety is also grounded in beliefs. Doubts cannot exist "for no apparent reason whatsoever". We cannot doubt until we first learn to believe. How can you doubt something before you have a belief structure in place? — Agustino

Again, baseless assertions. Doubting is a condition of unknowing, so clearly one can doubt without having any knowledge, therefore without having any belief structure in place.

"I am unsure if my memory is correct" points to a belief that your memory may be wrong. — Agustino

This is what you've been doing all thread, taking a condition which is described as a lack of belief concerning something, then interpreting it as a belief that one has a lack of belief. It is simply my expression to you, in words, which allows you to do this. When I describe to you, in words, a condition of doubt, lack of belief, it is necessarily expressed as a belief in this, through the words. But in the real condition, not the representation of the condition, there is no such belief.

This is contradictory nonsense. You are NOT sure where they are - "I don't know where they are" isn't a place where they could be. — Agustino

As I said, it's certainty "about" where they are. I didn't say it is certainty as to exactly where they are.

Someone who is mentally healthy deals with anxiety as a mood or as a response to stressors. — fdrake

This I think is a key point, the assumption of "stressors". To begin with, the term is very ambiguous. But beside that, anxiety is related to our perspective toward the future, so to say that there is something past, or even present, which causes anxiety, as a "stressor", is to misrepresent anxiety in the first place. We ought to dismiss this idea that anxiety is a "response to stressors", and replace it with the idea that stressors one's response to anxiety. Anxiety predisposes us to what we may incur, and to what is perceived as impending, if it is misplaced, the result is "stressors". In this way, we can understand the true beneficial role of anxiety as preparing us for potential stressors, thereby reducing the negative impact by allowing us to reduce the actualization of those stressors..

The dimension of fantasy is something which is very common in people with anxiety disorder. People without anxiety disorder typically do not have anxious fantasies of the same sort. People with it need to learn to cope with the anxious fantasies as part of learning a 'healthy response' towards anxiety.

The reason I brought in co-morbid conditions is that they matter a lot from the perspective of how to deal with anxiety. The things you would do to steel yourself against an anxious fantasy that you are a robot (believed sincerely with no insight) are a lot different from more generic paralysing fantasies of failure and self harm, which differs again from someone being transported back to their trauma if they have PTSD and anxiety. It makes a big difference in how the problems should be (and are) addressed. — fdrake

The point though, is that the so-called "anxious fantasies" are probably not caused by the anxiety at all, but by the underlying co-morbid condition. The anxiety is probably just a symptom, like fever is a symptom of some illnesses, and swelling is a symptom of some physical injuries. In some cases, the symptom itself, swelling, fever, or anxiety, becomes a problem on its own, needing to be dealt with, but in many cases these symptoms are just the body's natural reaction to the underlying illness, and the proper procedure is to identify and treat that underlying illness, not the symptoms.

If interpretation is all there really is - there is no dualistic interpreter that is the soul exerting it’s further point of view - then my account describes the situation. — apokrisis

There is no such thing as interpretation without something which is doing the interpreting. This is where Peirce and Pattee have lead you into nonsense.

Yep. Words can only function as constraints on interpretance. — apokrisis

No, words cannot function as constraints, the interpreter is free to interpret words in any way one desires, at the risk of misunderstanding what was meant. The constraints on interpretance are property of the interpreter. The learned habits of interpretation are what serve as constraints on interpretation. Such constraints are not property of the words themselves.

Again, your response founders on a failure to recognise that language games must create their speakers along with their worlds. — apokrisis

This as well is incorrect. Language does not create speakers, speakers create language.

You are assigning agency to words and to language, where none is warranted. Agency ought to be attributed to those who use words and language, not to the words and language themselves.

It was supposed to evoke the following cycle: anxiety diminishes a person's agency; — fdrake

I don't agree that anxiety necessarily diminishes a person's agency. This depends on one's approach to anxiety. As I described to Agustino, a healthy response to anxiety would increase one's agency. Therefore it is only in cases of unhealthy response that the individual spirals downward as you describe.

Anxious fantasies typically are not just failures of knowledge or familiarity, they are threatening possibilities given more emotive or evidential significance than they are due. They can also take the character of the truly fantastic: looking at a knife and intrusively imagining, or even feeling a shadow of, its potential for you to jam it into your eye socket. — fdrake

Now you've gone beyond anxiety itself, to describe fantasies. We ought to maintain a separation between these two. The appearance of such phantasms are more likel a cause of anxiety than to be caused by anxiety. Therefore we ought to maintain a separation between the conditions which cause such fantasies and the conditions which cause anxiety.

The line between fantasy and reality in those imaginings can be blurred if the subject has anxiety co-morbid with post traumatic stress disorder. In these cases, the every-day can often become a reminiscence of the traumatic. Which if anything is a case of defective generality in thought and action consuming the particularities of life, epistemically anyway. It is the application of the general to the particular which is inauthentic in this case; calcification over crystallisation. A post-traumatic anxious subject's throat may close if they have nearly drowned (when triggered), or they may feel terrible, isolating cold due to an injury obtained from hiking in mountains (when triggered). What abstract story should we tell to exorcise the ghosts raping them? What words alone could suffice? None. — fdrake

Again, the subject of our discussion is anxiety itself. We ought not talk about co-morbid situations in which the symptoms of anxiety might be confused with the symptoms of some illness. This blurring of the line between fantasy and reality might be a cause of anxiety, but we ought to maintain a separation between the cause of this blurring, (perhaps some form of illness), and the anxiety itself. To deal with anxiety is a different matter from dealing with an illness which causes hallucinations, unless the anxiety we are dealing with is caused by that underlying condition.

To recover from anxiety is to change the range and nature of permissible activity in your life; expand what you do, contract your abuses; to be forgiving and understanding of yourself and your impact on others, to afford yourself whatever choices allow you to accommodate to life again, and to bend but not break when life pushes back. — fdrake

I agree with this, but if the anxiety is caused by an illness which produces phantasms and hallucinations, then the approach is not to address the anxiety itself, but to address the reason for this other condition which may be an illness that is causing the anxiety.

An intellectually consistent and driven life is not a necessity for the treatment of anxiety and the promotion of agency - sometimes resistance and recovery means that you washed your clothes, showered and ate within the last two days. — fdrake

I agree again, dealing with anxiety may be very simple if the cause of the anxiety is simple, and well exposed. But if the cause is deeply hidden, or some underlying illness, then it is necessary to address this further condition.

I think Posty was quite clear that he was referring to anxiety as an illness... — Agustino

Your interpretation of what is "quite clear" is very far from mine. I think Posty proposed this as a matter of debate. Although it is clearly indicated that Posty thinks anxiety is something to be avoided, as the root cause of suffering, and says "I assume" that you do too, there is no indication that Posty is using "anxiety" to refer to any condition of illness. Suffering ought not be equated with illness.

Yeah, that's because you have an unruly mind which doesn't obey your commands. I used to have that as a teenager, and God was it a pain. If you didn't tire yourself during the day, you couldn't sleep at night. Always like a slave on a leash, I had to tire myself out by playing football, etc. Now that doesn't trouble me anymore - because I gained control over that aspect of my mind. I don't care anymore if I don't fall asleep, so it doesn't trouble me. No more switching from one side to the other, getting up, moving around the room, etc. etc. Just stay there, and not care - then you are at peace, even if you don't sleep. — Agustino

I don't know what you could possibly mean by "an unruly mind which doesn't obey your commands". This statement appears completely contradictory and the whole paragraph is nonsense to me.

This description you have provided, whereby a person is a slave to one's own mind is all incoherent nonsense. And so is this:

In order to doubt something, I must believe something else, since doubts have to be grounded - you must have a reason for your doubt. — Agustino

Doubts do not need to be grounded, they exist for no apparent reason whatsoever, just like anxiety. Certainty is what needs to be grounded, otherwise your certitude is nothing other than false confidence.

Why are you unsure about where the keys are? Is it not because you believe you don't remember where you put them for example? — Agustino

Don't be silly. I am doubtful about where my keys are when I remember where I put them but I am unsure if my memory is correct. I think I know where they are, but I'm not sure, that is doubt. If I believe that I do not remember where I put them, then I am sure about where they, i.e. sure that I don't know where they are. Doubt is when I think I know, but I'm not sure whether I really know or not.

Your false confidence doesn't allow you to experience doubt. When you think you know, you're sure you know, and when you think you don't know, you're sure you don't know. Therefore you've never experienced doubt. However, I'm quite sure that you've been wrong before, so you'd do yourself a favour to be more doubtful.

LOL. Pedantry, (adhering to strictly defined terms), for the purpose of logical proceeding, is one of the fundamental principles of scientific understanding. And that, is also philosophy. Disciplined description is another fundamental principle of scientific understanding which itself requires adherence to strictly defined terms.

Thanks for the clarification. It depends what is meant by saying "this counts as a hand". As I said, if it is an ostensive definition of "hand" then I don't find it problematic at all. One can simply stipulate that by "hand", one means, this. Is such an ostensive definition a dubious proposition? In one sense I don't think a definition can be dubious. If I choose, for my purposes, to use the word 'hand' as a name for this, what is there to doubt? One might ask, 'why call this a hand and not some other name?', but this is a semantic, and not a substantive, question. The simple answer is 'I've decided on this name. You can use another name if you like. It doesn't really matter'. — PossibleAaran

I think I agree with this pretty much. I went through this earlier in the thread, and didn't get too much agreement because the other participants in the thread did not think that Moore's proposition "this is a hand" was meant as a demonstration. If it is meant as an ostensive definition, then it justifies the further statement "I have two hands". As an ostensive definition, it does not need to be justified, it is a proposition in the sense of a proposal, which the audience can either accept or reject. The point being that he could have said "this is a foot", or something else, and the audience is in a position to either agree or disagree.

There are many reasons (of doubt) for the audience to reject such a proposal as "this is a hand". Principally, the boundaries of exactly what is and is not part of the hand, are not defined. Moore would hold up an entire arm, saying "this is a hand", not indicating whether things like the wrist and the fingers are part of the hand or not. So even ostensive definitions need to be justified, clarified by further descriptions.

This is where I see the foundation of justification, rather than in hinge-propositions, or ostensive demonstrations, I see descriptions as fundamental. So rather than naming things such as "this is a P", and "that is a Q", I see descriptions of what is a P, and what is a Q, as the basis for justification. Fundamental descriptions are where we find self-evident truths.

In "On Certainty" Wittgenstein sets out to determine what is meant by "certainty", in the sense of "it is certain that ...". He provides a preliminary definition of "certainty", as the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. The attitude of certitude (I am certain that...), as expressed by Banno, does not qualify as meeting the criteria of this definition, due to the fallibility of the human mind.

Really? Not over here. For Alice, maybe. — Banno

This statement expresses the attitude called "certitude". And such an attitude doesn't justify any claim of certainty. "Certainty" requires justification. Otherwise "it is certain" is nothing more than "I am certain of it", and that's just the manifestation of one's attitude.

So until you actually address the argument which I've produced, such statements are merely meaningless personal opinions, with no bearing in relation to what is known as "certainty".

But what I don't see, is how this solves the regress problem (I assume this is what it is meant to do, since that was the problem mentioned in the OP. — PossibleAaran

Yes, I think that's exactly the issue which Sam26 brings up, the infinite regress of justification. One proposition justifies another, which justifies another, so on and so forth. Hinge-props are proposed as a means to put an end to this infinite regress, by being beyond reasonable doubt without needing to be justified. This is supposed to ground certainty.

My argument is that because hinge-props are outside "the game" of epistemology, and are therefore not subject to justification, they are actually the most dubious.

To be sure, anxious thought is typically scattered and fleeting. It fears failure and disappointment as a moth flees a bulb. — fdrake

This is an odd analogy. The moth is actually attracted to the bulb, and would only flee the bulb if it touches it and gets burned. Do you think that Heidegger is implying that the anxious person is in some morbid way attracted to failure and disappoint, and only learns to avoid it by having gotten burned?

The intervention that changes an anxious person's life for the better is neither an engagement with finitude nor an engagement with their ownmost desires, it is an engagement with their anxiety itself in the contexts, boring day to day contexts, that it arises. An anxious person faces anxiety in a manner that flees from their ownmost being incessantly, and it is only through grappling with the every day and finding place in it that they begin, anew, to hone their ownmost being; to gain the capacity to flourish once more.

To recover and mitigate its effects is to accommodate yourself to your environment, to challenge those parts of it which are disabling, and to promote those bits which allow you to flourish. Far from 'fleeing into the world', as Heidegger would have it, this is the pattern of recovery. — fdrake

I find this very agreeable, but it seems to open up a division between the particular and the general. The "day to day contexts" refers to the particular occurrences of anxiety. What is implied is that we cannot turn inward to find a general principle for dealing with anxiety, we must deal with the uniqueness and particularities of each instance of anxiety. This may indicate something important about anxiety. It may itself be, a function of how we relate to the uniqueness of the situations which we find ourselves in, and our inability to negotiate these particularities through the application of general principles. Of course this would be to say something general about anxiety, which would be a turning back toward negating the premise.

The phenomenological segue from the everyday and the inauthentic to the specific and authentic only has a superficial resemblance to actual anxious thought and effective strategies to anxiety's resolution. — fdrake

So this terminology is a bit difficult for me. The "everyday" must refer to the particular instances of events and occurrences which we encounter in our day to day life. The "specific" must refer to some degree of abstraction, or generality, as in Aristotle's usage of "species" and "genus". In this case, "specific" refers to Arsitotle's secondary substance, not primary substance which would be the particular, or individual, "specific" implies some degree of abstraction. So authenticity is assigned to the abstraction, while the particular, individual occurrences are said to be inauthentic.

Would you say that from Heidegger's perspective, this is the first step to overcoming anxiety, and ultimately the fear of death, and finitude altogether? That would be to recognize the particularities of everyday life, as inauthentic, and to see the abstracted principles, by the means of which one makes decisions, as that which is authentic.

If anxiety is given an adequate account in Heidegger it must be only in a restricted and formal sense. An 'unease within the categories (existentialia)' which 'brings the truth to light (aletheia and essentia)'. This is the sense that anxiety operates within Heidegger's thought. It is not an affective/somatic condition. — fdrake

I like this description of anxiety, it avoids the bad connotations handed to it by modern medicine (if a child expresses symptoms of ADHT, then medicate it). Here, Heidegger claims that anxiety is what brings truth to light. This is probably due to the relationship between anxiety and the unknown, which I have been discussing with TimeLIne. Approaching the unknown is what produces anxiety and this produces the will to think. Thinking is what brings truth.

The "unease within the categories" is the source of anxiety. We always proceed in our daily life by applying general principles to particular situations. But the general principles cannot account for the uniqueness of the situations, so there is always an element of the unknown in all circumstances. This produces anxiety. The anxiety inspires us to think. I think that there are two principal reasons for the unknown. One is that the general principles which we attempt to apply are lacking in completeness, and the other is that our perceptions of the particular situations are lacking in completeness.

Death is about recognising our individuality or separateness but death is not the violence of the experience but rather the fear itself that encourages us to conform to the masses. — TimeLine

As I just suggested to fdrake, death, finitude, uniqueness, and individuality, are all properties of the everydayness of the particular. And this is the inauthentic. When we recognize the abstracted principles by which we act, as the authentic, this encourages us to conform. Conformation is a requirement to understand the vast realm of abstracted principles, and since this is recognized as authentic the will to conform flourishes.

Anxiety is just a feeling or a sensation without a language - subconscious - that is attempting to tell us something we disagree with or that something is wrong but that we cannot articulate because there is no language, no words to describe this. — TimeLine

A recognition of this anxiety, which concerns things which have no words for them, helps to bring about an understanding of the authenticity of the inner world of abstraction. There is a use of words, which is all about naming external objects, and this is day to day communication, the inauthentic. The real, authentic use of words is in describing our inner feelings. This is where we find sincerity, trust, and ultimately truth. So in day to day life, we mimic and imitate others, saying things and using words in the same way as others, because this is what gets us by. But the real, authentic way of using words is to describe things in the way that you personally perceive and apprehend them, not to say what the others want you to say, but to be truly authentic. Finding that there are numerous things which there are no words for, is a part of this authenticity.

It is easier to go back to that determined state and conform to the masses - hence slave morality - as popular conventionalism alleviates the feelings of anxiety and the feeling itself is painful. It is no different to going back to an unhappy relationship rather than being alone. We are wired to seek pleasure and avoid pain and so we confuse the sensation as being painful and attempt to alleviate it all the while our unconscious mind is screaming "no!" - it is like the battle between our brain and mind. When we actually start using this and our anxiety all but disappears, we realise just how easy it is and how much happiness it stimulates, but it is like this gauntlet produced by the fear work hard to prevent us from reaching it. As for fear, have a read of my response to fdrake - it is this mechanism that prevents us from proceeding to or transcending toward the next cognitive stage, to take advantage of the tool or instrument we have to actually think for ourselves. — TimeLine

I come at this from the opposite direction as you, but we seem to meet, and have compatibility in the middle. I never had the urge to conform. I never had the appropriate respect for authority, all my life. I was always a free thinker. It wasn't until I started to study philosophy and I realized the power of ideas, that I recognized how ideas are needed, as the tools for thought. Then I recognized the need to conform, in order to understand, such that conforming ultimately empowers free thinking.

You seem to describe the opposite situation, having had the need to recognize authority, and to conform, all your life, and now realizing that breaking away from this authority gives you the capacity for free thought. So we are both in the middle, apprehending the need for a balance between authority and free thought, just having different reasons for being in this position.

In addition to this, I started a relationship with my sister and her husband for the first time since I was young and who both swindled me that caused financial loss and reignited those days where I was bullied by my siblings. — TimeLine

Considering the relationship between anticipation and disappointment, and the fact that you probably wanted a relationship with your sister for a very long time, I'd say that the disappointment here was immense, and unfathomable to me.

Of course, the brain isn't the only component involved in inexplicable anxiety. A panic attack can be chemically induced, for instance. Also, caffeine can make a person anxious. No one is suggesting that the brain is the only cause. However, the brain is what experiences and interprets interoceptive sensations. A jolt of adrenalin could be felt as thrilling or terrifying. The base internal sensations are essentially the same. It is only the context and our conditioning that is different. This is a very important difference because stress, when taken as a challenge, can enhance performance, and stress taken as a threat prepares the body for injury, sacrificing performance. — praxis

I think we are pretty much in agreement on this.

I play the clown and let people think I'm an idiot on purpose — Agustino

Geez, no wonder you identify with DT so well.

DT has some good sides and some very bad sides, sure. What's your point? — Agustino

And I suppose you think that's a good side?

The basic insight of OC remains: doubt only makes sense agains a background of certainty. But OC is incomplete, and muddled. — Banno

OC is muddled and incomplete, because the basic premise, that "doubt only makes sense against a background of certainty", is the opposite of reality, and therefore untenable. What is really the case is that certainty only makes sense against a background of doubt.

Certainty only follows justification, which follows doubt. It is only when we doubt, that we seek justification. And certainty is only derived from justification. So doubt is necessarily prior to certainty in all cases. This is very evident from the evolution of knowledge, we proceed from unknowing (doubt and uncertainty) toward knowing (certainty). Our lives are full of uncertainties and we only get a glimpse of what certainty is really like. The background is doubt and uncertainty, as when we are children, and from this emerges knowledge and certainty, but only in relation to specific things. To me, this is very intuitive, and I don't see why so many people insist on the very counter-intuitive stance, that doubt only makes sense from a background of certainty.

The exemplar I have provided for a certainty is the constitutive rule. It makes no sense to doubt a constitutive rule within the context of the game it helps create. — Banno

"Certainty" does not make any sense in this context. "Certainty" refers to things which cannot be doubted, because it is known beyond any doubt, that they must be true. This is the case with a self-evident truth.

Sure, it makes no sense to doubt the rules of a game, when one consents to play that game, but the unreasonableness of doubt here is due to one's commitment to the game, it is not due to any form of certainty. If I make a social commitment, whether it is a business deal with you, or any other social agreement, then it is unreasonable for me to doubt the rules that I have committed to, after the fact of having consented to the agreement. To renege is to be unreasonable. But this form of "unreasonable to doubt" does not constitute a certainty that the rules I've committed to are the best, correct, true, or any such thing. This form of "unreasonable to doubt" is not a form of certainty at all, it refers to commitment, or obligation..

The statement was just an example, of a dualist proposition. I brought it up because I told apokrisis that dualism provides the best way for dealing with the epistemic cut. The way apokrisis proposed is that we accept that there is such a thing as the epistemic cut, then proceed to adopt principles which make the epistemic cut go away (bridge it). I find this self-contradicting, to assume the existence of a division, then hide that division behind vague principles, so that it appears that there is no such division.

I don't believe there is a separation between body & soul they are not parts of a whole. I agree with social construction of these notions, but on an epistemic level but not as ontically given. — Cavacava

I don't quite see what you are saying here. Are you saying that you agree with the division between body and soul, to the extent that it is useful for social institutions, and epistemology, but you do not agree that this division is a true, or real one. Isn't that a form of hypocrisy, to allow that a principle which you do not believe to be true, should be fundamental to epistemology and social institutions?

Your position seems to be the opposite of Pattee's. He seems to propose that the division is real, that is his premise. But he thinks the way to deal with it, is to make it vanish behind vague principles.

So, your opinion is that the division is not real, but it should be maintained in principle. Pattee's and I assume apokrisis' position is that the division is real but we should adopt principles which close it.

Dualism allows that the division is real, and assumes principles which support the reality of the division. This is why dualism is the only existing metaphysics which deals with the epistemic cut in a logically consistent way. The alternative would be a position like Banno's, and perhaps StreetlightX's, which would be to deny the division altogether, making this "epistemic cut" something completely meaningless. However, since the foundations of our language (the hinge-propositions) are based in the dualist metaphysics, Banno's course is extremely difficult. We haven't a way to say what Banno wants to say, because our language is firmly rooted in dualist ontology.

The brain is the source of all experience. Although some hormones are generated in other parts of the body the brain is where anxiety happens.
You can even experience an arm and a leg without an arm and a leg, but you cannot experience anything without a brain. — charleton

I think that this is a matter of philosophical debate. It all depends on how you define experience. If you define experience such that it requires conscious noticing, and remembering of something, then it requires a brain. If you define experience simply as being affected by something, then it does not require a brain. To me, "experience" might mean a memory of being affected, but this only defers the problem over to what is meant by "memory". There are many living things without a brain, plants, which seem to have some sort of memory of how they have been affected.

Regardless to that, this is not what is at issue here. Anxiety is the thing which is being experienced. Your argument is based on the assumption that the thing being experienced, (in this case anxiety), could not exist without the thing which experiences it. And that's a false premise. I agree that the experience itself, requires a thing which experiences, but what we are looking for is the nature of the thing which is experienced, anxiety, not the experience, which is the noticing or remembering of anxiety. There is no reason why we should restrict ourselves to the thing which experiences, and the experience, when we are looking for that which is experienced.

I totally agree that it is not always bad, I would even go so far as to say that since anxiety is using both our emotions and physical responses to articulate a subjective concern that we are not aware of, that it is in fact good that we have these responses despite the negative sensations, because we are trying to speak to ourselves without words or a language. There is that saying most men lead lives of quiet desperation and die with their song still inside them, and people who feel anxiety don't like something but are not conscious of what it is that they do not like. It is like the emotions and body is trying to tell them. — TimeLine

Right, I like this way of looking at anxiety, your body is telling you something but you do not know what it is. I like this better than saying that a specific part of the body, the brain is telling you something, because the worst cases of anxiety seem to be the ones when the brain isn't in control of the anxiety. Perhaps what the body is saying, is really simple sometimes. When I'm sitting, sometimes anxiety will give me the urge to get up and pace the room. Maybe my body is just telling me to get active. Other times, it's not so simple, like if I am doing something and I feel like it should be getting done faster. Sometimes if there's more things in my mind which need to be done, than I can logically order, the anxiety builds. Perhaps my body is saying that my brain is losing control. Because if the brain isn't exercising proper control, then what is controlling the body. Anxiety may be a state of the body when it is not properly controlled by the brain.

That is an extreme case, but the point is that our perceptions could be flawed because of what we have been taught or our environment; we need to articulate it, bring to consciousness using reason but most never reach that point because we instinctually want to alleviate the anxiety, it is a natural reaction to want it to end and so we go on avoiding this all-important conversation we need to have with ourselves.

The problem with anxiety and it's cousin depression is that they are highly individual because it is dependent on a number of factors, predominantly your experiences and why articulating it or reasoning why it has manifested is the only way to really understand and overcome it. This is why communication is the key, whether in writing, to a friend or psychologist, through art. I found that talking about it - despite it being broken and problematic - allowed me to eventually piece the puzzles. — TimeLine

This is the problem I have had with "good anxiety", which I pointed to earlier. It is always directed to a future event, something looked forward to. There is a strong desire to end the anxiety because the end is the good which is sought. But the good is quick, gone in a flash, and there is a sudden hole which is left. This, I would call melancholy. In some cases I might avoid the melancholy by focusing on the anxiety itself, making the anxiety the good rather than the real good which is the end to the anxiety. So I've learned to enjoy the anxiety, and the "leading up to" period of the anticipated event But this is somewhat delusional, elevating the anxiety to an unreasonably high esteem, giving it a false position, as if the means to the end were the end itself. But I find that there is a balance to enjoying the anxiety, and enjoying the thing looked forward to, which makes the end less of a "flash", lessening the melancholy.

People hold onto this fear and so afraid to live that they live and ultimately die having experienced nothing. — TimeLine

I don't think we've properly addressed "fear" yet, and its relation to anxiety. There are different approaches, you suggested the division between fear of the known and fear of the unknown, but I find this difficult because the so-called known fear may often be mistaken such as misapprehension, and hallucination. And anxiety in respect to fear seems to more associated with an uncertainty as to whether the feared thing is real or not. I would like to class all fear as fear of the unknown , such that when the future thing is known, despite it being bad, we will not "fear" it. "Fear" would then be defined as an irrational view toward the future, necessarily involving the unknown. If the future were known, no matter how bad it is, we would not fear it. But fear is related to that part of the future which is unknown. It's like if we could assume determinism, thus know our fate, we'd also know that it is impossible to change that fate, so there'd be no worry or anxiety.

This peace is only recent, so I can imagine how the continuity of this improvement will grow over the coming years. When you get that clean slate and start writing your own language that you use to interpret the world and not the one given to you, nothing is greater. — TimeLine

Here's something to consider. As you described the situation, your anxiety preceded your accident, so it was not caused by the accident, if anything the anxiety contributed to the occurrence. It may be the case, that you are like I am, just a naturally anxious person, and your level of anxiety is prone to rising. Your experiences in the recovery period are not so much related to your anxious personality, but experiences which any person might incur, though the anxiety would contribute to the appropriate degree. But your anxious personality might be related to the incident occurring in the first place. And if this is the case you ought to determine how anxiety contributes to what you do in a negative way.

Sometimes I am worried about some particular bad thing which may happen if I am not careful. There is anxiety. I will look for anything I can possibly do to prevent this bad thing from happening, taking as many steps as possible related to anything I think might lead to the bad thing happening. This is not always good, because I am messing around with the things which might lead to the bad thing happening. When I am not extremely careful and methodical in choosing what to mess around with, and how I proceed in such messing around, I have actually caused the bad thing to happen by making a mistake. I am a little bit prone to causing the thing which I am afraid of occurring, to actually occur, because I am so afraid of it occurring. It's odd how trying too hard to prevent a particular occurrence, can actually cause it.

Yeah, good point. The Bishop example I have been using is not from On Certainty, but from Searle in The construction of social reality. It's the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules.

So, doesn't a dualist proposition like "the human being consists of body and soul" set up the game? — Metaphysician Undercover
No, because it is not a constitutive rule. — Banno

Finally, after thirty some pages, I get some indication as to the criteria for a hinge-proposition. You know that Searle's distinction has been highly criticized don't you?

Regardless, let's consider the proposition I mentioned, "the human being consists of body and soul". This is a statement of what it means to be a human being, and in particular it gives an indication of what a "soul" is. It says that the soul is a part of the human being which is other than the human being's body. Without acceptance and institutionalization of this proposition, the word "soul" has no referent or meaning at all, and it would be nonsense to speak about a soul. The proposition may have been better stated to form a proper rule, but it is clearly constitutive in the sense that it gives an indication of what a soul is, so that we can proceed to speak about a soul. Without such propositions we couldn't reasonably speak about souls because there would be nothing to indicate what a soul is.

Now, the point I made earlier in the thread. If the truth or falsity of hinge-propositions lies outside the game of epistemology, as a constitutive rule of that game, (their "truth" is dependent only on acceptance and institutionalization), then they are actually the most dubious.

So back to my problem from the beginning of the thread then. How is it that it is unreasonable to doubt the hinge-proposition? That's what I don't understand.

So, doesn't a dualist proposition like "the human being consists of body and soul" set up the game?

The point being, that the propositions which set up your game vary with your metaphysical worldview.

Yeah. Bring on the soul-stuff. That'll work. — apokrisis

There's a real problem here, and that is that as much as you scoff, the soul works as a much more logical principle than vagueness, or any of the other alternatives proposed by modern process philosophers. It neatly fulfills the conditions which need to be fulfilled, and that's why it's been maintained. The fact that we cannot come up with a principle better than this thousands of years old notion of "soul", I think is a real problem. Perhaps it's a hinge-proposition and unreasonable to doubt it.

So, I think anxiety is caused by fear but I agree with you that this is due to a consciousness of 'looking forward' and that anticipatory reaction. It is particularly potent existentially when we look forward enough to become aware that we are going to die, ultimately raising the most important question relating to 'significance' or our very significance existentially. — TimeLine

If you agree with me, that anxiety is concerned with "looking forward", then you should also agree with my designation that anxiety is not always bad. After all, "looking forward to" generally has the connotations of something good. If anxiety is not necessarily caused by fear, but could be caused by other cases of looking forward, then anxiety may in some cases be good. Even fear in some instances is good. Perhaps we can take Plato's model, and class anxiety as a passion. In Plato's description, the passions in themselves, are neither good nor bad. If they are aligned with reason then they are good, but if the person's disposition is corrupted and they no longer align with reason, then they are bad.

I think it is more fear and this fear is divided into two; fear of the known - something physical - and fear of the unknown, something we cannot consciously ascertain and so we experience an emptiness that we cannot control. — TimeLine

Let's say that fear is directed toward something perceived as bad, so that anxiety due to fear is not a case of looking forward to something, not a case of being anxious about something good which is impending (in the sense of "I can't wait..."), but a case of being anxious about something bad impending.

You divide anxiety due to fear into two classes, fear of the known, and fear of the unknown. Let's look at fear of the known. If the impending bad thing which is feared, and causing anxiety, is known, then we proceed toward determining ways of avoiding, or mitigating the bad thing. These things which we determine as ways to avoid the bad thing, are "goods". Under the Platonic-Aristotelian ethical tradition, the desired end is the good for which any action is carried out. So the actions determined as required for avoiding or mitigating the bad thing, are necessary for obtaining that good. In this way we use reason to transform anxiety which is directed toward an impending bad thing, into anxiety toward particular goods. That is fighting the bad thing.

This leaves us with fear of the unknown, which is probably where we will find truly bad anxiety. The "unknown" gives us no specific future event which the anxiety may be directed toward. The anxiety cannot be aligned with any principles of reason and it would seem like it can only be associated with a corrupted disposition. This is the emptiness which cannot be controlled.

So I am rereading your post, and trying to see if there are any hints as to exactly what "fear of the unknown" is. I described this anxiety as irrational, and bad, but some other intuition tells me that it's completely natural and reasonable to be afraid of the unknown. I tell myself it is completely unreasonable to be afraid of the unknown, but at the same time I know my intuition, and it is extremely difficult to approach the unknown without being afraid. There is something important about the solitude which you describe, because approaching the unknown is not frightening if I am not alone.

Death is not entirely unknown either, there is much we know about death. To begin with, we know that others will continue to live after we die, so those others whom we commune with, will continue after we die. This brings me to what you call losing one's selfhood, conforming to the masses. Isn't this necessary, in order to avoid the anxiety involved with death? If one lived life with little communion with others, then as death approached wouldn't anxiety build? These are difficult subjects because so much concerns the unknown.

The mind, however, reacts the same way to a non-physical fear. In addition to this, our cognitive processing from an evolutionary perspective always attempts to alleviate pain and is drawn to pleasure and so one is drawn to give up, to submit to the masses or conform or refuse to think for themselves, because it takes away that anxiety and therefore is pleasurable. This is why people stop questioning and conform to the masses and choose to lose their self-hood. — TimeLine

So I really wonder about this point. Thinking is our approach to the unknown. In order for an individual to think for oneself, and be refusing to conform, this person must always place oneself in a state of anxiety, confronting the unknown. Thinking is produced by approaching the unknown. But this type of anxiety, confronting the unknown is what I described as bad anxiety, above. Clearly, confronting the unknown, and thinking for oneself cannot be completely bad. There's an element missing here though, and that is fear. Approaching the unknown without fear is different from approaching the unknown with fear. So it's not the approach to the unknown, nor necessarily, the anxiety which goes with it, that is bad here, it is the fear itself.

Is fear a form of anxiety, or is it something distinct? Suppose someone is so overwhelmed by fear, that this person could not think straight. Things like this happen. I assume that what causes this fear is the apprehension of danger. Is this a real danger though? If not, then is it real fear? If not, is it real anxiety? All this is an hallucination. Can anxiety be hallucinatory? If so, what would you call it?

I did not take any medication and in a way I kind of appreciate your understanding of this 'fight' because you really need that to overcome it. — TimeLine

I admire you for this, not taking medication. That is a strong will and a tough fight. An event like that will change your life, and this cannot be avoided. The easier route is the medication, but far too often the medication becomes lifelong. To be on medication for the rest of your life means that the event has changed your life for the worse. But if you can fight back without the medication, in time you will overcome, learn from the experience, and perhaps become a better person from it.

A stressor, or something that causes anxiety, doesn't need to be an explicit memory. That's why in many situations anxiety may have no apparent cause and seem unreasonable and be maladaptive. So this is brain activity, conscious awareness of this activity is after the fact, though only a fraction of a second behind. — praxis

I appreciate what you are saying, but what is the "stressor"? It appears to me, like all you are saying is that there must be a cause of anxiety (stressor), but since that stressor can't be identified, let's just assume that the brain is the cause anxiety.

But you ought to understand that all experience is received by the brain. This has to include anxiety. — charleton

We were looking for the cause of anxiety. That experience is "received" by the brain does not mean that it is caused by the brain.

Thus the further thing of the interpreter must either be addressed by the metaphysics, or else it sets up the familiar homuncular regress. — apokrisis

The dualist solution to this apparent regress is very simple. The interpreter, the subject, the mind, is designated as substantially different from the physical world being interpreted. That separation, a true epistemic cut, negates any possibility of such a regress. If this separation is denied as unreal, then there is an appearance of homuncular regress because any designation of "epistemic cut' becomes arbitrary and subject to further and further divisions. The regress problem is the result of denying dualist principles while attempting to maintain an epistemic cut. So the epistemic cut must be real (dualist), or else any designation of "epistemic cut" would face the problem of infinite regress.

Hence we have Pattee's focus on how a molecule can function as a message - how DNA can code for a protein that is then an enzymatic signal to switch on or off a metabolic process. — apokrisis

Pattee's method is to get rid of the epistemic cut, by making it into an illusion, a fiction. He does this by introducing concepts like self-constraining, and self-organizing, and by describing symbols which interpret themselves. But these speculative notions appear to be without any real principles of support.

The set of measurements is part of the world, and that's why there is no "epistemic cut", as defined, between the measurements and the thing measured. There is perhaps an epistemic cut between the thing measured and the principles employed in measurement, and between the measurements and the principles employed, such that the act of measurement provides us with a separation, an epistemic cut, between the principles employed and the thing measured, along with the measurements. But this only begs the question of the existence of a "principle", just like "epistemic cut" begs the question of the existence of the subject. If we ignore this question altogether, concerning the existence of the principles, then the division between the measurements and the thing measured, is obscured in vagueness.

In another sense, "the map is not the territory" is quite problematic. In order to use a map one must understand the little crosses and lines as being buildings and roads and stuff. — Banno

Banno gets this, but refuses to address the issue of what is a principle. Sam26 proposes hinge-props which are somehow different from principles, perhaps a special sort of principle. But Sam26 doesn't seem to be able to explain how to differentiate a hinge-prop from an axiom, or a self-evident truth.