Sorry, never gave it any thought, because it's irrelevant. So I really doubt that I was certain of it at the time.

Sure we are. But then, we are both confident that we are talking epistemology on a web site in English. — Banno

I'm not so confident that what you're discussing is epistemology. And if what you are discussing is epistemology, then what I'm discussing is not epistemology, because we clearly have incompatible descriptions of this thing which we are referring to as "epistemology".

So because of your uncertainty we cannot begin the discussion.

That is, we need some sort of certainty in order to get started. — Banno

Don't you think that we ought to discuss things first, throw some words back and forth at each other, to get an idea as to how each of us uses the various words, before we make any assumptions about certainty? Discussion is prior to certainty.

If I am certain that my opinions concerning "epistemology" are correct, and you are certain that your opinions are correct, then we will never make any progress. And if you're not prepared to doubt your opinions for the purpose of compromise, why should I be prepared to doubt my opinions? Certitude is counter-productive in epistemology, doubt is productive.

I think we're having a fine discussion. Why do you think we need to be certain of anything in order to have a discussion? Usually in discussion I find many mistakes in interpretation, so I think it's better to approach discussion without an attitude of certitude.

I don't know, I really don't play chess and I'm only vaguely familiar with it. I'm not really into games. I had bad experiences as a child, finding out halfway through, that the others were playing by different rules than I. And even after consulting the printed rules, they'd insist that these are the rules they play by regardless of what it says on the box.

Can we agree that it would not be viable to play chess against someone who doubted the movement of the pieces? — Banno

Right, I wouldn't play if I thought the person might cheat. How would I know whether the person was a cheater or not?

And again, for the purposes of this thread we are assuming there are such things and delving into their nature. — Banno

Yes, we assume that there are "hinge-propositions". The point I am making, is that as we are "delving into their nature", it becomes more and more evident that "indubitable" in relation to "hinge-propositions" is a false predication.

But the present line of thought is one we have been over innumerable times. — Banno

That's very true, but Sam26 is providing us with more and more information, such that the true nature of the "hinge propositions" is becoming more and more evident. Once we expose exactly what they are, and how they exist, it will be easier to see whether they are indubitable or not.

If it is revealed that "indubitable" is a false predication, then what becomes of Wittgenstein's response to the skeptic?

If people are comparing him to Hitler then it'll be because of some authoritarian tendencies he might be showing as President, which is obviously not something that would tend to come up when he's just a businessman and TV star. — Michael

You can't say that the authoritarian tendencies didn't come out in the TV show. And, I'm very sure they were quite evident to most everyone who knew him before that.

So why would anyone insist that hinge propositions are indubitable? They are not certainties, and they are only accepted if one feels obliged to do so. The "indubitable' characteristic is dependent on the obligation, but since they are not certainties the obligation has no efficacy to prevent doubt.

A given is something taken for granted. But it's not necessary to take it for granted, one may decline it, just like a proposition may be declined, and that is doubt.

A commitment is an obligation. But just as much as one person may feel obliged to take what is given, for granted, another person might feel obliged to request justification for it (doubt it).

I am saying that such commitments may not be certainties at all. In fact I think it's a mistake to refer to them as certainties.

It's not a question of who is forcing the act, it's a matter of who is acting, who's act it is. That's why motive and intention are irrelevant. Aqustino is trying to create the illusion that if an individual is not morally responsible for one's own actions, then those actions are not the individual's actions.

I disagree that these "non-propositional commitments" are necessarily certainties. It is just as likely that an individual is committed to an attitude of doubt, as to an attitude or certitude. And, since the attitude of doubt is what inclines us to demand justification, not the attitude of certitude, then knowledge as JTB must be based in a commitment to doubt.

Right, the law recognizes intent. But there is nothing to indicate that when a person acts under duress the act is not the person's act. That is contradictory, to say that the person's action is not the person's action, but it is what Agustino claims.

You continue with your faulty logic. You argue "if an action is not freely chosen, it is not mine, in a very important sense of the term". But you have no premise to support this conditional, it's based in an absurdity. You conclude that because I am not morally responsible for the actions therefore the actions are not mine.

You need a further premise to support your conclusion, and you cannot state that premise without contradiction. "A person's actions are not that person's actions if one is not morally responsible".
You've acknowledged the contradiction already.

Unless you can clear up this contradiction, you have no argument. How do you propose to separate the actions from the person, to support your claim that the actions are not the person's actions? Clearly, it doesn't suffice to say that we can separate the actions from the person on a basis of moral responsibility, because dogs, cats and other animals all have actions without moral responsibility. It is completely absurd to say that a cat's actions are "in a very important sense" not the cat's actions, because the cat is not morally responsible. Your argument is based in this absurdity, that a lack of moral responsibility provides a principle whereby we can separate the actions of an object from the object, allowing for the contradictory notion that the actions of the object are not the actions of the object.

I'll afford you some advice. Actions are attributed to things acting. If you can attribute your actions to something else, then you have a principle whereby you might say that the actions are not yours they are the actions of that other thing. Some for instance, have been known to insist that I am the conduit for God, God is thinking through my mind. Such an argument is commonly dismissed as lunacy though. But if you can explain what it is that your thoughts (as actions) are attributed to, other than yourself, then you provide the basis for your claim that your thoughts are in that sense, not yours.

Sure, my finger may have pressed the button, but it was forced by the criminal to do that - I never consented to it. So the action is "mine" if by that you mean that it is performed through my finger, but it is not mine in terms of its moral relevance - it belongs to whoever forced me in that case. — Agustino

Again, this is all wrong. The action of pushing the button belongs to you. The action of forcing you to push the button belongs to the other. Even if responsibility for pushing the button is transferred to the other, this in no way indicates that the action itself is the other's. "Responsibility for", and "the action" refer to two distinct things.

But how could you know something wasn't quite right unless you were making a prediction that it would be otherwise in some sense? — apokrisis

Doubt is not knowing, so it's not a case of knowing that something isn't quite right, I'd say it's more like an intuition. Intuition is not a knowledge in the sense of JTB. I think that most participants in this thread completely misunderstand and misrepresent doubt, claiming that doubt, like certitude, must be justified. Intuition is not justifiable but it plays a role in epistemology.

And then in complementary fashion, the brain is also designed to "doubt" - apply its attentional resources - whenever this general backdrop of belief fails to predict the world in suitable fashion. — apokrisis

Doubt is not only the result of failed prediction. Whenever something doesn't seem quite right, there is cause for doubt. So doubt precedes action in the attempt to avoid failure. It is more like an intuition, that I may be wrong, than a realization that I was wrong, after the fact.

You are such a sophist, you should get a prize for it, you know? It will be called Master Cum Laude of the Science of Eristic. (For the mods, don't think anything dirty, it's Latin). — Agustino

Thanks, I appreciate the respect.

So thinking is an activity (your words, not mine). If I do an activity without my consent - if that activity is forced on me, in other words - am I responsible for it? If a criminal takes my thumb by force and puts my fingerprint on the lock to the bank's safe, am I morally responsible for opening it for him? :s One cannot be morally responsible for things that lie outside of one's choice. Freedom of choice is a precondition for moral responsibility. So clearly, if an action is not freely chosen, it is not mine, in a very important sense of the term. — Agustino

You've now resorted to standard determinism. If you believe in determinism, and think that you are not responsible for your acts because of determinism then so be it. That is your belief.

Yes it does - you have moral responsibility for the actions that you have freely chosen. So the fact that you do freely choose them is what makes them yours in the moral sense. — Agustino

No, even if you are for some reason not morally responsible for your actions, the actions are still in all respects, yours. Being absolved from moral responsibility does not in any way make your actions not yours. You're arguing absurdity.

Why must skepticism be refuted? If it is an essential aspect of epistemology then respect it as such. Trying to sweep it under the carpet, or treating it as if it were some irrational illness of humanity which must be eradicated, is not the answer.

He wouldn't know he is only hallucinating? Then is he doubting or not? — Caldwell

If he's not knowing, then I think he's doubting. Agree?

Is that not a distinction? — Agustino

No, it's an illusion of distinction. That I freely choose to have something in no way provides any real means for classifying whether that thing is mine or not. That assumption is ridiculous.

You accept that the thoughts are yours, but you create this illusion, that because "I have not freely chosen to have them", they are in some sense not mine. But "freely choosing to have them" provides no real means for classifying whether a thing is mine or not. So your argument is absurdity.

No, I completely agree but what I am attempting to convey is that the process itself, of being able to articulate and examine their past and memories, to be able to understand causal connections particularly that of biological - including health and sleep - as well as genetic, of attempting to analyse and ascertain the authenticity of their perceptions, all this is the process that leads one toward the successful and indeed permanent alleviation of such anxiety. — TimeLine

OK, so this would be a process of understanding one's own conscious mind, self-reflection. Further, you seem to articulate that one can understand a relationship between one's biological health, and the health of one's conscious mind. Furthermore, an individual can ascertain that the health of one's conscious mind is dependent on a healthy biology.

This is because we begin to understand ourselves as an autonomous agent with better clarity and we begin to mature the existential properties that reduce ambiguous mental states, enabling us to exercise better control of our lives. The concept of "being born again" - removing any Christian connotations to this - is really just the ability to start all over again, to overcome the given way to interpret our perceptions and experiences with the external world according to our parents and friends and begin interpreting that independently or autonomously and that often means a complete transformation in their environment and the people that they associate with. A healthy psychology is a person who has achieved that kind of balance, that peace which leads one to happiness. — TimeLine

This is a little more difficult for me to understand. I assume you are suggesting a situation where a person has had problems with the conscious mind, that it has not been completely healthy. You suggest that a "start all over again" is required. What does this mean in relation to the biological condition? The conscious mind forms and evolves through childhood, as we develop. It is in the middle between the environment and the subconscious which is the underlying biological condition. It is shaped by these two features. Are you suggesting that we can go back, "born again", and reshape the conscious mind?

If so, consider this. The subject may be able to release the present conscious condition to a certain extent. Also, appropriate environmental conditions may be provided for that person. And this may be conducive to some success. But the serious issue is the condition of the subconscious, which is a property of the underlying biological features. The principle which I discussed in my last post, is that in the early stages of conscious development, infancy, the subconscious, the biological features themselves, must be conditioned to properly accept the conscious mind. Assuming that we can't really understand how the subconscious is molded to properly accept the conscious, how could we properly deal with the subconscious in this rebirth process?

Love is the foundation, in my opinion, the very core of who we are and this is clear in children who have caregivers that fail to provide adequate love or care that such neglect often has a massive impact right into adulthood, including anxiety and attachment issues. Our experience of love alleviates this feeling (hence why if you are in a relationship and feel anxiety, you do not love your partner) and for me that is proof that love is the source of all that makes us human; empathy, care, charity, it is moral consciousness. — TimeLine

My proposal was that love is the means by which the subconscious, the biological is conditioned to better accept the conscious in the very early stages of conscious development. If this is the case, then we ought to ask how is it that love can affect one's biological features? This may be very simple, such as through eating right and sleeping right, but there may be other factors which reach much deeper. Consider the adult who needs the rebirth which you refer to. That person needs a reconditioning of the subconscious, the biological features which provide for consistency between the subconscious and the conscious. What are all the benefits which love can give?

When we are young, our perceptions have the solidity of something definite until we become aware of ourselves, at which point we lose this solidity and thus the source of our anxiety becomes this inability to acknowledge an indefinite existence, the fact that we are separate and alone. We don't like feeling helpless and so in our desperation we reach out, to a partner or friends or anything in the external world that we can attach ourselves to, conform and finally 'unite' to return back to that same solidity and definite feeling we had when young. But this solution, this union is all wrong, we trick ourselves and falsely fill that void. It is why what is commonly done to explain existence by the masses does not produce anxiety in us when we follow; anxiety is proof that we have a problem following, but we have not yet 'let go' - it is the unity between automatons that gives meaning through common approval. — TimeLine

The unity which you refer to here is "all wrong" because it is not the unity of true love. It is a unity of purpose. This person wants to be close to this other person for some purpose, and so on, just like "networking" except that the purpose is often not revealed, disguised as "friendship", or even "love". When the ulterior motive is revealed there is the inevitable disappointment, the feeling of deception. We can't go on living like this, where the appearance of love is just an illusion, a veil covering the ulterior motive.

People incorrectly believe in this idea that they have "fallen in love" when it is really initiated by the same conformism where sexual consummation is really an attempt to overcome the preceding loneliness. Such love fails so often in our society because we do not see the application of love to be rational but rather 'spontaneous' and so we do not correctly examine that we need to learn how to give it. We study courses or subjects over a number of years to gain a basic understanding of a subject, before proceeding further for another number of years working in the field to gain experience. Why is it that we neglect the study and practice of love? And it is not to one person, but to learn how to give it to all people, it is to basically be a friend. — TimeLine

That's right, love is not taught. I am not religious, but I believe that Christians used to teach love. I don't know if they still do though, because I've never been to Sunday School.

They are mine in one sense, and not mine in another. It is your failure to make the necessary distinctions there. — Agustino

As I said, I find your position here to be contradictory nonsense. You claim some of your thoughts are "in one sense mine", and in another sense "not mine", and you accuse me of failing to make a distinction. It's very clear that you are the one failing to make the distinction of what is yours and what is not yours, falling back onto contradiction, as if you can justify this failure with contradiction.

And you know full well that you are responsible for your own immoral thoughts, as is evident from "covet", "lust", and "adultery in the heart". So you cannot absolve yourself from responsibility by claiming that I haven't freely chosen my thoughts, therefore they are not mine.

This is very wrong. How can you be responsible for things that are not within your control? — Agustino

When you lose control of yourself in a fit of passion, you are responsible for your actions. Sorry, but that's just the way it is. You may find some legal defence if you have a diagnosable illness, but that's for the doctors to decide. In any case, if the doctors decide that you have an illness, then your thoughts are the thoughts of an ill person, therefore they are still your thoughts. Your insistence that your thoughts are in some sense not yours, is nonsense. In no sense are your thoughts not yours, that's nonsense. You're barking up the wrong tree here.

The way I'm using the term indubitable, is in the sense of being undoubtable, which is exactly what Wittgenstein was getting at with Moore's propositions. Now whether you agree with this or not is up to your interpretation, but it's not just my interpretation, but many other philosophers believe these bedrock propositions are indubitable. I don't see how this cannot be the case. — Sam26

I've explained this to you already in this thread, but I'll explain it again. To doubt is to request justification. Knowledge requires justification. Bedrock propositions as you describe them, are not justified, therefore they are not knowledge. In order that it may be accepted as part of a body of knowledge, any proposed bedrock proposition requires justification, therefore it must be doubted. If it is not doubted, (and consequently justified), it remains outside the body of knowledge and cannot serve as a fundamental proposition.

When he talks about objective certainty and objective certitude, it's basically the same thing. — Sam26

Again, that 's clearly not true. Look at the difference between where he describes objective certainty at 194: "But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible." and where he describes objective certitude at 270: “I have compelling grounds for my certitude.” These grounds make the certitude objective."

Your claim that "when a mistake is not possible" means the same thing as "I have compelling grounds for my certitude" for Wittgenstein is clearly untenable. What has actually happened in "On Certainty" is that Wittgenstein started out with the intent of seeking the highest degree of certainty, (when a mistake is not possible), to provide an approach to the skeptic's doubt. However, he realized that such a certainty, "objective certainty" cannot be ascertained in any practical way. So he settles on a different type of "objectivity", one which allows him to say that "my certitude" is objective.

There's a substantial difference here:

True objective certainty, "it is certain", which Wittgenstein recognizes as "mistake is not possible", is attributed to the object, "it" is certain. True objective certainty represents the facts, the way it is. Whether or not any human beings know the way that it is, there is a way that it is, and this is represented by "it is certain that...", where mistake is completely impossible, because "..." represents the way that it is.

On the other hand, when my certitude is "objective", the certitude is a property of me, a subject. So we are now saying that I, the subject have a property which is objective, and this is my certitude. What makes this certitude objective is that it is grounded in the bedrock of inter-subjectivity. Now we have an objectivity that is not based in the object, which was the case with "it is certain that...", it is based in an inter-subjectivity, "we are certain that...".

As reference, consider the difference between how Wittgenstein uses "certain" at 175-200, and then after 200.

Between 175 and 200 he is discussing what it means for a proposition to be certain. At 178 he uses "It is so". Between 183 and 184 he uses "It is certain that". After 200 he switches his focus toward what does it mean if I am certain. At 230 he is asking what gives me certainty? At 242, "Mustn’t we say at every turn: 'I believe this with certainty'?" At 246 he is asking what does it mean if I am completely convinced. And this is where he talks about bedrock, and then produces objective certitude at 270. At 273 he asks "What qualifies as "objectively certain"?", and answers "There are countless general empirical propositions that count as certain for us."

Notice, he has switched from objective certainty, "it is certain", prior to 200, to "objectively certain", "certain to us", after 270.

My argument is that when something is objectively certain, "certain to us", it is unreasonable for us to doubt this, as it is unreasonable to doubt that which one is certain of. However, the "us" referred to here, is never absolutely inclusive, there are always those who are outside the "us". For those outside the "us", the propositions which are certain to us, are not certain. For these people, it is reasonable to doubt those propositions and ask for justification. Furthermore, it is unreasonable for "us" to insist, to those who doubt these propositions, that it is unreasonable to doubt them. It is unreasonable for "us" to do this because it is just an excuse, a tactic to avoid having to justify these propositions.

Such "compelling grounds" are ruled out by your game of faux radical doubt. This is chimera-chasing that demands absolute certainty which can never be reached and in the process of pretending throws out the realization that in its very activity it is still taking countless things for granted. — Janus

Like I said, in my daily endeavours I accept such things without a doubt. But since we're discussing fundamental principles of epistemology here, I see no reason why we ought to settle for anything other than a quest for real objective certainty (in the sense where the possibility of mistake is excluded). This means that as an epistemological principle, anything less than that which gives us real objective certainty ought to be doubted. If your argument is that nothing gives us objective certainty, therefore everything within epistemology would be doubted, then that's the way epistemology ought to be. I see no problem with believing that every fundamental principle of epistemology ought to be subjected to doubt. This could only improve certainty.

If you want to settle for less, saying that we ought to just take things for granted, and not doubt them because they appear to be correct, then that's your opinion. But I don't think your opinion will be acceptable to very many serious epistemologists.

To know the answer to Wittgenstein's question, "Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" is "No," is to think about not only what he said here, but what he said elsewhere. — Sam26

This is not true. Wittgenstein does not answer this question with "No". It is very clearly implied that the answer here is "Yes". And that's why he replaces "objective certainty" with "objective certitude" at 270. If the answer were "No" he wouldn't need to replace "certainty" with "certitude". It is only because the answer is yes that he is forced to seek something other than "certainty", and that is "certitude".

Moore's proposition, as well as any other proposed hinge propositions fulfill the conditions of "objective certitude", but they do not fulfill the conditions of "objective certainty". If you do not recognize this distinction then I think you are deficient in your interpretation of Wittgenstein, by not recognizing his use of these two distinct words.

In the vast majority of circumstances,, "objective certitude" relinquishes any need for doubt. But as dedicated epistemologists it is our due diligence to call for an investigation of (doubt) any proposition which does not obtain "objective certainty".

If I have intrusive thoughts which are presented to my mind without me directing my attention towards them, then these are clearly not "mine". — Agustino

This is nonsense, and contradictory. "I have intrusive thoughts" implies necessarily, through the use of "I have", that the thoughts are yours. To go on and claim that they are not yours is contradictory. Trying to disassociate yourself from your irrational or immoral thoughts, as if the thoughts were not yours, does not absolve you from responsibility for these thoughts.

So an intrusive thought isn't an action that I undertake, but rather something that happens to me. — Agustino

No, it is quite clearly something you are doing, you are thinking. It is a completely inaccurate description to say that this is "something that happens to me". Even sensing is not something which happens to me, it is something that I do. You are very clearly taking an unrealistic approach here, with an extremely unrealistic description.

Wittgenstein, as far as I know, never defined certainty as logically excluding the possibility of a mistake. In OC 194 Wittgenstein asks, "But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?" The answer to this question is seen in the way Wittgenstein deals with these questions throughout OC. — Sam26

Right, this confirms what I said. Wittgenstein claims at 194 that objective certainty is when the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. "When a mistake is not possible." "Mustn't mistake be logically excluded?"

The answer to this question is seen in the way Wittgenstein deals with these questions throughout OC. There are propositions, bedrock propositions, and they are grounded in a way of acting, they are not grounded in some epistemic or psychological certainty (objective or subjective certainty). So when he is talking about a mistake being logically excluded, it's not in reference to knowledge or certainty, but in reference to his hinge-propositions, which are outside any epistemic considerations. In fact, doubt is something that is part and parcel to knowledge, which is why Moore's propositions aren't the kind one can know, and it follows that they're not the kind that one can doubt. The answer to his question is in the negative, and that is seen in the overall picture of what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish. — Sam26

I think you demonstrate a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein here. Clearly, Wittgenstein associates objective certainty with when the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. So for you to go on and say " when he is talking about a mistake being logically excluded, it's not in reference to knowledge or certainty, but in reference to his hinge-propositions", you completely misrepresent Wittgenstein. When the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded, this is objective certainty.

What is the case, is that at 203 he goes on to talk about "certainty" in relation to when an hypothesis is in "agreement", with the world of facts. We might say we are certain if we find it difficult to disagree. He continues to discuss this notion of "agreement", and by 270 he produces a new definition for "objective" certainty:

270. “I have compelling grounds for my certitude.” These grounds make the certitude objective.

This is what I meant when I said that Wittgenstein "waffles". First, he says that objective certainty is when the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. Then he produces a compromised "objective certainty", notice how he refers to this as objective "certitude".

So, when you speak about the hinge-propositions, and how they are the grounds for certainty, what is really the case is that they are the grounds for this "objective certitude". Since the objective certitude is defined by "I have compelling grounds for my certitude", (the grounds being hinge-props), and not defined as "the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded", there is a substantial difference between "objective certainty" and "objective certitude".

We know that objective certainty would remove any rational doubt, because it would be irrational to doubt when the possibility of mistake has been logically excluded. However, the issue is with respect to objective certitude. Is it rational to doubt, even though I have compelling grounds for my certitude? I think that in our activities of daily life, it is not rational to doubt in any case that I have compelling grounds for my certitude, despite the fact that mistake is still possible. However, when we are seeking fundamental principles of epistemology, in which case we are seeking the highest level of certitude possible, it is rational to doubt until the compelling grounds for certitude reach the level of mistake having been logically excluded.

Pretty sure you're wrong about this. — Marchesk

You're not familiar with cosmology, are you?

Hmmm I disagree with your interpretation of Aristotle here. In my view, Aristotle is making a meta-ethical claim, that ALL people desire and seek after happiness. Even a criminal, for example, commits the crimes he does with the view that they will be conducive to his happiness. Of course, the criminal would be mistaken, but it doesn't change the fact that from his perspective, he is pursuing happiness. He is wrong either about (1) what happiness consists of, or (2) the means of acquiring it. — Agustino

Though it was not a formalized concept at his time Aristotle clearly believed in free will, as is evident from his discussion of the potential for future acts which must be decided upon. Your claim, that Aristotle believed all people desire and seek happiness is inconsistent with free will. It implies a necessary inclination toward happiness. He actually proposed "happiness" as something desired for the sake of itself, self-sufficient, and that this is self-evident. As a self-evident truth it is only self-evident to those who apprehend and comprehend it. So for those individuals who do not apprehend, and comprehend, with their conscious minds, that happiness is such an end, they will not desire it.

However, there's also the Stoic approach which states that the rational part retains full control, since nothing gets done without the assent of the rational part. For example, regardless of how afraid or angry you feel, you must still assent, with your reason, to those feelings, in order to act according to them. — Agustino

Remember, I consider thinking as an act. This is described by Aristotle when we says that the contemplative life is the highest virtue, virtue being the property of an act. So if an individual has irrational fear, and is inclined toward thinking about the thing feared, without the assent of the rational mind, then this person is acting according to the irrational fear. Since this is often the case, then it is very clear that the rational, conscious mind does not maintain full control over the subconscious. The conscious is clearly influenced by the subconscious to do something irrational, to think about something which it is irrational to think about.

Indeed, no clear avenue, but there is a way to reach that 'core' problem or to find out the root cause of those subconscious fears because they mostly exist through past experiences and it is about accessing that repository of memories and reasoning or calculating a number of possible factors that network the formation of this negative feeling. For instance, that girl has irrational fears of leaving home and venturing into independence because of a dominating mother and a normalisation of her behaviour culturally, but she is unaware of that consciously and she clearly ensures or fights any possible access to the truth by getting upset at those who bring it up and pushing them away. — TimeLine

I have to disagree with you on this point. I think that there is no way to reach the cause of those irrational fears and anxiety from the conscious mind. You suggest that one could proceed on the basis of examining possibilities. This would be like trial and error. However, in trial and error by the conscious mind, there must be a clearly defined "success", such that we would know when the trial has success. In this case, we'd examine all sorts of possibilities with no way of knowing which is the correct one. Furthermore, it is likely that each of the possibilities contributes its own bit toward compounding the problem. So it appears to me, like there are no parameters for judging "success", in determining which of the possibilities is the correct one. Then there is no way of knowing whether any such understanding of the subconscious by the conscious is a correct one.

Because of this perspective, I think that this approach would only contribute to the problem. You mentioned that resolution of the problem requires that one stops deceiving oneself. I think that this belief, that one can get to the cause of the unruly subconscious, by examining one's experiences with the conscious mind, is a case of self-deception. The problem is that consciousness starts to develop when the child is a baby. The first stage in this development would be the development of the "respect" for the conscious mind, by the subconscious. The subconscious must develop this respect in order that it would allow that the conscious mind develops at all. So the relationship between the subconscious and the conscious, the respect which is necessarily there, is a property of the subconscious. No matter how the conscious mind pokes away at this relationship, trying to understand it, it only has a very narrow perspective, and cannot see the vast amount of factors which would influence the subconscious in developing and maintaining this respect.

If language - as in reason or rational thought - is not serving us to articulate experience, stories seem to work as that next level of communication, like semiotics in that it provides symbolic connections between our experiences in a fictional story. This is why we dream and perhaps even the purpose of our imagination, that intuitive realm of communication. Sometimes (not all the time) our dreams are showing us those subjective, underlying problems and desires but the actual dream itself is completely fantastical and makes no sense until you attempt to interpret it. This is why writing your own story or painting or other creative arts helps us explain those deeper behavioural feelings as much as parables or allegories can explain underlying moral concepts without actually detailing what. — TimeLine

It's not that language doesn't serve us in articulating our experience, it does serve us to articulate our conscious experience, but it doesn't serve us to articulate our subconscious experience. What we might do, for example, is produce symbols of expression, artistic forms, etc.. But these are expressions from our conscious mind, outward toward other conscious minds, which are meant to express feelings from the subconscious. When we turn inward with the conscious mind, toward the subconscious, we would have to determine, and translate the symbols of the subconscious, in order to truly understand it. We don't do this though, because these symbols are way out of reach down in the atomic, or molecular level. So we analyze the feelings, memories, and dreams, as how the subconscious appears to the conscious, with the words and symbols of the conscious mind. We like to think that these metaphors and artistic expressions are symbols of the subconscious, but they are really symbols from these lower levels of the conscious mind. This does not give us what is needed to truly understand. To truly understand it is required to determine how the conscious appears to the subconscious, not how the subconscious appears to the conscious.

Consider for an analogy, that the subconscious is a completely different person from the conscious. What we want to do is to determine why this person behaves like it does. To do this we have to get into the person's mind, determine the person's intentions. Immediately we're hit with the problem, what type of a mind does the subconscious have, what type of intentions does it have. We must afford it some form of intention because it can freely choose whether to obey or disobey the conscious. It would obey if there is consistency between what it wants and what the conscious mind wants. But if there is inconsistency, it would disobey, just like a person would disobey the laws if there is inconsistency between what the person wants and what the laws want.

Even just the warmth of presence, to listen, to play, to read and all this nurtures the child to develop correctly and makes the process of transcendence much more smoother. A human being requires love to be full functional. — TimeLine

I'm glad you agree. I think that the importance of true love is often underestimated. It is what is required to create that very special relationship between the subconscious and the conscious, as the conscious mind develops. Even if it has been missed in the early stages of development, it can be useful in later stages of life, but with probably less effectiveness.

I can imagine that "4", in my language, means this many distinct units: — PossibleAaran

This is not correct. "4" must necessarily refer to one unit. Each of the numerals, "2", "3", etc., refer to individual units. If "4" referred to four distinct units we would not be able to carry out the mathematical proceedings which we do. For instance, 4x1 would be 1x1x1x1x1 if "4" referred to four distinct units. Instead, "4" must refer to one unity, a unity with the value of four individuals.

Thus, there is a sense in which I couldn't really doubt that 2+2=4. — PossibleAaran

You ought to doubt this, because the way you've described what "4" and what "2" means, is clearly incorrect.

Here is the issue which Banno needs to consider. We can know, and follow a rule without understanding that rule. It is only when we doubt the rule, and thereby analyze it for validity, that we actually come to understand it.

Am I right to understand that what makes 2+2=4 dubitable is that although I might decide the meanings of "2" and "4" such that it is indubitable, its still possible that any time I entertain 2+2=4 I am misremembering my own meanings of "2" and "4"? — PossibleAaran

If you do not actually understand the rules which you are following, then you might misrepresent what is meant by the rules, as you misrepresented what is meant by "2", and "4", above. When we doubt the rule, we proceed toward understanding it.


Keep in mind how Wittgenstein defined certainty in On Certainty, as logically excluding the possibility of mistake. At this point it is implied that this is what is required to render doubt unreasonable.

He later waffles though, and defines certainty in a different way, such that if it doesn't make sense to doubt it, then it is certain. The bedrock is the fundamental things we agree on, and so it doesn't make sense to doubt them. However, agreement only makes doubt unreasonable for all those who agree. If there are others outside of this agreement, it may be reasonable for them to doubt it. So those bedrock propositions are not really beyond doubt.

And I explained how I disagree with that, given that we can depict the world mathematically without a perspective, and given that our lack of a ability to picture a perspectiveless world does not necessitate the world can't be that way. — Marchesk

That's not true though. We cannot produce a mathematical model of the universe which is independent from perspective. This is one of the key things that special relativity demonstrates to us. And, my explanation demonstrates that to speak of things existing in a perspectiveless world is completely nonsensical.

Everything about who we are is dependent on the quality and capacity to reason adequately and fear stands as an obstacle only because of its ability to influence irrational thoughts. — TimeLine

I think we understand each other sufficiently, and maybe agree on some key points enough, that I could probably attempt another approach to the topic of fear.

We are talking about the type of fear which comes from the subconscious, and is irrational. The conscious mind attempts to quell the fear, perceiving it as irrational. However, the subconsciously derived fear does not relinquish. such that we might say that the subconscious is "unruly" in relation to the attempts of the conscious mind to subdue the irrational fear. When attempts to control the fear in this way are unsuccessful, the inclination for the subject is to attempt to understand the subconscious, and understand the reasons for the fear. However, as discussed, and I think we agree, there is no avenue here. The conscious mind is incapable of understanding the subconscious, and these attempts would only lead to frustration.

So we must adhere to the principle that the subconscious needs to "listen" to the conscious, and not vise versa. If we look back at the childhood learning process, we can see that this is what occurs. The child takes things in, learned from others, through the conscious mind, and the subconscious "listens", and accepts what the conscious mind gives it. By the principle of freedom though, which underlies all these activities, there is no necessity that the subconscious "listen", So we can conclude that the subconscious only "listens" to the conscious mind if it has a certain disposition, which makes it want to "listen". As discussed, we can't really describe the activities of the subconscious with words like I am doing here, because it's actions are beyond those of the conscious mind which we apprehend with words. and that's why I put "listen" in quotations. But this is where metaphors serve us, so I'll say that it's like listening, metaphorically. And the disposition which the subconscious must have, in order that it "listens" to the conscious mind, is like "respect", or "trust". So I'll refer to this as a disposition of respect, metaphorically. The subconscious has respect for the conscious, and allows itself to be told how to behave.

Now we might say that principally this respect is innate, instinctual, genetic. We are born with this disposition in which the subconscious has respect for the conscious, and this is what allows us to learn through the medium of the conscious mind. However, if we look at very early childhood, infancy or babyhood, we might find a period of time where the interaction between the conscious mind and the subconscious, has the conscious mind focused more on culturing this respect, rather than actually trying to tell the subconscious anything. Do you see what I mean? It is necessary that the subconscious has a very healthy respect for the conscious, in order that the child can learn through the conscious mind, so this respect must ne nurtured. At this early time the conscious mind probably isn't even aware of needing to tell the subconscious anything, it knows no words, so it's entire relationship with the subconscious is one of enhancing this respect. Here we find the importance of the unconditional love of the caregiver. The baby's subconscious receives, and benefits from the love given by the caregiver, through the medium of the baby's consciousness. This loving nurtures and enhances the naturally existing respect which the subconscious has for the conscious.

Back to the irrational fear now. If we have an adolescent, or even an adult, in the condition where this respect is compromised, as I believe is the case with irrational fear which the conscious mind cannot quell, then there could be a number of reasons for this problem. First, we might consider that the innate respect, the biological, genetically produced condition might be compromised by some physiological disorder. Next, we might consider that the nurtured, enhanced respect, has been for some reason compromised. The person, as a baby might not have received the required love, or the love might not have been true and unconditional, so as to produce "suspicions", etc.. Furthermore, it's possible that a traumatic experience later in life might even be enough to compromise the respect which previously existed.

Oh Sunny, you didn't discuss it in your next post.

In quantum time, we reverse time and hence move forward (in future). — Sunny S Koul

Can you explain what you mean by this "reverse time"?

You are one describing this -- not the person you are referring to. How would he know he is hallucinating? — Caldwell

He wouldn't, but that's exactly what doubt is, being unsure.

Do you doubt that twice two is four? Could you? — Banno

In general practise, I do not doubt "2+2=4", I use these mathematical principles all the time, without doubt that they help me achieve what I use them for.

However, I have doubted the truth of this statement in the past, and I have found it curiously contradictory. There is a problem with the meaning of "=", equivalence, which is inconsistent with the meaning of "unit" . Units are what the numerals represent to me, "2" signifying a unit of two, "4" signifying a unit of four.

On the left side of the equivalence signifier, we have two units of two, with a sign for addition. On the right side we have one unit of four. What is signified is that the two units on the left side are equivalent to the one unit on the right side. Initially, this appears as an impossibility, to say that two distinct units are the same, or equivalent, to one. It would require either a very odd definition of "equivalent", or some further standard, such as size, or weight, to say that the two units are equivalent to the one unit.

But I haven't yet taken into account the "+", and it is by means of the "+" that the two are said to be equivalent. The "+" signifies an action, addition. And it is by means of this action, adding, that the two are said to be equivalent. So the two units on the left are not equivalent to the one on the right, until the action of addition is performed. They become equivalent through this activity.

Now here's the problem. Before the action of addition is carried out, there are two separate units of two. After the action of addition is carried out there is one unit of four. So the equivalence which is signified by "=" is dependent on this action. Therefore "=" does not signify that "2+2" coexists with "4" as two equivalent things, it signifies that "4" negates "2+2" by means of that action. Because "two units" and "one unit" is inherently contradictory, they cannot coexist as equivalent things, the action negates one to bring about the existence of the other.

And if you came across someone who could, what would you make of them? — Banno

Doubting this was very useful two me. It helped me to justify the belief that Platonic Realism is not a good ontology. So I think that anyone who doubts this is a good, diligent philosopher. Anyone philosopher who does not doubt these fundamental rules is probably stuck within the confines of a Platonic Realism ontology.

In short, to doubt the rules is the only way that we're going to get through, toward an understanding of what type of existence these rules have. We can assume, take for granted, the existence of the rules, and follow them without doubt, but this will not give us an ontology. That would be a case of accepting the existing ontology. Ontology being the game which provides the rules for epistemology. So we must take the rules, doubt them, rip them apart in analysis, in order to see what supports their existence if we want a good ontology. Then the epistemology is built on the ontology. If you're happy with the belief that the rules are necessary then keep your Platonic Realism. if you do not believe that they are necessary then why not doubt them? Doubting them will only increase your understanding of fundamental ontological principles.

think this fundamentally confuses how we come to know about the world with the way the world is itself. Just because we can't get outside ourselves to imagine exactly how the world is without us observing it does not entail that the world cannot exist without us perceiving it. — Marchesk

No, the point I made is that the way that the world is, is completely dependent on one's temporal perspective. Without a subject, an observer, there is no temporal perspective. Without a temporal perspective there is no such thing as the way that the world is. That's why it's a senseless question to ask about the way that the world would be without an observer. Without an observer there is no such thing as the way that the world is.

This is just the best, however I believe that it may be accessible, only not completely, like a puzzle that you need to work through because if there appears to be that 'alarm bell' feeling we get from anxiety -which is our subconscious telling us that something is wrong - in order to have that, it would need linguistic capacity, there needs to be some meaning to that experience that it merely cannot articulate consciously because there is a lack of understanding. — TimeLine

I don't know about that. It may not be wise to attempt with the conscious mind to understand what the subconscious is doing. This puzzle might be impossible to solve, causing increased anxiety and frustrated thinking. If it is the subconscious which must "understand" the conscious, as I suggested, then we have to take a different approach. You know how some people argue that ultimately the subconscious passions control the conscious mind, and not vise versa? If this is the case, then the conscious mind might be able to communicate to the subconscious through this avenue. It would not be a case of trying to understand the subconscious with the conscious, but a case of trying to get the subconscious to understand the conscious. This would be saying something to the subconscious which it could understand.

When you teach a child that behaving someway is wrong, they often do not understand at conscious level why it is wrong, but this belief retreats into that subconscious domain as though the voice of this parent remains embedded and echoes doubts that we feel when we encounter similar experiences. — TimeLine

So this would be what happens with childhood learning. The subconscious is listening to, and in a way, communicating with the conscious, but the communication is sort of one way. The subconscious "understands" what the conscious mind gives it, receiving and remembering, but the conscious mind doesn't understand anything that is going on in the subconscious.

Only our instinctual drives remain completely unconscious, completely without any thought and really, as humans who are capable of identifying or becoming self-aware, consciousness is really the medium or tool that attempts to manage our instinctual drives with our social or moral development that we obtain for the external world. — TimeLine

I don't think that the conscious mind can ever really control the subconscious, because the subconscious is really the higher level. The aspect which we call "free", in "free will" is very deeply seated, so the subconscious itself is free, and will not necessarily follow the conscious mind's attempts to control it. So the subconscious listens, and to an extent understands the conscious, but it will not necessarily obey. We can learn from the history of teaching, and morality, that certain principles appeal to the subconscious, and these are readily accepted. In society, through communion, we use the conscious mind of other individuals to get through to, and affect the higher levels of those others, which are the subconscious, and in this way we can, to some extent manage the instinctual drives of others (education). Our own instinctual drives having been managed in a similar way by our teachers. But we're really very limited in what will be accepted by the subconscious, and this leads me to believe that the subconscious is really very narrowly focused. Trying to go outside these limits is problem causing.

It is experience that is not yet understood but considering that this moral development is within us, it is about raising it to the surface, to explain it at conscious level. — TimeLine

Again, I'm afraid this might be a backward approach. I really do not think that we can bring the deep levels (subconscious) to the surface (conscious). Our only approach may be to get the deep level to accept what the surface level has to offer. This means that whatever we offer to the subconscious, from the conscious mind, it has to be appealing, or else it will be rejected and the conscious mind will be left frustrated.

I am confident that there may be a way in which that transition could be eased with adequate support, but unfortunately society and religion and other institutions seem to do everything in their power to ensure you avoid this independent voice. — TimeLine

I think there is a degree of understanding of the inner voice which lies behind these institutions. But from your perspective, my perspective, and everyone else's perspectives, these principles of the institutions are always the "other". They use learned techniques to get through to the inner voice to teach and train it in the ways that have been deemed good by conscious thought. The subconscious might be quite focused, as I said above, in relation to infinite possibilities, but that doesn't mean that it is anywhere near as focused as the conscious mind would like it to be. So we keep working to focus the subconscious of others, and ourselves, through conscious reasoning. But even the reasoning must be conditioned with principles which are acceptable to the subconscious or else the effort is futile.

I disagree. The miser directs his attention to the hoarding of money because he believes that hoarding money will be conducive to his happiness - NOT because it really is conducive to his happinesss. — Agustino

Yes of course, it's all belief. Notice that I said if we "assume" happiness as the desired end. Many people will not even take the time to figure their own priorities, or what is important for them to get from life. These people would not make choices conducive to happiness, nor even choices which they believe are conducive to happiness, because they haven't taken the time to determine that happiness is what they actually want from life. And even if they do determine some ultimate goals like happiness, they seldom would take the time to think about each of the activities which they are engaged in, to determine how these activities would, if they even do, relate to that ultimate goal

Sure, and mindfulness and meditation actually trains this process. In mindfulness your goal is precisely to train your attention. You are supposed to focus on the breath, and maintain full awareness of it. And everytime your mind drifts to something else, and you become aware of it, then you must drop that thing and refocus on the breath. This process of choosing a goal, and then approaching it and not being distracted, this needs you to train your faculty of attention. — Agustino

I agree.

Not necessarily - joy and satisfaction will only come if that thing is really conducive towards one's happiness, not just if it has so been determined. — Agustino

There will be an immediate joy from accomplishing what one sets out to accomplish. This in itself is a cause of joy. If the thing accomplished is not really conducive towards one's ultimate goals, in this case happiness, then a disappointment or other bad feelings could follow when realization sets in.

Do we know that anything exists when unperceived? — PossibleAaran

The issue might be best understood from a temporal perspective. Consider that the human being is endowed with a very particular temporal perspective. Average reflex time is about a quarter of a second, so let's say that our perspective of what is "present", or "now", is about a quarter of a second. However, we can imagine time periods as short as a Planck time, and as long as billions of years.

Because everything in the world is moving, how things appear to our senses, is determined by our temporal perspective. Things moving very fast like photons only appear as a bright blur, because in that quarter second of perspective time, they cover a great distance of space, and must appear to be in all of those places at the same time (that quarter second which is "now"). Things moving much slower can appear to have a fixed position in that quarter second temporal perspective.

Now imagine different temporal perspectives. Suppose "the now" was a year instead of a quarter second. The earth covers the entire area of one orbit and so it now appears like a ring around the sun from this perspective. If we extend the perspective of "the now" to a longer and longer time period, like billions of years, the moving bodies in the universe occupy the entire space of the universe, and the universe appears like one solid entity, one thing.

So the existence of "things" is really dependent on a subject, an observer who has a particular temporal perspective. Our inclination is to ask, what would the universe look like from the temporal perspective of the subject, if we remove the subject, the observer. Will things still be the same? But this question really doesn't make any sense, because the temporal perspective is the property of the observer, and to remove the observer is to remove that temporal perspective. So to ask what would the universe look like from the temporal perspective of the observer, without the observer, is still to reference the observer. Without referring to the temporal perspective of the subject, we'd have no principle to choose a temporal perspective. Any choice of temporal perspective would be arbitrary, and the way that things appear, since they are all moving is dependent on the temporal perspective.

If we completely remove the observer, then we have no particular temporal reference, only the entire universe for all of time. There is no basis for singling out this particular time or that particular time. We'd be inclined to say that there would still be "the universe", without any subject or observer. But we really do not know what it means to be a universe, so this statement doesn't really make sense either. In the end, we have to face the fact that this question, "does anything exist if unperceived", really doesn't make any sense at all, because "to exist" refers to how we perceive things.

2+2=4 is not immune to doubt? But doubt here could only mean that the doubter did not know what "2", "+", "=" or "4" meant... — Banno

Why would you say that doubting the meaning of something is not a sensible form of doubt?. I think not understanding the meaning is the basis of all doubt. As I described earlier in the thread, those who doubt the existence of the external world do so because they doubt the meaning of "existence". Since it has not been demonstrated to them what it means to exist, such that "existence" could be applied to external things, they doubt whether "existence" can properly refer to external things. So they are completely unsure (doubtful) as to whether the external world has any existence, because "existence" has been assigned to it, but what it means to exist has not been explained, demonstrated, or justified.

So what is it they are doubting? Not that 2+2=4, because they do not understand what that means, and so could not doubt it. — Banno

Why do you think that one could not doubt what they do not understand? Isn't "not understanding" the very cause of doubt, just like understanding is the cause of certitude? Someone sees these symbols "2+2=4'", and recognizes that they are symbols, but has doubt, because the meaning is not known

The argument is, roughly, that in a given language game (and it is all language games), there are certain things that cannot sensibly be doubted. So in geometry the three angles of a triangle add to a straight angle and in Chess the bishop moves only diagonally. — Banno

If a person does not understand the rules of a particular game, then the person looks at those rules with doubt. This is completely sensible. What doesn't make sense is to assert that those rules cannot sensibly be doubted.

So the tyrant dictates: "these are the rules and you cannot sensibly doubt them, because you are my subjects, and you have no choice but to play my game". Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition.

Doubt has to hinge on something we know. — Caldwell

I really can't understand this claim. Suppose that a person is overcome with a severe illness causing delusion, and hallucinations, with the appearance of all sorts of phantasms, paranoia and suspicion of everyone and everything. This person would be completely unsure of what was real. Wouldn't this person doubt everything and know nothing?

Why do you think that doubt must hinge on something known? What about a baby just born? Isn't this baby lacking in knowledge, but full of doubt? Isn't the fundamental learning process of trial and error based in doubt? And doesn't trial and error precede knowing?

Why do you think doubt must hinge on something known?

Why can't thought be initiated by directing our attention towards a problem we want to think about? — Agustino

The question I think is what attracts one's attention. The way you ask the question, the issue of why do you want to think about this particular problem, is left open. And that might be an issue of mental health. If there is a problem which you want to think about, then your attention is already directed in that way. That thing interests you, and I need to know, why does that interest you. If there is something which you want to direct your attention toward, then there is a reason why you want to direct your attention in that way. That thing, which provides the reason why you want to direct your attention in that way is the thing which interests you.

This is the principle which Aristotle outlines in his Nicomachean Ethics, the good, the end, that for the sake of which. You have an interest in that particular problem, and therefore your attention is directed in that particular way, because you apprehend some good to be obtained. But that good is wanted for the sake of a further good, and so on. To assume an infinite regress of goods would not provide a proper end, so he posits "happiness" as the thing which is desired for the sake of itself, the ultimate good. If one adopts that principle, then the desire for happiness is what directs one's attention. So if you ask why do you want to direct your attention toward a particular problem, the answer is because it is through some means, conducive to your happiness. If it is not conducive to your happiness, then do not direct your attention toward that particular problem.

According to your usage of the term, pretty much ANYTHING one does is an "activity" - the term becomes meaningless since even not doing anything is an activity. — Agustino

Right, anything one does is an activity. Why do you find this to be a problem? No matter what one is doing, it requires the same sort of mental procedure. We determine our goals, or ends, then determine the means toward those ends, and proceed. As we proceed, we must deal with all the difficulties, obstacles which confront us, the problems on the way, and adjust the means, and sometimes even the goals, along the way, accordingly. Any instance of doing anything follows the same basic pattern, such that anytime we are doing anything we are engaged in the same sort of mental activity. It is a simple process of getting something accomplished. And, if the thing to be accomplished is desired to be accomplished because it has been determined as conducive toward one's happiness, then there is a joy and satisfaction which accompanies the accomplishment.

Again, you're reading uncharitably. Obviously I was referring to the unhealthy type of anxiety. — Agustino

You expressed a complete misunderstanding of what I said, and then went off to criticise that misunderstanding. What I 've been trying to tell you over and over again, is that I don't agree with you that there is an unhealthy type of thinking, and I don't agree that there is an unhealthy type of anxiety. I think that the unhealthy person practises the same type of thinking (rumination, etc.) as a healthy person. I think that the unhealthy person has the same type of anxiety as a healthy person. Consider my analogy with body temperature for example. You wouldn't say that an unhealthy person has a different type of body temperature from the healthy person. It is the same type, the same quality, but the quantity differs.

Right, and guess what, the relevant part of the biology can be changed since the brain has neuroplasticity. — Agustino

Good, we agree.

Yes, it is the activity of thinking in a certain way :-} - not through thought, right... — Agustino

Again, we agree, thinking is an activity. So if thinking is the therapy, then the goal of the therapy is not to put an end to the thinking itself, but to practise it in a more healthy way.

What else is the activity that you mentioned above if not thought? — Agustino

Thought must be initiated. Activity is good for initiating thought, because we need to think about what we're doing. Like a hobby for example. Remember, I didn't criticise your way of dealing with anxiety, you criticised mine. I only replied to your insistence that activity was not a good way of dealing with anxiety.

Having read a book on CBT and keeping in mind the list of cognitive distortions mentioned in it, I have seen no mention in most CBT books, that activity is an essential part of therapy. — Posty McPostface

You ought to write more clearly Posty. You say you read "a book on CBT", then you say "no mention in most CBT books". How would you know about most CBT books if you've only read a book? Have you read about CBT techniques? There must be an interaction between the patient and the therapist in order that there is a technique. This is where activity is involved, in the actual therapy. Even reading the book is an activity. So if you got therapy by reading the book, that was the activity involved. If the patient has to see the therapist, and interact with the therapist, that interaction is the activity involved.

Just that CBT can be done at any time or moment of crisis for an individual. — Posty McPostface

See, you have adopted it as a practise. It is therefore an activity. Agustino would not classify meditation as an activity, desiring instead to create a separation between the meditative activity and the monkey mind activity. One being a good "type" of activity, the other a bad type.

I merely brought up synaptic pruning as a comparative analogy to show how the brain - when a person' cognitive maturity reaches the right age - sheds useless aspects of our developmental learning in order to make it more open and sophisticated for adulthood; so when we reach this transcendence and begin to think as an autonomous agent, we shed or prune our reliance to conform to society or those close or around us, removing toxic people from our life, having the courage to experience the things that we want and not what others want from us. We shed those things in order to start improving our own language and identification to the external world. — TimeLine

I agree.

You know, while Jung did have rather ambiguous theories, I am compelled to believe that our subconscious does speak to us in a language that we understand and does this through stories. — TimeLine

I would say that it is questionable how much of this we actually "understand", and that is cause for anxiety. The human body has many systems which appear to be quite mechanical. One part of the body "understands" another part through these systems. But this is not the same as conscious understanding. So if we turn conscious understanding inward, in an attempt to understand the stories which the subconscious is telling us, we get stymied because it doesn't make sense. It doesn't make sense because it is a completely different system of communication from what we use to communicate with each other.

Remember what I said about real unity? Within each of us there is a real unity, which is not duplicated between us. This makes the communication between us inauthentic compared to the communication within us. The inauthenticity is built in, inherent within the languages. So when we turn inward there is an incompatibility between the language within, and the outward language, which makes understanding of the inner impossible from the perspective of the outer. The subconscious cannot be understood by the conscious.

This is expressed by Wittgenstein's private language argument. If there is a private language, it cannot in principle, be understood from the perspective of a public language. If we assume that there is a private language, then we must conclude that it cannot be understood via the public languages. The only resolution, to establish compatibility and "understanding" between inner and outer, is to allow the inner to take control of the outer, twisting and shaping the outer in an attempt to forge authenticity.

Heidegger does not speak of overcoming death - in the sense of 'death' being one actually dying physically - but rather overcoming the death of this given identity; as mentioned, when we are young, we are given the translations of our perceptions and experiences by others, that they tell us how to think and behave and we form our reality based on these given themes, but when our brains reach that cognitive maturity, it begins to translate these experiences autonomously only we do not understand or cannot articulate what they mean since we are brand-new at the experience. We suddenly become conscious that we are shifting away from that given identity or that given language that we use to translate reality and that is frightening, it is like everything that you are is untrue or false. — TimeLine

This would be that process. We learn the outer when we are young, the experiences of others. As we mature, like you describe, the inner as 'the brain" is working on these, translating it into the inner. That's the only possible way of understanding, because the outer cannot translate the inner.

There is something important missed here though, and that is that we are born with only the inner language. So all of our learning from others, as children, can only proceed to the extent that the inner may translate the outer. This, "being born with" is like a preconditioning, to accept the identity which will be given to us.

This is the 'angst' this moving away from what we thought was reality or the truth and most are unsuccessful in reaching that level of autonomy; they often retreat back to conforming, back to doing what others tell them whether it is friends or parents or partners, and with capitalism and the social media or network, it is becoming easier and easier for people to think that they are autonomous or independent, tricking themselves and others alike, this idea that they are individuals when they blindly move in masses. Changing your hair colour or wearing different clothes does not make you different. As we have the capacity to be self-aware, we have the capacity to recognise our separateness and this detatchment is the very anxiety that overcomes us. — TimeLine

I think that the way our society is now structured, we are taught that the authentic is the external. Then, the internal is incomprehensible to the external, as described above. This results in a denial of the reality of the internal voice. So we get lost in this external world with no capacity to understand ourselves. Anxiety is the internal voice reminding us of what is really the case. The only way to proceed is to maintain the natural balance which is to allow the inner voice to keep control over translation of the outer. To invert this, and attempt to control the "unruly mind" (as Augustino says) is to induce confusion.