Expansion of the universe shows up when the metric tensor has components which are an increasing function of proper time or proper distance depending on the formalisation. — fdrake

But isn't "proper time" simply an arbitrary designation, dependent on some pragmatic principles? Wouldn't it be contradictory to the special theory of relativity to assume that "proper time" was something other than imaginary?

Rather than interpreting it as the physicists have no idea what they're doing and that 'the expansion of the universe' is indexed to a universal time then using that idea to derive contradictions in relativity: I'd prefer to keep the thread on the track of analysing the real ontological consequences of assuming its truth. — fdrake

Isn't this the most fundamental, and important ontological consequence of relativity, the nature of "the present"? We know the present as the division between past and future. And the way that we related to this division influences all practical procedures, it is how we relate to the world in our daily lives. If special relativity tells us that the division between past and future is just an illusion, then doesn't this make how we relate to the world illusory? What is the source of this illusion? Why would the living mind act to deceive us in this way, to create the illusion that the division between past and future is something real?

I'm really not interested in discussing whether it's true or not. — fdrake

It's hypocritical of you to say that you want to discuss the ontological consequences of the truth of relativity theory, then when I bring some up you act like "I don't want to discuss 'those' consequences"

Yes, and magic flying unicorns are asserted by the scientific worldview to be non-existent too. — Pseudonym

So the things in concepts are non-existent? What about numbers and circles?

A theory is developed which is as simple as possible, inventing a few new concepts as it can and which is falsifiable. That theory is tested and whilst it remains unfalsified, it is held to be a currently good approximation to the truth. — Pseudonym

But what about the concepts themselves? How would one make a falsifiable theory concerning the existence of concepts? Or is it the case that some of us just take it for granted that they are real, and some take it for granted that they are not real?

What science does is simply say that we have no way conducting objective knowledge-seeking discourse about things which are entirely subjective. — Pseudonym

Are all concepts either entirely subjective or entirely oblective though? I think the issue is a lot more complex than a simple division between objective and subjective.

This is also somewhat present in general relativity. Things like cosmic inflation - the expansion of distances neighbouring points in space - are modelled by making the space-time metric (metrics assign distances to pairs of points in space-time) a function of the time variable. This means that in GR the 'evolution of the universe' can be spoken of with respect to a universal time - which is exactly what they do in cosmology. — fdrake

By "somewhat present in general relativity", do you mean that the universal time is completely arbitrary?

Isn't the "universal present" explicitly contradictory to special relativity? So how would general relativity produce a universal present without contradicting the principles of special relativity?

This is where I think you're going wrong. I don't think anyone is seriously claiming that science is the arbiter of what is meaningful and important. What those who espouse a scientific worldview are saying is that the scientific method is the only way of claiming any objective knowledge about what is meaningful or important. This is very important distinction. — Pseudonym

I think that this is a misrepresentation. Meaningful things, such as God and the supernatural, are asserted by most of those who hold the scientific worldview, to be non-existent. Therefore it is more than just the case that this worldview decides "objective knowledge about what is meaningful or important", it actually decides what "is" meaningful and important, and denies the existence of that which it deems as not meaningful and important.

No, the person could be said to hold the entirety complementary beliefs 'I am not going to the store right now' and 'I am going to the store at some point in the future'. As soon as the belief 'I am not going to the store right now' is removed or replaced as a direct consequence of external or internal stimuli, then they go to the store. — Pseudonym

OK, I'll accept that representation. The point is that the act of going to the store is not derived from, or caused by the belief. When "I am not going to the store right now" is removed, you are left with "I am going to the store at some point in the future". However, in reality you are actually going to the store right now. So your representation has created a separation between the belief "I am going to the store at some point in the future" and the action, going to the store right now.

So how do they do that? Have they got a random number generator in their brain? Where does the random element come from?

What's more, if there is a truly random element (say quantum uncertainty) then that's not free-will is it. We're no more in charge of the randomness than we are of the causal chain. — Pseudonym

That's why dualism is required, as you implied in your earlier post. Without dualism these features of the human being cannot be understood.

Why does autonomy, authenticity have to lead to moral behavior? — T Clark

It is psychological and while I understand the metaphysical considerations, being moral cannot be performed without consciousness, that our instinctual drives or impluses contain nothing of substance and as such conformity is acting on impluse; you do 'good' because that is what you are told and because that is what is expected and not because you consciously will to act. — TimeLine

Then how do you explain the fact that literally every act we consider moral has a parallel in the animal kingdom? Are you suggesting this is just coincidence? — Pseudonym

The issue here, I think, is the question of where we derive moral principles from. Let's say that humanity has produced, with conscious minds, certain moral codes, ethics which ought to be followed by the individuals who apprehend these principles with their conscious minds. We define being moral as adherence to these principles.

The question is where does the human mind derive these principles from. If we do not get them from intuition, instinct, and therefore what is proper to the entire biological realm, then the principles are completely artificial, "inauthentic" you might say. The individual conscious minds will not be inclined to adhere to these principles, because intuition and instinct will be motivating them in a different direction. So if conformity is what is desired from moral principles, it is necessary to have moral principles which individuals desire to conform to.

This distinctness is really the cognitive capacity to rationalise and reason with common sense, but central to this prospect is the autonomy that wills such agency, so it is not really about the separate and unique body that we possess - aside from the health of your brain - neither is it entirely our formative and unique childhood but autonomy is the motive or will that we possess that gives us the capacity to regulate our own behaviour and therefore legitimacy or authenticity to our moral actions; it is moral actions that make us human or good. There needs to be some sort of grounding, though, in this will or autonomy and that is our rational capacity where the mind regulates our decisions and opinions and therefore the obstacles that we face are psychological. We need to overcome these obstacles that enables this continuity of irrational behaviour, such as self-defence mechanisms, fear, negative childhood experiences, self-esteem etc &c., and it doesn't help that these vulnerabilities we possess advantageously complicate the process of transcendence, the latter of which is possible cognitively or psychological and not mystical. — TimeLine

I see a real problem with this perspective. If we ground morality, "what is good", with rationality, and allow rationality to dictate on this, without reference to intuition and instinct, presupposing that consciousness has the capacity to regulate our behaviour in this way, we run the risk of creating a divide between "what we ought to do" according to the rational mind, and "what we can do", according to the rational mind's natural capacity to regulate. Therefore the real grounding needs to be intuition and instinct, the human being's natural disposition.


That's very much to the point. Notice that in Plato's Republic, Socrates defines "just" in a manner which is very much opposed to conformity. Socrates' notion of just is that every individual be allowed to do one's own thing, which is particular to that individual, without being interfered with by others. To be just is to mind one's own business, and the just society seeks to promote the unique strengths of each individual, rather than seeking conformity.

If you take a look at the history of moral principles, the evolution of "ethics" is away from rules of conformity, towards the freedom to do what one determines as good. For example, the Old Testament had ten commandments of what not to do, the new has one golden rule of what one ought to do.

So explain to me how this works then. A human has a belief that it is cold and no other beliefs at all. The human 'decides' nonetheless to ignore the belief that they are cold and take off their jumper. Where did the thought to take off the jumper come from? Did it just magically appear in the brain? — Pseudonym

That doesn't work. What kind of ridiculous question is that?

The only way you can say that your not going to the store is not the direct and necessary consequence of some belief is if you invoke dualism to say that the notion of not going to the store arose spontaneously in your mind. Otherwise it must have come directly and with absolute certainty, from some previous brain sate ('belief') — Pseudonym

Looks like you're arguing for dualism now. But it's not the case that "not going to the store" is spontaneous, there's a reason for that. What is the case, is that one can decide to go to the store, but not at the present moment. so the person holds the seemingly contradictory beliefs, "I am going to the store", and "I am not going to the store (right now)". This allows that the decision to actually go to the store (and this is the source of the action), can be truly spontaneous. The person is all ready to go to the store, and chooses a time to leave, randomly.. .

You presuppose that all beings are particulars. Why is that necessary? I would agree that all physical beings are particulars, due to having particular spacial-temporal properties. But this would not apply to non-physical beings. — Samuel Lacrampe

It's not a presupposition, it's a conclusion from inductive reasoning. All examples of beings, that I know of are particulars. If someone showed me examples of beings which are not particulars, I would have to reconsider. This does not deny the reality of non-physical being. As I argued earlier in the thread, each particular physical being has a unique form which necessarily precedes its material existence. This form must be non-physical, but it is particular.

Also, I argued that if the type of form which we call a universal, has real existence, independent from human minds, these universal forms must be "Ideals", implying perfection in their conception. This perfection implies that they can be in no way other than what they are, so this indicates that they must also be particulars. Despite the fact that we call them universals, if they have real existence independent from human minds, they must actual exist as particulars. So I conclude that any real being, must be a particular.

It can also mean that we judge these things in the same way. I thought we previously agreed that different descriptions can still refer to the same thing. — Samuel Lacrampe

Again, your just arguing from possibility. My conclusions are inductive, so I accept the possibility that I am wrong. But, as I explain above, I believe my inductive conclusions to be quite strong, so you'll have to bring something more to my attention, than the possibility that I could be wrong, in order to get me to reconsider.

There's a reason why we make rules of logic, and adhere to them. That's so we don't get confused by simple issues, as you have.

Your logic has become an obstruction that limits you. I don't have such an obstruction. I'm only interested in understanding by whatever means available. — Rich

I find it extremely doubtful that throwing away the fundamental rules of logic because they don't support what you happen to believe, is conducive to understanding.

Only because that is the way you view it. I see them all as objects as real forms. — Rich

Because I view it logically, and you view it illogically?

No, just a different way of viewing things. A good example is this: — Rich

That's an adequate example. It's either a duck or a rabbit. To say that it's a duck and a rabbit is contradictory, illogical. We can take one as the object, or the other, but there is incompatibility which prevents us from saying that the two things coexist as the object. It's not two objects, its one.

And that's the point with wayfarer's statement

things that exist on one level, do not exist on another. — Wayfarer

We could say that on one level it's a duck, and on another level it's a rabbit, but we cannot say that on the same level it is a rabbit and a duck, because that is to make one object into two objects, and that's contradictory.

All the numbers are like that. Consider the numeral "4". On one level, this signifies four distinct units. But on another level, it signifies one unit, the number four which is a unified group, as a unit. It cannot signify four distinct unities, and one unity, at the same time, because this would be contradictory.

It might be possible to create tiny (microscopic) black holes in a big, big, big particle accelerator. — Bitter Crank

I remember when they fired up the Hadron, there were some folks concerned that they might swallow the earth in a black hole. I wonder if scientists really discover particles with these machines, or simply create them.

This is as far from an issue of logic as it comes. It is a matter of whether one can conceive of a unity of forms which in themselves contain forms. The answer is obviously yes. We have waves within an ocean, mountains arising from the beach, a sky arising from the mountains, etc. It is all a unity as is our body yet we can still perceive forms within these forms. — Rich

I'm not talking about forms, I'm talking about objects. A form cannot be said to be an object unless it has substantial existence. Take your waves and ocean for example. We'd commonly say that the ocean has substantial existence, and the waves are a property of the ocean. The ocean is the logical subject, and the waves are the predicate. So long as the ocean is the object of your attention (the logical subject), the waves will always be the property of the ocean and not objects themselves. If you shift your attention to the wave, then it becomes the object of your attention (the logical subject) and the ocean is no longer the object of your attention. You predicate properties of the waves. If you insist that your object (logical subject) is both the ocean and the waves, the you have contradiction.

For example, you can continue sit in the chair, or get up and turn the tv on or go outside for a walk. It's your choice but outside forces make those choices happen. It's a mechanical law - you do something and something else happens, and so on and so on. — Robertwills

Here's something you can try. Try holding an object between your thumb and fingers, above the floor, having decided that you will drop it to the floor. Tell yourself that you can drop it at whatever moment you wish, without any external influence, as to when you drop it. Then at some point, without any external influence, decide to drop it. I've tried this before, and I'm very convinced that I can decide for myself, the moment it will drop, without any external influence. What makes you think that you are incapable of doing this?
.

OK, let's get going on those ten posts then.

As individuated objects, they do depend on a context that individuates them. But complex objects, like a cat or a chair, can be organismic. — apokrisis

How would a context act to individuate an object?

But then that triadic structure is thus a single unity by definition. — apokrisis

So an object, as a unity, is defined into existence?

My pragmatism would instead say that the holism of a sign relation approach - ie: a triadic semiotic - is about the whole of that relation. So it shows how our notion of "an object" would arise as the best way to mediate between the subjective and objective aspects of being - if here you are meaning to talk of the duality of mind and world. — apokrisis

I'm not talking about "our notion of 'an object'", I'm talking about the very existence of an object. Does your metaphysics allow that an object, as an individual unity, has any real existence?

Sounds like basic determinism. Why would anyone believe it, when we know that our choices and actions come from within? We eat food, it gives us energy, we store it, and use it to move in whatever direction we feel like. Looks like Tesla was missing an important feature.

Btw, I didn't write this because you pushed me to. I wrote it to push you into thinking more clearly on this issue. You push me one way, I push back in the opposite way, doesn't that seem inconsistent with determinism?

So why is it logically impossible? — apokrisis

I'll repost my prior post

That is the inescapable problem of "unity". Consider the existence of an object. We are inclined to say that the object is composed of parts. With our analytical minds, we want to treat the parts as if they are themselves objects. But the parts do not have independent existence as individual objects, unless the original object is dismantled, annihilated. This requires that the original object ceases to exist as an object in order for its parts to be objects. Therefore it is logically impossible that an object, and its parts coexist, at the same time, as objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you adhere to process metaphysics, so you do not even recognize that any objects have real existence. Boundaries are vague to you. There is no such thing as unity in your metaphysics. Your claims to holism are the hollow claims of pragmatism, which renders the object completely subjective.

It is this shift - from same-scale dialectics to scale-free hierarchical organisation - which is the key for a pan-semiotic understanding of nature, I would say. — apokrisis

You seek to do the logically impossible, to apprehend the object, and its parts, coexisting as objects, at the same time.

I don't think that you can actually get rid of free will like that. Suppose you are "determined" to go to the store, in a determinist sense. What allows you to put off your trip to the store until tomorrow, rather than right now, other than will power? And if you're not so sure that you will actually go to the store tomorrow, then why do you believe it?

This is where the 'perspectival' nature of Eirugena's argument is significant: things that exist on one level, do not exist on another. — Wayfarer

That is the inescapable problem of "unity". Consider the existence of an object. We are inclined to say that the object is composed of parts. With our analytical minds, we want to treat the parts as if they are themselves objects. But the parts do not have independent existence as individual objects, unless the original object is dismantled, annihilated. This requires that the original object ceases to exist as an object in order for its parts to be objects. Therefore it is logically impossible that an object, and its parts coexist, at the same time, as objects.

My use of the thermostat was never intended as an Ordinary Language proposition about how the word 'belief' is used (the single quotes are to indicate reference to the word as opposed to its accepted meaning, by the way). The example is to explore whether our restriction of the term 'belief' to conscious creatures is justified analytically. This is a philosophy forum, not a linguists forum, I'm not so interested in how the word is used so much as what we can learn from it. That's why I keep coming back to the question of whether there is any meaningful job being done by restricting the word belief to conscious creatures. What is it about consciousness that makes belief data different from any other data (such as that which is stored in the position of a bimetallic strip)? — Pseudonym

The significant difference between the thermostat and the human belief is that the thermostat necessitates action, and in the human being belief doesn't necessarily result in action. One may or may not act on a belief. That's free will.

It would be more accurate to depict the thermometer itself as the thing with belief, such that the thermometer shows what it believes the temperature to be, and leaves it to the mechanism of the thermostat as to whether or not action ought to be taken on that belief, but the problems with this are twofold. The temperature shown by the thermometer still needs to be interpreted for meaning, while in human beings, belief is inexplicably bound to meaning. Also, the thermostat has no choice about acting on the belief, while the human being does.

The first two paragraph was actually my point. Especially "recognizing oneself as being at the present, is posterior to recognizing a past and future". This is why I think such a "self" cannot be said to an "actual self". To be an "actual self" (and so to speak not only "in potentia" - I am using Aristotelian terminology) one must experience the "flow". What I meant is that without the "experience" of change, there would be absolutely no self-awareness - and therefore nothing that could be rightly called as "self". — boundless

So I'd say we agree on this point, and what would be left would be to work out finer details, such as the relationship between the self, and the flow of time. What I proposed, is that the self desires to position the flow as external to the self, and this would alleviate the tinted glass problem. It places the soul at the eternal, unchanging now of the present, with all change occurring around it, giving the soul the "clear" perspective of all material existence.

Now, the problem I alluded to is that this perspective is just assumed. We realize that to avoid the tinted glass problem we must give the soul this perspective, so we assume that this perspective is a real possibility, and we attempt to locate ourselves there. This perspective gives us "the point in time". The point in time is a non-temporal division between two periods of time, which allows true contiguity between the two periods. As I said, it is assumed, so it is artificial. We just assume that periods of time can be separated from each other by inserting a point.

Special relativity however denies the reality of that perspective. It posits vagueness with respect to the division between past and future, and makes the point in time, which crisply divides one duration from another, unreal, inconsistent with physical reality. So special relativity adopts other principles which deny the soul this perspective, forcing us to look for another means to avoid the tinted glass problem.

With what you are saying in the third paragraph, I am paradoxically in agreement. In fact to be aware of oneself as a "timeless" point one must clearly have been before self-aware. But we saw that self-awareness arises when AFTER there is the awareness of change. So in this case, to be aware of the "static now" requires, paradoxically, that one has been aware of change. If there is a "substantial self" then maybe it could actually be self-aware "timelessly" only after having "learned" self-awareness from change. Hope it made sense — boundless

Yes, this demonstrates that you understand exactly what I was saying. The self apprehends change. It recognizes that to understand change it must provide itself an observation point. So it assumes the soul to occupy the eternally unchanging position of "now", as an immaterial entity, with non-temporal and non-spatial existence. This is the purely non-dimensional point. It cannot be temporal because all time exists on both sides of that point, and there is no duration at the point. At this assumed point, we traditionally would have produced a "state". The state is represented by a statement of what is assumed to be, at this moment in time. States are subject to the fundamental laws of logic, non-contradiction etc..

Again, relativity theory messes this up, because with relativity, the state at an particular point in time, is dependent on the frame of reference. Assumed states, are dependent on the non-temporal moment in time for their staticity, and without that required moment in time, the statements cannot adequately describe reality. So, the self desires to posit that moment of division between future and past, as the pure observation point of temporal existence, but relativity has stipulated that this observation point is unreal, and has forced the tinted glass problem back upon us.

Yeah, I can agree. There is however IMO a problem with this theory. We assumed that in all this it remained the same. So I was wondering does it interact in some way with "matter", or is it only a "detached" observer? If it interacts however it can change, and therefore the self does not strictly remain itself as time passes. But conversely if it does not change, how can it "learn" to be self-aware and to search to find a "a-temporal" perspective? — boundless

This is a complex issue which you raise, and this issue forces the need to assume a third aspect, and this is matter itself. The traditional concept of matter, as derived from Aristotle describes matter as the potential for change. It is the underlying substance which does not change when change is occurring. So for example, we take wood, and give it all different forms, the underlying thing, "wood" stays the same. It is the "matter". In this case "wood" is determined as the thing which stays the same (matter), while its form changes. We can go further though, and say that wood itself is just a form of the underlying molecules, which are the matter. Then we could separate out the molecules of the wood, and wood is no longer wood, this form has changed, and in this case the molecules are the underlying thing which doesn't change (matter). We can proceed to atoms, then the molecules would be a changing form, and the underlying atoms would be the unchanging matter. In modern physics, "energy" has replaced "matter" as the underlying thing which doesn't change (law of conservation). The concept of energy is much more versatile, because unlike matter which is the underlying substance of an objects, energy is transferrable from one object to another.

That was a big digression, to explain that "matter", and now "energy" are the concepts which account for our assumptions of temporal continuity. The assumption of this underlying thing, which stays the same from one moment to the next, as time passes, is what validates the belief that time is continuous, and all the "laws" of nature which we produce. Now let's put this together with the previous points. The self assumes an immaterial observation point at the "now" in time. From here it observes changing forms and notes in statements, particular states at particular times. It also observes continuity, aspects which stay the same from one moment to the next, and this feature is assigned to "matter", inertia and energy. So this concept, the underlying thing which stays the same as time passes, "matter", is the way that the self relates the assumed unchanging eternal point of the now, its observation point, to the changing forms. Matter partakes of both features. It persists at the present, as an eternally unchanging thing, yet all the changing forms, as time passes are said to partake of matter, being material forms, subject to the laws derived from the assumption of temporal continuity.

In my opinion, this concept which accounts for the underlying thing which does not change, "matter" or "energy", can be reduced to the passing of time itself. If we put aside special relativity, for the moment, we can assume that the passing of time is the underlying thing which does not change throughout all physical changes, and this provides the potential for change, the exact criteria for the Aristotelian concept of "matter". Once we take this step, we have the three aspects clearly individuated. The soul takes its observation point as eternal, and distinct from the passing of time. The changing forms of physical existence are apparent to it. The changing of those forms is made intelligible by noting the consistency in the passing of time. How we, as human beings interact with the changing forms, is now tied up with how time passes. This is how the eternal "now" relates to the changing forms of physical existence. This is the existence of the self, the interaction between the eternal now and the changing physical forms, which is the passing of time. How this is possible is the secret which will be unveiled when we discover the principles to unscramble the vagueness of the present moment which is disclosed by relativity theory, thus removing the tinted glass.

If you refer back to my earlier post I described this as objects passing a plane. And if we assume that bigger objects take longer to pass that plane than smaller objects, this necessitates the conclusion that the point, which is the now of the present, is not a point at all, but it must have some dimension, the plane has breadth. That is why there is a trend now in the philosophy of time, toward a two dimensional time, we must give the present breadth. Within this breadth, interaction can be accounted for.

There is a problem with the traditional sense of "intuition". Philosophers have used it as a coverup, when they didn't know how to explain how something came about. Why is it that so and so is true? Oh, it's an intuition. If I remember correctly, Descartes for example used "intuition" and "clear and distinct ideas" in this manner. — Agustino

"Intuition", in the traditional sense, does not necessitate truth, that's fundamental, there is good intuition and bad intuition. The person with good intuition is the one we trust. Aristotle identified two distinct forms of intuition in his Nicomachean Ethics, practical intuition and theoretical intuition. The person with practical intuition is the one adept at applying multiple theories to a particular situation, to decide what to do. So for example, the farmer with good practical intuition decides the best time to plant the seed. The person with theoretical intuition knows how to create a theory which is applicable to many particular situations, a theory with universal applicability. So for example, Einstein had good theoretical intuition.

Why are intelligible objects noumena? And what does it even mean "intelligible objects"? — Agustino

Noumena are intelligible objects because this is what Kant designated, within his system. Read the "Critique of Pure Reason", First Division, Ch.3: The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena. Pay particular attention to the footnotes.

If you do not know what intelligible objects are, then refer back to Plato, and Neo-Platonists who distinguish intelligible objects from sensible objects.

A pure intuition is what is left when you abstract sensation and the categories that are imposed by the understanding. — Agustino

So we remove sensation, and all the categories of understanding, and we are left with "pure intuition". Is that what you claim? If so, I would say that leaves us with nothing. However, I will grant you that this "nothing" could be conceived of as the possibility of sensation and understanding, what Kant calls "sensibility". Therefore "pure intuition" would refer to the possibility of sensation and understanding, "sensibility". But that contradicts the other quote you put up:

But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. — Kant

Notice, that an intuition can only take place insofar as an object is given to us. And, sensibility, being the possibility for sensation, is required in order that an object be given to us. So according to this passage, intuition only takes place after objects are received by means of sensibility, and this directly contradicts the claim that "pure intuition" provides us with the possibility for sensation, "sensibility".

In other words, it is impossible to take away sensation from intuition to be left with pure intuition, because according to the passage quoted, sensation is necessary for, as an essential aspect of intuition. I suggest that either you have misquoted something, or Kant simply contradicts himself. Honestly, neither of these possibilities would surprise me.

You need to make an effort and use terms as Kant means and uses them. You can't just start using terms your way if you want to discuss this. — Agustino

I perceive a great big problem. If Kant uses terms like "intuition" in a blatantly contradictory way, as is in evidence above, then we could each make an effort to use the terms "as Kant means", yet each go off into contradictory "understandings". It wouldn't be the case that you misunderstand, nor would it be the case that I misunderstand, but it would be the case that Kant misunderstood.

I know you have no problem with mysticism, but some people presuppose that if something looks like mysticism it's not real philosophy. So "metaphysics" gets divided in two by these people, stuff which is intelligible from the perspective of their metaphysics, which is valid philosophy, and other metaphysics which is mysticism. Thus, when Plotinus says that Intelligence emanates from the One, and the Soul emanates from Intelligence, and the multiplicity of beings follows from the Soul, this appears to be completely backward and unintelligible to a perspective of emergence, so it's just designated as mysticism, and ignored.

The point I am grappling with is that there are ‘degrees of reality’, which I don’t think is recognised in modern philosophy. The only place I see it explicitly acknowledged is in the Thomists, for example, Maritain’s Degrees of Knowledge (which is a daunting read.) There’s also a mention of the idea still persisting in 17th C philosophy in this article. — Wayfarer

This idea of "degrees of reality" is probably best formulated by the Neo-Platonists. Plotinus describes an "emanation", and Proclus a "procession". Simply stated it is a philosophy of how the One is related to the Many. It's very interesting stuff if you can get beyond the appearance of mysticism. I agree that this is a metaphysics which has totally slipped the grasp of modern philosophy. Nevertheless, it is perhaps the most important metaphysics because its subject is the validation of intelligible objects (such as mathematical principles), (as Forms), in relation to the eternal. In modern, western society, we tend to simply assume that if it's mathematical then it's valid and therefore an eternal truth.

Indeed, it does not make it necessary but possible; and this possibility is sufficient to refute your argument that, since we give different descriptions of concepts, then the concepts must be different. We are therefore back to the starting point obtained from the principle of parsimony, namely that concepts coincide with real things, because it is the simplest hypothesis. — Samuel Lacrampe

You've lost me now. I don't see how "concepts coincide with real things" supports your argument. If I remember correctly, you were arguing that concepts, as universals, have real existence. If they coincide with real things, then they are particulars. That is what I was arguing, if we want to give concepts real existence, we must reduce them to particulars, either as the form of a particular thing, or as an ideal universal.

Since our judgement is based on our respective concept, then the more objects we test, the closer we get to certainty that our concept is the same. — Samuel Lacrampe

All this demonstrates is that we judge these few things in a similar way. It doesn't demonstrate that we have the same concept. However, the fact that we each described our concept of "triangle" in a different way does demonstrate that we each have a different concept of "triangle".

I find that position surprising. Recall that if the concept is not connected a being in reality, then the consequence is that no proposition ever spoken can be true, that is, reflect reality. Up to now, I thought your position was that our concepts are connected to real beings, and although they may fail to accurately match the real beings, they nevertheless come close to it. I was willing to take that position seriously. But now, it seems your new position is that a concept is nothing but the description itself, not referring to another thing, thereby completely severing its connection to any real being. Consequently, no truth can ever be spoken. I hope I am misunderstanding something, because as it stands, your new position leads to absurdity. It forces you to give up on metaphysics (which is ironic given your name), and by extension, truth, and by extension, philosophy, which is the search for truth. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think we've been away from this discussion for too long, and we've both lost track of what each other has been arguing. perhaps we ought to give it up. Why must a concept be connected to a "real being"? A concept may be completely artificial. An architect designs a building. The concept is completely in the architect's mind, then on the paper. it is not connected to a "real being". Or do I misunderstand you?

I don't follow your distinction. I'm saying that the thing in itself is unknowable because all we have are appearances that cannot be said to reflect the thing in itself. You're saying that we can't know the thing in itself because it's mediated by sense phenomena. In either event we seem to be saying there's something causative between the noumena and phenomenal, so I don't see where I've gone astray calling the phenomena interpretative. — Hanover

Are you not a "thing in itself"? Do you not know yourself directly, without the medium of sense phenomena?



The point is that in the traditional sense of "intuition" an intuition is the direct apprehension of an intelligible object with the mind. Even in common usage, we associate "intuition" with "instinct", and this would imply something known without learning it through sense information. Under Kant's definition of "intuition", intuition requires sensation:

But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. — Kant

So Kant denies the possibility of apprehending intelligible objects (noumena) direct with the mind. He redefines "intuition" such that an intuition is necessarily derived from sensation.

So it's like this. Sense impressions are given within the pure intuition (of space and time), and structured under the categories of the understanding (like causality).

...

What does it mean to apprehend directly with the intellect? Anything that the intellect apprehends has already passed through the "filter" of the pure intuition - it must pass through that filter in order to be individuated and be an object of awareness at all. — Agustino

What do you mean by "pure intuition"? This does not seem to be Kant's usage. For Kant, intuitions have distinct forms, like space and time are "forms" of intuition. The notion of "pure intuition" seems to be inconsistent with Kant's terminology and incomprehensible under Kant's metaphysics. What could a pure intuition be?

I suggest you re-read the Transcendental Aesthetic quickly (or at least the relevant parts) since otherwise it will be difficult for me to tell you at each and every point how Kant uses his technical terms, so that we can be talking about the same thing. — Agustino

Well, it's all a matter of interpretation anyway. I could reread Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, and give you my interpretation, but you wouldn't accept it anyway, because you're already committed to your interpretation. Look at this quote, Kant says: "Space, as the pure form of external intuition...". And somehow, you interpret Kant as talking about "pure intuition". So, is it the case, that if you don't like certain words in the text, you simply leave them out of your interpretation?

But our apprehension of our own being is given through the mind right? And the mind thinks successively, not all at once. Thus this aspect of ourselves presupposes time. — Agustino

Evidently, the issue is whether time is a pure intuition, or whether time is a form of intuition. If it is a "form" of intuition, as Kant says, then we class it with the other forms, and they're phenomenal, requiring sensation, as Kant defines "intuition" above.. But if it is a "pure" intuition, as you suggest, then perhaps it is a thing in itself (noumenon) grasped directly with the intellect.

I think Kant is right on the point that we can't know an object freed of all subjective interpretation. — Hanover

It's not a matter of subjective interpretation, it's the question of can we apprehend an object directly with the intellect, without the medium of sense phenomena.

I'm not sure Kant is wrong. For Kant to be wrong, I think the transcendental aesthetic must fall - without collapsing the transcendental aesthetic, I don't think it's possible to show that Kant is wrong. — Agustino

There's a lot of good insight in the transcendental aesthetic, but it's doubtful whether the metaphysical principles which it is based in are acceptable. If they are not, then the whole thing, as a metaphysics, a system called "the transcendental aesthetic" collapses, despite the fact that there are many insightful points.

Consider that physical existence, which we apprehend through the senses, by means of phenomena, is "in itself" noumena. The question is, can we treat ourselves, one's own physical existence, as a thing in itself, a noumenon, and access that noumenon directly through the intellect, without the medium of phenomena. I see no reason to believe that we cannot do this, and this would mean Kant is wrong.

For example, given the transcendental aesthetic this is wrong. Those "intelligible objects" are given at minimum mediately, through the pure intuition of time. Thus, they are not given as they are in-themselves, but as they are in time. — Agustino

Sure, but as I explained, it seems highly likely that the transcendental aesthetic is wrong instead. So our intuitions of time may be derived from our direct access to the noumena through the apprehension of our own being, rather than what you describe, as the intuition of time being a medium between oneself and the noumena.

Notice that Kant even describes the intuition of time as an "internal" intuition. As an internal intuition it is distinct from the phenomenal influence of sensation, and therefore must be a direct intuition of the noumena. In actuality this is simply inconsistency in Kant. He claims that we have no direct access to the noumena, but then he allows for this internal intuition, which could be nothing other than direct access to the noumena.

But recall that the Latin 'substantia' was used to translate the Greek 'ousia', which is nearer in meaning to 'being' than to what we think of as 'substance'. So I think that a 'substance' in the sense intended by metaphysics (as 'ouisia') cannot be something that objectively exists. I mean, you will never find evidence of it by assaying a particular object, as it were. I think it's meaningful within the Aristotelean domain of discourse, but I do wonder whether its something that is real. (Buddhists certainly don't agree with the 'substance/accident' distinction. I keep meaning to enroll in an Oxford University external course with almost the same title as the thread but the next one isn't till September :-( ) — Wayfarer

I suggest that you consider "substance" in Aristotle's usage as that which substantiates. He introduces it in his logic, to ground logic in the individual, the particular, so that the particular individual objects, which he calls "primary substance" are what give substance to logic. This is like empirical evidence. Empirical evidence is what substantiates a theory.

So in his Physics, substance is expressed as matter. Existing forms are described by logical expressions, propositions and such. But forms which are continually changing, and the forms are substantiated, grounded, by material existence, matter providing the potential for change. You can see this principle at play even in modern quantum physics, in wave-particle duality. The wave-function is the formula, the form, which must be substantiated by the empirical observation of the photoelectric effect, in material existence, the particle.

In Aristotle's biology, substance is given to form. The soul, being a principle of actuality, a form, is seen as prior to, and a necessary condition for the material existence a the living body.

So in his Metaphysics, he looks to substantiate (ground) the existence of matter itself. He sees a need to substantiate material existence with forms, claiming that a material thing can only exists as what it is, and nothing else. So the actuality, that a thing is what it is, its form, is necessarily prior to its potential to be something else. He has already described a "secondary substance" in his logic which is formal, and his biology also describes a formal substance. This is the principle which Neo-Platonists adopt, claiming that Forms are prior to material existence.

So of all the terms you've introduced, "substance" is the most comprehensive because it allows for a clear distinction between the two different ways of using it, with "primary" and "secondary" substance. None of the other terms provide such a system for distinguishing these two fundamentally different usages, and they tend to mix up these categories in ambiguity.

You're asking how moral atheists ground their morality without God? They pretend like they're not relying on God even though they are. Maybe that answer is personal commentary, but I'm open to hearing your answer. — Hanover

I don't know, that's why I was asking. I suppose one might turn to intuition on that matter.

I get what TimeLine is trying to get at, but she's still wrong that we can have access to the noumenon. — Agustino

Actually I think it's Kant who is wrong on this point. From the Platonic tradition, we have direct access to apprehend intelligible objects (noumena) directly with the intellect, through intuition. That's why Aristotle placed intuition at the highest level of knowledge. Kant simply defines "intuition" in an odd way (as you explain in the other thread), and this dismisses "intuition" in the traditional sense, disposing of our access to the noumenon.

My point was that even when we are describing the same thing like a duck (and we know this by pointing to the same object), then it still happens that we can give different descriptions. — Samuel Lacrampe

So your argument is that we each describe the same thing with different words. But this does not necessitate that the thing we are each describing with different words is the same thing. So your argument just creates a possibility, it doesn't produce anything conclusive.

I am not sure what you mean by "pointing to the idea in my mind". Concepts or ideas are like signs that point to something else. If I have the idea of a specific chair in mind, I would not "point to the idea in my mind", but point to the specific chair in reality, which the idea is about. — Samuel Lacrampe

We are discussing whether "chair", or "triangle", or any other word, refers to the same concept when you interpret the word and when I interpret the word. Do you agree that we determine conclusively that we are talking about the very same thing, by pointing to the thing we are talking about, or in some other way determining it's spatial-temporal location? This is how we determine that the thing we are each talking about is actually the same thing.

Now, in the case of a concept, how are we going to point to it to determine whether it's the same thing which we are each talking about? I could point to the idea in my mind and you could point to the idea in your mind, but then we are clearly pointing to different things. You could argue that because we call it by the same name, "triangle", then it is the same thing, but the reality is that "triangle" refers to a universal idea, and therefore many particular things go by that name. So if we use different words to describe the conditions by which something qualifies as a "triangle", then clearly we do not have the same concept of "triangle".

You are making an error. Yes, you are correct that it is impossible for similar things to be one and the same thing. However, it is possible for similar descriptions of a thing to be about one and the same thing. And as shown previously, it is very probable that our description of the same duck will have insignificant differences in words and order of words. — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree that it is possible for similar descriptions to refer to one and the same thing. But the type of thing we are talking about here is a concept. And I do not believe that different description can refer to the same concept because I believe that the concept is the description itself. If the description is the concept, then it is impossible that a different description could be the same concept.

Let's assume a description, "big and red". My claim is that the concept is inherently tied to these descriptive words, such that there cannot be any separation between the description and the concept. If you tried to remove the concept from "big", or the concept from "red", you would be left with nothing because those words determine the concept. Without the description, "red", there is no concept of red. You seem to believe that the concept is separable from the words, such that different words can be used to refer to the same concept. So for instance, "huge and magenta" might refer to the same concept as "big and red". But clearly these two are different descriptions. Being different descriptions, I think they must be different concepts.

Consider two descriptions which are completely equivalent, 32 degrees Fahrenheit, and 0 degrees Celsius. They are derived from different measurement systems, so clearly they are different concepts. "2+2", and "4", despite being equivalent, are distinct concepts.

So I don't see any examples of instances where different descriptive words describe the same concept. You and the others just assert, without justification, that they do. You say that we each describe a "triangle" differently, but this difference is insignificant, a difference which doesn't make a difference, we are still talking about the same thing. So you make an unjustified assumption that we are talking about the same thing, despite these differences. I say the description is the concept, so any difference in description indicates that it is not the same concept. I am pointing to the concept, showing you the concept, it is the description, expressed in words, and in this way I show you that different descriptive words express different concepts. If you want to support your position, in which the concept is something other than the description, something referred to by the description, or described, you need to point to the concept, show it to me. How is the concept "triangle" something other than what is described as a triangle.

The space we inhabit has that property. — andrewk

What you describe are not properties of space, they are properties of "lines". And lines exist by definition.

We can give "space" any properties we want to, because it is nothing but infinite possibility. It is only when we seek to understand "the space we inhabit", that we have to allow for the existence of real physical objects within this space, and it follows that our geometrical constructs are thus constrained. But considering this constraint, we are now not talking a priori, but a posteriori.

In other words, we can make geometrical constructs however we want, they are a priori and true by definition, but the reality of "the space we inhabit" restricts us such that the ones we end up choosing for belief, are a posteriori, proven by experience.

"Space", in its pure a prior sense is universal and necessary, necessary as the condition for the possibility of all geometrical constructs. First, we assume "space" as the fundamental intuition, and this provides the possibility for whatever constructs we might dream up, the only condition that they are logically consistent. We may end up rejecting them though, if experience does not prove them to be necessary and universal.

The church and state are divided, and that's a good thing. What's left is a legislature that can impose laws, but it doesn't operate with any moral authority. Do you turn to your city council for moral direction? We've very intentionally created a godless government, so, yeah, if you want God, you have to go to church. — Hanover

My question was, that if one does not want God, and does not want to go to church, but still wants to turn somewhere for moral direction, where does that person turn? We've intentionally created a godless government, because we do not want to be governed by the church. But as you admit, the government doesn't give us moral authority, so where do we turn? Obviously we do not want to turn to the church, because we didn't like their moral authority, and that's why we divorced ourselves from it.

However, there is a self-contradiction in the assertion of the statement, as in "it is completely true that we cannot obtain complete truths". — Samuel Lacrampe

But I wouldn't make that statement as an assertion, because it would be obvious that it was self-contradicting. It is made as a proposition, a proposal which you might either accept or reject. You simply misrepresented it as an assertion so that you could dismiss it as self-contradictory. That's a classic straw man.

Indeed, the very nature of the topic is such that we will forever remain in the state of hypotheses regardless what position we take, and never be able to rise to a higher level of certainty. And this brings me to the point on the principle of parsimony. — Samuel Lacrampe

Isn't that the state which knowledge is always in? Consider science. We do not insist that the body of scientific knowledge consists of facts and truths, absolute certainties, we say that it consists of theories which have been verified by empirical observation. So it really is the case that we remain in the state of hypotheses, but we gain confidence that the hypotheses have been proven, such that they are taken as theories, and certainty increases by degrees.

I agree, but given the nature of the topic as shown in the previous paragraph, this principle is unfortunately the best method we have left. As such, if I perceive some thing, it is more reasonable to assume that the thing perceived is the real thing, than not, until a flaw is found in the hypothesis. And you claim to have found one, as follows: — Samuel Lacrampe

I am actually opposed to the principle of parsimony, because it promotes lazy, simplistic descriptions of complicated things. This is not conducive to good understanding and advancements in knowledge. Consider as an example, that you and I live side by side, and we see something on the far horizon that looks like a dark spot on the ground. So we call it the dark spot. Every day we meet each other out in front of our houses and say "there's the dark spot, it's still there". By the principle of parsimony, that's exactly what it is, "the dark spot". We have no inclination to investigate, and describe it in more detail, because we're completely satisfied that that's what the thing really is, the dark spot.

This depends on the degree of difference. Let's take a common-sense example: You and I both observe the same duck, and we describe it to a third person. I say "it has a beak, two wings and is brown". If you say "it has a trunk, leaves, and is green", then I agree that this type of difference is significant enough to debunk the 'sameness' conclusion, and by extension refute the 'complete truth' hypothesis. But if you say "it has wings, a beak, and is beige", then even though there are differences in the description (different words in different order), this type of difference is not significant enough to debunk the conclusion that we are describing the same thing, by common sense. As such, your demand for complete sameness is unreasonable. Then I claim the differences are for the most part insignificant, as demonstrated in the example of 'triangle' way back then, where I described it as "a flat surface with 3 straight sides", and you described it as "a plane with 3 sides and 3 angles". Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions. — Samuel Lacrampe

In your example, we both have different descriptions, and you are assuming that we are describing the same thing. That assumption is not sufficient. It might be the case that we are talking about the same thing, it might not be the case. To support your argument, you need more than the assumption that we are talking about the same thing, you need to demonstrate that we actually are talking about the same thing. This is what you are arguing about concepts, that my concept of triangle, and your concept of triangle actually is the same concept, not that it may be the same, or that you are assuming that it is the same.

So, let's see how we really determine whether or not we are actually speaking about the same thing. Since we can use different words to describe the same thing, as you demonstrated, then to be certain, without a doubt, that we are describing the same thing, we must somehow point to the thing. In the case of the concept, I point to the idea in my mind, and you point to the idea in your mind, and we are pointing to different things. Your claim that this would be an insignificant difference really doesn't make sense. It's clearly a big difference. If we were trying to determine whether or not we were talking about the same physical object, say, "the chair", and I pointed to an object in my house and you pointed to an object in your house, then clearly we are not talking about the same object, despite the fact that we might use similar words to describe these objects.

Furthermore, the claim of "insignificant difference", does not suffice to prove that similar things are actually the same. You are simply trying to reduce "same" to "similar", but this is not a reduction which can be made in any sound way. It's like what apokrisis and wayfarer tried to argue earlier in the thread, that if there are differences which don't make a difference, then we can say that two things are the same. However, the whole point of my argument is that there is a distinction to be made, between "similar" and "same". If you agree that there is a distinction between similar and same, then in making this distinction there can be no such thing as a difference which does not make a difference, because this would allow that two similar things are the same. And that would negate the distinction between similar and same which we would have agreed to uphold.

Surely you understand that I don't disagree with your description, and that the differences can simply be attributed to differences in expressions. — Samuel Lacrampe

If there are differences between two things, then they are similar and not the same. Do you agree?

That does not sound right. You and I surely agree that the sum of 2 and 2 is 4 and nothing else. Here is an example of agreement with no difference. Are you perhaps mixing the concept of 'agreement' with 'tolerance' or 'compromise'? Regardless, I think the first two points above are more decisive to the topic. — Samuel Lacrampe

The point I was making is that there is only a need for us to agree if there are differences between us. If there were no differences in what we believed, it would be the same, and there would be no need for agreement, the same is one and the same. It is only because there are differences between us, that we need to negotiate those differences, and come to an agreement.

And I'd reiterate that the escape from consumerism in modern society (in the grand ole USA at least) is typically religion, where a higher power decrees meaning and worth regardless of social standing and material wealth. — Hanover

If the good ole consumerist society is not going to give us any real standards of worth and meaning, where else is one to find them?

Hi Samuel, nice to hear from you. I'm going to have to refresh my memory on the issue here, it's been a while. I'll be back soon.

Interesting view!! It reminds somewhat the "metaphysical subject" of the Early Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer etc. The most basic experience is possibly the "now" you are talking about. In this view the most fundamental experience is not even the "distinction between past and present" which already requires the cognition of a "dynamic" change. At this level the experience is to speak "timeless", there is no awareness of change (since "change" requires already the perception of the flow). Timelessness is like the "point" in space, a dimensionless object (In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein actually says: "The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension"). The problem in this view is that such an observer cannot be "self-aware" and therefore it is quite inappropriate to be called thought as a "self", since self-awareness IMO occur in time. If the flow of time freezes, I believe, we can not have an "experience" of self-awareness (and a non-self aware soul can still be called a soul? ). To be a "self" IMO there must be some type of experience of change. — boundless

It may be that the most fundamental experience of time is as a simple now, but I don't think that is the case. I haven't read a lot of phenomenology, but I think the basic argument is that a conscious self doesn't not recognize oneself as being at the now, the present, until one already apprehends memories and anticipations. So recognizing oneself as being at the present, is posterior to recognizing a past and future.

And recognizing a past and future is to already apprehend external change, the flow. So that argument concerning the "self of solipsism" is really not applicable, because the conscious self only shrinks oneself to a timeless point, without temporal extension, after already apprehending the reality of the past and future, and the flow itself. Producing a timeless point, as a point of view for the conscious self, is only deemed necessary in the attempt to understand, and make sense of the physical world, to avoid the tinted glass problem. Consider the timeless point which divides two time periods. Imagine if we didn't have a timeless point which divides yesterday from today. Suppose that at midnight, we had to leave a period of time, five minutes for example, to account for the transition between one day and the next. What would that five minutes consist of? Instead, we give ourselves a timeless point which separates one period of time from another.

So contrary to what you say, the self as a point in time without extension, is necessarily already self-aware. And this self-awareness is an awareness of the past and future, and consequentially the flow. This representation of the self is only produced after an apprehension of the past and future, and is produced only for the sake of giving oneself a position relative to the past and future; the past and future having been already apprehended. Once the self assigns itself this timeless point, it can project that point anywhere in time, to individuate particular periods of time, between this point and that point.

To be a "self" IMO there must be some type of experience of change. — boundless

I agree, that there is a required apprehension of change, in order for a self to recognize itself as a self. But the self may designate this change as completely external to itself, assuming its existence as an immaterial soul, thus giving itself a timeless, immaterial point of existence, at the present, between those periods of time called the future and the past.

Timelessness is certainly like a dimensionless point but can we say that such an experience of "now" is an experience of a "self"? It sounds like the same "state" if there was a "stopping", a total "cessation" of the flow of "time". Maybe there would be some awareness but I am very hesitant to calling it an awareness of a "self". In timelessness there is no self-awareness. For the observer in fact to have a "feeling" of distinction between himself and "the physical world and other minds" IMO there must be some experience of change. So while maybe you are right to say that at the most fundamental level "time" is a "static now". But at the same time without the "flow" in my opinion the "observer" ould not be self-aware. This is why IMO for a "self-aware" subject the basic experience is in fact the "flow", the awareness of change. * — boundless

The point is that the self assigns itself this position, at the timeless point of the present. It is an assumption which is deemed necessary to avoid the tinted glass problem. To avoid the tinted glass problem we must start from a completely immaterial perspective in order to produce a complete understanding of material existence. As I said, we do not know whether or not the soul can actually have such a completely immaterial perspective, but we will not know until we try. So, we have already assumed this point, the dividing point in time, and utilize it quite regularly. If we find that there are problems with this assumption then we need to determine exactly what the problems are, to figure out why our conception of the division between the future and the past is inaccurate.

Simply put, the observer, the self, is aware of the flow of time, as you say. Then it determines that in order to understand the flow of time (avoid the tinted glass problem), it must give itself a perspective outside the flow, and this is the now of the immaterial soul. So it is as you say, that the experience of change and flow is most fundamental to the experience of time, but the self sees within itself, that the capacity to experience the flow is even more fundamental than the experience of the flow, as necessary for that experience. Therefore the self seeks to adopt this position, the most fundamental position which is prior to the experience of time, as the capacity to experience time, in its most pure form, and this is to separate oneself from the flow of time, in order to fully understand it.

Like people who have a 'perfect' life - loving partner, nice home, money and security - and yet are still miserable; they cannot articulate why and so to them the anxiety is the problem rather than the mode of existence, that it is somehow not your own feeling and it needs to be ignored. — TimeLine

This is what I disagree with, that feelings from the unconscious, are somehow not your own feelings. And the position that the law takes does not validate this claim. The law simply has a system for assigning responsibility to a specific class of actions. This does not mean that actions which you are not responsible for, are not still your own actions.

In fact, I assign a higher level of authenticity of the self, to the unconscious levels than to the conscious. The unconscious is more foundational, more basic. This is why, as we discussed earlier, the conscious has extreme difficulty to understand the unconscious, because the unconscious is far more substantial. So when there is inconsistency between the life of the consciousness, and the life of the unconscious, despite the appearance that the conscious is "happy", and the unconscious is "unsettled", it is the conscious mind which must change its attitude, to bring stability to the unconscious.

Legally and philosophically there is that conflict between subjective and objective in the concept of mens rea in similar vein to this unconscious and conscious realms or the learned 'I' and the actual 'I'. — TimeLine

So the "learned I", the conscious I, is really the inauthentic "I", it is the "I" in the perspective of the legal system, and moral responsibility. The authentic "I", the "actual I", is the composite of the whole, the conscious and unconscious. For the two, the conscious and the unconscious, to live together, in harmony, requires that the conscious has proper respect for its place. The necessity of the conscious mind having proper respect for its place is easily exemplified by "I want to do something which it is impossible for me to do".

I agree, but not so much the way you have stated here. So, say a person becomes conscious of themselves and feels the angst as we had originally stated, but this subjective feeling of alienation is a phenomenon too overwhelming due to an intense lack of self-esteem that they choose to conform. While they may be mindlessly following, the fact is that they have chosen to do this (hence why I am a compatibilist) and therefore intentional. Only children or one without the cognitive capacity is safe from the moral burden of such intentional activity. — TimeLine

I believe that the vast majority of things which we learn through the conscious mind, social conventions, have been created to be consistent with the underlying unconscious I. They have been created from thousands and thousands of years of effort, and have been formed to promote health and harmony within the individual. This is the influence of love. So to chose to conform is usually a good thing for the authentic self (the union of conscious and unconscious) because the accepted social conventions general promote personal harmony. However, society changes, there is growth, new principles are put forward, new norms are produced, and much of this is in a trial and error fashion, not necessarily designed by true love. Meanwhile, each person is unique, and much of this uniqueness is due to the complexities of the underlying unconscious. So choosing to conform at each instance, is not necessarily the best option for harmony in the individual. However, we generally have many choices even within societal norms, so we can often shape our choices in conformity, so as to best maintain personal harmony.

So we appeal to the intuition and find out that Euclid's 5th postulate is true. And yet, you claim that we were merely wrong about our intuition... but it doesn't make sense to be wrong about our intuition when it is our intuition to which we appeal to determine whether Euclid's 5th is true or not, isn't it? — Agustino

Intuitions are inherently subjective. One intuition says Euclid's fifth is correct, another says it is not.

Again - Euclid's 5th postulate contradicts non-Euclidean geometries by not allowing cases that non-Euclidean geometry does allow. Therefore, it cannot be necessary. — Agustino

Take a long hard look at the way Kant uses "necessity". You know the principal use of "necessary" is the use which implies "needed for", and I think Kant's "necessity" is a derivative of this. So if in some geometries it is necessary for Euclid's 5th to be true, and in other geometries it is necessary that it is not true, there is no real contradiction, just like one logical possibility doesn't contradict the opposite possibility. The different geometries are simply based in different intuitions.

I possibly misunderstood your argument but if the "tint" is the immaterial aspect of reality, then you are saying that if we want to understand the glass (matter) we should verify if there is or not the "tint" (and therefore we need the concept of "tint" in the first place). — boundless

Sorry, I thought that the tinted glass argument was more obvious. The point is that if one is looking at (observing) something through a glass, and the person is unaware that the glass is tinted by some colour, then the person's observations of colour will be inaccurate. So the argument is that the soul, if it is to accurately understand material existence, must be given an immaterial perspective. If its perspective is "tinted" by material existence, the observations will be skewed like the tinted glass skews the observed colour. Try rereading that section of my post from this perspective. Actually if you didn't quite get that, you probably misinterpreted a large part of my post.

For the mind time is the "flow" and "space" is given by sensations, proprioperception etc. — boundless

I disagree with the idea that for the mind, time is "flow". I find that most fundamentally, for the mind, time is the division between past and future. But since things are changing, while the division between past and future stays the same, we posit a flow. Things were different yesterday from today, so we say that yesterday was a different time. Since we have different times, we conclude that time must be flowing. But this is a constructed "time", just like we have a constructed concept of "space". All that is immediately evident to the mind, concerning time, is that there is a past, and there is a future, and we are at the present. We can sit at the present, meditate, calmly removing ourselves from the flow, while the world changes all around us. And this just makes us more keenly aware of the division between past and future.

So let's look at this from your perspective of a distinction between experienced time and physical time. I say there is no flow in experienced time. There is an experience of being at the present, which is the experience of being at the division between past and future. This is the immaterial perspective which I claim that we need to understand material existence. What we observe is that all around us, material things are moving from the present into the past. we assume that they are coming from the future, and moving into the past. So the "flow" is part of the physical time, it is the physical objects moving into the past. The state which exists in front of you now will be in the past by the time you say "now". You are the immaterial observer, at the static, non-moving "now", independent from the temporal world, while the entire physical world moves past you as time goes by.

But while I agree that the mind creates concepts and also participates actively in creating the "direct experience", I would not said that it creates the body. — boundless

The "soul", as I use it, is the principle of life, what it means to be alive. So when I say that the soul has created the body, this is what has happened over time, in the process of evolution. Now the living human body is the perspective which the soul has created for itself, from which it observes the world. So if we consider that the soul is immaterial, and its body is its observation instrument, then we must understand what the instrument is contributing to the observation in order to avoid the tinted glass problem.

Somehow you think this not a contradiction. — Banno

Evolution has occurred as the result of the actions and interactions of many living beings, along with their interactions with the environment. It is how we describe what has occurred. It is a description. What on earth would make you think that evolution is an acting agent?

Take another description for example, "my dog bit the mailman". Would you say that this description is an acting agent? Of course not, the things described my dog, and the mailman, are the acting agents. Likewise, in this description "evolution", the living beings, and the environment are the acting agents.