Then I would be anxious to hear your account. — unenlightened

As we were saying, part of consciousness is responsive and part is creative. If we try to model reality, then the model must precisely "reflect" reality. But the creative aspect adds things which are not there, made up things, artificial things, imaginary things. If these imaginary things get into the model, they are fictions, making the model wrong in respect to those fictions. That is what I think "the present" might be, such a fiction, something imaginary, created, which has gotten into the model.

You've said consciousness is "in the present". I dispute this, saying "the present" may be a fiction, created by the imagination. So the challenge for me is to remove "the present" from the model, while maintaining an adequate model. What I think is that consciousness is in the future and the past. Part of it consists of anticipations toward the future, and part of it consists of memories of the past. When we reflect on the activities of consciousness, as you are doing in this thread, we apprehend a substantial difference between the future and past, so we imagine a division between these two. Just like I insisted that we ought to maintain, in principle, a division between the responsive (related to the past), and the initiative (related to the future), you appear to insist on a division between past and future. This imaginary division between future and past inclines one to assume "the present".

That is what I think is wrong with your model of conscious. Consciousness is really composed of elements which are related to the past, and elements which are related to the future. So I think consciousness is "in" the past and "in" the future, both at the same time. It appears like you apprehend a clear and crisp division between future and past, which you call "the present". And, assuming that nothing can cross this boundary, to exist in both the future and past at the same time, because that would be contradictory, you locate consciousness "in" the boundary, "in the present".

My opinion, is that this fictitious "present" you (or whomever lent you this idea) have created, will give you endless problems for your model. You will never be able to fit consciousness into reality, because reality consists of future and past times, and you have created an unreal, imaginary "present" where you locate consciousness. So your model allows that consciousness is completely removed from reality, by placing it in a fictitious, imaginary "present", permitting you to say that consciousness is anywhere, or everywhere, as you do in this passage:

When a blind man feels his way with a stick, his consciousness is in the curb he feels, at the end of the stick, in the hand holding the stick, in the brain modelling the environment, and the feet propelling him and confirming his model. When an earthbound astronomer uses the Hubble telescope his consciousness is amongst the stars just as much as it is in his head. Or to put it better - consciousness is not located, because it is virtual. — unenlightened

Whereas I am arguing that the laws represent global constraints. — apokrisis

What Smolin argues is that while some represent the laws of physics as "global", they really are not. Check out the chapter he calls "Doing Physics in a Box".

The method of restricting attention to a small part of the universe has enabled the success of physics from the time of Galileo.

...

To study a system we need to define what is contained and what is excluded from it. We treat the system as if it were isolated from the rest of the universe, and this isolation itself is a drastic approximation. We cannot remove a system from the universe, so in any experiment we can only decrease, but never eliminate, the outside influences on our system. — Smolin

Also, check out the chapter he calls "The Cosmological fallacy":

It remains a great temptation to take a law or principle we can successfully apply to all the world's subsystems and apply it to the universe as a whole. To do so is to commit a fallacy I will call the cosmological fallacy. — Smolin

So I don’t think that my view is radically out of line with Smolin’s. — apokrisis

Well, we haven't even gotten to the limitations of entropy, the second law of thermodynamics, and what he calls "the fallacy of applying thermodynamics to the universe as a whole".

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The fundamental laws are fundamental because they take us back to the beginning. If the Cosmos evolved, there has to have been an initial state of high symmetry that then became the current succession of increasingly broken symmetries. — apokrisis

If you would read physicist Lee Smolin's "Time Reborn", you might come to understand that these so-called fundamental laws are actually extremely limited in their applicability. The laws are produced from the human perspective, which is a small range of possible perspectives midway between the extremely small and the extremely large. Furthermore, the laws are verified by highly controlled experimental conditions, which confine the perspective into an even smaller range of possible perspectives.

When we extrapolate, any tiny error is multiplied, sometimes exponentially. Therefore any extrapolation towards the "beginning", or "end", of the universe is extremely unreliable, and I would say ought to be simply dismissed as unprincipled speculation.

A response includes an element of initiative, as you put it, or as I put it earlier an element of imagination. So my op is hopefully a creative response to various bits and pieces that I have come across and most of the responses at least have been similarly creative, at the same time as they are relevant to the op. — unenlightened

OK, so conscious activity is a combination of these two elements, reaction, and creation. Therefore I conclude that you are describing consciousness in terms of what it does, what it is doing. It is reacting and it is creating, in a way which combines these two elements. My opinion is that there is a very real need to separate these two, in principle, so that we can proceed to separate them in practise, when we make judgements concerning what consciousness is doing.

Look at the mirror. Notice that the features on the right side of your body appear to be on the left side of your body, and vise versa. The mirror is doing something weird. But we don't say that the mirror is making a mistake; nor do we say that the mirror is "wrong". We appeal to the physicists who use fancy terms like "chirality", and "higher dimensions", to explain exactly what the mirror is "doing". So it turns out that despite the fact that the mirror appears to be doing something weird, it is not really doing anything wrong, it's actually doing exactly what it's supposed to be doing.

Now look what happens when human consciousness "models" the world. We cannot say that the model is a "reflection", because human consciousness has that creative element which the mirror does not have. Because that creative element is there in human consciousness, and manifests within the model, we can judge the model as right or wrong. So when you ask us to imagine a poplar tree by the lake, and someone doesn't know what a poplar tree looks like, and imagines a birch tree instead, that's creativity, and we can judge creativity saying that the person is "wrong" in that model. That element of creativity within consciousness allows us to look at what the conscious person is doing, and judge those doings as right and wrong.

It is rather more radical though to claim that the internal world, memories, models, thoughts, are not conscious either, but are also only more contents and provocations. I mentioned earlier that model time is not real time. You can probably replay the events of yesterday in a few minutes at most, and re-present the past to consciousness. Re-membering, re-presenting is now, all of it is present, or else it is absent. Memories might be 'there' in the brain, just as there is crap behind the sofa that I cannot see, but these things are not 'here' in consciousness. — unenlightened

Will you allow me to separate the contents here from the "agent"? When I say "agent", I mean it in the most general sense possible, like the grammatical subject, the thing which is active, doing something. So the mirror is an agent in the sense that it is doing something, making a reflection. What I am asking, is that when you separate the contents from the consciousness, as you do here, do you still maintain that it is the consciousness which is acting, "doing"? That way we still maintain the capacity to judge the actions as wrong and right.

I locate consciousness in the present; it is presence, it is the now. I can describe the contents from the senses, the computer is on my lap, a cup of coffee steaming to the right, the armchair is red, and I am typing with two fingers. Also, the contents are memories, that I just made the coffee, that I made a post yesterday, and models, that if I scroll up I can read it, that I am intending to continue an exploration in this thread. — unenlightened

What if I say your model of consciousness is wrong? There is no such thing as the present, so it is impossible that consciousness is located in the present. The present is an imaginary division which separates the temporal duration of the past from the temporal duration of the future. This is just an artificial boundary, a point which separates two contiguous durations of time, like "noon" separates morning from afternoon. But there could be absolutely nothing there, so it's impossible that consciousness is there.

Each frame must have some duration or it could not exist. — Janus

If the frame has duration, then it cannot be a still frame. I already discussed this problem with boundless. The human mind is inclined to give the soul an immaterial perspective. This perspective is supposed to be the point of the now, which is neither past nor future. There is no temporal duration in this point, because all temporal duration must be either in the past or in the future, so the "now" is eternal, outside of time. It is simply a boundary which separates two contiguous durations of time. We assume this artificial point and project it to separate different periods of time. Noon is the point which separates morning from afternoon. Furthermore, we describe what exists, as a state, at any artificial point in time, and this forms the basis for deductive logic, what is and is not.

The problem is that this point in time is artificial. It is assumed in order to give us the perspective we need, to understand things. But as you claim, it is most likely that such a point could not exist. So I presented boundless with the tinted glass analogy. If the glass you are observing reality through is tinted, then the tint gives something to your observations. If you do not know that the glass is tinted, then you will not account for the tint in your observations, and your observations will be tainted. The tinted glass analogy was used in the past to indicate why the soul must be given a completely immaterial perspective in order to understand all of material existence. As I argued, that perspective has been assumed as the point of "now", where there can be no temporal extension, and no temporal existence. The point of "now" has been assumed in the past, in order for the soul to have its immaterial perspective.

If we now come to the conclusion that this point in time cannot be real, then we assume that the glass through which we observe the world, is necessarily tinted. There is no such thing as the non-temporal point of division between past and future, and no completely immaterial perspective from which the soul could observe reality. Now the task is to determine the nature of the tint, so that we can separate what is proper to the tint, from what is proper to the thing being observed. My argument is that the tint is the thickness, "breadth" of the present, "now".

Why must there be "time passing between still frames"? — Janus

If they are "still" frames, then no time is passing within them. And time must pass sometime, so it must be between the still frames.

Take the example you gave, telling us to imagine a poplar tree by the lake. I would classify this action of yours as initiative rather than responsive. I perceive you starting this thread as an initiative rather than as a response.

It may be the case that you perceive these conscious actions as responses rather than as initiatives, but I'm not privy to this information, which makes you view the op as responsive rather than as initiative.

Anyway, that's what I see about consciousness which makes it other than responsiveness, that it initiates things. Isn't that the difference between the free will perspective and the determinist perspective, one looks at consciousness as initiative, the other as responsive?

So these thoughts appear to have come from my brain, but are actually more or less distorted reflections of the world... — unenlightened

I look at thoughts as creations of the brain, not as reflections of the world.

Yes, I think it's very near to the exact opposite of responsiveness, meditation. I have to free myself from all interferences, which might demand responsiveness, and reflect within. That is how I apprehend my own consciousness.

I have developed some sympathy for eternal approaches... — Banno

An epiphany! Recognizing the Platonism inherent within your own mind. That's rich!

Good lord! The 1970s just flashed before my eyes. — apokrisis

LSD flashback. Banno meets Timothy Leary.

I will sometimes yell at myself, or pinch myself to stay awake when I'm driving. But I think this is an indication of the inversion which is created by the mirror of consciousness. I apprehend my own consciousness in a way different from the way I apprehend another's. I might yell at another to wake them up, but I yell at myself to keep myself awake.

So I don't see that my own case is any different at all. — unenlightened

Why would you have to check yourself for responsiveness? Would you yell at yourself? Would you pinch your own ear? Don't you determine your own responsiveness in a way completely different from the way that you determine another's responsiveness?

So apparently, it can make sense for someone to be a person (formed of will & intellect) and without a body. — Agustino

Not in the sense that I know "person". And this is a big problem which theologians have run into in modern times, a rejection of the idea that God is a person.

Do you believe in God? God is a person that has no body.

Do you believe in angels? Angels are persons that have no body. — Agustino

I'm not convinced that God is a person with no body, and from what I've heard about angels, each angel has providence over a physical body. Anyway this is irrelevant because we are talking about human persons. You were addressing me, and the relationship between my body, and my will and intellect, do you believe me to be a god? Perhaps if we were all gods, it would be appropriate to separate the actions of one's body from the actions of one's intellect, to say that if an action of a body is not willed, it cannot be an action of that god. But we're not gods, and we do have involuntary acts.

Well that's what I am saying anyway, because what I want to mean by 'consciousness', whatever else I want to say about it, is that it is something that I see in myself when I am awake, and definitely don't see when I am on the operating table, thank anaesthetics, and see in other people and to varying degrees in animals, and not at all in rocks and plastic spoons. — unenlightened

Do you notice a difference between what you "see" as consciousness within your self, and what you "see" as consciousness within others? How would you account for this difference? Some people might say that it is a difference in perspective. But what does that mean, other than that the medium between you is doing something weird, like when you look in the mirror, and the features on your right side look like they are on your left side, the mirror is doing something weird? How does the medium create such a difference of perspective?

No, the immediate cause of the act may be your body, but your body is not you. I identify you with the will and the intellect. If your body remains, but the will and intellect are gone, then I would say that you are gone. But if will and intellect somehow remain without body, then you are most certainly not gone. — Agustino

I don't believe that you can separate a person's body from a person's will and intellect, in this way. It doesn't make sense to say that a person is a will and intellect, but not a body. If you could show me a will and intellect without a body, and demonstrate that this is a person, then I might believe you. Until then, I think you're talking nonsense.

Yes, I think I'm denying that. I can describe the even numbers without the necessity of them having an ontology. 12 is even regardless of whether numbers have some sort of Platonic existence. It is even because there exists some other integer (6) that yields 12 when added to itself. That is the sort of existence that we require if the universe is a mathematical structure. — noAxioms

So you assume that 12 and 6 exist. You don't think that this presupposes an ontology? If you can't say what you mean by "6 exists", then how are you using that word "exists"?

As for MDR (which does not assert this mathematical reality), that is another view that makes reality a relation, not an objective state, known or not. A thing is real to something else. I think perhaps the view denies an objective correct answer as to which model is in fact correct, be it proposed somewhere or not. — noAxioms

Do you recognize that "a relation" requires things which are related? When you say that reality is a relation, don't you think that the things which are related are at least as real as the relation itself? What do you think it means to say "a thing is real to something else"? Does this mean that reality consists of at least two things?

The quest comes from all the unsatisfactory answers typically offered for the "Why is there something, not nothing?" question. Taking a step back and noticing the biases in the asking of that question sheds a lot of light on a suggested solution. — noAxioms

Here's a suggestion. Forget about the question of why there is something rather than nothing because you will never find a satisfactory answer. Instead, ask why there is what there is, rather than something else. Suppose you answer this with "there is what there is, instead of something else, because of the particular relations which exist". We still have to ask what does it mean to occupy the position of being related to something else.

Clearly I do not take this assertion as a given. I just said that my description relies not a bit on the ontology of the situation. I do have a description, having just described it. — noAxioms

If it is a description, it relies on an ontology, because the description must claim to describe something. Maybe you're just trying to deny that your description relies on an ontology.

I think you don't understand the view, in the same way you claim eternalism is false because the empirical experience would be different. — noAxioms

I'm, not questioning your view, I haven't taken the time to properly interpret it. I'm questioning the claim that you could produce a model of reality without an ontology. Without an ontology you couldn't call it a description of reality. And if it's a model without an ontology, then you have no claim to model reality.

interesting. Could you please provide an example? I would be very interested in it. Thanks in advance! — boundless

You'll find a two dimensional time in Itzhak Bars "Two-Time Physics". But mostly the idea is developed by presentist philosophers who see the need for a wide present to account for human experience. How much time does the present consist of? Check out J.W Dunne, An experiment with Time. And in Jack Meiland's "A two dimensional Passage model of Time for Time travel", you'll find a diagram. I just got these names from google searches when I started realizing the need for two dimensions of time.

I would make a graphic representation similar to Meiland's. At each moment of passing time there is something occurring. I can represent each moment as a horizontal line, with an arrow pointed left, like Meiland. The lines are numbered from bottom to top as t1, t2, t3, etc.. I can then make a perpendicular line (P1, perspective 1) crossing all the t lines, with an arrow pointed up, and this represents a standard model of the flow of time. Each horizontal line crossed represents a static image of a moment in time. However, our experience is of a wide present, so I produce two lines of time flow, one to represent the beginning limit to our experience, the other to represent the end limit. So we now have two parallel vertical lines representing the beginning and end of the human experience of the present, one is perspective 1 (P1) the beginning, and the other perspective 2, P2, the end. Now you can imagine that P1 is crossing t2, t3, or even a later time, as P2 is just crossing the earlier time, t1.

The more difficult question is what is that "something" which is occurring at 'the present", and is represented as happening along the lines of t1, t2, t3, etc.. This is the coming into existence of the physical world at each moment of the present. It is represented in cosmology as the expansion of space, the discrepancy of a long time line, crossing many t lines . As I said in an earlier post, large things, the massive objects which we see, must come into existence first, and these are represented in quantum physics as fields, they appear as the background continuity and exist along the line of P1. At the other extreme of human experience, is the tiny objects, coming into existence last, their existence is represented by P2. So you see that there is the entire width of the human "present" separating the fields from the particles, and this is why quantum mechanics is so difficult to understand. This temporal breadth represents a vast unknown area between the mathematical fields, based in the observation of massive objects, and the observations of tiny particles. This allows for theories about strings and loops.

So the correct order of coming into existence must be established. This is what is represented by the horizontal arrows at t1, t2, t3, etc. It is directly perpendicular to our experience of passing time, so it cannot be observed, but we infer logically everything we know about it from the discrepancies in our observations due to the breadth of our observational present.

If this is the case, then what we think are "objects" in reality are a "construction" of our mind. And also, we need to re-construct any time we change the scales. I might add that this process can be done also for very big objects (by this I mean objects with a spatial dimension of orders of magnitude greater than ours). In this case we need to change "the map" every time. And the "maps" relative to each scale might be different and therefore we have a multi-layered map of reality. Somehow this reminds me the "plurastic realism" by Putnam (but of course in our case we are discussing a "pluralistic representionalism". But IMO there are some affinites). — boundless

Yes, so we can speculate as to how we create "objects". Let's start with the assumption that what we observe with our eyes, "see", is as close a representation to the continuous existence represented by mathematics as possible. This is what is at the right hand side of the lines of t1, t2, etc., what I represent as P1. The key is that these are not really physical objects, but more like Rich's hologram. Way back in history they would have represent these images as physical objects, drawing them on paper, and producing a concept of space between them, allowing for them to move in time. But there's no real "space" between these objects, because they are all united as the "One", the whole continuous universe. However, it was assumed that they were real physical objects with separate existence, even though they are not. Now let's assume that we hear waves in a physical medium, sound. This assumes that there are real physical particles, vibrating in relation to each other. Lets say that this is P2, the existence of a real physical medium, particles vibrating in space. At P1 there are no existing particles, and at P2 there are existing particles. So on each line of t1, t2, etc., there is particles coming into existence, and these particles allow for the existence of sound.

Here is the difficult part. Between P1 and P2 we have an inversion between what is possible and what is actual, the possibility for particles, and actual particles. The inversion is not merely epistemic, because it must be ontological to allow for freedom of choice represented in the actual coming into existence of particles. The inversion is represented epistemically in QM by the distinction between the wave function and particular existence. But each line of t1, t2, t3, extends indefinitely, beyond P2, which represents the human perception particular existence. We have created our conception of "objects in space", from the P1 side of the present, as what we see, along with the possibilities for motion. But there are no real objects at the P1 side, only the potential for particles. The real "objects in space", need to be represented from what is on the P2 side of the present. So to produce a real concept of "objects in space", we must ignore all the visual observations, which are not of actual objects, but of the potential for objects, and produce a conception of "objects in space", particles, which is based only on other senses such as hearing. This is where we find real objects in space, on the past side of our experience of the present, P2, where we cannot see because our visual image is of P2 where there is not yet any real particles. Our current conception of "space" is produced from these visual observations, assuming that what we see is objects, when it is really not what we see, and this does not provide us with a representation of the real space which particles exist in. We cannot see the real particles, so we can only get an idea of how they behave in real space through the senses of hearing, touching, smelling, tasting. And from these senses we can produce a concept of "space" which allows for the real existence of objects, particles moving in space, this "space' being on the P2 side of the present. Our current representation, based in visual observation doesn't allow for the real existence of "objects in space", it is just based in the determining factors which we see at P1, prior to the coming into existence of real particles at P2.

Demonstrate said impossibility please. In particular, which empirical observation would be different (rendering it a scientific falsification), or what inconsistency is there in the logic (rendering it a self-contradictory philosophical stance)? — noAxioms

It's quite simple. Ontology puts forward the fundamental principles by which we understand reality, it determines how we distinguish true from false. So you ask "which empirical observation would be different", and the answer is every observation would be different. That is because one's ontology (world view) determines how one describes what is observed. If you replace description with mathematics, you no longer have a description. True understanding requires description because it will always come to a point where you have to say what it is that is being counted.

My proposal of reality being a relation (not actual ontology) is something like model dependent realism, except the realism claimed is more like existential quantification. — noAxioms

This is the point, to quantify something and to describe that thing are two distinct procedures. To understand something requires that one do more than quantify that thing, it requires that one can describe it, say what it is that is being quantified.

This is just acknowledgement of epistemology. Few stances claim that absolute certainty can be known. But does MDR take a stance that despite the inability to know it, there might be (must be???) a true reality? — noAxioms

No, I believe that MDR states that there is no "true reality", reality is according to the model, very similar to what you stated in the last post. That's why it's called "model-dependent reality", reality is according to the model. It's a radical idealism.

I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems. — noAxioms

Doing away with ontology might appear to you as a solution, but we, as good philosophers are interested in determining the truth, and that means the true nature of reality. Since doing away with ontology renders this as an impossibility, it is an unacceptable proposal.

Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. — noAxioms

Stephen Hawking proposed "model-dependent realism" as your replacement for ontology. This claim of yours, that ontology "doesn't matter" is nothing more than intellectual laziness. If the problem is to difficult, let's direct our attention away from it and pretend that it doesn't matter. Of course it really does matter though, as is evident from the difference between the geocentric and the heliocentric models of the solar system.

I'm having to work harder than I expected to do even this simple thing; people will insist that the mirror has an inside, or else that the image is on the surface like a painting (see below). — unenlightened

You wanted to put the image outside the mirror, and thus place consciousness outside the human head. But there cannot be an outside without an inside. So why would you think that outside is a better, more real, location than the inside?

What about the boundary between inside and outside? Isn't it rational to assume that the image on the mirror is at this boundary. Perhaps we need to consider that consciousness is on the boundary between inside and outside (whatever that means).

But I think Moore's use of performative utterances in the argument - not 'I know this is my hand' but 'Here is a hand', i.e. he makes a demonstration and is not merely stating a proposition - could be used to support W's views about meaning and truth embedded in our actions and way of life. — Cuthbert

I think that this is the only reasonable way to take Moore's proposition, as a demonstration. Then it is a type of justification, demonstrating, this is the type of thing which I call a "hand". But it doesn't serve to ward off the skeptic, because it can only be taken as a proposition, which is inherently a proposal, will you allow me to call this a hand. And the skeptic is free to reject the proposal, for whatever reason the skeptic dreams up. Wittgenstein's position hinges on the assumption that such rejection is irrational. But he puts forward no principles to distinguish irrational rejection of a proposition from rational rejection. Surely it's not always irrational to reject a proposition.

I would say the image is not "in" the mirror, but on the surface of the mirror. If it were "in" the mirror, then it would be as unenlightened says, it would be a virtual image located behind the surface of the mirror. — Janus

The light interacts with the substance of the mirror to make the image, just like it interacts with any substance that you see, allowing you to see the object. Therefore the image (what you see) is in the substance of the mirror.

We understand, most of us, that when we see a tree, and a reflection of a tree in the lake, we are not seeing a literal second tree in the lake, but rather seeing the same tree 'round a corner'. This becomes more obvious when one considers a periscope, or the wing mirror of a car. — unenlightened

Right, that's much better than talking about the image behind the mirror. There's a further issue now though. Once you see that the image in the mirror is just a reflection of what's around the corner, can you look at the object itself as just a reflection, like Plato suggested in the cave analogy? Perhaps what we see as "an object" is just a reflection of what's inside. The light shines off the object, giving us just a glimpse of an indication of what's inside. So what you apprehend as "consciousness" is just a glimpse of what's inside the human being.

No, it isn't really anywhere. It's a virtual image, not a real image. But to be honest, I don't want to discuss optics, but consciousness. If you do not understand that a virtual image can be located, you won't understand the analogy, but I am already wanting to move on; the analogy was intended to open up a conceptual space to consider the nature of consciousness, that's all. — unenlightened

My point is that consciousness is really inside the human body, just like the image is really in the mirror. You've made a faulty representation of the image in the mirror, as if it were somewhere outside the mirror, and compared this to consciousness, as if consciousness was somewhere outside of the human body. But that the image is somewhere outside the mirror is just an illusion. And probably the notion that consciousness is outside the head is just an illusion.

So a brain is somewhat like the polished surface of a mirror, and consciousness is like a reflection that appears to have its source inside one's head, but is not physically there, but physically out in the world. And whenever consciousness looks at consciousness, it creates a bizarre fractal complexity that it cannot get to the bottom of. — unenlightened

If you want to support this bizarre notion, that consciousness is not inside one's head, "but physically out in the world", you need something better than the mirror analogy, because it really doesn't do what it's supposed to do.

There's nothing absurd with my conditional. If you do not will the actions, then they are not yours, since they occur without your will. If mind control was real, and someone could mind control you and get you to do a nefarious deed, would you say that it is you who did the nefarious did, or rather the person who mind controlled you? — Agustino

Yes, if someone controls you to make you do a nefarious deed (the devil made you do it), the act is still yours. The rock breaks the window despite the fact that someone throws it.

Here's the other premise: actions performed with the body and/or mind of another are not that person's actions if they do not will them. No contradiction. — Agustino

But the act is carried out by your body. Despite the fact that someone controlled you, there is no argument here to prove that the act was not carried out by your body.

Based on whether the person wills the actions or not when they occur. — Agustino

The problem is that even things without will carry out actions. So the fact that you did not will an act is insufficient to prove that the act is not yours.

We were talking just about humans. If you want to generalise to other animals, then obviously moral responsibility is not required. But one of the two components of moral responsibility (which are will and reason) is still required. Animals lack reason, but they do not lack will. — Agustino

An act with moral responsibility is a special type of act. Animals don't have moral responsibility, but animals still act, and those acts are the acts of the animal which performs them. So why would you argue that a human act without moral responsibility is not an act of the human being which performs it?

No, the action is not mine in the sense I've specified above. I do not will the action, and hence I cannot be morally responsible for it. From a moral point of view, the action is not mine. From a biological point of view, or a physical one if you want it, the action belongs to my body as the immediate initiator. — Agustino

You haven't yet produced the reasoning for your premise which allows you to say that if you are not morally responsible for an act, then the act is not yours. But of course that premise is absurd, because if it were the case, then animals and inanimate things would be incapable of acting, because they are not morally responsible for their acts.

There is. As the ray diagram indicates, and I remember doing it in physics 101, one can readily find the location of the virtual image using parallax, and it is behind the mirror. — unenlightened

Thinking that you're locating the image "behind the mirror" is delusion, the image is really "in the mirror".

We ordinarily say that the reflection is 'in the mirror', and yet we know that the essence of a mirror is that it is all surface with no 'inside'. — unenlightened

Actually the reflective surface is on the back of the glass, so the reflection is really known to be "in the mirror", to begin with. This becomes evident if the glass gets cracked. Don't break the mirror to see this though because it will bring you bad luck.

So with a little more care, we talk about the reflection as a virtual image that appears to be located behind the mirror, and with a little experimentation one can actually mark out the position of a virtual object behind the mirror. — unenlightened

I don't think there is anything which should make you talk about "behind the mirror". The image appears in the mirror, not behind it. We see the mirror as a surface, we know we are not seeing behind it, we are seeing into it. And in the mirror is a reflection of oneself. But the reflection is extremely odd, because the features of the left side of my body are on the right side of my body in the image. Maybe there's a spot in the centre of my nose which is not distorted like this.

It is very simplistic, and not really descriptive of what is occurring, to say that light hits a surface, and reflects back. In reality light interacts with the object, so it must to some extent, penetrate the surface. The interaction between light and the surface is not completely understood, as is evident from the difference between wave descriptions and particle descriptions.

So there is a very real issue to be discussed, concerning what is going on "in the mirror". Likewise, in your analogy, there is a very real issue of what is going on "in your head", which is creating the image of consciousness.

... I am beginning to think that there is a significant number, if not a majority, of people whose minds are made up about reality, are closed to anything more than a tweak here or there in that reality, and are solely in the business of making everything conform to that reality. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Oh yeah, that's scientism to a tee. It's sad that scientism is so pervasive.

We don't ever actually obseve anything that it's static. However, we can sort of view something as static in our minds though it too is always changing. Three closest thing we can create that is static is some c symbolic language, but when we do this, the mobile nature of nature is lost. — Rich

The point being that we choose a static unchanging thing to act as the temporal reference. So for example the day, or the year is a relatively unchanging thing which acts as a reference to measure time against. To the extent that these activities of the earth are static and unchanging, our measurements according to these references would be inaccurate.

Not really. Observing movement directly, e.g. music, is Infinitely better than trying to understand music from notes. — Rich

To observe music, we need a static unchanging point, the present. From the perspective of this point, the notes and musical score flow past as a procession. If your perspective flowed from future to past, like one of the notes, you would only be able to observe that one note or chord, which you exist along with. So we have a perspective, which we assume as the unchanging present, the now; we assume that the soul exists at the eternally unchanging now; and from this static perspective we can observe and measure all the changes as they occur around us.

They are not being recreated. They are morphing. There are no static states. Static states (nothing is static) are symbolic projections which the mind creates to share observations or solve practical purposes. — Rich

This is where I disagree with process philosophy. Process assumes no static states. But the biological systems create static states by which we perceive and apprehend the physical world. So the assumption of static states is fundamental to the conscious understanding of the physical world, as is evident from the basic laws of logic. Since these static states are fundamental to conscious understanding, we must give some sort of reality to them, even if their realness is completely artificial. Artificial things are real, and if the biological systems are creating these artificial states we need to understand how, and why.

There is a problem which process philosophy runs into which involves associating one activity, or one type of activity, to another. Then process philosophers end up having to invent imaginary things, like Whitehead's prehension and concrescence, to account for the relationships between various activities. So instead of going this route I find it much more reasonable to assume the real and natural existence of the imaginary static states, which is supported by the natural trend of biological systems.

No, existence is just continuously morphing exactly as it is perceived. Memory of the past gives us the sense of duration. — Rich

The assumption that all of reality is completely composed of continually morphing forms, doesn't give us what is required for a complete understanding reality. We need a static viewpoint, independent of the morphing forms, from which to observe and produce a complete understanding of the morphing forms. Without this perspective our understanding will never be complete. That is why the biological systems evolved in this way, to produce the static states from which we understand the world. If we cannot give reality to these static states, we cannot produce a complete understanding of the morphing forms. So, the model may appear to be "overcomplicating itself", but these complications are what is necessary to understand reality. Some of us like to believe that science is on the verge of a complete understanding of reality, but I think the evidence is overwhelming that we're very far from it, due to these complications.

Unless we dismiss them at dead ends or as not really being contradictions. We decide all the time (implicitly at least) what is and is not worth talking about. — mrcoffee

This is a difference of opinion then. You dismiss these inherent contradictions as "dead ends", "not worth talking about". I consider them as having important ontological significance.

I can't understand what you are trying to say here. Since '0' is just one part of a system (or of many systems), I can't imagine anyone saying that it itself is or is not ideal. I can only guess where you are coming from, but I can say that I found math far less metaphysical upon studying it than I first understood it to be. Or rather it's metaphysical in the driest and most desirable of ways. It works with basic structural intuitions. — mrcoffee

The point is that "0" does not work within a basic structural intuition, as you claim, it works only by arbitrary designations, different intuitions which vary. One cannot say what "0" symbolizes because depending on how it is used, this varies.

For example, put "0" on a number line. You can count down, 3,2,1,0,-1,-2, etc.. Here, "0" is just an equal integer. You count two equal intervals between 3 and 1, and likewise, two equal intervals between 1 and -1. The intervals are all equal. This clearly does not represent what "0" really does in mathematics, it has a special place, of greater significance than any other integer.

In other applications, "0" occupies a special place, unlike any other integer. This is because when we count down the positive integers we are proceeding toward "less than", but as we pass zero we cross a categorical separation, into the negative integers, so the negative numbers increase and we actually count "more than" of a different category, the negative integers, as we continue to count down. Counting down from zero, through the negative integers is actually counting up, increasing the number, of a categorically different thing, the negative rather than the positive.

The different, arbitrary, functions of "0" become evident when you try to multiply negative numbers. One convention says that when you multiply negative numbers, a double negative makes a positive, so negative numbers multiplied together makes a positive number. But this is not a very sensible convention because it doesn't allow that there is a square root of a negative number, and it doesn't reflect the fact that when we count into higher and higher negative numbers, we are actually increasing the quantity of a different category, the negatives, not simply descending by integer. So another convention allows for imaginary numbers. But no existing convention really represents "0" properly, as making a categorical division, such that we increase from zero into two distinct categories, the positive, and the negative.

Some time ago, I actually considered an idea similar to this. I was wondering how "big" is the present. And in fact I arrived that if the "present" has some "thickness" change would be impossible. But interestingly, here you are giving an interesting perspective on this, i.e. that it is possible to accept both a "thick" present and change. — boundless

The idea of a two dimensional present is becoming more common amongst speculative physicists. I think it provides a basis for explaining our experience of activity occurring at the present, and it might also help to create a bridge between relativity theory, and our intuitions, that the present is a substantial aspect of reality.

Have you ever wondered how we observe motion visually? If one's viewpoint is the dimensionless point of the present, then we can only notice static states at this non-temporal point. We'd have to infer motion by stringing together still frame states. What we see as activity would have to be a creation of the memory. It may be that this is actually how we observe motion, but the problems are numerous. If we observe static states at the moment of the present, then we have a big logical hole, between the static points, which needs to be filled. The actual passing of time would have to occur between the points, when we couldn't see it, and therefore actual change would have to also be occurring between the points of observation. So we'd be seeing a serious of still-frames, but the entire activity of change, whereby one still-frame is replaced with the next, would be completely invisible to us.

If this were the case, then the actual change that occurs behind the scene, which we cannot see, must occur extremely fast because it wouldn't be as if the object moves from point A to point B, while we're not seeing it, the object would have to be reconstituted at each point where we see it in a still frame. We cannot assume that the object "moves" from point A to B or else we'd have to allow that it could be at intermediate points. The behind the scenes activity would have to consist of a re-creation of each object at each moment of time, as time passes. So even this way of looking at motion requires a second dimension of time. There is the time that we know, which consists of the series of still frames, but there is a second time which we could call "real time", which is the time passing in between the still frames. I called it real time, because it is when the real activity is going on, which is the preparation of the next still frame. But all this activity is not evident to our eyes.

Now consider how we observe motion with other senses. Let's take the tactile senses, touch, taste, and smell. Heat will burn, and that's a sensation of molecules moving fast, causing damage. The olfaction senses are themselves extremely active, with nerves and other activities, and they sense molecules which are less active (unless they are overly active causing burns). In these senses we have activities of the nerves, which are sensing states of the object. And this is what seeing does as well, it is activities within, which are sensing unchanging things (objects). The conscious mind, sees movement within sight, and in understanding the movement of these large objects, it turns back toward the movement of tiny objects, which the unconscious already uses to sense states of existence.

So we must account for this difference in "direction" when we try to understand motion. The conscious mind produces a concept of motion from large objects moving, and looks back toward the tiny, from this artificial perspective. But the living being already has a natural perspective, which is the reverse of this, it is already utilizing these tiny fast motions to rule over the more static, temporally extended states. The natural "rule" of the living being therefore may be derived from the "real time", the activity between the static states, and the static states may be completely artificial.

The reasoning is in fact, sound. The possibility of being more "presents" as the "scale" of observation varies is something that I have never encountered in physics (and in philosophy for that matter). But again, nothing tells us that there is only a "present". In fact, the tendency to hyper-semplify sometimes had its side-effects: for example the Newtonian "absolute" space is certainly simpler than SR, but it is not really effective. — boundless

Consider the possibility that the static states of the still frame representation are artificial, created at the conscious level. The states correspond to objects. The objects we see are masses of molecules in different shapes. We create a present, a timeline by giving these shapes temporal extension, inertia. But if we look at individual molecules, as shapes, then we have created a different set of static frames with a different, but supposedly parallel timeline. If we go to atoms, we have a different set of frames, and a different parallel timeline.

This model of reality is of course very complex and the natural inclination is to reject its complications as unnecessary. But the key to believing it, or accepting it, is to recognize the logical necessity of concluding that physical objects are necessarily re-created at each moment of passing time. There are different approaches to this conclusion, mostly presented by different religions. But the best, I believe, is the direct approach from personal experience. Consider the difference between what has been in the past, and what may be, in the future. All of physical existence is in the past, and it has been sensed by us. Now turn your attention to the future. I see an abrupt wall, where my senses cannot go. There is nothing here to sense, no physical existence. I sit here without moving, and I realize that I can move my arm whenever I want. So it's impossible that where my arm will be in the next second is already existing, because only I can make that designation, now, and I can do it whenever I want. If there is no definite place where my arm will be in ten seconds from now, then it is impossible that it has physical existence at that future time. So I must conclude that it comes into existence at the present moment, at each moment as time passes. Now I can look around the physical world at all the things which human beings have the power of changing, and I can extrapolate to conclude that all physical existence must come into being at each moment as time passes.

This produces all sorts of problems and complexities with the nature of spatial extension. Let's assume that all physical objects, static states with temporal extension and inertia, are artificial, created by the conscious mind, as described above. This means that "space", which is our conception produced to allow for the real existence of objects, is created according to our observations of these objects as well. So if we go to a parallel time line, as described above, we need a different conception of space at this timeline. And each timeline requires a different conception of space, to allow for the necessity that spatial existence, and therefore space itself, comes into existence at each moment of passing time.

Here I see two possibilities, BTW:
1) We at best can have a "partial knowledge" of the tint. In this case our "trial and error" procedure allows us to know partially the "tint" by the "inside", so to speak. We can think that the "tint" actually has two "parts". One part is changeable by us: we can in fact use whatever concept we like and "test" it. However a part of the tint is completely "hidden", it is "a priori" in all our observations. We cannot "remove" it, so to speak. In this case we can never have the possibility to "see things as they are", but we can have a "partial knowledge". This IMO is quite a rational perspective.
2) On the other hand we can accept that we can "trascend", so to speak, all tinting. In this case the "tint" can be modified by our trials until we arrive to a "perfect" untinted perspective. Note that this is possible only if no "part" of the tint is "a priori", since in that case we could not even imagine "reality as it is". If there is no "a priori" part of the tint, then in fact we can infer how the untinted perspective is by studying the "behavior" of the results of our trials and errors. — boundless

So I think that the issue with the tint is to figure out the exact nature of the tint. I believe it is as you say "a priori" within all our observations, but that does not mean that it must remain hidden to us. The reason, is that we have different senses, so the tint will appear differently to the different senses. And this is how we will determine the nature of the tint. Notice, that in my discussion of the different senses above, I did not even approach the relationship between seeing and hearing, of which the Fourier transform and the frequency/time uncertainty are derivative. The uncertainty, being a product of the tint, ought to have a different measure in sight than it has in sound, and that would help to expose the nature of the tint.

Let's assume for the sake of argument, that the tint is in how we draw our timeline. If for example, we create a timeline by using relatively large bodies like the earth and sun, and stay true to that timeline, we will produce accurate knowledge of things within this spatial realm of "objects", objects this size. But this knowledge would not be very reliable in relation to larger objects like galaxies which exist on a different timeline, because we would be making a diagonal across from one timeline to another, without knowing this. The desire would be for an orthogonal relation between timelines, but how would we know what's orthogonal? Likewise, if we study tiny subatomic particles, an atomic clock would give us a good timeline, but to relate this timeline to the one of the earth and sun would be problematic because we would know the orthogonal relation. To determine the orthogonal relation would require figuring out how spatial existence comes into being at each moment. Anytime one timeline is related to another, without determining the true tint, it would cause a problem.

What exactly is matter? Ultimately it is just quantum stuff of some sort. Matter feels solid. Matter is perceived of as solid. But we know it is empty. It is something we call energy. It is energy tightened into a ball as one might imagine vapor tightening into a snowball. — Rich

Why would you assume that matter is "quantum stuff"? Why wouldn't matter be better represented as a continuous field, or wave function. Matter is how we understand continuous existence, not how we understand particular changing forms.

There are rules that apply to the language-game of knowledge, and there are rules to the language-game of doubt. One precedes the other, i.e., knowledge seems to come first, then the ability to question that knowledge. — Sam26

I think it's clear that the skeptic doubts the rules. And if this is the case then it makes no sense to say that there are rules to the game of doubt, because the skeptic would doubt those rules as well. That's the nature of free will, we don't have to follow any rules. We may suffer the consequences but we do not have to follow rules.

You are simply taking a determinist perspective and trying to force it upon the free willing skeptic, insisting that the skeptic has no choice but to follow rules. If you accepted free will as a principle you would see that the skeptic does not have to follow rules. To follow rules is a choice which is freely made. The so-called private language argument exposes this. What is private to the individual (doubt) cannot be called "following a rule".

It is a mistake to frame doubt as rational, just like it is a mistake to frame instinct and intuition as rational. These are more like feelings, attitudes, and we attempt to dispose of them with an attitude created by the conscious mind, the attitude of certainty. All doubts are irrational because if they were rational, they'd be certainties, but they cannot be quelled without creating certainty.

It's all in good fun. I love you Agustino

Grammatically, I said the tax is applied to the salary above certain levels. — Agustino

No, you said:
"Lawyers and doctors need to have their salaries taxed at 90% above certain levels, which can still be quite high - say $150K in US."
Clearly you state that a salary above a certain level, say $150K ought to be taxed at 90%

Pragmatically, I'm not a retard, — Agustino

You mostly demonstrate otherwise . Why would I expect this to be an exception?

The modifier "above certain levels" is right there in front of you. — Baden

Right, the statement says that salaries above a certain level ought to be taxed at 90%. Where's the indication that what is meant is that only a part of that salary should be taxed?

It's a prepositional phrase acting as an adverbial modifying the verb "taxed" in conjunction with the other prepositional phrase "at 90%" pointing to the fact that there are two important qualifiers on the action of taxing; firstly, that it be at a rate of 90%; and secondly, that it apply above a certain level. — Baden

The statement clearly indicates that the salary is what is to be taxed at 90%. And, "above certain levels" qualifies the salary. The fact is, that Agustino did not say what Agustino meant. You understood what Agustino meant, because you did not take Agustino to be an idiot, and knew that what was meant must be other than what was stated. I simply took Agustino to be an idiot. And why shouldn't I, when Agustino has proven so many other times that this is the way to be taken?

"Salary taxed at 90%" means salary taxed at 90%.

salaries taxed at 90% — Agustino

I saw no indication that what was really meant was "part" of the salary ought to be taxed at 90%.

Oh, why didn't you say so in the first place?

Right, so income of $150,001 leaves one with about $15,000 in take home pay.

Lawyers and doctors need to have their salaries taxed at 90% above certain levels, which can still be quite high - say $150K in US. — Agustino

What, a person making $150K ought to be taxed 90%? So their take home pay is $15K? That wouldn't even pay rent.

Right. But in the science of formal systems we discover the relationships of categories/symbols/tokens and not of the marks we need to aid memory and communication. The theorems aren't about the marks. Beyond that, there's no denial that the marks are different. There's just no interest in the mark except as the representation of a category. — mrcoffee

This is not "the science of formal systems", this is philosophy. In philosophy we are concerned with understanding reality as a whole, so we cannot dismiss certain contradictions and inconsistencies as irrelevant to the field of study.

If it is necessary that we take two distinct things, which have a very similar physical appearance (two distinct instances of a symbol), and assume that they are "the same", despite the fact that they are clearly not the same, in order to understand some aspect of reality, then as philosophers we ought to recognize and take interest in this, to determine what the implications of such a contradiction might be.

If I draw the letter a in two ways, even a child can agree that the marks are different and yet the 'same' (the same letter). This is an informal computation of the many-to-one function from marks to symbols. Some might prefer to use 'symbols' for what I mean by marks, which is fine. So for clarity I can just talk about the categorization function or categorization itself, which is allowed to place 2 or more different objects in the same conceptual bin. This is just an ability we find ourselves with. Existence is ultimately mysterious, etc. But I don't think there's problem with categorization. A person would have to use categories successfully in order to argue for their failure. — mrcoffee

The point is to recognize the difference between "the same" and "similar". We all agree that there is a fundamental difference between these two. I would say that it is a categorical difference, "the same" always indicates one and only one, the one and only, while "similar" always indicates a multiplicity. The law of identity, as expressed by Aristotle claims that "the same" refers to the one and only. This is supported by the Leibniz principle of indiscernibles, if it appears as two distinct things, but the two are absolutely identical, then they are in fact the same, one not two.

I agree that we can categorize, and place similar things in the same category. Where I disagree is that it is proper to call these similar things "the same". The category itself is "the same", as the one and only, but the individual items are not the same, they are similar. Therefore we have a categorical separation between the category and the members of the category. The category is "one", the members are "many". If I remember correctly, set theory violates this categorical separation, being based in a fundamental category error.

But surely you didn't mean the usual order on the integers or real numbers? My point is that if something is less than ideal within or about mathematics, that this would tend to involve a notion of the ideal. — mrcoffee

Yes, we refer to the notion of "the ideal". Let's say that it must be perfect, cannot be otherwise without loosing the status of "the ideal", therefore it is unique, the one and only, the ideal. If it can be demonstrated that any particular principle does not fulfill this criteria, then we can conclude that the principle is not the ideal. I agree that in excluding the principle from the category of "ideal", we refer to "a notion of the ideal". Do you recognize the difference between "the ideal", and "the notion of the ideal"? We make a category, "the ideal", and have a notion of what is required of something to be put in that category. But the category may be empty, like the empty set. There may be nothing to put in that category. There is a notion of the ideal, but we haven't found the ideal. That we have a notion of the ideal doesn't mean that we have the ideal.

This is why I used zero as the principle for ordering. Let's say someone claims that zero fulfills our notion of the ideal. The argument is that we haven't found any ideal, the category is an empty set, therefore zero is the ideal. However, zero allows for the possibility of ordering toward the negative or the positive, two distinct possibilities. So there is inherent within "zero" two distinct possibilities. Therefore it cannot be the ideal because the ideal must be one unique perfection. The ideal is like the empty set, but it cannot even be represented as zero, because we cannot put zero into that set, because this leaves it not empty.