What allows the mind to create for itself, a multitude of distinct and completely inconsistent realities at different times. — Metaphysician Undercover

The mind creates mental phenomena, not realities.

With man's insatiable need to make nature conform to his needs and even wants, what are your opinions about our current relationship with nature? Is it becoming better or worse? — Shawn

We're part of nature, and co-evolve with other parts of it, such as our environment. This parthood-relationship can become better when we achieve a sustainable interplay with our environment, or worse when we fail e.g. by shortsighted, compartmentalized or just idiotic trade-offs that destroy what we're all part of.

Regarding what's perceived as true. Perception is a part of nature that's providing us with facts. Statements about those facts can be true or false.

5. On Science and Philosophy – Wittgenstein was skeptical of the way philosophy borrowed the prestige of science. Once, when someone said that philosophers should learn more science, he responded:
“That’s like saying that architects should learn more about bricklaying.”

My favourite is the bricklayer one. — Wayfarer

Despite working within an increasingly industrialized building industry, Sigurd Lewerentz did in fact learn more about bricklaying, and as a result he produced some of the greatest architecture of the 1900s. :cool:

Wittgenstein's joke might refer to an unwarranted use of science in philosophy, but bricklaying is not necessarily unwarranted in architecture.

Descartes's Evil Demon does not require an external material world. — Art48

Right, but the world is not experienced by way of sense-data, it is experienced directly. Therefore, there can be no demon in between the world and our experiences.

The demon-problem is entirely artificial, it arises from dualism and the false assumption that experience is indirect (e.g. by way of sense-data, mental images, phenomena etc.)

what makes a person interested in philosophy? — Rob J Kennedy

A variety of things can make a person interested in philosophy, but in general I think the subject satisfies curiosity and will to think clearly. Unlike a scientific question, a philosophical question has no decisive answer. Therefore, philosophy attracts varieties of thought, including anti-intellectual, religious, political, or sophistry masquerading as "philosophy". All of them showing you aspects of human nature.

The philosophical significance of silence is “space” or “opportunity”. — Bret Bernhoft

It is easy to understand how silence is significant in music, poetry, environmental design, health care and so on. Not so much in cookery, fundamental physics, or in philosophy. To say that the significance of silence is space or opportunity seems more like psychology. The seeming lack of stimulation in silence is used for stimulating one's imagination.

A material cat may exist which is causes us to experience the bundle of sensations which we call a cat. — Art48

The cat exists independent of your bundle of sensations. If you'd only experience sensations, then you'd never experience anything else. Yet you know of a cat, and publish the word, neither being bundles of your sensations. When I feed my cat, I feed the cat, not a bundle of sensations.

We experience only sensations: physical sensations, emotional sensations, and mental sensations. — Art48

Sensations may arise when you see a cat, for instance, but what you see and sense and thus experience is the cat, not sensations. To say that we only experience sensations is plainly false. The cat is not a sensation.

Sellars rejected the "Myth of the Given," the idea that our knowledge rests on a foundation of non-conceptual experiences. He argued that all awareness involves the application of concepts. But he also recognized that we can have non-inferential knowledge—knowledge that isn't inferred from other beliefs.

When we see the cat on the mat, we don't infer that it's there from other beliefs. Our knowledge is direct and immediate. But it's still conceptual... . — Pierre-Normand

To say that knowledge is direct and immediate yet conceptual seems incoherent. Do we experience the cat or the concept?

While Davidson acknowledges that beliefs are caused by the world, he doesn't give experience itself a rational role in justification. — Pierre-Normand

The belief that the cat is on the mat is caused by (experiencing) the cat on the mat.

One might add, that the way the cat is on the mat, or one's angle of view etc. fixes the experience to be a certain way. I think these are examples of what's "given" and available for us to discover in the experience.

I would assume that Scruton as a traditional conservative wouldn't be so enthusiastic about the state of conservatism today, anyway. — ssu

Perhaps it's already been mentioned in this thread, but apparently he became a conservative after witnessing the student riots in Paris in May 1968 where politically left leaning students from mostly wealthy families were throwing rocks at policemen from mostly working class families. :cool:

Seeing that the cat is on the mat is not a reason to think the cat is on the mat so much as believing that the cat is on the mat... — Banno

I'd say seeing it presents it, unlike the belief which one can maintain or change regardless of the whereabouts of the cat. You won't keep on seeing the cat on the mat when it hops up on the chair. The visual experience is then the cat on the chair. This suggests that seeing is different from believing, and that seeing can be used as a reason for believing that the cat is on the mat (or on the chair).

difficult or impossible to give them the skills of a one-year-old when it comes to perception and mobility. — NOS4A2

Perhaps because perception and mobility are direct interactions with the environment? Unlike indirect interactions via computational or mental representations. One hardly needs a brain to be able to perceive things or move intentionally.

It is because the argument does not require cosmology or physics. They are irrelevant to its point. — Philosophim

If your argument is not about the physical world, then what is it about?

It seems like my point and yours coincide. Yes, meaning is found within the universe, not without. — Philosophim

Sure, meaning is found within the universe, but you also write that there is no prior causal meaning and:

This means that anything could have been — Philosophim

I don't think it follows from an uncaused universe that anything could have been. Somehow spacetime, big bang, causal chains, organic life, flying baseballs etc emerge within a universe which is not caused by anything else. Unlike our juggling of words, there is relevant science which might eventually show us how that works.

I am neither arguing for or against spacetime as fundamental. — Philosophim

Hence I said that your paper says little or nothing about cosmology, physics etc. so I propose an approach to the logic of a universal origin from available science.

My example, again, is that it takes spacetime for an origin to be possible, but if the universe includes a domain more fundamental than spacetime (i.e. from which spacetime emerges), then the universe is arguably without an origin.

Tell you what, put what you're saying next to a quote of mine in the argument so I can see what you're referring to. — Philosophim

So, compare what I'm saying above with what you're saying in this quote:

If ultimately there is no prior cause for existence, this means there is no prior meaning for existence. . . . 'Meaning' is development and purpose created and maintained within existence, not from outside of itself. — Philosophim

Despite its apparent lack of a universal origin, the universe doesn't seem so incapable of creating and maintaining development and purpose (e.g. big bang, organic life, baseball).

how this applies to what I've written — Philosophim

What you've written is about the meanings of 'scope', 'causal chain', 'limit' etc but there's little or nothing about cosmology, physics, or current research (e.g. quantum gravity) from which there is reason to suggest that spacetime is not fundamental, and therefore there is no universal origin. The Big Bang might be the origin of spacetime, but not the origin of the universe. Without spacetime it's meaningless to assume that the universe had an origin.

On the logic of a universal origin, my "viewpoint" is that it takes spacetime for origins to be possible, and the universe includes arguably not only spacetime but also a more fundamental domain in which there is no spacetime, but from which spacetime emerges, entanglement of particles etc.

For every effect there must be a cause, except in parts of ithe universe where time has stopped (black holes?), or for a possible origin of spacetime (e.g. qubits), for which it makes little sense to assume a causal origin.

the distinction being groped for here is between subjective and objective, such that matters of taste are to do with the subject, whereas matters of fact are features of the object. But therein lies a whole can of worms if not a pit of vipers. — unenlightened

Then we'd better avoid those categories :cool: I think it's fairly clear that matters of taste refer to features of objects, and how an object affects subjects is one among other facts about the object.

It seems to me that if the argument works for beauty and ugliness, then it works for any other features of experience - veridical and illusory, or married and unmarried, for examples. Which would be inconvenient, if the intention is to say something about aesthetics that distinguishes it from science or mundanity. — unenlightened

What sets aesthetic experiences apart from other experiences is not intrinsic and extrinsic features but the fact that some experiences are attractive (or deterrent) for their own sake regardless of whether it serves other interests.

Kind of like what you did when you claimed you could just see the curve — flannel jesus

No, my claim is that the curve is visible, and that its straight or flat looks are features of some angles of view. We could limit our visual field to a vanishing point on the horizon, which is a feature of central projection, not the observed object. The vanishing point is not a visible object, nor are the straight or flat looks of the earth.

People don't have subjective experiences. — frank

Well, during the traditional discussion between the Nobel prize winners, Hinton seemed to hold a grudge against philosophy and the notion of subjectivity. But then he added that ethics is fine, as if to appear less fanatic.

I do not believe you can actually perceive it. I know I can't - I go to the beach pretty often, I see the horizon a couple times a month, and there's no apparent curve from a vantage point of 6-8ft above sea level. — flannel jesus

Granted there's an angle of view from which a visibly curved object may look straight. Its straight look arises from the angle of view, unlike its curved look which arises from its true shape. That's why it's called curved.

Like "scientific" skeptics about perception, also "unscientific" flat-earthers fail to distinguish between what an object may look like and its true visible shape.

I'm pretty sure it's not visibly curved. — flannel jesus

How can you be sure? The curvature might be too small to notice, say, if you only see a narrow piece of the horizon, but I'm pretty sure it's curved, also visibly if you'd look closer.

Compare it with seeing the complex tangle of shapes, textures and colours of a birch tree. You might not pay attention to all of them, yet they are there, visible, and they are the object of your visual experience.

prove yourself that the earth is round — flannel jesus

The earth's curvature is visible wherever there's a visible horizon. What's an example of a place from which the Earth could appear flat? Is there good reason to doubt that the curvature that we can see does not imply a round shape?

..what questions of being could possibly be interesting or important? — Srap Tasmaner

For example, can a model of conscious verbal behavior be conscious?

A model of a duck is arguably not a duplication of a duck. It's a model or simulation based on a selection of observed and known behaviors. A model of duck depends on what we observe and know of ducks. For some anti-realists, also ducks depend on us. I think ducks are not so dependent on us, but when we speak or think about ducks we construct models based on what we observe and know.

Likewise, we construct models based on what we observe and know of our conscious verbal behavior. But being conscious and modeling something is different from being the model.

Perhaps this has already been mentioned, but one theory (link here) seems to be that spacetime emerges from a network of entangled bits of information, qubits. This network has no spatial properties, nor temporal durations, and as such it is possibly ubiquitous and eternal, i.e. a domain of the physical reality which doesn't require a first cause. However, as such it allows spatiotemporal and causal phenomena to emerge, and by way of being part of such a domain also spatiotemporal particles can be entangled and act in spooky ways at a distance :cool:

Here’s what Derrida says about not being wrong:
...
"..this definition of the deconstructionist is false (that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of numerous texts, first of all mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread." — Joshs

See, apparently one must read his numerous texts again until one gets it "right", which exemplifies my point about postmodernists thinking that there is no such thing as being wrong (in this case only their critics are "wrong").

The Spanish Inquisitors, like witch hunters, used a mix of secular law and religious scripture so that the basis for judgement appeared lawful yet depended entirely on the interpretation of some alleged witness, expert, or priest. Thus the judges could get away with accusing, punishing and executing anyone that someone didn't like, and by such terror maintain political and religious orthodoxy in an entire population. It served the interests of power.

Not unlike how some of today's political activists use postmodern "theory" (or theories). Granted that these activists are not the ones who think and write the theories, but if the theories have anything in common, it's their diagnosing and revelatory character which makes them intellectually intriguing, yet they are written in a style which is obscure enough to remain dependent on the authority of expert interpreters. Thus, any critic can be dismissed for misunderstanding the theory. Furthermore, when the theory attacks our intuitive and common sense views and rejects the existence of a shared basis for judgement (e.g. realism), it serves the interests of power.

Of course, any philosophy, theory, or science can be misused for repressive rhetoric and actions. Imperial colonialists misused Enlightenment principles, nazis misused biology, communists misused psychiatry as political means. But they could at lest be accused for being wrong. Some postmodernists, however, don't even admit that there is such a thing as being wrong, which is arguably more pernicious.

Realist fear of postmodernism. — Joshs

At some universities postmodernism has become as scary as The Spanish Inquisition.

I am most interested in speculation about this or just a complete rejection of this concept. — mlles

A rejection is that you haven't described anything to speculate about but a neologism that alludes to something evasive, beyond logic etc. As curious readers we may take it as a promise of insight, but apparently it's just a word game with invisible or moving goal posts.

empirical realism obscures what exists outside of clear definitions and also resists being stapled as something or nothing and, in doing so, critiques the very attempt to reduce the richness of reality to resolved notions. — mlles

Postmodern fear of knowledge.

If animals use creativity is there a common primal need? — Jerome

We're creative not only when we need to, but also when we want to, or when it's expected of us (i.e. various reasons). Sometimes it's necessity that makes me creative, other times it's boredom.

I assume this is because change was seen as a threat to a groups power structure as it can be today. — Jerome

Yeah, creative writers, artists, and scientists may have to express their work in ways that reduce the risk of being burned at the stake or ostracized by the group. For example, by the use of metaphor, coded language, jargon, obscurity.

But only something that occupies some space can expand, as there needs to be the space it occupies and then expands into. — Clearbury

Unlike a balloon, the universe has no outside into which it can expand. It creates the space.

solipsist evolutionary theory posits one kind of a thing (a mind) and one disposition (the disposition to create a similar mental state to the one it is originally in) and gets everything out of that. I still do not see how an alternative that starts with something else is going to be able to explain as much with as little. — Clearbury

The problem is that you don't explain anything, you only say that you do, while dismissing and ignoring the objections. That's disingenuous.

But how can something unextended 'expand'? — Clearbury

When one instance of the extended universe collapses into an unextended nothingness, the following compression of all remaining energy and forces causes an explosion (big bang), and the explosion creates a new instance of extension. When it cools down, atoms begin to form, followed by the compounds of matter and things.

In conclusion, having both subjectivity and objectivity co-exist in the same world creates a logical contradiction. — bizso09

There's no contradiction in things having different modes of existing.

A room with people has an objective mode of existing. The room and the people exist as such regardless of anyone's experiences or knowledge about them.

Their talk, however, has a social mode of existing. Its existence depends on our knowledge of language, or else it's just noise.

Your experience has a subjective mode of existing. It exists only for you when you have it.

By experiencing the room and talking to the people, you can have objective knowledge about them and their experiences, regardless of the fact that their experiences, just like yours, have a subjective mode of existing.

It struck me that if the forthcoming US president is not so interested in maintaining foreign power balances around the world, then it seems likely that other stake holders will begin to test (e.g. provoke) to see whether they have a chance to advance their positions, or take over. Not sure if this has anything to do with the the current event in South Korea.

Breakthroughs in medical science seem to have been historically rare until we began to use microscopes (or the hypothetical-deductive method seriously) and thus learned about microbes etc.

Across place and time, is creativity a reaction to a primal need? — Jerome

Or a consequence from the fact that by drawing pictures on the walls of caves etc some of the more human-like primates could preserve and accumulate knowledge, which eventually increased their fitness. I think creativity is basically something that an animal (including human) does in order to solve problems and invent things in order to increase its fitness. However, in many human cultures creativity is oppressed, demotivated, or redirected by distractions.

Speaking of cosmic inflation and the idea that things are either extended or unextended... Consider Roger Penrose's suggestion that the universe expands and eventually reaches a state in which all matter is dispersed so that there is practically no difference between things being extended hundreds of billions of light years away or unextended in the here and now. A sort of collapse of spacetime, which causes all of the universe's energy and forces to explode as yet another big bang, followed by yet another spacetime expansion etc.

On this account, physical monism may describe the existence of a state in which spacetime has no practical meaning, and the world is practically unextended and simple (in terms of "things", "types" and "number").

Yes, but we are both appealing to evolutionary processes. You're positing billions of physical things, I'm positing one mind. In terms of simplicity, my theory assumes less than yours. — Clearbury

No, I posit a physical world in which things evolve (including minds). You posit a mental world (the mind of the solipsist) in which experiences and patterns evolve. Neither is more simple than the other. Just think about it, it would take billions of experiences to evolve a mental world in the solipsist's mind. Unlike my appeal to evolution, you just assume that a mind exists without reason.

There are two types of thing possible: immaterial and material. That is, extended or unextended. If you think there's a third, then you need to tell me what you're talking about, as those seem to exhaust the logical space available. — Clearbury

That's a false dichotomy. A physical monism is not limited to descriptions of "extended" matter but also energy, time, space, information, processes, emergence, consciousness, intentionality, words etc. It makes little sense to categorize everything as either "extended" or "unextended". Do you understand this?

We're talking about 'things'. Types of thing and number. You're either positing more kinds of thing than I am (if 'electromagnitism' is a thing - which it isn't, of course) or a greater number of one kind of thing. Either way, you're theory is more complex than mine — Clearbury

The most simple world is one that contains practically nothing. A solipsist with an empty mind is a very simple "world", I grant you that. But also the physical world in a maximum state of cosmic inflation is simple in the sense that nothing happens, until it bursts into yet another big bang.

Appealing to evolution is not going to do it, as I am appealing to that too. My account is an evolutionary one. — Clearbury

We don't appeal to evolution in the same sense. Your appeal to evolution omits the mind, as you just assume that it exists, and that experiences appear in it, and from then on you describe an evolution of experiences.

I will use the traditional terminology of materialist monism and immaterialist monism. — Clearbury

Skip the old terminology, because physical or neutral monisms do not only describe matter.

Perhaps this is what the materialist monist can do too, though it is hard to see how given that their whole story depends on material objects interacting with another. So it looks as if one needs at least two to get things going. — Clearbury

Electromagnetism, gravitation, and the weak and the strong nuclear forces are not discrete things that "get each other going". They're ubiquitous and continuous.

So immaterialist solipsist monism does seem to me to be simpler, and thus rationally to be preferred. It posits one instance of one kind of thing, not many instances of one kind of thing. — Clearbury

You forget the many instances of experiences that appear and evolve and form patterns in the solipsist's mind.

It can also be noted that what it posits - a mind, one's own - is a thing of a kind we know for certain to exist. By contrast, material objects are speculative. — Clearbury

It's speculative only for those who assume that they never see the world, only their own mental representations. Yet we don't usually doubt what we see. Under ordinary conditions of observation, I've never found a good reason to doubt the existence of what I see, nor the experience in my mind when seeing it.

..positing that there is something more basic that my mind is made of is to go beyond the evidence. — Clearbury

If you're interested in a physicalist account on the mind, try Searle on why he is not a property dualist in this online PDF.

And this thesis is simpler than supposing that there exists a mind-external physical reality in which evolution by natural selection is occurring. — Clearbury

The idea that only one mind exists is not simpler than the idea that only one substance exists. Any monism is simpler than the dualism assumed in a "mind-external physical reality".

But is mental monism simpler than physical or neutral monism? The latter two seem far more plausible, because of the genetic evolution required for background capacities to arise before anything resembling a mind could begin to identify objects and states of affairs.