You've been leveraging the word now for many posts. Maybe you should have put out your definition of that if it means something other than 'able to be understood', as opposed to say 'able to be partially understood'. — noAxioms

Let's take the weaker definition. Honestly, I don't think that anything changes in what I said.

So I must deny that physicalism has any requirement of intelligibility, unless you have a really weird definition of it. — noAxioms

Partial intelligibility is still intelligibility. For instance, the reason why I don't believe that the Earth is only 100 years old is because a different age of the Earth better supports all evidence we have. This doesn't necessarily mean that absolutely everything about the Earth is intelligible but if I had not some faith in the ability of reason to understand what is the most likely explanation of the evidence I have I could not even undertake a scientific investigation.

So, yeah I would say that intelligibility is certainly required to do science. And I doubt that there are physicalists that would seriously entertain the idea that science give us no real understading about physical reality.

One person's reasonable doubt is another's certainty. — noAxioms

Of course people can be certain without a sufficient basis for being certain. A serious philosophical investigation should, however, give a higher awareness about the quality of the basis for one's beliefs.

I hold beliefs that I admit are not 'proven beyond reasonable doubts'. There is nothing particularly wrong about having those beliefs if one is also sincere about the status of their foundation.

There are more extreme examples of this, like the civil war case of a woman getting pregnant without ever first meeting the father, with a bullet carrying the sperm rather than any kind of intent being involved. — noAxioms

Good point. But in the case you mention one can object the baby is still conceived by humans who are intentional beings.

An even more interesting point IMO would be abiogenesis. It is now accepted that life - and hence intentionality - 'came into being' from a lifeless state. So this would certainly suggest that intentionality can 'emerge from' something non-intentional.
However, from what we currently know about the properties of what is 'lifeless', intentionality and other features do not seem to be explainable in terms of those properties. So what? Perhaps what we currently know about the 'lifeless' is incomplete.

A similar argument seeks to prove that life cannot result from non-living natural (non-teleological) processes. — noAxioms

Yes, I know. However, unless a convincing objection can be made to the argument, the argument is still defensible.

We change our coding, which is essentially adding/strengthening connections. A machine is more likely to just build some kind of data set that can be referenced to do its tasks better than without it. We do that as well. — noAxioms

Note that we can also do that with awareness.

As a curiosity, what do you think about the Chinese room argument? I still haven't find convincing evidence that machines can do something that can't be explained in terms like that, i.e. that machines seem to have understanding of what they are doing without really understand it.

They have machines that detect melanoma in skin images. There's no algorithm to do that. Learning is the only way, and the machines do it better than any doctor. Earlier, it was kind of a joke that machines couldn't tell cats from dogs. That's because they attempted the task with algorithms. Once the machine was able to just learn the difference the way humans do, the problem went away, and you don't hear much about it anymore. — noAxioms

Interesting. But how they 'learn'? Is that process of learning describable by algorithms? Are they programmed to learn the way they do?

Technically, anything a physical device can do can be simulated in software, which means a fairly trivial (not AI at all) algorithm can implement you. This is assuming a monistic view of course. If there's outside interference, then the simulation would fail. — noAxioms

This IMO assumes more than just 'physicalism'. You also assume that all natural process are algorithmic.

Doing science is how something less unintelligible becomes more intelligible. — noAxioms

Ok.

There are other examples of that, such as the robot with the repeated escape attempts, despite not being programmed to escape. — noAxioms

I'll try to find some of these things. Interesting.

Partially intelligible, which is far from 'intelligible', a word that on its own implies nothing remaining that isn't understood. — noAxioms

Well, it depends on what we mean by 'intelligible'. A thing might be called 'intelligible' because it is fully understood or because it can be, in principle, understood completely*. That's why I tend to use the expressions 'partially intelligible' and 'intelligible' in a somewhat liberal manner.

*This 'in principle' does not refer only to human minds. If there were minds that have higher abilities than our own it may be possible that they understand something that we do not and cannot. This doesn't mean that those things are 'unintelligible'.

Not sure where you think my confidence level is. I'm confident that monism hasn't been falsified. That's about as far as I go. BiV hasn't been falsified either, and it remains an important consideration, but positing that you're a BiV is fruitless. — noAxioms

I believe that you believe that some alternatives are more reasonable than the others but you don't think that there is enough evidence to say that one particular theory is 'the right one beyond reasonable doubt'.

I'm saying that alternatives to such physical emergence has not been falsified, so yes, I suppose those alternative views constitute 'possible ways in which they exist without emergence from the physical'. — noAxioms

Ok, thanks.

No, since I am composed of parts, none of which have the intentionality of my employer. So it's still emergent, even if the intentions are not my own. — noAxioms

My point wasn't that the programmer's intentionality is part of the machine but, rather, it is a necessary condition for the machine to come into being. If the machine had intentionality, such an intentionality also depends on the intentionality of its builder, so we can't still say that the machine's intentionality emerged from purely 'inanimate' causes.

Not a very strong argument but it is still an interesting point IMO (not that here I am conceding that we can build machines which have intentionality).

Don't agree. The thing in the video learns. An engine does too these days, something that particularly pisses me off since I regularly have to prove to my engine that I'm human, and I tend to fail that test for months at a time. The calculator? No, that has no learning capability. — noAxioms

Mmm. I still don't get why. It seems to me that there is only a different of complexity. 'Learning' IMO would imply that the machine can change the algorithms according to which it operates (note that here I am not using the term 'learning' as to refer to the mere adding of information but, rather, something like learning an ability...).

Dabbling in solipsism now? You can't see the perception or understanding of others, so you can only infer when others are doing the same thing. — noAxioms

Yes, I agree. But I am not sure that this inference is enough for certainty, except of the form of certainty 'for all practical purposes'.

More importantly, what assumptions are you making that preclude anything operating algorithmicly from having this understanding? How do you justify those assumptions? They seem incredibly biased to me. — noAxioms

They are inferences that I can make based on my own experience. I might be wrong, of course, but it doesn't seem to me that I can explain all features of my mental activities in purely algorithmic terms (e.g. how I make some choices). I might concede, however, that I am not absolutely sure that there isn't an unknown alogorithmic explanation of all the operations that my mind can do.
To change my view I need more convincing arguments that my - or any human being's - mind isn't algorithmic.

So the reason why I said that discussing about 'what is good' is the starting point is that it is the foundation upon which ethics is oriented. — boundless

Forgot to mention that 'what is good' for a person seems to be related to the 'what is a person' and this would in turn imply that ontology and ethics are related. Ethical values can't be an 'arbitrary code' that has no bearing to the ontology of human beings in order to be meaningful.

I did not think you personally started with Christian notions, but I think it is so much a part of our Western culture that it would be unavoidable. — Athena

Ok.

What are possible obscurations to rational thinking? — Athena

A lot of things. I made the example of addiction before. An addict clearly acts against one's own good. And this is because they prefer the good feelings experienced by indulging into the addiction over the long term benefit of stopping it.
Another possible example might be excessive 'self-importance', e.g. someone who tries to force their will on others which likely result in isolation, excessive suspiciousness and fear.

I don't like labels, and I am realizing that is hindering my ability to understand what you are saying. I mean, I know virtually nothing about libertarians. On the other hand, I feel strongly about the importance of learning virtues, but now I am thinking that learning virtues may be culture-bound and that this may be inadequate. Such as, I recently learned, some cannibals feel strongly about the rightness of eating their loved ones when they die. Culturally, eating people is forbidden, but to the cannibals who eat their loved ones, to not eat them is terrible. I think culture puts some limits on what we can think about. — Athena

By 'libertarianism' I mean the position that equates 'freedom' with the mere 'ability to choose between different alternative'. In my view, this understanding is incomplete.

Choices are made with an end in view. If we aren't constrained to act otherwise, if we are presented with different options, we choose the 'best' alternative, i.e. what we think is good for us (even when we experience a 'cost' for such a choice - e.g. in an 'altruistic' choice - we regard it is better to act in a certain way despite the 'cost'). However, we can be wrong in our thinking about what is good and this leads us to choose what isn't good for ourselves.

Regarding the differences between cultures I do think that the best explanation is actually that societies can be wrong in their practices, just like individuals can. I do recognize the possibility that I am 'constrained' in my judgments by my own cultural and social prejudices but I also believe that an excessively 'relativistic' approach leads to absurdity. To make a different example, slavery has been seen as 'something natural' for a very long time. I believe that nowadays we are simply more aware of the evil that slavery is and those societies that considered slavery as 'normal' were simply deluded.

Also such a relativism would also make questionable the dialogue between cultures. If we are so constrained by our cultural and social prejudices, how could possibly have benefit by having a dialogue with someone from a different socio-cultural context?
As always, perhaps, the truth is in the middle.

I have listened to a long explanation of meditation and Buddhism, which makes me think that enlightenment is a totally different frame of mind from our everyday thinking. I don't think I am ready to be free of being a part of our common lives with all our social concerns. — Athena

Neither do I. In any case, I was just using Buddhism as an example where virtue ethics seems to be central. IIRC, some scholars disagree with this interpretation of Buddhist ethics because in Buddhism there is the central tenet of 'anatman', not self, which is generally interpreted as meaning that the 'self is illusory'. At the same time, however, for an 'unenlightened' disciple the 'virtue ethics model' seems to best represent the way in which Buddhism ethics 'works'.

Incidentally, this idea that "we should cultivate virtue because it is good for us" was actually common in Antiquity. It is certainly found also in Greek and many Christian thinkers. However, in the latter case, there are undoubtedly also streams of thoughts that seem to reduce ethics to 'following rules of an extrinsically imposed system' (especially from the Late Middle Ages, if I am not mistaken). But you also find many thinkers that agreed that virtue is it's own good, that we should cultivate virtue because it is beneficial to ourselves and so on.

Well, what would be good for me is an end to pain and more energy, so I could do more volunteering and have greater life satisfaction. This is so far from what I think you are talking about, but, back to us being animals, our health and the amount of energy we have. plays into our decisions. It is hard to be the person I want to be when dealing with pain and having very little energy. Like many people my age, I am learning to keep my mouth shut and let the young find their own way. The way to relate to others is to be encouraging but not interfering. Wow, that is hard for me to do! — Athena

Ok, I see and I appreciate that :up: Note, however, how the conception of 'what the good for us is' influences the 'ideal' of life we have and how the former depends also on the 'worldview' one has.

For someone who has a 'secularist' worldview, clearly, the 'good' arguably is 'flourishing' in this life. And it makes perfect sense in such a framework.

A traditional Buddhist would, however, point out that, if Buddhism is correct, we are bound in samsara and, ultimately, 'flourishing' doesn't resolve the deeper lever of suffering we are into. In other words, those effort would be amielorative but, ultimately, would be unsatisfactory. Practicising for the ending of the cycle of death and rebirth would be the 'highest good' for them. So, in this framework, a monk or a nun that tirelessly practise to achieve Nirvana with limited social contacts would be seen as wiser than an activist.

A Christian can similarly argue that social, environmentalism activism is good. But, again, the general worldview that a Christian has is different from that of a 'secularist' and this influences also the conception of what the 'good' is and certainly for a Christian activism alone can't be the 'highest way of life'.

I could go on with examples.

So the reason why I said that discussing about 'what is good' is the starting point is that it is the foundation upon which ethics is oriented. Also, I think that too often a 'religious life' is assumed to be a life where one imposes to oneself an extrinsic 'moral code' that one follows only due to fear. Incidentally, I also believe that extreme forms of relativism also have the same problem. If there isn't any 'objective' ground upon which we can base values, ethics etc, at the end of the day there is a risk that one system imposes itself. It is no wonder why IMO Nietzsche made so many references to conflict while also be a critic of 'morality' as a form of 'denial of life'.

I deny that requirement. It sort of sounds like an idealistic assertion, but I don't think idealism suggests emergent properties. — noAxioms

If physical processes weren't intelligible, how could we even do science, which seeks at least an intelligible description of processes that allow us to make predictions and so on?

I was on board until the bit about not being a time (presumably in our universe) when intentionality doesn't exist. It doesn't appear to exist at very early times, and it doesn't look like it will last. — noAxioms

I was saying that if there was a time when intentionality didn't exist, it must have come into being 'in some way' at a certain moment.

But it hasn't been fully explained. A sufficiently complete explanation might be found by humans eventually (probably not), but currently we lack that, and in the past, we lacked it a lot more. Hence science. — noAxioms

I sort of agree. And honestly, I believe that everything is ultimately not fully knowable as a 'complete understanding' of anything would require the complete understanding of the context in which something exists and so on. Everything is therefore mysterious and, at the same time, paradoxically intelligible.

Maybe we already have (the example from wonderer1 is good), but every time we do, the goalposts get moved, and a more human-specific explanation is demanded. That will never end since I don't think a human is capable of fully understanding how a human works any more than a bug knows how a bug works. — noAxioms

I don't know. Merely giving an output after computing the most likely alternative doesn't seem to me the same thing as intentionality. But, again, perhaps I am wrong about this. It just doesn't seem to be supported by our phenomenological experience.

Mathematics seems to come in layers, with higher layers dependent on more fundamental ones. Is there a fundamental layers? Perhaps law of form. I don't know. What would ground that? — noAxioms

Yes, I think I agree here. Even natural numbers seem to be 'based' on more fundamental concepts like identity, difference, unity, multiplicity etc. But nevertheless the truths about them seem to be non-contingent.

Good point — noAxioms

In my records, if you agree with that, you are not a 'physicalist'. Of course, I accept that you might disagree with me here.

Just so. So physical worlds would not depend on science being done on them. Most of them fall under that category. Why doesn't ours? That answer at least isn't too hard. — noAxioms

If we grant to science some ability to give us knowledge of physical reality, then we must assume that the physical world is intelligible. Clearly, the physical world doesn't depend on us doing scientific investigations on it but, nevertheless, the latter would seem to me ultimately fruitless if the former wasn't intelligible (except perhaps in a weird purely pragmatic point of view).

Agree again. It's why I don't come in here asserting that my position is the correct one. I just balk at anybody else doing that, about positions with which I disagree, but also about positions with which I agree. I have for instance debunked 'proofs' that presentism is false, despite the fact that I think it's false. — noAxioms

OK. I have a sort of similar approach about online discussions. Sometimes, however, I believe that it is simply impossible to not state one's own disagreement (or agreement) with a view in seemingly eccessively confident terms. Like sarcasm, sometimes the 'level of confidence' comes out badly in discussions and people seem more confident about a given thing than they actually are.

Furthermore, I also believe that a careful analysis of a position one has little sympathy for actually can be useful to understand better and reinforce the position one has. I get that sometimes it is not an easy task but the fruits of such a careful (and respectful) approach are very good.

Close enough. More of a not-unemergentist, distinct in that I assert that the physical is sufficient for emergence of these things, as opposed to asserting that emergence the physical is necessary fact, a far more closed-minded stance. — noAxioms

Not sure what you mean here. Are you saying that the physical is sufficient for emergence but there are possible ways in which intentionality, consciousness etc emerge without the physical?

This is irrelevant to emergence, which just says that intentionality is present, consisting of components, none of which carry intentionality.
OK, so you don't deny the emergence, but that it is intentionality at all since it is not its own, quite similar to how my intentions at work are that of my employer instead of my own intentions. — noAxioms

Good point. But note that if your intentions could be completely determined by your own employer, it would be questionable to call them 'your' intentions. Also, to emerge 'your' intentions would need the intentionality of your employer.

Anyway even if I granted that, somehow, the machines could have an autonomous intentionality, there remains the fact that if intentionality, in order to emerge, needs always some other intentionality, intentionality is fundamental.

So, yeah, I sort of agree that intentionality can come into being via emergence but it isn't clear how it could emerge from something that is completely devoid of it.

It recognizes 2 and 3. It does not recognize the characters. That would require a image-to-text translator (like the one in the video, learning or not). Yes, it adds. Yes, it has a mechanical output that displays results in human-readable form. That's my opinion of language being appropriately applied. It's mostly a language difference (to choose those words to describe what its doing or not) and not a functional difference. — noAxioms

Again, I see it more like a machine doing an operation rather than a machine 'recognizing' anything. An engine that burns gasoline to give energy to a car and allowing it to move doesn't 'recognize' anything, yet it operates. In the same way, I doubt that a machine can recognize numbers in an analogous way we do but I still do not find any evidence that they do something more than doing an operation as an engine does. This to me applies both to the mechanical calculator and the computer in the video.

An interesting question, however, arises. How can I be sure that humans (and, I believe, also animals at least) can 'recognize' numbers as I perceive myself doing? This is indeed a big question. Can we be certain that we - humans and (some?) animals do recognize numbers - while machines do not? I am afraid that such a certainty is beyond our reach.

Still, I think it is reasonable that machines do not have such a faculty because they operate algorithmically (and those algorithms can be VERY complex and designed to approximate our own abilities).

Cool. So similar to how humans do it. The post office has had image-to-text interpretation for years, but not sure how much those devices learn as opposed to just being programmed. Those devices need to parse cursive addresses, more complicated than digits. I have failed to parse some hand written numbers.
My penmanship sucks, but I'm very careful when hand-addressing envelopes. — noAxioms

Do we just do that, though? It seems from our own phenomenological experience that we can have some control and self-awareness on our own 'operations' that machines do not have.

That would be an interesting objective threshold of intelligence: any entity capable of [partially] comprehending itself. — noAxioms

I think I agree with that provided that one adds the word in the square brackets. The problem is: can we have an unmistaken criterion that allows us to objectively determine if a living being, machine or whatever has such an ability?

Would you like to pick up from here and say something? We might consider how different the discussion would go if we held a more scientific mindset, as opposed to assuming Christianity pretty much covers the subjects of morals and ethics, and proceeded with Protestant assumptions. — Athena

TBH, I never wanted to assume the truth of Christianity from the start in my posts, not sure why you think that. I was just arguing that, in my opinion, virtue ethics is a better view about ethics than other models. Virtue ethics is also generally coupled with the 'intellectualist' model of freedom, i.e. that a rational being is truly free when he or she is freed from all 'obscurations' that prevent him or her to recognize properly the good with the assumption that being 'rational' means to spontaneously desire what is recognized as good, in contrast to the 'libertarian' model which, instead, simply assert that freedom is the same as 'deliberative power' to choose among alternatives.

This model of ethics and freedom was certainly accepted among many Christians in history but I think you find it also asserted in completely different traditions like, say, Platonism, Neoplatonism, Aristotelism etc in the 'West' and also in Indian religions. For instance, in Buddhism Nirvana is said to be achieved when spiritual ignorance ('avidya') ceases precisely because the 'enlightened' isn't said to be deluded about what is truly the highest good for him/her.

I now believe, after having reflected upon these things, that these kinds of ideas about freedom and ethics - irrespective (of some form) of Christianity, Buddhism or even 'secularism' etc being right - make most sense and they are the only that allow us to avoid considering 'virtuous behaviour' as the result of merely following an external code which is unrelated to our own nature.

Having made this clarification, sure, I think that scientific studies about the behavior of animals actually give us more understanding about human ethics. I am a bit reticent, however, to use it as a starting point because as you note there are differences among animal species. Still, I believe that the best approach is to study directly what happens among humans. I believe we should make the same observations we can make about animals in the case of humans.

So, I believe that the starting point of this kind of inquiry would be: what is good for a given human being? Considering that humans seem to be 'social animals', i.e. that human beings can't really be in total isolation from other human beings, we might think that, perhaps, relationships with others are essential for the good of a human being. So, how should people relate to each other in a way that it is good for them?

Are cultural differences enough a barrier to prevent us to make some judgments about other cultures? For instance, it seems that it is better for children to be raised by parents who truly love them. This is something that certainly seem to be supported by research in psychology. If we encountered a society that doesn't consider important how parents treat their children, would the difference among our cultures prevent us to say that such a society is simply wrong about this? Are we so hopelessly constrained by our own cultural context that we aren't able to make any judgment about other cultures?

The Count was quick to point this out and I agree. — praxis

:up:

I think human reality is largely shaped by human needs or purposes—and human values. We don’t share the same values however, so if there are objective values, who is right and who is wrong? And what is the purpose of insisting that one set of values is Correct? It provides the means to harness collective power. — praxis

I believe that the best approach here is to carefully examine all proposed 'set of values' with a critical spirit in a similar way one does in science (although the approach can't be the same of course). I happen to believe that, as I said, in the beginning of this post, virtue ethics and the intellectualist model of freedom are right precisely because they make the most sense and not devalue ethics as the mere following of an extrinsic moral code that is estranous, as you put it, to our 'needs or purposes'.

So, I believe that the starting point is to assess and try to find out what what are these 'needs' and 'purposes' are. Clearly some of the 'needs' aren't culturally dependent. It seems that, for instance, all children need genuine love when they are raised. Are we going to argue that this depends on a given culture? Or, instead, we might consider that, say, after reading the brutal effects that being raised in a dysfunctional or even abusive context can have on a person, perhaps we are allowed to say "it is good for children, irrespective of their cultural context, to be raised in a loving environment" as something that might apply to cultural contexts different from our own.

Ok, I watched the video. Nice explanation of how machine learning works.

Still, I am hesitant to see it as an example of emergence of intentionality for two reasons. Take what I say below with a grain of salt, but here's my two cents.

First, these machines, like all others, are still programmed by human beings who decide how they should work. So, there is a risk to read back into the machine the intentionality of human beings who built them. To make a different example, if you consider a mechanical calculator it might seem it 'recognizes' the numbers '2', '3' and the operation of addition and then gives us the output '5' when we ask it to perform the calculation. The machine described in the video is far more complex but the basic idea seems the same.

Secondly, the output the machine gives are the results of statistical calculations. The machine is being given a set of examples of associations of hand-written numbers and the number these hand-written numbers should be. It then manages to perform better with other trials in order to minimize the error function. Ok, interesting, but I'm not sure that we can say that the machine has 'concepts' like what we have. When we read a hand-written number '3' it might be that we associate it to the 'concept of 3' by a Bayesian inference (i.e. the most likely answer to the question: "what is the most likely sign that the writer wrote here?"). But when we are aware of the concept of '3' we do not perceive a 'vector' of different probabilities about different concepts.

This is clearly a bad analogy. Scientific truths are a different category of knowledge than moral truths or values. — praxis

I find interesting that you only quoted this part of my post. You raised the objection that, if all human beings are wrong about 'what is good for them', then 'objectivity' about ethics is impossible. I merely made an example where there has been a context where most people have been wrong.

In any way, I don't believe that one can make such a 'hard distinction' between scientific truths and moral truths. We also learn, at least in part, good and bad behaviour with experience. A coward, for instance, often lives in a tormented state due to their fear. Instead, a generous person might find solace in the acts of helping others and live a more serene life than say someone greedy who lives in either a constant fear of losing one's possessions and/or in a state of disappointment for not having all the desired riches.
I already made the example of the addict. Clearly the addict acts under a self-deception (sometimes mingled with some awareness of behaving against one's own interest) about what is 'good' and might completely ruin his or her life.

These are clearly empirical observations one could make. They perhaps do not tell the whole story about what is 'virtue' and what is 'vice' but nevertheless they are important in a context of virtue ethics. I like virtue ethics because, as I said, seems to me the only ethical framework where ethical behavior never becomes an external imposition.

I still have not find a compelling objection of the apparent objective validity of, say, the statement "an addict, while indulging in the addiction, acts against one's own good".

:vomit: I am sorry, I am strongly opposed to using the God of Abraham religions to understand reality. It stood in the way of science and stopping, or at least slowing down, the destruction of our planet. It continues to stand in the way of science, and this has divided the US. I feel no mercy for those who bring this upon us. — Athena

It seems that you have an aversion against Christianity and apparently other Abrahamic religions. I just say that generalizations are never helpful and I think if you seek enough you'll find that there are very different ideas among Christians on a huge variety of topics.

But note that I wanted to make a general point about virtue ethics which was widely accepted, I believe by many Christians in history. But, in fact, not only Christians but you find the idea in many ancient cultures (e.g. Indian religions, Taoist texts like Daodejing and Zuanghzi and so on).

Clearly, virtue ethics assumes that there is a distinction between 'virtues' and 'vices' and the firsts are 'better' than the seconds for a given person.

The way many humans dealt with this moral conflict was to create a story where the hunted animal agreed to being killed and eaten in exchange for a benefit the humans would provide. However, the Christians have a different relationship with nature that is not so nice. — Athena

Well, I would not say that about all Christians... anyway, I believe that even the most radical vegan would recognize that, in order to live, we have to kill some animals (e.g. the insects that would destroy our crops).

Also, note that Christians actually recognize that this world is not (at least now) 'what is meant to be', so perhaps e.g. the inevitability of conflict with other species would be better understood in that light.
This is not to say that, of course, that many Christians didn't have a 'not so nice' relationship with nature.

In a more general viewpoint, it seems to me right to say that a human being should seek 'what is truly good' for herself or himself. At the same time, it is also obvious that, even within a 'secularist' viewpoint, that (most? all?) human beings often act against their own good, are confused about what is 'better' or 'worse' for them and so on. This is to say that 'virtue ethics' is IMO applicable even within a purely naturalistic view of human beings. In fact, it seems the only view to me that avoids a 'legalistic' reason to consider some intentions, behaviors etc 'right' and others 'wrong'.

We will absolutely misunderstand — even about ourselves — so how can there be objectivity? — praxis

I would say that, yes, it seems that it is inevitable for human beings to misunderstand and act against our own good.

Regardless, I do not see how even if all human beings misunderstood what is 'truly good' for them or even what is 'better for them' and what is 'worse for them', this would falsify the possibility, in principle, of making objective statements about 'what is truly good for human beings' and so on.

There was a time when most people believed that the Earth was the center of the universe and all celestial bodies revolved around the Earth. Yet we know that geocentrism is 'objectively false'. So, it would be not surprising that we might in a condition that we do not know what is truly good for us and nevertheless, in principle, we could know it.

And I do not see a contradiction between what I said above with the claim that philosophy might help us to improve our understanding of 'what is truly good for us' (in general or in a particular situation) etc.

thanks for the video. It seems interesting. I'll share my thoughts tomorrow about it.

No, I'm sure monkeys dislike being eaten.

Monkey consumption is still good or bad relative to the perspective—whether one is the eater or the eaten. — praxis

This doesn't imply that "for a monkey it is bad being eaten" is 'relative'. At best, it might show that the what is good for the tiger is bad for the monkey and this leads to conflict between the two animals.

That "the same event might be good for a being and bad for another" hardly implies that "there are no objective statements about what is good for a given being". Indeed, even this 'relativistic statement' ( i.e. "the same event might be good for a being and bad for another") seems to be a truth that is independent for any given perspective on the matter.

At the human level there are situations that seem ambiguous but some seem obvious. For instance, indulging in a drug addiction seems good to the addict because of the pleasant feelings the consumption of a given substance might give. But when compared to the painful consequences the addiction bring, it seems to me clear that the addict acts under a deception about 'what is truly goodfor him/her'. And this isn't true only 'for me' but also for the addict himself/herself.

In a 'virtue ethics' framework what is sought is what is truly good for a human being and the reasonable assumption that is made is that a human being might misunderstand 'what is truly good for him or her'.

I would not buy that suggestion. More probably the intentionality emerges from whatever process is used to implement it. I can think of countless emergent properties, not one of which suggest that the properties need to be fundamental. — noAxioms

Ok. But if there is an 'emergence', it must be an intelligible process. The problem for 'emergentism' is that there doesn't seem any convincing explanation of how intentionality, consciousness and so on 'emerge' from something that does not have those properties.

As I said before, that we have yet to find a credible explanation for such an emergence is an evidence against emergentism. Of course, such an absence of an explanation isn't a compelling evidence for the impossibility of an explanation.

Anyway, I also would point out that IMO most forms of physicalism have a difficulty in explaining that composite objects can be 'distinct entities'.

Thus illustrating my point about language. 'Intentional' is reserved for life forms, so if something not living does the exact same thing, a different word (never provided) must be used, or it must be living, thus proving that the inanimate thing cannot do the thing that it's doing (My example was 'accelerating downward' in my prior post). — noAxioms

Ok, thanks for the clarification. But note my point above.

boundless: Ok, but if intentionality is fundamental, then the arising of intentionality is unexplained. — noAxioms

I misphrased this. I meant: if intentionality is fundamental then there is no need for an explanation.

That would make time more fundamental, a contradiction. X just is, and everything else follows from whatever is fundamental. And no, I don't consider time to be fundamental. — noAxioms

Right, but there is also the possibility that ontological dependency doesn't involve a temporary relation. That is, you might say that intentionality isn't fundamental but it is dependent on something else that hasn't intentionality and yet there have not been a time where intentionality didn't exist (I do not see a contradiction in thinking that, at least).

As an illustration, consider the stability of a top floor in a building. It clearly depends on the firmness of the foundations of the builing and yet we don't that 'at a certain point' the upper floor 'came out' from the lower.

So, yeah, arising might be a wrong word. Let's go with 'dependence'.

Again, why? There's plenty that's currently unexplained. Stellar dynamics I think was my example. For a long time, people didn't know stars were even suns. Does that lack of even that explanation make stars (and hundreds of other things) fundamental? What's wrong with just not knowing everything yet? — noAxioms

I hope I have clarified my point above. But let's use this example. Stellar dynamics isn't fundamental because it can be explained in terms of more fundamental processes. Will we discover something similar for intentionality, consciousness and so on? Who knows. Maybe yes. But currently it seems to me that our 'physicalist' models can't do that. In virtue of what properties might intentionality, consciousness and so on 'emerge'?

That's what it means to be true even if the universe didn't exist. — noAxioms

Good, we agree on this. But if they are 'true' even if the universe or multiverse didn't exist, this means that they have a different ontological status. And, in fact, if the multiverse could not exist, this would mean that it is contingent. Mathematical truths, instead, we seem to agree are not contingent.
Given that they aren't contingent, they can't certainly depend on something that is contingent. So, they transcend the multiverse (they would be 'super-natural').

Maybe putting in intelligibility as a requirement for existence isn't such a great idea. Of course that depends on one's definition of 'to exist'. There are definitely some definitions where intelligibility would be needed. — noAxioms

If the physical world wasn't intelligible, then it seems to me that even doing science would be problematic. Indeed, scientific research seems to assume that the physical world is intelligible.

It might be problematic to assume that the physical world is fully intelligible for us, but intelligibility seems to be required for any type of investigation.

A made-up story. Not fiction (Sherlock Holmes say), just something that's wrong. Hard to give an example since one could always presume the posited thing is not wrong. — noAxioms

Ok. I would call these things simply 'wrong explanations' or 'inconsistent explanations' rather than 'super-natural', which seems to me to be better suited for speaking about something that transcends the 'natural' (if there is anything that does do that... IMO mathematical truths for instance do transcend the natural).

Again, why is the explanation necessary? What's wrong with just not knowing everything? Demonstrating the thing in question to be impossible is another story. That's a falsification, and that carries weight. So can you demonstrate than no inanimate thing can intend? Without 'proof by dictionary'? — noAxioms

TBH, I thing that right now the 'virdict' is still open. There is no evidence 'beyond reasonable doubt' to either position about consciousness that can satisfy almost everyone. We can discuss about what position seems 'more reasonable' but we do not have 'convincing evidences'.

That does not sound like any sort of summary of my view, which has no requirement of being alive in order to do something that a living thing might do, such as fall off a cliff. — noAxioms

OK, I stand corrected. Would you describe your position as 'emergentist' then?

But the problem being difficult is not evidence against consciousness being derived from inanimate primitives. — noAxioms

Chalmers et al suggest that the reason why the problem is 'difficult' it is because it is wrongly stated, i.e. the assumption that we can 'get' consciousness from inanimate primitives is wrong. Of course, the absence of a solution is not a compelling evidence of the impossibility of finding one but the latter is a possible explanation of the former.

Probably because anything designed is waved away as not intentionality. I mean, a steam engine self-regulates, all without a brain, but the simple gravity-dependent device that accomplishes it is designed, so of course it doesn't count. — noAxioms

If there is intentionality in something like a steam-engine, this would suggest that intentionality is also fundamental - in other words, the inanimate would not be really totally inanimate. But the problem arises in views were intentionality isn't seen as fundamental but derived from something else that seems to be completely different.

Completely wrong. Fundamentals don't first expect explanations. Explanations are for the things understood, and the things not yet understood still function despite lack of this explanation. Things fell down despite lack of explanation for billions of years. Newton explained it, and Einstein did so quite differently, but things falling down did so without ever expectation of that explanation. — noAxioms

Ok, but if intentionality is fundamental, then the arising of intentionality, assuming that it arose, is unexplained. Conversely, if intentionality is derived, we expect an explanation of how it is derived.
Same goes for 'consciousness' and so on.

Depends on your definition of consciousness. Some automatically define it to be a supernatural thing, meaning monism is a denial of its existence. I don't define it that way, so I'm inclined to agree with your statement. — noAxioms

TBF, I also am a bit perplexed on how some non-physicalists define consciousness. But also note that, for instance, the 'Aristotelian' view, which was later accepted and developed in most philosophical traditions from late Antiquity onwards (Neoplatonic, Christian, Islamic...) of the 'soul' is that the 'soul' is the form of the body and that the 'sentient being' (animals and humans) are actually both body and soul, i.e. matter and form. In this view, we are not composed of two substances ('material' and 'mental') but, rather, the Arisotelian model ('hylomorphism') explains a 'human being' as an ordered entity where the 'soul' is the order that makes the entity ordered. Furthermore, IIRC, there isn't such a thing like 'pure matter' because 'pure matter' would be completely unordered and, therefore, unintelligible.
I don't think that, say, the common arguments against the existence of a 'soul', a 'unified self' and so on that sometimes are advanced by some 'physicalists' can affects these views.

Since I am more or less an 'hylomorphist', TBH I see much of the debate about 'consciousness' as simply not relevant for me.

Anything part of our particular universe. Where you draw the boundary of 'our universe' is context dependent, but in general, anything part of the general quantum structure of which our spacetime is a part. So it includes say some worlds with 2 macroscopic spatial dimensions, but it doesn't include Conway's game of life. — noAxioms

Ok. I am even prepared to say that if there is really a multiverse with all possible 'worlds' with different laws, to equate the 'natural' to 'pertaining to the whole multiverse'.
So I guess that for me 'natural' includes also Conway's game of life :wink:

Good, but being the idiot skeptic that I am, I've always had an itch about that one. What if 2+2=4 is a property of some universes (this one included), but is not objectively the case? How might we entertain that? How do you demonstrate that it isn't such a property? Regardless, if any progress is to be made, I'm willing to accept the objectivity of mathematics. — noAxioms

Being the 'speculative fool' I am, I would say that given that intelligibility seems a precondition of the existence of the multiverse, this would mean that either (i) the multiverse is fundamental and, therefore, its existence is not contingent and intelligibility (and as a consequence all mathematical truths) is an aspect of the multiverse or (ii) the multiverse is contingent whereas mathematical truths are not and, therefore, they exist in something 'transcendent' of the multiverse (I prefer this second option). TBH, however, it would be quite a strange physicalism IMO that accepts the multiverse as being ontologicall non-contingent (i.e. necessary!) - it would become something like pantheism/pandeism* of sorts (i.e. a view that asserts that the multiverse is a kind of metaphysical Absolute). But positing metaphysical absolutes seems to go against what many people find in physicalism. So, it would be ironic IMO for a physicalist to end up holding the idea that the multiverse itself is a metaphysical absolute after having accepted physicalism precisely to avoid accepting a metaphysical absolute.

[*It is important to distinguish this from panentheistic views were the Absolute pervades but at the same time transcends the multiverse. ]

I didn't say otherwise, so not sure how that's different. That's what it means to be independent of our universe. — noAxioms

:up: Do you think that they are independent from the multiverse?

By definition, no? — noAxioms

Yes and no. For instance, I can't give a purely 'natural' explanation of how we can know and understand mathematical truths if I say they aren't 'natural'. If mathematical truths aren't natural, and our mind can understand something that isn't natural, then the 'natural' can't wholly explain our minds.

However, it should be noted that, in my view, even a pebble can't be explained in fully 'naturalistic' terms. Being (at least partially) intelligible, and being IMO the conditions for intelligibility of any entity prior to the 'natural', even a pebble, in a sense, is not fully 'explained' in purely 'naturalistic' terms.
So, yeah, at the end of the day, I find, paradoxically, even the simplest thing as mysterious as our minds.

OK, but that doesn't give meaning to the term. If the ghosts reported are real, then they're part of this universe, and automatically 'natural'. What would be an example of 'supernatural' then? It becomes just something that one doesn't agree with. I don't believe in ghosts, so they're supernatural. You perhaps believe in them, so they must be natural. Maybe it's pointless to even label things with that term. — noAxioms

See above.

Depends on what you mean by 'inanimate'.
... — noAxioms

I sort of agree with that.

I believe, however, that it is easier to discuss about intentionality rather than consciousness.

If intentionality exists only in *some* physical bodies, and we have to explain how it arose, we expect that, in principle, we can explain how it arose in the same way as we can explain other emergent features, i.e. in virtue of other properties that are present in the 'inanimate'. The thing is that I never encountered a convincing explanation of that kind nor I found convincing arguments that have convinced me that such an explanation is possible.

Your own view, for instance, seems to me to redefine the 'inanimate' as something that is actually not 'truly inanimate' and this allows you to say that, perhaps, the intentionality we have is a more complex form of the 'proto(?)-intentionality' that perhaps is found in inanimate objects. This is for me a form panpsychism rather than a 'true' physicalism.

At the end of the day, I guess that labels are just labels and you actually would be ready to accept what I would consider something that isn't physicalism as a form of physicalism. The same goes for what you say about mathematics. This is not a criticism of you but I want to point out that your own 'physicalism' is, in my opinion, a more sophisticated view of what I would normally call 'physicalism'. So, perhaps some confusion in these debates is caused by the fact that we - both the two of us and 'people' in general - do not have a shared vocabulary and use the words differently.

Probably not, but I'd need an example of the latter, one that doesn't involve anything physical. — noAxioms

I meant logical implications. I can, for instance, make a formally valid statement without any reference to something 'real'.

In a similar way, I believe that one can also make a similar point about the 'living beings' in general. All living beings seem to me to show a degree of intentionality (goal-directed behaviours, self-organization) that is simply not present in 'non-living things'. So in virtue of what properties of 'non-living things' can intentionality that seems to be present in all life forms arise? — boundless

Also, I would add that the apparent 'gradation' of 'intentionality' found in 'entities' at the border of being 'living' and 'non-living' like viruses isn't really evidence for a 'reductionist' view. After all, if viruses have a rudimentary form of intentionality it has still to be explained.

That's a false dichotomy. Something can be all three (living, artificial, and/or intelligent), none, or any one or two of them. — noAxioms

I was making a point about the current AI and living beings. In any case, until one can find a way to generate truly artificial life, there is no 'artificial life'. But in my post, I was even conceding the possibility of sentient AI.

I can't even answer that about living things. I imagine the machines will find their own way of doing it and not let humans attempt to tell them how. That's how it's always worked. — noAxioms

That's the hard problem though. The problem is how to explain consciousness in terms of properties of the 'inanimate'. So, yeah, probably the 'hard problem' isn't a 'problem' for 'physicalism' but of all attempts to treat the 'inanimate' as fundamental and 'consciousness' as derivative from it.

In a similar way, I believe that one can also make a similar point about the 'living beings' in general. All living beings seem to me to show a degree of intentionality (goal-directed behaviours, self-organization) that is simply not present in 'non-living things'. So in virtue of what properties of 'non-living things' can intentionality that seems to be present in all life forms arise?

Note that in order to solve both these problems you would need a theory that explain how consciousness, intentionality, life etc arose. If the 'inanimate' is fundamental, you should expect to find an explanation on how consciousness, intentionality, life and so on came into being, not just that they come into being. And the explanation must be complete.

Beyond materialism you perhaps mean. Physicalism/naturalism doesn't assert that all is physical/natural. — noAxioms

? Not sure how. At least physicalism means that the 'natural' is fundamental. In any case, however, with regards to consciousness, consciousness in a physicalist model would be considered natural. And something like math either an useful fiction or a fundamental aspect of nature (in this latter case, I believe that it would be inappropriate to call such a view 'physicalism', but anyway...)

Of course I wouldn't list mathematics as being 'something else', but rather a foundation for our physical. But that's just me. Physicalism itself makes no such suggestion. — noAxioms

Interesting. I do in fact agree with you here. However, I believe that your conception of 'physical/natural' is too broad. What isn't natural in your view?

PS: Never say 'undeniable'. There's plenty that deny that mathematical truths are something that 'exists'. My personal opinion is that such truths exist no less than does our universe, but indeed is in no way dependent on our universe. — noAxioms

Right, I admit that there is no conseus and perhaps the majority view is that mathematics is just an useful abstraction. To be honest, however, I always found the arguments for that view unpersuasive and often based on a strictly empiricist view of knowledge. I believe it is one of those topics where both 'parties' (I mean the 'realist' and the 'anti-realist' about the ontology of mathematics in a broad sense of these terms) are unable to find a common ground with the opponents.

I agree with you about the fact that mathematics doesn't depend on the universe. I have a different view about the relation between mathematics and the universe. For instance, I believe that mathematical truths would still be true even if the universe didn't exist. I do see this universe as contingent whereas mathematical truths as non-contingent.

Let's reword that as not being a function of something understandable.
... — noAxioms

It seems to me that you here are assuming that all possible 'non-magical' explanations are 'natural/physical' one. This seems to me a stretch.

I also don't like to make the distinction between 'supernatural' and 'natural', unless one defines the terms in a precise way. Perhaps, I would define 'natural' as 'pertaining to spacetime' (so, both spacetime - or spacetimes if there is a multiverse - and whatever is 'in' it would qualify as 'natural').

Regarding the point you make about Chalmers, as I said before perhaps the 'hard problem' is better framed as an objection to all reductionist understanding of consciosuness that try to reduce it to the inanimate rather than an objection to 'physicalism' in a broad sense of the term.

That's mathematics, not physics, even if the nouns in those statements happen to have physical meaning. They could be replaced by X Y Z and the logical meaning would stand unaltered. — noAxioms

Yes, we can also make a purely formal syllogism. But that's my point, after all. Why the 'laws' of valid reasoning can apply to 'reality'? If mathematical and logical 'laws' aren't at least a fundamental aspect of nature (or, even more fundamental than nature), how could we even accept whatever 'explanation' as a 'valid explanation' of anything? Also: is physical causality the same as logical causality?

I believe that people who deny the independent existence of 'mathematical' and 'logical' truths/laws assert that our notion of logical implication, numbers etc are abstractions from our experience. The problem, though, is that if you try to explain how we could 'generate' these abstractions, you need to assume these laws are valid in order to make that explanation. This to me shows that logical and mathematical truths/laws are not mere abstractions. But to be honest even if I find such a brief argument convincing of this, I admit that many would not be convinced by this argument. Why this is so, I do not know...

Regarding the distinction between 'living beings' and AI, I believe that @Joshs did a very good job in explaining (much clearer than I could) why I also think why there is a real distinction between them.

Anyway, even if I granted to you that in the future we might be able to build a 'sentient articial intelligence', I believe that the 'hard problem' would remain. In virtue of what properties of the inanimate aspects of reality can consciousness (with its 'first-person perspective', 'qualia' etc) arise?

And even it is unrelated to the 'hard problem', I think that the undeniable existence of mathematical truths also points to something beyond 'physicalism'*. That there are an infinite number of primes seems to be something that is independent from human knowledge and also spatio-temporal location. In fact, it seems utterly independent from spacetime.

*TBH, there is always the problem of what one means by 'physicalism'. I mean, I do not see how, for instance, 'panpsychism' is inconsistent to a very broad definition of 'physicalism' in which "what is spatio-temporal" includes everything that is real.
As I said before, however, I believe we can know something that cannot be included in a meaningful way in the category of the 'physcial'.

Regarding the 'magic' thing, then, it seems to me that the criterion you give about 'not being magical' is something like being 'totally understandable', something that is not too dissimilar to the ancient notion of 'intelligibility'. That is, if one has a 'fuzzy explantion' of a given phenomenon where something is left unexplained, the explanation is magical. If that is so, however, it seems to me that you assume that the 'laws of thought' and the 'laws of nature' are so close to each other than one has to ask how is it possible in purely physicalist terms?
Physical causality doesn't seem to explain, say, logical implication. It doesn't seem possible IMO to explain in purely physical terms why from "Socrates is a man" and "men are mortal" that "Socrates is mortal". If 'physical reality' is so intelligible as you think it is, it seems to me that your own view is actually not very far from, ironically, to positing an ontologically fundamental 'mental' aspect to reality.

I am not saying you are wrong here. I actually find a lot to agree here but, curiously, intelligibility suggests to me that there is a fundamental mental aspect to reality whereas if I am not misunderstading you, you seem to think that intelligibility actually is a strong evidence for physicalism. Interesting.

t means that all energy and particles and whatnot obey physical law, which yes, pretty much describes relations. That's circular, and thus poor. It asserts that this description is closed, not interfered with by entities not considered physical. That's also a weak statement since if it was ever shown that matter had mental properties, those properties would become natural properties, and thus part of physicalism.So I guess 'things interact according to the standard model' is about as close as I can get. This whole first/third person thing seems a classical problem, not requiring anything fancy like quantum or relativity theory, even if say chemistry would never work without the underlying mechanisms. A classical simulation of a neural network (with chemistry) would be enough. No need to simulate down to the molecular or even quantum precision. — noAxioms

Ok for the definition! Yes, and GR seems to imply that both spacetime and 'what is inside of it' are 'physical/natural'. i disagree with your view that mathematical truths are 'natural', though. They seem to be independent of space and time. That our minds are not 'natural' (in this broad sense) is perhaps more controversial. But the fact that we can know mathematical truths is quite interesting if we are 'wholly natural' (I do not know...). It seems to me that however it is better to reframe the 'hard problem' in a different way: can consciousness arise from what is completely inanimate?

The confidence you have in the power of algorithms seems to arise from anunderlying assumption that every natural process is 'algorithmic'. Of course, I am not denying the enormous success of algorithmic models and simulations but I am not sure that they can ever be able to give us a completely accurate model/simulation of all processes.

I admit that I can't give you a scientific argument against your assumption. But for me my phenomenological experience strongly suggests otherwise (self-awareness, the ability to choose and so on do not seem to be easily explainable in terms of algorithms).

OK. Not being a realist, I would query what you might mean by that. I suspect (proof would be nice) that mathematical truths are objectively true, and the structure that includes our universe supervenes on those truths. It being true implying that it's real depends on one's definition of 'real', and I find it easier not to worry about that arbitrary designation. — noAxioms

I lean towards a form of platonism where mathematical truths are concepts and yet are timeless and indipendent of space. it seems the only position that makes sense considering the following: the fact that we know them as concepts, the incredible success that mathematical laws have in describing the behaviour of physical processes, the apparently evident 'eternity' of mathematical truths (that there are infinite prime numbers seems to me indipendent from any human discovery of such a fact for instance) and so on.

Of course, I am under no illusion that I can give an absolutely convincing argument of my view (as often happens in philosophy) but it seems to me the best view after weighing the aguments in favour and against it.

Me considering that to be a process of material that has a location, it seems reasonably contained thus, yes. Not a point mind you, but similarly a rock occupies a region of space and time. — noAxioms

Ok. In a general sense, yeah I perhaps can agree with you that mind is natural or even 'physical'. But it has quite peculiar attributes that it is difficult to explain as arising from 'inanimate' matter. And, as I said before, it seems to have the capacity to understand/know 'something' that is not 'natural'.

By magic, I mean an explanation that just says something unknown accounts for the observation, never an actual theory about how this alternate explanation might work. To my knowledge, there is no theory anywhere of matter having mental properties, and how it interacts with physical matter in any way. The lack of that is what puts it in the magic category. — noAxioms

Ok, I see. But consider that under this definition you risk to include inside 'magic' many partial or unclear explanations that I would not include into that word. In other words, your category of 'magic' seems excessively broad.

For instance, if we were talking in the 14th century and you claimed that 'atoms' exist and 'somehow' interact with forces that we do not know to form the visible objects, would be this 'magic' (of course, you have to imagine yourself as having the scientific knowledge of the time)?

I can argue that people also are this, programmed by ancestors and the natural selection that chose them. The best thinking machines use similar mechanisms to find their own best algorithms, not any algorithm the programmer put there. LLM is indeed not an example of this. — noAxioms

Am I wrong to say that, however, that the operations of these 'thinking machines' are completely explainable in terms of algorithms?
As I said in my previous post, I can't neglect the fact that my own self-awareness, the experience of self-agency and so on seem to point that we are not like that.

And you don't think we do? Our brains are bundles of neurons which all work in very similar ways. You could easily make an argument that we operate in accordance with some very basic kind or family of algorithms recapitulated in many different ways across the brain. — Apustimelogist

No, I don't and you don't here provided sufficient evidence to convince me of your view. Rather, it seems to me that, given the impressive results we have obtained with computers you are concluding that our congition is also algorithmic.

I believe that there is a difference between conscious - and in general living - beings and algorithmic devices. All living beings seem to have a 'sense' of unity, that there is a distinction between 'self' and 'not self' and so on. They do not just 'do' things.

Regardless, I don't think there is any consensus on this topic among scientists. So, after all in a way both our positions are speculative.

As can a human brain. — Apustimelogist

Says you. To me there is a clear difference between how human cognition works and how, say, a mechanical calculator works. And I am open to the idea that, perhaps, our cognition can't even be wholly comprehended by mathematical models, let alone only algorithms.

:up: yeah, I often compare computers to highly sofisticated mechanical calculators. At the end of the day all LLMs are very complex computers and they operate according to algorithms (programmed by us) just like mechanical calculators.

I don't think that many people would think that mechanical calculators or a windmill or mechanical clocks etc have 'awareness' or 'agency'. And computers just like them perform operations without being agents.

In order to have consciousness, computers IMO would have to be aware of what they are doing. There is no evidence that have such of an awareness. All their activities can be explained by saying that they just do what they are programmed for.

That bothers me since it contradicts physicalism since there can be physical things that cannot be known, even in principle. Science cannot render to a non-bat, even in principle, what it's like to be a bat. So I would prefer a different definition. — noAxioms

OK. So what is 'physical' in your view? IIRC you also agree that physical properties are relational, i.e. they describe how a given physical object relate to/interact with other physical objects.
'Scientistic physicalism' is also inconsistent IMO because, after all, that there is a physical world is not something we discover by doing science.

Other than 'consciousness' I also believe in the existence of other things that are 'real' but not 'physical'. I am thinking, for instance, of mathematical truths. But this is perhaps OT.

Materialism typically carries a premise that material is fundamental, hence my reluctance to use the term. — noAxioms

Ok, yes. But it does sometimes clarify at least a meaning that 'physical' can have. For instance, if by matter one means "whatever object exists in a given location of space in a given time", would you agree that this is also what you mean by 'physical'? Note that this would also include radiation not just 'matter' as the word is used by physicists.

Has consciousness a 'definite location' in space, for instance?

People have also questioned about how eyes came into being, as perhaps an argument for ID. ID, like dualism, posits magic for the gaps, but different magic, where 'magic is anything outside of naturalism. Problem is, anytime some new magic is accepted, it becomes by definition part of naturalism. Hypnosis is about as good an example as I can come up with. Meteorites is another. Science for a long time rejected the possibility of rocks falling from the sky. They're part of naturalism now. — noAxioms

OK. But IMHO you're thinking in excessively rigid categories. Either one is a 'physicalist/naturalist' or one accepts 'magic'. Maybe there is something that is not 'natural'. Again, mathematical truths seem to me exactly an example of something that is not natural and yet real. One would stretch too much the meaning of 'natural/physical' to also include mathematical truths in it.

So, I guess that my response here can be summarized in one question for you: what do you mean by 'physical' (or 'natural') and why you think that consciousness is 'physical'?

Agree. — noAxioms

:up:

While (almost?) everybody agrees that such knowledge cannot be had by any means, I don't think that makes it an actual problem. Certainly nobody has a solution that yields that knowledge. If it (Q1) is declared to be a problem, then nobody claims that any view would solve it. — noAxioms

Ok but notice that in most forms of physicalism that I am aware of, there is a tendency to reduce all reality to the 'physical' and the 'physical' is taken to mean "what can be know, in principle, by science" (IIRC in another discussion we preferred 'materialism' to denote such views).
If your metaphysical model denies such an assumption then, yes, my objection is questionable.

Still, however, I believe that any view in which 'consciousness' emerges from something else has a conceptual gap in explaining how consciousness 'came into being' in the first place. It seems that knowing how 'something' came into being gives us a lot information about the nature of that 'something' and if we knew the nature of consciosuness then it would be also possible to understand how to answer Q3.
Notice that this point applies to all views in which 'consciousness' is seen as ontologically dependent on something else, not just to physicalist views.

Not sure about that. One can put on one of those neuralink hats and your thoughts become public to a point. The privateness is frequently a property of, but not a necessity of consciousness. — noAxioms

The content of my thoughts perhaps can become public. But my experience of thinking those thoughts remains private. For instance, if I know that you are thinking about your favourite meal and that this thought provokes pleasant feelings to you doesn't imply that I can know how you experience these things.

My neurons are not interconnected with your neurons, so what experience the activity of your neurons results in for you is not something neurally accessible within my brain. Thus privacy. What am I missing? — wonderer1

'Privacy' perhaps isn't the right word. There is a difference in the way we have access to the content of my experiece even if you knew what I am experiencing right now. That 'difference' is, indeed, the 'privacy' I am thinking about.

And here is the thing. While scientific knowledge seems about the relations between physical objects - and, ultimately, it is about what we (individually and collectively) have known via empirical means about physical objects... so, how physical objects relate to us (individually and collectively*) - 'subjective experience' doesn't seem to be about a relation between different objects. And, also, it seems to be what makes empirical knowledge possible in the first place.

*This doesn't imply IMO a 'relativism' or an 'anti-realism'. It is simply an acknowledgment that all empirical knowledge ultimately is based on interactions and this means that, perhaps, we can never have a 'full knowledge' of a given object. Something about them remains inaccessible to us if we can't detect it.

Even if one assumes that physicalism is right, you need to explain how it is so. Generally, physicalists assume that the 'physical' is what can be, in principle, known by science.

And here we have the problem. All what we know via science can be known by any subject, not a particular one. However, 'experience(s)' have a degree of 'privateness' that has no analogy in whatever physical property we can think of.

I believe that the problem of 'physicalist' answers to the 'hard problem' is that they either try to make 'consciousness' a fiction (because nothing is truly 'private' for them) or that they subtly extend the neaning of 'physical' to include something that is commonly referred to as 'mental'. This unfortunately equivocates the language used and makes such a 'physicalism' questionable (IIRC this is referred to as Hempel's dilemma among comtemporary philosophers of mind).


As I said in my previous post, however, the 'hard problem' IMO is a part of a more general problem of all views that reduce entities to how they relate to other entites, i.e. a denial that entities are more than their relations. For instance, we can know that an electron *has a given value of mass* because it responds in a given way to a given context, but at the same time, it is debatable that our scientific knowledge gives us a complete knowledge of *what an electron is*.

In a way, the 'hard problem' is IMO a form of a more general problem that arises when it is assumed that one can have a complete knowledge of anything by purely empirical means.

For instance, even when we consider what physics tells us of, say, an electron we have information on how the electron behaves and interact with other particles. Even the 'mass of an electron' IMO can be understood in a way that makes the concept pure relational, i.e. how the electron 'responds' to certain conditions.

The very fact that we can a very deep knowledge of the relations between entities and maybe we can know only relations (epistemic relationalism) doesn't imply that the entites are reduced to their relations (ontological relationism). So, perhaps we can't know by empirical means an 'entity in itself'.

In the case of consciousness, there is the direct experience of 'privateness' of one's own experience that instead seems a 'undeniable fact' common to all instances of subjective experiences. Its presence doesn't seem to depend on the content of a given experience, but this 'privateness' seems a precondition to any experience. So, at least from a phenomenological point of view it seems that there is a quality of our own experience that is immediately given and not known by analyzing the contents of experience (as empirical knowledge is acquired). This means that while empirical knowledge can be described in a 'third person perspective' the privateness can only be taken into account in a first person perspective.

I believe that d'Espagnat brillantly explains how we can understand an epistemic interpretation of QM (and how such an interpretation is compatible, in principle, with a 'realist' philosophical view)

Even within a classical, mechanicistic, approach a rainbow, obviously, may not be considered an object-per-se. For, indeed, if we move, it moves. Two different located persons do not see having its bases at the same places. It is therefore manifest that it depends, in part, on us.
...
But still, even though the rainbow depends on us, it does not depend exclusively on us. For it to appear it is necessary that the Sun should shine and that the raindrops should be there. Now similar features also characterize quantum mechanically described object, that is, after all - assuming quantum mechanics to be universal - any object whatsoever. For they also are not 'objects-per-se'. The attributes, or 'dynamical aproperties,' we see them to posses depend in fact on our 'look' at them (on the instruments we make use of and on how we arrange them).
...
And lastly, at least according to the veiled reality conception, even though these micro and macro objects depend on us they (just as rainbows) do not depend exclusively un us. Their existence (as ours) proceeds from that of 'the Real.' — Bernard d'Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, p. 348

Soon later:

When N observers are scattered in the fields, each one of them sees the rainbow at a specific place, different from the ones where the others see it. In fact, under these conditions speaking of one and the same rainbow seems improper. It is quite definitely more correct to state that there are N of them, and that each observer sees his own 'private' rainbow. But then, if N=0 there is no rainbow. ... If nobody were there, there would simply be no rainbow. — ibid., p. 349

As d'Espagnat himself says, of course, all analogies are limited and we know the physical causes that are necessary for a rainbow to appear. But suppose we didn't have any possibility to know about the sunlight and the raindrops. What we would know would only be the rainbows, not what is 'beyond' them.
In a similar way, in an epistemic interpretation of QM, the mathematics of QM isn't descriptive. It is more like an alogirthm that allows us to make probabilistic predictions of what we would observer once we assumed certain things. But, according to epistemic interpretations of QM, we have no description of of what is beyond the 'observed phenomena'. Does this mean that 'what is beyond' is impossible, in principle, to describe? No but we are not in the position to know.

D'Espagnat himself, in any case, in his book makes it quite clear that he thinks that there is some reality beyond phenomena but such a reality is 'veiled' and we can't know 'how is it'. It is reasonable, however, to suppose, considering the regularities of phenomena, that such a reality has some structural affinity to the 'empirical reality' that we observe. But of course, we can't 'prove' it. So, in a sense, this is speculative.

I do not deny that the interaction ends the isolation of the system. But such loss of isolation doesn't remove superposition. So, my question is: in your view, what about the other outcomes?

I do not think that anyone is proposing an ontological difference between the device and the system. Both are physical/natural.

But this is exactly the point. In standard quantum mechanics you have to point out at which point you get a definite result from a superposition of states. The problem is that if you treat both the device and the system in the same way you cannot avoid superposition. In fact, what you get is an 'entanglement' of the device and the system which leaves the total system 'device+system' in superposition.

This does give you the appearance of collapse but if you take QM literally all outcomes are real (despite the fact that it appears that only one is real). So you end up with something like MWI (many worlds interpretation).

If you do not want to go that route, you either adopt other 'realist' interpretations or you adopt an epistemic one, where the 'collapse' is simply a way to describe the change of knowlege/degree of belief of an agent after a measurement. These views do not say that mind creates reality but they recognize that we have a limitation in our ability to know the physical world. 'How the workd is' independent of any observation is not knowable.

Sure - as I already said, it’s a product of our design. In other words whatever ‘mentality’ it possesses is ours. — Wayfarer

I always wondered why people seem to miss this point. Experimental devices, computers and so on aren't different from, say, a mechanical calculator.

A mechanical calculator is 'able' to perform calculations but it doesn't 'interpret' its own operations as calculations. We, however, are able to do that. Experimental devices and computers are not really different from mechanical calculators. There is nothing ontologically special about them that would make them different from any other 'inanimate' object.

So if one accepts the idea of a true 'collapse' of the wavefunction IMO the only options are that either all physical interactions cause it (as in Rovelli's relational quantum mechanics) or that it is a purely epistemic process. Such interpretations are, in fact, more like statements on the limitations of our knowledge.

To borrow a statement of Wittgenstein's Tractatus out of context (I sort of like to do that... I believe that Wittgenstein's Tractatus is a flawed masterpiece that can be used to clarify many concepts unrelated to its own purpose) epistemic interpretations of QM try to do something like this:

What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, preface

(source)

Of course it is debatable that the epistemic interpretations are right but I believe that their aim is this.

Yeah, the argument is, empirical knowledge is required to prove logical or mathematical knowledge. But that doesn’t mean empirical and mathematical knowledge are the same. One must be an epistemological dualist to grant that distinction. — Mww

Well, I agree with Kant that knowledge in mathematics and logic is 'a priori'. In fact, I would even say that some knowledge of those domains is a precondition for any kind of rational knowledge. To make an example, we could not be able to know that there are 'three apples' on the table if we didn't have a concept of 'three'.
Regarding mathematics and logic I believe that my view falls in between Kant's and Plato's, if the 'Neoplatonic' interpretation about the latter is wrong, i.e. mathematics and logic study of the structure of thought but, unlike Kant, I believe that, ultimately, their timeless truths are grounded in an 'infinite Mind'. So, I am closer to the Neoplatonic or 'Theistic' view about mathematics and logic.

I suspect that’s true no matter which philosophical regimen one favors. Whether phenomena represent that which is external to us, or phenomena represent constructs of our intellect within us, we cannot say they are unconditioned, which relies on endless…..you know, like….boundless…..cause and effect prohibiting complete knowledge of them. — Mww

Agreed. I also believe this kind of thinking also perhaps inspired mystical experiences. In a certain way, seeing that anything finite seem in some way to have an 'infinite depth' seems something like a 'perennial truth', so to speak. It is compatible basically with any metaphysical position.

In a sense, yes. An empirical sense, a posteriori. In a rational sense a priori, that which is known by us with apodeictic certainty, the negation of which is impossible, is complete knowledge of that certainty, re: no geometric figure can be constructed with two straight lines. Or, all bodies are extended. There aren’t many, but there are some. — Mww

Ok, yes, I agree with that. Logical and mathematical knowledge are of a different kind of, say, empirical knowledge. But even in mathematics, we can have partial knowledge. For instance, one might know something about natural numbers while not knowing that the primes are infinite. But once you know something in that field, you can have certainty, yes.

On the other hand, I am not sure we can even know completely any phenomena. For instance, when you consider one natural phenomenon, it seems that in order to understand it you have to understand it in its own context. But the 'context' seems limitless (or 'boundless' :lol: ). So, in a sense, every phenomenon, even the simplest ones, seems to be of infinite 'depth' so to speak.

As I said, I won’t stand in your way of using perfection as a relative measure of knowledge quality. I’m satisfied with the amount we know about a thing in juxtaposition to the quality of our ways of finding out more about those things. From there, the jump to imperfect, from our knowledge being contingent on the one hand and incomplete on the other, is superfluous, insofar as calling it that doesn’t tell you anything you didn’t already know. — Mww

Fair enough. But I believe that, perhaps, the fact that our knowledge is 'contingent', as you say, means it is incomplete.
In a sense, we know nothing, because we do not have a complete knowledge of anything. But of course, this doesn't mean that we are completely ignorant.

Yikes!!! You done got yo’self in a whole heapa logical doo-doo. What are you judging the imperfect by, if you don’t know that by which imperfect can be measured? — Mww

To make an analogy in physics. No measurement device is 'perfect' but we know that all of them are imperfect and we also know that some are more or less imperfect than others.
I also know that I have doubts, I vacillate and so on.

You’d be correct in not knowing how perfect knowledge manifests in your consciousness, but you must know what the criteria for perfect knowledge is, in order to know yours isn’t that. — Mww

I disagree. As I said, once you accept that knowledge can be of better or lesser quality, it's easier to accept that our knowledge can be imperfect, despite not knowing what 'perfect knowledge' would be.

(Until recently, I actually tended to deny we have 'knowledge' at all, precisely because I assumed that 'knowledge' must mean certain, inerrant etc knowledge).

Be that as it may, and I agree in principle, how do we get to imperfect knowledge from mysterious phenomena? — Mww

I would say that you should consider my example again. We now know a lot more about, say, an oak tree than 3000 years ago. Still, neither they were completely ignorant of it nor today we have complete knowledge of it.

Another logical mish-mash for ya: take that famous paradox, wherein if you cover half the distance to a wall at a time, you never get there. Using your atomic structure scenario, if you take enough half-distance steps, sooner or later you’re going to get into the atomic level of physical things, where the atoms of your foot get close to the atoms of the wall. Except, at that level there is no foot and there isn’t any wall. And as a matter of fact, there wouldn’t be any you taking steps, insofar as “you” have to be present in order for any half-step to be taken. So it is that talking about a table at the atomic level, isn’t talking about tables. — Mww

In a sense, yeah, there is no 'foot', no 'table' and so on at the atomic level. In fact, the very fact that we perceive a 'table' is a perfect example of the regulative activity of our mind. We pre-reflectively individuate the table as a distinct, substantial object. I believe that even scientific evidence suggests that table are mere appearances. There is this marvellous 5 minutes video where David Bohm quite brillantly says more or less the same thing.

However, I do not think that the same kind of reasoning holds for living beings. Living beings are IMO distinct and substantial entities. Yet, also in their case, like the oak tree above, they are also both 'knowalbe' and 'mysterious' for us.

No that assumption is not necessarily entailed by what I said. I said the thing that calls for explanation is the undeniable fact that we see the same things in the same places and times, even down to the smallest details. The question is as to what is the most plausible explanation for that fact. — Janus

Ok, thanks for the clarification! I agree that all evidence point to the fact that there is some kind of 'external reality'. Perhaps a veiled reality, as physicist Bernard d'Espagnat would put it.

The you come up with―a fictional scenario, which it would not be implausible to think could not actually exist. — Janus

Ok but IMO it isn't even impossible in the far future.
Let's then use the example of a dream. If you bump into a wall during a dream, the wall can cause you pain and so on. Yet there is no 'wall' and even pain in a sense it is illuosory. And yet it appears to be 'real'. In a sense, appearances in a dream do have a 'degree' of reality.

Now, of course dreams aren't shared. But they show clearly that the 'way things appear to us' do not necessarily correlate to 'what is truly happening'.

What, you are not writing down your calculation or being aware of thoughts within your body, manifesting as sentences or images? — Janus

Here you are suggesting that thoughts are bodily phenomena. But our phenomenological experience doesn't suggest that. I can distinguish an internal physical stimulus and an awareness to a concept.

Let's not―the Matrix is not a feasible scenario, and hence cannot serve as a relevant examples in my view. You would need to convince me that it warrants being taken seriously in order to interest me in it. — Janus

While I agree that the 'Matrix' literally isn't feasible, I do believe that, perhaps, in the future, we might be able to produce some virtual reality environment that 'looks like it is real'.
Anyway, think about dreams...

Observing animal behavior shows us that they see the same thing in the environment, and any differences in ways of perceiving across the range of animals can be studied by science to gain a coherent and consistent understanding of those differences. We see dogs chasing balls, cats eating out of their bowls and climbing tress. We don't see animals or people trying to walk through walls. — Janus

I see your point, but IMO this doesn't show that the 'reality beyond phenomena' is more or less equivalent to 'phenomenal reality'. It is possible, however, that both we humans beings and dogs 'represent' the phenomenal world in a similar way.

I see no problem in believing in such things, but they cannot serve as a foundation for clear and consistent rational discourse, since they are by general acknowledgement ineffable, and what people say about them is always interpretive, and generally interpreted in consonance within the cultural context in which people have been inducted into religious or spiritual ideas. — Janus

I believe things are even more complex than this. Let's say, for the sake of the argument, that Advaita Vedanta has the 'right' metaphysical view. But we can't IMO arrive at that conclusion by simply making philosophical arguments or by studying the empirical reality.
At the same time, if Advaita Vedanta is 'right', then, say, Buddhism and Christianity are wrong in their metaphysical systems at least. But, again, it is not something we can be certain of solely based on philosophical reasoning.

Then, of course, there is the problem of interpretation of certain 'transcendent'/'revalatory' etc 'experiences'. We do not live in a vaccum and our judgments are also mediated by the culture we are into. This certainly adds more complexity. But IMO we can't deny the possible cognitive validity of 'experiences' of this kind only because the experiencer is influenced by his or her culture. In fact, historically, these kinds of 'experiences' caused radical cultural changes.

It is certainly an extemely fascinating and complex topic.

Okay, fair enough, but for me it is far more difficult to understand what a "fundamental mental aspect" or "divine mind" could be — Janus

Ok. So do I. But, as I said, it seems to me the best class of metaphysical models.

Yeah, I can see that. My response to the first would be there is no need to explain it, and for the second, we simply don’t know how. — Mww

Ok, but for me unless it is 'proven' that we can't know, we should seek. YMMV

Agreed. While it certainly changes, it doesn’t necessarily improve. — Mww

Right! However, to philosophy's credit, in a sense, it is less easy to know if there is progress or not, given the nature of inquiry.

We might even be able to reflect this back on the lack of philosophical progress, in that regardless of the changes in the description of knowledge, we still cannot prove how we know anything at all. I think it a stretch that because we con’t know a thing our knowledge is imperfect. — Mww

In a sense, yeah. I believe that this in fact an aporia in philosophy, in general. We are not completely ignorant and unaware. We have some degree of knowledge and awareness but we also know that they need to be improved. So, how can we trust to improve our knowledge if our faculties are limited, not completely reliable and so on?

What would perfect knowledge look like anyway? — Mww

I don't know. But I do know thay my knowledge is imperfect.

Again, the general, or the particular? The quality of knowledge in general remains constant regardless of the quantity of particular things known about. I’m not sure knowledge of is susceptible to qualitative analysis: a thing is known or it is not, there is no excluded middle. By the same token, I’m not sure that when first we didn’t know this thing but then we do, the quality of our knowledge has any contribution to that degree of change. — Mww

Well, to make an example of a natural phenomena... consider, say, a plant. If we know that the plant is born from a seed and that it reproduces we know little of the plant. In fact, even if one studies all the biological knowledge we have about that plant, something is still missing. For instance, we do not know every single cause that brought ultimately to the existence of that particular plant. In a sense, all phenomena are mysterious for us. And yet, we do have some knowledge and our knowledge today of, say, biology is better than it was 3000 years ago.

Even if your idea revolves around the possibility that because our knowledge is imperfect there may be things not knowable, which is certainly true enough, it remains that there are more parsimonious, logically sufficient….simpler……explanations for why there are things not knowable. — Mww

My point is more like the above.

To make another example. Consider a table. Even if we knew its composition at its atomic level and how the 'table' emerges from that composition and the interaction between its atoms, it would still be the case that we do not 'fully' know the table in a sense.

Note that this is true even if you have a 'direct realist' view... of course, when one takes into consideration that there is also the interpretative and regulating role of the mind (with the term 'mind' here I include all our faculties: sensitive, intellectual etc), everything is in a sense even more 'deeper' and mysterious. But neglecting the presence of this mystery is actually knowing less well things.

The Kantian system of knowledge a posteriori, is twofold: sensibility, arrangement of the given, and, cognition, the logic in the arrangement of the given. The logic of the arrangement is determined….thought….. by the tripartite coordination of understanding, judgement and reason. — Mww

I see two unexplained assertions here: that there is a 'given' and that such a 'given' can be arranged. Now, it is one thing to say that we might not be able to know (with certainty) why these two assertions are true, another to say that speculating about these things is either meaningless or whatever. Honestly, I agree with the former but not the latter.

Such is the fate of metaphysics in general: a guy adds to a theory in some way, shape or form, then accuses the original of having missed what was added. It may just as well have been the case it wasn’t missed in the former at all, so much as rejected. So the new guy merely cancels that by which the original rejection found force, and from within which resides the ground of accusation of the missing. Even without considering your particular instance of this, it is found in Arthur’s critique of Kant, and, ironically enough, Kant’s critique of Hume, a.k.a., The Reluctant Rationalist. — Mww

I can hear you here, philosophy doesn't seem to 'progress'. However, I believe that is because philosophers sought certainty with their arguments. On the other hand, I believe that we can establish that some 'metaphysical theories' are more or less reasonable than others. Feel free to disagree.

Dunno about imperfect, but even if it is, it has nothing to do with being unconscious of some operational segment of our intelligence, in which no knowledge is forthcoming in the first place. Perhaps you’ve thought a reasonable work-around, but from my armchair, I must say if you agree with the former you have lost the ground for judging the relative quality of your own knowledge. — Mww

Our knowledge is imperfect in two ways: of many things we aren't conscious of and we can't have certain knowledge beyond the phenomena. But even if one disagrees with the previous phrase, in a more limited sense, it is imperfect in the sense that we do not know everything we can know.

Contingent, without a doubt. Imperfect? Ehhhhh……isn’t whatever knowledge there is at any given time, perfectly obtained? Otherwise, by what right is it knowledge at all? If every otherwise rational human in a given time knew lightning was the product of angry gods, what argument could there possibly be, in that same time, sufficient to falsify it? Wouldn’t that knowledge, at that time, be as perfect as it could be? — Mww

There is no need to 'invoke' ancient mythology. Even in science we made 'progress'. The Newtonian understanding of gravity is different from the understanding of the same phenomenon in General Relativity. The former theory has been 'falsified'. But I do not think that we can say that Newton was simply 'ignorant' of gravity because he didn't know General Relativity. There are degrees of (the quality of) knowledge. In fact, I believe that science itself shows us that our knowledge is limited, confuesed, imperfect etc even about 'phenomena'.

The system used to amend at some successive time the knowledge of one time, is precisely the same system used to obtain both. So maybe it isn’t the relative perfection of knowledge we should consider, but the relative quality of the system by which it is obtained. — Mww

In a sense, yes, I agree. But 'perfection' of knowledge is what is sought for. Plato and Aristotle famously said that philosophy begins in 'wonder' - we seek, we feel a need to improve the quality of knowledge.

Do you see the contradiction? What would you do about it? — Mww

IMO a good starting point is to differentiate between degrees of quality of knowledge, confidence about one's beliefs and so on.

More than a bit of a stretch I'd say, there would seem to be no way this could be possible. We see the same things at the same times and places, and since as far as we know our minds are not connected this is inexplicable in terms of just our minds. — Janus

Here you are assuming that space is mind-independent. There is no need to do that for a 'realist' IMO.

To make a crude analogy... think about the Matrix. Alice and Bob visit a city in the virtual reality of the Matrix. The buildings are not really there. When they compare their notes Alice and Bob find that a lot of agreement about the report of the city. Yet, there city is not 'really there'. But, their experiences, albeit deceptive, had been possible thanks to something external to them. So, there is no need to posit that the 'external reality' is 'like' the 'phenomenal world' we experience.

I don't see why we should assume that of the physical. The world shows lawlike patterns and regularities. I think the old image of dead, brute matter died a long time ago, but it still seems to live in some minds. — Janus

Ok. What are these laws and regularities in physical terms?

Today that sense is know as interoception―the sense of what is going on in our bodies. We also have proprioception―our sense of the spatial positions, orientations and movements of the body. — Janus

Not only that, however. When I, for instance, make a calculation I am not aware of any bodily processes. I am aware of a relation between concepts.

He says that there cannot be such existents, that they are neither existent nor non-existent. I think that is meaningless nonsense. — Janus

IMHO you (in the plural) are using 'existence' in a different way.
Let's take again the Matrix example, I wrote above. In a transactional way, the 'city' above is 'real'. Alice and Bob have to pay attention of 'what happens', there is interusbjective agreement in their reports and so on. However, the city's existence is merely virtual. 'Ultimately', there is no city. And 'the real world' 'outside' the Matrix can't be said to 'exist' in the same way the 'virtual world' exist.
Or, to make another example: think about dreams. If I dream about visiting a 'city', that 'city' might be said to exist in a sense - bumping into a wall might even give me painful sensations. However, it would be weird to denote with the same term 'existence' what is in the dream and what is 'in the waking world'.

So, is the 'mind-independent reality' more or less the same to the 'phenomenal world'? We do not a way of know. And we can't neglect the fact that our mind has an active role in shaping the 'phenomenal world'.

I'd say there is no certainty except in tautologies if anywhere. I agree our knowledge is imperfect, but it's all we have. — Janus

I almost agree with this. But I am open to the possibility of things like 'revelations', 'insights via meditative experiences' and so on that can allow us, in principle, to get a 'higher knowledge'. I do recognize that there are good reasons to be skeptical of these things, however.

I don't see the phenomenal world as a guess. If we were all just guessing then the fact that we see the same things in the same places and times would be inexplicable. Perhaps you mean our inferences about the nature of the phenomenal world? Even there, given the immense breadth and consistency of our scientific knowledge, I think 'guess' is too strong. — Janus

Well, pehaps 'guess' is a wrong word. Think about 'model' or 'map'. Just like a map is useful to understand a city. The map, however, doesn't necessarily give all that can be possibly known of the city. Nor, necessarily, the map is 'similar' to the city.
We might use the same map. But the fact that we use the same map doesn't imply that the city is like the map.
Note, however, that the map should share some structural similarities with the city. That's why I believe that the 'external reality' must be intelligible.

I think it is a kind of artificial problem. We experience a world of phenomena. It seems most plausible (to me at least) that the ways phenomena appear to us is consistent with the real structures of both the external phenomena and our own bodies. We can recognize that this cannot be the "whole picture" and also that, while our language is inherently dualistic, there is no reason to believe nature is dualistic, and this means our understanding if not our direct perceptual experience is somewhat out of kilter with what actually is. I think it is for this reason that aporia may always be found in anything we say. — Janus

Ok, I see. Not sure I agree, however. Think about the map in my previous paragraph.

We can, but experience on these and like forums tells me that people rarely change their opinion on account of debating about what seems most reasonable when it comes to metaphysical speculation. — Janus

:up: But even when we do not change our minds, discussion can help us to clarify our own positions. Changes in metaphysical positions also can require years.

I agree. I think a physicalism that allows for the semiotic or semantic dimension to be in some sense "built in" is the most reasonable. However many people seem to interpret the idea that mind in fundamental to entail and idealist position that claims mind as fundamental substance or as some form of panpsychism which entails that everything is to some degree conscious or at least capable of experience and some kind of "inner sense". I don't think it is plausible to think that anything without some kind of sensory organ can experience anything. — Janus

To me the problem with a 'physicalism that allows for the semiotic and semantic dimension' is a better position than a physicalism that doesn't and in which semiotics and semantics happen 'for no reason'. But IMO, I am not satisfied by this version of physicalism because the semiotic and semantic dimensions still seem to me a 'brute fact'. A fascinating 'brute fact', indeed, that can also be inspiring but still a brute fact.
Whereas, if one assumes that some kind of 'fundamental mental aspect' or 'Divine Mind' etc is fundamental, it's easier to understand why these properties are present even in matter.

Anyway we seem to agree on the major points. — Janus

Yes. And also we can have a fruitful conversation about our disagreements.

Which is your prerogative. My point was simply that the two views are distinct enough from each other that they should be considered as different theories altogether. — Mww

OK. IMO they share a lot in common, but you are right.

Of what there is no clue, is how the non-mental matter of appearance transitions to its mental component of intuition. That it is transitioned is necessary, so is given the name transcendental object, that which reason proposes to itself post hoc, in order for the system to maintain its speculative procedure. — Mww

Interesting. But isn't this a form of 'transcendental realism', though? I mean, if we can distinguish what in our experience is 'truly external' from us, it would be 'transcendental realism', right?

Even if there is a transcendental realist epistemological theory which explains Kant’s missing clue, it remains the case no human is ever conscious of all that which occurs between sensation and brain activation because of it, which just is Kant’s faculty of intuition whose object is phenomenon. — Mww

On this, I agree. That's why I think that our knowledge is imperfect. So, in a sense, we do not really know and Kant was right in saying that the mind has an active role. But denying knowledge of the external reality completely, I am not convinced of that.

Don't forget that the categories of the understanding and our sensory abilities are factors that we all share. They're not particular to individuals, although individuals 'instantiate' those capacities. I have just responded in the mind-created world discussion to further points along these lines. — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree. This might explain intersubjectivity. But IMO this is only part of the story. I believe that we are in good agreement that the 'phenomenal world' is not 'reality in itself'. It is an interpretation of it, our 'best guess', that is however the way we can know 'reality in itself'. Now, I do not claim any 'sure knowledge' about 'reality in itself', but I do think that, at least for the contents (not the form), of our 'phenomenal world' it is necessary to postulate it.
In a way, I agree with epistemic idealism that all 'views' about the 'noumenal' are speculative. But to me this is because we have imperfect congnitive faculties ('we see as through a glass'...) and we can't adequately know the 'external reality', which is nevertheless intelligible in principle. To me it seems the most reasonable hypothesis here.

Yes, and I would say that it can only explain the general forms that our experiences take, and not the commonality of experiences of particular forms (which we might call the content of experiences). — Janus

Well, if the structure of our cognitive faculties share a lot of properties, then the structure of pur experience is similar. But it is a bit of a stretch to say that all 'formal' properties of experience depend on the regulative faculties of our minds.

So, it is hard to say what we might mean by 'mind-dependent' in distinction to 'body/brain dependent'. — Janus

To be honest, I am not even sure that we can make a hard distinction between 'body' and 'mind'. I do not see them as different substances, although I admit that even from a phenomenological point of view we can distinguish mind and body*. To me the problem is trying to make sense of the mind in purely 'physical' terms, once you assume that the 'physical' is completely devoid of any quality that pertains to mind.

*Interestingly, in Buddhist scriptures you find the teaching of six senses. The first five senses are what we take as senses. But the sixth is the 'inner' sense of the mind. So, to a Buddhist when we are aware of a mental content, it's like being aware of a sense object.

That there are such existents is strongly suggested by science and even by everyday experience. Of course as soon as we perceive something it no longer strictly qualifies to be placed in that category. — Janus

I don't think that even Wayfarer reject that. However, the way things appear to us is conditioned by the cognitive faculties of our mind. Even our emotional states, biases and so on condition the way we process 'reality'. There is something external but we have a mediate knowledge of it and this knowledge in our case is imperfect. Can we be certain on how the 'external reality' is? I would say no, because our knowledge is limited and imperfect (and not strictly speaking becuase it is mediated). Note, however, that the epistemic idealist is right in suggesting that we do not have a direct knowledge of 'reality' and our 'phenomenal world' is our 'best guess' of it, so to speak (to borrow a phrase from St. Paul, 'we know as if through a glass, darkly'). Given that we do not have a possibility to 'check' how our 'interpretation of reality' corresponds to 'reality', we IMO should grant the epistemic idealist that we cannot make certain claims on the noumenal. The epistemic idealist might say that the 'noumenal' is beyond concepts, beyond intelligibility and we should be silent on it (and you find quite similar claims in some Buddhist and Hindu tradition, to be honest). I believe that it is a bit too far, even if partially correct, in a way. But, again, in a way everything we assert without an 'infallible guarantee' on the validity of our statements about the 'noumena' ('external reality') is in a way pure speculation. We can, however, debate on which picture of the 'noumenal' seems more reasonable.

I agree with most of what you say here, although I'm not clear on how you have related it to theism. In Kant was the problem that the senses might thought to be deceptive veils, and I think Hegel effectively dealt with that error in his Phenomenology. — Janus

Ok, but note what I said in the previous paragraph. I address the point about theism later.

If we do away with the external world we are left with a mere Phenomenalism, which seems to explain nothing. By "external world" I simply refer to what lies outside the boundaries of our skins. I cannot see any reason to doubt the existence of external reality defined that way. What the ultimate nature of that external reality might be is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It might be ideas in the mind of god, or it might simply be a world of existents. — Janus

I think we agree on this!

You seem to allude to the idea that without god the intelligibility of the external world is inexplicable — Janus

Honestly, I can't make sense of intelligibility without mind. If physicalism were right, intelligibility of 'the world' seems to that has no explanation at all. Just a brute fact, that allowed our minds to navigate in the world. Note, however, that mathematical and logical laws (the 'laws of reasons' in general) seem to have a character of 'eternality' (or 'time independence') and 'necessity', which both do not seem to be compatible with a view that mind isn't in some sense fundamental. Now, of course our minds can't be fundamental - we are born, we grow, we die etc. But the 'laws of reason' seem to be irreducible. And, in fact, if you try to explain them as derivative to something else you have to assume them in the first place!

So, I am inclined to think that there is really a fundamental mental aspect of reality. Perhaps a 'Mind' that is the source of the intelligibility of everything. I acknowledge that this is a form of 'theism'. It seems to me that it is a more parsimonious explanation of intelligibility than considering it as an unexplicable 'happy' accident or 'brute fact'. Although, admittedly, I don't think that there are absolutely compelling arguments one can make on these things.

Yes, ofcourse. Interestingly, you can produce bombtester-like behavior in baths of fluid: e.g. — Apustimelogist

Interesting, will read!

For me, a mechanism like this is the most attractive explanation of quantum theory, something already postulated in the stochastic mechanical interpretation and some versions of Bohm. It sounds weird but it seems quite compatible with the ontologies of quantum field theory imo, which additionally also seems to tell us that there is no truly empty space, i.e. vacuum energy and fluctuations. — Apustimelogist

Perhaps. I know that there are some technical difficulties for de Broglie Bohm's extensions to QFT but I am not competent enough to comment.
I do not recall if I already shared with you this link about the Thermal interpretation of Arnold Neumaier. It is explicitly nonlocal, 'holistic' (in the sense that there are nonlocal properties of extended systems that can't be explained in terms of local properties) and the author claims that it is Lorentz invariant and can explain also QFT.

The main non-classical feature seems to be the presence of those nonlocal fundamental properties.

A classical analogy for interaction free measurements, as in the quantum Zeno Elitzur–Vaidman_bomb_tester, can be given in terms of my impulsive niece making T tours of a shopping mall in order to decide what she'd like me to buy her for her birthday.
... — sime

Ok, but IMO the classical analogy you propose misses the fact that the there is a change in the 'state' of the system by not detecting it. This is quite bizzarre from a classical viewpoint.

Of course, you can interpret the 'state' of the system as 'what we know' (or even 'what we believe') of the system. However, this isn't exactly like the classical case because there are no hidden variables in the epistemic interpretation of QM

OR you say that the 'state' is in some way real. But if that is the case, then, you have to introduce some kind of nonlocality or some other 'weirdness' like MWI.