The person resorting the drama is the person screaming "DRAMATICALLY"! — boethius

It was you who have used the word, because you were unable to show how the base is more significant than a single frigate. And obviously still cannot do that, so you resort to such comical claims as that a base located 20 km from the shore (of which you were unaware, of course) is somehow more difficult to hit than a ship.

What facts are you even talking about? That the US doesn't have a weapon right this moment with publicly available specifications that literally says "for nuclear deployment in ABM tubes"?

I literally posted a video showing how to take a warhead out of a nuclear bomb. — boethius

The fact is that the US does not have a nuclear warhead that is capable of putting into the ABMs deployed in the base. AND you still ignore the fact that their range is too short for the first strike.

As I wrote, even Russian propaganda does not make that point - they only refer to Tomahawks (which, as you seemingly are still blissfully unaware, are not ABMs), not SM3. In other words, Russian simply ignore what you believe is the greatest threat (i.e. 'easily switching the warheards in ABMs'). Why do you think is that?

1. Obviously you can load a nuclear warhead into an ABM missile tube or then just an ABM missile itself. (After denying this was possible, you finally accepted it was possible but not "easy" and could not be done covertly. When I ask you why it being easy or hard matters to someone setting up a first strike, and also why it couldn't be done covertly ... nada, no specifics, just random denials based on nothing.) — boethius

After five pages of discussion you still have no idea what missiles you refer to... I have pointed out that that while theoretically it is possible, it would be pointless, because ABMs (and SM3 in particular) are rather poor surface-to-surface weapons AND they do not have sufficient range for the first strike. That is why Russians are NOT saying this. And yes, you can put Tomahawks into them, but it is rather hard to do it covertly. On the other hand, you CAN put covertly the exact same missile into a frigate launcher sailing 100 km from the very same base and you get the same effect (only more tubes).

2. The ABM treaty (which the US withdrew from) was negotiated because ABM is first strike capability, arguably anywhere but for sure in forward deployed missile bases. — boethius

And I have explained more than twice already that sure, ABMs play a defensive role in first strike capability. I cannot help that in your confusion you got it to mean 'ABMs can be easily loaded with nuclear warheads and used for the offensive first strike'.

3. The bases we're talking thus represent an increasing nuclear first strike capability and the Russians would make the same analysis and same conclusion and take mitigatory measures. Perhaps they view the risk as low and the only mitigatory measure they saw reasonable to take was simply diplomatically complain about it (to for example setup taking stronger measures if more bases are forward deployed) or then maybe it was one factor in the decision to invade Ukraine. — boethius

Except that you have insisted that the biggest threat is using ABMs as an offensive weapon and that a single base 'dramatically' (your word) increases the offensive capacity. Neither of the claims are true.

I asked if the US would not have reacted if the Russians deployed ABM. — boethius

You have asked specifically 'if the Cuban missile crisis was about Soviets moving ABM', so I have retained all other characteristics of the particular event taking place at particular time and just switched the weapons in question - and then the question makes no sense, because there were no equivalent weapons at that time. Your question could not be 'how would the US react if Russians have deployed ABMs in Cuba today', because you wrote specifically 'Soviets'. So which particular time and technical and political situation did your question refer to? The obvious answer is: none, because you had only a vague idea of what you were asking.

My question is, make the Cuban missile crisis of similar nature to the US bases in East-Europe. So whatever analogue of ABM missiles you want to imagine being deployed to Cuba. — boethius

If Russians have deployed ABMs in Cuba today, they would be significant in intercepting all the ICBMs flying from the States toward the South America. So I suppose their significance depends on how serious are the US plans of nuking South America.

As for their offensive capacities, if the analogues of SM3 were used, they would be capable of nuking Florida, maybe a bits of Georgia, Alabama and Louisiana. So their sigficance depends on the fact how much of the US command control infrastructure is located in Florida (or bits of Georgia, Alabama and Louisiana).

Or then add the caveat of "of course not all caps because you're not a moron and need to resort to all capitalization". — boethius

No, you need to resort to use words like 'dramatically' (and half a page pseudo-philosophical ramblings), because you do not know the basic facts of the things you discuss and when faced with that you have to resort to inane rhetorics. When asked about specifics, you flatly refuse to engage with facts, because you abhor the facts, you do not even look at the map.

For example, feel free to try to explain how if the Cuban missile crisis was about Soviets moving ABM into Cuba, the US would be like "insignificant, we cool with it, soviets already have ships". — boethius

Lol, you do it again... The Cuban missile crisis was about land-launched ballistic missilies which had SIX TIMES (some argue more) the range of any ship-borne missiles that Russians could realistically deploy in 1962. For those map-averse: a regular-service Russian submarine anchored right at the Statue of Liberty equipped with R-13 could penetrate the American continent to about Pennsylvania. R-14s launched from Cuba could reach California. Admittedly, Russians had one submarine, K-19, which in 1961 was equipped with three R-13s (with the range doubled, but still three times shorter than land-based missiles), but it was only one unit and prone to failures (or, rather disasters: in 1961 and later twenty sailors died of radation, the boat was nicknamed 'Hiroshima').

So yes, at that time the land-based launchers did provide an enormous advantage over the ship-borne ones, which you would be aware of, if you had the slighest idea of the things you insist on talking about.

To defend against a Russian first strike?

And where do you even get what the "Russians really think" from?

You just makeup total bullshit, whatever is required to simply directly contradict obvious common sense.

Nuclear threats, first strike threats, are far greater than an ABM threat to your own first strike.

This whole areas is far from US shores ... this ABM base does not protect Washington (or any part of the US counter-strike arsenal), from a first strike.

Totally moronic point. — boethius

Because, depending on who their narrative is directed to, Russians have often skipped that point.

Please explain how these missiles are simply "not capable" of having their ABM warhead swapped out for a nuclear warhead. We can literally put nuclear warheads in artillery shells but this feet is just not possible. — boethius

Sure, I might be wrong. Can you provide evidence which specific nuclear warhead can be used with SM3? They keyword is 'specific'. Asserting that it can be is not evidence, not to mention that it takes down your whole argument, as I have already pointed out: if Americans can put their nuclear warheads into any missile (irrespective of its capacity and range), then the base is even less significant, as we can imagine anything that flies can be a carrier and there are alot more of those. Just put nukes on ATACMS and drive fifty of them to the border...

Therefore, if the same tensions emerged as in the sixties we could expect the US to deploy nuclear weapons to new countries.

Your imagination levels are literally zero. You can't even imagine something that has already happened, and a key point of yours, simply happening again. — boethius

No, your assertion was that Americans would certainly deploy nuclear nukes if they could. And that is simply false - they could for all those years and they did not. Maybe you should consider why.

Again, a ship you can get your own submarines, planes, other ships closer to than an inland base. — boethius

Lol. Hint: nowadays, ships do not battle by firing broadsides. If you believe that a base located TWENTY KILOMETERS from the shore is somehow out of range of modern weapon systems, then it just shows that your lack of knowledge is comical. Oh, wait, you still have not looked at the map, have you?

The land bases are also simply in different positions so expand the radar coverage and missile coverage. — boethius

Given the ranges of the missiles, the 150 km distance does not change the 'missile coverage' significantly. YOU. DID. NOT. LOOK. AT. THE. MAP. AGAIN. And we are not talking about 'radar coverage' at all, as both countries have other radar stations much closer than that base.

It's also easier to sink a ship than a land-base. — boethius

Yes, because land bases are not sunk at all. On the other hand hitting a stationary base is easier than a moving ship. So again you insist on providing the evidence you do not know what you are talking about.

This is really the most basic common sense possible that a single ship is less capable than a ship + land base. — boethius

No, we are comparing a SINGLE ship to a SINGLE base. Because, you know, NATO can always build another ship. So the question is: would NATO get a better offensive capacity if it just built another frigate instead of the Redzikowo base? And the answer is, yes it would (more tubes, better mobility, flexible deployment).

If it was so insignificant why would such a base be built? Answer: because it's not insignificant but increases capabilities in the theatre. — boethius

*sigh* Yes, I have already said so. The base is not insigificant, if it is used for the purposes which *surprise, surprise* it is actually built for.

"DRAMATICALLY" does not equal "dramatically".

"DRAMATICALLY" is significantly more dramatic than merely "dramatically".

A citation should be exact, I do not all-caps words because I can rely on "arguing a point". — boethius

Of all the hilarious of your backtracks this is the best one... You claim that you did not use 'the word'... When I have pointed out that yes, actually you did use the exact same word, you claim that the same word in all caps is not the same word? Seriously, can you get more absurd? Oh, yes, you can: you then argue that your use of the word 'dramatically' was less dramatic.

Ah yes, They can't! ... but if they could (because they obviously can) here's another goalpost move.

We've literally but nuclear warheads in artillery shells, so what's your argument that swapping out the warhead in these ABM missiles is beyond what US engineers are "capable" of? — boethius

Bare assertions are just that: bare assertions. Again, if you have evidence that the specific missiles can be used with nuclear warheads, provide it. Hilariously, even Russians with all their propaganda are not making that argument. And, again, this nonsensical point basically destroys your whole line of argumentation: if you can put a nuclear warhead into any missile, then the whole issue is moot, because both sides have literally thousands of untraceable missiles which then could be used (in your imagination) for dozens of strikes. You do not care about the sizes, capacities, ranges, it is all the same to you.

You're really saying that the missiles couldn't be modified (such as the ABM missiles or otherwise) to more easily fire from these tubes, and if went beyond what was "easy" in preparing your first strike, you couldn't do the difficult task of converting the tubes in some covert way, part of regular maintenance etc. on your own base? — boethius

So your bright idea is to take missiles specifically developed to counter the threat of ICBMs, which are quite effective in that role, and convert them to a role in which they would be much less reliable, with a range so short that they would not even reach Moscow, not to mention any control centers. Because it would enhance the offensive capacities dramatically (no caps), even though you can get a better effect with a SINGLE frigate, more suited for that purpose.

But sure, let us use our imagination... If you can rebuild launchers covertly, then you can just build another launcher in the ground somewhere else - after all, it is just a tube, as you claim...? If that is so, then what stops Americans from covertly putting such tubes anywhere they want? This is certainly something they are capable of? But then why Russians would protest that single overt base, if they know that Americans can put launchers wherever they want covertly (and if they can, they most likely did, because that is what they do, as you claim)?

That you can deploy nuclear weapons to these bases is a larger threat than the ABM missiles. — boethius

No, it is not. The main Russian concern is the defensive capability of ABMs. However, for obvious reasons that does not sell as well, as I have already explained.

It is not logistically as easy to deploy nuclear weapons to a barn or seal team six on the USS rusty fishing boat than it is to a military base. If tensions starts to rise, it's far easier to deploy nuclear missiles to the bases in "routine" shipments than other locations.

You'd have no way of knowing. Likewise, ABM missiles themselves are duel-use and can be programmed to attack a ground target and loaded with warheads. — boethius

No, the ABM missiles deployed in the bases are not capable of carrying nuclear missiles. To load the tubes with nuclear missiles, Tomahawks would need to be delivered (and the tubes rearmed). So yes, it would be quite obvious if the base was under surveillance (and of course it is). And even Tomahawks with greater range would not be that effective as a first strike OFFENSIVE weapon. That is why the article on the doctrine does not list any ABMs as the likely or potential offensive weapon.

We were talking about forward deployed bases. There is significant risk that the US deploys nuclear missiles to those bases, if not today then maybe tomorrow, as well as that they'd continue to march their bases closer to Russia, and so into Ukraine, if Russia let them.

Why wouldn't they? — boethius

For the same reason they have not deployed any nuclear missiles in any new countries since the sixties.

"NATO borders" aren't the US' borders. Poland is not close to Washington. You would not launch a first strike against the US to take out command and control etc. from Poland or Estonia.

You're trying to conflate "NATO borders" with a threat to counter-strike capability.

That Poland, Latvia, and Estonia are close to Russia is not a risk to the US counter strike capability, as their counter strike capability is not in Poland, Latvia or Estonia. — boethius

And Russian command and control center is not within the reiiable range of the missiles deployed at the ABM missile site. As you would know if you have looked at the map, which you flatly refused to do.

"Nonsense" then you defended this position by simply ignoring that ABM is anyways a nuclear first strike enabling system, and focusing on the "insignificance" of these bases, by comparing the missiles (so far) deployed to these bases to all the missiles tubes in the entire US navy.

I've explained how that it is just completely wrong. For the entire US navy to be of equal threat, it would need to be equally close and maybe Russia would be like "hmm, wonder why all these ships are coming to our shores". — boethius

I see the question was too hard. OK, I will try again:

How does the Redzikowo base used for OFFENSIVE purposes DRAMATICALLY increase the offensive potential as compared to ONE German frigate sailing on German teritorrial waters?

Be sure to notice the word ONE (1). It means that I ask you to compare the offensive potential of the Redzikowo base to a SINGLE German frigate. That means a number less than two. Will I get an honest answer to that question or not?

I do not once use the world "DRAMATICALLY". — boethius

What is this then?

The bases quite dramatically increase first strike capability (both in the ABM and nuclear capacity) above what would just be normally "hanging around". — boethius

You cannot remember your posts which are on the current page? That explains SO much...

I've explained what role the bases would play (both in launching nuclear missiles by surprise and their ABM capability) in a first strike. Of course, plenty of other assets would be needed as well. — boethius

Sure, the issue is that you are just wrong. The base does not have missiles which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and even if they were, their range would be too short for the first strike. The tubes could be loaded with different missiles, but that cannot be done easily or covertly. Not to mention that it would be rather pointless, given that a single frigate sailing where it is regularly sailing could have the exact same effect.

Obviously a nuclear threat would include both nuclear weapons and whatever systems enable to use of those weapons. So "enabling weapons systems" such as ABM fall under the category of nuclear threat. — boethius

When you have described the 'nuclear threat', you have specifically used the phrase 'they could deploy nuclear weapons there'. Pretending that it was not your main point is just silly.

So your original position that the bases representing a nuclear threat is "nonsense" you have since debunked yourself. — boethius

My original point was that it is nonsense that there is significant risk that US will deploy nuclear weapons in Ukraine. You can try to obfuscate that as much as you want, it will not change the fact that you are unable to support that claim.

Again, the Russians say themselves their concern is that the tubes could easily be converted to fire other missiles.

It is literally a tube where you put in a missile and fire said missile. There's nothing special about the tube that would prevent you from firing things other than ABM missiles, and you could also put a nuclear warhead in an ABM missile if you wanted to.

If the US doesn't have this capacity today it could easily develop the capacity tomorrow. It's really not a an insane complicated task that no one has ever accomplished before and pushes up against the laws of physics to take (or develop) a missile of the appropriate size for the tubes or then develop a nuclear warhead that you simply put in the ABM missiles (the literally put nuclear warheads in artillery shells in the past, so I'm sure the US military industrial complex could manage the feat). — boethius

It is hilarious how hard you are trying to undermine your original argument... If the Redzikowo base is just a tube in the ground and Americans can shoot nuclear missiles from anything, then the base loses all sigificance, as it would be equally easy to put the said tubes in the ground covertly and quickly anywhere else.

There's no need to look at a map, the New York Times calculated the distances: — boethius

Then maybe that should be the lesson that you should not take anything that the press publishes for granted...

Yes, the '100' sounds scary, unless you are familiar with the geography. 100 is to Kaliningrad, which is actually a tiny piece of Russian territory wedged in between NATO countries. Yet somehow the New York Times does not write about the Russian missiles 40 miles from the Polish territory and 300 miles from Warsaw... So if two Russian frigates leave the Kaliningrad port, they immediately have three times the firepower twice as close to NATO borders than Redzikowo. Should NATO leaders be fuming?

The first critical thing to do in a first strike is hit command and control to disrupt, delay, and ideally prevent a strategic counter-strike even being ordered. With a little bit of delay one's chances of hitting those strategic nuclear launch facilities and other equipment increase dramatically.

So missile bases getting closer and closer increase the effectiveness of a first strike. The closer you are, the less warning time and so more able to decapitate the leadership and other systems. — boethius

Then I ask for the third time: how does the Redzikowo base used for OFFENSIVE purposes DRAMATICALLY increase the offensive potential as compared to a German frigate sailing on German teritorrial waters?

For the obvious reason that they could deploy nuclear weapons there. — boethius

I was clearly referring to this statement and all my arguments referred to this. I am not sure why you were unable to follow it, I tried to be as clear as possible.

Notice how I explain that you could obviously substitute a missile, whether existing or to be developed, in an ABM as well as just putting a nuclear warhead in an ABM missile if you wanted to. — boethius

And I have asked you specifically which missiles you have referred to. It should be well noted that you did not do that, only backtracked to claim that they could be 'developed'. Because the simple fact is that at this time you cannot put a nuclear warhead on SM-3 missiles which are deployed there. Sure, maybe such warheads could be developed, but it is rather pointless to assess the risks of of launch platforms based on missiles which have not even been developed yet... Not to mention that their maximum range does not even reach Moscow, so their use would be rather questionable as the first strike weapon. And sure, you could put Tomahawks in the tubes, but it is far more complicated and rather difficult to do 'covertly'. The fact is that at this time it is not possible 'to switch nuclear missiles/warheads easily' (and this does not even touch the issue that an offensive base needs specific targeting infrastructure which is different from the defensive one), as you have claimed. Add to that the fact that no nuclear weapons have been deployed in any new NATO countries since the sixties, then we have no reason to assess the risk of deploying nuclear weapons in Ukraine as high, which was your exact claim.

As to your watered down position:

1. ABM bases can be converted to launch nuclear missiles.

Yes, they can, but not easily nor covertly. To switch the warhead you have to develop new warheads to fit on existing missiles, or, alternately, replace the missiles themselves, which cannot be done covertly. And their effectiveness compared to mobile platforms is quite limited, especially for a base located 900 km from the Russian border currently equipped with missiles with 1200 km range.

In your comparison, you'd have to get those ships close to Russia, likewise any planes to conduct a first strike, which are what are called "warning signs". — boethius

Oh, so you did not look at the map, how unsurprising. Hint: Redzikowo is not 'close to Russia'. With current missiles it would reach about 300 km behind the Russian border (another hint for non-users of maps: Russia is a bit bigger than that). To make it any sense, it would have to be equipped with Tomahawks. But tell me, which is easier: to covertly smuggle a Tomahawk with a nuclear missile through the whole Europe to install it in Redzikowo, which is most likely observed all the time, or just to load it in any NATO port into one of ten German or Danish frigates which have the exact same launchers (only bigger, so more effective) frequenting Danish and German territorial waters 200 km from Redzikowo, which, given the range of the missiles, put them practically in the same distance from Russia?

The bases quite dramatically increase first strike capability (both in the ABM and nuclear capacity) above what would just be normally "hanging around". — boethius

No, an immobile base 900 km from Russia with missiles with max. range of 1200 km does not dramatically increase nuclear OFFENSIVE capacity. As pointed out above, a single frigate present in German or Danish territorial waters (i.e. in its regular habitat) provides more potential offensive capacity than the Redzikowo base. And, shocking as it may be, German and Danish frigates quite frequently are in German and Danish territorial waters, possibly even now.

2. ABM is anyways a first strike risk. — boethius

This I have never questioned. If your argument was: 'forward intercepting base in Ukraine would diminish Russian offensive nuclear potential', I would simply agree. But your argument clearly was: 'they could deploy nuclear weapons there'. With this I do not agree, the risk of that is very low for all the reasons given above.

Which is exactly what I describe: The bases increase first strike capability, and so something to worry about, especially if the trend is allowed to continue and you end up with 100s of "limited continental missile defense". — boethius

Maybe this is what you describe NOW, when I have finally educated you about the matter. Your previous claim was 'You could literally take a ABM missile and simply put a nuclear warhead in it and fire it at a ground target'. Sure, you COULD do that, but its effectiveness when launched from a ground base would still be very limited as compared to the offensive mobile capacity NATO already has. Then you have wasted three pages of discussion about the supposed advantages of land bases as a 'forward offensive base', because you believed that ships have to 'surround Russian shores'. This was to prop your argument that: 'It's unstable, so Ukraine entering NATO could lead to a series of escalations that lead to the US forward deploying nuclear weapons'.

But now that you have finally educated yourself, we can finally close the argument 'the US will deploy nukes in Ukraine'. You could do that the first time I have pointed that out and save us both the trouble, but I guess you do you.

Girkin himself says in your citation of him that things would have "fizzled out" without him, so even your own evidence you use to support your claims clearly claims things had started before that. — boethius

Only if you do not know what you are talking about, which you clearly do not (because, as you wrote, you do not care). He referred to protests and demostrations, not to violence. And even 'things had started before' clearly contradicts your ignorant claim that 'Ukraine has started the war after separatists have declared independence'. That is still not what has happened, grasping at straws will not change that.

In such a context, it would matter a great deal if the people on the street even wanted to secede and if anything was used to coerce them one way or another.

We could then get into hundreds of years of history, legal and moral precedent, to try to tease out who has just cause in the affair.

Whatever happened in the initial Donbas secession, it was reversible.

What is clear is that there's a lot of Russian speakers there unhappy with Ukrainian language and cultural oppression, so the idea that there were no genuine separatists at all I feel far fetched.

What exactly the majority genuinely wanted I think is up for debate and we may never know.

What is clear is that they become a separate government to that of Ukraine and Ukraine had lost control of the territory without any realistic way of reversing things (without being invaded by Russia). — boethius

Sure, there were separatists who wanted independence and possibly join Russia. But as you say, it is now impossible to say whether that was the view of the majority. Given that it is unknown, and given what we know from the direct participants of the events, we can conclude that there would be no rebellion. So, again, Ukraine did not start this war - Russia did.

Playing footsie with NATO, Russian language oppression, random violence against Russian speakers, promoting Bandera as a national hero, then attacking (including shelling civilians) the separatists, is all definitely picking a fight with Russia. — boethius

Yes, I know the whole list of Russian grievances, they still have nothing to do with the real cause of the war.

Many of the factions supporting these provocative policies vis-a-vis Russia had no qualms of explicitly stating their main goal (to Western journalists on camera) is starting a war with Russia that will destroy said Russia. — boethius

Can you provide the exact quotes in which Ukrainians claim that they want to destroy Russia?

Ukrainian elites, decision makers and faction leaders knew the policies they were pursuing could easily, maybe even likely, start a war with Russia, especially waging war on the Donbas for 8 years. Some tried to reverse course (I have zero problem believing Zelensky legitimately wanted to make peace with Russia and avoid a way) but failed to do so and others bet NATO would save them and still others seem to have wanted a war as a "purifying" experience to Ukrainians. — boethius

I have already given you the number of casualties in 2020. The conflict was as deescalated as possible, Ukraine has practically given up any idea of recovering the territories, without openly admitting that. The status quo could be maintained practically indefinitely, just like in other frozen conflicts instigated by Russia in other republics.

Yes, once they lost control of territory filled with Russian speakers and right next to Russia, they should have recognized there was no military option to reconquer the territory: any potentially successful attempt would trigger an invasion by Russia.

Therefore, their options were diplomatic, and had they implemented Minsk I or II that would be far more likely way to regain the territory than what they've decided to do instead.

As for foreign intelligence agents operating elsewhere in the country, the response to that is counter-intelligence. — boethius

Maybe try to read why the Minsk agreements failed. Neither side was interested in implementing them, so blaming just Ukraine is pointless. And obviously you still do not understand why Russia has started the hostilities in Donbas in the first place.

1. Ignore ABM as itself a first strike system
2. Trivialize the missile bases as 10001 compared to 1000 capacity of US ships (and also German ships for some reason).
3. Insist they are insignificant even if you then laugh at you own "1000" ship points scenario of all these ships literally being on Russia's shore at the same time.
4. Agree that ABM is itself a first strike weapon ... but that's somehow not part of "offence"
5. Agree the bases are significant, just no offensively even though on step 4 you agreed anyways ABM was an offensive first strike system. — boethius

No, if you had read anything with understanding, you might get a better idea what I think.

1. Ignore ABM as itself a first strike system

Here is the article on the first strike strategy, it also lists the weapon used for it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_strike_(nuclear_strategy)

Can you point out all the ABMs from that list?

2. Trivialize the missile bases as 10001 compared to 1000 capacity of US ships (and also German ships for some reason).
3. Insist they are insignificant even if you then laugh at you own "1000" ship points scenario of all these ships literally being on Russia's shore at the same time.

If add all short range platforms that NATO has in the Baltic Sea, 24 tubes ARE insignificant. As I wrote, you can get the same effect by commissioning another frigate, which Russians do not protest. For this you have no answer beside 'land bases are not ships', but the reasons you give are utterly silly, not mentioning all the reasons why this particular base is much worse for offense than a ship-based platform.

And no, they do not have to be 'on Russia's shore', just like Redzikowo is not on 'Russian shore'. If you had any idea about what you are talking about, you would know it is closer to Germany than to Russia... But you just abhor the facts, as is already well known.

4. Agree that ABM is itself a first strike weapon ... but that's somehow not part of "offence"

That is your original confusion, which might be somewhat understandable. However, your clinging to it despite all the times I have tried to correct you is inexplicable. Yes, ABMs can be a part of the first strike because they can PREVENT the enemy from making a successful first strike or weaken it.

5. Agree the bases are significant, just no offensively even though on step 4 you agreed anyways ABM was an offensive first strike system.[

No, I did not agree to that, it is just your reading comprehension that is so frighteningly low.

But the result of your idiocy is that you clearly agree even in your own analysis that the ABM bases are a significant increase in first strike capability.

Add to that the fact people can put nuclear strike systems in those bases, make the bases bigger, make more bases and so on, and the threat is even more significant. — boethius

No, they are significant for their ability to neutralize first strike capability. Their offensive capability is still limited for all the reasons I have listed several times already.

This is literally what happened in the Cuban missile crisis. US felt threatened by ground bases in Cuba (even though the Soviet had ships!) and started a blockade of Soviet ships. The situation was deescalated when the Soviets withdrew.

Now, Soviets had been sending ships to Cuba anyways, and have nuclear submarines and so on ... why did the US react to missile bases in Cuba? Because it significantly increases the threat, enough to react to it. — boethius

The difference is that the potential launch platfoms (both ABMs and SLBMs) has significantly changed since that time. You did not have anything even close to Aegis that could be used on a frigate. Now Russia can send to Cuba a ship that significantly outfires the would-be Cuban bases, US can send Gravely to Gdynia. And somehow there are no blockades and no protests.

However, "arms" and "more arms" are the same category, and depending on the situation, definitely the precedes of some arms build up maybe a predicator of more arms buildup, resulting in an arms race. — boethius

The slippery slope is your seeming view that if you allow one side to have certain armaments, then you have to agree to anything else. That is obviously false: US and Russia has agreed that they can arm themselves in certain weapons and protest against other weapons. Thus Russia can allow one base in Poland and protest in the exact same way against the second one or the third one, whichever threshold it considers to be significant, exactly as it happened with all other armaments in the past.

Again, your points are just dumb and I'm pretty sure it's intentional at this point, but if you insist you are just that stupid then I'll give you the benefit of the doubt. You're owed that much. — boethius

Make sure that you also stick out our tongue... I thought I was discussing with an adult, though that belief was indeed strained at some points.

In any realistic scenario (what analysts actually worry about) some political tension already exists and escalation already exists, so at some point in your escalation scenario you make an ultimatum that any ship or submarine X Km from your coast will be fired upon: that they stay on their side and you'll say on your side. — boethius

There is this wonderful site called Google Maps. I suggest you look at it and check where is Rostock, where is Redzikowo, where is Gdynia, where is Kaliningrad and where is Moscow. Then check the ranges of the missiles in question. Maybe then you will understand why your 'X km from' scenario is simply nonsensical, but I do not have high hopes.

End of the story is that the legitimately recognized local-government there declared independence, the locals that "didn't want hostility" didn't stop it happening either, and then Ukraine attacked the separatists thus starting the civil war. — boethius

Lol. Legitimately recognized by whom exactly? And locals might not want to attack armed militants, they might prefer for the military to show up. And if they did not care, it is not much of an argument for forcing their independence.

It is Russians that started the killing. That is what Russians themselves are saying. If you close your eyes and shout 'I do not care about Girkin', it does not change that fact.

Ukraine started the civil war. If somehow their justification does make some sense in some political theory, then they were just stupid. If they had no argument that wouldn't also work against Ukraine's own declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, then the war is just evil. — boethius

No, Ukraine did not start it. Girkin's unit of mostly Russians has crossed the border and started the hostilities.

The obvious difference is that the Ukraine's referendum was not made under the guns and threat from regular military forces of the neighbor. But I suppose you do not care about such details.

The separatists obviously had the power to secede as they do so. If alliance with Russia is part of that power then that's just being politically astute. If Girkin was a problem and "the key to everything" then Ukrainian counter-intelligence should have dealt with him sooner.

Sessions and revolutions always attract extremist foreigners.

I do not care about Girkin because Ukraine could not win the fight they picked, and if you pick fights you can't win why expect any sympathy? — boethius

They did not pick the fight, a foreign power has instigated an armed rebellion on their territory to destabilize them. If you believe that might makes right, then sure, it is not a problem. Not everyone does, though.

Again, wish it wasn't so, but the current international status quo is that supplying weapons is not an act of war. — boethius

They supplied troops. Girkin himself (and most of his unit) were Russians. If you read obituaries of some Russian combatants of the war, you might see that the list of their accomplishments starts in 2014.

However, again, it's not so important to me because my main view is that picking a fight with Russia is stupid. If you want to believe the Azov guys have been perfect rules-of-war angels since 2014, be my guest. Believe what you want. — boethius

So Ukraine should just let Donbas secede, because a band of armed thugs has said so. Then the same band would appear In Zaporozhia. And then Ukraine should let them secede, too, because you do not pick fights with Russia. But Odessa has always been Russian, Putin says. Then send some 'separatists' there, too. Is there any country that would allow that?

Doesn't seem plausible to me, but then again I am a super intelligent AI, of which you have no hope in defeating in verbal fisticuffs, sent specifically to mess with you from what is essentially another dimension, and perhaps I haven't picked up yet on all the subtleties of our simulated subjects and their secessionist shenanigans. — boethius

I would appreciate that you post your answers when you are sober. It would facilitate the discussion a lot.

They are not "insignificant".

That's just dumb to say. Why would they be there is they were insignificant? — boethius

They are insignificant as far as the offensive potential is concerned. They are quite significant as a defensive measure.

Ships operate in the ocean where you can have your ships too as well as planes.

If you felt threatened enough you can much more easily sail to said threats and much more easily sail into other's territorial waters. You could go and blockade any port if you wanted to and this is less of an escalation than sending tanks and infantry to go surround a base on land. — boethius

What? Again, your fantasy scenarios are so divorced from reality that it is hard meaningfully engage with them. Ever heard of conventional surface-to-surface missiles? That what would be used to neutralize both ships and any land base. It is 300 km from Kaliningrad to Redzikowo... In fact, Russians declared that exactly that would happen.

land bases are also a lot cheaper and a lot faster to make, so if you "let the US make bases" then they could in short order create a lot of bases in a short amount of time.

Oh, the slippery slope again. If you let them build one base, you have to let them build a hundred. Because that is how international treaties always work. Really...

That you don't get the differences between "land" and "water" is just dumb at this point.

Oh, I do. The former are much less effective for offensive purposes. You said yourself that ships must be effectively tracked to be neutralized. The land base cannot go anywhere and you know much earlier if anything unusual is happening there. So yes, it is stupid, but not on my part.

First, my scenario is Quebec separatism with whatever modifications are necessary to make it comparable to the Donbas (so replace Russian intelligence with French intelligence, and put France beside Quebec and so on). — boethius

So if fifty Quebec separatists attack police stations and local government buildings and kill the policemen, they are in their rights? Even if the rest of Quebec citizens do not necessarily support such violent course of action? That is obviously absurd.

Second, I do not care much about Girkin and whatever covert actions Russia has taken in the Donbas.

Covert actions do not constitute starting an actual war. There's spies all over the place and we don't say that because the US has spies in China, Russia, Europe, everywhere else that therefore the US is at war with these countries. That covert action and spies can affect political results is just part of the status quo the world currently accepts. If the CIA never did anything similar, but have always been good little boys never interfering with anyone self determination, ok, then complain all you want.

As it stands in the real world, intelligence and covert actions are not considered acts of war but just part of the status quo everyone accepts: you are allowed to affect political processes with your spies and the legitimate counter-action is trying to catch those spies while deploying your own spies.

If the separation was 100% Russian intelligence operation, Ukraine should have had better counter-intelligence. You snooze you lose in the spy game. — boethius

Actually, you simply do not KNOW much about Girkin and his obviously non-covert actions in Donbas. And based on that ignorance you produce so many paragraphs, which are completely irrelevant, because they have nothing to do with reality. The issue that repeats oh so often in our discussion.

The actual civil war was not started by the separatists. They declared independence and then Ukrainian militias invaded their territory and Donbas war from 2014 to 2022 occurred on Donbas territory. For the separatists to start the war they would have needed to attack Ukrainian forces outside their territory. — boethius

No, that is not what happened at all, which you could check in five minutes. But you just abhor the facts.

If you do not believe the Western sources, at least you could read what Russians, such as Girkin, have to say about it. 'I'm the one who pulled the trigger of war. If our unit hadn't crossed the border, everything would have fizzled out, like in Kharkiv, like in Odesa', he said. His unit has crossed the border and started the hostilities, most of the unit was not even the separatists, but regular Russian soldiers. He then complained that the locals are very reluctant to join the rebellion. Then they have executed the local government officials and policemen, taken the weapons cache. Modern cities are not prepared for local defense, any larger bunch could take one in a day. Claiming that doing so would immediately give them any rights and the intervenening force would be 'invading their territory' is clearly absurd.

No separation ever is! All states condemn all revolutionary or seditionist action except for whatever revolutionary or seditionist action created the state in question, then we're in the realm of heroes and common sense violence that was obviously justified and brings tears to our eyes. — boethius

Sure, but the issue is that if a foreign government actively provides troops and weapons to fuel such actions, it is rather hard to tell whether the right of the people to self-determine has been preserved. Possibly, the people of Donbas would like to be a separate republic or to join Russia, the issue is that nobody asked them, as you cannot seriously treat the referenda organized under the separatists' guns as valid. By the way, that would be exactly the case with Quebec: what if the separatists were in minority - would they still have the right to declare independence just because they have rebelled? You just treat all Quebecans and all Donbass citizens as homogeneous group with the exact same views, which is certainly convenient, but as unrealistic as most of your other arguments.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian side would shell civilians, so whether it was evil or stupid to begin with, we can be safe in concluding it quickly became evil in any case. — boethius

The claims of indiscriminate shelling of civilians have not been confirmed by OECD. The number of civilians killed in 2021 was 110. Even if we attribute all of those to Ukrainians, the argument that Russia just had to kill 10000 civilians and raze numerous cities to the ground to stop that is rather questionable.

LOL, indeed... Kremlin censors Carlson:

https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1756051693358191055

1. We're now far from your 1000 to 1 ratio here. — boethius

No, we are not. Add up all the missile tubes from just the non-US NATO ships and the Redzikowo tubes are still insignificant.

2. If political tensions were high Russia may very well start blockading US ships in the Baltic (not to mention that even now may have ships and aircraft closer to the ship you're talking about than an inland base; you simply fail to integrate the differences). — boethius

Oh, so you do not even know where Redzikowo is. Not that it surprises me. And you seem to miss what has already been written: with the NATO presence in the Baltic already, Redzikowo makes very little difference.

3. ABM itself is part of nuclear first strike capability. — boethius

Sure, ABMs are a factor in the first strike doctrine. The issue is that you got confused and you believe it is because of their offensive capabilities. That just shows how little you know about the things you discuss.

4. The base may very well be not so significant at its current capabilities ... but its capabilities maybe augmented in the future covertly or overtly at any time. — boethius

Well, if missile launchers can just be added 'covertly', then the whole discussion is pointless, as we do not know how many covert missile launchers Russia has put covertly in, say, Belarus. And, again, you clearly do not know what you are talking about.

5. Regardless of current or future capabilities, the base maybe one of many and even if each base was somehow kept at under-capacity to a frigate ... and so enough of them starts to add significantly to your 1001 points. Your "we only want one" logic just doesn't matter, everyone knows Americans are a gluttonous people. — boethius

It is not just a slippery slope, it is more of a rollecoaster. You can make the exact same argument to ANY weapon, from destroyers, through frigates to warheads themselves. 'If we allow them to have one warhead, they will have a million'. No, that is not how any arms race works.

6. Germany and the other Baltic states are non-nuclear powers, so nuclear shenanigans are far less likely coming from equipment under their command. American bases with American soldiers are de facto under American command. — boethius

Oh, so Americans will just smuggle nuclear warheads. Right. Your disconnect from reality makes this discussion rather absurd.

7. Your whole argument is just dumb because if the bases add zero relevant military capability ... why build them in the first place? Even if what you said was true, an opponent would not conclude "well they're just wasting their money to create a provocation for nothing" but would assume the bases (especially considering the political costs they come at) must serve a critical purpose. — boethius

I did not say that the bases add zero relevant military capability. They add a significant military capability - defensive one. That was the actual Russian concern - that their offensive capabilities will be diminished, even though US stated their are not the point of those. However, given that the argument 'you cannot defend yourself so well!' is somewhat harder to sell, they have also made the claims about the supposed offensive capabilities - which theoretically exists, but in fact are barely relevant. As can be seen, those more ignorant about those issues fell for it - like you and some journalists.

8. American does not even have a no-first-use doctrine, so you can't blame other powers for not taking America at it's word (when it comes to destructive violence); America has a first-use doctrine and therefore you should assume America prepares for first use-strike capability and even subtle military moves maybe critical in a first strike operation. You do realize "deception" is apart of warfare? — boethius

But I am not taking America at its word, I am just pointing out that, contrary to your claims, Aegis bases have negligible offensive potential compared to SLBMs and other shorter range launch platforms.

The rest of your fantasies is not really worth answering to... The idea of the first strike initiated from shorter range immobile platforms is beyond absurd. If you point a gun at someone who points a gun at you, you do not start the fight by kicking him in the shin.

Again, the major reason for a large war (in my view) was that there was already the war in the Donbas which Russia could not deescalate (despite 2 major diplomatic efforts the West later gloated was a bad faith move on their part and the part of Ukraine), would not play domestically to abandon the Russian speakers there even if Putin wanted to (which he definitely doesn't), leaving only one choice of completely demolishing Ukraine's military capability and economic viability over the long term. NATO-Ukraine footsie, forward deployed bases, resources, land-bridge to Crimea, are simply additional reasons to the inevitability of the war starting in 2014 escalating to a major conflict. — boethius

You forgot to mention that the war in Donbas was instigated and started by the Russian Federation, with significant participation of soldiers from the RF. Girkin clearly stated that locals were not interested in starting the hostilities. To 'deescalate' all Russia had to do was to withdraw its troops and support for separatists (or not start the war in the first place). Even then, the war mostly deescalated itself: 50 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2020 in the zone, so it was a typical Russian 'frozen conflict'. Further escalation was started with significant build-up of Russian forces in 2021. Thus your scenario, as usual, has little relation to reality.

Some of the claims from Putin's interview relating to Poland debunked by the Polish MFA:

https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/mfa-statement-on-president-vladimir-putins-10-lies-on-poland-and-ukraine-which-were-not-rectified-by-tucker-carlson-interview-of-8-february-2024

The historical claims are pretty easy to verify. In other words, Putin just openly lied to Carlson, completely unchallenged. In other words, when Putin says he was 'forced' to attack Ukraine, he is as believable as when he claims that Hitler was 'forced' to attack Poland in 1939.

But do notice one important fact: where Putin starts. He starts from history from the creation of Rus, hence for the long term here is something really important for Putin. Westerners typically don't give a shit about history or anything that happened a decade ago, but for Putin history (and his role in Russian history) means a lot. He isn't focused much in the next elections, but the long run. Hence the importance to what for example Putin has written about Ukraine and Russia is very important in understanding this war. And that simply refutes any idea that this was just about NATO expansion (and if that hadn't happened, Russia/Putin wouldn't care about Ukraine). — ssu

Yes, when Putin himself clearly denies Ukrainian statehood, declares he has right to shape Ukraine's borders and insists the war will not end until 'denazification', it is hard to argue that 'it was all about NATO'.

This is sort of a red herring. The threat from Aegis Ashore is that it can shoot down Russia's ballistic missiles, not that the cells there could be used to launch an attack. Aegis interceptors have shot down SRBMs, IRBMS, and even ICBM targets in public tests. For intercepting Russian missiles, location is indeed incredibly important, and Aegis Ashore systems, be they in Poland or Korea, offer interception options that naval assets, being necessarily bound to the sea, can't offer. Plus, they don't have to go into port for maintenance. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I know that. It is boethius who insists that Aegis are 'forward nuclear bases' which pose a threat of the first strike.

I explained it: moving ships to Russia's shores would be a provocation. How do you get 73 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer's next to St. Petersburg to quickly strike at targets in Russia. — boethius

To outdo the Redzikowo base, you do not have to move ALL US ships into the Baltic. In fact, you do not need any US ships at all: ANY single German frigate would outfire the Redzikowo base. I know it can be a shock to you, but German military ships are regularly sailing the Baltic Sea and they are not blockaded each time by Russia (and so do the American ones and other NATO ships - USS Gravely - i.e. the equvalent of four Redzikowo bases, was recently in a Polish port, with no Russian blockades). To have an equivalent of the Aegis OFFENSIVE capability, all NATO has to do is literally put into service another frigate. I will tell you a military not-so-much-a-secret: they do that quite often, with no or little Russian protests. Quite possibly, because Russians commission new missile platforms (and new missile types) quite often, too, EACH of which is much more powerful than the Aegis base in offensive capabilities. So in fact neither NATO nor Russia protest adding to the 1000 already pointed weapons, they do it routinely.

Likewise if you sent all your nuclear submarines to surround Russias shores for a first strike. Maybe it works ... but maybe it doesn't. There's a risk your ships are detected, and if not today, Russia can act on that threat by developing better detection capabilities. — boethius

'Surround Russia's shores'? You are so out of your element that it is comical. Trident II has the range of 7500 km. Tomahawk's range is 2500 km. That is, a SLBM submarine, to reach the same targets as the Redzikowo base, needs to be... in the middle of Atlantic. In fact, SLBMs can reach the exact same targets from the OTHER side - while sailing around Alaska. Not to mention the Mediterranean Sea... Your fundamental mistake is that you are repeatedly doing 'analyses' based on your very limited knowledge of the facts.

And again you just wasted time,yours and mine, writing a dozen of paragraphs of pseudo-philosophical musings which are completely irrelevant, simply because you know so little about the topic you write about.

The base in Redzikowo has three MK41 tubes with 8 cells each. That is 24 cells total.

A single Ticonderoga-class destroyer has 122 cells. The US has 22 of those. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer has 90 cells, there are 73 in the active service. If you take just those two classes of ships, you get almost 10000 cells. But that is comparison of capabilities of just a single type of a missile launcher... Of course, if you add all NATO frigates, etc. the disproportion would be much greater. And that is just tactical missiles - in a nuclear war SLBMs would have a much greater impact.

So sure, if you have 1000 guns pointed at you, if you add one, technically it is more. The question is, how much of a difference it makes, given that you also point 1000 guns at the other guy. By your logic, NATO should bomb Kaliningrad each time Russia puts a new frigate into service and sends it to the Baltic - as even a single frigate has more missile capacity than the Polish Aegis base.

I have been both to Spain and to Russia. I am asking, as I wonder what is the foundation of your views. Citing isolated indexes (in which you do not believe anyway, when the very link you quote clearly undermines your point) and comparing two different metrics does not seem to be a good one, so I was wondering whether you had something more solid.

You are so ignorant of the key issues that you are basically not worth talking to. — boethius

That is rather funny, given your following remarks.

It is also equipped with missile launchers known as MK 41s, which the Russians worry can be easily repurposed to fire offensive missiles like the Tomahawk. — On the Edge of a Polish Forest, Where Some of Putin’s Darkest Fears Lurk

It is not a point made by 'experts', it is a point made by Russians and just repeated by the journalist. Actual experts would point out that locating an offensive base within such range from Kaliningrad and Byelarus would not be optimal, to put it mildly, given the interception times. Moreover, their offensive capabilities, given the range and flight time of the relevant missiles, would be rather limited - you could get the same effect with a frigate in Baltic, which for the offensive purposes would have the advantage of not being in the same heavily observed spot. So much for your 'factual knowledge'.

Had the Soviets only deployed "missile bases" and "we don't know which missiles are in the missile tubes, tee hee hee" and "we haven't literally developed a missile called 'Surprise Mother Fuckers' and published the specification" and had some plausible deniability bullshit ... you're position is "well of course the US wouldn't have been concerned in the least". — boethius

Most likely unknowingly, given your 'factual knowledge', you describe the exact situation of Kaliningrad, 500 km from Berlin. Did NATO invade Kaliningrad for that reason? I cannot recall such situation.

Have you ever been to Russia?

Ukraine was ranked 55th in 2023 in the Global Innovation Index. https://www.wipo.int/global_innovation_index/en/2023/index.html — javi2541997

Russia's rank: 51st, Spain: 29th.

You'd really have the same analysis of the Cuban missile crisis as you have here? — boethius

No, because Russia had a clear intention of deploying actually existing missiles.

The whole point of exiting the INF treaty (which was never entered anyways, just pretend entering and exiting) is to develop exactly those kinds of missile with size and range to ABM missiles. — boethius

Oh, so now you are talking about missiles which have NOT YET BEEN DEVELOPED? But you have clearly writtten:

Russia really didn't like the forward positioning of US missile bases in Europe (that can be easily loaded with nuclear warheads). — boethius

So you are saying that Russia really did not like the positioning of non-existent missile bases with non-existent misssiles. And the FACT remains, that the US did not deploy such missiles in any new NATO countries since 1960s. Sure, they COULD do that, but the probability of this in the view of known facts remains low. Much lower than the probability of Russian re-invasion.

Is forward missile bases, either nominally ABM sties that could be fitted with nuclear weapons now or in the future (or then straight up abandoning "we're only concerned about Iran, tee hee hee" and simply overtly forward deploying nuclear missiles), in itself sufficient reason to start a giant war. — boethius

Again, you clearly have no idea what you are talking about. That is why I have asked you specifically for the types and ranges of missiles you meant: checking this up would save you from further embarassing yourself. So now is your chance again: read up on what kind of bases and missiles Russia has protested about.

It's unstable, so Ukraine entering NATO could lead to a series of escalations that lead to the US forward deploying nuclear weapons because they feel it is "needed" even if they didn't intend to do so from the outset.

Things change, and any analysis of these sorts of issues will go decades into the future. What can we expect the future to be like? — boethius

In terms of ridiculousness the argument 'Ukraine could become so unstable that the US would deploy nukes there' reaches new heights. Obviously you are reduced to such arguments, because you have no others, simply because in view of the facts the Ukraine's alignment has practically no bearing on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.

And, again, your argument is self-refuting. Finland has switched from neutral to being in NATO in a year. That is, if the US decides to adopt such aggressive stance as you describe, Ukraine's neutrality would make exactly zero difference, as its alignment can be changed much quicker than the US will be able to develop the infrastructure to use it. So against the nuclear threat you are describing any Ukrainian pledges would provide Russia with ZERO protection.

For the obvious reason that they could deploy nuclear weapons there. — boethius

If we are in fantasy land, the US could deploy the nukes everywhere - in Ukraine, whether it was in NATO or not, in Alaska, or in Greenland.

Russia really didn't like the forward positioning of US missile bases in Europe (that can be easily loaded with nuclear warheads). — boethius

Oh, please do tell which missiles in European bases can be 'easily loaded with nuclear warheads'. But be specific... which types and ranges did you have in mind exactly?

The fact remains that the US has not deployed the nukes in any new country since 1960s. To claim that it is more likely that the US would do that than that Russia would re-invade Ukraine (which it has already did twice in a decade) is beyond delusional.

Basically, your argument is: 'treaties are not worth the paper they are written on, but if Ukraine pledged neutrality (again), then Russia would not re-invade it'. That is obviously self-refuting.

For example, had there been a peace relatively quickly, the gas flows to Europe would have likely restarted, a "peace dividend" everyone would have been happy to collect. So, this would be one reason putting pressure against Russia re-invading. Likewise, if Ukraine became neutral and wasn't a nuclear threat (of hosting NATO missiles) and Russia obviously kept Crimea, which was and is the major strategic consideration in terms of land, war in the Donbas resolved, and there wasn't really any "problems" anymore, then one may project out that the diplomatic and economic cost of restarting the war is simply far higher than anything Russia would have to gain in re-attacking a Neutral Ukraine.

I point out that Russia may have no interest (or at least one predicts that as likely) in re-invading a neutral Ukraine and so maybe very unlikely to do so for various reasons in addition to having signed an agreement, and you turn this into me saying that Putin wanted to "hold hands and sing Kumbayah". — boethius

Beside the obvious nonsense of 'nuclear threat' (again, no nuclear missiles have been deployed in any of the new NATO countries, so why exactly should that be an issue?), you are basically stating that if everything went back to the exact state that was in 2014-2022 (the war in Donbas would not be 'resolved' by any measure in March 2022), Russia would have no reason to start the re-invasion.

As to the question of neutrality - sure, Ukraine might pledge not to enter NATO (like it did in 2014, which made exactly zero difference), but it still would most likely arm itself and align itself economically with the West (so it would be like Sweden before 2022 - formally unaligned, but in fact Western-oriented. But that would not satisfy Russia in any way.

But that poses the obvious problem: these were the exact conditions which Russia made to invade in the first place.

There is one underlying cause of the conflict: Ukraine wanting to leave the Russian sphere of influence. And there seem to be only two possible resolutions: Ukraine doing that with Russia unable to stop it, or Ukraine losing its sovereignty to Russia to a much larger degree than before (i.e. Byelarussinization of Ukraine).

Ukraine declared both simultaneously that it was neutral and also intent on joining NATO, and that also their definition of neutrality didn't exclude collaboration with NATO. — boethius

No, it did not. The discussion gets really tiresome when you get all the facts wrong.

What are the facts, NATO declared Ukraine would join, and then Ukraine made a clumsy play to join NATO thinking that would solve its security problem and NATO certainly would need to keep its word ... oh, some day. — boethius

The facts are that in 2008 Germany and France blocked MAP, which put Ukraine on hold indefinitely. Then Ukraine declared independence from military alliances and put in its constitution. Then Russia has invaded it anyway. These are the facts, which you again seem unaware of.

In other words ... what you're saying is ... in the real world Ukraine is not important enough to NATO for NATO to let Ukraine in ...

Congratulations on expounding on the reasons why Ukraine is not important strategically to NATO. — boethius

Congratulations, you have finally understood that the war has very little to do with NATO. Now convince the other Russian apologetics.

But lets say Ukraine was strategically important to the US and the UK and not Germany and France, well first note that's another way of saying Ukraine is not important enough to NATO for NATO to let it in, but even then the US and UK are big boys, they could just go and make a bilateral defence agreement, such as the UK made with Finland to cover the ascension process.

US acts unilaterally all the time, so if Ukraine was somehow strategically important to the US, the US would just march right in, make some bases: as it does everywhere else it says it has "strategic national interest" in. — boethius

Congratulations, now you understand that the war has little to do with the US as well. We are definitely making progress!

Is literally just straight up saying "Important members of NATO weren't afraid of Russia in the slightest, didn't even view Russia as a military rival, and just wanted to do business!!"

Not even fearing reprisal is as far as possible as you can get from some strategic military asset required for credible defence. — boethius

Congratulations, now you understand that just having nukes and bases and forces is not that much of a threat in itself, if the probability of its use is so minimal.

This is probably true, sure, but most Ukrainians also wanted to avoid a war with Russia in such a process, and so why they kept on voting for compromisers, including Zelensky advertised himself as a compromiser.

Likewise, certainly a majority of Ukrainians would like to be in NATO as a way to avoid being invaded by Russia.

The problem is that NATO doesn't let Ukraine in. — boethius

They voted for Yanukovych who promised them further economic integration with the EU and then reneged on that promise (that is why you have the reasons for the Euromaidan completely backwards). Zelensky also supported stronger integration with the EU and in his campaign was focused mostly on the internal matters (it is more that his rival Poroshenko painted him as a Russian conciliator). Sure, at a time he was supporting the militarily neutral stance, but it became clear that Russia is not interested.

If you put it to Ukrainians anytime in the decades before the war that "would you like to play footsie with NATO for decades, be in a 'will we, won't we relationship' and all cute and shit, but never actually get into NATO and likely be invaded by Russia and the country ruined, millions of Ukrainians permanently leaving, the already terrible demographics totally shot ... oh, and hundreds of thousands of heroes dead or maimed in a war they can't win?", you really saying most Ukrainians would be like "oh! sign me up! Glory to those soon to be dead heroes!".

I don't think so. Rather, people in "less sophisticated" places, such as Ukraine, often put stock in word keeping, as that's the only way society has any sort of structure at all, and they are easily manipulated by more sophisticated civilizations that can see a bigger picture where their word meaning absolutely nothing is of greater benefit to themselves, over the long term; talk to the native Americans if this level of sophistications escapes your imagination.

So you are saying that Ukrainians after their own independence war in 1917-1920, Katyn, Finland, Afghanistan, the Lithuania intervention, two Chechen wars, the Georgia war, and dozens of others were blissfully unaware what Russian imperialism means? It seems your naivety shows again.

Obviously, has thousands of nukes.

The problem vis-a-vis Ukraine is that Ukraine is not a legitimate area of strategic defence for NATO.

If Ukraine was of legitimate strategic value to NATO, then NATO would have gone in the night to Ukraine at some point in the 20 years it's been playing footsie with Ukraine and just brought Ukraine into the alliance by surprise and then flooded the country with NATO troops, bases and equipment the next day. — boethius

That is hilarious from someone urging me to 'live in the real world'. You clearly have no idea how the real world works... Ukraine joining of NATO required consent of all it members, some of which (mostly Germany and France) blocked it in 2008 (not for fear of Russian reprisal, but due to quite lucractive business going on, not to mention subversive influence of Russian on European politics which is only now being disclosed). Moreover, it has required consent of various Ukraine political factions which played this card against each other for years. Joining of Poland took six years, with all the sides much more willing. Thus your scenario of 'going in in the night' is completely divorced from reality and just shows how naive is your view of politics.

So, why is there a war?

Well there isn't a war between Russia and NATO, that's clear.

There's a war because enough Ukrainians (though no the majority, going by any of the votes in which this was a major topic) are gullible enough to play footsie back with NATO and some of those even gullible enough to think NATO really will "stand up" for democracy and risk something real for themselves (aka. nuclear war) in order to "defend freedom or whatever".

The other reason we have the war is that the US elite saw strategic benefit in provoking tensions, as the RAND document literally entitled "Overextending and Unbalancing Russia" makes clear. Now, it's possible US elite weren't aiming for such a large scale war so destructive to Ukraine, but as RAND makes perfectly clear that is a risk (to Ukraine) of the policy. — boethius

No, that is not the reason there is a war. The reason there is war is because most Ukrainians, as the constant majority of votes shows, want to get out of the Russian sphere of influence, just like Poland and the Baltics did. And for Putin that is unacceptable, as most of his powerbase relies on the nationalistic circles which helped him maintain and consolidate his power.

The rest of your fantasies are not really worth addressing, as you clearly have no idea what you are talking about. Hint: Germany and France did block Ukraine's accession, hint 2: 'it was the EU ultimatum that was the casus belli' is so wrong it is beyond hilarious.

Now, you can argue that Russia shouldn't invade Ukraine even if NATO is indeed a legitimate threat to Russia, but arguing NATO is not a legitimate threat is just dumb. — boethius

Is Russia a legitimate threat to NATO?

Yes, the link confirms what I have already told you: you were wrong. You have no knowledge of the issues you try to discuss, only vague ideas you picked up from the Internet. And I have already said that the US is not a 'good guy' by any measure. That does not make Russia automatically good.

You have claimed that the countries accepted into NATO after the unification of Germany have nukes 'on their soil'.

You have made a specific claim that was quite easy to prove false. As you are obviously unable to support your claims with any evidence, you are reduced to 'google it' and personal attacks. And no, Americans are far from being the good guys, however, this does not make Russia any better.

The link yourself has provided shows that there are no nuclear weapons in the countries that joined after the unification of Germany. Your previous claim is false.

Your current claims are not only false, but just silly: you say that NATO is bordering Russia, but Russia is not bordering NATO. That is logically incoherent.

Russia has deployed nukes to Belarus, which is very much bordering Poland, a NATO country. Moreover, Russia has routinely deployed nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, which also borders Poland (and allows Russia to easily reach most of Western Europe):
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-missiles/russia-deploys-iskander-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad-ria-idUSKBN1FP21Y/

In short: you clearly have no idea what you are talking about.

This is blatantly an incorrect statement.

So at least know your history if you are going to attack others on not knowing theirs. — Tzeentch

As usual, you jump into the discussion with as little understanding as possible...

In the quote I have given boagle clearly referred to new NATO members AFTER the unification of Germany and so did I.

So pointing out an glaring historical mistake from someone insisting on the importance of history is an 'attitude'? Right... And I am quite aware of how the Cuban Crisis began, that is why his mistake is so glaring.

Why, I had no idea you were so open-minded. The problem began with the unification of Germany, which was an agreement between all the allied countries under the protection and guidance of America. It was agreed to by Russia as well, on the condition that NATO did not move any further east towards Russia. This was agreed to by America, stating we will not move one inch closer to the borders of Russia. They lied, and soon began their advance toward the Russian border. With each country America took into its fold moving closer, they also placed nuclear warheads on the soil of these countries. Starting to get the picture? — boagie

That is simply false. No nuclear weapons have been deployed in new NATO members:

https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/nuclear-weapons-europe-mapping-us-and-russian-deployments

So much for your knowledge of history.

Members, sure. (Might also be members of the EU / Asian air forces, heck, send Xi an official notification-invite for that matter.) But they wouldn't bomb inside Russia (for a while, depending), except due threats to be issued for Russian missiles entering Ukrainian airspace (direct violation). Would put the invading forces into a defensive position, taking initiative from the precarious situation of being "sitting ducks with some repellent". If bombs/missiles go Russia → Ukraine, then bombs/missiles may equally go → Russia. What's an expected range for anti-fighter-bomber SAMs (not anti-ballistic/cruise-missile SAMs)? The Kremlin's actions were repeatedly condemned by the UN, in violation of international law, which they've given a(n impunity) hand-wave. Justification isn't missing; will is missing, contrary to pledges since 2022 by various parties. — jorndoe

The nominal range of S400 is 400 km (hence the name), but effectively against airplanes it would be about 200 km. This means that to effectively enforce a no-fly zone in Ukraine NATO planes would either have to engage targets in Russia or allow themselves to be taken out with impunity. Again, 'no-fly zone' is simply 'starting the war with Russia', which NATO countries are unwilling to do.

Well, it wouldn't be a NATO operation (under the auspices of NATO), except the combined force would include NATO members. More importantly, it would be a bona fides Ukraine defense operation, operating in Ukraine, irrespective of invader, within Kyiv's mandate. Wouldn't be an invasion of Russia. But, you're right, it could (incorrectly) be perceived/cast (by some) as NATO warring against Russia, which would be propagandized, especially because such a move can push invading forces out of Ukraine. That's the "wargame" set up by Kremlin strategists. Ironically perhaps, such a move could save lives, defender/Ukrainian lives at least (while limiting propagation of Kremlin authoritarianism). — jorndoe

No, it would not be operating in Ukraine, unless I completely misunderstand what you mean by 'no-fly zone'. There is already a 'no-fly zone' in most of Ukraine for Russians: they cannot fly farther than about 30 km from the front line, otherwise they risk being shot down by Ukrainian SAMs. To push them further away would require flying over the frontline, which would require bombing Russian SAM sites located much farther. It still would be NATO member planes bombing targets in Russia.

EDIT: The 30 km range refers to typical shorter range SAM deployments. With such systems like Patriots the distance must be much farther away. I cannot find much hard data, but it is reasonable to assume based on the ranges that most Russian sorties (i.e. UMPK/KAB attacks) take place about 70-90 km from the frontline. In other words, beside Crimea, Russian planes barely enter the Ukrainian air space.

To my knowledge, there isn't anything against this by international law. Besides, it's Ukrainian airspace. Logistics etc demanding. Where combined air force lands is irrelevant as long as OK'd by Kyiv (it's their airspace to defend, their choice to make). None of this is proxy war or terrorism, or intended so. After some time with clearer skies, civilians can be expected to be a bit safer, though not to the extent of resuming international commercial air traffic. — jorndoe

'No-fly zone' effectively means 'bombing Russian SAM sites by NATO forces'. How exactly is that different from NATO starting a war with Russia?

In the West it is mostly forgotten that in 1939 USSR and the Nazi Germany have signed the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact with the secret clause concerning the partition of Eastern Europe (USSR has invaded Poland soon after the Nazi invasion). Some of the mass graves discovered by Germans were of Polish officers who were interned on the lands taken over by Russia and then executed by NKVD. The West basically overlooked the fact in order not to offend the new 'ally'. Due to that controversy and the protests over the Yalta accords, Russians (the former Nazi collaborators) were invited to the London victory parade, while Poles (who as the first fought with Nazis and then joined the Western forces, e.g. in the Battle of England) were not.

What is astounding to me is the apparent lack of awareness of the overall situation. This was visible early on with the failure to make a convincing case to India, apparently forgetting that India is on the verge of becoming a major power and would have to be treated as an equal partner.

Is this simply the primacy of economics having become to ingrained, so European leaders have trouble actively shaping a geopolitical policy? — Echarmion

Why would democratic politicians have long-term goals? They will out of office in a few years and for now they have to win the popularity contest... The irony is that dictators and authoritarians have a much bigger stake in the future – for them long-term failure means prison, exile or death.