Would you be inclined to agree that although the prevalence of the continental tradition writ large has declined, at least it couldn’t be said to have killed itself, as the infusion of OLP and LP eventually self-destructed the analytic? — Mww

No. For a number of reasons.
The OLP advocated that philosophy should analyze, but wanted to analyze in a different way- in Ryle's terms, informal logic as opposed to formal logic or untechnical as opposed to technical concepts - and tried to carve out an arena for philosophy which avoided awkward conflicts with more technical disciplines - though he also thought that philosophy's arena was "more fundamental\" than the technical disciplines' one other feature was abandonment of the idea that it is philosophy's task to reform and regulated language. Philosophy of Language (that is what you mean by LP?) was rather different, and was, I would say, a development of the idea that philosophy's primary method was logical analysis.
Actually, I don't think that analytic philosophy has self-destructed. My perception is that it is alive and kicking strongly - even though some people are very critical of it and are announcing it is over.

I think using the caterpillar and butterfly analogy is incorrect, I think a better one would be a seed planted in a garden. The life cycle of a seed starts at germination, where it starts to take in moisture and sprout, if you were to compare it to a foetus it would be the stage where the egg is fertilized and it starts to divide. — Samlw

I was talking about a certain kind of concept, so I didn't have an actual analogy in mind. Caterpillar and egg were examples rather than analogies. Yes, seeds vs plants are a better analogy.

Obviously I'm not calling for all abortions to be banned. I just think that in the future, we would do well to adhere to a policy of not aborting when not completely necessary (presuming a future that has improved upon the world today, which might be a stretch, but is also the only way I can see a future at all). — Igitur

There's plenty of room for debate about "not completely necessary".
I think we have to be careful about a policy in relation to decisions that ought to be made at an individual level. A policy of encouraging people to have children because the population is declining (or the reverse) is one thing - and actions to make the process (for or against) easier would not be objectionable. But laws compelling people in either direction are objectionable; people tend to resist them strongly anyway.

And he replies that it is not yet fixed, therefore it is fixed, and you should pay. — tim wood

You are confusing me with someone who is making that mistake. There are indeed important differences between the flood that has not yet happened and the flood that is happening now. But it is also important not to confuse the flood that has not yet happened with no flood happening.
I think this is just a question of language and emphasis - unless you can show me what hangs on it. I think that what hangs on this is that, just as one should not confuse a foetus with a child, one should not confuse a foetus with a parasite. A pregnant woman is not yet a mother, but her pregnancy is still important, ethically and in other ways.

It is well established that prior to WWI, German idealism was still highly influential in English and American philosophy departments. That began to wane with GE Moore and Bertrand Russell’s criticism of idealism in the 1920’s, — Wayfarer

That's true. I was placing Husserl a bit earlier than I should have done. I just wanted to point out that their characterization of what they were doing might have been a bit partial. A rebellion was also going on in Germany, which they didn't like, of course. But Bentham and the two Mills had continued the empiricist tradition through Hume from Berkeley and Locke through the 19th century. I think the divide can be traced back to rationalism (Descartes and others, on the other side of the Channel) and empiricism (Berkeley, Locke, Hume, in England).


You see, sometimes I go too far the other way and insist on calling a spade an agricultural implement.

What are some of the major differences you see between Continental and Anglo philosophy? — Janus

First and foremost, and from which all relevant distinctions evolve, the presence in continental, the absence in analytic philosophy, of theoretical system metaphysics.
Probably isn’t a single all-consuming response, but I read this one somewhere, seemed to cover more bases. — Mww

It certainly covers some of them. Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and Carnap made it clear that theoretical system metaphysics was their primary target. This was a not an unfair characterization of the German Idealism, based on Hegel, and Kantian tradition which were indeed dominant in the whole of Europe at the time, But a rebellion (Husserl, Heidegger) was also going on across the Channel at the same time. Analytic philosophers mostly didn't like them, but they were not simply a continuation of metaphysics.

(Ray Monk was biographer of both Wittgenstein and Russell, although the latter bio is not very well regarded.) — Wayfarer

Yes. I have read the Wittgenstein biography, but not the Russell one. As I remember it, the Wittgenstein book rather stole a march on Brain McGuiness and there was some bad blood. I read McGuiness' as well and it was the better book. But it stopped half way.

The article I linked to ascribes the rift to Gilbert Ryle’s hostility to Husserl and Heidegger in the 1940’s and onwards, and also Ryle’s dominance of English philosophy at that stage (he was editor of Mind from 1949-71 and had a lot of say in who got philosophy chairs in Britain). — Wayfarer

Yes. There were problems, but I just don't feel strongly about it - perhaps because I have always been very sympathetic to his project. I can understand the hostility to Heidegger - there's still an issue about his venture into public life in the 30's. Some people still want him "cancelled". In the context of WW2 so soon after WW1, it would be surprising if there were not some hostility. It looks unreasonable now, I grant you. But we're 70 years, at least two, perhaps three, generations, further away from those times.

Your rhetoric always seems quite circumspect to me, for what it’s worth. — Wayfarer

You don't know how much I delete before posting. When I read others indulging themselves, I don't like it, so...

I've saved the review for later. Thanks.

As am I, make no mistake! But Nagel, in particular, has the advantage of being dissident inside that mainstream, so at least he is paid attention, even if it's often hostile. — Wayfarer

I can recognize that I should not lump him in with the materialist mainstream - nor Chalmers. At present, I'm inclined to think that he is not dissident enough. I need to take a closer look. When the closer look will happen, I do not know. In the mean time, I can perhaps moderate my rhetoric.

According to Ray Monk, the Continental-Anglo divide stems from the period of Gilbert Ryle’s dominance of Anglo philosophy. — Wayfarer

I don't think that's historically accurate. I have the impression that the divide was well embedded before WW2. Indeed, it goes back to Hegel and beyond. Some people seem inclined to blame Ryle for everything, but I don't think that's fair.

Don't we already have, and have had for a long time, that "first-person science" in the form of phenomenology? — Janus

But I thought that Husserl specifically developed phenomenology to be something quite distinct from science - unless you define science as anything that attempts to achieve objectivity.

Which prompts me to complain that this entire discussion is scientistic and ignores the possibility that disciplines that do not aim to emulate science may be (I think are) essential to understanding consciousness. History, Literary and Cultural Studies, Sociology, some branches of Psychology etc. - not to mention Marxism and Psychoanalysis which might well have something to offer. But, of course, it all depends how you define "science".

I have literally never heard anyone try to deny that anywhere, at any time in my life. — Patterner

You didn't mention it in your account of how different humans are from animals. Mind you, I don't mention what you emphasize in my accounts of how similar they are. Perhaps it comes down to "glass half full/empty" - a difference in perspective rather than a disagreement about the facts. Then we need to tease out why that difference in emphasis is so important.

Are you contradicting yourself? Or am I reading it wrong? — Patterner

Yes, it does look peculiar. I didn't put the point carefully enough.
I think that "sensory input" is already a recognition that consciousness and experience are present. I also think that there is no a priori reason to rule out in advance the possibility that conscious beings might have bodies of plastic and silicon. Does that help?

My point is there couldn't be such a thing. As I've said before, just because we can say the words, doesn't mean we can conceive of them. Like a square circle. — Patterner

That's exactly why I can't do anything with your thought-experiments.

Right, but then isn't that the "simpleminded" case? — Janus

Yes, I guess it is. Perhaps that simple-mindedness is a fault. One can't, for example, describe an unborn baby as a foetus and pretend not to know what kind of context that sets up.

I'm not bothered by it either, so it wasn't a complaint, but merely an acknowledgement. I see it as a good thing to acknowledge our limitations. — Janus

Well, I certainly agree that it is a good thing to recognize the difference between a picture and a description and being there. Whether "limitations" is appropriate for that is another question.

But the point is that there is not any such thing. — tim wood

I'm surprised that you think that is a point so obvious and simple that one can simply remind me of it and pass on. There are profoundly different views at stake here. The view that you are expressing here is, on my reading of it, a kind of atomism that posits a world consisting of entities each of which exists in its own right, independently of all the other entities in the world. Everything is what it is, and not another thing. This view works quite well in many contexts, but sometimes does not work at all well.

You can insist that a caterpillar is not a butterfly. I shall insist that a caterpillar is not yet a butterfly. I am thinking of the state of being a caterpillar (or a chrysalis or a butterfly) as a stage in a life-cycle. Because the changes in this life-cycle are so dramatic, we apply different terms to the stages. But we include our understanding of each stage in the concept - the way we think about - each term. We call this the life-cycle of the butterfly, choosing the final stage to identify the life-cycle, which is somewhat arbitrary, but not incomprehensible. This is why there is so much argument about abortion.

The common argument here is that bodily autonomy is a defensive right - you have the right to refuse interference with your body, but you don't have a right to a specific treatment. And in case of a pregnancy, the fetus/baby is "using" the body of the mother, hence her bodily autonomy takes precedence. — Echarmion

I hate this argument. I would think that a mother who thinks like that about her unborn baby is likely to think like that about baby/child and that will not be a good thing for either child or eventual adult. Perhaps one might one posit a radical change of heart. But in fact it amounts to occupying the opposition's ground and turning it against them. It high-lights how inappropriate it is to think of a foetus as a small person as opposed to a future person.

Well, I think it's either simpleminded or dishonestly tendentious. "Trying to gain a rhetorical advantage" seems a strategy more suited to sophistry than to philosophy. — Janus

Yes, it is exactly the kind of thing Plato had in mind. But, to be fair, those effects are not always being consciously manipulated.

It's not clear to me what you are wanting to get at here. — Janus

Perhaps it's not relevant. Let's not pursue it here.

No. I really like Chalmers. Most of the time. But PZs are just dumb. A planet that never had consciousness, but had our intellectual abilities, would never come up with three concept of consciousness. They wouldn't ever talk about it, or have words for it. — Patterner

OK. The PZs are supposed to be indistinguishable from normal humans, so that case is not relevant. You get much closer to that with your planet. I don't know of any reason to suppose that's possible, so I have no opinion to give.

Don't we have robots that perform certain actions when they get certain sensory input? — Patterner

It depends. If they have sensory input, they are conscious, so I don't accept that we have robots like that. But I agree that we can strap a camera to a computer (or input an image) and program it to respond in certain circumstances. I understand also that we often call that seeing or calculating or speaking. But it's by extension from human beings, not in their own right. Getting it to do everything that we do is a different matter. I don't rule out the possibility that one day there might be a machine that is conscious, but I have very little idea of what it would be like. But I also don't think that consciousness is on/off, like a light and sometimes there may be no definitive answer.

Now we think about things, and kind of things, nothing else thinks about. — Patterner

.. and yet we are still animals.

When you say it's a "non-issue", do you mean we're in agreement that a human foetus and a human baby are the same thing, despite the different terms usYeed? — Hallucinogen

Yes.

A person's ethical attitudes ought to be based on reasoning, just as their descriptions ought to be. The descriptions don't justify their ethical attitudes, their reasoning does. — Hallucinogen

Yes. But these descriptions involve both facts and values, and that makes for an argument in which it is easy to get confused.

The debate has constrained usage and most dictionaries are sometimes not helpful in understanding all usages. — tim wood

If I was a dictator - which God forbid! - I would legislate that a foetus is a foetus until live birth occurs, after which it is a baby.

I don't know the details about Roe v Wade, but from what I've seen, it is certainly a good start.

I agree with what you said, barring nit-picking details.

Above I asked you if you thought a caterpillar is a butterfly. Or even if the contents of an egg are a chicken. Pro-lifers seem to think they are, which given that they are not, is an example of what I call vicious. — tim wood

I thought they were trick questions, so didn't answer. I would be an idiot to answer either yes or no.

A caterpillar is not just a caterpillar, but a future butterfly. It should be treated as such. Ditto the contents of an egg.

A foetus is not just a lump, but a future person (even if it has died). (There's been some conflict about that between parents and doctors.) This creates a complicated situation. Of course the mother has a predominant interest, and, as a living person, prior rights. But society also has a reasonable interest and perhaps the father too.

There's far too much content to take on nowadays. — Wayfarer

The most annoying tendency is for people to append very long lists with no comment whatever. Very unhelpful. They give the appearance of being the result of a search and little more. You can tell who's read a lot from the text itself (and the footnotes). Reviews are good, when they don't just repeat the publisher's blurb.

My interest in David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel in particular, is because they are both opponents of philosophical materialism but from within a generally mainstream analytic context. — Wayfarer

Opposing materialism is good. But I'm very ambivalent about the analytic mainstream. Yet it is the analytic mainstream I am opposed to and I have to admit that from time to time I come across ideas that I can take on board.

Very much so, but let's leave that for now. — Wayfarer

Agreed. One cannot pursue every rabbit that pops up.

He doesn’t say it’s insoluble. I quoted it for its succinctness. But that is one paragraph - actually one half of one paragraph - from an entire book. Nagel’s suggestion for a solution is sketchy, but revolves around the idea of there being a natural teleology - a natural tendency for minded beings to evolve, which can be seen as a movement towards the ‘universe understanding itself’. As distinct from the neo-Darwinian picture in which we’re the accidental byproducts of a fortuitous combination of elements. — Wayfarer

Hold on! I thought we were talking about Chalmers. But perhaps that's not important. I suppose I'll have to Nagel's book on my ever-lengthening reading list - and I'm a slow reader of philosophy books. I'm beginning to think I'll never catch up. But I would like to be fair to him in future.

An interesting idea. Back to Aristotle again. Perhaps.

I'm not sure that "a natural tendency" and "accidental by-product" are in flat contradiction. They could constitute different attitudes to the same phenomenon. (Except I have serious difficulties about "the universe understanding itself" - but then I don't have to go that far.) Evolution itself could be an example of how to make progress. It manages to posit a blind, purely causal process, which nevertheless manages to have the effects of a purposive process. Dennett argues at length that such a process deserves to be called "purposive", and, on the principle of the duck, that seems a reasonable proposal.

Maybe Hakicho? — Wayfarer

Indeed. I've been trying to remember that story ever since the example was proposed (by Vera, I think). I couldn't remember enough detail to construct a search that would throw it up. Thank you.

I don't see how. There is no need to think about one's own beliefs about future events in order to have beliefs about future events. — creativesoul

I'm waiting on the platform for the 5 pm train; it is 4.58; I expect (believe) that the train will arrive shortly. It doesn't. I am disappointed. Is it correct to say that I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false? It is correct to say that that constitutes a belief about a belief?
Why would it be incorrect to substitute "the dog" for "I" in that story?
I think you would reply that it is incorrect because the dog is unable to speak English.
However, I do not believe that attributing beliefs or knowledge to an agent is about what is going on in the agent's head. It's about making sense of what the agent does.

Despite being very similar in almost all ways, we can think in ways no animal can. — Patterner

That's true. But, since we are animals, the ways that an animal thinks are still available to us, so these special ways are grafted on to the ways of thinking that an animal thinks.
My favourite quick way of making this point is to remind you that we are perfectly capable of using language without any ability to formulate the rules that we are following. Articulating definitions and grammatical rules is grafted on to "wordless" thinking.

Of course this is the background to Chalmer's 'facing up to the problem of consciousness'. — Wayfarer

Certainly. But I don't think that formulating the problem in such a way that the problem is insoluble is particularly helpful. I wish I was sure that it was an unintended consequence, but I very much doubt it.

The brain's activity could do these things without any subjective experience/consciousness anywhere. — Patterner

The problem is that your thought-experiment only works if I pretend that I accept this. It begs the question. (This is about the P-zombies, isn't it?)

What seems most misguided and retrogressive to me is the very idea that the brain is merely "grey glutinous matter". That seems most simple-minded to me. The counterpoint to that—thinking of the mind as ethereal is the equally retarded sibling. — Janus

Oh, I don't think it is all that simple-minded. It is an attempt to gain a rhetorical advantage by labelling the phenomenon in a prejudicial way. If I'm feeling charitable, I try to ignore the label for the sake of the argument.

That said, we are concerned with what it seems most reasonable to say, while acknowledging that our words can never capture the reality. — Janus

I'm not that bothered about that supposed failure. It's a bit like complaining that a photograph doesn't capture the reality of the scene. Of course it doesn't - unless you allow it to by supplementing the coloured patches by empathetically imagining (remembering) being there.

Consider Wordsworth's famous lines "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive / But to be young was very heaven!" For me, they capture what it was to be Wordsworth in France before the Revolution. But not by reporting facts. Language has resources beyond that.

To start with, that they are not the same thing, ergo different; and different, ergo not the same thing. — tim wood

Very true. All I asked was what the differences are that make the difference. I didn't think that was a particularly vicious question. Let me try again.

Foetus - An unborn or unhatched vertebrate in the later stages of development showing the main recognizable features of the mature animal.

Baby 1. A very young child; an infant. 2. An unborn child; a fetus. 3. The youngest member of a family or group.

These are dictionary definitions and not particularly authoritative. However, I have the impression that they are an acceptable starting-point for discussion. So can you please explain where they are wrong?

You're just playing games with words, and since I don't reckon that you're actually playing, I must assume you're serious, which makes you vicious. Just exactly as I would be if I mislabled you for nefarious purposes of my own. — tim wood

I don't disagree with you. But it's not quite the whole story. I do think that the labelling of - let's say - an unborn baby as a foetus or a baby is part of the very serious business of debating the issue. I also think that in this context, it is vicious, or at best irrelevant. That was my point.
The emotional overtones of "foetus" and "baby" are very different and are being used to gain rhetorical advantage in the debate. Participants in the debate are indeed playing games with words.
(Not that the proper use of "foetus" in clinical and research contexts is vicious.)
You must forgive me if I made the point in a way that misled you. .

You will probably both disagree with me,
— Ludwig V
:rofl: — Patterner

I did notice what was going on. But were going off on a discussion of epiphenomenalism and walking. I didn't feel I had much to contribute to that - and my bandwidth is rather limited.

I guess there are those who say the neural activity isn't experienced as wanting to have milk. Rather, the neutral activity is wanting to have milk. Experiencing the neural activity vs. the neural activity being the experience. The latter being the case if we are ruled by physical determinism. In which case, the "wanting to have milk" is, I guess, epiphenomenal, and serves no purpose. — Patterner

I agree with your beginning. But, as you predicted, I don't agree with your ending. ("neutral" is a typo for "neural", I assume.)
Monkeys and Shakespeare. Think of someone who has never seen or conceived of a calculator. They may press keys and random and watch the changes shapes on the screen. They have no idea of the meaning. The causal sequences are working away behind the screen. Some of them are calculations, some are not. The significance of what is going on escapes them.
But we know how the calculator was set up and the correct sequences of keys to press in order to execute the calculations we want to make.
The causal sequences on their own cannot distinguish between calculations and random numbers. They work in just the same way whatever keys are pressed. Only when you know how the calculator fits in to human lives can you grasp their significance.
It seems to me a complete misunderstanding or misrepresentation to say that the screen display is an epiphenomenon. The screen display is the point of the whole exercise.
Causal sequences in the brain are described in a way that is designed to ignore the significance of what is going on. Unless you know how they fit in to human life, you cannot grasp that. Wanting to have some milk is the point of the causal sequence, not an epiphenomenon.
(This involves rejecting the idea that a causal sequence always undermines the rational, human understanding of what is going on. The progress from a brain state of thirst to walking to the shops is causal, but is what enables me to do what I want to do. The reductionist deterministic view of causal sequences only reflects the fact that we only pay attention to causal sequences when they have gone wrong, and prevented me from doing what I want to do.)
Does that help?

epiphenomenalism is supposed to argue against that on the grounds that consciousness appears to be superfluous if neural activity does all the causal work. — SophistiCat

No, the conscious outcomes are the point, the meaning, the significance of the causal sequences. It's just that we ignore them unless something goes wrong.

According to the definitions I quoted earlier, epiphenomenalism says mental states do not have any effect on physical events. Walking is a physical event, not a mental event. And walking certainly has an effect on physical events. So I don't know how you are thinking walking is epiphenomenal. — Patterner

Well, the fact that mental states make me walk to the shops demonstrates that epiphenomenalism is false.

With this I disagree. They are different things, their differences being in part recognized by differences in description. One may become the other - but being and becoming very different, yes? — tim wood

I must be missing something. What are the differences that need to be recognized?

Though I suspect that the terms may be being used, shall we say, more flexibly, because "baby" is more emotionally appealing than "foetus".

The same may apply to "egg" and "sperm", which may help to explain explain why they are less protected than babies.

Thank you, Ludwig V, for reflecting further on my question, and trying to rescue me from myself. I don’t even think my mother would do that! :cool: — Thales

You give me too much credit - or maybe you thought I was patronizing. I was, selfishly, trying to work out a space in which we might have a constructive debate.

Animals don’t use different voice “genres,” or plan out concert schedules, or reserve venues, or collect money, or issue tickets, or require dress codes, etc. — Thales

No, they don't. But they do have voices and they do do something that is at least akin to singing. But we can bat this back and to forever without anything of any interest emerging.

Because whenever animals use their “voices,” it is for some survival reason – e.g., mating, warning, etc. And that’s it. — Thales

Surely we do sing for mating, warring, etc.

certainly most singing is for enjoyment, expression of emotions or some other “human” reason. — Thales

I don't know about "most", but some is. How do you know that wolves don't howl at the moon, for example, for the enjoyment of it?

My starting-point is that human beings are animals. We have bodies in the same way that they do. We have instincts which dominate our lives just as they do. Pretending we are not animals is something that are very much tempted to do, because we spend much time and effort trying to distinguish ourselves from them. But most animals do that in one way or another. For the most part, species prefer not to share their homes, roosts or whatever with other species. So that desire is shared with other animals as well.

When someone tries to find some respect in which humans differ from animals, what I hear is a desire to pretend that they are not an animal. But they eat and sleep and do all those animal things. How are they not animals - admittedly an animal with over-developed capacities? But that doesn't change the foundation.

Three divisions of nine months: first, abortion ok, second, maybe ok, third, probably not ok. — tim wood

That's a very good starting-point for developing policy. But, of course, those are lines drawn in a continuous developmental process. The argument against abortion is essentially an argument against the ethical significance of those lines, so they are swept away by a blizzard of slogans and absolutism. Pity.

Can we get some perspective by considering a related but different issue? The idea that contraception is wrong. The abortion argument seems to draw a line at the point of fertilization of the egg and there is a point to that. Still, there are people (some of whom I respect) who believe that that line is not ethically significant. It is true that the causal process does not begin at that point, but is arrived at by means of a causal process which is initiated by the sex act.

There are ethical and legal restrictions on the sex act. So now I want to ask why if it is thought to be so vitally important not to interfere with the development of a foetus/baby/child, it is thought to be ethically acceptable to interfere in any way with the sex act.

Once one has decided that it is ethically important to regulate the sex act, it seems to me that there is no good reason to reject interference with the process at any later stage, until the foetus/baby/child becomes sentient, and even then, when situations arise in which life and welfare
of the baby and mother are in danger and choices have to be made, there is no good reason to prioritize the life of the baby over that of the mother.

My claim is that people who insist on using the term foetus instead of baby can't point out what the substantive difference is, and that they use the term to suggest there is one. A human foetus and a human baby are both human individuals. — Hallucinogen

This is a non-issue. A human foetus and a human baby are the same individuals being described in different ways. The difference is the ethical attitudes embedded in the description. It is pointless to fuss about which description is being applied when what is at stake is the ethical attitudes embedded in the descriptions.
I would argue that there is a significant difference between the descriptions "baby" and "child", although it gets severely eroded in common use. A child is a baby who has grown up somewhat, probably to the point where they can walk and talk. However, there are somewhat different ethical attitudes embedded in those descriptions as well.

That was a very helpful dialogue. The most interesting feature was that it turns out that you agree on a great deal. So I'm going to try and identify more accurately where your disagreement is. You will probably both disagree with me, but I hope we will get clearer about the problem - which is certainly a hard one.

It's not controversial that electrochemical processes cause us to decide to act. — Janus

I'm afraid it is very controversial. The disagreement centres on "cause". There's a definition which circulates in philosophical discussion and this definition itself is, in my view, suspect. After all, it was developed more than 300 years ago and things have moved on since then. Allied to a popular metaphysical view - that the only "true" or fundamental reality is physical/material reality, it is inescapably reductionist. Part of the problem is that the scientific revolutionaries in the 17th century took an entirely rational decision that their physics would not and could not take account of anything that could not be represented as a measurable quantity that could be treated mathematically. There's nothing wrong with that decision, except the illusion that anything that could not be represented in physics was not real.

Do you really believe that when you decide to act or simply act that there have been no prior neural processes (that you have obviously not been aware of) which give rise to that decision or action? — Janus

You've moved away from the troublesome concept of cause to something vaguer, which masks, to some extent, where the disagreement is.
You refer to "when I decide to act or simply act". That seems to posit the possibility of acting without deciding to act, which seems absurd, and certainly won't help the neurophysiologists, who are looking for causes of action. So we need to choose between saying that when I "simply act", there is no decision or the decision is the action and the action is the decision.
All this is hugely complicated by the concept of "intention". We don't I think decide to intend to act, yet intending to act seems to presuppose that I have decided to act. Then the question arises about "simply acting". Does this mean acting without intending to - i.e. unintentionally? I don't think so.
So now we have a rather complex preparatory stage to action - decision, intention, action, and a category of actions that seem to be actions, yet have no visible preparatory stage.
Then we need to think about planning, preparing, trying - where do all these fit in?
Coming back to what I will call - as vaguely as possible - the neurophysiological correlates of action. The neurophysiologists are positing all sorts of mental events - at least that is the language they use - which precede action. They don't seem to allow the possibility of "simply acting" - and if they did, it would mess up their search for physical processes that precede action. In fact, they are in a conceptual space that is closely parallel to the conceptual space of traditional dualism, who posited all sorts of "mental events" that preceded action and seemed to distinguish acting from a simply causal event with an empty gesture at substances. The dualists explained "simply acting" by positing that they took place very rapidly or unconsciously, which I think most people now recognize as hand-waving. Neurophysiologists are doing the same thing. The difference is that they are waving their hands at physical correlates.
It's a mess.

But the 'two competing explanatory paradigms', mental and material, just is the Cartesian division - mind and matter, self and other. — Wayfarer

Well, there is the difference that the distinction is no longer between two substances. But it is not wrong to say that the appeal to explanatory paradigms is a reinscription of Cartesian dualist and repeats the central dualist problem - how to explain the (causal) interface between mind and matter. But the nature of the question is different. That may be progress.

The way to "transcend that division" is to see that they are just two ways of understanding and that no polemic is necessary or even coherent between them. — Janus

Yes. That worked for a while in the late 20th century. But the scientists couldn't leave it alone. So here we are. What puzzles me, though, is why you seem unable to resist positing an interface between them. (Nor can I). Anyway, it is very helpful to know that you are seeing the problem in a Spinozan framework.

The point was that the ‘kettle’ example is a clear-cut illustration of the distinction between efficient (water temp) and teleological (intentional) causation. Using ‘neural activity’ to illustrate the distinction muddies the water by introducing another set of questions, concerning the relationship between neurophysiology and free will which you acknowledge is not at all clear cut. — Wayfarer

It sounds as if you are seeing the issue in an Aristotelian context. Am I wrong?

I was hoping to keep free will out of it at least for the time being. However, my strategy here is to see free will as equating with the proper functioning of my body, including its brain. Then I am able to do what I want to do and able to want what I want to want. But I'm a long way from being able to construct a compelling argument for that.

Ludwig V might find that of interest. — Wayfarer

Yes. I haven't read that book. But I have a lot of time for Hacker and Bennett. The first paragraph is a good presentation of what I want to say.

Moreover, merely replacing the mind by the brain leaves intact the misguided Cartesian conception of the relationship between the mind and behavior, merely replacing the ethereal by grey glutinous matter. The structure of the Cartesian explanatory system remains intact, and this leads to Bennett and Hacker's conclusion that contemporary cognitive neuroscientists are not nearly anti-Cartesian enough. — Wayfarer

That seems to me to be importantly correct, in this context.

So you found an exception or two to the rule. Congrats. — Leontiskos

a-z-animals.com has 7 species and says that " In fact, up to one in three mammal species are known to commit infanticide."

wildlifeinformer.com has 10 species and says that heads its list as "10 examples with pictures". (They aren't pictures of the animals in the process of eating their young). They say of blenny fish that " it is the fathers that eat their babies rather than the mother." Their story is that it is the father that looks after the eggs until they hatch. But apparently they sometimes eat the eggs they are supposed to be looking after so they can wander off and find another mate.

www.livescience.com has 12 species and introduces its list with "many creatures engage in this behavior."

Not as casually with little to no thought about the matter, rather. — Outlander

I would hope that anyone choosing an abortion would treat the matter seriously. Whether they do or not is an empirical question. Proper data, properly gathered is the only serious basis for making a judgement about how many do in fact take it seriously and how many do not.

What if, say, a woman chose abortion and later becomes infertile. Or simply ponders, as she becomes older, the magnitude of the act, or rather begins thinking along the lines of "imagine what could have been", etc. — Outlander

The only way you can answer that question is to talk to women who have made that decision and become infertile (or chosen not to have children, for that matter). Again, proper data, properly gathered. Anything else is speculation, and possibly fear-mongering and propaganda. "What if.." questions are all too often misused.

It's uncontroversial that the brain responds to stimuli and orchestrates all bodily processes and actions. That's what I mean. I've already said that I'm referring to that as modeling but am not suggesting it is any more than a physical process. Take it as a metaphor. — Janus

I'm afraid I missed the place where you said that. "Orchestrates" is a very good way of putting it. A metaphor is just about right for the state of our knowledge - a place-holder for a more detailed account. What I was trying to argue was a misunderstanding. Thank you.

For a species to intentionally kill its own fetuses is exceedingly unnatural. — Leontiskos

I'm sorry but that's just not the case.

Lots of things we do are “unnatural”. But then also killing one’s offspring happens in nature too. There are various species of birds that occasionally kill the weakest baby so that they can better feed the others — Michael

Yes, 5 minutes with Google threw up several lists of different species that will kill (and eat) their young. Hunger is one motive. Preventing a predator getting them seems to be another. Males seem to resent or be jealous to new babies. Killing the young is not particularly common, but there is no basis for calling it unnatural. The same applies to that other great taboo - cannibalism.

"Desperate" is my middle name! — Thales

That makes two of us, then. Let me try to be a bit more constructive.

Can a qualitative difference between humans and other animals be found in what humans "do" differently rather than how humans "are" different? — Thales

..... by reflecting on the question.

I don't rule out the possibility that there may be something that humans do that is absolutely unique in the animal world. After all, homo sapiens is undoubtedly unique in the animal world. So there is a collection of criteria that define it. But the same can be said of any other species.

Suppose that, in the end, there wasn't a qualitative difference between homo sapiens but a number of differences in degree, on a spectrum. (I think that's likely to be the truth of it). Why would that matter?

Moral realism can be true even if moral truths cannot be determined. — Michael

Russell's tea-pot is another well-known example. It was eventually exploded by the Voyager missions.
More seriously, why would indeterminate moral truths be relevant to anything?
Oh, of course. God's judgement.

What do you mean I didn't cover that? That's what I said in the third sentence you quoted. In short, either they're both murder, or neither is. (That is, if the law is consistent.) — Patterner

Sorry. My mistake. At least we agree.

I can't see why an infinite regress would be involved. You haven't actually explained your reasons for those three claims. — Janus

Then obviously I have not understood what you are trying to say. I still don't know what you mean by "modelling". I'm used to people claiming that my brain causes my behaviour, but this is presumably something different. I think it would help me if you could explain what you mean by modelling.

Can a qualitative difference between humans and other animals be found in what humans "do" differently rather than how humans "are" different? For example, humans make tools that make tools. Whereas a sea otter may use a rock to crack open shellfish for food, humans create tools (machinery) to manufacture lobster and crab crackers. This seems to be a behavior that animals lack. — Thales

I have heard of that as a criterion. But then I also heard that a counter-example had been found. Perhaps someone will come up with details.
This kind of argument is very difficult to press home. There was a suggestion at one time that only humans use tools. But that one got refuted. Then the suggestion was that only human make tools, but that one got refuted. Moving on to make tools that make tools looks a bit desperate to me. Given that animals not only use tools, but make tools as well, one wonders how significant making tools to make tools really is.

Well, this is the issue I have with morality in general. I don't think any moral claims are either verifiable or falsifiable. Unlike science and maths there's just no way to prove or disprove one claim or another. We just either accept them or we don't, and then make our choices accordingly, and such choices include whether or not to pass a law to ban abortion. — Michael

If moral realism is correct, then there is. So you need to explain why there is no way to prove or disprove a moral claim.

It would have been helpful if you had stated your view. Some people think that moral claims are purely subjective, but that's over-simplified. Moral claims are certainly not proved or disproved in the way(s) that science or math is. But there are moral arguments - not as crisp or conclusive as science and maths, but there they are. You have to work with what you can get.

.... they will not be convinced by any counter-argument, that points out - for example the horror of a pregnant woman bleeding out and losing her baby in the hospital car park because doctors are too afraid of prosecution to treat her. — unenlightened

I heard about that case. It was indeed horrible. But I'm afraid I'm very much inclined to include the doctors in my disapproval. True, they have a good deal at risk and they no doubt have families to consider. But still, to stand back and watch her die, or worse, to walk away, and not keep her company while she died.... Still, I don't really know what happened beyond the headlines.

I think we should be consistent. If it's murder then so is abortion. If abortion is not murder, then neither is this. — Patterner

H'm. You didn't cover "If it's not murder, ..." Given what you've said, if it's not murder. abortion is not murder. It's vicious nasty crime, but who was killed? No-one. So it's not murder.

His defence fails if consequentialism is false, so to prove that abortion is permissible he must prove that its moral permissibility is determined by the consequences. — Michael

What if there is no proof of consequentialism either way?
Can I assume that anyone who says that abortion is impermissible whatever the consequences is assuming that deontology is true and must prove that?
What if there is no proof of deontology either way?

There's an interesting question of the burden of proof here anyway. Do we have to prove that abortion is impermissible, in which case, lacking a proof, we can assume that abortion is permissible? Or do we have to prove that abortion is permissible, in which case, lacking a proof, we can assume that it is impermissible?

If we lack a proof both of the permissibility of abortion and of its impermissibility, can we just suspend judgement? I suppose we have to. In that case, there will be nothing to prevent people following their own consciences.

There is, at least at present, no conclusive argument available either way. In which case, there is no justification for a law either way and no ground to prevent people following their own consciences.

Unless that philosophical theory is true. If deontology is correct and the moral permissibility of abortion is determined by rules and principles rather than by consequences then abortion may be morally impermissible even if the mother might suffer from not having an abortion. — Michael

You've left out a premiss. If deontology is true and the rules and principles are incompatible with abortion, then abortion will be impermissible. However, before we can assert that abortion is impermissible, we have to know 1) that deontology is true and 2) that the relevant rules and principles are incompatible with abortion. We don't know either of those things, so this doesn't help.

Fair point. A 'pro-lifer' is a member of a tribe, no matter how persuasive an argument might be, the matter is settled for them. — Tom Storm

I think that's true. They seem to take the immorality of abortion as a fixed point in the argument and adjust all the other concepts involved to fit in with that.
Rational argument on its own won't cut it.
But let's not stereotype. One expects that not all "pro-lifers" think in exactly the same way and it doesn't seem unreasonable to expect that some of them may be able to see another point of view as possible. Conceding that is a big step forward, even if full change of mind (and heart) is beyond reach.
But it means that the argument is not just about rationality.

I'm saying that the brain's inscrutable neural processes we can only conceive as 'modeling'. — Janus

What I'm trying to get at it is that what you are arguing seems to me to be exactly parallel to the argument of many dualists back in the day. They argued that the mind was a kind of "homunculus" - an ill-defined being that actually executed all the (mental) operations that the body could not. In the case of perception, for example, it was thought of as a perceiver who did the perceiving that the body could not. But if that's how you explain perception, you have set up an infinite regress, so the model explains nothing. In the same way, if you posit that the brain has to carry out some process - call it modelling - that has to be executed before any action can be carried out - it seems to me that you have created an infinite regress.

To attribute to them a mind of some sort, sufficient for inciting that behavior, but without any means to prove THAT is the sort of mind they actually possess, from which arises causal necessity, or, without any means to prove they have any mind of any sort at all, when his only provision for it is his own experience, is certainly a problem. — Mww

But this is exactly the traditional problem of other minds. So your argument also proves that we cannot know that other human bodies have a mind.

The dog doesn't think about its own expectation. Expectation is belief about future events. — creativesoul

Surely this proves too much. It proves that the dog cannot act purposively.

What I meant is, if she wants to have the baby, and you sneak drugs into her food so it aborts, it's not murder. — Patterner

Oh, I see. Interesting.
So this is part of the argument that "becoming human" isn't a single moment, a single event, but a process. Is that what you were getting at?

In this it doesn't matter when a fetus 'becomes human' what matters is the bodily autonomy of the mother. In other words, no person is morally obligated to use their body to sustain another life against their will, even if that life is dependent on them. Just as one cannot be forced to donate organs to save another person, a woman cannot be compelled to use her body to support a fetus. — Tom Storm

I've seen this argument. I find it very persuasive. But I don't think that a "pro-lifer" would. The analogy with organ donation is not strong enough. And there's always the argument that the future mother has "signed up" when she consents to sex.

Here in Australia, abortion is still technically illegal in some states, but it's never enforced, and it's not nearly so much a matter of controversy as in the USA. — Wayfarer

Yes. On the face of it, it's a very unsatisfactory situation. But in practical terms, it's one way of coping with the difficulty of arriving at a consensus.
Abortion seems to be more of an issue in the USA than anywhere else in the world. It's very odd.

But if we aren't talking about a child, I don't think "parents" is the right word. There is only a pregnant woman. — Patterner

Fair point. But the question whether there is a child or not. I'm trying to prompt "pro-lifers" to think about all this, so it seems best to talk of parents meaning, the individuals who have primary responsibility for the situation.

And, again, sneaking drugs into a pregnant woman's food so that she aborts, as long as it doesn't harm her, is no worse than breaking her window. — Patterner

I don't understand. It doesn't harm her if she want the abortion, so sneaking would not be necessary. But it sneaking is necessary, then it's likely that she does not want the abortion and in that case, it definitely does harm her.

AH! I seem to detect the voice of reason. Thank you.

Many believe a fetus should have the same consideration as a child. — Patterner

.... and many do not. Should not the parents have the right to their own conscience? It's not as if anybody seriously believes that abortion should not be controlled. I don't know if it is universal but many legal systems prohibit late stage abortions except in very exceptional circumstances.

Parents don't have the right and duty to end their child's life. — Hanover

True. So they must have the right and duty not to bring a child into the world. So they must have the right and duty to abstain or use contraception. But all contraceptive methods (including just say no) have a failure rate. So why do people think that they have the right and duty to prevent them using the last-ditch opportunity not to bring a child into the world - early stage abortion? (I'm not saying that abortion is OK, just that it is better than the alternative, which is positively cruel.)

If the brain tells the heart to beat and the lungs to breathe and processes and renders intelligible all sensory input and tells our limbs how to move when performing actions both simple and complex how would all this be possible without prior modeling? — Janus

Do you need prior modelling of the modelling? No? Then why do you need to model the action in the first place?

Apart from all the autonomic functions the brain gives rise to consciousness and creates an overarching model we refer to as the "self". — Janus

Is the brain part of the self or not? Assuming it is, then it has to model itself, including a model of its modelling. !?
Can you tell me the difference between my "self" and "Ludwig" and "I"? I don't perceive any.

We can say the brain must model all our bodily functions and actions and all its sensory input, but its true we don't know exactly what all those neuronal processes and networks are doing simply because they cannot be directly observed in vivo. — Janus

Yes. Exactly. So how do you know the brain is modelling anything?

It may be that I simply don't understand what you mean by "model" and "modelling".

I do have quite a lot on my 'to read' list and nowhere near as much time to read as I would like so there may be a fair bit of time before I can get to it. — Janus

Tell me about it. There's no hurry. It's just that it might be interesting to swop notes as and when. Up to you.

That is, one way women choose to have children is by having sex. It's the most common way actually. Women should have the right to choose to have children, but if they're raped and become pregnant, they were deprived that choice. For that reason, abortion might be argued to be permissible in that instance. — Hanover

It is often argued that incest, under-age sex (both of which are usually non-consensual in legal terms at least), non-viable foetus, risk to mother's own life are often included with rape. I think not to allow those exceptions is inhumane, even cruel. However, the cruelty to both mother and child of forcing a mother to go through an unwanted pregnancy and then expecting both mother and child to cope with a dysfunctional relationship is too often ignored. Children need love - for at least twenty years. You cannot create that by passing a law.

The most common reason for advocating for abortion bans is not acknowledging that this topic is one of competing interests (fetus vs adult woman). Thus any argument that addresses only one side of the topic (such as "abortion is murder") is at minimum incomplete, but usually is intellectually dishonest. — LuckyR

That's a very good point.

Let's make laws against them during pregnancy and child-care, and then there will be little demand for abortions, except for tragic medical circumstances that cannot be avoided by legal fiat. — unenlightened

Absolutely. It's the least you can do for a reluctant mother and for the child as well.

Some think a fetus is a stage in the life of a human being, so nobody should have the right to choose what to do with the fetus' body. — Patterner

That's absurd. Parents (biological or other) not only have the right, but the duty to make decisions about their children's lives. Why should there not be a similar right and duty to make decisions about a foetus? After all, we allow people to make decisions for their relatives when they are ill and unable to make the decisions themselves.

moral value is not determined by benefits, i.e. deontology is correct and consequentialism is incorrect — Michael

The last thing anyone should do is make a decision of this sort based on a philosophical theory - unless, by some miracle, all the theories deliver the same judgement.

Abortion is not a simple yes/no question. It's complicated. For example, there seems to be widespread agreement that late-stage abortions should not be permitted - roughly, at the point when the foetus becomes sentient (conscious). There seems also to be agreement that even those should be permitted when the mother's life is at risk (unless the mother consents to the risk). (I'm assuming that rape, incest, non-viable or damaged foetuses etc. can be dealt with at an early stage.) There is also widespread agreement that infanticide should not be permitted, though mothers should be treated sympathetically. Anything else seems to be hotly contested. Where there is consensus, laws are perfectly reasonable. Where there is not, laws preventing abortion are tyrannical and tolerance (on both sides) is the only option.