Now with AI, we have photo and video fakes, voice fakes, that look as good as anything else, so we have a new layer of deception. We have the “hallucination” which is a cool euphemism for bullshit. — Fire Ologist

This is why I was shocked that philosophers, of all people, wouldn't be ignoring the "AI summary" invitation at the top of the search results? — bongo fury

I'd have thought the relevant job description, that of filtering the results for signs of trails leading to real accountable sources, would have to disqualify any tool known ever to actually invent false trails, let alone one apparently innately disposed to such behaviour? — bongo fury

I think this is the fundamental problem. AI does no research, has no common sense or personal experience, and is entirely disconnected from reality, and yet it comes to dominate every topic, and every dialogue. — unenlightened

As a solipsist, that's the core of my worldview. — Copernicus

You serve your vision of a better world. — Copernicus

No. — Copernicus

Exactly. Everything is about that one way or another. — Copernicus

No one escapes it. — Copernicus

Great post, just that one line sticks out to me as something that others might gloss over thus prematurely proving the OP's premise as valid. — Outlander

But they're still your children. — Outlander

It benefits your family and existence directly to have happy children who live productive lives, possibly earning lots of money, holding you in high regard, esteem, and favor, and then taking care of you when you're enfeebled. — Outlander

Philosophy has long divided human action into the “selfish” and the “selfless.”
Yet such a distinction may be more linguistic than real. Every deliberate human act is born from an internal desire — whether that desire seeks pleasure, avoids pain, fulfills duty, or maintains identity. — Copernicus

If every action originates from the actor’s internal state, then no act can be wholly “selfless.” Even apparent self-sacrifice — the soldier dying for his country, the mother starving for her child, the philanthropist donating wealth — finds its roots in personal satisfaction, emotional fulfillment, or existential meaning. — Copernicus

Every act of kindness, every moral code, every love story is a negotiation between biology and meaning, desire and discipline, self and other. — Copernicus

Until the communitarian comes to terms with the fact of our separateness, of our individuation, the communitarian Good can never be imagined in any other sense as individual, selfish desire. — NOS4A2

Say someone was born with the need to help others, sometimes to the detriment of other wants and needs, but if one of their needs is to help others, and they find satisfaction in helping others, then would that fall into your definition of "selfish"? — Harry Hindu

because it's giving them a good feeling, at least, if no other transactional motive is present. — Copernicus

The self is caged in the solipsistic bubble and can only act from within. — Copernicus

It is off topic to this OP, but I often wonder about self-identified schools of thought and the range of vocabulary shared amongst different views represented through them. I won't try to talk about that in this thread. — Paine

Alternatively, the logical (grammatical) “cannot” is that I can’t know your pain without accepting it, identifying with you. — Antony Nickles

but, in doing so (not as an argument for), we also see a different relationship to another’s pain than knowledge. — Antony Nickles

But I’m not sure if pointing out just any alternative criteria would be convincing, nor do I think he means to say the argument would be over if they were aware of the nature of what they were objecting to, as if convention is more justified or powerful or certain, because the trick is to capture the “difficulty” seen by the metaphysician (and philosophy in general), which I take as real and actual and not something he is dismissing. — Antony Nickles

He feels tempted, say, to use the name "Devonshire" not for the county with its conventional boundary, but for a region differently bounded. He could express this by saying: "Isn't it absurd to make this a county, to draw the boundaries here?" But what he says is: "The real Devonshire is this". We could answer: "What you want is only a new notation, and by a new notation no facts of geography are changed". — p. 57`

(It is true, however, that we may be irresistibly attracted or repelled by a notation. We easily forget how much a notation, a form of expression, may mean to us, and that changing it isn't always as easy as it often is in mathematics or in the sciences. A change of clothes or of names may mean very little and it may mean a great deal.) — p. 57`

I am surprised by your lack of surprise. The shared use of terms by the two authors is clearly evident in comparisons of their texts. That includes the term 'experience', that invokes what is called empria by Aristotle which led to the word "empirical." — Paine

What is primary is what is sought throughout Aristotle. — Paine

Kant's terms can be said to move across the background of their Aristotelian versions. — Paine

I need to get more chores off the honey do list first. — Paine

I will pursue my Buddha nature by not commenting on the SEP article. — Paine

The receptivity of perception in Aristotle can be seen as a parallel to that of the intuition of sensibility.
Yes. But there's a vast difference in the "mechanism". Aristotle's mind is, so far as I can see, almost entirely passive. Quite unlike Kant's - I guess that's his great contribution.
— Paine

But where Kant directly rebukes Aristotle is over his use of logic at A268/B324. — Paine

On this is grounded the logical topics of Aristotle, which schoolteachers and orators could use in order to hunt up certain titles of thinking to find that which best fits their current matter and rationalize or garrulously chatter about it with an appearance of thoroughness

The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, is on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth. — Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, page 374, or page 69 in the linked document

Instead of seeking two entirely different sources of representation in the understanding and the sensibility, which could judge about things with objective validity only in conjunction, each of these great men holds on only to one of them, which in his opinion is immediately related to things in themselves, while the other does nothing but confuse or order the representations of the first. — CPR A270/B326

Some epistemologists use "warrant" to refer to a justification sufficient for knowledge. The conditions that make it so are open to debate. Nevertheless, I was just treating warrant as synonymous with justification. — Relativist

That’s what I get out of it, anyway. Loosely speaking. — Mww

Isn't "warranted" just another way of saying "best"?
— @Banno
No. Being warranted means to be rationally justified.
A subjective "best" inference may, or may not, be warranted. — Relativist

We seem to be circling. Being warranted means to be rationally justified, and something is rationally justified if it is warranted. The best explanations are the ones which are rationally justified, and those are the ones that are warranted, and they are the ones we accept. A subjective best inference may not be warranted, but then it would not be the best inference, and so not justified, and not the best. — Banno

A statement authorizing movement from the ground to the claim. In order to move from the ground established in 2, "I was born in Bermuda", to the claim in 1, "I am a British citizen", the person must supply a warrant to bridge the gap between 1 and 2 with the statement "A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British citizen" (3). — Wikipedia - Stephen Toulmin

Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. — CPR, Bxvi

His (sc. Aristotle's) primary investigation of mind occurs in two chapters of De Anima, both of which are richly suggestive, but neither of which admits of easy or uncontroversial exposition. In De Anima iii 4 and 5, Aristotle approaches the nature of thinking by once again deploying a hylomorphic analysis, given in terms of form reception. Just as perception involves the reception of a sensible form by a suitably qualified sensory faculty, so thinking involves the reception of an intelligible form by a suitably qualified intellectual faculty (De Anima iii 4, 429a13–18). According to this model, thinking consists in a mind’s becoming enformed by some object of thought, so that actual thinking occurs whenever some suitably prepared mind is “made like” its object by being affected by it.

In other words, the Critique does teach the twofold aspect, but not of the object. It is the two-fold aspect of the human intellectual system as laid out in transcendental philosophy. It is by means of that system that an object is treated as an appearance in accordance with sensibility on the one hand, or, an object is treated as a ding an sich on the other, in accordance with pure speculative reason. — Mww

We can also ask what manner of existence they could have for other percipients or absent any percipients at all — Janus

So if you want to argue a counter-narrative, it has to engage with the conspirator’s structure of belief on what may be its own well-structured level. — apokrisis

By ackowledging our beliefs are warranted by abduction, a discussion is feasible, and can be productive for both sides. Productive in various ways: undercutting the other guys belief ("proving" him wrong, in an abductive sense); or simply helping both sides to understand the other's point of view - when both positions are defensible. — Relativist

Yes, a single, specific real explanation isn't always possible. A more general explanation may still be possible, or at least some may be ruled out. It can be appropriate to reserve judgement. — Relativist

The two-aspects reading attempts to interpret Kant’s transcendental idealism in a way that enables it to be defended against at least some of these objections. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. For this reason it is also called the one-world interpretation, since it holds that there is only one world in Kant’s ontology, and that at least some objects in that world have two different aspects: one aspect that appears to us, and another aspect that does not appear to us. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism.

All the thinkers Kant responded to had different ways of framing what is intuition, phenomena, ideas, logic, and categories. They were arguing within a set of parameters. The problems we have looking in from outside is that we cannot share that set without problems of translation. — Paine

I meant to say that taking intuition of space and time as a process of my perception raises the question of how "objective" it is. That ties into Kant's beef with Berkeley who treats space as an experienced phenomenon. Kant argues that it is, rather, an a priori condition for sensibility: — Paine

The principle that throughout dominates and determines my Idealism, is on the contrary: "All cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth." — Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, page 374, or page 69 in the linked document

Space and time, together with all that they contain, are not things nor qualities in themselves, but belong merely to the appearances of the latter: up to this point I am one in confession with the above idealists. But these, and amongst them more particularly Berkeley, regarded space as a mere empirical presentation that, like the phenomenon it contains, is only known to us by means of experience or perception, together with its determinations. I, on the contrary, prove in the first place, that space (and also time, which Berkeley did not consider) and all its determinations a priori, can be known by us, because, no less than time, it inheres in our sensibility as a pure form before all perception or experience and makes all intuition of the same, and therefore all its phenomena, possible. It follows from this, that as truth rests on universal and necessary laws as its criteria, experience, according to Berkeley, can have no criteria of truth, because its phenomena (according to him) have nothing a priori at their foundation; whence it follows, that they are nothing but sheer illusion; whereas with us, space and time (in conjunction with the pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe their law to all possible experience a priori, and at the same time afford the certain criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein. — Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, page 374, or page 69 in the linked document

I, too, am learning from this discussion. — Paine

I will try to respond to some other of your comments but need to get back to painting a specific appearance. — Paine

By contrast, probabilistic reasoning always carries qualification: no matter how small the probability of error, there remains some chance that the conclusion is false. Thus, probabilistic conclusions can approach certainty in degree, but they can never be absolutely certain in kind. — Sam26

However, I think it is a misrepresentation to call Hume a sceptic about this issue. — Ludwig V

Ludwig rightly emphasizes that Hume rejects the idea of causation as a metaphysical reality. — Banno

Operant and classical conditioning in animals (and in humans), for one example, would be impossible without such innately held means of association. — javra

On this view, causes are not waiting out there in the world to be discovered; they are part and parcel of the way we interact with the world. — Banno

but it's clear Hume rejected the Aristotelian idea of causation, replacing it with habit and custom. — Banno

But, as facts go, Hume never once claimed that causation was in fact illusory … hence, that there was no objective truth to causes (not in these or any other words). — javra

Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition. — Enquiry, section VI, Probability, footnote to title

Berkeley is, in fact, mentioned by name at the beginning of the Refutation of Idealism: — Paine

One question is how far outside of myself have I gotten if it is my intuition of space and time that allows for the possibility for the experience. — Paine

Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary. Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if
one regards space as a property that is to pertain to the things in themselves; for then it, along with everything for which it serves as a condition, is a non-entity. — CPR B274

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me — B275

I, represented through inner sense in time, and objects in space outside me, are indeed specifically a wholly distinct appearances, but they are not thereby thought of as different things. The transcendental object that grounds both outer appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former as well as the latter. — CPR A379

If, therefore, as the present critique obviously requires of us, we remain true to the rule established earlier not to press our questions beyond that with which possible experience and its object can supply us, then it will not occur to us to seek information about what the objects of our senses may be in themselves, i.e., apart from any relation to the senses. — CPR A379

But if a psychologist takes appearances for things in themselves, then as a materialist he may take up matter into his doctrine, or as a spiritualist he may take up merely thinking beings (namely, according to the form of our inner sense) as the single and sole thing existing in itself, or as a dualist he may take up both; yet through misunderstanding he will always be confined to sophistical reasonings about the way in which that which is no thing in itself, but only the appearance of a thing in general, might exist in itself. — CPR A379

You describe these objects as "actual, physical objects beyond the senses". — Ludwig V

I did exactly the opposite:
I misunderstood you. I'm sorry. — AmadeusD

Much of our knowledge comes through — Sam26

Almost all justification is fallible, not just testimony. Why? Because most knowledge relies on probabilistic reasoning, including science. — Sam26

To better understand the ready-existent regulations by which something operates is not the same as pigeonholing everything into rules of one’s own creation. — javra

a mystic’s understanding of reality at large cannot be shared in the complete absence of JTB knowledge regarding this understanding, via which the understanding could then be convincingly communicated to others. — javra

More mundanely, though, most understandings among adult humans in a society are commonly held by all individuals (e.g., the understanding of which side of the road to drive on). — javra

But consider how kids learn language: they must come to their own understanding regarding what words in their proper contexts signify. One cannot impart this understanding to children directly (in contrast to how a JTB can be directly imparted among adults), but can only lead the way toward it via affirmations and negations regarding what is correct. This until the understanding clicks. — javra

JTB, on the other hand, will require a) belief (that is both true and endlessly justifiable in valid manners in principle), b) some measure of understanding, and c) awareness. — javra

The five justificatory routes identified in JTB+U illustrate this point. — Sam26

In this way, JTB+U brings Wittgenstein’s therapeutic insight into constructive form: it dissolves confusions about “know” by looking at use, and it offers a framework that captures the grammar of knowledge as it is lived in our forms of life. — Sam26

Sometimes knowledge enters philosophical consideration in the form of a propositional attitude. — frank

Some philosophers and linguists also claim that sentences like ‘Jill wanted Jack to fall’, ‘Jack and Jill are seeking water’, and ‘Jack fears Jill’, for example, are to be analyzed as propositional attitude ascribing sentences, — sep article on propositional attitude reporting

And that's just the nature of what a mistake is, something which eludes judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

The proof that is demanded must therefore establish that we have experience and not merely imagination of outer things, which cannot be accomplished unless one can prove that even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible only under the presupposition of outer experience.

If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori.

The analogy with Copernicus is to demonstrate how mutually exclusive the two standpoints are. — Paine

How some of us went from this location to reading "things-in-themselves" as "mind independent" is a long and winding road through perilous terrain. — Paine

We don't know anything of objects or phenomena in general a priori—in terms of what commonalities we can know about all objects without actually consulting particular objects in real time, we must reflect on their general characteristics as perceived. That is we must reflect on prior experience of phenomena in order to see what they all have in common. — Janus

Experience is prior in time to knowledge but the possibility for experience is prior as a condition. — Paine

In the Preface, objects of experience are either made present to us through an intuition that has to "conform to the constitution of the objects" or by means of our processes of reason. — Paine

I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them (sc. objects) a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a
priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. — Bxvii

Perhaps, but I think it is the tool, as the means to the end, which actually overcomes the circumstances. It is more proper to say that the means is what brings success rather than the will. If it was just the will, you could will yourself to success. Instead, success is highly dependent on the tool employed. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Mistakes in producing or choosing the symbol to be used as a representation". That would be a mistake of trying to use the wrong tool. We were talking about the different types of mistakes which are possible, and whether each type could be recognized. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's know that and there's know how. Sometimes it's know of. In some cases, it might be a combination?

I know how you feel.
You should know better than to eat wild mushrooms.
I didn't know which path I should take.
I want to know what it's like to jump from an airplane.
How do the migrating butterflies know the way to Mexico?
I love you more than you'll ever know.
Frank doesn't know his ass from a hole in the ground.

I don't think it's really necessary to build a formula for each usage. Do you? — frank

We don’t need epistemology to know; epistemology is an after-the-fact rationalization of what life already does. Epistemology is like a priest arriving after the festival, declaring rules for the dancing that already happened. — DifferentiatingEgg

This is what to me the butterfly question, for one example, would most likely addresses: how does a butterfly (granting it is in some way sentient even though not sapient) behaviorally understand how to navigate their way toward Mexico. — javra

[JTB type of] Knowledge is always in terms of concepts and can be passed on by means of words or other symbols. Understanding is not conceptual, and therefore cannot be passed on. It is an immediate experience, and immediate experience can only be talked about (very inadequately), never shared. — https://www.anthologialitt.com/post/aldous-huxley

I’m very curious to see if anyone can discern any other species of knowledge via the way “to know” is used within language that would not fit into any of the three categories just mentioned. (I haven’t yet found any.) — javra

JTB is fits into many different language-games, and the definition is based on Wittgenstein's family resemblance idea. — Sam26

I don't think so. First, i didn't say anything about how mistake would be determined, only that we ought to believe it is possible. Then, when we look at the primary feature of determining mistakes, mistake is commonly a matter of not producing the desired result. This doesn't imply truth or lack of truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think there is a relationship of mastery, like a tool masters the circumstances it is applied to, to produce the desired end. The representation (symbol) is a tool, the living being uses it, and this tool assists the being in survival, as well as making use of its environment toward its ends, and perhaps some other things, dependent on intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kant's terminology is intimidating. I think the way Kant speaks in the Preface to the Second Edition is a good outline to his intentions and what he means by experience, intuition, and cognition: — Paine

I think it's just an expression of one of the meanings of "knowledge." — frank

I agree there is an important difference that my pain is in my body, as in: not your body, but also that it is “mine”. — Antony Nickles

Plus, he seems to believe that it is true (we could), only to better understand what the skeptic wants to deny. — Antony Nickles

But to say “I know your pain” is not to try to equate ours, but to identify with you; to say “I feel your pain” is to console you. So then the context of saying it is “impossible” might be in the sense of giving them the space to be alone in their pain, — Antony Nickles

But perhaps this does not “fulfill” what he wants, which is to “try to find the form of expression which fulfills a certain craving of the metaphysician which our ordinary language does not fulfill and which, as long as it isn't fulfilled, produces the metaphysical puzzlement.” — Antony Nickles

the different types of mistakes which are possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Suppose that we consider words as an example of a representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I figure a representation happens when what is given through sensible intuition becomes an object one can have knowledge about: — Paine

Possibly I also haven't been clear about why the PoV matters -- who is doing all this. The phrase "point to" is meant to raise this question. — J

I think you've been assuming, in this discussion, that a single person is taking all these steps, but there's nothing in JTB that requires that. We don't ask, "Have I verified that this sentence is true?" but rather "Is this sentence true?"; we don't ask "Have I provided good justifications?" but rather "Are there good justifications?" — J

JTB wants to pin down the correct use of "I know"; I'm suggesting that it might be more profitable to look at the ways we actually use "I know." I don't think they correspond to JTB. There are many things I believe I know, but am not certain they are true. JTB would argue that, therefore, I'm using "know" incorrectly. Whereas I'm saying that it's JTB that needs correction, not me. This latter position lacks punch, of course, unless the "me" can be turned into "us" with sufficient frequency. We need a fairly widespread agreement on the faults of JTB in order to claim that it doesn't capture our common practice. — J

So the bridge from practical refutation in everyday life, which often involves the testing of individual hypotheses under the assumption of true auxilliary hypotheses, doesn't withstand skeptical scrutinty and the standards demanded by scientific epistemology - an essentially unattainable standard, relegating JTB to the realm of the impossible, or to the realm of semantics that is epistemically vacuous. — sime

On the first point: understanding is not the same as justification. Justification is the giving of reasons that satisfy the standards of a language-game. Understanding is a matter of concept-mastery, the ability to use terms correctly within that grammar. A student can repeat reasons in a way that looks justified, but without grasping the concepts, they do not understand—and so they don’t know. The “+U” is needed because justification can sometimes be mimicked or borrowed without genuine uptake. — Sam26

The framework is sound; what fails is our use of it. — Sam26

The structure of BT by itself does not seem to get around the problem that fitness vis-á-vis reproduction/survival does not seem to necessarily track with truth. — Count Timothy von Icarus

But later, he's saying we must pre-suppose them (despite, not being able to know them). — AmadeusD

Deciding what is a mistake in Kant is more difficult. We don't have the object of representation in hand to compare with another supposed object in the unexperienced bush. — Paine

Instead of insisting that there must be real independent objects, because we perceive objects, as Amadeus seemed to be doing, we ought to accept the possibility of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps I'm not grasping this, but if someone is perceiving "something" then that is "objects" broadly (and in the way i suggest it be used here - I'm not suggesting there are (or that we could know that there are) actual, physical objects beyond the senses). These could simply be that which is required as an assumption for hte perception to obtain. I content roughly that. — AmadeusD

Now the answer of the common-sense philosopher--and that, n.b., is not the commonsense man, who is as far from realism as from idealism--the answer of the common-sense philosopher is that surely there is no difficulty in the idea of supposing, thinking, imagining that someone else has what I have. But the trouble with the realist is always that he does not solve but skip the difficulties which his adversaries see, though they too don't succeed in solving them. The realist answer, for us, just brings out the difficulty; for who argues like this overlooks the difference between different usages of the words "to have", "to imagine". "A has a gold tooth" means that the tooth is in A's mouth. — p. 48/49

Suppose I feel a pain which on the evidence of the pain alone, e.g., with closed eyes, I should call a pain in my left hand. Someone asks me to touch the painful spot with my right hand. I do so and looking round perceive that I am touching my neighbour's hand (meaning the hand connected to my neighbour's torso). — p. 50

He decides that these are cases where we must be aware of something before we could judge what is the case, as in needing to understand an order before being able to obey it.
A peripheral case that does not appear to fit the above “beforehand” necessity is “I must know where a thing is before I can see it” (p.50) perhaps because I would be told what it is, not where, and then I would search for it and know where it is in the seeing of it. After seeing how these cases work completely differently, he makes the leap to postulating that “What I wish to say is that the act of pointing determines a place of pain.” — Antony Nickles

we can deduce, from the fact that we have JTB of X, that X is true. — J

My concerns with JTB are all about how the truth of P is supposed to be established — J

If you tell me, "I know X, because I have JTB of X," and I believe you, then I know, or at least believe, that X is true, without knowing anything about its truth conditions. — J

Is personal verification of the truth conditions the only truth-guaranteeing justification? Or, if "guaranteeing" is too strong, the only good-enough justification? — J

An alien civilization inimical to ours might choose tonight to destroy our solar system. That is not impossible, or incoherent, or against the laws of physics, etc. — J

Doesn't that have to answer the possibility question. If P is true, it cannot possibly be false. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What sort of concept though? Rorty's move to redefine truth as "what our peers let us get away with is a conception of truth. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Rather, it is, do we think P is possibly false. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Affirming P is a sort of endorsement. "It is good to believe P," where "good" is also "hurrah for..." — Count Timothy von Icarus

No matter how hard they reasoned about the groundlessness of their own knowledge, they would still run from rabid dogs like Pyrrho or climb a tree to get away from raging bull elephants like Sanjaya. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hence, in most ordinary circumstances, one will affirm knowledge of what one will do later on in the day (or else of when one’s airplane will arrive), this serving as one example among many. — javra

If one instead prefers to remain on the safe side, one can instead simply declare it as a belief one has. — javra

I think there is a problem with this account, and I think the problem is precisely what Gettier points up. Gettier shows that someone can have belief, truth, and inconclusive evidence, and still fail to have knowledge. (But I am going to come back to your earlier posts in this vein. I am still catching up.) — Leontiskos

Hume would say that even if you've pocketed the 9-ball in this identical situation 1,000 times in the past, it doesn't follow that you will pocket it this time. — Leontiskos

if the identity of mind and object is true, then you do not have global uncertainty. — Leontiskos

What is at stake here is an argument against truth dressed up as an argument against JTB. — Leontiskos

"I know that I know ..." is pure pleonasm
— Ludwig V
Upon reflection, I think you might be right (at least in the JTB context that isn't committed to fallibalism). — Count Timothy von Icarus

However, if we pair JTB with a sort of fallibalism that denies any certitude to beliefs, ... I do think it follows that we can never know that we truly know anything. .... Another way to say this is that, if we believe our own belief might be wrong, we don't seem to believe that we know it, since knowledge is necessarily true, and we can hardly believe that something that is true might also be false. — Count Timothy von Icarus

One solution here, that I'm sure no one will like, is to simply do what analytic philosophers have done for "evaluative" knowledge claims. We could suppose that statements of knowledge and statements of fact should simply be reinterpreted the way evaluative statements are, such that: "P" is "hurrah for asserting P!" or "I believe P," or "from my perspective, P." — Count Timothy von Icarus

... it's on us to show why we think there needs to be something of the sort where "P is *really* true," and that we must be able to assert that this is so.. — Count Timothy von Icarus

After all, others' first-person experiences and beliefs are generally accepted to be ineluctably private, so prima facie there can be no empirical support for them, whereas there can be no empirical support for anything outside of such experiences for us. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If it's right that we can't know X is true via JTB (since it's an element of JTB, not a result, and would require a previous demonstration of knowledge), then we might never know whether we know a given X, since we wouldn't know if X was true. — J

So we have two distinct notions of truth in play: Intersubjective mathematical truth, for which the truth maker is independent of Johns judgements whether or not his judgements are correlated with intersubjective mathematical truth, versus what we might call "John's subjective truth" in which the truth maker is identified with the neuropsychological causes of John's utterances. — sime

John has to live with the possibility of being wrong. — frank

I see doing mathematics as a physical activity, involving pencil and paper, computer, or neural activity. — Janus

If say I am certain that something is the case, then I mean that there cannot be any doubt about it. Then I would say I know it to be the case. If I think something is the case but there is any possible doubt it, then I would say that I believe it to be the case, but do not know it to be. — Janus

Say I believed that something is the case, and for very good reason, despite thinking that there was some small possibility which could cast a doubt about it—then I would say I believed it, but did not know it, to be the case. Then say I found out that the small possibility of doubt had been unfounded—I would then say I now know it to be the case. — Janus

But if I had justifiably believed it to be the case previously, despite thinking there was a small possibility of doubt and the small possibility of doubt turned out to be a mistake, then according to JTB I would have already known it to be the case despite the fact that I didn't think I knew it to be the case. That would be knowing despite not knowing that you know. And that just seems weird to me. — Janus

an objection to any theory which says that truth is supposed to be established prior to justification and investigation, — Leontiskos

In seeing an unsound justification and a sound justification as equivalently sufficient conditions for knowledge. — Leontiskos

Can the justifications for thinking it true be themselves true even if the theory is false? — Janus