Such a term is not often bandied about on these forums, but it effectively states that human beings have the freedom to choose their beliefs. Doxastic determinism claims the reverse: we do not possess the freedom to choose what we believe in. — Thorongil
My very first post at PF was about this, although I didn't know the term "doxastic." It was actually this question that caused me to search for a philosophy forum so that I could post it. I posted on several sites only to either be ignored or to get some pretty worthless responses. The old PF members responded, I stuck around, and the rest is history.
My thoughts were a bit different though. I had long questioned the existence of free will generally, and it was the relationship between free will and knowledge that finally led me to accept the existence of libertarian free will as a necessary given, even if it is problematic (to say the least: the uncaused cause). To deny free will is to deny knowledge and to deny knowledge is to deny reason, and to deny reason is to deny any basis for understanding anything.
If we accept reason, then when we drop a ball, we accept that it will fall based upon our prior observations of it dropping. That is, we are presented with a variety of reasons that might explain our observation, and we exercise judgment based upon those observations, and that judgment leads us to conclusions. A judge who has formed a pre-determined course of action is no judge at all.
On the other hand. if we accept that there is an unbreakable causal chain, then the reason we believe that the ball falls when we drop it may or may not be related to what we have previously seen. That is, we're going to believe the ball falls when we drop it regardless, as that is what the cosmos of causes has caused us to believe. In a deterministic system, we cannot hold that our beliefs are the result of what is observed as true, but we must accept that our beliefs are just things in our heads that could have come about by any prior event. The fact that we believe our beliefs are the products of reason hardly makes it so.
The concept of "persuasion" therefore makes no sense to a determinist. One does not persuade a judge. A judge is forced into making his decision by all the applicable worldly causes, regardless of whether the decision bears any relationship to reality. What you think is persuasion is simply you barking your pre-determined noises toward a judge and the judge then barking his pre-determined response.
Since our beliefs (and therefore our knowlege, K=JTB) to the determinist are not based upon justifications nor truth, but just on whatever happens to bounce into the brain of the decision maker, we have no knowledge at all. That being the case, we can know nothing at all if determinism is true.
Such was my theory years ago, and it remains so. It was at that point that I stopped arguing about free will, as I considered the matter solved. To deny free will is to deny the abilty to speak intelligently about anything at all. If you disagree and claim that determinism and knowlege are compatible, then I'd submit that you're just saying that because you had to.