All doable within the current system, mon ami. Just set up another account with the user name "Jew". I will then make a new rule that everyone must write Jew instead of "Jew" when referring to said ethnic group. I'm sure that will be a crowd-pleaser. :-* — Baden

Multiple accounts is an interesting idea. I've always thought that I'm the only one fully qualified to debate against me.

Did Jews who condemned the German people en masse for their acquiescence to Nazism somehow contribute to racism? Hardly. — Baden

I see some distinctions here, though. Germany as a nation was the enemy in WW2 and they were officially Nazis. So, to hate those Germans and those Nazis was not racist. The enemy was clearly defined. I would say, though, that if in 1940, you hated a German immigrant in the US who had nothing to do with the atrocities solely because he was German, you'd have been racist (considering some Germans were Jews). And certainly you'd be racist today if you continued hating the krauts.

On another note, could you guys add a feature so that when a post says "Jew" in it, I get notified, just like when it says @hanover?

If there is no meaning, then how can I know what you mean? Are we even talking to each other?

A complaint I've heard from academic philosophers is that the field is vicious, with everyone cutting each other down, criticizing one another for their errors and pointless remarks. This remark by Dennett seems consistent with that, basically arguing that everyone is pretty much incompetent so they are forced into useless and meaningless pursuits.

My guess is that the field is producing very capable philosophers. It's hyper competitive and I'd expect that there are extremely good philosophers who can't find work so they move on to something else, not that there are a bunch of hacks finding work because of too little talent.

If someone asks me who I am, I tell them my Social Security number (345-90-7843), date of birth (6/27/66), bank account number (Wells Fargo 392820411) and my account password (BadenRocks).

And here's where it gets confusing.

I wasn't being personal. What I was saying was actually consistent with Baden's remark that Israel wasn't under threat of extinction because the US supported it. What I do therefore see as a real threat to Israel's existence is the withdrawal of US support. If that happened, it would be a very different backdrop. US support is not as strong under Obama in theory as it was under Bush, although I realize from a practical standpoint that little has changed.

And so the point of my post: Those who believe that Israel needn't worry about its existence due to its support from the US also believe that the US shouldn't be supporting it, which means that those same people aren't terribly worried about Israel's existence. My post ended with a question as to whether you agreed with this analysis.

Isn't that similar to the sort of hyperbole that fascists spout to push their anti-democratic agendas. "All this democracy, it's just too dangerous!" — Baden

Sometimes it's hyperbole and sometimes it's true. As they say in the US, "The Constitution is not a suicide pact." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Constitution_is_not_a_suicide_pact.

"A strict observance of the written law is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the ends to the means." Thomas Jefferson

I don't believe the environment is "incredibly hostile" and that, for instance, Palestinians want Jewish "elimination". They see a rather direct claim to living in what today is Israel because their families were displaced in 1948, they consider themselves occupied and want this to stop, they want to reunite with their families without having to give up the right to live in Israel, which, despite the discrimination, is still their home. — Benkei

60% want the total elimination of Israel. http://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-palestinians-backing-2-states-become-minority/ . I seriously doubt the other 40% hold much kinder views. It's likely that there are good number of pragmatists in that mix who just want peace even if it means allowing what they perceive as invaders to remain.

I also believe many Jewish Israelis believe the danger is real or at least immediate much like many Europeans now unreasonably fear Syrian refugees and French fear unarmed women in burqinis. — Benkei

No, unlike in France, Israel is under constant terroristic threat. The threat is real and amount of policing required in Israel to control that threat does not compare to what you see in France. I understand that many irrationally react to perceived threats. I don't think that's occurring in Israel. The daily threat there is likely greater than the average citizen realizes.

I don't believe there is an existential threat for (Israeli) Jews — Benkei

Only because the US has adopted policies protective of Israel that you disagree with. You can only be dismissive of Israel's concerns about its destruction by conceding that you and like minded folks have no influence on American policy toward Israel. That is, Israel is safe because you're not in charge, right?

I would be perfectly fine with this, if it weren't for the fact that the JNF is seriously intertwined with the Israeli government and has first right to any sale of land sold by said government and other legal protections that go beyond it just being a foundation. If the government wouldn't give the JNF special treatment this wouldn't be an issue to me. At most I could then say that the JNF would be discriminatory in its allocation but I would consider the purpose for it - taken in relation to the total land it owns - reasonable. — Benkei

I'm curious as to what practical effect the JNF leases have on the non-Jewish public. Are non-Jews actually having difficulty finding suitable housing because of the JNF rules, or is this only a matter of principle. In the US, I can't purchase or even live on Native American lands. I have no desire to live in abject poverty in remote South Dakota or various other places out west, but I suppose it's discriminatory at some theoretical level. I know I'm white, but neither I nor my ancestors drove any Native American off his land. In fact, my ancestors found their way over here long after the Indians were displaced, and they arrived here fleeing all sorts of pending horrors of their own.

That 93% can be sold to Jewish Israelis but not to non-Jewish Israelis. — Benkei

I didn't read the article this way. I read that only 7% is private and that it could be sold to anyone. The rest is in the hands of the government or JNF, which only leases the land. Maybe you're saying that one day the government will start selling land off and that only Jews will be able to purchase it. That seems inconsistent with the article that said that once land is sold to private interests, it can be sold to anyone. It also seems like that if only 7% has been actually sold throughout the history of Israel's existence, there are no plans for this land sell off. It seems to me that Israel is well aware of the importance of keeping the land secured from the fleeting interests of private investors and so it has regulated 93% of the land by keeping it off the market.

As with everything that has to do with Israeli policy, security concerns are paramount. I get that you believe that racist issues drive Israeli policies, but it's just as easy to see that security issues offer as much explanation as anything else. Israelis are in an incredibly hostile environment, surrounded by people who want their elimination.

You mentioned that democracy and Zionism might be incompatible, when in truth it might be that democracy (at least to the extent everyone receives equal rights) and survival are incompatible. In a democracy, you have to begin with the idea that everyone is supportive of the state at some basic level. It would be suicide to allow subversive elements access to power. I'm less concerned about the race of someone than I am in their beliefs. As long as there remains an anti-Jewish sentiment in the Arab world, it's hard to abdicate power to Arab interests. I understand that just because one is Arab does not mean they want to eliminate Israel, but it'd be foolish to suggest the correlation doesn't exist.

I'm not clear how it's in the Israeli Jewish community's interest to prohibit non-Jewish Israelis from buying land in order to protect "Jewish" culture (after the civil war if 1948 this includes land of displaced Palestinians). — Benkei

I've not looked up all of the claims you've made except this one, mostly because I'm at work and can't spend the time. This one in particular isn't exactly correct. 93% of all of the land in Israel is not privately owned, but is subject to long term leases. The 7% of privately held land can be sold to any citizen, Jewish or not. 69% of the land is owned by the State and 12% is owned by the Development Authority. All of this land can be leased long term to any citizen, Jewish or not. The Jewish National Fund owns the final 12%, and only this land is restricted to be leased long term to Jewish citizens. http://www.buypropertyinisrael.com/article/types-of-land-in-israel

So, 88% of the land is open to every citizen, Jewish or not. The other 12% is owned by the JNF and it apparently is imposing its rules on the leasing of the land. It is a matter of personal opinion I suppose (and how you want to spin this) as to whether this is non-Jewish discrimination or a Jewish set aside to assure Jews, a historically oppressed people, a place to live.

I find it all the more remarkable considering Hanover just argued there isn't consensus on "who's a Jew" between the various interpretations of Judaism. Well, maybe not so remarkable as it was made up by politicians. That's just asking for trouble. — Benkei

It's not really arguable. The Reform Jews define Jews one way and the Orthodox another. It's a matter of fact. If you convert through the Reform synagogue, no Orthodox rabbi is going to let you lead any part of the service in synagogue (or any other Jewish rite for that matter). The reason he wouldn't is because you're not Jewish to him. You'd just be some strange blonde haired guy wearing a yarmulke.

Zionism and democracy are simply incompatible and the Israeli high court has done nothing to stop the rightward tilt of Israeli politics. — Benkei

Well, this makes the point of why the question of who is a Jew so significant, or maybe more generally, what makes the concept of Jewishness so significant. It's one thing to say that you must be Jewish to be significant in Israeli society and quite another to say that the culture must remain distinctly Jewish. The former is exclusionary, while the latter only dictates the cultural norms. If the French wish to set forth how the French ought to preserve their culture, no one will claim they are undemocratic, although it's clear their Muslim population (for example) might have its objection.

So, if Israel wishes to legislate that their nation is to have Jewish values and norms and to be identified as a Jewish state, that will not be undemocratic per se, but it will obviously create a culture entirely unpalatable to its Palestinian population, as they'll look at it as just another act of imperialism.

Obviously Arab nations identify themselves as Arab nations, and Jews would not be permitted to alter the culture in those nations, which is not an aside. It offers a reason for Israel's existence, namely that a historically oppressed people be given a haven for self-determination that they would otherwise not have. And truly, if not for the US likely providing a safer haven for Jews than Israel, Israel would be all that more important. It's also fairly clear at this point that without the US, there'd likely be no Israel at all.

Except that there isn't any consistent political view shared by Jews. In fact, the primary source of the debate on who is a Jew are the debates among Jews. It's also not like there's a single monolithic political view among Jewish Israelis.

It's just really complicated. To an Orthodox Jew, once a Jew, always a Jew, which would mean that a Jew who coverts to Christianity remains a Jew. http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1269075/jewish/Is-a-Jew-Who-Converts-Still-Jewish.htm.

I wonder then how many Jews are out there who converted around the time of Jesus. I guess they'd still be Jews.

Of course, the law in Israel seems to vary from that as you've pointed out. I'd also point out that further complications have arisen when a non-Jew converts through the Reform movement, the Orthodox won't recognize that conversion.

All I know is that I'm a true blue Jew, which is all I need to know.

Since we can't even determine when a chair is a chair, how do you expect we'll be able to determine when a Jew is a Jew?

The word "Jew" (like all words) will vary by context, with legal definitions, religious definitions, vernacular definitions in various countries, and racist definitions all varying. I think Hitler (conversation over, Hitler's been cited) defined Jews as having any grandparent Jewish. That definition might not have been shared by many, but it was of critical importance if you were so designated.

None of this diminishes anyone's Jewishness. It's just points out the inherent ambiguity of words.

So you're saying that to be a planet is to belong in bucket X and I'm saying that to be a planet is to belong in whichever bucket we name "planet". — Michael

This really is just evasive and not even responsive. We must assume there is some object out there that we've identified as Pluto and there is another object we've identified as Neptune and so on. That these objects might behave similarly is a metaphysical fact. If we note this similarity and name it "Planet," then that's what it is and all objects that behave in that manner fall into that class. If we put hats into the planet bucket, we've not made hats planets, we've made them "planets."

And my point is that being a planet is an identity that changes as our use of the word "planet" changes rather than an identity that's forever fixed to things in bucket X. — Michael

A planet is a thing in the sky. Pluto is "pluto" until we change the name.

I'm not saying that nothing is similar in the objects we call "planets". I'm saying that it might be that there isn't anything that all things named by some common noun have in common. What is the thing that all (and only) games have in common (the thing that determines whether or not a thing is a game)? — Michael

Ok, so if I have a blue lollipop and a blue chair, you're saying that they both might not be blue but that we've only named them both that way and when we rename them "green," they're no longer blue?

If no, please clarify. If yes, that's stupid.

I disagree. I think Wittgenstein was right. It's nonsense to look for some material characteristic that is the "essence" of being a game. All we can do is look to how we use the word "game". There is a family resemblance of material characteristics that influence our language-use, but being a game isn't reducible to these characteristics (such that if our use of the word "game" changed then being a game wouldn't change). — Michael

I don't think I've argued essentialism, and I don't think that any of what you say here affects my position. I agree there isn't some single component that can be identified that makes a chair a chair that could be sprinkled on a hat to make it a chair. There are likely a variety of things that make a chair a chair, some of which some chairs may have and some others don't. Perhaps it's a list of 100 criteria and if 40 are satisfied, it's a chair. Regardless, if the same chair criteria (or family resemblance or whatever) are satisfied at T-1 as at T-100, then it's still a chair. If we learn later that the object we were calling a chair at T-1 did not fit our criteria, it was not a chair at T-1.

I'm saying that it doesn't then follow that being a planet is reducible to these consistent characteristics — Michael

There is something similar between the various objects. That is, objects A, B, and C all orbit the sun (for example). As such, we put A, B, and C in bucket X, and then we name bucket X "planet." If we realize that B doesn't orbit the sun, we remove it from bucket X.

These consistent characteristics might simply be contingent influences on our decision to impose the planet-identity on these things. — Michael

Sure, but you're just pointing out the consequences of an equivocation fallacy. We today call bucket X "Planet" whereas tomorrow we call bucket Y "Planet" and so to say that B is Planet today doesn't mean it's a Planet tomorrow because we've now redefined "Planet." I see none of this as a problem as long as we remain consistent in our terms over time.

What I'm saying is that Pluto was never a planet as long as planet has been defined the same way over time. Of course, if we've changed our definition of planet, then we're not talking about the same thing at all, in which case our problem is lack of clarity and nothing else.

Furthermore, there might not be any consistent characteristics. — Michael

This is nonsense really. There may not be anything similar in the objects we call planets? Then why do I notice all these similarities?

I really am not concerned that I can't itemize with specificity what it means to be a boat, for example, as I truly have no problem whatsoever distinguishing boats from houseplants and the like.

That's the notion I'm questioning. It's problematic, as shown with the example of games, and also of planets (the point of this discussion). — Michael

The problem doesn't appear to be in anything I've said, but it appears to be in what Wittgenstein said.

Common nouns like "planet" might work in the same sort of way as proper nouns like "Michael" – the only difference is that one is plural and the other is singular. — Michael

This isn't really clear, especially with your hedging word "might" thrown in there. "Michael" is not descriptive, but it's just a random group of letters assigned to you as an identifier. "Planet" is a descriptive term, indicating that the item identified has certain qualities. It makes sense to say England is not a planet. It means that England lacks the characteristics of a planet. On the other hand, if you told me that you were Michael and I told you that I've spoken to you long enough to know you are not a Michael, you might be curious as to what I meant, as if there were something required in your personality or constitution to be a Michael.

You seem to want to avoid categorization of objects for some reason. If every object in a group has certain consistent characteristics, why can't I offer a single word (like "planet") to describe them? If later I figure out that I had miscatagorized a particular object, why would it be wrong to then remove it from that bucket?

Anyway, tell me why you want to go to such mental gymnastics here to avoid the straightforward position I've taken? Is there something deeper here I'm missing, as if you've got to go down your twisting road to avoid some other problem?

And Hanover isn't a German city. Hannover is. I missed the train in Hannover once. I just got on a different train that I didn't have a ticket for. I thought the Germans would care, but I explained to the train guy who looks at your ticket what happened, and he didn't care. They were weirdly flexible, very unGerman like. Maybe he stopped being "German" that day, sort of like Pluto stopped being a "planet" that other day.

Corporations gather and keep a great deal of information about customers. — Bitter Crank

And since you know this, it's obviously prudent to limit your public behavior (which includes your internet behavior) to only what you wish others to see.

I'd also point out the competing "right" of others to live in the public arena and to see and hear all that goes on in the world. That is, if you decide to finally publish your nude selfies to the eager public, don't I have some right to look at them, print them out, and store them beneath my mattress?

Guys, I can read between the lines. You're asking me to create a video series offering a comprehensive discussion of Hanoverian philosophy. Please, stop begging. I'll think about it.

The right to privacy obviously does not extend to public information. If you decide to publish personal information about yourself on the internet, on a billboard, in a local newspaper, or wherever, you can hardly complain when someone reads it and uses the information for their personal purposes.

If, on the other hand, Yaha- I mean Michael, is correct, then stoves became planets if you call 'em planets, because a triangle is a three-sided shape. — Sapientia

Well, I can see where stoves will become "planets" if we call stoves "planets," but I can't see how a stove can become a planet. An object can't morph into another object based upon our classification, but an object can be reclassified however we want to do it.

Am I missing something? Can someone restate Yahadraes/Michael/Mr. Awesome's view?

Was the morning star the evening star before it was known they were both Venus, which is a planet, and not a star? It's clear that "morning star" references something different than "evening star" in terms of when the object appears. And it's clear that it's a misnomer, as it's not a star at all.

So, we could say that Pluto(1), which was what we thought to be a planet, is different than Pluto(2), which we now don't consider to be a planet. Pluto(1) occurred from T1 to T100 and Pluto(2) is occurring from T101 to current day. Obviously, Pluto(1) and Pluto(2) are the same physical object, but the former occurred at an earlier time, so we, for whatever arbitrary reason, can classify it separately based upon its occurrence time if we want to.

Here's my question: what is the philosophical import of all this? I think I see the puzzle, but I don't see any far reaching implications here.

I find that I waste a lot of time on this Forum that I should be spending doing work. So, yeah, it affects my life.

You've posited that the murderer is uncatchable, so I think I have to do whatever I can to limit his murdering, right?

I think the people should sort of roll off the track. It just doesn't look like they're secured to the track itself, so I think they ought to get out of the way. We're also not provided any explanation for how these folks found themselves in the quandary. Maybe they deserve to be just where they are.

There's a pregnant lady in my office and I often ask her how her choice is doing. I got that joke from a bumper sticker that said "It's a baby, not a choice," which means the opposite view is that it's a choice not a baby.

The OP was a hypothetical stating that "they can't catch him." Your response of "the killer would be caught in no time" violates the given hypothetical and is therefore non-responsive. It's a given - he can't be caught. Don't fight the question.

If I understand the hypo, if the question is simply whether I would delete a thread if I knew it would result in someone's murder, I'd not delete the thread. I mean I get the need to free up server space and having an orderly website, but I don't see a real harm in letting an uncatchable murderer post at will if it'll keep him from murdering.

I think you missed their point, jamalrob. You can't be anti-semitic or anti-jewish because these categories are nonsensical. If something does not exist, you can't be against that something. It's all so simple! — Πετροκότσυφας

I would suggest that a fairly high form of racism is to deny the existence of the race altogether. Two things are obvious: (1) the specific demarcation of what constitutes a Jew (or any race for that matter) can be nebulous and variable depending upon who is doing the defining and (2) there are certain people who are unequivocally Jewish. There is no particular board that makes a boat a boat.

So the question is; what is criterion X, and has Pluto ever met it? If criterion X is some set of material characteristics, and if Pluto has never had these material characteristics, then Pluto has never been a planet. — Michael

That would be correct. If Pluto = x, y, and z and a planet = x, y, z, and a, then Pluto was never a planet. We just thought it was because we didn't realize it lacked the "a" element.

I suppose there can be some ambiguity here which leads to confusion, but as long as we keep our terms clear, I don't see a problem. That is, if we define Planet in two different ways: (1) a common usage way, and (2) a scientifically prescribed way, then I can see where there is a problem, but that's just an equivocation fallacy. If in year -5 we called Pluto a planet, it was a planet insofar as definition #1 was met, but it was not a planet insofar as definition #2 was met. In year +5, we have changed our #1 definition to comport with the #2 definition, so we don't consider Pluto a planet either in the vernacular or in the scientifically prescribed way.

My father always thought himself to be an identical twin. There was never any genetic testing. If he had been tested, and it were determined he was a fraternal twin, then it would be accurate to say he was never an identical twin despite the fact that he previously considered himself to be. How's this controversial, and how's this different from the Pluto question?

Stroking cocks? At least accuse me of oral and not just a lowly hand shandy.

If "planet" is a definition, a purely abstract, non-physical set of criteria, then an object is classified as a planet if those criteria are satisfied. The object (the actual physical thing we see in the sky) is a planet if those criteria are met, regardless of whether we identify it as such. That means there are many other planets we don't know about and have never spoken about, and there may well be many objects we call planets that are not. If when I say "planet" I mean it has criterion X, and I refer to an object as a planet that lacks X, then I am simply wrong.

Speaking on behalf of all of those of us who left at the time of the initial PF takeover:

I told you so.

I so love these moments.

I am truly enlightened as I failed to read the OP. That's what wise people do bitch.

If intelligence were that simple to replicate, AI wouldn't be nearly as limited as it is, especially with regard to the Turing test. As it stands, I think we'd all be able to separate the bots from real people in a matter of minutes regardless of how much intelligence had been programmed into the bot.

Your post posted 2 minutes after mine, so I'm first saying that you read quickly.

I'm saying that the distinction between property and substance dualism is a distinction without a difference. He's not addressed any important problem by redefining physical substance to include non-physical properties.

I disagree with your summation of substance dualism as "there are souls," because that suggests it's a theological position. It strikes me that you've jettisoned the classical Cartesian position so that you could move on to the more modern views. My thought is that substance dualism and it's newer offspring property dualism largely collapse into the same thing under analysis and no real headway has been made by Chalmers or Searle in their new classification system. They've just rearranged the furniture.

Substance dualism hold there are: 1. Physical things and 2. Mental Things. Property dualism holds there is one thing 1. Physical things, but it has two properties A. Physical properties and 2. Mental properties. So, property dualism begs the same question as substance dualism, which is what is this magical substance that contains mental properties? A property dualist simply declares that physical substance has mental properties, which means we have no idea what a physical substance is. It apparently has properties that can't be measured or observed. How does that help us any? Why not just say there are two types of substances?

We know we can have physical objects that don't have mental properties (like rocks and the like). Why then can't we have physical objects that have only mental properties? How would that particular physical object be any different than a Cartesian mind?

I'm to take it then from Chalmers that we a nebulous monistic universal substance that we call Physical Substance and sometimes it thinks and sometimes it just sits at the bottom of a stream.

My point to all this is that Western Philosophy hasn't moved an inch since Descartes. That's not an indictment. That's just an acknowledgment that he got it right. I do thank Chalmers for writing his fascinating book, though, and I do think Searle remains the clearest and most convincing of the modern day philosophers. I also think that Dennett is a waste of time, highly overrated, and has little significant to say.

No, I have all kinds of friends! All of the friends. All of the best friends! Everyone is my friend -- except for you! — Wosret

Alas, here's how I learn we're not friends. Sigh.

Also, I think that it was probably because Einstein was a jew and everyone feels bad for them because of Hitler, so that when you said that Einstein said it, people would be all like "oh, the poor jews", and not want to say it's wrong, because it might make the jews feel bad. That's clearly what happened. — Wosret

Honestly it is the least that can be done for the Jews considering their mistreatment. Sometimes when a regular white guy says something at work that makes sense, we'll agree to ignore it because regular white guys always get their way and now it's time for everyone else to get their way.

And now I've turned your playful comment into a cutting evaluation of liberal diversity trends. Well played Hanover! Well played indeed!

Since a central question of philosophy is "what is truth," it's hard to know if philosophy has arrived at the truth, considering we're not even sure what it is.

You can also look at the track record of science and conclude that with its constant modifications of theories, we can only expect that what we think today to be the truth will not be what is considered the truth in 1000 years.

The practical question is whether either science or philosophy has produced a useful result. It doesn't matter whether our reasoning bears any relationship to reality if we arrive at a successful result. I often think that many philosophical positions (and certainly some theological ones) might be terribly untrue (and some even incoherent), but they seem to yield useful results.

There are numerous examples of superseded scientific theories (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superseded_scientific_theories). In many of those examples, we still received useful results, even though the theory was ultimately wrong. In philosophy, fundamental principles are often accepted as true even though there is no way to show their existence, like time, space, free will, etc. (and some of these concepts become incoherent upon deep evaluation). In theology, I'd argue the entire enterprise is founded upon false premises, but there is no question that if done right, it can inject meaning and purpose into lives.

If we ask ourselves the question "does it assist us in living our lives" as opposed to "is it true," then I think philosophy falls just about where every other field does. It can, depending upon the life.

This is an interesting Wiki article I stumbled across a while ago where they have gone through and itemized all the unanswerable questions in philosophy. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_philosophy
Every time we begin a debate into one of these areas (which is often), I guess we could just cite this article for the proposition that we're going to get nowhere debating it.