The initial states aren't probabilistic in nature. If someone doesn't know the initial state, then how can they know some future state? — Harry Hindu

Thanks for your comments. It's been some time so you might have lost the train of thought.

Probability, in my opinion, has to be objective or real. By that I mean it is a property of nature just as mass or volume. So, when I say the probability of an atom of Plutonium to decay is 30% then this isn't because I lack information the acquisition of which will cause me to know exactly which atom will decay or not. Rather, radioactivity is objectively/really probabilistic.

If you agree with me so far let's go to my example: person A who doesn't have knowledge of the initial states of each dice throw and person B who has.

The fact of the matter is that, experimental probability? the outcomes of a throw of a dice, say done a 100 times, will be an almost perfect match with the calculated theoretical probability. For instance the probability of a dice throw with outcomes that are odd numbers is (3/6) or 50% and if you do throw the dice 100 times there will be 50 times the dice shows the numbers 1, 3, 5 (odd numbers).

This match between theoretical probability and experimental probability is "evidence" that the system (person A and the dice) is objectively/really probabilistic.

However, person B knows each initial state of the dice and can predict the exact outcome each time.

So, we have an "apparent" conundrum on our hands. The system (person A and the dice) is deterministic for B but it is also probabilistic (for A and B) in an objective sense.

At some level of the experiment, probability has creeped into the system (person A and the dice). The outcome of the dice is determined by the initial state of the dice. In essence we can replace the outcome of the dice with its initial state since the latter determines the former.

If, as the experiment reveals, the outcomes are indicating the system (person A and the dice) is objectively probabilistic, then it must be that the initial states are probabilistic. After all the outcomes are determined by the initial states.

What do you think?

If earth was a heaven I wouldn't be an antinatalist — khaled

This is all that I want to hear

Can you kindly present your version of antinatalism?

I'm not denying that there is suffering in the world. A good indication of this would be the concept of heaven. I could simply use heaven, the very existence of such a notion, to prove and be in agreement with antinatalism.

However, notice something important - Everyone wants to go to heaven and that means two things:

1. This life isn't satisfactory
2. A life of joy is desirable.

Now consider the opposing concept - hell. Nobody wants to go to hell. This means:

3. It is better to be nonexistent than to be in hell

Now imagine a person being given choices as follows:

1. Hell
2. Earth
3. Heaven
4. Nonexistence

Antinatalism at its best can make us choose nonexistence over hell or earth. Can antinatalism ever make us choose nonexistence over heaven?

The foundation under antinatalism is suffering. There is no suffering in heaven. So, no, antinatalism can never provide a good reason to opt for nonexistence over heaven.

Doesn't this mean that life/existence is NOT the problem here and that existence is sufficiently distinct from suffering? I know that, as of now, the two are inseparable - a head comes with headaches so to speak. Nevertheless, we can treat headaches and hopefully treatment can be extrapolated to suffering in general. In short I think it's possible to make earth a heaven. No suffering, no antinatalism.

Also, they have just one part (the singularity) making them ultimately simple. But their gravity can potentially allow them to interact with a huge number of things. So if someone said a black hole is simple, they would be right - and if someone said a black hole was complex, they would be right. — ZhouBoTong

Notice that you said "huge number of things". So you agree that being greater in number, which results in an explosion of possible interactions, qualifies as complex.

I think you're equivocating between "black hole" and "black hole interactions".

One thing that is interesting is you used the singularity of a singularity to say a singularity is simple. I guess we need to, like the great Einstein, relativize the concept of simplicity and complexity. A black hole is simple relative to the interactions it can be part of. However, it is more complex than, say, a planet or a sun.

No. Antinatalism doesn't require this to be the case. It just requires that life includes SOME suffering — khaled

That's what I mean. The antinatalist can't see the distinction between life and suffering. You say even "some" suffering is good enough to decide. Doesn't that mean no suffering or perhaps ecstatic joy would make the antinatalist decide otherwise. In short it's not life that's the issue, it's the suffering that, as of the moment, is so inevitable that it's difficult to see that life is not the same as suffering.

A simple question:

1. Life + joy
2. Life + suffering
3. Life = suffering

If 1 were true then antinatalists have no argument. Right?

The antinatalist/pessimist thinks 3 is the truth. I'm saying the situation is actually 2 and then the following basic arithmetic is possible.

4. Life + suffering - suffering = Life
5. Life + joy

Once 5 becomes a reality and I think that's possible, antinatalism/pessimism collapses.

Life/existence isn't the problem. Suffering is.

In a sense it's about degrees of freedom, freedom in the broadest sense of the word.

An object once possessed gets locked to the possessor and loses its freedom. After all if it were public property it would have greater freedom by which I mean more possibilities.

An object's best economic state would be one with maximum freedom or possibilites. Thus we have thieves who take what is NOT theirs.

This forces the state to intervene and create an artificial structure of rules and regulations that prevents thieves and protects ownership.

Why is ownership more important than maximizing utility of objects?

It seems that we've made a choice between the options of maximum utility of an object where it is not owned by anyone and protection of ownership. There must be a good reason for this. I think it was Banno who started a thread on the tragedy of the commons. The group works best when they compete with each other and ownership is a part of the competitive landscape. I think it's the most important element of competition and thus of the health of an economy.

Yes, but that assumes the Designer intended to create a perfect Garden of Eden. If so, then we have to invent an evil god who is powerful enough to foil that intention. However, what if the whole point of creation was to produce a self-perfecting Experiential Process? Some philosophers have postulated that God experiences reality through our eyes, ears, and feelings. I can't speak for God's intentions, but the self-improvement Process of Intelligent Evolution makes more sense to me than the failed Perfection of Intelligent Design — Gnomon

Part of, I think the most vital part of, self-improvement is having the ability to recognize the most efficient processes of life and then choose them.

I see. A tendency towards balance. :chin:

What about the initial imbalance that drives the entire process? I'll give you an example. Take a battery/cell. It has a positive and a negative. The voltage (imbalance) between the positive and negative lights a bulb. The moment balance/equilibrium between the negative and positive is attained the bulb goes off.

In this case we must remember that the current must be within a certain range - too much and the bulb will burn out, too less and the bulb doesn't shine. This is the balance you're talking about.

This is something I wanted to write earlier but it wasn't clear enough for me. Now it is. So, let me explain the situation as I understand it.

To initiate or begin something, anything, we need an imbalance. However, to maintain/continue whatever that thing is we need balance. In my battery-bulb analogy, an imbalance (voltage) is necessary for the bulb to glow but to maintain the the glow for as long as possible we need balance (a specific value of current, temperature, etc.).

Interestingly, we need to maintain the imbalance (voltage) to keep the bulb glowing.

We could look at it as imbalance having a range and different phenomena finding an existence, through balance, at different points along that range. The driving force which begins the entire process of all existence is imbalance but to maintain existence at any point on the imbalance-range we need balance.

He considers both fine-grained and continuous scenarios as hypothetical suppositions. Why use theology as an example when ethical ones are emotive enough I have no idea. — bongo fury

I still don't get it. How is it possible that two ethically similar people have contradictory outcomes (one going to hell and the other going to heaven)?

I have a very vague understanding and the word "vague" probably is the key here. I guess Sider is onto something here. If people are spread like a continuum and morality is a spectrum without any discrete borders then it is possible that two people of similar moral standing may have opposite fates - one in hell and the other in heaven.

if the doctor first caused conditions known to make the patient suffer — schopenhauer1

Otherwise the analogy is not apt to the antinatalism argument whereby the parent is creating a life that will suffer, de novo, in the hopes that it won't be that bad or they will find some coping techniques such that the good will outweigh the bad. — schopenhauer1

Firstly I don't deny that there is suffering in life. Countless millions have lived their lives in abject misery only to perish in horrible ways. However, we can't ignore what is in my opinion the other side of the coin - let's call these the happy ones. Just like antinatalists/pessimists ignore this significant chunk of people who are content and enjoying life there are people on the other side of the line ignoring the true and real suffering. In all fairness then, like good ol' China we need, in recognition of these facts, a ONE country TWO systems policy. In fact this is the existing policy in all the nations of the world. People are advised to plan their family - avoid teenage pregnancies, have small, ergo, manageable families, give adequate space between pregnancies, etc. All of these measures have the dual purpose of ensuring the health, ergo, happiness of the children who are alive and prevent large, unmanageable families that inevitabily fall to an entire array of exquisite varieties of suffering.

In short, neither antinatalists nor pessimists nor those who think having children is a good thing are right in terms of being applicable to the entire population on earth. Their positions, like so many of our other views on life, apply to certain segments of the population. There is no one size fits all here as the two opposing camps are claiming.

The antinatalist/pessimist position is as follows:

1. Life is suffering or suffering outweighs happiness
2. If life is suffering or suffering outweighs happiness then nonexistence is better than life
So,
3. Nonexistence is better than life

I can't deny premise 2 but what about premise 1? The negation of premise 1 is:

4. Life is full of joy

If proposition 4 is true then antinatalists/pessimists would lower their swords and admit there's nothing to fight for. Implicit in this - the willingness of the antinatalist/pessimist to change their minds if we could ensure happiness in life - is the position that existence is NOT the problem. Suffering is. As you can see the situation is analogous to a patient (life) that has to be cured (happiness provided) of a disease (suffering). As for the doctor giving the disease to the patient and then trying to treat, this is exactly the error in judgment antinatalists/pessimists make - thinking life = suffering.


You might be interested to know that I've heard people claim that birth rates are lower among the educated and higher among the uneducated. I don't know if this is due to economic considerations or because education leads to antinatalism.

What say you?

Well, yes, to be non-existent surely beats having to suffer a hellish nightmare of a life. People make choices in that direction in the form of suicide. There may be disagreement as to the soundness of suicidal logic but no one should ignore the extreme anguish which can only be perceived in a subjective way. It's a mistake to dissuade a suicidal person by laying out before him agreeable pictures of the world because s/he's already crossed that point.

In regard to the above and mainly to address the belief that non-existence is better primarily because of the suffering one has to undergo from birth to death, we might consider a case which gets my point across very well - the case of a patient who consults a doctor.

Not even a quack, let alone a qualified doctor, would prescribe beheading as a cure for a headache. The aim is to treat the malady - suffering - AND make life enjoyable or at least livable. I guess I'm saying, in a very important way, antinatalists are unable to distinguish the patient (life) from the disease (suffering) and this leads them to the mistaken conclusion that life (patient) = disease (suffering).

Of course the antinatalist will now mention inevitable irremediable suffering to revive their now dead argument but for such situations people generally agree that people so unfortunate be given the choice to end their lives. However, this in no way gives any support to the antinatalist position that all life, everywhere, always = suffering.

Yes, agreed.

Sider's speculations are ... just that: mere speculations. — alcontali

:rofl: :lol:

going to lead to two very similar people who have committed similar acts of faith, goodness, repentance, etc. to receive eternal damnation or eternal salvation. — Bridget Eagles

This claim is not substantiated in the argument unless Theodore Sider is privy to information we're not aware of. It's implausible at all levels of credulity. He seems to be well-informed, too well-informed. Of course arguing against Sider puts me in the same boat as him but the point is morality is more plausible in a binary setup which makes Sider's claim quite difficult to swallow.

Willingness to take whatever by murder or die trying to keep it from being taken away has always, in the last analysis, made some thing mine. — 180 Proof

I think I might've mistaken one meaning of "possess" for another here. Does the following not make sense:

1. Owners have boners
2. The owned are things that can be boned — TheMadFool

I'd like your comment. Thanks

In my world, which is quite small I must confess, the following laws hold true:

1. Owners have boners
2. The owned are things that can be boned

I think the whole concept of ownership can be reduced to these two basic laws.

Okay, let’s define, or agree somehow, on what we mean by ‘the future’. To me it’s the absolute unknown, it doesn’t exist. And yes, for me, the universe is chaos. — Brett

:ok:

In conclusion if you have a limited number of choices that are a subset of the actual number of choices do you have free will — enzomatrix207

As I mentioned in my post that choosing the most efficient/bestest path isn't a choice at all. However to enable us to find such paths requires intelligence and to take us on the paths requires an ability to choose even if this is just illusory.

So, you think evolution "intended" to create intelligent agents all along, but it took 14 billion years to create a working prototype? I'm kidding, but most materialists would find the notion of teleology in Nature to be magical thinking. I happen to agree with your intuition, but instead of promoting Intelligent Design (ID), I propose Intelligent Evolution (IE).

The primary difference between blind groping evolution and directed evolution is the foresight to imagine something better than what is. According to Darwinism, Nature is an ad hoc process : it works with what worked in the past, and adapts it to a new function. Early humans were not much better. They found rocks lying around and used them to pound on nuts. Only thousands of years later did their intelligence invent the hammer, which is intended specifically to pound on nails.

Intelligent Design envisions a world that began as a perfect design, but has been corrupted by an evil deity. Intelligent Evolution proposes a world that began as a primordial Egg, and is still developing and evolving toward the complete design. Both theories explain the imperfections, but only one explains the necessity for gradual evolution, and for the belated emergence of Intelligence, Will, and Morality. :smile: — Gnomon

I think we're on the same wavelength though I must confess that you saw the connection intelligent design and intelligent evolution but I only strayed into these domains in my discussion with @ZhouBoTong.

Since you're in the right conceptual spot to get the main thrust of my argument all I'll say is that the methods scientists use to attack intelligent design is to point out the many structural and functional flaws in the living world. Surely an intelligent designer could've done better. In fact even humans, as imperfect as we are, can detect flaws in our biology. Isn't this a tacit affirmation that, given the means and opportunity, an intelligent designer can surpass blind evolution in every way?

I didn't mean either of those quite so negatively (although eugenics certainly deserves it). When you talked about speeding evolution, that has to be more than individual choices...right? I think of dogs as a good example of accelerated evolution. Are humans making any decisions that are speeding evolution in any sort of similar way?

My point about EVERYBODY reproducing was to suggest that there is no targeted improvement happening if everyone is passing on genes.

I feel like I am NOT really addressing what you are getting at. Can you give me an example of how humans are speeding up their evolutionary development? — ZhouBoTong

I agree that the picture of directed evolution doesn't reflect the truth as it is now. What I'm saying boils down to the fact that intelligent design is better than blind evolution. If you look at how scientists argue against intelligent design you'll see one common motif - that our biology has countless structural and functional flaws. Implicit in that claim is an intelligent designer would've done a better job than probability-based evolution.

I think where we clash here is in the idea that we can consciously shape and plan for the future, whereas I don’t think we can because the future is unknowable and cannot be planned for. — Brett

I still can't figure out why you think the future is unknowable. There's only one thing I know that can justify such a claim - chaos - and the world we live in is ordered enough to permit realizable plans for the future.

Are you saying the world is in chaos? I'm willing to admit that there's a lack of coordination in the world and this may be source of your confusion; you're mistaking poor teamwork for chaos. The uncoordinated world does make it difficult to plan but this is not the same as saying the future is unknowable. I think it's just a lack of trying.

:up: :ok:

The only quibble I have with this-and it isn't substantive- is that I would have said "predictions X, Y, Z would be observed — Janus

What's the difference between my "predictions X, Y, Z must be true" and your "predictions X, Y, Z would be observed" ?

I do find the shift in meaning to be in better alignment with Popper though. I feel "verifiabilty" is expressed better with "would be observed than "would be true". The former is closer to Popper's views on the matter as the rationale of the scientific method isn't as logically restricted as in non-empirical arguments.

In non-empirical arguments, modus ponens and modus tollens works because the antecedent and the consequent are truth claims.

However the scientific method is a different beast. To continue with my example and your suggestion to use "would be observed rather than "would be true", I'd like to correct the scientific method to:

1. If theory A is true then prediction X, Y, Z would be observed.

2. predictions X, Y, Z are NOT observed.

So,

3. Theory A is false?!

The above argument looks ok but actually has a flaw in that when predictions fail to materialize (aren't observed) it doesn't always mean the theory in question is false. Take for example the classic case: All swans are white. If you fail to observe white swans it doesn't mean that the claim is false. It just means that you haven't discovered evidence for the claim. The only way we can say that the claim, all swans are white, is false is by observing a non-white swan. The modus tollens fails to apply like it does in non-empirical arguments.

This then would necessitate some experiment that is designed specifically to falsify a scientific theory.

I think this squares with Popper's view that verifiability alone doesn't qualify a theory as scientific. There has to be a way (experiment/observation) to falsify a theory.

Why is falsification more important than verification to Popper? I think the reason has to do with induction failing to provide definitive truth. If we are to put our trust in a theory it can't be based on it being true because the nature of induction only allows for tentative truth. Ergo we need a better spot to park our trust in and that spot is when we know a theory is NOT false which leads to Popper's falsifiability interpretation of science.

What do you think?

"what if nothing is real bro". — Grre

Your example is a good one and captures both the nature of the thoughts that flit across the minds of drug bugs and also how they're a caricature of what philosophy is.

After all "nothing" and "real" do feature in serious philosophy e.g. ex nihilo nihil fit and reality is a philosophical subject in its own right. In fact if one considers how much progress has been made in these topics I think philosophers, even great ones, have barely managed to drop the "bro" from the question "what if nothing is real bro?"

Perhaps it's not like I put it. Druggies aren't caricatures of real philosophers and their thoughts are serious philosophical issues that have boggled the minds of entire generations of great thinkers. However it must be noted that druggies needed assistance to reach what is to a philosopher just a routine. We can take this the other way of course; that philosophers are those with an abnormal mind - they talk like drug addicts.

To say that such thoughts as emanate from the junkie is cliched may be true but only in terms of being oft repeated and not in the sense of uninteresting.

I have a problem. It begins with the way numbers are presented to us in school. The usual methods:

1. Set method: A given collection of items are used to convey what numbers mean. A set of three apples are counted beginning with 1 and ending in 3. This pattern is then applied to other sets and we get an understanding of what numbers mean.

2. Line number method: Here a line is used and distances from 0 are used to teach children what numbers mean.

Which of the two methods above maps on to time? It isn't the set method but rather the line number that's used to represent time. Before I venture further with my analysis or perhaps just a sorry attempt at analysis I'd like to say that a possible explanation may be found here.

My analysis:


Sets aren't used for time and a line number is preferred because time is believed to be a continuum and sets are inconvenient to work with when you want to talk of such things. A line number not only has a form that is continuous in appearance, it also represents distance which is a continuum.

However, the number 3 in a time measurement, say seconds, means nothing more than that 3 seconds have passed. People are in the habit of talking about moments/instances and this can only be understood in terms of saying something like the third second. A moment understood in this sense is more like a signpost on a road telling us how much time has elapsed. Just as a signpost isn't an actual distance any moment in time is NOT time at all.

My argument depends on the difference between ordinal and cardinal numbers. Just to add, I think this is one of the reasons why a line number is used to represent time since it's more amenable to showing ordinals, allowing us to depict an nth second/minute/hour/ etc, which is not as easy to convey with a set model.

If one wants to discuss moments in time we'd need to use ordinals and talk of the 1st, 16th, 23rd, nth, unit of time. However we must remember that the moment itself is NOT time which is by definition a, for lack of a better word, "gap" between moments. To think that a moment is time would be like saying that the location 3 cm on a scale is the distance 3 cm which is actually the spatial "gap" between 0 cm and 3 cm.

I agree that if time really is infinitely divisible then it does contain an infinite number of moments. This is exactly what a line number captures. However, as moments are only positions in time (ordinals) this doesn't matter. Time is actually the finite "gap" between moments. Why is the "gap" finite? Divide any given duration of time by any number of your choosing except zero and you'll always get a finite result. Ergo time is not infinite even though there are an infinite moments between any two positions of time.

These sweeping / shaping "forces" are my history and I can never ever be separated from them in the sense of: on the one hand, here am I, and, on the other hand, there are they. These "forces" are integral to who I am - they "integrate" me to be who I am. Therefrore, it can never be justified to state that someone "has" a history. Much nearer to the truth will be to state that someone is what he/she has become in his/her history. In other words, you, I and all of us, we are our history. The role of history should thus not be restricted to cultural philosophy, but should be given an ontological position in its role of making up the picture of the nature of human being! — Daniel C

I'm not sure if I understand you completely. You seem to be saying that to remove the people, the sense of who and what they are, and focus on the usual topics of politics, religion, culture, etc., is at best incomplete or at worst wrong. Yet, I wonder if there's anything other than the usual framework of history I mentioned that could justify your thesis. What is there in "someone is what he/she has become in his/her history" that is so distinct that the usual approach to history fails to inform us something important?

I agree that every human is shaped by stuff like religion, culture, philosophy, politics, etc. which give a framework to history. To understand a person in terms of who s/he is will definitely require a grasp of this environment of ideas and experiences s/he is/was mmersed in. I think this is done by historians who seem to give considerable weightage to so-called movers and shakers of the world. Influential people are analyzed in the way you suggest - as in how they became who they were/are.

Is this what you mean?

Every person, as a self, body, or both, knows they exist. But that knowledge is certainly variable with concern to each one, as a lot of philosophies about proving one's existence have emerged, and are known for their common contradictions.

What's yours? I would like to hear from you. — Unlimiter

What about the idea of possible worlds? It seems that apart from contradictions everything is possible. This is rather a truism since arguments for nonexistence generally follow the pattern in which the existence of something is shown to result in a contradiction, thereby proving nonexistence.

Proving existence then involves demonstrating an absence of contradictions and proving nonexistence requires one to show that a contradiction follows.

This method utilizes the notion of possible worlds.

My understanding is that Popper rejected induction, and saw science as being a combination of abduction (conjecture and prediction) and observation. Failure to observe the predicted outcomes of a theory constitutes falsification which leads to refutation of the theory.

Induction is reduced to just the (ungrounded?) expectation that nature will continue to behave in the ways it has been observed to behave in the past. — Janus

I see. I think you're in agreement with Popper regarding the necessity for falsifiability for a theory/proposition to be considered as scientific.

In Popper's argument he makes a distinction - that between verifiability and falsifiability. The meat of his argument lies in understanding this distinction.

You rightly pointed out that the scientific method in re falsifiability involves the following simple argument:

1. If theory A is true then the predictions X, Y, Z must be true
2. Predictions X, Y, Z aren't true
Ergo
3. Theory A is false

So we have a theory A that makes predictions that are falsifiable and this form of the scientific method agrees with Popper's falsifiability criterion.

As I said before Popper sees verifiability and falsifiability as two distinct concepts. I can't see the difference in the way you described the scientific method. I see verifiability and falsifiability as two sides of the same coin.

In the example I gave above, theory A is verifiable because of the predictions it makes but the fact that these predictions can turn up false means falsifiability is built into the principle of verifiability.

Perhaps if we look at Popper's argument more carefully we can see why he considers verifiability as not the same as falsifiability.

Propositon B = there exists an incantation that can invoke the antichrist.

B can be "verified". Verification here is the logical positivist notion of considering propositions meaningful only if and also just by its possibility of being perceived through the senses. Of course if we consider the scientific method as you described it (theories with predictions which when not observed falsifies the theory) then verifiability alone is sufficient because falsifiability is just the application of modus tollens to the argument.

However, Popper thinks B can't be falsified. Unfortunately he doesn't give us a reason why but only repeats himself 3 times. Is it because he's arguing in the context of all possible worlds, one of which would possess a working devil-invoking incantation or does he mean something else? If he is using all possible worlds to show B can't be falsified then he must mean that scientific theories need to be propositions about this and only this world; a world in which verifiability and falsifiability would be tied together like so: Verifiable if and only if falsifiable..

The way Popper uses probability - the fact that if all possible worlds are considered the existence of a devil-invoking incantation becomes highly probable - suggests that he is saying that all possible worlds make statement B unfalsifiable. He mentions in the beginning that he wants to discuss a purely existential proposition which I think means one whose scope is all possible worlds.

Popper thinks that despite the notion of falsifiability being implicit in verifiability it needs to be made explicit so that we may exclude propositions that have as a scope all possible worlds.

Kindly comment on this. Thanks.

That way he could have treated scientific laws and the demon summing example uniformly and symmetrically, by saying that both lack empirical content - the former in not being verifiable in requiring infinite confirmation, and the latter in not being falsifiable in begging potentially infinite consideration. — sime

I think verifiability is limited in scope to a particular world for the reason that induction isn't conclusive in any world. However for the devil-proposition to work the way Popper wants we need possible worlds (infinite "consideration" as you put it).

Popper uses the devil-proposition to emphasize the problematic combination of false AND untestable BUT verifiable. By definition verifiability is incapable of disproof and untestabiltity, well, relieves the lookout of his duty to spot the black swan in Australia.

Thanks Ying for taking the trouble to post Popper's argument. A couple of things:

1. Popper means by testable that a theory can be disproved and by verifiable that a theory can confirmed. I used th word "confirmed" and not "proved" as I think doing the reverse would have invited Popper's disapproval for the reason that scientific reasoning is, at its foundations, inductive.

2. Popper wants to base science on empirical propositions which he defines as falsifiable. He explicitly wants to remove verifiability and probabilistic confirmability as conditions for empirical propositions.

He does this by considering the claim for the existence of an incantation to raise the devil. Such a statement would be presumably false but untestable (unfalsifiable) and have a high likelihood of being true IF we consider possible worlds. With one example he undermines the relationship between the empirical and the verifiable, between the empirical and probability; leaving only falsifiability as a criterion for empirical claims.

I think Popper is basically concerned about induction - the lifeblood of science. Verifying scientific theories though important don't provide us with certainty since no finite sample of past verifications is representative of the infinite future. Given this is so, we must look elsewhere for certainty and this can be found easily in falsifiability, a tool that can positively identify false theories.

Another thing to consider the combination of concepts with regard to statements that are presumably false, only verifiable and highly probable. I've underlined the most important aspect of the combination in statements like the claim that an incantation exists that can invoke the devil. There is the possibility that such statements are false. This undermines the utility of both verifiability and probability to identify empirical statements. That leaves us with falsifiability alone as the only reliable method for empirical claims.

What say you?

Do we really need to invoke demons to see the logical error in scientific reasoning.

Was there any good reason for choosing the antichrist to show the weakness of verifiability? How does the argument go? I'd like to know.

@Ying provides a hint by saying "presumably false yet formally highly probable non-empirical statement". Perhaps understanding someone as great as Karl Popper is above my pay grade but I feel there's a contradiction there obscured by loose terminology. How can something be presumably false yet highly probable. Either Popper's notion of the weakness of verifiability in science is truly hard to grasp or there's a context in which it makes sense to come so close to contradicting oneself. Which is it? Pray tell.

The notion of balance seems either implicit or explicit, the difference between the two being the degree of their prominence in the zeitgeist of a people.

The Buddha and Aristotle, both thinkers far ahead of their times, agree on the necessity of balance as a central feature in living. The former preached the now-famous middle path and the latter mentioned the golden mean. I hope I haven't strayed too far from the truth here.

The advice for moderation and balance in life makes a whole lot of sense. After all, science has discovered that life can thrive only within a certain range of physical and chemical parameters. Too hot or too cold, no life. Too acidic or to alkaline, no life. This motif seems to be quite universal despite some life-forms thriving in extreme conditions.

One wouldn't think it an error to then extrapolate the idea of balance to the universe itself. However, consider the generally accepted belief that the universe exploded into existence 13.8 billion years ago. I'm no astrophysicist but am I wrong to say that there had to be an imbalance for the Big Bang to occur? There must've been a force that made the scales tip in favor of the universe's birth.

Also, notice that scientists say entropy is [/i]always[/i] increasing. This is clearly not balance. Of course an open system like the earth being energized by the sun has managed to produce life that can, for a limited amount of time, only delay the inevitable progression to greater disorder - death and decay.

We could say that it's the difference, ergo imbalance not balance, in entropy between two states that provides an environment conducive to life - the intermediate stages (balance/Goldilocks zone) being favorable to life. It may seem that I've contradicted myself but the point is the so-called balance is only possible because of, what looks to me, an imbalance. At a fundamental level it's all about the flow of energy and that would be impossible without there being an imbalance.

What now of Buddha's middle path and Aristotle's golden mean? What about how earth sits in the Goldilocks zone of our sun and allows life to evolve? Are these not indubitable evidence that balance is the a fundamental law of the universe? Yet we see that without disequilibrium there's no energy transfer and without energy transfer, no chemistry. No chemistry, no life.

We can view this "contradiction" through the lens of rationality and human nature. Our rationality informs us that both balance and imbalance are necessary for life but our nature has a preference for balance.

Wait, do you mean like eugenics or genetic engineering? — ZhouBoTong

The path from random evolution to well-orchestrated efficient evolution has its slippery slopes. In my humble opinion morality is as distinct a human characteristic as rationality. I think Aristotle defined humans as rational animals. A slight modification is in order if we're to think, as Aristotle probably did, in terms of essential characteristics. This is to define man as rational and moral animal.

So, directed evolution needs to be framed in the context of rational faculties AND ethical sense. To immediately think of eugenics and genetic engineering would be incorrect. Nevertheless, I think it's important to point out the dangers.

If "directed evolution" means that the average Joe takes all applicable factors into account then chooses the most efficient way to live and reproduce, then I am yet to be sold. — ZhouBoTong

The efficiency of the l'homme moyen is so well-concealed that it sometimes appears as the exact opposite - inefficiency. I agree that there are individual differences which are more obvious than the similarities that unite us because evolution seems to have favored the ability to see distinctions better than resemblances. It is better to recognize a tiger than to fail to recognize your wife. ( :joke: I think I'm taking this a bit too far). The point is the concerns that unite us seem to fall in line with the concern for survival. Ergo, something in the way of addressing these concerns in an efficient way is in order.

I would suggest that actual goodness is superior to theoretical goodness, in the sense that the purpose of goodness is exactly to be realized or enacted. So a practical ethic that realizes some good is superior to the practice of theoretical ethics. Exactly in this sense that Stoicism, yes it has many dimensions, but always the bottom line is that it guides personal development in a practical sense. — Pantagruel

It's possible to imagine the perfect car - inexpensive, fuel-efficient, low maintenance, etc - but until one can be constructed, thus felt, bought and driven, nobody will take you seriously. Practicality matters. This reminds me of Plato's world of forms. Supposedly these so-called forms are the perfect originals of which the physical world is just an imperfect image. If so then what we call theory, usually the perfect ideal original, becomes as valuable as original manuscripts to make practical copies of. The same applies to theoretical ethics and practical ethics. The latter is just a case of trying to fit the former within the limitations of the world as we know it which, because it is imperfect, renders practical ethics, not useless, but not completely satisfactory.

Of course I plan for the future. However I might make a plan for going from Australia to New York, book flights, hotels, anticipate the weather and choose appropriate clothing, change my money, work out how long it takes from home to the airport and arrive in time to board the plane. What I didn’t plan for was the plane crashing into the Pacific Ocean. — Brett

No plan is perfect but no objective is under the sway of every possible contingency. Right? You didn't expect the crash but at least you thought, for a good reason, that sailing there on home-built raft is not the best you could do.

Your concern on the difficulty of planning to be 100% successful is valid. However don't compare the success rates of planning for the future to 100%. Rather weigh it against random probability. You can't deny that your well-conceived plan to travel to Australia isn't better than walking randomly in the streets and if and when you chance upon a travel agent to throw a dice to choose your destination and so forth, hoping that in behaving this way you'll reach your desired destination, Australia?

You cannot make the right or efficient choices for a future you do not know, and the choices you do make are very minor in the scheme of things, and whether they are the right choice in terms of evolution cannot be known. — Brett

Why do you say that? Have you never planned for the future? Did you not plan yesterday that you would respond to my post? If you say "no" then, like me, you're a rarity in the world of humans who do make plans for the future and most of the times these do bear the desired fruit. Human society has a structure that depends on considering future outcomes which seem to, on mos occasions, work quite well. Don't you think?

I'd like to request a good justification for the words "future you do not know". If you mean to critique causality, the basis of all planning, then I'm all ears.

So I don’t believe we can make choices that we might call efficient to shape the future according to our desires. As I said which is the best choice about my climate change dilemma? — Brett

Not having knowledge is not the same as not wanting knowledge. You can't hold a toddler responsible for not knowing a match causes fire but one would be concerned if s/he has no desire to know.

In fact the use of the word efficient in terms of society makes me nervous — Brett

Yes, I understand what you mean. For one it may be extremely efficient to kill of all people who have "unhealthy" genes. However, this is a non-issue because, having achieved total control of our genes, this problem would simply vanish on it's own accord. Do we worry about small pox these days? However, your concern is of great importance because as Dosotevsky pointed out "without God everything is permissible". To navigate the perilous seas will require more wisdom than we can credit even the wisest amongst us.

Nonetheless, we can agree that morality, in essence, is about inclusion contrasted with exclusion. We always think twice about hurting those we include in our personal space. We usually don't give a damn about or feel no qualms about hurting those we exclude as not-us. I must say we can pin the blame for this situation squarely on the selfish gene.

However, consider how knowledge gained through our rational mind, itself a product of the "selfish" gene, has quite literally unveiled a truth of great consequence viz. we're all connected in a way that to heed only the call of our selfish genes is to invite disaster one of which you mentioned - climate change.

While this may be viewed as the height of vanity - the acme of selfishness where humans broaden their concern to other life-forms only because ultimately we care for ourselves - it can also be construed as life itself recognizing it's own nature and wanting to self-correct. Viewed this it isn't selfishness. Rather it's, for lack of a better word, an Awakening.

I think no amount of learning can ever get us to the meanings the art forms (movies included) the creator(s) wants us to experience. This is not just about foreign-language creations but also includes stuff in our own first languages whatever it may be.

The reason is simple. The art forms are usually fully immersed in the culture of its birth. To grasp their true and complete meaning, ergo to the enjoy and understand them, requires knowledge of fashion, philosophy, math, you-name-it, of the period involved. Knowledge vast enough that no one can achieve it. Thus no matter how much of a movie/art buff you are you can never grasp the complete content of an instance of the art forms.

Language stands out as the most obvious hurdle to comprehension in movies because visual data is not alien enough. Everyone of us are familiar with most eye-related content in movies. There are mountains, roads, sunsets, men, women, children, etc - very familiar objects. Language however is sufficiently distinct to cause complete unintelligibility to a foreign audience. Add to that what I just said about their cultural immersion and comprehension is literally impossible.

Subtitles, if cleverly done, do manage to get across an acceptable portion of the true meaning but capturing the full significance of what is being said is simply beyond the scope of translators. There's just too many extra-linguistic, cultural or other allusions, for translations, which ignore these devices almost completely except when a happy coincidence occurs, to capture the true meaning of dialogues. I guess subtitles are easier, not better, than learning a foreign language to enjoy a movie.

But my feeling is, and this partly tied to the selfish gene idea, that the only act of free will we have is to go against our nature (I don’t know if this what ZhouBoTong is suggesting, maybe) which is moral anyway, and that would be a destructive act and consequently irrational. If self awareness amounts to the ability to make that choice, then what could the benefit be?

We cannot chose efficiency because we can only know the present. The future waits to act on us. — Brett

I've heard that evolution finds it difficult to explain morality, given the fact of the selfish gene. I find this rather odd point of view considering how a person's sense of wellbeing seems to lie beyond the self too - in family, friends, communities, nations, etc. It isn't too much of a stretch to see where this is going. Haven't we realized that the health of the ecosystem we live in is critically dependent on each element in it? It seems the so-called selfish gene will shrink and fade away with an ever-expanding familial connection, as evidenced through biology, between all species. This realization - that we're all family - is the truth that there is no us vs. them but that everything is us.

Second thought: and, if I am correct (of course I think I am), then what exactly and what value is the ‘self-awareness’? — Brett

The unexamined life is not worth living — Socrates

If truth is our ultimate goal then self-awareness is a necessary step. I can work in my own favor only if I know I exist. Right? It appears that life and by extension the universe wants a "life" that isn't at the mercy of chance. Life, the universe, has become self-aware AND rational. Essential ingredients for success, don't you think?

So if you look at humans who can make choices, and then organisms that can't, which one selects the most efficient path most often? Humans very regularly do not. For MOST meals, I compromise on perfectly healthy in some way. And statistically, I eat healthier than the average human. I get that half the planet is ill informed on such things, but I would bet against the informed making proper choices if "proper" is inconvenient or uncomfortable.

I would also point out that the "choices" we are discussing happen during one's lifetime, and therefor have very little to do with evolution (how many of those choices actually effect the passing on of genes?), unless we are bringing Lamarckian evolution back. Notice that "unhealthy" choices like having loads of unprotected sex are actually very "fit" according to evolution. — ZhouBoTong

We need to look at the time-frame if you want to see the difference between blind evolution and human-directed evolution. Blind evolution would require an immense amount of time to get things right. Human-directed evolution would arguably achieve optimum efficiency in a shorter period. Which situation would have a higher hit rate? You firing your gun randomly or a trained sniper?

So which would be the best process to consider in my point about climate change? Which would be the decision that has most efficiency for our survival? — Brett

One could say that life has achieved self-awareness through humans. This isn't such a difficult proposition to consider. Look at the human body. Is our liver or heart or lungs or our toes conscious? No. Yet the brain, the conscious part of our body, works to ensure the survival of the whole body. Similarly, life is like the body and humans are like the brain. We humans, conscious and capable, must work to ensure the survival of the entire biosphere. Trying to prevent and reverse climate change is beneficial to the entire ecosystem. We may not be in the know about which methods/processes can solve the problem of climate change in the most efficient way but we are looking aren't we?

You are right, there will always be controversy in defining what 'good' is.
There is nothing banal about considering how to live as well as we can, cultivating certain virtues.

Given that the discussion is about Stoicism, here's an Introducion to the 4 cardinal virtues:

1. Wisdom
2. Courage
3. Justice
4. Temperance — Amity

:smile:

Thanks. The cardinal virtues don't really address good in a moral sense do they? They seem more behavior-oriented. Someone who is wise, courageous, just and lives a life of moderation is observably "good". The theoretical basis of these behaviors are being sidestepped.