Then I return to being completely at a loss as to your argument. It seems to be little more than "Putin is the biggest threat to civilisation because I reckon he is" — Isaac

Oh, you see “Putin is the biggest threat to civilisation because I reckon he is” as equivalent to "no 'local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty' causing the level of economic, infrastructural, human, political damage that is causing one single subject, Putin"?! Coz I don’t: in my claim I didn't talk about "biggest threat to civilisation". So far just more strawman arguments.

they seem completely unrelated to the point at hand. I'm disputing your claim the the Western world ought to help Ukraine best Russia by military force. — Isaac

Do you know the famous Kantian claim that “ought implies can”? Aside from how one wants to analyse it, my conviction is that a rational “ought” (as in “X ought to do Y”) must fall within what a subject “can”. Therefore rational expectations about what individuals, collectives and states likely can do are key to formulate rational oughts. In other words, I take “ought”-claims grounded on very “unlikely” expectations about individuals, collectives and states to be implausible and irrational. BTW I already made similar claims.
Now concerning the questions I addressed to you: my answers would be “unlikely” for all except the last one which is also crucial because if all authoritarian regimes would more likely resort to supplying weapons than using sanctions/diplomacy or in addition to using sanctions/diplomacy, and sanctions/diplomacy don’t turn to be effective as supplying weapons, then it could be very damn handicapping to just keep using sanctions/diplomacy against authoritarian regimes. But here some additional clarifications:

How likely is that Western citizens members of ethnic minorities (say Ukrainians, Iranians, Taiwanese) will see regional conflicts (like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Iranian revolts against the Iranian regime, the China's claims over Taiwan) as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in? — neomac

Moderately likely. — Isaac

Well that may depend on the issue, I can grant you that much. But knowing the example of the American Jewish community lobbying for the American support to Israel, it’s hardly surprising to find grass-root, high profile or even institutional lobbying activities from other minorities, including Ukrainians (https://www.theamericanconservative.com/congress-and-ukraines-relentless-lobbyists/) and even Russian activists (see the anti-Putinist Garry Kasparov). Among the Iranians one can find many popular anti-regime Iranian expat activists: Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Hamed Esmaeilion, Masih Alinejad, Nazanin Boniadi. Here an example of how pro-Ukrainian and pro-Iranians protests united recently in London : https://globalnews.ca/news/9201763/london-ont-ukraine-war-support-rally/

How likely is that Western military and/or geopolitical experts (like Mearsheimer or Kissinger) will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in, especially when allies, strategic partners and Great Powers hostile to the West are involved? — neomac

Moderately likely, there's a range of opinion from isolationists to full on hawks. — Isaac

That’s unlikely even for isolationist (“Isolationism is a political philosophy advocating a national foreign policy that opposes involvement in the political affairs, and especially the wars, of other countries. Thus, isolationism fundamentally advocates neutrality and opposes entanglement in military alliances and mutual defense pacts. In its purest form, isolationism opposes all commitments to foreign countries including treaties and trade agreements” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isolationism) if the American National interest is at stake (e.g. America was isolationist until it joined WW2). And here is the explanation Mearsheimer could offer [1].
At best you could say that Russia is not perceived as a serious threat to the American national interest by some American military and/or geopolitical experts. But evidently they aren’t very influential since American anti-Russian stance persisted under different American administrations (even despite Trump).

How likely is that historians would find historically plausible to expect that Western countries “mount a multi-billion dollar campaign” to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world without meddling in regional conflicts? — neomac

Pretty likely. — Isaac

There are no historical periods in which the West didn’t meddle in regional conflicts while at the same time mounting a multi-billion dollar campaign to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world (here a little reminder from the history of the US https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/List_of_proxy_wars). Not to mention the well known failures of foreign aid campaigns from the West. Or the failures of anti-Western forces (Islamic revolution and Communist revolution) to implement a better alternative to the Western social model, especially wrt implementation of human rights.
But you are absolutely free to imagine otherwise, of course.

Of course, I could continue: how likely that the Western Europeans will support American isolationism and say farewell to American military protection? How likely is that Westerners complying to Russian demands will not bolster other authoritarian regimes’ regional ambitions? How likely is that authoritarian regimes antagonising the West will not take a useful lesson if Russian nuclear threats scared the West away? And I didn’t even need to talk about the military-industrial complex or the big finance or the big tech yet.

In conclusion, as long as your “oughts” are grounded on unlikely expectations about how individuals, collectives and states behave, your “oughts” are irrational. And since a world where Western countries “mount a multi-billion dollar campaign” to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world without meddling in regional conflicts, is grounded more on your wild imagination than on what one can see as likely from history or geopolitics, then neither your expectation nor your prescription is plausible. Period.

[1] My own realist theory of international relations says that the structure of the international system forces countries concerned about their security to compete with each other for power. The ultimate goal of every major state is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. In practical terms, this means that the most powerful states seek to establish hegemony in their region of the world, while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region.
To be more specific, the international system has three defining characteristics. First, the main actors are states that operate in anarchy, which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. Second, all great powers have some offensive military capability, which means they have the wherewithal to hurt each other. Third, no state can know the intentions of other states with certainty, especially their future intentions. It is simply impossible, for example, to know what Germany’s or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025.
In a world where other states might have malign intentions as well as significant offensive capabilities, states tend to fear each other. That fear is compounded by the fact that in an anarchic system there is no night watchman for states to call if trouble comes knocking at their door. Therefore, states recognize that the best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. No Americans, for example, worry that Canada or Mexico will attack the United States, because neither of those countries is strong enough to contemplate a fight with Uncle Sam.

https://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931

I’m not convinced that “the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now”. — neomac


There are no "local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty" causing the level of economic, infrastructural, human, political damage that is causing one single subject, Putin. — neomac — Isaac

Oh, you see “the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now” is the same as "no 'local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty' causing the level of economic, infrastructural, human, political damage that is causing one single subject, Putin"?! I don't: in my claim I didn't just talk about deaths and misery, and "single" wasn't qualifying the "costs".

Roughly, yes. Where by 'meddle' you mean 'supply arms to'. — Isaac

Now:
How likely is that Western citizens members of ethnic minorities (say Ukrainians, Iranians, Taiwanese) will see regional conflicts (like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Iranian revolts against the Iranian regime, the China's claims over Taiwan) as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in?
How likely is that Western commodity traders and industry who partnered with some state muddled in some regional conflict, will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in?
How likely is that the piece of Western economy relying on Western commodity trades and industry will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in?
How likely is that Western political representatives and media industry who feed on ideological, religious and national differences and global threats or opportunities will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in?
How likely is that Western military and/or geopolitical experts (like Mearsheimer or Kissinger) will see regional conflicts as something the Western governments shouldn’t meddle in, especially when allies, strategic partners and Great Powers hostile to the West are involved?
How likely is that historians would find historically plausible to expect that Western countries “mount a multi-billion dollar campaign” to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world without meddling in regional conflicts?
How likely is that for any of the above subjects “meddling in regional conflicts” equates to everything except 'supply arms to’?
How likely is that for authoritarian regimes (like Russia, Iran and China) their “meddling in regional conflicts” equates to everything except 'supply arms to’?

If you're seriously convinced that the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now — Isaac

I’m not convinced that “the war in Ukraine is the single highest toll of avoidable deaths and misery in the world right now”. But if your imagination tells you otherwise, what can we do about it? Right?

A few million are currently at severe risk of starvation (according to UNICEF) in Afghanistan.

Off the top of my head, something like 10-20,000 are killed in the Myanmar conflict in a year, a few thousand a year every single year for decades in the Mexican war on drugs. The US supported war in Yemen has killed over a million with a similar annual death toll to Myanmar.

A failure to tackle air pollution kills 100,000 or more people every year in India. Even here in England there are something like 100-150,000 deaths a year from all causes that could be avoided through public health interventions.

There's wars in Ethiopia and Somalia which, coupled with famines, cause thousands of deaths every year. Half a million children are at risk of death from the latest drought and that's barely even made the inside pages of most newspapers, nearly twice that in Sudan… — Isaac

is your conviction that we, the West, should “mount a multi-billion dollar campaign” to counter the risk of famine, pollution and diseases around the world while avoiding to meddle in regional conflicts around the world like in Yemen and Ukraine? Is that it?

Lots of global events cause that level of damage - from local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty... Do we mount a multi-billion dollar campaign against each? No. — Isaac

There are no "local warlords, oppressive police, environmental pollution, poverty" causing the level of economic, infrastructural, human, political damage that is causing one single subject, Putin.

We make judgments based on the details of the circumstances we find ourselves in rather than sweeping generalisations based on very tangentially related situations in the past. — Isaac

Who is "We" ? Who are those who make "sweeping generalisations based on very tangentially related situations in the past." ? Why "sweeping"? Why "very tangentially"?
Or you simply mean that one doesn't need history when imagination is enough?

If Russia are useless at invading places they cannot at the same time be a serious threat to any great number of such places. One cannot be both a global threat, and impotent. With what power would such a threat be realised? — Isaac

That's a crappy (N.B. not ridiculous just crappy) argument.

• Russia is failing this war but it was able to cause lots of damage at different levels to Ukraine and the West. So the possibility that Russia is in no condition to win the war, doesn’t imply that Russia can still cause lots of damage (economic, infrastructural, human, political).
• Lots of people prefer evidence over imagination (not your case of course): now we have evidence of Russians’ failures.

There is a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, there again an example from history how these can end. — Isaac

Sure, Russia could withdraw from Crimea and Donbas as much as Isreal withdrew from the Sinai peninsula this could be a step toward peace.

:up:

'Russia is evil and must be stopped at all costs' and 'Russia is useless'. Putting aside for now the fact that these two narratives aren't even coherent (who cares about that anymore) — Isaac

Show the incoherence.

The world changes and we're living the consequences of a failure to realise that. — Isaac

At any point of history one can claim that bot that the world is changing and that we are living the consequences of a failure to realise that for anybody by anybody. You included. Now what?

Justin Bronk (Senior Research Fellow for Combat Airpower and Technology at RUSI) on Russian nuclear threats:

Exactly!

The question is how much truly does the Russian accept the inconveniences of the war for the imperial gain of Novorossiya? How much do they support the war? The Crimean annexation did genuinely excite Russians. It was bloodless and there was support for it in the Crimean population (if not a majority, but anyway). The annexation of these new territories was a Stalinist theatre, especially when Putin is losing ground in them. — ssu

Indeed, a wide Russian support to Putin’s expansionism is likely to be conditional on mass mobilisation (especially of ethnic Russians), otherwise why would Putin be so late and cautious to call for a wider military mobilisation?
Yet I guess that the insurgence of the military to be more decisive for Putin’s destitution and the push for more liberal political reforms than the Russian population insurgence per se. That is why military humiliation on the battlefield (including the killing of generals) combined with Putin’s disposition to put all the blame on and replace military leaders for military failures, is the right recipe for military defection or conspiracy from the military subordinates and high ranks.

I am still curious if you're willing to follow through, or prefer to hang onto a double standard — Tzeentch

This looks to me as a false alternative, let me explain.

I cumulated the reasons why the West must intervene in this war against Russia. However the appeal of those reasons is grounded on two implicit assumptions: 1. The standard of life the avg person can experience in the West in terms wealth and rights is perceived as evidently preferable than the standard of life the avg person can experience in societies in the opposite ideological spectrum (e.g. authoritarian regimes like Russia, China and Iran) 2. Struggles between political powers for hegemony is practically a historical constant for whatever reason, and states must deal with it: so either be a hegemonic power (with all the privileges and burdens, merits and abuses [1] that can go with it), or within its sphere of influence (e.g through alliance), or challenge one, or remain neutral if affordable. Individuals who have no fucking clue about how to fix the world (who has?), will pick their side according to their preferences/convictions, bitch about it and good luck with that.

The first assumption explains why there is a double standard, I’m picking a side wrt a standard of life that I wish to be preserved as much as possible (if not improvable) for me and likeminded peers within my reach, at minimum. Double standards is inevitable when standards are clashing: so e.g. I won’t treat a democratic regime nuclear bombing a fascist regime in the same way I would treat a fascist regime nuclear bombing a democratic regime. That’s the predicament we have to deal with. The second assumption explains why I expect states to struggle against perceived hostile/alien/exploitative competitors (including the hegemonic power I happen to be siding with), and I expect people (me included) to at best exercise empathy, political restraint and self-criticism whenever affordable (which by the way is an option likely best supported by Western democratic institutions like the ones where I live than in authoritarian regimes) in line with the side they have picked. That far I’m willing to follow through.
Do you see any striking and unrecoverable incompatibilities between these two intellectual dispositions? I don’t.

[1] you can replace “abuses” with “shocking injustice”, “horrible crimes”, “callous hubris”, “inhuman barbaries”, “satanistic atrocities” and the like.

Putin is a problem for the West beyond this war and the criminal annexations of Ukrainian territories. The authoritarian turn of his regime to grant concentration of power in his hands, the Russian growing military presence in the Mediterranean area (also through the Black Sea), in the Middle East, in North Africa, in the Baltic sea (encircling Europe), Russian attempts to corrupt the democratic life in Western countries (from state cyberwar to financing western politicians), Russian attempts to economically blackmail the West by compromising the trade of critical commodities (e.g. gas and wheat), Putin's nuclear threats, Putin's declared goal to challenge Western hegemony and his attempts to build an alliance with other countries to antagonise the West perceived as weak, all these facts justify the Western intervention in Ukraine.

I don't see any justification for the cartoonish super villain role the Russians been assigned in western narratives. — Tzeentch

Agreed. "Super" is too much.

I've chosen to believe because it seems plausible — Isaac

Or it seems plausible because you have chosen to believe it?

In your case your assumption was wrong because it was contradicted by those with expertise on the matter (not to mention your own data). That is was Western propaganda was proffered as an explanation for your fault, not evidence of it. — Isaac

In the sense that you have evidences of such contradiction, or it's just your functional imagination at work as usual?

Isaac:

Yet the argument is frequently given here that "that's straight from Russian propaganda" as if that fact had some bearing on the likely veracity of the point being made. You'll agree, then, it has none whatsoever. — Isaac

Also Isaac:

Your notion that human rights are associated with the Western Sphere of influence is nothing but Western propaganda. — Isaac

I'm not in favor of capitulating to bullies. I'm not in favor of appeasement. I am in favor of diplomacy and compromise. — Xtrix

Ukrainian neutrality and recognition of the Donbas/Crimea annexations by Ukraine in exchange for peace is a good compromise to you?

As such, the fact that Putin repeats it has no bearing whatsoever on it likely veracity. — Isaac

And what would have bearing whatsoever on its likely veracity?

If you can't understand the concept of underdetermination — Isaac

evidence of that?

Liars lie because they want a particular narrative to be taken as true. Any bits of that narrative that happen to actually be true are going to be reported truthfully. I mean, this is obvious stuff. — Isaac

Not in your world though, coz there is no evidence to support such a claim "Any bits of that narrative that happen to actually be true are going to be reported truthfully" in case of conflicting narratives.

So if one can't rely on evidence to discriminate between conflicting theories, then how to discriminate when imagination is too much or too little? wrt what?
You still didn't get anywhere with your senile anti-positivsm though.

For those who are interested, there are these lectures given by Timothy Snyder (a historian specializing in the modern history of Central and Eastern Europe) under the title "The Making of Modern Ukraine" and published in Sep 2022, which I find extremely interesting and well presented:

Worse then this. Since Isaac claims: "Let's say there are two conflicting narratives on a subject theory A and theory B, but they are underdetermined by the evidence such that it cannot be said which is the case. My position is A and yours if B. You have claimed that my A is mistaken, you propose the alternative B. I'm not claiming your B is mistaken. I'm only countering your claim that my A is mistaken. That's not the same. I'm upholding the position that A and B are underdetermined, against the position that B is correct and A mistaken."
So if one can't rely on evidence to discriminate between conflicting theories, then how to discriminate when imagination is too much or too little? wrt what?

Putin is doing his best to fail this war. I'm worried more about the resilience of the West, and in particular about the political instability of the Americans.

Just more random thoughts relevant to you, but not enough to question the claim I made and supported by those graphs.

Oh look. Human rights abuses match...wait for it...wealth. Not ideology, not Western culture, not NATO... Money. — Isaac

Buthan and Costa Rica fare better than the US, Russia and Saudi Arabia in terms of human rights yet they are not wealthier than them. Classic Isaac's cherry-picking, isn't it?

So what effect do we think Ukraine's now enormous debt is going to have on human rights? — Isaac

There are ways to deal with it: "Germany agreed to pay reparations of 132 billion gold marks to the Triple Entente in the Treaty of Versailles, which were then cancelled in 1932 with Germany only having paid a part of the sum" (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12469/ukraine-crisis/p351).
Or making Russia pay for the reparation also through the confiscation of Russian economic assets frozen in the West.

The greatest gains have been made by Bhutan and Costa Rica, both outside of the Western sphere of influence.

The United States falls below Cuba.

Belarus (a Russian puppet state) has made comparable progress to others in its economic group.

Some of the worst losses are in Spain.

Ukraine have made virtually no improvements at all since he Maidan.

Iraq and Libya both 'benefited' from exactly the kind of Western military intervention you're advocating and their human rights records have worsened.

So no. Once you stop cherry-picking the data to match your theory you see exactly the pattern the experts I cited have described - a big gain post 1945 followed by a very mixed picture unrelated to 'Western' countries. — Isaac

Cherry-picking is wrt a theory. My theory is here: "I’m talking in comparative terms about entity, likelihood, timing of the implementation of human rights supporting institutions within the Western sphere of influence as marked by NATO and EU membership (because these are Ukrainians’ aspirations) wrt non-Western countries, especially wrt authoritarian regimes like Russia, China and Iran and their sphere of influence."

So I didn't say that Human Rights can be successfully implemented exclusively within NATO&EU (or western sphere of influence for that matter), so Buthan and Costa Rica are not good counter-examples. Nor that Western military interventions aim at or succeed at improving human rights (so Iraq and Libya are not good counter-examples). Not that Ukraine outside NATO&EU has improved wrt human rights, considering also how much of the Ukrainian political, military and economic apparatuses fell within Russian sphere of influence. Other random observations about Spain and Belarus, are pinpoiting over nothing that matters here: compare Spain under Franco vs Spain under NATO&EU, compare ex-Soviet republic Belarus state with those ex-Soviet republics that joined NATO&EU.
So you can not accuse me of cherry-picking.
The evidence that I gave to you is proof (however fallible and limited in scope) of what I clam and it's relevant to me, not to whatever random thoughts are hunting your mind.

It's this I was talking about.. But fine, you present 'conceptual frameworks' that apparently don't need proof and then ask for it from others. An odd habit, but understood. So. I'm asking you for you proof now then. — Isaac

Proof of what? Its consistency? What is the proof you are expecting I should provide? Do you see
any logic contradiction or categorical confusion in claiming: “State institutions, as I understand them, presuppose authoritative and coercive ruling over a territory.”? Do you see any contradiction between what I claimed here and all my past claims? I don't. Do you want me to prove its explanatory power? I would need an alternative conceptual framework to compare it within a set of identified phenomena? Where is this alternative conceptual framework? What phenomena are we talking about? No idea. Do you want me to prove that my conceptual framework matches standard usage? I don't think it's that relevant coz terminological issues can be fixed by stipulation, however I could show a dictionary definition for comparison: “state, political organization of society, or the body politic, or, more narrowly, the institutions of government. The state is a form of human association distinguished from other social groups by its purpose, the establishment of order and security; its methods, the laws and their enforcement; its territory, the area of jurisdiction or geographic boundaries; and finally by its sovereignty.” (https://www.britannica.com/topic/state-sovereign-political-entity). Do you see any contradictions between what I claimed and that definition? Do you see any substantive mismatch between my claim and that definition, wording aside? I don’t. What else? Oh, what on earth your objection “Representation is definitely an important tool, but that's not the same thing as sovereignty” has to do with my claim, its consistency or its explanatory power? No idea, my claim doesn’t even mention “representation”, so nowhere I said or implied that “representation is the same thing as sovereignty".
An objection is about what one finds questionable for hopefully “rational” reasons. What are you reasons to find my conceptual framework questionable and in need of proofs?

I'm upholding the position that A and B are underdetermined, against the position that B is correct and A mistaken. I'm not upholding the counter-position that A is correct and B is mistaken. — Isaac

This looks a good example of clashing idiosyncratic assumptions I was talking about, because the evidential indeterminacy claim is itself indeterminate as long as it is not grounded on a conceptual framework for collecting and comparing evidences for a given epistemic purpose: e.g. web app logins are designed to identify the web app accounts, not to identify physical users because 2 different physical users could use the same web app account. So while the usage of a web app account is evidentially determined by the login system, the user is not. Therefore one can not use a login trace as evidence for the fact that e.g. a blackmailing email was sent a by a given physical individual. Unless there are other contextual reliable generalizations or evidences that would ensure this by inference.
That is why it is pertinent to clarify our epistemic standards for assessing evidences.

Your reasoning is flawed for the reasons boethius has already given - You have failed to take any account of the costs. It's insane to propose a course of action based only on the potential benefits without even holding a view on whether they outweigh the potential costs. — Isaac

It is flawed according to your epistemic standards. The problem is that I too find your epistemic standards (like costs in number of war casualties vs vaguely potential benefits in terms of timing and likelihood) flawed and useless for my decision making for the reasons I explained.
Here another case to make it more clear: Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings. Let’s try to assess it according to your claimed metrics.
Costs: total killed civilians estimates in a range 129000–226000 out of ~72M (so ~0.2%-~0.3% of the population) in 4 days. Just for a comparison with the Ukrainian war: 6114 estimated civilian deaths out of ~43M population (0,01% of the total population) in ~210 days, https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/10/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-3-october-2022
Benefits (for Japan): democracy almost immediately after, human rights adoption (See art.11 of 1946 Japanese Constitution) and steep growth in GDP per capita in the next couple of decades (https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/gdp-per-capita-maddison-2020?time=1941..2018&country=JPN~RUS).
Now was it worth it to nuclear bomb Japan according to these metrics? I don’t know what your answer is based on your standards and prescriptions (like "to be solely concerned for the well-being of the people there" as compassionate outsiders). In any case this would be an a-posteriori evaluation, because at the time when the decision was taken nobody had your figures for the future benefits of Japan. So at that time was it worth to politically support the nuclear bombing of Japan?
We are in the middle of historical events, future payoffs for each conceivable strategy are not as certain or evident (wrt their likelihood, timing and entity) as the actual costs. Besides, concerning the costs: civilian deaths is a too little metric to assess war damage (how about civilian injuries? How about psychological damage? How about infrastructural and economic damage? How about lasting and likely future effects of all these damages? How about international political equilibria?) but the larger is the number of metrics the difficult is their aggregation (do they have the same relevance or do we have to ponder their relevance? How to assign weights?) and comparison with other historical cases (because maybe not all those metrics are equally available or reliable) or imagine counterfactual scenarios (which depend on a set of assumptions that maybe be questionable).
Not to mention the theoretical and scientific difficulties in assessing the economic, (geo-)political, social, psychological, material links between costs and benefits of complex historical events over generations.
Finally the higher are the rational standards the less affordable they become to average people and the less realistic is our expectations they would comply to them.
That’s why I consider this “accountant”-like approach badly misleading for average people’s political decision making, especially in the heat of historical events, while broad geopolitical considerations and historical evidences (which, notice, change over time: before the nuclear bombing of Japan there was no previous case to compare to) would offer clearer and affordable guidance under uncertainty, in addition to experts feedback and daily news of course.

Well then you should check your historical evidence… — Isaac

Why? What exactly did I say that your experts’ quotations is questioning? Quote my claims that are contradicted by Although their proposal was opposed by the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Austria, Germany, and the European Union or “Both resolutions were adopted by a vote, with most Western countries abstaining”. I can’t find any.
I’m talking about the fate of States that enter the Western sphere of influence not the ones that are outside for whatever reason. I’m talking in comparative terms about entity, likelihood, timing of the implementation of human rights supporting institutions within the Western sphere of influence as marked by NATO and EU membership (because these are Ukrainians’ aspirations) wrt non-Western countries, especially wrt authoritarian regimes like Russia, China and Iran and their sphere of influence.

human rights are associated with the Western Sphere of influence is nothing but Western propaganda. — Isaac

It is Western propaganda of course! But it looks also a reliable one within the scope I’m considering not in whatever ways you may think about it. Unless you are claiming that within authoritarian regimes like Russia, China and Iran according to you and your sources human rights institutions are equally or better implemented than in the West. In this case, there would be another clash of idiosyncratic assumptions which, this time, I have no interest to deal with.

Vague hand-waiving in the direction of possible counterweights does not constitute an argument that they do, indeed outweigh their opposing factors. — Isaac

I see, here is the trend of “Human rights protection, 1946 to 2019” about EU&NATO countries (some are ex-Soviet republics and let’s not forget German reunification): https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-protection?tab=chart&country=RUS~CHN~IRN~DEU~ITA~ESP~POL~LTU~ROU~BGR~SVK

Is that enough?

No evidence, no 'proof'. — Isaac

No evidence, no 'proof' of what exactly? I was just exposing a conceptual framework.

The requests for 'proof only started when I objected to that position. — Isaac

That's false. Your objection started with: "How? I don't see the mechanism. Representation is definitely an important tool, but that's not the same thing as sovereignty" (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746158)
To which I answered: "I didn't equate representation and sovereignty anywhere. I was talking about pre-condition for the implementation of state institutions that support human rights. State institutions, as I understand them, presuppose authoritative and coercive ruling over a territory." (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746177)
So no, I didn't ask you for proofs in this case. On the contrary I exposed once again my conceptual framework. You might have objected that it's incoherent or with little explanatory power and consequently I would have asked you for proofs. But such a random objection like "representation is not the same thing as sovereignty" simply means you didn't understand what I was talking about. That’s all.

You present a position without proof, I object to it, you demand proof of my objection. That's the game we're playing. It's a game of toss and catch with the burden of proof. — Isaac

First of all, I don't feel compelled to prove all I say by default to anybody nor expect others to prove me all their claims by default. For those claims that I find questionable I ask for proofs, if others didn't provide any. Others can do the same, as you did: I take your objections to be about what you find questionable and in need of proofs about my claims. Hence I don’t see anything worth complaining about, so far. Secondly, these shifts of burden of proof are kind of common when we experience a clash of idiosyncratic assumptions, but if your point is that I was unfair to you because you most of the time provide evidence when I ask while I don't when you ask, then you provided the wrong argument to support that conclusion as I explained. Thirdly, if you claim: “I'm quite happy with your position. I don't agree with it, but I've neither the interest, nor have any clue how I would go about 'disproving' it”, then why on earth do you keep making objections?

Classic example...

Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that “In 2 fewer die” is correct and that that’s all that counts. How likely is strategy 2 going to succeed? And how long is it going to take? — neomac


No, let's instead do that with the actual claim I'm arguing against. If you think 1) is the better course of action then you give your figures to support it. And if you just 'reckon' it probably is then stop being so hypocritical in expecting others who disagree with you to do so to any higher standard of proof than you yourself use. — Isaac

This argument is a failure on all grounds: not only because it is another wrong argument to prove a putative "classic example” (and 2 bad examples are not really good stats), but also because all you are asking now I already answered in previous comments and complemented in that part you intentionally left out in that quotation. All that also suggests that you evidently failed to understand "my standards”:

- Let’s start with my standards as I already specified them:
“Honestly I find such quizzes about moral dispositions in different hypothetical scenarios (as in the ‘trolley problem’) highly misleading for debating the issue at hand and therefore useless for my decision process. This is why:

• Ukrainian lives are not at my disposal as money in my pocket.
• I’m not even a political leader with all kinds of information political leaders can afford, popular consensus and peer-pressure to take tough political decisions for long terms goals affecting an entire collectivity.
• I can’t even reliably calculate the costs I or my beloved ones will likely pay now or in 10 years or in 50 years if I now politically support Ukrainian struggles against Russian oppression.
• Actually I believe that everyone in this thread suffers from similar limits, even when they do not support Ukrainian struggles or the Western hegemony.
• I also believe that nobody can frame this war as a game theory study case where outcomes and their likelihood are given. Everybody has to struggle with their personal uncomfortable blindspots as the war progresses.

So my political support for Ukrainian struggles is grounded more on the reasoning I exposed earlier (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746949). Reasoning and evidences grounded on historical/geopolitical assumptions that go beyond this war, its major players and its short-terms results are more compelling to me then such quizzes.” (By “such quizzes” I’m referring to a certain way of accounting for costs and benefits of this war that seem relevant to you, in other words we are looking at different kinds of figures https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/747341).

- How about “my figures” to support option 1 according to my standards? Here: how likely is that a pro-West country can implement human rights by being within the Western sphere of influence (so within NATO and EU) than by being within the sphere of influence of an anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights (see first step), if not now in the future? I say it’s more likely, based on historical evidence (see Germany, Italy and Spain after WWII) and ex-Soviet Union countries that joined EU and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse. Also the democracy index is telling (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/democracy-index-2022-europe.jpg, https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking): Russian democracy index is lower than any country in the EU and Belarus which is under the sphere of influence of Russia is even lower than Russia, Kazakhstan better of Russia for few points. Is this enough evidence? If not why not? (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746949).

- How about “my figures” to question option 2 according to my standards?
Here: “How likely is strategy 2 going to succeed? And how long is it going to take? The West has supported protests and political change for decades in Iran, North Korea, Russia and China with what results for their population's human rights? How about the ex-soviet union countries that had the chance to join NATO and EU? This is hardly unpredictable: indeed there is a part of the local population in any of these authoritarian regimes that profits from the sanctions and political pressure from outside to preserve/increase economic inequalities and support authoritarian regimes to brutally squash local protests (and condemn the population to a miserable life in terms of freedoms, public and private services, or economic survival compared to western standards) or worse aggressively expand outside national borders to gain geopolitical influence (like through wars, proxy wars and terrorism). Additionally, it’s questionable that “life” is all that counts (slavery wasn’t about killing people, Russian oppression isn’t about killing Ukrainians). Finally there is a hidden death toll that one must taken into account when talking about such authoritarian regimes given some inconveniences that add up to greater economic inequalities (the costs of boycotts and sanctions often end up oppressing the local population even more e.g. when the population lacks the foreign treatments necessary for their survivals, or gay or political activists are killed in prison).” (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/747342)

You're obsessed with proving. It's you who raised the objection to my position, not the other way around. I'm quite happy with your position. I don't agree with it, but I've neither the interest, nor have any clue how I would go about 'disproving' it. — Isaac

That’s a public philosophy forum, we discuss reasons, explore disagreements and assess how compelling arguments sound. And this is how I deal with your claims (like “As compassionate outsiders, our concern should solely be for the well-being of the people there”). If you don’t want to play this game, I don’t care. If you don’t want to play this game with me, then stop answering me.

1) Continued war to retain Ukrainian control over the region and improve the population's human rights by political pressure from their membership of the EU/NATO.
2) End the war by ceding Donbas/Crimea to Russia and improve the population's human rights by supporting protest and political change in Russia.

In 2 fewer die. — “Isaac

Let’s assume for the sake of the argument that “In 2 fewer die” is correct and that that’s all that counts. How likely is strategy 2 going to succeed? And how long is it going to take? The West has supported protests and political change for decades in Iran, North Korea, Russia and China with what results for their population's human rights? How about the ex-soviet union countries that had the chance to join NATO and EU?
This is hardly unpredictable: indeed there is a part of the local population in any of these authoritarian regimes that profits from the sanctions and political pressure from outside to preserve/increase economic inequalities and support authoritarian regimes to brutally squash local protests (and condemn the population to a miserable life in terms of freedoms, public and private services, or economic survival compared to western standards) or worse aggressively expand outside national borders to gain geopolitical influence (like through wars, proxy wars and terrorism).
Additionally, it’s questionable that “life” is all that counts (slavery wasn’t about killing people, Russian oppression isn’t about killing Ukrainians). Finally there is a hidden death toll that one must taken into account when talking about such authoritarian regimes given some inconveniences that add up to greater economic inequalities (the costs of boycotts and sanctions often end up oppressing the local population even more e.g. when the population lacks the foreign treatments necessary for their survivals, or gay or political activists are killed in prison).

What is the price you are willing to pay, in Ukrainian lives, for Ukrainian "liberation" of the 5 annexed territories?

What price are you willing to pay, in Ukrainian lives, and Ukraine still lose the war?

Let's say Ukrainian military is in a position where they could easily defend the rest of Ukraine or could commit to all-in-offensives to liberate the occupied territory at the risk of exhausting their forces and total defeat.

What is your risk tolerance for a failed re-conquest of the annexed territories resulting in the even worse outcome of the complete fall of most or all of Ukraine into Russian control? — boethius

Do you yourself have answers to these questions? Can you show me how you do the math?

Honestly I find such quizzes about moral dispositions in different hypothetical scenarios (as in the ‘trolley problem’) highly misleading for debating the issue at hand and therefore useless for my decision process. This is why:

• Ukrainian lives are not at my disposal as money in my pocket.
• I’m not even a political leader with all kinds of information political leaders can afford, popular consensus and peer-pressure to take tough political decisions for long terms goals affecting an entire collectivity.
• I can’t even reliably calculate the costs I or my beloved ones will likely pay now or in 10 years or in 50 years if I now politically support Ukrainian struggles against Russian oppression.
• Actually I believe that everyone in this thread suffers from similar limits, even when they do not support Ukrainian struggles or the Western hegemony.
• I also believe that nobody can frame this war as a game theory study case where outcomes and their likelihood are given. Everybody has to struggle with their personal uncomfortable blindspots as the war progresses.

So my political support for Ukrainian struggles is grounded more on the reasoning I exposed earlier (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746949). Reasoning and evidences grounded on historical/geopolitical assumptions that go beyond this war, its major players and its short-terms results are more compelling to me then such quizzes.

You seem to be arguing that Ukrainians fighting more, regardless of outcomes, is a humanitarian accomplishment. — boethius

Then you seem to have misunderstood my argument.

If Zelensky sued for peace in the early stages of the war, say the first days, and basically Ukraine lost Russian occupied Donbas and Crimea and the war ended, are you willing to argue that would have been against human rights on Zelensky's part? — boethius

Not sure what you mean by “against human rights” in this case. But it’s beside the point. When talking about human rights I’m more interested in long-term and systemic outcomes not in short-term episodic outcomes (which is what you scenario looks to me like).
As far as I’m concerned, the critical point in geopolitical terms is that as long as Putin challenges the Western-backed World Order the outcome of the Ukrainian war must look a military and political defeat for Putin as convincingly as possible to all incumbent World Order challengers (Russian political elites included) no matter what Putin or the Russian propaganda says. And I political support this goal for the reasons I explained earlier (see https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/746949).

You seem to have disassociated the costs of your proposal from the imagined benefits — boethius

How many lives do systemic and long term political conditions supporting human rights cost to you? What is the likelihood of their success as of today, or in 10 years, in 50 years to you? What compelling evidences do you have to back your claims up? What’s the math you are doing to calculate costs and benefits? Take your time.

Chicago Riots killed 43 people, part of a series of about 50 such riots which, together with many peaceful demonstrations, brought about the changes in American civil rights.

The Ukraine war is currently killing 600 people a day. — Isaac

First this doesn't prove my point wrong. Secondly, you are comparing a political struggle within a hegemonic democratic regime to a war between Russia and Ukraine critical for the World Order. It's a bit of a stretch. Third tell me how many such examples you can find within the history of authoritarian regimes.
It would have been more fair to compare the Chicago Riots with Euro Maiden protests. But this was part of the genesis of the Russian aggression of Ukraine, so back to square one.

You think the "chance" of Ukraine improving its human rights record is worth thousands of deaths and can't be achieved any other way. I can't argue against a callous disregard for human life nor a dysfunctional imagination. — Isaac

Dysfunctional imagination? Your concern for “human life” is at odds with your concern for “human rights” on historical grounds. The end of foreign, political, social oppression doesn’t come without people putting their own life and others' at risk of a bloodshed, so no progress toward “human rights” can get there in a certain, straight, compassionate and peaceful way as one would hope (the recent Iranian protests are another good example of this point). So I get why you need lots of functional imagination to overcome your intellectual impasse.

You, neomac and @Olivier5 alike are all seeing this like we're choosing wallpaper. If you're choosing between A and B but to get B requires years of brutally destructive land war, then B had better be bloody fantastic. It had better have every citizen decked out with their own fucking floating island in the Mediterranean. A slightly better human rights report (but still bad) is not worth the death of thousands of innocent people. I can't believe I've just had to write that. — Isaac

I can't believe I had to read it once again. Such a claim "A slightly better human rights report (but still bad)" is highly misleading. My political support to Ukraine is for granting their chance to grow in prosperity and political freedoms within the Western sphere of influence in the next decades. The importance of granting them this chance goes however beyond the Ukrainian people themselves and their struggle against centuries of Russian oppression , it concerns also the World Oder as we know it and the power conflict between Western World and the emerging authoritarian regimes. Now since human rights and democracy are best implemented in the West than in the emerging authoritarian regimes, I choose to side with the West. And I also think this conclusion is backed by pragmatic considerations under uncertainty, factoring in realistic expectations about individual, collective and State dynamics. At least until someone proves me wrong, of course. So try harder.

Well then I don't see much evidence that your (4) follows. Countries with a long history of democracy and free press tend to have better internal human rights. It's not a magic pill. You don't just get human rights with membership. — Isaac

Nowhere I said that support for human rights comes with membership as a magic pill .
If our decisions require pragmatism under uncertainty, we are interested in relative likelihood and evidences to assess it. So I was talking in terms of relative likelihood. And I claim that it’s more likely that a pro-West country can implement human rights by being within the Western sphere of influence (so within NATO and EU), than by being within the Russian sphere of influence. What evidences do I have for this? Historical evidences (see Germany, Italy and Spain after WWII) and ex-Soviet Union countries that joined EU and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse. Also the democracy index is telling (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/democracy-index-2022-europe.jpg, https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking): Russian democracy index is lower than any country in the EU and Belarus which is under the sphere of influence of Russia is even lower than Russia, Kazakhstan better of Russia for few points. Additionally, as already pointed out, candidature to NATO/EU membership doesn't come without scrutiny and places some burden on the candidate to prove also their commitment to EU/NATO charter which include democracy, individual freedoms and human rights (nothing alike can be found on the Russian side).
So I would consider such evidence strong enough as long as you do not have at least equally strong evidence to the contrary, namely that within Russian sphere of influence countries have a greater chance to see human rights implemented equally or even better than in Western countries.

There's no question of ceding the whole of Ukraine to Russia so what possible relevance would that have to this discussion? — Isaac

Because Russia is at war with Ukraine and annexed part of Ukrainian territory, against its will. But even if you want to exclude Crimea and Donbass from this discussion, the problem is still there: did you forget the story of Ukrainian neutrality?
BTW since you are so passionate about human rights, how does having Crimea and Donbass annexed to Russia get those regions likely closer to having a more Western-like implementation of human rights institutions?

As long as you keep evading my counter-arguments, ditching my questions and shifting focus, you are no longer compelling. Try playing the devil's advocate some times instead of always playing dumb.

No it isn't. Pro-west is not a single measure but is made up of military, economic and cultural forces. — Isaac

Who said so? My requirement is minimal: for me pro-West simply means to be in favor of being part of the Western sphere of influence like by joining NATO and EU.
You can raise the standards of analysis as high as you like, but the question remains: according to your vague but certainly greater measuring standards is Ukraine more pro-Western than Russia? Besides you didn't offer any evidence to support the claim that Ukraine is exactly as anti-Western as Russia if not more. And by removing the Donbas region and Crimea from the equation Ukraine would be even more pro-West than it already is, because those regions (being more pro-Russian) are likely more anti-Western than the rest of Ukraine.

... We're talking about the situation in Donbas. — Isaac

No you are talking about the situation in Donbas. I'm talking about Ukraine as opposed to Russia.

NATO is a military defensive organisation and the EU an economic one. Neither decision 'unquestionably' shows anything about a commitment to the sorts of human rights gains that the countries within those institutions enjoy. NATO particularly has absolutely no human rights element whatsoever. — Isaac

Again, it’s a step-by-step reasoning, at step 3 I didn’t talk about “commitment to the sorts of human rights gains that the countries within those institutions enjoy”. I simply asked you if Ukraine is more pro-West than Russia? The answer is unequivocally yes.

Nor are Ukraine 'ready to suffer a war against Russia' for that move. There's no link at all. The fiercest fighting against Russia has come from the ultranationalists, the very same groups opposed to westernisation. — Isaac

You mean that the exclusive overwhelming reason why Ukraine is fighting against Russian oppression, is because a tiny minority of Ukrainian ultranationalists is taking hostage Zelensky’s administration and the rest of the population to keep fighting Russian oppression exclusively out of spite of Russians? And that Ukrainian ultranationalists (like the ones who joined the Euro Maidan revolts) didn’t want Ukraine to join NATO and EU?

I’m reasoning on a step-by-step basis :

• First step: human rights is an acceptable way to identify collective well-being? Yes
• Second step: are human rights better implemented within Western countries? Yes
• Third step: is Ukraine more pro-West than Russia? Yes. Asking to join NATO and EU, and be ready to suffer a war against Russia to defend their choice wrt anti-Western rhetoric and hostility from Russia are unquestionable evidences for that. And if this is no evidence I don’t know what is.
• Fourth step: how likely is that a pro-West country can implement human rights by being within the Western sphere of influence (so within NATO and EU) than by being within the sphere of influence of an anti-West Russia with a poorer implementation of human rights (see first step), if not now in the future? I say it’s more likely, based on historical evidence (see Germany, Italy and Spain after WWII) and ex-Soviet Union countries that joined EU and NATO after the Soviet Union collapse. Also the democracy index is telling (https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/democracy-index-2022-europe.jpg, https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking): Russian democracy index is lower than any country in the EU and Belarus which is under the sphere of influence of Russia is even lower than Russia, Kazakhstan better of Russia for few points. Is this enough evidence? If not why not?