Perhaps you could actually quote Wittgenstein. So far, you seem to be tilting against a windmill.

I don't see that it matters where or how a disposition arose, as that is not going to affect how effective it is at enabling communication between people. — Clearbury

It was your idea. You presented it as what made communication possible.

But the position you are opposing is not making a claim of necessity.

Your remark about probability does not address the question of "disposition" you introduced.

Where does that come from?

Where did my "disposition" to have such a belief come from?

I think that's wrong. All that's required for a language is effective communication. — Clearbury

You include the word "communication" in your argument against the activity happening. How will the "same information" be the "same" if it is only what is happening in each individual?

This is the part that many people find it very difficult to grasp. What's worse, it seems to me that some people who one might expect to have grasped it seem to forget it when it's needed. Hence a long and pointless argument about "illusionism". — Ludwig V

Good points. The method Wittgenstein incorporates pitches conflicting points of view of what is the best response. His knack for voicing views different from what he might opine makes him difficult to pin down.

I think it’s a different story when it comes to neurophenomenology and enactive embodied cognitive science. Like Witt, these approaches reject the idea of inner, computational processes in the head in favor of practices of interaction immersed in the world. — Joshs

Is that the only problem for "elemental" languages, a mistake in what those elements are?

As it happens, I wouldn't want to argue the breaking down one set of terms into simpler sets can never improve our understanding of them. W's point, for me, is that applying that approach to a general understanding of descriptive (true or false) language not only doesn't help, but throws up further problems. Hence the need to change the subject. — Ludwig V

I don't read the Blue Book or PI as saying there is no use for reduction in all cases. The objects of shared experience do not have the same problems as what is experienced by us as persons. The discussion of mental states thrusts us into an unknown. To say that nothing more can be learned would be a kind of nominalism. The following from the PI put a finger on the issue:

383. We do not analyse a phenomenon (for example, thinking) but a concept (for example, that of thinking), and hence the application of a word. So it may look as if what we were doing were nominalism. Nominalists make the mistake of interpreting all words as names, and so of not really describing their use, but only, so to speak, giving a paper draft on such a description.

308. How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise? —– The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we’ll know more about them - we think. But that’s just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a certain conception of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite innocent.) - And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them. — ibid.

That "sometime perhaps we'll know more about them" militates against imagining ourselves at the end of explanations.

I think Ludvig V's question about facts is germane. If the beginning of PI and the talk of live versus dead signs in the Blue Book puts a certain understanding of learning language in doubt, that has consequences for attempts to form scientific theories about such activities. I offered Chomsky as an example but there are many other areas of human development which are implicated by the question.

I may be misreading this.
The argument (comments on) the idea of elements certainly includes logical atomism but is based on an alternative view - roughly that an atomic view of them is misleading because it tries to think of the elements independently of the overall structure that gives them their meaning. — Ludwig V

I read the problem as more about priority than independence from circumstances. W does not care about Aristotle's objections to a separate world of forms. What is being questioned is whether analysis breaking down one set of terms into simpler sets will reveal a more fundamental set of conditions. The matter is directly addressed in Philosophical Investigations:

62. Suppose, for example, that the person who is given the orders in (a) and (b) has to look up a table coordinating names and pictures before bringing what is required. Does he do the same when he carries out an order in (a) and the corresponding one in (b)? - Yes and no. You may say: “The point of the two orders is the same.” I would say so too. - But it is not clear everywhere what should be called the ‘point’ of an order. (Similarly, one may say of certain objects that they have this or that purpose. The essential thing is that this is a lamp, that it serves to give light —– what is not essential is that it is an ornament to the room, fills an empty space, and so on. But there is not always a clear boundary between essential and inessential.)

63. To say, however, that a sentence in (b) is an ‘analysed’ form of one in (a) readily seduces us into thinking that the former is the more fundamental form, that it alone shows what is meant by the other, and so on. We may think: someone who has only the unanalysed form lacks the analysis; but he who knows the analysed form has got it all. - But can’t I say that an aspect of the matter is lost to the latter no less than to the former?

64. Let’s imagine language-game (48) altered so that names signify not monochrome squares but rectangles each consisting of two such squares. Let such a rectangle which is half red, half green, be called “U”; a half green, half white one “V”; and so on. Could we not imagine people who had names for such combinations of colour, but not for the individual colours? Think of cases where we say, “This arrangement of colours (say the French tricolor) has a quite special character”.

In what way do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of analysis? How far is it even possible to replace this game by (48)? - It is just a different language-game; even though it is related to (48).

65. Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. For someone might object against me: “You make things easy for yourself! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what is essential to a language-game, and so to language: what is common to all these activities, and makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you the most headache, the part about the general form of the proposition and of language.”

And this is true. - Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, I’m saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all - but there are many different kinds of affinity between them. And on
account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all “languages”.
I’ll try to explain this — ibid.

Your comparison with Gestalt psychology is interesting. Will ponder.

Could you explain to me, please, what ‘Plato’s Betrachtungsweise’ is. (Google Translate was foxed as well!) — Ludwig V

It just means a point of view. In this case, a general assignment of Plato to being the champion of the "ideal" versus whatever is assigned to what that is not. Soulez is not faulting either for that, just putting it into a context of what concerned Wittgenstein.

Aristotle took recourse to a distinction between the eternal and the "temporary" to arrange his cosmology:

Now there are two meanings of “cause,” one being that which, as we say, results in the beginning of motion, and the other the material cause. It is the latter kind with which we have to deal here; for with cause in the former sense we have dealt in our discussion of Motion, when we said that there is something which remains immovable through all time and something which is always in motion. To come to a decision about the first of these, the immovable original source, is the task of the other and prior branch of philosophy, while, regarding that which moves all other things by its own continuous motion, we shall have to explain later which of the individual causes is of this kind. For the moment let us deal with the cause which is placed in the class of matter, owing to which passing-away and coming-to-be never fail to occur in nature; for perhaps this may be cleared up and it may become evident at the same time what we ought to say about the problem which arose just now, namely, about unqualified passing-away and coming-to-be. — Aristotle, Coming to be and Passing away, 318a

The arguments made against Parmenides in that work do not subtract from the transition of something from "nothing" that happens with actual beings but puts those events into a larger context. Potentiality is not a feature of eternal beings.

Language games are the forms of language with which a child begins to make use of words. The study of language games is the study of primitive forms of language or primitive languages.

Don't these remarks invite distracting arguments about whether they are factually correct? Do w need to say more than this approach is a useful way of analyzing language and understanding how it works? — Ludwig V

It seems to me that the limits to analysis being put forward by Wittgenstein are arguing for a particular set of facts over others. In Philosophical Investigations, he challenges the role of elements which various theories could be reaching for:

“A name signifies only what is an element - of reality a what cannot be destroyed, what remains the same in all changes.” - But what
is that? - Even as we uttered the sentence, that’s what we already had in mind! We already gave expression to a quite specific idea, a particular picture that we wanted to use. For experience certainly does not show us these elements. We see constituent parts of something composite (a chair, for instance). We say that the back is part of the chair, but that it itself is composed of different pieces of wood; whereas a leg is a simple constituent part. We also see a whole which changes (is
destroyed) while its constituent parts remain unchanged. These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality. — PI, 59

The question of elemental structure is clearly directed toward such as Russell and Whitehead but also to language theorists like Chomsky. Looking for a language underneath the one we use requires employing certain kinds of assumptions. We are being asked to consider an alternative approach to what is "primitive", but it is not being presented as a competing analysis.

Another example of the argument establishing a set of facts is the treatment of solipsism as a mistake. It does not work by offering a competing view of the elements.

Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.
— p. 18

Certainly, respect for science is often exaggerated and it may explain some metaphysics. Plato is a particularly clear example. But I think that W may be over-generalizing here. — Ludwig V

The scientific method, as we know it, was not a model for Plato. Wittgenstein does not seem interested in Plato's own problems with analysis. There are the many times when the singular essence is sought for and not found. I agree with an observation made by Antonia Soulez:

His reading of the ancient text was unrefined, indifferent to authenticity, careless about the historical distance between the ancient and the contemporary. What then did he look for?

Did he look for a better model of the analysis of meaning? As we know from Baker and Hacker, Wittgenstein would rather attack ‘Plato’s Betrachtungsweise’, including Russell and himself (as expressed in the Tractatus) with Plato, in order to reshape his method of ‘comparison’ with paradigms. To his eyes, Plato’s problem illustrates a misleading model or picture of logical analysis that he wanted to get rid of. This illustration in turn could be addressed to and against Russell’s conception. His contention in §48 is rather constructing a new language game in order to confute logical atomism than, in the spirit of a critical method, trying to discuss Russell’s distinctions one by one. Wittgenstein was as little interested in critical arguments or analytical sorts of discussions with ancient authors as with modern or contemporary ones. — Soulez, How Wittgenstein Refused to Be ‘The Son Of’

You are keeping you alive when you eat and all that stuff. — Darkneos

And I suppose that applies to all the other desires I have.

There are different kinds of desires and pursuing their consummation is an engagement with one's life. That is why apathy and depression factor into some considerations of suicide. On the other hand, the rush of risk taking also leads to a lot of death. I find both extremes unnecessary for myself.

What I had in mind about one preserving life is the way one jumps out of the way of the truck or jumps to save a colleague. These actions are not on a drop-down menu. The person who does them is just as alive as the other agents of choice.

I have worked in a dangerous industry for most of my life. The epistemology of learning what is stupid has joined forces with this person who is always alert for the bad things. It is a beautiful partnership that I am grateful for.

Anabasis of Alexander the Great by Arrian.

Arrian's style of critical admiration with concise recounting of events is awesome.

Every day you don’t off yourself is a choice to live. It’s not really the default. — Darkneos

But that ignores your life. Whatever is keeping you alive does not care a whit about your logic.

I would be interested in the drones being captured by helicopters and studied afterwards.

Power (might=right) is someone’s goal of what is good. Is it the most worthy goal? No, but it still exists in the world, and it gets dismissed because it doesn’t meet the standard Socrates wants. — Antony Nickles

I do not read the Republic to say that the equation of Thrasymachus did not exist. The work does not solve the problem but shows how it is surrounded by other problems. Using the individual soul to measure the body politic is not done by Wittgenstein but his self-imposed limits upon the discussion of ethics suggests he was not assigning the problem of the good to being simply another case of craving generality.

To me arguments for staying alive or for meaning only work if you HAVE to live. — Darkneos

I don't understand this view of compulsion. Whatever this life thing is, it has its own life. I have survived a number of crises because something took over while I was being stupid. We are more than we can talk about. Your premise assumes the contrary.

The central problem is the ever-increasing degree of income disparity between those at the top and everyone else. Moving from the visions of free trade gurus will not address that problem if the global wealth structure is secure. Trump needs that for his grifts. Thus his popularity amongst the very wealthy.

I hear the rehashing part. I do it too.

Demarking a clear line of what is or not a history of philosophy is a problem in deciding what is talked about by itself.

Plato and Aristotle have their versions of their past that are important to their statements. It would not be helpful to exclude that stuff from the discussion.

And how to approach a work like the Phenomenology of Spirit by Hegel? We cannot exclude what he did not from the discussion.

When I read through many of those threads, it strikes me that interest in the primary texts is rarely what gets discussed.

Edit to add: But I see you are trying to keep the focus upon what is written in many of them.

Hah, no treble.
Love the animal print dresses. Don't tell anybody.

I will look for more songs in the box.

Virtue is beautiful. Despair is not a good look.

Do you not think that the song came from a place of despair? — Amity

I do think that is so. His refusal to live there is the thing.

Your suggestion is interesting to me. I figure a policy about secondary sources would have to be established for such a thing to work. The usual practice is that interpretations of the primary source is within the same sphere of discussion as each source. There would have to be a rule set down that restricted that practice in the interchanges.

It is a difficult rule (or rules) to enunciate because the most dedicated readers of primary texts are influenced by many others. Maybe a footnoting practice that separated arguments from admitted influences.

At the very least, since Sam can do that song, it would be embarrassing for me to despair.

The following from the Tractatus still seems to apply in the Blue Book:

The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages.
And in fact both are right and both wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained. — Tractatus, 6.371

The matter of what is right and wrong is not a single problem. Socrates and Witt are similar in looking for the limit to their arguments.

That if we take skepticism as a problem, it leads to the desire for an answer, and he wants to show examples of the ordinary working rationality we have, to say that: when that comes to an end (as Joshs @Ludwig V are discussing), we at least are on open, common ground to differentiate from, rather than fighting in “frames of discussion” of theoretical fantasy. — Antony Nickles

I do think Wittgenstein is looking for a way to help the solipsist find an answer to a problem:

The solipsist who says "only I feel real pain", "only I really see (or hear)" is not stating an opinion; and that's why he is so sure of what he says. He is irresistibly tempted to use a certain form of expression; but we must yet find why he is.
— Blue Book, 59

While I recognize that W is taking a stance against the singularity of Plato's use of essence, he is oddly just like Socrates in accepting he has to live with the arguments he makes.

I don't read the issue he has with Plato as equivalent to his complaints about the temptations of modern science. The latter are the people he lives amongst.

I do think W urgently wants to get past the 'problem of skepticism' in regard to phenomena versus reality frames of discussion. He may eschew other explanations but he keeps taking aim at that one throughout his life.

I, too, worry about 'sycophant loyalists'. The point I was making about the supporting staff is that there is a paradoxical blowback from hiring profoundly ignorant people. They have nothing to say when informed people in their organization tell them something is not real or possible. Compare that predicament with making a deal with the likes of Bill Barr. He understood the DOJ inside and out. He had developed ties over years to get particular results from particular people.

If Patel gets his job at the FBI, he will be entering a structure and a culture of which he has had negative experience. Past directors came up through decades of work and oversight of complex investigations. The only way for him to gain control in that situation is if he replaces enough of his office with MAGA zombies. But even that move will collide with the sphere of actual agents. Making something dysfunctional may serve some people's interest. But it is not an advance of power per se.

The same dynamic is in play with all the other federal agencies.

Patel won't be able to do jack shit by himself. He needs a cadre of Federal employees willing to do his bidding, particularly if investigations are initiated in the top-down fashion of William Barr.

That is where the proposal to end background checks by the Trump team kicks in. If one fills the ranks with people outside the meritocracy of working experience, then anybody can run any part of government. The last vestige of professional conduct will join the other extinct species.

My challenge is simple. I will not withdraw it.
But I will leave the discussion, upon your request.
Fare forward, as Eliot said.

The point, though, is that solipsism has a very long and well established meaning: — Clearbury

Then cite some passages from those who use it without relation to the isolation of the individual.

Solipsism is the view that only one mind exists. — Clearbury

You are applying a definition not shared by the common sense of the word as the isolation of the individual from the world beyond their senses and representations. Your definition sounds more like an argument between "panpsychism" and "monism" .

You are proposing various possible conditions for our experience. Solipsism imagines there is no way to verify other beings because they have to be produced by my activity.

Such a thought is not capable of comparison with other proposed conditions. Comparisons require standing outside of all the candidates in order to judge which is the case.

That 'standing outside' collapses the premise of solipsism.

I find the general category of "idealism vs. realism" unhelpful when reading ancient texts. It retrojects later interpretations on to authors that had their own problems and concerns.

Reading to understand the latter is always difficult and is an act of interpretation as well. But it is different from placing ideas into a model unused by previous thinkers.

That doesn't mean every utterance is some kind of use, but it means that the uses of a sign are open-ended. Whatever 'grammar' describes, it is not a fixed set of rules that must be followed when using a sign; 'language games' illustrate use, but do not exhaust the possibilities of use. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree. I read the book as confirming your statement when W says:

The sign (the sentence) gets its significance from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs. Roughly: understanding a sentence means understanding a language. — p. 5

I think of that as asking why we are so good at doing it. The different models we come up with to explain it are no match for our ability.

The importance of "family resemblances" is not to deny any purpose to seeking general qualities. For example, the comparisons made between 'rules of chess' and what we are doing allow seeing a similarity and a difference. The objection to the 'occult' explanations is that they are too easy. We use them to make bread and frighten children.

Your link raises some interesting questions and historical comparisons.

There is still a lot of work to be done understanding what Aristotle was intending to say for me to rely too much upon the lexicon used in histories of philosophy.

If you search this topic on Google Scholar, there is a fair sample of the range of opinions of those who read Aristotle closely for the purpose of gleaning his intentions.

If you read the Sallis book, you will find people who closely read Plato that way too.

Maybe the collision of those two endeavors requires its own OP. That is above my pay grade.

I only mentioned the last move before his death. The SEP article I linked to may have the circumstances right or wrong. I was not proposing all of his movements were based upon a singular motive.

You said he could have switched camps regarding testimony of faith if he did not like where he was. The Sweden adventure is neither proof nor disproof of that idea. It does point to a fluid environment where intellectuals who are cool with the Church one day may become kindling the next.

Yes, he seemed to have enjoyed traveling around — frank

He did express pleasure in seeing new places. But the question of feeling compelled to move is the question raised above regarding opinions unpopular with those with power.

Okay. Sallis requires careful reading of Timaeus to be of any value. I suggest starting there.

Before addressing your description of place, I think we have to approach why Plato says it is so difficult to talk about.