All great answers, thanks! musing on all!

a general conception is not contradictory, but to cognize a singular noumenal object as a referent — Mww

Thanks!

but does that "general conception" actually act as an object (for a subject)?

the referent of a noumena is the unknown something that causes such an appearance. — RussellA

Great answer! However, is there a contradiction if we talk of a "something" (i.e., a "thing"), since noumenon is not an object for a subject...even if we replace "thing" with "reality", "an existence,"...still it must be a reality/existence for a perceiving subject?

I am actually pulling out my Schop books now....!! it is certainly not a straightforward argument

I agree with what you say here. I think you are referring to the "problem of other minds", right?
But, i still cannot see how "the root of the PSR- there is "no object without a subject" (and consequently "no subject without an object") establish that representations/appearances apart from my own body have a subjective side (like my own body does, as will)?"

The idea of "no object, without a subject"-- that comes from Berkeley, right?
I assume according to the author, In order to qualify as an object, they must have an internal side... but I cannot see exactly how?
Schopenhauer/Kant experts help?!

when you say "nature of depression" what are you referring to?

yes, seems good to me, but i would say it is not clear what some of these terms mean..."nature' being a big one...

the reconstruction seems pretty damn good to me.....BUT.... some of these terms are vague/and/or ambiguous........ the argument also hinges on precise definitions...
how did he define terms such as "Noumenon" (it is not always clear with Kant) "human will" and "nature"???
"nature" that is a big one...how the heck do we define that?? I mean, i see furry stuff on the ground which i walk on....the nature is carpet??
the argument is a modus ...

"to satisfy the formal validity of the argument, the 2nd premise should be expressed in modal terms: “we can know we act unconditionally” (i assume since there are other ways we can act too) — KantDane21

i do not get that. did he offer any other reason why it has to be stated in modal terms?
And if stated in modal terms, it is then an inductive argument right??

It is a little trick, not entirely clear what he means. This is how I see it:

If the will is blind it cannot know itself directly or indirectly (through the phenomenon).
Since, if it is phenomenon it must recognize itself as phenomenon. If it recognizes itself as phenomenon it knows, but it is not the noumenon (the noumenon cannot know).
It then must then, as phenomenon, distinguish itself from the noumenon.
This act of distinguishing turns noumenon into an object of knowledge.

But, how this last part relates to the Will being blind, I am not so sure.

According to this excerpt, I see him as saying that the represented thing ("the representation of it", i.e. of the representation) differs from the thing-in-itself.
Will have to reflect more on the excerpt.

he is saying that there can be no part/whole relationship within a single entity? a find that strange, and do not see logic violated.

The very act of considering the object of our action, nullifies the premise, and changes it. Can't you see that? — god must be atheist

No I can't see that.
can you give me an example of considering the object of our action?
It nullifies it and/or changes it?


Atwell is saying that Schopenhauer claims that our actions are known to us unconditionally from the inside, as will, that is, in a non-representational way since they are not subject to the PSR.
(we also know our actions externally, we observe our body and our acts as intuitive representations, as appearance).... but since we have this "inside" unconditional knowledge of our actions, and all appearances are conditioned on the PSR, then actions and appearances (not known in equivalent) are distinct.

The fallacy would simply be invalid premise. The full premise is implied, not explicit: We know that we always act directly/unconditionally. This according to Atwell is incorrect. — hypericin

Atwell changes the second premise to "We can know that we act directly/unconditionally"
This change would then make it an inductive argument right?

As opposed to how he first stated the argument; as a deductive argument--
If anything is an appearance it is known conditionally
We know that we act directly/unconditionally
Therefore action as such cannot be a appearance.

as an inductive argument:
If anything is an appearance it is known conditionally
We know that we can act directly/unconditionally
Therefore action as such cannot be a appearance.

What part of your action don't you know? Gimme one example.

What part of the effect of your action don't you know? Literally inifinite effects, of which you have infinite numbers that you don't know. — god must be atheist

Atwell is saying that, for Schopenhauer, the knowledge we have our our actions is unconditional insofar as it is not mediated by the subject-object relation. We have immediate access to our willing which is not conditioned by the PSR. Atwell is stating nothing regarding the effects of our actions, but only speaking of the knowledge we have of them.

he EFFECT of our actions — god must be atheist

but where do you see Atwell doing that?

yes, but with respect to premise 2- We know that we act directly/unconditionally- in order to for his argument to be formally valid, should he not have this premises states as: "we know we act ONLY in a direct/unconditioned way"?

What about two words blended into a single one (scapegoat, portemanteau, mockingbird, ...) ? :smile: — Alkis Piskas

nice point! But I would say these are only one word (compound nouns)...denoting the existence of only one entity!

it is splitting hairs, right!?
I word agree "Lion!" in an utterance is an implicit metaphor..the comparison is implicit.... But on the written page I do not think it-- the single word with exclamation mark- would qualify as a metaphor.

I don't think any of these words, with the exception of "shit," is a metaphor. There has to be a comparison for it to be a metaphor. To say "She is a trailblazer" is a metaphor. Just "trailblazer" by itself is not. I think "shit," as an exclamation is a metaphor, because it represents "This situation is shit," which is a comparison. — T Clark

yes, I agree. although with the word "shit" with the exclamation mark, it is certainly a figure of speech and can be unpacked to be a metaphor, but as "shit!", it may have some other technical name.

If one states the terms being compared, is that not more like an allegory? Plato's allegory of the cave places our experience of knowing and ignorance side by side with an image that is meant to correspond with it. — Paine

I believe I may have read that an allegory is a subtype of metaphor, although generally the two are distinguished (merely) on the basis of an allegory being an extended piece of literature/narrative, where there may be personification, metonym, etc etc, and a metaphor is a short expression.
But certainly, that allegory cannot be condensed into a metaphor, "Life is a shadow", or something like that...

So many great answers here. The difference in viewpoints can be explained by the fact that there is not a universal consensus on the definition of a metaphor. However, there seems to be a consensus that a necessary condition for an expression to qualify a metaphor is there is a comparison being made between a minimum of 2 ideas/terms.

A metaphor pretty much has 3 parts.. a subject (tenor), the "metaphorical vehicle," and the ground.
the subject or tenor is that what is being spoken about. the characteristics of the vehicle are transferred to the tenor. very simple example:
Life is a journey.

Life- tenor
journey- vehicle

the tenor and vehicle can also be called the target and source domain.
the characteristics of the source domain (the vehicle) are "mapped" onto the target domain (tenor).

so with "Geworfenheit" there is merely a tenor. there can be no mapping. Although it is understandable why one would think it is a metaphor, it seems technically not to be.

Some people have provided examples of what the think are one worded metaphors, but I think most are technically "metonyms", or there is an implicit metaphor insofar as in the expression is being implicitly compared to another object/idea etc.

Geworfenheit — emancipate

that term, as far as I know, is Heidegger's coinage. I would say that is a concept, not a metaphor. After it is unwrapped, then it can have a metaphorical sense. "thrownness" has no metaphorical meaning when used in isolation. "Geworfenheit" has no target/source domain,

The word metaphor itself is a metaphor, coming from a Greek term meaning to "transfer" or "carry across." Metaphors "carry" meaning from one word, image, idea, or situation to another. — Metaphor

"Metaphors "carry" meaning from one word, image, idea, or situation to another.[/quote]" -- therein lies my problem with saying a mere word (in isolation) is a metaphor.
And the definition of a metaphor seems to contradict the claim that the term "metaphor" is a metaphor!

sorry, I completely forgot!
But with respect to your comment "the philosopher wanted to emphasize that the term is not to be taken literally", i assume you mean that, given that is the case, "metaphor" was used in a pretty lose way....

I do believe that a metonym can consist in a single word, but a metaphor, to be strict, seems to require at minimum two, since a metaphor involves a comparison between 2 or more ideas/objects etc...

Thanks again for the answer!

Many thanks for all the answers!
Unfortunately, i cannot remember exactly (I am no Heidegger scholar but merely attended the talk), but it struck me as odd.
so even in the example provided -- "candle lit in a dark room: "Sunlight!", I would say the word "sunlight" itself does not constitute a metaphor, although we can make integrate the term into a metaphor, e.g., "the candle was sunlight in the dark room," or something like that. if I "sunlight" and point to the candle, the metaphor just mentioned is implicit, yet if I merely utterance the single word, it would not be a metaphor I think.

but so long as we experience our own emotions in the confines of our own being, i think the concept of "altruism" is illusory. I think Nietzsche outline this, but if i see someone suffering that generates my own suffering inside me which i then want to get rid of by helping 'the other'....but it's fundamentally the suffering in me which i want to dispense with.

Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, — Wayfarer

I have read quite a bit of this, an interesting read for sure.
You make very good points (and I am tracking down the Polt text).

The very fact that humans have a sense of ‘what ought to be the case’ can be seen as the basis for a metaphysical argument, in that it posits a sense of a greater good — Wayfarer

That is a very pertinent point. Now, "a sense of the greater good", I agree is the basis of the metaphysical argument. Any empirical account of this, in my opinion, falls short of true compassion. Utilitarian and/or Pragmatist approaches, that you interpreted the account to be, can only ever be 'enlightened egoism'..... we act on the basis of another's interests only insofar as we relate, or have reference to those interests, if that makes sense. "I" feel another's pain through my own being....so it is my pain...

True, empiricism is usually paired with a universalism about reality that thus requires agreement between different first-person experiences, i.e. intersubjectivity, but nothing ever said that phenomenalism has to be entirely solipsistic, caring about only one person’s experiences and no others. — Pfhorrest

agreed. so, in a sense they are synonymous.... both require sense experience (of external world) as their bedrock? i think that is what you also mean?

(i think i will post my question again separately, I think the Schopenhauer part detracted from (people focused more on the Schopenhauer part rather than) the actual question I was posing!)

modern ethical theorists will generally try and ground any such accounts in the reality of social life alone, so as to avoid anything that hints of metaphysics. But I don't see how such accounts can be anything other than reductionist. — Wayfarer

yes, agreed. In my opinion, try do reduce all ethics down to the empirical level. For example, in this chap's account...

"what really moves the altruist is that she loves us, and is therefore moved to care equally for all members of the ‘us’, for self and others. On this representation of the altruist, no egoism of any sort is involved since the fundamental object of love is a nonego. Notice that an ‘us’, a community, is a natural entity a plurality of individuals. No appeal to metaphysics, to a non-spatio-temporal unity, is required to explain its existence."

It seems to me to be empirical, but also a phenomenological account . But empiricism and phenomenology are distinct, so I am not sure how to characterise it. Like you said, it is reductionist....but empirically reductive...?

On the Basis of Morality is a great work. Here is a link to the full text: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44929/44929-h/44929-h.htm

I agree with you about Hegel too... personally also Heidegger is similar....obfuscation of the highest oder. Using terms which really mean nothing. I never knew the judge (of OBM) was an Hegelian, but! He would have been most offended without a doubt hahah

Yes definitely distinct. The observer can only surmise what's happening based on their own personal experience. But there will still be that shared relatedness of observing another's experience that causes one to recall something that something similar also occurred to them.

With regards to yawning, you don't even have to be sleepy but when the person you're with (who is sleepy) yawns, it somehow causes you to yawn as well.

Or seeing your friends laughing at something you didn't yourself see but you still find yourself "copying" their reaction. — 8livesleft

Great answer, friend. But, when it comes to fellow feelings, would you personally term this phenomenon as empathy or compassion?

"what really moves the altruist is that she loves us, and is therefore moved to care equally for all members of the ‘us’, for self and others. On this representation of the altruist, no egoism of any sort is involved since the fundamental object of love is a nonego. Notice that an ‘us’, a community, is a natural entity a plurality of individuals. No appeal to metaphysics, to a non-spatio-temporal unity, is required to explain its existence."

How to classify this account? it seems empirical in the sense that it requires no appeal to metaphysics, but also seems to be a loosely phenomenological type of explanation since the person, via first person recognition, one recognizes that they belong to a community. However, strictly speaking, it can't be both an empirical and phenomenological account? — jancanc

Empirical account in what way???
Phenomenological??

Compassion is so lauded by Schop precisely because it is something which gets one out of the individuation cycle. — schopenhauer1

Exactly! Egoism can only apply to individuation!

The discomfort of others causes the self to sense discomfort as well and so there is the desire to alleviate that. — 8livesleft

but would you agree that the two "discomforts" are nevertheless empirically distinct?? You have your discomfort and I have mine, which is caused by yours?

thanks for all the great answers. I do not agree with Young that Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion reduces to egoism, but I am more interested in how we would classify Young's account.

If we say Young's account is empirical and phenomenological, I seem to be conflating "empiricism" and "phenomenology"- surely these are not equivalent terms?

sure, mainly in Section 22 ofon the Basis of Morality.

in what sense would you say?

“the real self” as noumenal, the definitions are opposed to what Kant himself posits. — Mww

essentially to the extent that it is not accessible, much less a "noumenal solipsistic self"....

Your author may have some points to make, but it would appear he has nonetheless begun his theory under a misappropriation of terms. — Mww

Well it just appears so sloppy, that I don't know where to begin, and the idea that "TI" is some kind of noumenal solipsism is just way off base...but mind you that by him equating "TI" with solipsism, it puts him in a better position to criticize it....like a straw man (if that's the correct term?)

False equivalence? — Mww

Thanks again, my friend. I actually also was thinking False Equivalence, but it seems a bit different since with False equivalence I thought there has to be at least one characteristic in common between the two things. But I really don't see the correspondence between "TI" and "solipsism"! And Kant never espouses solipsism in any sense, and TI does not imply solipsism.
Both transcendental idealism and solipsism are defined terms and he comes along and basically tries to equate the former with the latter.
Keep in mind too, this commentator is trying to refute Kant's metaphysics...

the definitions:

"Transcendental Idealism purports that the real self is noumenal and space and time are merely faculties of the brain, and that ultimately only the noumenal "I" exists". Let us call this view "Noumenal Solipsism", that is, the view that only the noumenal "I" exists."

A fallacy is generally an error in logical argument, while equating T.I. with solipsism is merely a gross misunderstanding.

Probably shouldn’t try to identify a fallacy without the argument from which it may arise. — Mww

Thank you both for the replies. Essentially there is not much more to the argument, but the chap has just defined TI in terms of solpsism, and then carried on with a discussion substituting "TI" for "solipsism".

It seems to fit the definist fallacy since this fallacy essentially consists in (1) defining one concept in terms of another concept with which it is not clearly synonymous, (2) as the persuasive definition fallacy, defining a concept in terms of another concept in an infelicitous way that is favorable to one's position.

In my above example, transcendental idealism (concept 1) has been defined in terms of solipsism (concept 2). These two concepts, two my way of thinking, are not in the least synonymous.

Could I be missing something else?
Thanks again.