So then why is he president? Why are so many more people being fooled? Is it only economic conditions? — Mikie

You make some familiar points, inasmuch as I’ve heard these observations from commentators and friends here in Australia. I think some people would rather vote for the mad guy with crazy plans than for the ossified status quo, which offers business as usual without hope. Those on the religious right want God restored, and die-hard right-wingers will vote for an obvious cunt rather than for any Democrat. And there must be some who think he’s virtuous and will protect freedom, guns, and a way of life.

We are seeing some of this here, some voters are going for local anti-immigration, MAGA-style reactionaries. I think they want to turn back the clock to a country they imagine they remember fondly, when roles, culture, and society seemed more certain and stable.

I explained myself in my next post, which you quoted in part. What era do you think MAGA supporters consider "great"? — Ecurb

MAGA is largely a nostalgia project, isn’t it? I guess they would most like the post-war period, but their view is likely not to be grounded in a realistic account of life back then; more an idealised, romanticised one.

We have something similar here in Australia with One Nation and sometimes the Liberal Party (our half-arsed Tories). There’s a lingering view among these groups that there were “good old days” and that we need to turn the clock back to recreate them. They don't seem to mind a lot of the bigotries that underpinned those times, it seems. Perhaps the most prominent cliché available to us now is the idea that the current era is especially awful and that everything: politics, education, retail, food, cars, architecture, music, used to be so much better.

I wonder whom philosopher man or women that do everything in the center of two political axes. A pope? — Gmak

Pope? Catholic pope? Not often at the centre, whether you think of the right-wing anti-communist John Paul or the progressive Francis. Popes, like any other political figure, will always be aligned with some constituency, ideology, or historical moment, whether they intend it or not.

Who comes to mind in global politics as a centrist? Who you consider a centrist often depends on your own baseline thinking. Some people thought of Tony Blair as a centrist, but others saw him as right-wing, focused on market forces and military interventions.

What does it mean to be a centrist philosopher? Does it mean someone who makes safe choices, subject to the era they live in?

Husserl would insist that even after the most radical phenomenological reduction, consciousness remains relational. It is always correlation, never an isolated substance. For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is embodied, not secondarily but fundamentally. The self is not first and then related; it is constituted in relation, it is world-involving. There is no pure inward gaze that escapes the fleshly intertwining of body and world. — Joshs

That's exactly what I was trying to get at. Thanks.

yes this much I get. But:

Experience seems to be an interaction - do we ever have it without a relationship with an other of some kind? — Tom Storm

Can we ever say we experience experience? Isn’t consciousness always in relationship to something else?

Would you say the term participatory realist still describes him? Bitbol clearly identifies that scientific knowledge depends on the conditions of participation of observers in the manner of phenomenology. Would we say he is something of a transcendental idealist?

Bitbol isn’t saying that our experience is random but shaped or perhaps constrained by a reality we simultaneously co-create as we experience it. Or something like this.

I’d be interested in whether you employ a working conceptual definition of “reality” I’m assuming you would found it in experience. I am sympathetic to the notion that experience is irreducible but it still leaves the question, what is expedience? Experience seems to be an interaction - do we ever have it without a relationship with an other of some kind?

Nicely worded and astute.

The notion that 'philosophical counselling'
empowers the 'patient' to own recognisable
symptoms and conquer the powers of the soul,
or form healthy relationships to
alleviate obsessive or vice like attachments is
a considerable leap over forms that are culturally operating through qualification and supervision.

Where then does such a term that professes
competencies and efficacies have its
justifications? — Alexander Hine

Your language seems vague to me. Most counselling in the West is designed to support the client to develop insights into their beliefs and behaviors. Most of it might be described as philosophical in as much as counselling generally asks you to examine your life and values.

I don’t think you have sufficiently described a modality here that is much different in essence to humanist counselling. Although I personally don’t know what the term soul refers to. I take it to be an elevated description of the self.

Would you be content to rent an office and
get a signwriter to place your name next to
the title, 'philosophical counsellor'? — Alexander Hine

Let’s hope not. I don’t think many people have sufficient expertise in philosophy let alone supporting people and will be woefully inadequate and potentially harmful as counsellors.

The T Clark you see here on the forum is exactly the T Clark you would see if you were sitting here in my living room with me right now. No canyon. — T Clark

I wonder if this kind of thing is for others to judge. But who knows? In life I’d guess I’m not much like I am here. I expect many people are often nicer or nastier on line for all sorts of reasons.

On the contrary, for some of us, at least, metaphysical questions are pressing. They're not idle or abstract - they matter. — Wayfarer

No need to be defensive. I was very clear to put in option 1.

In any case, all of this is firmly in the ballpark of metaphysics, and it's a very difficult subject. — Wayfarer

An excellent response, Wayfarer. And there are really just three responses possible: 1) Do the hard work and study thinkers who have effectively thought through these matters. 2) Make shit up, reinvent the wheel, making every mistake along the way. 3) My response: don’t concern yourself with recondite matters, since they are close to impossible to resolve unless you have the time to read and a fecund and prodigious intellect. Since I have neither, I’m happy to leave the metaphysics to the experts and the plonkers.

I’m not sure I find the poetic language helpful.

not just the boundary but the very essence of your self-respect, — RadicalJoe

For me this seems a bit muddled. How is “the very essence of your self‑respect” different from simply “your self‑respect”? What does “very essence” actually add? I also don’t understand what the word “soul” is doing here. What is a soul?

How is what you’re saying different to the maxim, Don’t let others push you around?

Or, at least, it's always appeared to me to be something like a mystery. To a point that I wonder if "conceptual confusion" is a possible answer, but that doesn't seem so to me. In a straightforward way we talk about the world, our talk about the world is about the world, and this aboutness -- insofar that language is real and not an illusory set of squeaks and squawks we don't really understand as much as feel like we understand -- is as real as the rest around us insofar that we are non-dualistic naturalists. — Moliere

Yes. I heard Hilary Lawson explain his view (derivative, I know) that meaning does not map onto the world. Instead, meaning is a human construction, something that drifts in and out of relevance but ultimately functions as a way for us to “close” the openness of reality, to impose structure where none intrinsically exists. Sometimes our closures work pragmatically, and sometimes they hold only briefly before being replaced by others. But we never arrive at Truth, at least not in the sense of truth as a “mirror of nature,” as Richard Rorty might put it. I find this view somewhat seductive.

Yes, this much I get. But to posit it isn’t possible for physical processes to explain intentionality, I wonder if this is a question for expertise rather than a problem for reasoning. What would it mean for a physical processes to produce meaning? I’m not even sure we know what meaning is. I feel like this piece of reasoning, while interesting, is excluding a multiplicity of other relevant matters I know nothing about so I don’t feel it’s a self-contained argument one can make use of. But that may just be me.

That sounds like proving a negative. I suppose a theist is more likely to point to (demonstrate) the absence of physical evidence for mental phenomena in matter — Gnomon

I’m interested in what people think more than looking for answers . I’m not sure what you were saying in your post.

So what I mean to say is that in terms of a basic analysis his argument checks out and makes sense -- which part doesn't make sense to you? — Moliere

I really just wanted to see what others thought, to be honest, because it seems so simple and avoids all the usual banalities about the nature of consciousness which is more commonly proffered in arguments against physicalism. I have no real idea what the argument means or how it works.

I'm inclined to say that number (as an example) is a necessary and uniform structure within rational thought. When I ask what the sum of 1 + 3 is, the answer is constrainted by necessity to '4'. We are 'compelled by reason' to give that answer. But in what sense does '4' exist? This is the question sorrounding platonic realism which has generated centuries of argument. The implication is, if abstractions exist, in what sense do they exist?

A strong empiricist or reductionist naturalism inclines us to accept only those things that exist as phenomena as real - numbers and logical rules are, then, seen as being in the mind or the product of the mind, 'human inventions', and the like, 'projected' onto the world. But that belies the whole concept of mathematical necessity! — Wayfarer

But isn't the view that numbers are idealizations we construct that stabilize the world into convenient, standardized identities, somewhat inimical to this thesis? I don't know the answer to this myself.

Where I see the resistance to Platonic realism is the suggestion that numbers arereal but not material.. As soon as you say that, you're into metaphysics, like it or not, and most don't. We have a hardwired tendency to believe that what is real must be 'out there somewhere', literally existing in time and space. — Wayfarer

I'm not saying anyone needs to resist the idea; I'm simply wondering whether the idea is more than speculative. I'm already familiar with the arguments, so I don’t need to see them again. What I’d like, perhaps, is a postmodern account of mathematics (something not too inscrutable) that unpacks this further. I don’t think we’ll get that from classical philosophy.

I’ve always taken cyberpunk to be an aestheticized form of postmodernism that riffs off Weber’s idea of disenchantment, the sense that modernity drains the world of meaning, leaving only systems, bureaucracy, and efficiency (technology). The bad guys won and untamed capitalism has reached its inevitable resolutions. It's obviously a play on where we have been since the mid 20th century. A film noir aesthetic seems to be a key - there is usually someone with integrity in a world where moral codes no longer seem to apply.

I can't help you with Hart's reasoning*1, except to note that it is based on theology, and argues against Naturalism/Materialism. If you are committed to Materialism, his arguments won't make sense — Gnomon

No. Some arguments that theists raise are self‑contained. All the theist has to demonstrate in this instance is that intentionality can’t be explained by physicalism or naturalism (not materialism per say).

If he is right, this does not lead directly to theism by any means, any more than demonstrating the existence of UFOs leads to little green men.

And remember that the famous atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel presents arguments similar to Hart.

Give it a try. What vocabulary can you come up with to talk about the objective pole that doesn’t already imply a contribution from the subjective pole? — Joshs

Fair question.

But does each thing (or, what is equivalent here: does any thing at all) have such an essence of its own in the first place? Or is the thing, as it were, always underway, not at all graspable therefore in pure Objectivity, but rather, in virtue of its relation to subjectivity, in principle only a relatively identical something, which does not have its essence in advance or graspable once and for all, but instead has an open essence, one that can always take on new properties according to the constitutive circumstances of givenness? But this is precisely the problem, to determine more exactly the sense of this openness, as regards, specifically, the "Objectivity" of natural science.”(Husserl, Ideas II)

So if the essence of things is open and continually shaped by the conditions in which they appear to us, then objectivity cannot be a fixed feature of the world itself but must instead be something constituted through an ongoing unification of these shifting appearances across different perspectives.

(This is also why I make frequent reference to Charles Pinter's 2022 book 'Mind and the Cosmic Order'. He shows in great detail how the mind structures experience through the formation of gestalts, meaningful wholes, which are the basic units of cognition (and not only human cognition). We 'pick out' specific 'things' and identify them as shapes and forms against backgrounds. Without this cognitive activity there would be no conscious awareness as such - that is what 'the world' is for us. The difficulty is becoming aware of those activities, as it is largely reflexive and unconscious.) — Wayfarer

It interests me that you see maths (Platonically) as transcending contingent human experience, what do you make of Josh's observations:

If you remove all of the idealizations that minds impose on the world of appearances, there is not much to say about the nature of what is mind-independent. — Joshs

Our mathematical schemes depend on idealizations we construct that stabilize the world into convenient, standardized identities. — Joshs

I'm not sure how evolution can explain intentionality, but I'm no expert.

I don't remember the context of my question. It was probably to understand what a theist might offer by way of reasoning.

I apologize, if you were offended by my interpretation of your OP : that you are not comfortable (OK) with the postulated explanations --- supernaturalistic or naturalistic --- for the Intelligibility of the universe — Gnomon

I am rarely offended.

The point of this thread was to understand Hart’s reasoning. What does he mean? Is the reasoning any good? That’s the main thing I was looking for. Seems to me after 9 pages, the question may be unanswerable or perhaps, I just can't make sense of it.

I don't think that "unintelligible structure" makes sense. So it would be better to say "co-create the structures we study". Then doesn't "study" suggests the structures exist independently of us? That's not inapt, so long as we don't forget that we co-create them. — Ludwig V

Good. Nice.

I'm interested to read what @joshs has to say about this.

@Joshs I’m wondering if you could help me articulate a position I have some interest in but can’t fully articulate. The idea that mathematics describes the structures and truths of the universe because rationality is built into it seems potentially misleading, since mathematical realists would hold these structures exist independently of us. I'm interested in the idea that the regularities and patterns we see are shaped by the ways we interact with the world, and that our perception and interaction with the world co-create the intelligible structures we study. Can you explain what a postmodern perspective (recognizing there are various approaches) might say in response to Platonism or the idea that science describes or maps on directly to a reality “out there”? Happy to be corrected on my take.

So you are not OK with metaphorical philosophical answers to the Intelligibility question on a philosophy forum? Do you think Math (logic), and other nonphysical aspects of the Cosmos, is not Real, simply because we can't see or touch it? If so, then it's Ideal, and physical science will not answer your question. — Gnomon

All I did was ask the question, "How do we know...? why would you jump straight to me being not OK with something?

A post-modern view of mathematics would seem to say that it is a human practice that develops within shared languages, rules, and historical traditions, rather than a set of timeless objects existing independently of us. Its objectivity comes from the internal consistency of its systems and our agreement on their rules, not from access to a separate mathematical realm.

I'm asking how do we know this is not the case? I don't know the answer and I am not a post-modernist or active reader of the oeuvre.

doubt you would be asking the OP question if you were satisfied with empirical science's physical mechanical description of how we see*1 (rods & cones, etc). — Gnomon

I’m asking the question because it struck me as a curiosity and I didn’t understand the argument. Unlike some others, while I have my sympathies, I’m not here to promote a particular philosophical view, I’m simply curious about different positions and their critiques.

You say we ‘built’ mathematics to find patterns. But that gets causation backwards. We discovered mathematical patterns were already there, and then developed formal methods to study them more systematically. — Wayfarer

And the point about ‘cognitive frameworks’ actually supports my view, not yours. Why are our cognitive frameworks capable of grasping mind-independent mathematical truths? — Wayfarer

To be clear, it's not actually my view as such, I'm trying to put forward what post modern perspectives seem to be saying. Although I am sympathetic and am open to this view.

So in pushing back on you, could we simply say that “π existed before minds” assumes exactly what it is trying to prove? Circles in nature existed, yes. But π is not a physical object in the world. It is a concept that arises when a rational agent defines “circle,” “diameter,” and “ratio” within a particular symbolic framework. Without those conceptual operations, there is no "π "only physical shapes. The claim that π “was there anyway” quietly smuggles in human abstraction and treats it as mind-independent reality.

Secondly, the move from “math works” to “rationality is built into the cosmos” is a leap. Mathematics works because it evolved as a tool for modeling stable regularities in experience. It has been refined precisely to fit the kinds of patterns we can detect and formalize. Its effectiveness doesn’t prove cosmic rational structure any more than language proving that the universe is inherently grammatical.

Thirdly, the idea that mathematical truths are “perceptible only by reason” does not establish their mind-independence. It shows the opposite: they are accessible only within rational systems. Reason is the condition under which mathematical objects appear at all. That doesn’t make mathematics arbitrary, but it does make it framework-dependent.

So the likely post-modern reply would be not that “math is phoney.” It is that mathematics is a powerful human structuring of reality, not a window into some pre-existing Platonic realm.

I think there is ample evidence that ghosts are real psychic phenomena. Do they have an independent existence? How would we know? Is that question very much different in the strictest sense from the question as to whether the world as it appears has an independent existence? — Janus

That's an interesting comparison. I'm not sure if I would have put those two ideas together, but I see what you mean. Both appear to be unverifiable. I'm not convinced people see ghosts even though I have heard some stories (from folks I know and trust) which are ball-tearers. I've always believed in haunted minds not haunted houses.

Because they enable discoveries about nature that would otherwise be completely imperceptible to us. They account for the discoveries which make the platform on which this conversation is being conducted possible, among many other things. — Wayfarer

I'm not confident of this. Saying that maths must be independent of us because it leads to discoveries and technology doesn’t really settle the issue. Of course it helps us uncover things we couldn’t see before. We built it precisely to find patterns, make predictions, and extend our reach. The fact that it works so well shows it’s a powerful human tool shaped by long interaction with the world, not that it floats free of our ways of thinking and describing things. We could say that success proves usefulness and reliability, but it doesn’t prove that maths or even “reality” as we describe it exist independently of the cognitive and cultural frameworks that make them intelligible in the first place.

Cool. We mostly agree.

Curious, if someone tells you there are ghosts, is your response:

Bullshit: science hasn’t demonstrated their existence and souls most certainly can’t be demonstrated..
Or
We can’t rule ghosts out as yet and while I am unconvinced so far by any evidence, I am open to changing my mind if fresh evidence is forthcoming.

Science is a combination of observations (of what appears to us, obviously) and inference to the best explanation for those observations. It says nothing, and can say nothing, about how things are in any absolute, non-contextual sense. There is no such sense―not for us anyway―how could there be? — Janus

I agree but I would just say that science is a reliable pathway to doing/achieving things in the world. But it makes no truth proclamations and provides tentative models that often become obsolete; our scientific models constantly being revised.

That leaves room to ponder what we actually know of reality. Or even if this thing called reality is just a placeholder construct we use to pragmatically go about our business and solve problems. The human urge is for sense making and getting to the bottom of things. But what if there’s no bottom?

I think you have answered your own question. The intelligibility of reality, and the "unreasonable effectiveness" of mathematics (Wigner), are not scientific questions. So we should not expect naturalistic answers. Also, any philosophical answers postulated will be limited to metaphysical and metaphorical conjectures. Are you OK with that? :wink: — Gnomon

No.

How do we know that what we call reality and math’s aren’t simply the contingent products of cognition, culture and language. In other words the patterns and regularities are in how we see not what we see. There are significant philosophers who hold this in post modernism and phenomenology. And no doubt there are other explanations we haven’t thought of.

The odd part there is that in studying philosophy one can also learn to do the opposite -- to defend one's viewpoint from all possible objections and prove oneself right. — Moliere

Not odd to me, I suspect most people are drawn to philosophy to find “better” justifications for what they already believe. It’s hoarding weapons and artillery.

I agree. I should have said a more comprehensive account.

How about "Treat others as you, to the best of your understanding, think they would wish to be treated"? — Janus

Yep, that’s pretty much how I understand the maxim. We need to remember that no one sentence formula is going to articulate a full account of morality. But it’s certainly better than, “Death to all apostates!”

Then there's the knowledge of the trades I think of: knowing the different types of switches you can install into a control panel is about reality but it's not really a scientific knowledge and it's not only know-that. It's technical knowledge. Plumbing, machining, electrical work seem to fit here as genuine kinds of truth that are even about the world but they're not doing the science thing. — Moliere

I’m not sure I agree. I take something closer to Susan Haack’s view of what counts as a scientific approach. Methods that have been established within an intersubjective community, that have replicable and predictable results, where there's a body of standards and best practices based on empirical experience, would certainly include areas like plumbing, electrical work, and even boat building. All achieved over time through testing an idea, trial and error and experiment. Many fields fit this broader account of disciplined, evidence‑based inquiry.

Philosophy! :D

At least I tend to think so. It's hard to characterize just what is learned by studying philosophy, but I can see that people who do are more able at thinking. It's not that they will not fall for traps but they'll be somewhat aware of possible traps and be open to error more than people who do not. — Moliere

I hear you. Although I wouldn’t say philosophy as a whole. Some philosophy, perhaps even most. But I wouldn’t include something like logical positivism, for example. The problem is whether we can treat all philosophy as a form of truth, even while recognising that some philosophy is mistaken, and in some cases perhaps even wilfully ignorant.

I think the idea that is being circled around here without really being stated is metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism is the philosophical position that a mind-independent world exists, holding that objects, their properties, and the structure of reality remain the same regardless of whether they are thought of, perceived, or experienced. — Wayfarer

Exactly. Thanks for the term. Queue The View from Nowhere by Nagel. An important argument.

I want to say that intelligibility, causation, and the idea of an ordered world can be metaphysical presuppositions, but I don't believe they must be a part of science as a whole. — Moliere

Interesting. Do you think many scientists identify as anti‑realists, and also as Kantians, understanding space and time as forms of cognition rather than external features of the world?

. I genuinely believe there's more to knowledge than science. — Moliere

What are you thinking here?

Even philosophy counts here -- it's just seeking a different kind of truth than science seeks, by my lights, and due to the practices of science being made relatively free of metaphysical commitments (at least, necessary metaphysical commitments), which is evidenced by the wide interpretations of science even by scientific practitioners (i.e. a naturalist vs. an idealist, say) while the practice continues to be successful. — Moliere

Yes, I find this interesting. Are there many scientists who believe that time and space do not exist as external realities? Or should I have written ‘spacetime’ instead?

What would count as a different kind of truth?

Is science built upon philosophical axioms? Is "Reality can be understood" an axiomatic belief? — Moliere

You’re right. Axiom may not be the right term. But it is a metaphysical presupposition. There are others, like causation and the idea that the world is ordered. And pragmatically this works for us ( for the most part).

And I'd say I'm not committed to positivism or scientism with this because I don't believe science is the end-all-be-all on reality. — Moliere

I’m not attempting to define who is a positivist or a scientistic thinker.

Is Dawkins? Many would say so. And yet he writes with vitality about the centrality of art, poetry and music in his life. I think, perhaps, that scientism arises from the belief that reality is transparently accessible to us, that it can be captured in a complete descriptive system, and that scientific inquiry alone provides genuine insight into what matters. ( eg, consciousness) Or something like that. How do you see scientism?

("We're interested specifically in intentionality. Have you found that yet?") — Srap Tasmaner

I’m not convinced that’s how it goes. It seems closer to this: if you are a naturalist or physicalist, how do you account for intentionality? Does your model have sufficient explanatory power? There’s nothing to “find” but there may be an explanatory gap (Just how significant will depend on what metaphysics we subscribe to.) But that's been thrashed on that other thread.

As the celebrity physicist Sean Carroll observes, science does not require explicit metaphysical explanations in order to function, even though it inevitably rests upon metaphysical assumptions. Similarly, a talented musician doesn't need to read or formally understand music theory to perform brilliantly. Technical or pragmatic success does not depend on awareness of the underlying structures that make something possible. Effectiveness in practice can be largely independent of perhaps even indifferent to the deeper intellectual commitments and theoretical presuppositions that silently sustain it.

For me what remains interesting is that science is built upon philosophical axioms ( e.g., reality can be understood) and how strongly these are believed depends on how scientistic we are or whether we are metaphysical or methodological naturalists.