True, but for all intents and purposes unimaginable is as good as impossible in my book. Of course the unimaginable may later become imaginable — Janus

So then its possible. Do you see you keep making contradictions to yourself?

We can't really imagine, in the sense of "form an image of" an eternal existence. We can think it as the dialectical opposite of temporal, that is all. — Janus

So we can imagine without an image. Which is still just imagining something.

Empirical existents are not eternal so I don't know what leads to say that an eternal existence could be empirical — Janus

I'm not, I'm just using your words. I really didn't care about that part, I just wanted you to clarify what you were saying with some evidence and without contradictions. As I noted, it doesn't matter these types of existence, as it does not negate the question of, "Should there be existence?" which does not care about types. Which you still have not addressed. So again, I'm not seeing any viable counters to my points here.

If it wasn't universal, then it would not be a guarantor of objective moral goodness everywhere, if it was not eternal it would not be a guarantor of objective moral goodness at all times. — Janus

So then if I asked a question, "Should there be existence?" and I could prove the answer always has been, and will be "Yes", then would that not be an eternal guarantor of objective moral goodness everywhere? Wouldn't that be transcendent then?

So you can see the standards your arguments need to be raised to to counter the OP.
— Philosophim

Sorry but I cannot help but :rofl: at that. I think we are done here. — Janus

Its fine, as I noted not everyone likes to go to that level, but that is the level that's expected for me to consider my points countered. And believe me, I've been countered before and owned up to it. I appreciate your contributions Janus. I'll be putting a second part out this weekend that may clear up some questions and further the thinking if you're interested.

There is no imaginable way in which an empirical existent could be a universal guarantor of objective moral goodness. — Janus

Just because you cannot imagine it, does not make it impossible right?

For a start such a guarantor would need to be eternal, — Janus

So it is imaginable then. And an eternal existence can still be empirical, so then it seems logical there could be one.

At this point you just seem to be doubling down to try to defend your thesis. — Janus

No. I'm pointing out that coming in and saying, "Here is my counter" does not absolve you of clearly defining and proving your counter is correct. You believe your points to be true, but you have not proven your points to be true. If they are not true, I, who have attempted to prove my points, am not countered.
If you want to counter what I've written, you need to address the logic of what is written, and demonstrate your own counter can hold up against equal criticism. And don't take it the wrong way! :) It is better to make claims, arguments and counters. Just understand and expect the same will be given back.

Finally, it doesn't matter whether the existence is transcendent, empirical, etc. If it exists, it exists.
— Philosophim

That seems to me to be nothing more than empty words — Janus

How? Are you saying that any of the descriptors of existence, transcendent, temporal, empirical etc, don't exist? I think that's pretty clear, otherwise we wouldn't call them existences. They are weighty words that make the point very clearly.

The essential attributes of the idea of a guarantor of objective moral good must be universality, eternality and thus transcendence. — Janus

Why? Can you prove that then more than your opinion?

But so far, you have not presented anything pertinent against the actual argument, just an opinion.
— Philosophim

You apparently won't hear an argument against your claim that such a guarantor could be an empirical existent. — Janus

No, I've heard clearly and addressed it clearly.

The very idea is incoherent, and that's all the argument that is needed. — Janus

You need to prove its incoherent, not just say it is. I have seen no proof that it is incoherent.

So you can see the standards your arguments need to be raised to to counter the OP. As I've noted, its fine to have counter arguments, but they must rise beyond opinions. The OP is a proof. It rises to the same standard I am asking you to give. And now that you understand that standard, feel free to look at the OP again and hold it to the same level. I'm not asking for anything I wouldn't demand of myself.

Unfortunately, we are just talking past each other; and I would just be reiterating if I responded. So I will let it rest.

Take care, Philosophim! — Bob Ross

You too Bob! I'll have the second part posted this weekend, we can touch base again for the second part to see if that resolves your issue.

A real guarantor of objective moral good could not possibly be an empirical existent, so your argument fails from the start unless you posit a transcendent guarantor. — Janus

1. Where is your proof that an objective moral good could not possibly be an empirical existent?
2. What is a transcendent guarantor and what is your proof of it?

My point is all of the above is not a proof, just an opinion with unproven statements. Not that it matters that much as...

And, as I've pointed out, whether or not the existence of that transcendent guarantor is itself good has no bearing on whether empirical existence is good — Janus

3. I will note again that I have not separated existence into different types. Meaning if there were multiple existences, I am not saying at this moment that any one existence would be morally superior or inferior to another. So you're inserting a point that I have not claimed to make. That's typically called a straw man argument, or a logical fallacy. You build up something that the person is not saying, then argue that its wrong.

Finally, it doesn't matter whether the existence is transcendent, empirical, etc. If it exists, it exists. I am stating this for the third time, and I have yet to hear an argument against this. I noted the question, "Should there be existence?" and that logically, the answer is yes. Feel free to look through the argument and demonstrate why you believe this is incorrect by refuting the logic given. But so far, you have not presented anything pertinent against the actual argument, just an opinion.

8. Only X or Y can exist (by way of actualizing it), but not both.
8. Only X or Y can exist (by way of actualizing it), but not both.
9. X should exist, and Y should not exist.
10. Y should not exist, but is good. (6 & 9)
11. Good is ‘what should be’.
9. 10 is then incoherent: Y should not exist, but it should exist. (10 restated in light of 11)

Your response, was to sidestep the issue by denying 8 and commenting on if they both could co-exist. That’s blatantly not the point. — Bob Ross

I didn't think I sidestepped. I thought I addressed this with the grandfather and the grandson next to the explosion, and only one being able to live. Isn't that the situation in 8? But this does not destroy that Ideally we want all three existences to be able to co-exist. Even if there's a limitation and only one can live, it ought to be that both still live. Just because we can't generate that outcome doesn't change anything in regards to their goodness as existences.

Morality is not about the outcome, it is about what ought to be. Morality is about possibilities. In the instance of the explosion, there is no possibility of both the grandfather and grandkid coming out alive. So we evaluate the situation based on the limitations presented to us by the state prior to the explosion, and determine what the most moral outcome would be. Both the grandfather and grandson are good, but unfortunately, we cannot change the fact that one of them will die, only choose who will die.

Have you ever heard of triage? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triage
My mother is a nurse, and its a very basic approach to care when there is not enough time and resources to treat everyone at the same time equally. A person who has third degree burns and is dying is going to be treated prior to someone who has a cut that needs stiches, but otherwise can wait. Does that make the person who has the cut unworthy of treatment? That they aren't valuable? No. Its just an assessment of understanding that given limitations, certain people have priority over others. If the hospital had unlimited resources, ideally everyone would be taken care of at the same time. If we were Gods then ideally we would let both the grandfather and grandson survive. But we are not Gods. We are mortals with limitations.

An objective morality should be able to determine what is most moral without limitations, and what is most moral given limitations. I've done that here. That should answer your point, but feel free to contest if it does not.

If what is morally good (let’s call it G) necessitates that existence is good, then existence is not what is morally good—it is good insofar as it relates to what is morally good. — Bob Ross

Let me take the first part of your sentence.

"If what is morally good (let’s call it G) necessitates that existence is good, then existence is not what is morally good."

This is not my argument. First, its not "morally good" which necessitates anything, its an "Objective morality." Morality is an analysis of what is good. If an objective morality determines that existence is good, then existence is good.

Now lets tie in your second sentence. "it is good insofar as it relates to what is morally good"

So this now becomes, "An objective morality is good insofar as it relates to what is morally good", which is not a problem. So no circular logic.

Objective moral cases are always open and ask one to conclude, subjective moral cases are closed but can be opened and concluded. — Barkon

That's a neat way of looking at it. Did you happen to read the OP entirely btw? Any comments, questions, or issues with what was stated? Thanks for stopping by.

Ha ha! Thank you for the pleasant post Kizzy! To your reference to Janus, the current setup is a base, and we will tackle the idea that some existences are going to be better than other. I look forward to your contributions when I post it this weekend. :)

Sure, we can entertain the idea that there might be some kind of existence we have no idea of, but it's no better than fiction, in fact it's worse, because fiction is really based on our experience of this world. — Janus

I was not the one who introduced the idea of non-empirical existences, you did as a counter. So then your counter to me is noted by you as fiction. Fiction does not counter what is objective. "Unicorn" arguments can be dismissed. So then we're back to the point where my points remain unchallenged. Try again! Maybe another angle? Challenge anything, the definitions through the premises to the conclusion.

Existence is "What is".
— Philosophim
I.e. "existence is" a sentence fragment. :roll: — 180 Proof

You know, you have a vast knowledge of philosophy and a clever mind. I keep appealing to you because I feel if you ever got into a serious discussion, you would have a lot to offer. If I'm going to propose an objective morality seriously, I need serious attacks. What I have written has never been written before. Here's a real chance to think about something new and be a part of it. My last appeal, do what you wish.

↪Philosophim The only existence we know is our empirical existence and so the question, "should there be existence?" if it doesn't refer to that empirical existence, is meaningless. — Janus

Existence is "What is". Lets say there's another form of existence that's not empirical. It exists right? Thus the question, "Should there be existence", and its answer, does not change.

If something morally objective exists it could not be an empirical existent. — Janus

That's irrelevant. Existence is "What is". I have the definitions at the top, let me know if there is any definition that needs more detail. Even if its not empirically existent, it still exists right? It would be an odd thing to say it doesn't. The question is, "Should there be existence?" Not any specific empirical, rational, metaphorical, relative, existence. Any existence at all. It is that, or nothing.

I've given an argument that in my personal opinion refutes the OP. In your personal opinion it does not refute the OP. — Janus

Its not an opinion. You didn't address the arguments of the OP. No citation of the steps, nor refutation of the specific reasoning given. Its ok, not everyone wants to engage at that level.

I'm not convinced you really think our exchange was a good conversation — Janus

No, you were polite, said your peace, and wanted to go no further than that. That's a good conversation. :) No trolling, 'yelling', or insults my way. This is an open forum for all people to engage at all levels. Thanks for participating and enjoy your day!

I've already told you why I disagree with it. — Janus

You've given a personal opinion, but not a refutation of the OP. Its ok, I know not everyone reads and understands the OP. Its an establishment of a base, I'll write the next steps on where we can go with this over the weekend. But I wanted to give people time and thought to digest the first part. Good conversation.

That doesn't tell us what should be — Janus

The question was, "Should existence be?" Did you understand the logic that lead to the answer being "Yes"? Do you have some disagreement with it?

Your non-reply reply to my ↪180 Proof (i.e. showing that your previous objection to my counter-argument fails) speaks for itself, sir. — 180 Proof

I've tried my best but I genuinely don't understand what you're trying to say. Have a nice flight, catch you another time.

I already said why I don't think it works, because it all depends on what objective goodness is. — Janus

Where in the OP do I go wrong when I show you what objective goodness must be?

Okay, you can't ... — 180 Proof

If you want to claim I didn't, point out how. A repost of a few sentences that doesn't address my reply, nor attempt to clarify your position leaves you over there in a world I cannot reach nor understand.

Such an analysis would need an objectively good object of analysis, and that object would be "The Good" if it existed. — Janus

Well, take a look at the OP, think about it carefully, and let me know if you think it works as a start. :)

Let me break it down another way for you then.

1. If "objective moral good" entails objective moral bad, and

2. if "objective moral good" assumes "existence is good",

3. then objective bad assumes existence is bad; — QED

Let me translate what you said in terms of what the OP is saying.

1. If there is an objective moral good, then of course there must be an objective moral bad.
2. An objective moral good concludes that existence is good.

You state, "So an objective moral bad must conclude existence is bad." But that doesn't follow. We've concluded that an objective moral good must conclude that existence is good. In such a scenario the objective moral bad would be, "A lack of existence".

I'm saying A = good !A = bad
You're saying A = good, A = bad.

So no, you cannot conclude from what I've written that what is objectively bad is existence.

What is the difference between there being an objective morality and there being The Good? — Janus

An objective morality would be an analysis of what good is apart from culture, emotions, or subjectivity.

How do you define "The Good"? I'm not using that term here so I don't know what it means.

Do you mean something like 'If there is the Good, then existence must be good'? — Janus

No, I mean the steps that I go through on the OP to reach the conclusion. If good is "what ought to be" and there is an objective morality, it must necessarily conclude "Yes" to the question of "Should there be existence?"

I'm not arguing for the truth of Buddhism, just pointing out that it's always going to be a matter of interpretation. — Janus

For a subjective notion of morality, sure. Anything goes. This is not anything goes. This is a step by step process to prove certain conclusions that an objective morality must abide by.

Sure ...
The point I will make below: If there is an objective morality, the most logical fundamental aspect of that morality is that existence is good. — 180 Proof

That was just an intro sentence to sum up what you would read. Where do I note that objective morality is conditional in the argument? I feel the logic is pretty clear, so I'll sum it here again.

Good is "What should be"
I conclude that if there is an objective morality, it necessarily must answer the question, "Should there be existence?" with Yes.

So this would mean that existence is good. The denial of existence would be bad. You say:

3. then objective bad assumes existence is bad; — QED

but that doesn't lead from anything I've stated in the OP. If good is what should be, bad is its negation. Thus the absence of existence entirely would be bad. In no way does the OP imply or assume that existence is bad.

You're moving the goalposts: according to the OP, "objective morality" is conditional, not "existence". The objection above is incorrect. — 180 Proof

I'm not understanding the point. Can you quote the part of the OP you're talking about?

No worry on the delay, have a safe trip!

1. If "objective moral good" entails objective moral bad, and

2. if "objective moral good" assumes "existence is good",

3. then objective bad assumes existence is bad; — QED

3 is incorrect. If there should be existence, then the absence of existence would be bad. We have nothing so far which notes, "This particular existence should not be," because we have not asked the question, "Should this particular existence be?" This question only entails the void of all existence, vs there being existence.

Now, I will be building up in the next post up to the point where we can evaluate how to parse existence into existences, and logically determine that some combinations of existence result in overall lower existence then if they were not there. But before I can get to that part, the fundamental needs to be answered. If we realize that all existence is good when compared to nothing, then we have an objective base to build off of.

It only contradicts itself in one unique case, when the objective morality is referring to itself. — finarfin

As long as you understand the answer to the fundamental question, you're ready for the next step. Its just a start. Compared to nothing, all existence is good. But It doesn't tell us if some existence is better than others. Yet when we have an objective fundamental to start with, we can build towards a more complete moral system not based off of subjectivity. I'll post the next part this weekend as this has to be digested in bits. If you want to see where I'm going to go, you can click the link I noted in the OP. I warn you though that's more of a note splash.

Yes, I agree. Therefore, an objective morality must advocate that its existence is just. But I don't see how that proves that the concept of existence itself is moral, or how it shows that our existence is moral. — finarfin

Because it cannot answer the question, "Should there be existence?" in the negative without contradicting itself.

g. If it is [not good] for anything to exist then it is not good for that objective moral standard to exist. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Lets continue.

If its not good for the objective moral standard to exist, then according to itself, it ought not to exist.
If we are to know that it ought not to exist, then we should destroy it, ignore it, or not follow it according to itself. The only conclusion we can make then is we ought to conclude that existence should be, therefore existence ought to be.

Its a pretty clear contradiction from the conclusion. Any conclusion which leads to negating itself is irrational, and cannot be an existent objective morality.

I don't think your proposition proves that existence as a concept is moral, only that the existence of an objective moral system is moral (which is somewhat redundant and tautological). — finarfin

No, because the question is not, "is the objective system moral itself?" The question is whether there should be existence at all. If the answer is no, then the very objective morality itself shouldn't exist. But if it shouldn't exist, then it cannot claim that other things should or should not exist as it should not exist itself. If it should not exist, then it should not be followed. It contradicts itself.

Then isn't your proposition only proving that objective morality itself should exist, i.e. is a moral end? — finarfin

No. There is one assumption that I noted in the OP. We are assuming an objective morality exists. If it exists, logically, what must the answer be to "Should there be existence?" Logically, any objective morality must conclude, "Yes." We aren't proving that an objective morality exists, we are simply proving what it must entail if it does exist.

The hypothetical stated that they cannot both co-exist; but I understand what you are saying: it just doesn’t address the issue. — Bob Ross

How? I don't understand. Please give an example of the issue in another way so I can understand then. You can use the grandfather, the grandson, and the explosion to demonstrate if you wish.

That’s why I used the example: there is one thing that is good but should not exist; which contradicts your definition. — Bob Ross

Should not exist in that context. In another context both the boy, the grandfather, and the explosion ought to exist, just separately. Because when you get into existences, we find that some combinations create more potential and actual existences than others. But we're getting too far ahead now within the scope of this conversation. Lets just break the basic example down.

If you wish, chart it out. Take the boy, the grandfather, and the explosion and set them to every variation of true and false you can think of. True = exist, while false = does not exist. Of course the optimal set would be where all three are true. But if we're in a situation in which one must be false, that is a less optimal situation. Meaning we have a situation that is the greatest good, and situations which are not as good. As you can see, we can have one set which is the greatest good, with other sets that are not as good.

Perhaps you're missing the notion of relativite vs absolute. In an absolute sense (within the context of this simple thought experiment only, don't go any deeper than this!) all three should exist. But we are not Gods. Just because something ought to be, doesn't mean it can be. There are limitations in which we cannot reach the ideal. In this case, the explosion is going to exist and either the grandfather or son will be set to false. In such cases we must take the best of what is available to us. Meaning that when we cannot reach the case in which all three can exist without eliminating the other, we must chose from what is remaining. Meaning there is an ideal good, and a reachable good. If this is incoherent, please point out with clear examples, not abstracts.

Also, on a separate note, I’ve always thought something fishy is going [ (; ] on with your derivation of existence being good — Bob Ross

Ha ha! No worry. It needs to be challenged in every way. A claim to objectivity requires it.

In order for there to be a standard, there must exist already something that is morally good. If this is true, then existence cannot be that standard; because that would be circular. — Bob Ross

A logically necessary requirement for something is not a circular fallacy. Something circular would be something which tried to prove itself by illogical self-assertion. "The bible is entirely true." How do we know its true? "Because the bible tells us its true." I am using a proof by contradiction to note that existence should be, not circular logic. Consequently, it would be that something good already exists, but that is not being used as a proof for the claim that existence is good.

I think you might have an equivocation with your use of "should" here. "Should" can mean "ought," or "it would be good to..." but it can also be used as in "x should follow from y," where it is basically standing in for "x entails y." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I wouldn't say that x should follow from y is the same as 'entails'. Should or ought in are words of intention or preference. If x should follow from y, it means that there is a possibility that it does not. If existence should be, it doesn't mean that it necessarily will be for example.

It seems possible that an objective standard could exist that says "things ought not to exist." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Then how would it answer its own contradiction? Anytime you reach a contradiction in logic, its an indicator its something that's not possible. To be clear, the question is, "Should there be existence?" or the binary of "Something vs Nothing". Meaning in the face of an absolute void, there still ought to be something. Does this mean, "If we can have 2 somethings vs the 1 something, that the 2 something is always better?" No. We are setting a base good, and nothing more at this point.

Now, it is the case that if nothing exists, then no standard of goodness can exist. If that's what you're getting at, that seems fine — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's about the gist. So if there is an objective standard of goodness that exists, it cannot logically conclude that it ought not to exist. For if it did, then that logically means it would be good if the objective conclusion did not exist. If we got rid of the objective morality based on its own conclusions then, we are left with only one answer, that there ought to be existence.

Objective reality cannot be a contradiction. Objectivity is a state of reality that is, while a contradiction is a claim that something both is and is not at the same time in purely equivalent positive and negative terms or A = !A. No objective conclusion that I know of leads to a contradiction of itself, therefore anything which is a contradiction cannot be objective. Ergo, "Existence ought to be" is the only conclusion which an objective morality could conclude.

Do facts like 1+1=2 exist outside of created existence? — Count Timothy von Icarus

No. They are observations and logical conclusions about created existence. Everything that is exists. There are no ghosts 'outside of existence', floating concepts in the aether 'outside of existence', or other nonsense. You cannot get outside of existence. If it is, it exists.

Also, a better word than possible would be plausible. Something possible is the knowledge of something that has occurred at least once. So it is possible it could happen again. What is plausible is something in our imagination that we have not actually explored. So its plausible that a green man is outside of my home monitoring me right now. Plausibility however is not a very good induction if there is something above it, which is possibility or impossibility. What I am claiming is that it is impossible for there to exist an objective morality that contradicts itself, because that which is objective does not contradict itself. Therefore anything plausible to the contrary we can imagine is a consideration to explore, but by itself unexplored can be dismissed as a serious challenge.

So, if you believe it is plausible that there is an objective morality which concludes there ought to be no existence, feel free to propose a proof of its counter where I have proposed it is impossible. But if you cannot raise it to the level of possibility or impossibility, then cogently, we can dismiss the argument as a thought that cannot be elevated enough to be a serious consideration in the argument.

Okay, we're talking past each other. — 180 Proof

No worry. Feel free to chime in any time later if it hits something you feel like exploring.

You sidestepped what I said: mentioning that both co-existing would be better doesn’t address the hypothetical I gave you. ‘What should be’ is a final consideration: it leaves out any discussion of a hierarchy of good things that never make the cut for being things which should exist. — Bob Ross

Ah, it wasn't my intention to side step the issue. Let me take a look at it again.

Let's say you can only perform one of the combinations (as performing one eliminates the possibility of performing the other): obviously, you would choose the second one (because it is more "good"). However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')".

You might be missing context as the important factor. Within the context in which both can co-exist, it is good for both to co-exist. In the context in which only one can exist, it will be a greater good for one of them to exist over the other. But this second context does not universalize that the one which will not exist wouldn't be good if they could both exist.

Lets use people. An 80 year old man is out with their 5 year old grandson. As they pass by a building, an explosion happens. The still spry grandfather can leap out of the way, but his grandson will die. If he stays, he will die, but his grandson will live.

Ideally both should be able to live. But given the situation, only one can. In the situation between the grandfather and grandchild its not that the grandfather shouldn't exist, its that the best outcome within this specific situation is that the grandfather dies protecting the grandson. A moral outcome based on a limitation does not mean that we will have the same moral outcome with that limitation removed.

In sum, the objective fact of the matter is this: 'all human beings suffer — 180 Proof

There is no question that we all suffer. You view morality as a methodology of easing human suffering and providing benefits to humanity. But that's not objective. That's just a methodology that benefits mankind. I've defined morality as, "What should be." The problem with a human centric morality is, "Why should there be humans?" If the answer is, "I want there to be," then its really a culturally subjective viewpoint for self-benefit.

The morality I'm looking at is the deeper morality that would give us an objective justification for concluding that humanity should flourish. The morality I'm asking would exist even if humans didn't. Its a morality that can be applied to animals, and even the non-conscious universe itself. It does not care about our personal benefit, or our cultural subjective viewpoints.

Correct. But how should I respond to my suffering?
Prevent or reduce your (or another's) suffering without increasing your (or another's) suffering. — 180 Proof

Why? If I can benefit while hurting another, why not? Lets say I have no emotional feelings of empathy towards other people. In fact, murdering a person gives me great happiness. Why should I listen to your morality? If I can make a billion dollars and be respected by the world while giving my employees the most minimal of human respect and decency, why shouldn't I? An objective morality cannot be based on emotions, nor can it only appeal to normal or good people.

Humans exist, there is no "why" (because every conceivable "fundamental why" begs the question). Also, "why should ... exist" conflates prescription with description which is a category error; the question is incoherent (and therefore not "fundamental"). — 180 Proof

There's no category error here at all. Going back to my start, notice I never say, "I'm proving an objective morality exists." I'm noting, "If an objective morality exists, then this is what we can rationally conclude must be an answer to the fundamental question." If you claim, "I don't believe there is an objective morality," or that there is no objective answer to whether there should or should not be something, then there's nothing else to explore. We have subjective morality, and we all take our own corner of what we think ought or ought not to be. But in entering this discussion, we are assuming there is an objective morality. And if so, the question of, "Should there be existence?" is an absolutely imperative question that must be answered to build upon anything else.

"Murdering" is not a non-zero sum resolution to conflict, which may "help" you to survive but survival is not the sufficient condition for flourishing. — 180 Proof

Why should I care whether others flourish? Why shouldn't I eliminate every other person on this Earth for peace and quiet? Again, I personally agree with flourishing as a goal, but it is nothing we objectively conclude, only emotionally conclude.

However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')".

That's not coherent to my claim. I already mentioned if both could co-exist then both should as that's more existence. The only case in which we decide one over the other is if both cannot co-exist, or we only have the capacity to choose one over the other.

Talking coherently about existence being “good” in the sense that it ‘should be’ doesn’t help: that’s talk about what you are ascribing as ‘good’, and not what ‘good’ is itself. — Bob Ross

I'm still scratching my head at this Bob. If good is "What should be", then that's what good is. If "X is good" then I am ascribing X as good. Can you give me an example of your terminology division?

This isn’t a definition of ‘good’ as a concept: ‘what should be?’ is not a concept, it is a question. — Bob Ross

Its not a question, there's no question mark! :D If I used the phrase, "This is what is", you understand that's not a question. Same here.

I'm not seeing what you're stating. Should "X" be? Then it is good.

This doesn’t explain what ‘good’ is. — Bob Ross

Right. Good = "What should be". If "X is good" then "X should be". We have the definition of what good is, and then a demonstration of something which has the attribute of being good.

‘to ought to be’ — Bob Ross

That's just an odd phrase. You can just drop the 'to' and leave it as 'ought to be' if the 'what' part of the phrasing is causing issues.
Good = ought to be
Something which is good = A specification of what ought to be"

is this the division you're looking for between good and what is ascribed as good?

If this is true, as you have stated, then your concept of 'good' is incoherent; which will not get resolved by elaborating on what you think is good. — Bob Ross

Can you drill into that more?

If I claim good is "What should be" then note, "Existence should be", then existence is good. If I go to the next step and say, "If existence is good, then more existence is better," how is that incoherent?

You are confusing an explication of the property of goodness with what can be predicated to have it. — Bob Ross

Considering good is "What should be" I'm not seeing what you're stating. Should "X" be? Then it is good. Should "Y" not be? Then it is not good. The property of goodness is something that a thing has, or it doesn't. The question of, "Why is X good?" is different from the property itself. Is that the division you're noting?

Suffering (i.e. dysfunction, loss of homeostasis, fear) happens, like life itself, is a ubiquitous, objective fact (e.g. human facticity). — 180 Proof

Correct. But how should I respond to my suffering? If I'm in constant pain, should I be on pain killers to the point that I become a blissful zombie? If I suffer in war, should I abandon my post? And this still does not answer the more fundamental: "Why should I exist to suffer at all?"

We flourish in order not to languish. Not to flourish is maladaptive. — 180 Proof

No disagreement here. But should we flourish to the point where we wipe out other species? What if in one section of the world can one person flourish 3 times as much at the cost of killing one person on the other side of the world? And the more fundamental: "Why should humanity exist to flourish at all?"

We are (often) reasonable in order to cooperate, or negotiate non-zerosum resolutions to conflict. Not to be reasonable (more often than unreasonable) is maladaptive. — 180 Proof

And what if it is reasonable that murdering the other person resolves my conflict and helps me to flourish? Lets say we have a resource, oil, that is limited and drives economies. Wouldn't it be reasonable to wipe out any competitors to oil on the other side of the world to greatly benefit the country where I live? And once again, to the more fundamental: "Why should beings with reason exist at all?"

Again, these are all nice guidelines to live a subjective moral life. But these are not objective moral answers which transcend personal benefit and self-interest. Morality is more than one's own self-interest. It sometimes asks us to suffer, die, or be 'unreasonable'. Why should I spend 18 years of my time and money raising a child I don't love? Who cares if the human race dies out after if I'm happy and flourishing? There are more fundamental questions that need to be answered.

Thus, in my understanding, evaluating the ground of all evaluations (i.e. judging the ground of all judgments) – e.g. "existence is inherently good" – seems to me viciously circular and therefore incoherent. — 180 Proof

That is fair as I have not delved deeper into it yet. I will have more time this weekend to do so.

As for "objective morality", I propose that its objective basis is nature in general and disvalues (i.e. suffering of natural beings) in particular – whatever harms, or is bad (dysfunctional, maladaptive) for, our kind (and other species) – which I summarize in this post ... — 180 Proof

While nice, I still don't see it as objective. For example, why should humans flourish? Why should humans be reasonable? All of this makes sense in a subjective self-beneficial viewpoint. But it doesn't answer anything more fundamental than this, and we all know how subjective morality ends up.

there is no such distinction between intrinsic (inherent) and extrinsic 'ought to exist". Either something ought to exist, or it shouldn't. — Bob Ross

This is true. Again, it seems I need to go into the second part where we actually measure what existence is and how we calculate it. For now as an intro, I'm not bothered by these issues. We'll see if they remain pertinent on the next drill down.

I think it would be objectively good if sentient beings existed but that’s only because I think sentience is intrinsically valuable and good. — Captain Homicide

I agree, but I believe I can objectively show this to be true as well. Just starting with this part and writing the next part after if this part seems rather clear with few objections.

I am glad to see you are more active again on the forum! I am guessing the new job has settle down a bit (: — Bob Ross

It has! I haven't had much energy to think about much else until about now.

I don't think this is internally coherent for your position: you use the term 'good' to denote things which you do not thereby concede should exist. — Bob Ross

I hesitate to go more than what is currently in the OP at this time as I am trying to focus it to be more approachable. The warning about what is to come are well appreciated, though I think it will be ok.

Let's say you can only perform one of the combinations (as performing one eliminates the possibility of performing the other): obviously, you would choose the second one (because it is more "good"). However, if you what you mean by "good" is merely "what should exist" then both combinations should exist; but it seems perfectly coherent for you to say "the first combination is good, but it should not exist because the second combination is better (i.e., 'more good')". — Bob Ross

Good as defined here is like "tree". Its describing a general concept. When we dive into more specifics, this is after directly defining what existence is, and how we can create situations that have more or less existence. Gradations still exist, because there are different combinations which result in more existential or less existential outcomes.

This of course relies on the context. If both combinations can co-exist without issue, then lets have both. But if we only have a choice of making one or the other, then that which creates more existence, is the better one. So yes, "Existence is good" at first glance does not appear to have gradations, but that's because we haven't set existence yet into a measurable quantity yet.

As an external critique, the other issue is that defining goodness in this manner eliminates many commonly accepted usages of the concept; e.g., by saying that this clock is good for telling the time, one is not at all implying that the clock should exist. — Bob Ross

I think this is fine. The same words are used within different contexts normally, and I don't think that most people will confuse the definition of good when talking about existential morality versus describing the effective and pleasing functionality of a clock. Or maybe they will and I'll have to cross that road when I get there!

Just food for thought (: — Bob Ross

It is always well cooked and appreciated!