I was clarifying what is meant by "hunger". And, rather than being sophistical, I was exposing your sophistry. When we say that someone has "the desire to eat", we recognize the generality of the supposed "object" by showing that what is actually desired is a particular type of activity, "to eat". — Metaphysician Undercover

Only in an attempt to further your argument:

Hunger is a physiological sensation or pang. The experiencing of hunger, though, does not even necessitate a person's conscious "desire to eat". Case in point: a person who is on a diet (or else fasting, such as for religious purposes) might well at times experience what is relative to the person extreme hunger ... yet the (conscious) person might nevertheless in no way intend to eat anything, thereby having no such desire.

However, when the conscious will concerned aligns, else assimilates, itself with their experienced hunger, then, and only then, will the person consciously desire to appease this physiological sensation which goads: the very appeasing of this physiological sensation then being the immediate object (or maybe better, objective) of concern. And this appeasing of the sensation as a now primary telos will then occur via a very generalized secondary telos of eating something. The specifics of what is to be eaten yet being a matter of choice between available alternatives. Only once this choice between available alternatives is made will there then be a concrete and specific object (or objective) to be realized ... this so as to satisfy the primary (consciously held) telos to all this, which is that of alleviating the underlying pangs of hunger.

As an aside, Peter Simpson has a paper related to a similar issue, "Justice, Scheffler and Cicero." — Leontiskos

I skimmed through the paper. The principal example given - that of killing one person to save five - has always been irksome to me due to its ambiguity/non-specificity: ought one kill a Mother Teresa to save five Hitlers or, else, ought one not kill one Hitler and allow five Mother Teresas to die instead? Or, as per the trolley problem, if all six are of exact same moral worth, why kill one of them to save the five instead of choosing to jump off the bridge oneself in a blaze of glory (... all lives considered being equal in moral worth and all)? But getting back to your reply ...

Also, your book looks interesting! — Leontiskos

I could deprecate it galore, but thanks for so saying.

I think the basic idea here is fairly straightforward. It is the question, "Does duress excuse?" Or, "Is one still culpable when they act under duress?" — Leontiskos

I'm thinking I didn't present the hypothetical sufficiently well. The hypothetical is strictly aiming to illustrate the possibility of a person being attributively responsible for deed X without however then being morally responsible for deed X. Here, let attributive responsibility for X be understood as "being the primary cause for X" and let moral responsibility for X be understood as "being answerable for the goodness or badness of X".

I might be wrong, but I'm thinking this definition of moral responsibility will hold in all cases.

Alternative (b) was provided so as to force the person into freely choosing of their own will between (a. i) and (a. ii) - such that the choice between (a. i) and (a. ii) is in no way constrained by threats or ultimatums (unlike the choice between (a) and (b) - which, due to being made under extreme duress, the person can be argued to not be attributively responsible for). In this second, non-coerced choice between the given wrongs, the person of their own liberty then chooses what they deem to be the lesser of two wrongs (or evils as you say), and thereby commits a relatively minor transgression of mores.

But the issue to this hypothetical, within its own context of argument, is as follows: must the person in this case then be answerable for the goodness/badness of the deed they brought about?

In other words, are they in any way morally responsible for their choice (a choice which they now are attributively responsible for)? Specifically, this for having insulted a stranger rather than having done a far worse bad/evil/wrong against this same stranger.

To either celibate or deride the individual for his choice so far to me makes little to no sense. And, if so, the person is not morally responsible for their (in this example) freely willed choice - a choice which was thereby a human act (which the OP affirms to always be a moral act).

It's not about the choice or deed being excusable due to the duress - there was no duress in the two alternatives of the second choice that was taken (there was only a necessary choice between a fixed set of alternatives, with complete liberty to choose either). It's about the individual not being answerable for the goodness or badness (depending on perspective) of the choice of insulting a stranger rather than beating them unconscious. (In contrast, were the person to choose not to insult but to instead beat the stranger unconscious, then they would be morally responsible for their choice - for, in this case, they would now be answerable for the goodness/badness of their choice.)

So the hypothetical presents a human act that, as per the OP, is a moral act, which the given agent is nevertheless not morally responsible for (this by the very definition of moral responsibility provided). A choice for which the agent is attributively responsible that is nevertheless amoral in its characteristics - here strictly meaning that it is beyond the realms of moral responsibility wherein the agent can be either praised for taking a good choice or blamed for taking a bad one.

Lots of explaining done. If you still feel that the example is not of significant interest, I'm more than willing to let this one possible counterexample go in the context of this thread.

I was not expecting to receive this level of engagement in the thread! — Leontiskos

I'm myself finding it a good means of honing my reasoning skills (or lack thereof :smile: )

For Aquinas (as for Kant) it is not permissible to lie even in this case. Here is what he says in an article entitled, "Whether every lie is a sin?":

[...]

Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x). — Aquinas, ST II-II.110.3.ad4 — Leontiskos

Myself, I so far find the idealizations of what should be which are presented in this reply contrary to "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end" which Aquinas also makes mention of. Were this due end, for example, to be that of completely obeying or else holding duty to a set of rules set up by some supreme rule-maker, this might then make sense to me. But consider this hypothetical: either one tells oneself a white lie (say, that today the appearance of one's clothes is decent when, in reality, one does not feel this to be so) or, else, all of humanity perishes (one can affix whatever daemon scenario on pleases to this). If the end pursued is absolute obedience/duty to the rule-maker's rule that one does not ever lie, then it might be correct, or right, to destroy all of humanity by not lying. Yet - not only does this intuitively seem very wrong - but, in changing the end one directs one's actions toward to that of, say, maximal eudemonia, it would then necessarily be rationally incorrect, or worng, to do so as well.

As I believe this illustrated, the issue pivots on what one's ultimate goal is - via which one's current best choices are teleologically determined, and via which one can rationally appraise the rightness or wrongness of one's actions. To this effect:

Would you object to my characterizing your view as (a robust form of) consequentialism? — Leontiskos

This is not an easy question for me to answer. But I'll try. My own views on morality are thoroughly teleological. And, in so deeming, find that this outlook can well be concluded an emphatically complex form of consequentialism just as readily as it can be concluded a form of deontology (wherein one holds a duty to best approximate or else actualize that ultimate long-term goal which is itself of pure intrinsic value). For example, for Kant, this ultimate goal one ought to dutifully pursue to the best of one's ability is the Kingdom of Ends - wherein at least every human is deemed of intrinsic value and never viewed as instrumentally valuable for the benefit of any one human or cohort of these. Maybe I could also point out that, absent any such goal, deontological duty loses meaning (other than, again, duty to obey some other psyche's already made rules ... yet such latter obedience too holds an at least implicit goal in mind, such as that of being rewarded rather than punished by the rule-maker).

That said, any system of consequentialism that does not look upon such literally ultimate long-term goal but, instead, focuses one merely intermediate goals will, to me, necessarily be less than moral. One here deems eating candy a good due to the intermediate goal of satisfying one's sweet-tooth despite so doing leading to tooth decay and the loss of one's teeth ... sort of mindset. And I don't find that typical utilitarianism holds any such ultimate long-term goal in mind - just a generalized heuristic that might or might not eventually lead to such goal (depending on its interpretation and administration).

Perhaps one of the most fruitful entry points is linguistic. First, to nitpick a bit, is the bolded an accurate depiction of your view? "Good and thereby moral"? — Leontiskos

Yes, language is important, and I was clumsy in how I applied it. To try to better explain, an important synonym for good is "beneficial", which can be interpreted as being of proper fit. One then can further interpret good as that which is of proper fit to one's goal, or telos. There are always different teloi we actively hold at the same time: some proximate, some distal, some intermediate (and, in my own musing, as per what I mentioned above, one's ultimate telos, which I shall here address as "the Good"). That which fits the Good is always good/right in an ultimate sense. That which is antithetical to the Good is then always bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. Then, if one's actively held ultimate goal "X" is antithetical to the Good, one's intentions will always be bad/wrong in an ultimate sense. This even if, to further approach or actualize goal X, one needs to engage in acts that are of themselves a proper fit to the Good. Example: one wants to sadistically destroy humanity at large but finds that in order to do so one needs to rescue an innocent baby from drowning; one than is compelled to save the baby from drowning (something one would not have otherwise done) in order to destroy humanity and then so proceeds to do. The deed of saving the baby is good, for it of itself as deed is fit to the Good, but the intentions with which this deed is done are bad, for as intentions they are of proper fit to goal X. Otherwise expressed, the saving of the baby does not hold intrinsic value to the saver or the baby - as it would for anyone whose ultimate telos is the Good - but, instead, is strictly of instrumental value in allowing for goal X. In brief, the deed of a saved baby is of itself moral but the intention with which it was saved is immoral.

What's philosophically interesting here is that, according to your position, it would seem that a bad end/goal vitiates a good deed, but a bad deed does not vitiate a good end/goal. — Leontiskos

I would most definitely not express things as they are in the boldfaced text. Rather, I'd say that a good end/goal vitiates those bad deeds mandatory for [edit: one's optimal proximity - given all contexts and available alternatives - to] the good end's/goal's actualization [edit: for the given good end might not be at all actualizable via these very same bad deeds, this despite these bad deeds being mandatory for one's optimal proximity to the good end, all things considered ... with an example of this provided below as pertains to Ukraine's engaging in war]. To me it makes for a world of difference. My beating some complete stranger to a pulp strictly out of the pleasure to do so directly estranges my from the Good. However, where I to be aiming to remain optimally aligned to the Good, and were a horrendous attack on an innocent to occur right in front of me, my then beating to a pulp the assailant so as to prevent the innocent's death (were I to be so capable of doing and were this to somehow be the only viable alternative to take) would be vitiated as an intentionally performed bad/evil/wrong. Here, (were I to be so capable) I would be proud of risking my own life to save the innocent despite the violence I willfully engaged in - and would feel very deep shame and guilt, i.e. profound culpability, where I to do nothing while the innocent died right before me with me doing nothing about it (though, in the latter case, I would not have engaged in any violence myself).

I know things can get more complex, but maybe this serves as good enough explanation?

In other words to advise X such that X non-hypothetically ought to be done is incompatible with X being wrong. Hence the commonly accepted idea that the end will "color" the means (e.g. If Y is necessary, and X is necessary in order to achieve Y, then X becomes necessary). What do you think of this? — Leontiskos

You are right, it's not easy to phrase these disparate notions of wrongness in common speech. But to try to clarify my position: X is not a wrong (an incorrect or else unfit) course of action to take as a necessary means of achieving Y which is itself optimally fitting to an eventual achieving of the ultimate good goal Z - this even though, in direct respect to ultimate good Z, X can only be ascertained as ultimately being a wrong (this because it does not allow for the ultimate achievement of Z). More concretely, let Z = Kant's Kingdom of Ends; Ukraine's engaging in war against an unjustly invading Russia is then something that cannot of itself directly achieve a Kingdom of Ends and, so, is a wrong in this ultimate sense (I do have trouble calling Ukraine's war of self-deference an evil, though, even when termed a "lesser evil"); nevertheless, Ukraine's engaging in war is necessary to achieve Ukraine's maintaining of autonomy, which is itself optimally aligned to an eventual Kingdom of Ends. As regards common speech: although we all know that war is ultimately bad, it is good for Ukraine to engage in war against an unjust invader rather then allowing itself to be decimated by not engaging in such war.


I'll reply to the second post later on.

Just wanted to say I'm in agreement with what you've expressed. ...Including your accolades regarding @Count Timothy von Icarus's posts. :up:

Here is a hypothetical wherein the choice made is concluded to be amoral (this strictly in the sense of being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy) despite a) the available alternatives not being of equal moral import, b) being an act of consciously made volition and, thereby, a human act, c) being a non-hypothetical ought-judgement and, hence, per the OP, a moral act, and, to top things of, d) the choice taken being a known wrong a priori.

It's an excerpt from something I've already written regarding our free will. (If the moderators disagree with my posting this, or else with my providing a link in the quote for possible context, please inform me and I will delete the post and/or link.)

For reasons just given, I find this example to be pertinent to the thread/OP. And I would greatly appreciate any criticism you might have of its conclusion or contents.

Consider, for example, the following hypothetical—wherein shall be held that it is a moral wrong to insult a stranger:

I am the summoned subject of a tyrannical and mad king who, simply for his own amusement, informs me upon my arrival to his citadel that a) either i) I insult a greatly starved, and thereby physically weakened, stranger that also stands before the king in my presence or ii) I beat this same starved stranger until the stranger becomes unconscious or, else, b) the king will insure that everyone I’ve grown close to will be brutally raped and tortured till they die. Granting that I have no reason to doubt the veracity of the king’s imposition, my first-order choice between alternative (a) and alternative (b) might be considered so coercive as to virtually grant me no choice [...] whatsoever, allowing me only one viable option: that of choosing alternative (a). In then granting this, I nevertheless am in no way coerced in my choosing between alternative (a. i) and (a. ii)—for, other than a potential harm to my conscience, neither alternative possess any significant negative repercussions to my personhood—and I happen to be capable of successfully implementing either alternative. I, in being indifferent to which alternative I presume would please this mad king most, then freely choose what I take to be the lesser of the two wrongs—and I thereby proceed to insult the stranger.

Given my alternatives, do I or others then find me culpable for the wrong of having insulted this stranger in front of the king?

While the answer to this question will be contingent on numerous variables (such as, for example, the given stranger’s, and others, degree of empathy for the conundrum into which I was placed through no fault of my own), it is fair to presume that everyone (including the stranger) will be aware that at least the second-order choice I made was freely made by me, was thereby an outcome I intentionally brought about, and, hence, was an outcome I am attributively responsible for. Furthermore, given that I have a generally goodhearted nature, it is also likely fair to presume that everyone (including the given stranger) will nevertheless neither find me blameworthy for my resulting transgression nor praiseworthy for so choosing it over its alternative (considering this outcome the only decent option to be had given the circumstances I was in).

If so, this case illustrates how an [ego or I-ness; i.e., the first person point of view] which is attributively responsible for an outcome commonly deemed a moral wrong—that of insulting a perfect stranger—might neither be blameworthy nor praiseworthy for said outcome, and, hence, how this [ego] might not be morally responsible for an outcome it is nevertheless attributively responsible for. — www.anenquiry.info / Chapter 11: Validating Our Free Will / Section 11.3.2.

Fingers crossed. If this example holds, as I believe it does, it then illustrates how one could have a human act of conscious choice making which, as per the OP, can be defined as a moral act (for it involved non-hypothetical ought-judgements) that is nevertheless amoral in so far as being neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy. And, furthermore, this amoral quality of the act is upheld despite the committed wrong of insulting a perfect stranger.

First off, thanks for the thoughtful reply. Your views are much appreciated.

So according to your earlier statement which I quoted* (and assuming we have no other choice), the act would be amoral. Here it seems like you want to say that it is simultaneously amoral and wrong. Or perhaps more accurately, the act would be amoral and yet in so acting we would be "committing a wrong." There is thus an interesting way in which immorality and wrongness are separating. — Leontiskos

Ah, well said. Yes, I find there is distinction to be made between immorality and wrongness. I will be later posting an example that I find far more pertinent to the topic but, in general: there are actions which even the most mildly moral folk know to be wrongs. Telling lies and engaging in violence as just two examples. Especially from the viewpoint of what can be termed "the Good", these will always be wrongs in an ultimate sense. Notwithstanding, given the myriad complexities of life, there will be times when engaging in these very wrongs in the short-term will be necessary for optimizing that which is right, or good, in the long term. As one example, were a WWII Nazi to knock at the door to inquire as to whether there is a Jew in your house (granting that the latter would be greatly harmed unjustly by the former via the telling of truths, and that there are Jews in the house), here it will be right/good to lie to the Nazi - thereby resulting in the moral praiseworthiness of having committed what in ultimate analysis is a wrong in the short-term (telling a lie) so as to avert a far greater wrong in the long-term (unjust injury or even death befalling innocent people). The same can be said with physical violence undertaken in self-defense against an unjustly aggressive assailant. Or even in the act of partaking in a just war as a soldier.

Due to life's complexities, in these and like examples we in my view then act morally by engaging in lesser wrongs for the sake of preventing greater wrongs (given caveats such as that no other viable alternative in preventing the greater wrong is available to us).

Because of this, I do deem that on occasion being moral or else immoral is separate from the committing of wrongs. One can likewise appraise someone who does something good and thereby moral due to intentions that are ultimately evil - in so far as having been committed so as to result in the realization of an evil long-term goal. Here, given the overall situation, doing a right/good act can well be nevertheless appraised as immoral (as one possible example, such as when a liar reinforces their nefarious lies via the telling of truths in what is often enough termed "spin").

For Aquinas the moral decision of which foot to begin walking with is, I think, not a human act. This is because there are no rational criteria upon which to deliberate. Because the reason has nothing to act on, therefore it cannot be an act that flows from reason. The act could only become rational (and moral) if perchance the agent fastened upon some aspect that could support rational deliberation. — Leontiskos

In having thought about this, it yet seems to me that, in order for a human to consciously discern that there are no moral differences in the two alternatives available, the human must necessarily to some extent deliberate between the two alternatives - thereby consciously judge and weigh their differences and differing consequences via their reasoning faculties. So doing will itself be a consciously rational act. So, I presently believe that the very act of consciously discerning that the two alternatives have equal moral import can only be a human act - for it requires conscious rationality. Once this active deliberation between the alternatives arrives at the conclusion that the available alternatives are of equal moral import, then ... I'm thinking one could still make a reason-based conscious choice as to which alternative to act on (for example, choosing to start with the right foot with the aim of maintaining consistency were this scenario to ever befall again - thereby keeping the harm to a minimum (I know this is iffy, but its the best I've got at the moment)) or, else, one might at this juncture simply allow one's strongest unconscious impulse to precipitate a first step with whichever leg it might be - or else abide by the flipping of a coin. If the first, it would then still be a reason based conscious act. If the latter, then not.

All the same, in terms of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness, the individual's act would be beyond either. Given no other available alternative to choose from, in this sense alone the person's act of walking would then be amoral - despite resulting in an equal wrong regardless of alternative acted on. Yet the discernment of the act so being (both on the part of the individual or any onlooker) would then be fully rational - for the individual here was not negligent; he/she took to time to deliberate the situation so as to arrive at the rational discernment of being forced to commit an equal wrong regardless of what is chosen.

I'm hoping my reasoning here is explained well enough. In short, I yet see it as a human act (i.e. a rationally conscious act of volition) on grounds that the person reasoned the equivalency of the two alternatives - thereby deciding that there is no best and worst alternative to choose between. The person then in one way or another acts in accordance to this deliberation-resultant reasoned conclusion.

But do let me know if you find fault with this.

Here is a related quote from Aquinas:

And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. — Leontiskos

Nice quote! To me, again, the individual, in judging the merits of the two alternatives via deliberation, arrives at the conclusion that there isn't a more moral alternative to take via the use of "deliberate reason ... directed to the due end [of minimizing harm / maximizing eudemonia]" - and their action will then be accordant to this very deliberate reason directed to the due end. It just so happens that, on these very same grounds, the conclusion is that there is no alternative which is better/worse than the other. So, due to their faculty of conscious reasoning, they then know that they have no choice but to necessarily commit an identical wrong irrespective of which available alternative they choose. And, because in this hypothetical they must choose among one of the two alternatives, their either consciously made or else unconsciously resultant choice is then neither in any way blameworthy nor praiseworthy.

Ha - very interesting! Aquinas follows Augustine, and for Augustine evil is a privation of what ought to be, which dovetails nicely with some of this. Further, as you may have noticed from the above, for Aquinas irrationality and immorality are closely related. — Leontiskos

Precisely! :up: :smile: Nice to see your evaluation of it.

I'll post the initially mentioned hypothetical I have in mind separately, this just in case the moderators might want me to delete it.

Concepts are crucial to cognition and to understanding of that perceived, but are in themselves extra-empirical. — javra

And still contain no information which is beyond observable reality. — Vera Mont

Humans throughout history have conceived of many different possible worlds. Not all these possible worlds which exist among humans as concepts are within the boundaries of observable reality. For one example of this, the monads of Leibniz’s monadology are non-observable. Yet the concept of monadology still holds (non-observable) information.

will necessarily exclude many if not most elements which the concept itself encompasses.

This, I understand not at all. — Vera Mont

Perceptually focus on any exemplar of animal. Once this exemplar is visualized (or heard, smelled, touched, etc.) either via the imagination or otherwise, it will exclude all other possible exemplars of animal which the concept of “animal” by its very definition encompasses. For example, if the visualized exemplar of “animal” is a bird, this will exclude all dolphins, all insects, all reptiles, etc. Because of this, the concept of animal is itself non-observable, for it includes all individual exemplars of the concept that can be individually observed all at once. And such a thing cannot be seen, nor heard, nor smelled, etc.

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EDIT: p.s., The same non-observability will apply to all concepts, even those that are far more specific. For example, the concept of a “red apple” will by its very delineation include all possible hews of red, all apple shapes and sizes, and all apple species (which can be in any way any shade of red) all at once—thereby making the concept of “red apple” non-observable when one gets into the nitty-gritty. And any given visualization of a red apple we might find ourselves holding will, then, necessarily exclude all the other possible exemplars of a red apple which the concept necessarily encompasses.

To emphasize: when I previously mentioned that we think and understand perceptions via concepts, but that concepts are in themselves extra-empirical (else non-observable), it is this analysis of concepts that I held in mind. Controversial though I know this can be.

my asking what information is there in the extra-empirical? — Vera Mont

Concepts are crucial to cognition and to understanding of that perceived, but are in themselves extra-empirical. One for example does not perceive the concepts of "animal" or of "world" or of "number" but simply understands them - this when perceiving signs, for example - and any perception we might have of an animal or a world or a number (be it of the imagination or not) will necessarily exclude many if not most elements which the concept itself encompasses.

Nice exposition of Zeno!

Abstract space (as opposed to physical space) cannot be discrete because any minimum unit you propose can be halved. — keystone

[...]

The discreteness that ↪Metaphysician Undercover
↪Michael
are looking for is not in space but in measurement/observation. — keystone

Yes, I’m in agreement with you as to the non-discreteness of space.

Good thoughts! Suppose an evil genius (or maybe an evil non-genius :sweat:) rigs up a scenario where he will murder one of two people given a decision you make. As you are standing still, he tells you, "If you begin walking with your left foot I will kill person A, and if you begin walking with your right foot I will kill person B." You know nothing about either person beyond these simple facts. According to your argument, "because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral."

What are your thoughts about this? I don't think this alternative scenario necessarily undermines your reasoning, but I am curious what you would say. — Leontiskos

Thanks!

Tricky counterexample. My current best thoughts:

Unless the individual will then walk with the explicit intention (and pleasure) of killing some stranger, I wouldn’t term it “murder”. All the same, in this scenario, unlike the first, irrespective of which choice we make we know that we will be committing a wrong beforehand. This will then be a crucial difference.

Because we are committing a wrong, we then will most likely not walk without care but, instead, search for additional alternatives prior to walking: maybe choosing to skip on two legs to where we need to go, or maybe choosing to not move but debate with the evil genius/daemon in hopes of tricking it into stopping its imposition.

If, however, no other conceivable choice were to be available, then we’d literally have no choice but to knowingly commit the wrong of killing some unfortunate stranger via our actions. In which case, because a) we hold no choice in the matter of so doing despite the two alternatives available to us and b) the two alternatives are morally identical in impact to the best of our knowledge—were we to not then so step with the explicit intent and pleasure of killing a stranger—I’d then conclude that our walking either via a first left step or a first right step would be amoral. We would be attributively responsible for (i.e., we’d be a/the primary cause for) the killing of a stranger but we’d not be morally responsible for it (EDIT: here meaning in any way either blameworthy of praiseworthy for the action taken and its consequence).

To me this so far makes ethical sense.

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Apropos, as to the evil genius being not so genius: It is interesting to me that in Romanian there are two adjectives for the English word “bad” (with no adjective for “evil”); one is rău, which can just as well mean either “sick” or “mean spirited”; the second is prost, which can just as well mean “stupid” or “idiotic”. (The only relatively close proximity to the term “evil” is the noun form of rău, but, again, it doesn't occur as an adjective). Which when literally translated into English to me at least presents the connotative understanding that the property of badness could be interpreted as “the stupidity of being mean spirited and, thereby, psychologically sick”. Your expression somehow reminded me of this. :grin: Though, of course, so understood the concept can only apply to agents.

I think this may be a helpful way to reframe my debate with Bob Ross. — Leontiskos

I neglected to give @Bob Ross a mention in my previous post, but yes, the primary focus was the debate between the two of you.

On second thought, scratch the example I just gave of Achilles and the tortoise in finite quanta of space. While I still see deeper problems with such interpretation of motion, I've realized it can be addressed mathematically via ratios - and I don't want to get into debates regarding the nature of time and space. It was a case of me talking before thinking. I won't delete my previous post, though.

If movement is continuous then an object in motion passes through every 1nm marker in sequential order, but there is no first 1nm marker, so this is a contradiction. — Michael

To the best of my understanding, not within process philosophy.

I’ll first try to better explain my own current stance:

It's the the very marker you address that I take to be the conceptual measurement imposed: In process theory, there is no beginning nor any permanent thinghood, only continuous becoming. Like with quantum mechanics, wherein everything is a wave till measured. Whenever we measure, we quantify (and vice versa): one given, quantitative parts of that one given, multiple whole givens, and so forth. But the movement of whatever we quantify remains purely continuous, wave-like in this very limited sense.

We thereby quantify there being one arrow that is being projected. Likewise we quantify there being one target it is going to penetrate. Yet, as per process theory, both are otherwise merely processes of becoming themselves, that are forever in flux in manners devoid of any absolute beginning. We furthermore empirically know (this by imposing measurement/quantity) when the quantified arrow first starts its motion toward the target, we know that if travels through air via certain placements in space, and that it eventually hits the target whereupon the arrow stops its motion. But when we then try to quantify this very (here, by analogy, wave like) process of the arrows motion what we end up with are quanta of space that appear to be infinite in number. These, in turn, then facilitate Zeno’s paradox of the arrow.

I don’t know how to address this properly with the arrow paradox, so I’ll use Achillies and the tortoise instead:

Here suppose motion occurring in a finitely divisible (hence quantized) space. For the sake of argument, say this finitely divisible space from point A to point B has only ten divisions. The tortoise is at the fifth division of this space while Achilles is at the second division of this space—both moving toward the tenth division of space. How would conceiving of space in such finitely quantized manner change Zeno’s paradox so as to allow Achilles to catch up to the tortoise?

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I so far can’t apprehend a coherent way demonstrating logically (non-empirically) that Achillies can catch up with the tortoise in such a scenario.

And this because at the very least physical motion (if not also any psychological change) seems to me to be completely continuous in its ontological nature. This again, as per core concepts of process theory. A continuous change which we measure/quantize and thereby impose upon the notion of fixed beginnings and fixed thinghood—which, in an ontology of flux, don’t in fact occur.

I acknowledge this train of thought deviates from the thread’s intent. But, to cut things short, I don’t yet understand how a finite quantization of space or of motion is interpreted as resolving Zeno’s paradoxes (as per my example above)—this given what we empirically know to be (Achilles can catch up with the tortoise).

The solution, similar to my proposed solution above, is that movement is not infinitely divisible (either because space is discrete or because movement within continuous space is discrete). — Michael

I'm not yet comprehending this to my liking. To my current understanding, an infinite series is the very thing which makes something otherwise perfectly continuous discrete. It's, for one example, the difference between a perfect circle and an apeirogon with equal sides: the first is perfectly continuous, the second discrete.

Due to this, I've so far always assumed the resolution to Zeno's paradoxes is that movement is not infinitely divisible precisely because it is perfectly continuous while it occurs. Such that it's our imposed conceptualizations of measurement upon an otherwise immeasurable process which makes Zeno's paradoxes possible.

Either way, one ought not use the same brush. — Fooloso4

Funny, I previously assumed that to be self-explanatory. But now that you've pointed that out, yes, sure, of course.

You could, of course, expand the moral sphere by eliminating space for such amoral acts and judgements, but they could never be fully eliminated, I think. — ToothyMaw

Here's a concrete example that might help out: In one's morning routine, ought one brush one's teeth before brushing one's hair or, otherwise, brush one's hair before brushing one's teeth? Whichever alternative one chooses, the action one will engage in will in this example be a fully conscious volitional act (in contrast, for example, to haphazardly touching one's beard in unthinking manners). Yet, because there is no discernible morally best alternative - for both alternatives are to be deemed equally good or bad - irrespective of the choice made the volitional act can nevertheless be deemed amoral.

Nice thread and OP!

The difference lies in whether their cause is a responsible agent—something that can be held responsible for producing the evil effect. — Leontiskos

Nah, I don't think I have conflated this once in the entire thread. For traditional language-users "moral" has only two basic meanings, and both are closely related: 1) capable of moral or immoral acts, and 2) moral or immoral (and in both of these cases the term "moral" is meant in the sense of praiseworthy or morally good). This is standard language, where a cause can be named according to its effect (see, for example, my "corollary" above). — Leontiskos

I myself find the issue of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness to basically reduce down to the issue of causation—as in, what cause is to blame/praise for a given effect/consequence.

I first want to mention that, as with all others, the English language has its own idiosyncrasies via which possible conceptualizations find themselves limited to certain linguistic expressions. There is no one word in the English language with addresses this generalized state of blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in impartial manners. I think the closest English comes to it is in the word “responsibility”—this in the strict sense of being the primary cause for an effect/consequence (rather than, for example, in the sense of being accountable, or answerable, for an effect/consequence). As is also the case with at least the Romanian language (which I also speak fluently), existent words also overwhelmingly tend to emphasize the wrongness of effects/consequences: e.g., what or who is at fault for, what or who is to blame for, or culpable for, etc.

That said, when considering the goodness or badness of an effect or else consequence—via what I will here specify as “responsibility for” in the strict sense just mentioned of being the primary cause—the responsible cause can either be in any way accountable, or answerable, for the given effect or not. If the primary cause is deemed answerable for its responsibility in having brought about the effect, then we likewise deem the same given cause’s future effects to be alterable (or else reinforceable) via rewards or punishments. This first broad category of cause-types then subsumes that category the thread addresses as moral evils.

Other primary causes which we deem incapable of being in any way answerable for their responsibility in having brought about a certain effect, we then deem fully unalterable via the (yet possible) administration of rewards or punishments—with tornadoes being one example of such latter types of causes. In this second generalized category of cause-types we then place all natural evils. Here, though the wind is responsible for the tree’s leaves movements, we neither blame nor praise the wind in an attempt to either alter or reinforce its doings (this because the wind as primary cause is incapable of in any way answering, or taking responsibility, for what it does).

This outlook I then find can be itself reduced to a dichotomy between (a) agent-caused effects (with individual agents being, as I believe you’ve previously mentioned, in at least some ways causa sui originators of the effects they willfully produce) and b) effects caused by non-agential causes (which are then basically deemed fully deterministic in their nature). [edit: just as I take your own arguments to generally be]

For one example, while people will blame and praise their dog’s doings with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) their dog’s behaviors, tmk most will not blame or praise an AI’s doings in their interactions with the AI program with the intention of altering (else reinforcing) the AI program’s behaviors. The first is deemed an agent whereas the second is not. (If dogs are too controversial in terms of moral doings, then one can just as well replace their example with the example of fellow humans.)

Not sure if this is of significant benefit to the discussion, but to me at least it does serve to further illustrate the divide between moral evils and natural evils.

:blush: Cheers!

But he seems completely unaware that his polemics, as distinct from his science writing, are aimed at methodically destroying any idea of there being a higher purpose or higher life. — Wayfarer

Having read much, if not most, of Darwin’s works, I judge that just as Darwin was opposed to the notion of what become known as Social Darwinism, he would have also been staunchly opposed to the notion of the selfish gene. I’ve mentioned this before on the forum: there are very well argued (both empirically and rationally) opposing views, with The Genial Gene being one such example.

As to “a higher purpose or higher life”—to fan the flames a bit—we all live by this credo as undoubtedly as we all know in our heart of hearts that solipsism is frigging joke (if it even warrants laughing at). All evolutionary biologists know that, when objectively addressed, all life without exception is equally evolved from predecessors. But no evolutionary biologist thereby holds that the eating of lesser lifeforms somehow equates to a form of cannibalism, or that the killing of weeds equates to the killing of humans. We all (sanely speaking) know that the value of a human life far exceeds the value of chickens’ life, to not even mention that of grass as a lifeform. We all sanely know that humans are more evolved than chickens, which are more evolved than weeds or grass. And we thereby hold more compassion for chickens than we hold for grass. Yet, unlike in the first sense of evolution wherein all coexisting life’s intrinsic value is identical, in the second here mentioned sense of evolution—wherein some lifeforms are more evolved than others—we as a sapient species appraise the value of a chicken’s life to be of greater worth than that of a weed’s. Not because we dislike weeds per se, but because we recognize that the chicken’s degree of awareness is far more advanced than that of the weed’s. This second sense of evolution—without which we might starve to death or else might become more depraved than any lesser lifeform has ever been—directly speaks of an evolution toward greater sapience.

This evolution toward greater sapience, then, to me directly speaks of the “chain of being” you are making mention of. Something we, again, innately acknowledge in our day to day living of life but which physicalism/materialism cannot easily, if at all, account for—other than, maybe, by the proclaiming of absolute relativity when it comes to values … the very same values by which physicalism/materialism is upheld … making the physicalist’s position sort’a self-defeating. Something like the notion of "the Good", on the other hand, can account for this very type of evolution toward greater sapience.

Science has no inherent moral orientation, it is concerned with facts, not oughts (as per Hume and the is/ought division.) — Wayfarer

Here addressing pure empirical science--rather than scientism: I find that science and scientists in general are at times voraciously interested in discovering the ever-truer nature of reality and that, just as with the best of philosophy and philosophers, this interest is deemed to be a good in itself, i.e. of intrinsic value. As such, it is not facts per se that are of concern but greater and deeper understanding regarding the nature of reality, maybe ultimately of being itself ... which to me again speaks to an evolution toward greater sapience, this via desire to so become.

Wolves and groundhogs have rules of behaviour - they just don't make a big verbose fuss about it: if somebody misbehaves, they snarl or snap at him; they don't put him on the rack or cut out his tongue. — Vera Mont

Right! They're not moral, nor immoral. — Wayfarer

I'll try no to belabor this issue much. We humans are on average far more familiar with domesticated animals than with wild ones. As such, anyone who has had a dog will know that dogs give good enough indications of experiencing shame and guilt at things they know they ought not have done (according to their owners). And some dogs have been known to be quite altruistic. This isn't any proof of lesser animals having some awareness of right and wrong (and, hence, a far less evolved sense of moral judgment by comparison to the average human) ... but then, neither is there any definitive proof of lesser animals being anything else but automata. :wink:

Looks like misrepresentation to me. Citations? — wonderer1

“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” Daniel Dennett said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?”

Examples could be multiplied indefinitely. — Wayfarer

Yes, per Dawkins, chickens are literally nothing more than an egg’s way of replicating itself. Hence, all phenotypes (both physical and psychological) are utterly unimportant biologically other than for their capacity to replicate genotypes—more specifically, the immortal selfish genes from which genotypes are constituted.

And this, then, seems to me too to essentially result in an exceedingly biased valuing of the four “Fs” addressed in terms of biology. Which, btw, I often hear echoed in many a layperson who proclaims that the sole purpose to human sexual intercourse can only be that of reproduction (to me utter BS, but this would be a different topic).

That said, it is however to be acknowledged that Dawkins also tells us:

“We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

… Which to me, sure as the earth I walk on, directly entails there occurring some form of Cartesian dualism between biology and the biology-resultant human … ego(?). This being something that no monist would accept.

-------

Personally, while I fully acknowledge the exceedingly large gulf between humanity and all other, hence, “lesser” lifeforms, biological evolution necessitates that all life is constituted of the same stuff but in different ways and in different measures (here specifically thinking of humans' capacity for sapience)—this irrespective of whether this stuff of life is understood to be in any way spiritual (such as Buddhism and Hinduism can, for example, uphold) or else strictly material. Hence, if our highly evolved consciousness is contingent on the workings of our complex CNS, then animals with less complex CNSs would necessarily be endowed with less evolved forms of consciousness. … For example, such that dogs are more sapient than are ants.

Doesn't the effectiveness of classical computers contradict your perspective? — keystone

To be laconic about things: no. But then many an ontological perspective would need to be addressed to back this up - perspectives that would amount either to an objective idealism or, else interpreted, to a neutral monism.

As it is, as previously attempted, I'll try to bow out of this thread's discussion. But it was good discussing with you.

The real question isn't whether quantum mechanics is fictional (an idea that seems absurd), but rather if quantum mechanics employs the infinite-rooted objects themselves or merely the finite descriptions of — keystone

Interesting perspective! My own slant is that in physical reality there can be no absolutely integral physical being as is symbolized by the number one/1 when the issue is addressed more objectively: all individual objects are integral physical things only in relativistic terms, always permeated (by quanta, for one example) and hence entwined with what (we perceive and conceive to be) other and always in flux. Hence, our very understanding of mathematics in full is grounded in conceptual idealizations, rather than physical realities - starting with the idealizations of 0 and 1.

As regards infinities, if you happen to not be familiar with them, you may get a kick out of surreal numbers. They incorporate both infinite and infinitesimal numbers as well as real numbers. (While I'm no mathematician that can properly describe or implement them in mathematical formulations, surreal numbers have always held a rather aesthetic appeal to me.)

[...] it could just as easily have been described purely as a mathematical problem within the realm of abstract mathematical thought. Indeed, when you questioned the feasibility of constructing such a die, it seemed you were addressing the narrative element of the paradox, leaving the core mathematical issue untouched. — keystone

Well, the issue to me was and remains the conflux of pure mathematical thought and empirical reality. There often (although not always) is no tidy cohesion between the two—as exemplified by an infinite-sided die whose individual sides need to be looked at to be discerned. One can simplify the very same issue by addressing the purely mathematical concept of a perfect circle and its nonexistence in empirical reality.

As an aside, I am aware that without the concept of a perfect circle no such thing as quantum mechanics could obtain, for the latter’s uncertainty principle is necessarily dependent on pi, which can only obtain in a perfect circle (that, again, can only be non-empirical). But the basic discrepancy between pure mathematical thought of a perfect circle and its nonexistence in physical, empirical reality remains. This and related subjects, btw, being why I’m on the fence regarding purely mathematical objects of thought being of themselves existents: e.g., if a perfect circle does not exist, then this directly entails that so too is quantum mechanics a fiction … and, yet, QM works rather well to explain what physically, and hence empirically, is. I acknowledge this is a deviation from Cantor, but to me it speaks to the same issue: the relation, if any, between pure mathematics and the empirically perceivable physical world.

Cool. Thanks.

If you believe that infinite sets cannot exist, then I am preaching to the choir. — keystone

Just to be clear: when it comes to the realm of pure mathematical thought, I can see it both ways and so remain on the fence; but when it comes to empirical reality as in the form of a die, a member of the just stated choir I am. :grin:

Interesting way of expressing the issue, btw.

All that's left is a little divine magic to ensure it rolls fairly, and extraordinary vision for the players to discern the minuscule markings on those higher rolls. — keystone

In that case, I’ll let this thread be. But I confess, to me, this conflux of mathematical thought with “magic” and “extraordinary vision” not bound by empirical sight so far equates to the question of: What defined result obtains when one divides three and a quarter invisible unicorns by zero? Just saying.

Is this truly a paradox? If not, why not? [...] This scenario seems to indicate a problem with the concept of an infinite-sided die, possibly even suggesting that such a die cannot exist. What are your thoughts? — keystone

Just as a polygon with infinite sides of equal length would be empirically indiscernible form a perfect circle—this irrespective of how close one observes it, say with a quantum microscope—so too would a die with infinite sides of equal length be empirically indiscernible from a perfect sphere, even when analyzed with a quantum microscope.

Hence, having the numeral “42”, or any other, viewable on any one of the die's infinite sides would be a logical impossibility considering the nature of empirical reality—an empirical reality which both the serpent and Adam utilize to look at the die.

So no, no paradox.

OK. Thanks again.

Right. What you say could make sense to me, as in the two truths are not separate in the world as is but are instead maybe even indiscernibly entwined. But they nevertheless remain two truths or else only one. I'll rephrase things this way:

If Nirvana without remainder (also termed parinirvana) is something that can be obtained, I so far take it to be the obtainment of ultimate reality/truth sans any remainder of conventional reality/truth. I'm currently thinking this is about right - but correct me if I'm wrong. But what you've previously stated implies that upon its obtainment the conventional truth of phenomena (such as of phenomena-dependent pains and pleasures together the our apprehension of selfhood) will also persist in this state of ultimate being - for the two truths were roughly stated to be one and the same. Yet, as expressed, I can currently only presume this to be wrong, for it is contrary to what Nirvana without remainder is described to be. From my readings at least.

Yes, the two truths are understood to be intimately entwined - but if they are not two truths all the same, then Nirvana without remainder could not be obtained within Buddhist doctrines.

... saying this as someone who's enlightened in comparison to ants and such but not enlightened in comparison to many a wiser being (supernal deities/Buddhas included, if such were to occur). :razz:

Thanks for the feedback. I find myself agreeing with much of what you state, but do find currently grave difficulties with what I boldface here:

In the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna, there is 'the doctrine of two truths', the domain of conventional reality, Saṃvṛtisatya, in which all sentient beings are situated, but then the domain of ultimate reality, Paramārthasatya which is the higher truth perceived by the Buddhas. But part of this doctrine is that (1) these are not ultimately two — Wayfarer

There of course are multiple interpretations of the original Buddha's teaching, and various interpretations of the many Buddhist works that followed. But - again, this via a typical Western mindset interested in the reasoning rather than any poetic appeal - the affirmation that there is an ultimate reality and a conventional reality which from the vantage of ultimate reality are one and the same reality can be fairly easily interpreted as a logical contradiction (from the vantage of ultimate reality, at the same time and in the same respect there both a) are two realities and b) there are no two realities but only one). If it is and if this contradiction is to be assumed true, then dialetheism is be accepted as valid. This being something I'm in no way in favor of.

Not sure where you stand in this respect, but if you have further clarification of this one part of the doctrine here addressed, it would be greatly appreciated.

You might find this a useful resource: Nonduality, David Loy, a .pdf copy of his book by that name, based on his PhD. — Wayfarer

Thanks for the reference. I’ll add it to my library. Though I’ve yet to read the entire work, to quote from page 17:

The following types of nonduality are discussed here: the negation of dualistic thinking, the nonplurality of the world, and the non-difference of subject and object. In subsequent chapters, our attention focuses primarily on the last of these three, although there will be occasion to consider two other nondualities which are also closely related: first, what has been called the identity of phenomenon and Absolute, of the Mahayana equation of samsara and nirvana, which can also be expressed as “the nonduality of duality and nonduality”; […] — David Loy

My last post was strictly addressing the ontology of this very “nonduality of duality and nonduality” which, as expressed in English, and as processed through Western filters of philosophical concepts, to my ear can only present an at best incomprehensibility of meaning (and, at worst, utter BS).

What I’m suggesting via English expression which utilizes Western philosophical concepts and reasoning is that, where a non-dualistic ontology to be real, it would then necessarily consist of a duality (rather than of a "nonduality", this as expressed in the quote above) between an ultimately real essence of being (be this understood as Brahman, as Nirvana, or via a different terminology/concept) and the ultimately illusory essence of phenomenal being ... which partitions, or ratios, the first ultimately real essence of being into parts via, for one example, the production of I-ness (which can only be phenomena-relative).

I gather this affirmation of a necessary duality of fundamental essences within a non-dual reality would be a non-Eastern perspective/expression of non-dualism ontology—and in my limited reading I have never come across non-dualism being expressed via a quite literal duality of fundamental essences, this by those who uphold the given ontology.

That mentioned, what I was fishing for here is any rational criticism of the presented necessity that non-dualism, this regarding the world as it’s known, entails a duality between a) a real (or ultimately real) and non-dual fundamental essence and b) a contingent fundamental essence of phenomena (etc.) which brings about duality in the world and which is ultimately illusory in full.

What is non-dualism ?

Non-dualism represents the absence of a distinction that seperates reality into subject-object, appearance-thing in itself, becoming-being, nothingness-somethingness, necessity-contingency etc. In short, binary distinctions created by our langauges and thoughts dissappear.

Who are we from the non-dual perspective ?

Brahman, who is pure consciousness. — Sirius

I'm wanting to explore a technicality and see how, or if, it resonates. (FYI, this correlates with parts of something I'm currently working on.)

In any such non-dualistic ontology, there is a subtlety to reality when philosophically addressed: In the world as is, because there are dualities we as conscious beings are aware of - to include that between any I-ness / ego and what is relative to it other - there will then necessarily occur a duality between a) the non-duality which is real (else, the ultimate reality) and which is in the OP termed Brahman and b) (what in the same sense of ultimate reality would be) illusions of duality, hence illusions of separateness, of a subject-object dichotomy, and so forth (what in Hinduism is specified as Maya). In ultimate reality, this being what is real from the vantage of Brahman, then all I-ness is an aspect of Maya. Yet in what might be termed mundane, or profane, reality, the occurrence of I-ness as other than that which it is not is about as stable a concrete fact as they come.

Point being, in any non-dualistic ontology, there is an almost but not quite paradox: there necessarily occurs a duality between two fundamental essences (so termed to avoid all connotations associated with the term "substance"): one ultimately real - here, the Brahman, aka pure consciousness per se - and one ultimately illusory: all that is not the Brahman, to include both the mind and matter which consciousness apprehends, or witnesses, and is constrained by.

Such an ontology, by my current reckoning, could then be properly classified either as a) a form of idealism, for all that occurs, both pure consciousness and all that it is conscious of (this being both mind and matter), can here be deemed psychical in nature or, else, as b) a form of neutral monism, for here both mind and matter equally pertain to that fundamental essence which is non-Brahman, thereby posing no ontological dualism between apprehended mind and apprehended matter but, instead, only a property dualism of the very same essence (which, again, would in a non-dualistic ontology be ultimately illusory in whole ... although nevertheless quite real in a mundane sense of what is real); an illusory essence of both mind and matter which, as essence, is itself dependent on the non-illusory essence, hence, in the OP's terminology, on the Brahman.

To summarize, unless I'm getting something wrong here, any non-dualistic ontology regarding the world as is will then necessarily consist of a duality between two fundamental essences: one ultimately real and non-dualistic that is neither mind nor matter but the pure consciousness aware of both, and one ultimately illusory that is itself via different properties both mental stuff (thoughts, ideas, imaginings, etc) and material stuff (physicality).

To be even more laconic about things: a non-dualistic ontology, in order to be valid within the world as it is currently known, can only consist of a duality of fundamental essences: one real, and one illusory.

It seems that for AGI to join us, not only does it require some form of "reiterative automaticity" - that is to say, to spontaneously rewrite, live/in the present moment, its own predictive algorithms independent of us, but that such algorithms must be further compressed until they no longer require googols of data but the same or less data than a typical human in order to reason. — Benj96

Seems reasonable.

The second thing is how do we give it both "an objective" but also "free auto-self-augementation" in order to reason. — Benj96

The “free auto-self-augmentation” to me so far translates into a literal free will to pursue closer proximity to whatever objective it, the AGI, might choose to progress toward. So, AGIs would then need to be programed with different objectives, i.e. goals to actualize, which the AGI would then be metaphysically free to choose among—this in terms of which objective to attempt to actualize and, thereby, which heuristics pertaining to itself to augment in its attempts.

That said, we as a humanity still don’t agree on whether free will is a real possibility.

Yet, given that I uphold the reality of freely willed choices, while AGI gaining a free will capacity is to me not impossibility, how an AGI might be made into a freely willing agency that can thereby autonomously choose between objectives is, to at least me, currently incomprehensible. And if there were to be no free will, then I don’t get how a “free auto-self-augmentation” in AI can ever be implemented. In this case, the AGI’s choices would all be fully predetermined by the developed programing.

And curiously, could that be the difference between something that feels/experiences and something that is lifeless, programmed and instructed? — Benj96

I take this to be the general case (here granting different magnitudes of free will capacity; e.g., an adult chimp’s capacity of free will being far less than that of the average adult human’s).

p.s., While I don't mean to turn the thread into yet another discussion regarding the possibility of free will, I honestly don't find any other way of frankly addressing the issue in the OP.

My question came about because of the use of the word 'confidence', which I had laid out in a different context earlier, as an alternative to faith. — Tom Storm

Sorry. I missed that connection.

The only time I use the word faith in conversation is to describe someone's religious views. — Tom Storm

OK, but, as you well know, you are not the only English user of that word. Other people do use it in wider contexts than just the religious, even if you might consider such usage “inaccurate”.

I try to avoid using this word to describe quotidian matters. — Tom Storm

I don't know. Religious matters can well be quotidian (i.e., commonplace and everyday) in certain populaces, which seems to fully sidestep the distinction you're trying to make. For instance:

Especially in relation to all the radical relativism discussions that have been going about, that 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 is upheld by some as sometimes being valid and true—everyday/commonplace and so quotidian though this issue of the Trinity might be for many—seems nevertheless significant to this discussion regarding types of faith. Namely, is the presented summation valid and true on account of it being socially constructed by those who have faith in its so being—this as radical relativism would have it—thereby making this arithmetic justifiable? Or would this be an article of religious faith that is reason-impervious regarding matters of fact and thereby wrongheaded—quotidian though it is in most aspects of western cultures?

So faith is absolute confidence? But confidence need not be absolute? — TiredThinker

How did you arrive at that? Isn't faith certainty? — Tom Storm

If @TiredThinker had something else in mind, he can of course provide a different answer. For my part, though:

Certainty comes in different degrees of strength—e.g., from being fairly certain to being extremely certain—and so it need not be absolute, by which I here understand “unshakable” and “complete”.

Faith, however, is unshakable and complete, and so it is more than mere psychological certainty. It is unshakable psychological certainty. Via the dichotomy I’ve just expressed in my last post, this either because one’s logically consistent justifications upon which one’s faith rests do not warrant one’s questioning one’s own faith, or, otherwise, because one is dogmatic about one’s faith in manners impervious to any reasoning evidencing it erroneous.

As an example of the first, I personally have full-fledged faith that solipsism is false precisely because this a) is an unshakable belief/certainty which I hold despite not having any infallible proof for it and b) because it is fully in-line with the body of all justified beliefs which I hold such that no contradictions unfold by my holding this unshakable belief/certainty. Here, the stated faith remains for me unshakable until the time contradictions in my holding this faith arise.

As an example of the second, were someone to have faith that the pink elephant they saw in their own house when they were drunk actually exists (rather than being a figment of their imagination) despite all reasoned arguments to the contrary (e.g., the house doorways needing to be damaged were an elephant to walk through the house from room to room), then this would be one example of a logic-impervious unshakable belief/certainty. Here, this faith remains unshakable regardless of the contradictions that might or else do arise.

But both will be faith in that they are unshakable and complete certainties regarding facts for which no proof exists.

So faith is absolute confidence? But confidence need not be absolute?

I understand confidence in plausible things happening, but religion asks people to have confidence in things that quite possibly never happened before. — TiredThinker

Here's what will likely be a controversial post for many regarding the issue of faith.

All which follows will assume that “faith” is here interpreted to signify “one’s firm, or else complete, belief in something for which one has no proof”:

To my mind there is first and foremost an umbrella dichotomy between these two types of faith: a) faith in that which directly contradicts the basic logical reasoning which one otherwise upholds and a) faith in that which doesn’t do this.

An example of (a): in certain cases, 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 is valid and true, i.e. conforms to that which is real (this being the typical interpretation of the Christian Trinity)

Firm belief in a plethora of common sense tenets for which there is no proof will be a vivid example of the second type of faith: from faith that what we experience as time and change is not fully illusory, to faith that the sun will once again rise tomorrow (rather than the planet being destroyed by a meteor or an alien laser beam in the meantime), to faith in what is technically termed free will and the praise and blame this allows for, to faith that everyone else is not a p-zombie, to faith that the goodness which humanity has so far imperfectly exhibited with not all go down the drain in the blink of an eye, and so on and so forth (examples could get far more outrageous in terms of things which typical common sense denounces but for which one holds no proof of so being erroneous).

For a good number of people, questioning (b) type faith will be just as reflexively taboo as questioning (a) type faith.

Also, those who proclaim to not live their lives via any faith whatsoever—this as faith is defined above—will, for example, either not hold firm belief in others not being p-zombies (this being commonly considered a sigh of less than optimal mental health) or, otherwise, will profess to hold proof that others are not p-zombies (this being bullshit, or else the proof could be readily shared with all others upon request).

Going by the just expressed, all sane people will to some extent live their lives via faith (irrespective of whether it is consciously recognized or else strictly unconsciously maintained), faith which is often enough required to engage in life-sustaining actions and reactions. The principal difference, again, being that some live their lives by reason supported, and thereby justifiable, faith (this being faith-type (b)) while others will uphold their faith in manners contradicted by the very reasoning they otherwise support (this being faith-type (a)).

Though a controversial stipulation for some, to my mind, none of this should be in any way surprising to any fallibilist out there. (For one thing, in honest fallibilism, there is no definitive proof for anything, for nothing epistemological is infallible. But this does not preclude firm, or else complete, belief in fallible conclusions—conclusion for which there thereby is no proof—this just in case these conclusions are consistently justified by reasoning such that they cohere into one’s total body of justifications without any contradictions.)

Quantity only exists in Nature because we displace Nature with quantity, etc. Think of quantity without reference to any form of representation, but on its own, in its allegedly pure and essential form as it supposedly inhabits Reality. You can't, that's absurd, right? The very thinking utilizes representations. Then why do we shy away from acknowledging that our uniquely human Conscious experiences are structured by representations and as such, they are not ultimately Real? — ENOAH

I should start with the observation that we don't share the same ontological models of reality. That mentioned, I think of it this way when I put my ontological/metaphysical cap on:

If there happens to be two or more coexistent psyches, then quantity necessarily is existentially in the cosmos in an objective manner: for here there factually co-occur a plurality of psyches (if absolutely nothing else). If, on the other hand, there is no quantity in reality, then this will entail the fact that there is no plurality of coexistent psyches: with this directly resulting in solipsism - wherein the one solipsist by unexplained means "fictionalizes" everything, quantity very much included. I in no way uphold the possibility of solipsism - though I'm not here to argue this out. Because I don't, I then conclude that it is logically impossible for quantity to be illusory, or fictional - again, this because at the bare minimum a plurality of psyches co-occur.

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I'll also add that, as I so far interpret them at least, representations are such precisely because they re-present that which is present. Without that which is present, no representations could obtain.

Getting back to the thread's topic, our representations of present quantities might well be deemed mental constructs, but the quantities themselves (which our representations re-present) are not (unless one starts entertaining notions such as that of objective idealism wherein everything is mind stuff, but even here quantity would yet be a staple aspect of the universal effete mind ... which is not the fully localized and active minds that you and I are, individual active minds which represent portions of this same universal effete mind which all coexistent active minds share).

How many gods, or deities are there on the head of a pin. — Punshhh

My late night answer: This will in large part depend on whether these incorporeal beings are zero dimensional; and to a far lesser extent, on the size of the pin ... of course.

:razz:

If you replaced the word math, with symbols, or representations, would the above also hold true for you? — ENOAH

As I tried to explain, to my thinking quantity can only be represented via math - such that at the very least rudimentary math is a representation of quantity (I should add, and its relations). Because of this, my answer will be "yes".

But more questions follow: "is math only in us? If so, where does it come from? What causes it?"

I guess this would probably depend on your views on perception. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Hmm, I find the issue more intimately entwined with whether or not quantity in fact occurs within the cosmos. I find the stipulation that it does not hard to even fathom, much less entertain. But if quantity does occur within the cosmos, then the means of addressing this quantity in the cosmos is, and can only be, what we term maths. Maths is a language with quantity as its referent. No quantity, no maths.

It is only when we humans get into axiomatized maths that maths can be deemed to become fully relative to the axioms we humans concoct.

No lesser animal has a clue about axiomatized maths, but some lesser animals can and do engage in rudimentary maths just fine; again, with quantity as their referent.

Hence, to my mind, the only way of appraising all maths as strictly within us and thus as having nothing to do with the quote unquote "real world" is by appraising the "real world" to be fully devoid of quantity.

While writing this post I was touching my body in order to stimulate — not in a weird way — thoughts about the topic. — Lionino

:grin: Yes, OK. Understandable.

BTW. not that I’m saying this is what you were getting at but, I had a hunch this topic might inadvertently awaken thoughts of touching oneself in sexually sensual manners for some out there … just want to mention that, in itself, there’s nothing weird about it :razz: … it’s been evidenced healthy even.

Let's say our mind is indeed immaterial, being immaterial, it does not extend in space, so we can metaphorically say it has 0 dimensions. As soon as we reflect upon the experience of touch, it seems that experience is spatially extended. Being experience an attribute of the substance we call mind, it would be reasonable to conclude the initial assumption is wrong, and that the mind does extend in space (even if it is still immaterial perhaps). — Lionino

As to mind and perception, I find myself agreeing with the latter sentence. You’re focusing on physiological perceptions via the physiological senses; still, the same issue of spatial extensions will also be found in imaginations which incorporate imagined senses of perception: imagined sights via the mind’s eyes, imagined sounds via the mind’s ears, imagined tactile feels via the mind’s skin, if not all other senses as well. I get that not everyone can easily imagine things, but some are quite apt at it. All these imaginings will require spatial distances of delimitation to that which is being imagined. And since imaginings are purely mental, this then points to mind necessarily being extensional when in any way engaging in, at the very least, willful imaginings.

So, from where I stand, yes, the Cartesian notion of res cogitans can often be, if it is not always also, res extensa. This to my mind makes the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter fruitless, to say the least.

That addressed, I would however express that I nevertheless find it reasonable to affirm that consciousness (the first-person point of awareness which we all are and which apprehends givens: understandings, concepts, physiological percepts, and imaginings, among other things) could be of itself construed as zero-dimensional. This though the mind (of which it is consciously aware of and also those portions which remain unconscious relative to itself) by which consciousness can be said to be enveloped can at times be extensional, if not always so being.

So if an argument is to be made for 0D, I so far don't find it possible that it is the mind which is 0D (the mind again consisting of things such as percepts, concepts, etc.; in short, of cogitations one is aware of) but I do find it possible to interpret the consciousness/awareness which is aware of both its own mind/cogitations and of the external world as being, of itself, zero dimensional.

It can be upheld that whereas passions in themselves always addressed ends (passions always being in some way wants and that wanted being the end pursued - javra

I am not sure about this. The "passions" are generally associated with emotion, and I am not sure these always have "ends". Consider being depressed or angry; is there necessarily an "end" here? Oftentimes the passions seem so problematic precisely because we cannot identify ends that would relieve/gratify them. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here evidencing that this is always true would be difficult at best. So I wont engage in such arguments. That said, it is however not impossible or inconsistent that all passions, or emotions, are contingent on agencies of mind such that some of these passions are unconsciously produced by unconscious agencies of mind; this so that these either consciously or unconsciously produced emotions are all intentional, hence purposive, and hence goal oriented—this even if one is not consciously aware of their particular goals. As with most other emotions, both depression (though I’m not clear if depression qualifies as an emotion) and anger are broad and imprecisely defined umbrella terms for a wide enough range of possible experiences. Here speculatively addressed, some depressions might be one’s unconsciousness’s way of telling one that there is something fundamentally wrong with the way one is operating, such that their possible aim is a fundamental change in one's modus operandi. On the other hand, some forms of anger which consist of animosity and an urge to harm will then hold as their aim the intent that that which one holds animosity toward is to be harmed. But I grant these presented possibilities in no way evidences the goals here speculated upon, much less that it is always true that passions are goal-oriented.

[reason] will always strictly be a means toward the ends pursued—including potentially those ends of discerning what is true - javra

Again, I am not sure if this is always true. Is intuiting or understanding something we have not set out to understand an end or desire? It seems like understanding and knowledge sometimes come upon us "out of the blue," not as the end of some process, and yet these seem bound up in reason. — Count Timothy von Icarus

These too (intuitions and eureka understandings) can be suggested to be resultant from unconscious agencies of mind—which, again, would here unconsciously reason so as to optimally arrive at the goals unconsciously pursued. But again, arguing that this is the case is a difficult challenge, and so I will not here engage in it.

That the desire for what is truly good and true is different from the desire for other ends is precisely Plato's point. No other desire is capable of shaping the other desires in the same way. No other end might be seen as "the end of ends." The distinction is a key point for our anthropology. Are all things with ends the same "sort of thing," or is this a bad way to classify them? I would tend to agree with the latter. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I fully agree with this statement and that not all desires are of the same kind. I would go so far as to express that some subordinate desires are wrong/incorrect in that they are unable to satisfy one’s predominant desire(s) or else right/correct in that they are so able to satisfy. That, in Platonic terms, wrong desires (given their context, etc.) prevent one from approaching the Good whereas right desires (given their context, etc.) facilitate one’s approaching the Good. And that it is only via reasoning one can thereby differentiate between good and bad desires.

But I do have difficulties with this:

So, the desires of reason don't seem to be "just another desire" that persons have, but rather key to the definition of persons, making it play an entirely different role in philosophical anthropology. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Did you by the bolded text intend “desires for reason”? If not, what do you intend by saying that reason per se holds its own desires (i.e., the desires of reason)? I ask because this is so far unintelligible to me: to me it so far seems to entail that reasoning per se holds its own agency of being ... such that, for one example, reasoning can choose between the desires it holds.